Morgan v. Rohr, Inc. et al, No. 3:2020cv00574 - Document 186 (S.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Reports Prepared by Teresa Fulimeni and Preclude Testimony (ECF No. 161 ). Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 7/24/23. (jmo)
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Morgan v. Rohr, Inc. et al Doc. 186 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 NATHANIEL MORGAN, an individual; MICHAEL BEVAN, an individual; individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORTS PREPARED BY TERESA FULIMENI AND PRECLUDE TESTIMONY Plaintiffs, 14 15 v. 16 18 ROHR, INC., a corporation; HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND, d/b/a COLLINS AEROSPACE; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, 19 Defendants. 17 Case No.: 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG [ECF No. 161] 20 21 Pending before the Court is Defendants Rohr, Inc.; Hamilton Sundstrand 22 Corporation; and United Technologies Corporation’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion 23 to Strike Expert Reports prepared by Teresa Fulimeni and Preclude Testimony. ECF No. 24 161. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, (ECF No. 161), and Defendants filed a Reply, (ECF 25 No. 180). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 26 27 28 1 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs brought this class action to recover unpaid compensation resulting from 3 Defendants’ allegedly improper payroll practices and policies. On April 12, 2022, 4 Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard issued a scheduling order, which provided a 5 November 28, 2022 deadline for initial expert disclosures and a December 19, 2022 6 deadline for rebuttal/supplemental expert disclosures. ECF No. 115 at 3.1 7 On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs served Fulimeni’s initial report. ECF No. 161-2, 8 Exh. 1 (initial report). Defendants state this report “contained zero analysis” and simply 9 discussed “plans to conduct an analysis at a later time.” ECF No. 161-1 at 9 (emphasis in 10 original). On November 29, 2022, Magistrate Judge Goddard sua sponte continued the 11 initial expert report deadline to December 16, 2022 and the rebuttal/supplemental expert 12 report deadline to January 13, 2022. See ECF No. 130 at 5-6. Judge Goddard further 13 continued the rebuttal/supplemental expert deadline to January 27, 2023. ECF No. 136 at 14 3. 15 Prior to service of the initial report, the Parties agreed that Defendants would 16 produce time and pay records for all class members, minus those who opted out, within 17 two weeks of the conclusion of class notice. ECF No. 161-1 at 9; ECF No. 161-2 at 2 18 (Rusche Decl.). On October 28, 2022, the claims administrator mailed the notice to class 19 members. Id. On December 28, 2022, the administrator provided Plaintiffs with the 20 names and contact information of class members who did not opt out. ECF No. 161-1 at 21 10. Fourteen days later, on January 11, 2023, Defendants produced the relevant time and 22 pay records. Id. On January 17, 2023, Plaintiffs informed Defendants that Fulimeni 23 needed additional time to analyze the data produced. Id.; see also Rusche Decl. ¶ 12; ECF 24 No. 161-2 at 352. Judge Goddard subsequently extended the rebuttal/supplementary 25 26 1 27 28 Page citations refer to CM/ECF pagination. 2 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 deadline to February 21, 2023. ECF No. 139. Fulimeni filed her second report on 2 February 21, 2023 (the “Second Report”). ECF No. 161-2, Exh. 2. 3 On March 6, 2023, Fulimeni produced documents in response to a subpoena. ECF 4 No. 161-1 at 10. Included in this was an undisclosed report dated February 24, 2023. Id. 5 at 10-11. Defendants allege this report “was intended to revise and replace [Fulimeni’s] 6 Second Report,” but “was never disclosed to Defendants, except through subpoena.” Id. 7 Plaintiffs state this draft is irrelevant and that Fulimeni prepared the report to prepare for 8 her deposition. ECF No. 171 at 19. 9 On March 13, 2023, Plaintiffs produced Fulimeni’s third report (the “Third 10 Report”). ECF No. 161-2, Exh. 3. Defendants argue that the Third Report “contained new 11 opinions and analysis as well as a new damages calculation, none of which was included 12 in the Initial Report or even the Second Report.” ECF No. 161-1 at 11. Plaintiffs respond 13 that the Third Report contained new analysis that was previously excluded as the result of 14 “error.” Id. 15 Following the production of her Third Report, Fulimeni was deposed by 16 Defendants on April 25, 2023. ECF No. 161-1 at 12. Because the court reporter arrived 17 late, Defendants state the deposition was not complete. Id. Defendants were not able to 18 secure a date to complete the deposition until after May 1, 2023, which they state was too 19 late to incorporate any of Fulimeni’s testimony into their pre-trial briefs. Id. 20 Defendants now move to strike Fulimeni’s Second Report, Third Report, and 21 Fulimeni’s opinions and testimony. See ECF No. 161-1 at 7. Defendants argue that (1) 22 Fulimeni’s Second Report was produced after the November 28, 2022 expert disclosure 23 deadline and was mislabeled as a “supplemental” report, or, in the alternative, that 24 Fulimeni’s Third Report replaced the Second Report; (2) Fulimeni’s Third Report was 25 produced three weeks after the supplemental/rebuttal report deadline and improperly 26 provided new opinions; (3) Fulimeni’s reports do not offer expert opinion because they 27 28 3 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 only involve basic arithmetic; and (4) many of Fulimeni’s calculations are based on 2 “dubious assumptions” and “cherry-picked data.” ECF No. 161-1 at 7-8. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(a)(2)(D) states that a party must 5 disclose expert testimony “at the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). Failure to comply with a court deadline may lead to sanctions 7 pursuant to Rule 37(b). See Tamburri v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 2013 WL 3152921, at *1 8 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2013). Further, Rule 26(e) states that a party who has disclosed expert 9 testimony “must supplement or correct” the disclosure in a “timely manner if the party 10 learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response in incomplete or incorrect, 11 and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the 12 other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). If a 13 party fails to disclose expert testimony as required, “the party is not allowed to use that 14 information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the 15 failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 16 17 18 DISCUSSION I. The Second Report Defendants argue the Second Report should be excluded for two reasons: (1) it was 19 produced after the November 28, 2022 expert disclosure deadline and is not accurately 20 classified as a supplemental report; and (2) regardless of whether the former is true, 21 Fulimeni’s Third Report replaced the Second Report. ECF No. 161-1 at 7. Plaintiffs 22 respond that the Second Report is a proper supplemental report because Defendants did 23 not produce the full class data until January 11, 2023, and therefore, it would have been 24 futile for Plaintiffs to produce a report with Fulimeni’s analysis prior to this date. ECF 25 No. 171 at 14. 26 27 28 4 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 Prior to class certification, Defendants produced “a random 15% sampling of time 2 and pay data for the entire putative class for purposes of pre-certification discovery, with 3 the remaining class member data to be produced if and when the class was certified.” 4 ECF No. 171 at 8 (citing to Wells Decl. ¶ 5). The pre-certification records, among other 5 deficiencies, did not indicate whether employees were union or non-union (non-union 6 employees are not included in the classes that were ultimately certified). Id. Upon class 7 certification, the Parties filed a Joint Proposed Notice Plan, which was approved on 8 October 18, 2022. See ECF No. 120, 125. The Parties agreed that Defendants would 9 produce time and pay records for all remaining class members within two weeks of the 10 conclusion of the notice process. ECF No. 161-1 at 9. This did not occur until January 11, 11 2023. See ECF No. 136. 12 On January 27, 2023, Magistrate Judge Goddard granted a Joint Motion to 13 continue the supplemental disclosure deadline to February 21, 2023. ECF No. 139 at 2. 14 This extension was, in part, because “Fulimeni need[ed] additional time to review 15 Defendants’ most recent production of class data to incorporate the data into a report.” Id. 16 On February 21, 2023, Plaintiffs timely produced the Second Report. 17 The issue Defendants raise now is whether the Second Report is accurately 18 classified as a “supplemental” report. The Court finds that it is. “Supplementation” under 19 Rule 26(e) “‘means correcting inaccuracies, or filling the interstices of an incomplete 20 report based on information that was not available at the time of the initial disclosure.’” 21 Luke v. Family Care and Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 Fed. Appx. 496, 500 (9th Cir. 2009) 22 (quoting Keener v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 639, 650 (D. Mont. 1998)). A report or 23 declaration that, for example, asserts a new legal theory or presents new opinions is not 24 supplemental. See id. However, it is important for a court to determine whether the 25 relevant information was available at the time of the initial disclosure deadline. See e.g., 26 27 28 5 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 O’Connor v. Boeing North Am., Inc., 2005 WL 6035243, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2 2005). 3 Here, it is not disputed that Defendants did not produce the complete class data 4 until January 11, 2023. Thus, the data relied upon in the Second Report was not available 5 at the time of the initial disclosure deadline. However, Defendants argue that the 6 Plaintiffs should have either (1) analyzed the 15% sample of class data that had been 7 provided pre-certification; or (2) asked for an extension on the initial disclosure deadline. 8 ECF No. 180 at 7-8. 9 The Court finds that Plaintiffs were not required to analyze the random 15% data 10 sampling. Prior to class certification and the conclusion of the opt-out period, the data 11 was irrelevant at best and potentially misleading at worst. Rather than analyze the 12 sampling, Plaintiffs’ initial report provided a “general description of the approach 13 [Fulimeni] intend[ed] to take to provide a statistically valid estimate of class member 14 behavior with respect to meal periods, rest periods, wage statements, time worked, and 15 other issues relevant to plaintiffs’ claims.” ECF No. 161-2 at 7. For example, the initial 16 report states that “[o]nce we receive the time and payroll data, we can evaluate the length 17 and timing of meal periods, to determine meal periods that are short, late, or missing.” 18 ECF No. 161-2 at 9. 19 The Second Report, produced after Fulimeni had the opportunity to review class 20 data, applies the methodology discussed in the initial report and drew conclusions based 21 on this data. Although Plaintiffs’ Second Report includes “new opinions,” the Court finds 22 that Plaintiffs could not reasonably have produced a relevant expert opinion prior to 23 Defendants’ disclosure of the full set of class data. Thus, the Court should not penalize 24 Plaintiffs for any lack of analysis in the initial report. 25 26 27 28 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs should have requested an extension of the deadline for initial expert disclosures. However, as discussed above, the Court sees 6 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 Fulimen’s Second Report as a proper supplemental report, and therefore it was not 2 necessary for the Plaintiffs to extend the initial disclosure deadline. The initial report 3 provided enough notice of the analysis Fulimeni would perform once she was in 4 possession of the full class data. 5 However, Fulimeni’s Third Report states that it replaced her Second Report. See 6 ECF No. 161-2 at 61 (“This report replaces my previous report dated February 21, 7 2023.”). Thus, the Court excludes Fulimeni’s Second Report on the grounds that the 8 Third Report supersedes it.2 9 II. 10 The Third Report Plaintiffs’ counsel states that after producing the Second Report, they discovered 11 the Second Report “was incomplete and that a further supplemental report would be 12 required.” ECF No. 171 at 11. Plaintiffs state they notified Defense counsel on March 6, 13 2023 that they would provide an updated report. See ECF No. 171 at 11; Exh. H. As a 14 result, Fulimeni’s March 7, 2023 deposition was cancelled. Id. On March 10, 2023, the 15 Court granted a Joint Motion allowing Fulimeni to be deposed after the discovery cutoff. 16 ECF No. 152. Fulimeni was eventually deposed on April 25, 2023; however, because the 17 court reporter did not arrive at the noticed start time, Fulimeni’s deposition lasted just 5.5 18 hours. ECF No. 161-2 at 4-5 (Rusche Decl.). The Parties attempted to secure another date 19 to complete Fulimeni’s deposition, but a date before May 1, 2023 was not available, and 20 Defendants say this was “far too late to incorporate the testimony into Defendants’ pre- 21 trial briefs before the May 4 filing deadline.” ECF No. 161-2 at 5. Plaintiffs state Defense 22 counsel did not propose alternative times or “attempt to confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 The February 24, 2023 draft report Fulimeni produced in response to a subpoena is excluded for the same reason. 7 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 about any pre-trial deadlines or any purported prejudice that they believed Defendants 2 would suffer due to the inability to resume Fulimeni’s deposition.” ECF No. 171 at 12. 3 An untimely supplemental report is not necessarily inadmissible. Rule 37(c)(1) 4 states that an untimely expert report may be admitted if “the failure was substantially 5 justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). To determine harmlessness, a court can 6 consider: (1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) 7 the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; 8 and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard 9 Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing David v. 10 Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2003)). Because there is a preference for 11 deciding cases on the merits, “a party receiving a late or incomplete designation should 12 not receive the ultimate sanction of dismissal, or a sanction tantamount to such, unless the 13 receiving party is substantially prejudiced . . . .” 3 Johnson v. Sacramento Cnty., 2007 WL 14 127799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007). 15 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ untimely disclosure of Fulimeni’s Third Report is 16 substantially justified and harmless. Under Rule 26(e), a party must “supplement or 17 correct its disclosure or response in a timely manner if the party learns that in some 18 material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. 19 P. 26(e)(1)(A). Here, the redline version of Fulimeni’s Third Report makes clear that 20 Fulimeni’s Third Report was intended, in part, to correct inaccuracies in the Second 21 Report. See e.g., ECF No. 161-2 at 143-160. Further, Fulimeni’s Third Report includes 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiffs’ Opposition incorrectly attributes this quote Shore v. Brown, 2009 WL 3273263 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009). This quotation actually is from Johnson v. Sacramento Cnty., 2007 WL 127799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007). Defendants’ Reply notes this discrepancy. See ECF No. 180 at 12 (“[Plaintiffs] invent a quote that does not actually appear in Shore.”). 8 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 analysis related to meal period damages and wage statement penalties. See id. at 152-154, 2 158-159. This information was omitted from the Second Report, and thus is intended to 3 correct the previously incomplete expert report. 4 In addition, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ delay is harmless and agrees with Plaintiffs 5 that any prejudice to the Defendants was minimal, or at the very least could have been 6 mitigated with additional diligence on behalf of Defendants. No trial date has been set, 7 and, once aware of the need to correct the Second Report, Plaintiffs promptly contacted 8 Defendants. ECF No. 171 at 21-22. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel stipulated to allow 9 Fulimeni to be deposed after the expert discovery deadline, and the Third Report was 10 disclosed on March 13, 2023, which was nearly two months prior to the pre-trial motion 11 filing deadline. Id. at 22. Defendants had sufficient time to request an extension to file a 12 rebuttal report and/or extend the pre-trial filing deadline, yet they did not do so. 13 Defendants cannot now claim substantial prejudice. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 14 Defendants’ request to strike Fulimeni’s Third Report.4 15 III. 16 Whether the Reports are Properly the Subject of Expert Testimony The Court finds Defendants’ argument that Fulimeni’s reports are not the proper 17 subject of expert testimony without merit. The Court does not agree that Fulimeni’s 18 reports “consists of little more than basic math.” ECF No. 161-1 at 24. Plaintiffs state that 19 Fulimeni’s Third Report “analyze[d] time punch data consisting of 1,398,606 recorded 20 shifts for more than 1,600 employees.” ECF No. 171 at 24. To accurately and efficiently 21 analyze such quantity of data, Fulimeni was required to write and employ “computer 22 code using a statistical computing software called ‘R.’” Id. 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Defendants have not filed a motion requesting the opportunity to file a rebuttal report to Fulimeni’s Third Report. The Court would be inclined to grant such a request, should it be made. 9 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 The Court agrees that it is unreasonable to expect a lay person to analyze this 2 substantial amount of data, regardless of whether Fulimeni’s report states that she “was 3 asked to count the number of pay periods from 3/27/2018 to 3/27/2022 where hours were 4 listed in the pay data using earnings codes other than the codes corresponding to regular, 5 overtime and double time.” ECF No. 161-2 at 69 (emphasis added). Defendants rely 6 heavily on the word “count,” however, this ignores the reality that Fulimeni did not 7 simply sift through the nearly 1.4 million shifts logged by Defendants’ employees. 8 Fulimeni’s analysis was not a “[s]traightforward application of grade-school arithmetic to 9 uncomplicated numbers” and “well within the ken of the average juror.” Waymo LLC v. 10 Uber Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 5148390, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2017). Accordingly, the 11 Court finds Fulimeni’s report is the proper subject of expert testimony. 12 13 IV. Whether Fulimeni Relied on “Dubious Assumptions” Defendants next argue that Fulimeni’s report is grounded in “baseless 14 assumptions.” ECF No. 161-1 at 26. Specifically, Defendants discuss six assumptions 15 they believe unfairly form the bases of her analysis. See ECF No. 161-1 at 26-27. The 16 Court finds most of these without merit; however, Defendants argue that Fulimeni’s 17 analysis assumes that every auto-deducted meal period, or 1,026,222 meal periods, never 18 happened and instead the employees worked the 30 million minutes covering those meal 19 periods. ECF No. 161-1 at 26. Plaintiffs respond that in her testimony, Fulimeni stated 20 that her analysis simply identified how many auto-deducted meal periods occurred and 21 does not purport to make findings on whether those meal periods were actually taken as 22 required by law. See ECF No. 171 at 26-27. 23 However, Fulimeni’s Third Report explicitly states that Fulimeni was asked to 24 consider the auto-deducted meal periods as time worked. See ECF No. 161-2 at 64. An 25 expert’s opinion must be based on sufficiently reliable facts and data. See Stephens v. 26 Union Pac. R.R. Co., 935 F.3d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2019). “A party’s own speculation is 27 28 10 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Id. at 856. Plaintiffs have not 2 shown that the assumption that every auto-deducted meal period did not occur is based in 3 “sufficiently reliable facts and data.” Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the portions of 4 Fulimeni’s Third Report that purports to make findings relying on the assumption that 5 every auto-deducted meal period was actually time worked by the employees. Plaintiffs 6 shall file a new version of Fulimeni’s Third Report with these portions omitted on or 7 before July 31, 2023. 8 However, the Court finds Defendants’ other objections without merit. Defendants 9 argue that Fulimeni assumes that all employees that cut their meal breaks short or took 10 their meal breaks late, or not at all, did so at Defendants’ direction rather than their own 11 choice. ECF No. 161-1 at 26-27. Fulimeni’s deposition clearly shows that her findings 12 did not intend to make a showing about employee choice; she simply analyzed the data. 13 See ECF No. 171 at 27 (citing ECF No. 161-2 at 266 (Fulimeni Dep.)). 14 V. 15 Whether Fulimeni “Cherry-Picked” Data Last, Defendants argue that Fulimeni “impermissibly cherry pick[ed] data.” ECF 16 No. 161-1 at 27. They provide three examples: (1) she counted any break where an 17 employee punched in and out for just a minute or two as an unlawful meal break rather 18 than a data error or something innocuous; (2) she determined that shifts greater than 20 19 hours should not be included in her analysis; and (3) she decided to count as two shifts 20 any time records showing a four hour gap between out and in punches. ECF No. 161-1 at 21 28. 22 The Court finds that Defendants’ objections “go to the weight of the testimony and 23 its credibility, not its admissibility.” Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 24 738 F.3d 960, 970 (9th Cir. 2013). A district court’s job is not to determine whether “the 25 expert is right or wrong,” but rather to determine if the testimony would be useful to a 26 jury. Id. at 969. Here, Fulimeni’s testimony would be useful to a jury and should not be 27 28 11 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG 1 excluded on the grounds that Fulimeni “cherry-picked” data. If the case were to proceed 2 to trial, Defense counsel would likely be permitted to call Fulimeni’s testimony into 3 question based on the arguments put forth in the instant motion. A judge is merely “‘a 4 gatekeeper, not a fact finder,’” and a future jury is free to reject any portion of Fulimeni’s 5 testimony they find not credible. Id. at 970 (quoting Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 568 6 (9th Cir. 2010)). 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons above, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. The Court strikes 9 Fulimeni’s Second Report, because it is superseded by the Third Report. Plaintiffs are 10 ordered to file a new version of Fulimeni’s Third Report without the impermissible 11 assumption regarding auto-deducted meal periods on or before July 31, 2023. 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 24, 2023 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG
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