Chavarria v. United States of America, No. 3:2019cv00431 - Document 13 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 1 § 2255 Motion as to Karla Vanessa Chavarria. Chavarria's § 2255 motion is dismissed with prejudice. The Court accordingly denies a certificate of appealability. The clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Larry Alan Burns on 11/14/2019. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (jdt)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Chavarria v. United States of America Doc. 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KARLA VANESSA CHAVARRIA, Petitioner, 12 14 ORDER DENYING § 2255 MOTION vs. 13 CASE NOS. 19-cv-00431-LAB (LL) 05-cr-01456-LAB UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. [Dkt. No. 107] 15 16 In 2006, a jury convicted Karla Vanessa Chavarria of importation and possession 17 of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Dkt. No. 58. 1 This Court sentenced her to 18 180 months’ imprisonment. Id. Chavarria appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the 19 conviction and remanded to this Court for a new trial, concluding the court prevented a 20 defense witness from testifying in violation of Chavarria’s Sixth Amendment rights. Dkt. 21 No. 74 at 5-7; United States v. Chavarria (Case No. 07-50003). In 2008, a second jury 22 convicted Chavarria, and this Court again sentenced her to 180 months’ imprisonment. 23 Dkt. Nos. 84, 96. Chavarria again appealed, this time unsuccessfully. Dkt. No. 104; 24 United States v. Chavarria (09-50076). Her petition to the United States Supreme Court 25 26 27 1 All docket numbers in this order are from Case No. 05-cr-01456. 28 -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 for writ of certiorari was denied on October 4, 2010. Chavarria v. United States (Case 2 No. 10-6110). 3 Nearly eight years later, on October 2, 2018, Chavarria filed this petition in the 4 Northern District of California where she was confined. 2 Dkt. No. 107. She first sought 5 habeas corpus relief in the Northern District under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 raising three claims. 6 Id. The court in the Northern District determined that Chavarria’s petition would fail under 7 § 2241 and instead should have been brought as a § 2255 motion. Dkt. No. 114. 8 Because only the sentencing court has jurisdiction over a § 2255 motion, on March 5, 9 2019, Chavarria’s petition was transferred to this District (Dkt. Nos. 114-15), but without 10 recharacterizing it as a § 2255 motion. After receiving the petition, this Court proposed 11 to recharacterize the petition as a first motion under § 2255 and provided Chavarria an 12 opportunity to withdraw her filing or amend it so that it contained all the § 2255 claims she 13 believes she has. Dkt. No. 121; see Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003); 14 United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 463-64 (9th Cir. 2000). Chavarria did not 15 withdraw or amend her filing, and the Court now construes this as her consent to the 16 recharacterization. See also Dkt. No. 123. 17 Under § 2255(b), the Court must require the government to respond to the motion, 18 “unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show” that the 19 petitioner is entitled to no relief. The motion, files, and record here make clear that 20 Chavarria is not entitled to relief, therefore the Court need not hold a hearing or require 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 On September 7, 2019, Chavarria submitted a notice of change of address; the new address listed appears to be a private residence and not a federal detention center. Dkt. No. 128. Even if Chavarria is no longer in federal custody, she must still comply with supervised release for a term of five years. Dkt. No. 96. Accordingly, her petition is not moot. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled on other grounds) (finding that release from custody does not moot a habeas petition because there is an irrebuttable presumption that collateral consequences result from any criminal conviction); Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that movant was in “custody” because he was still subject to supervised released). -2- 1 the government to respond to the motion. § 2255(b); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 2 1055, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 I. Statute of Limitations 4 A one-year limitations period applies to § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 5 Chavarria’s criminal conviction became final on October 4, 2010 (see Chavarria v. United 6 States (Case No. 09-50076); Chavarria v. United States (Case No. 10-6110); United 7 States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2001)), therefore the limitations 8 period to file a § 2255 motion expired in October 2011. Chavarria’s petition was filed 9 almost seven years later (Dkt. No. 107) and she has not shown that one of the 10 circumstances in §§ 2255(f)(2)-(4) applies, or that she’s entitled to equitable tolling. 11 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); see Dkt. Nos. 123, 125. Chavarria’s § 2255 12 motion is therefore time-barred and for that reason must be rejected. 13 II. 14 15 Chavarria’s Claims for Relief In addition to her motion’s untimeliness, it’s also without merit. Each of Chavarria’s three claims fails. 16 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 17 Chavarria challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for 18 illegally importing and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. 3 Dkt. 107 19 at 11. Although Chavarria’s claim is not clear, the gist of it seems to be that because the 20 packaging used to transport the methamphetamine had been destroyed by the time of 21 her second trial, there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Id. Chavarria 22 also disputes the genuineness of the packaging, claiming that a witness—purportedly an 23 Agent, though Chavarria does not specify which witness she’s referring to—testified at 24 trial to this effect. Id. A § 2255 proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Brule 25 v. United States, 240 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that the proper remedy for raising 26 27 28 3 Because Chavarria’s first conviction was reversed on appeal, the Court will not address her argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence presented at her first trial. -3- 1 a sufficiency of the evidence claim is on direct appeal); see also United States v. Berry, 2 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s “evidence-based” claim calling “into 3 doubt the overall weight of the evidence against him” was not cognizable under § 2255). 4 Issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, may not properly 5 be brought in a § 2255 motion unless the defendant shows cause and prejudice or actual 6 innocence. See United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2003). Any 7 error Chavarria thinks the Court made relating to the sufficiency of the evidence 8 supporting her conviction should have been raised on direct appeal. By failing to do so, 9 Chavarria defaulted her claim. Id. She has not demonstrated cause and prejudice or 10 provided evidence of actual innocence, so her default is not excused. Id. This claim fails. 11 B. Denial of Competency-Related Continuance 12 Chavarria claims that her counsel failed to diligently pursue a competency-related 13 continuance before sentencing and that this violated her constitutional right to effective 14 assistance of counsel. Dkt. No. 107 at 12. This claim derives from one that Chavarria 15 unsuccessfully raised on appeal after her second conviction. See Dkt. No. 104. On 16 appeal, Chavarria argued that this court abused its discretion by denying her request for 17 time to conduct a competency hearing before sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that 18 there was no abuse of discretion and that there was no evidence in the record that 19 Chavarria was prejudiced. Id. at 4. The Ninth Circuit also held that Chavarria had not 20 diligently pursued a competency-related continuance. Id. 21 Chavarria tries to sidestep the prohibition against relitigating issues already 22 decided on direct appeal by converting her argument into a claim for ineffective 23 assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 24 she must demonstrate: (1) deficient performance—that her counsel’s errors were so 25 serious that he was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to Chavarria by the Sixth 26 Amendment, and, (2) prejudice—that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for her 27 counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. 28 Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 693-94 (1984). -4- “A reasonable probability is a 1 probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. There is a 2 “strong presumption” that criminal defense counsel’s “conduct falls within the wide range 3 of reasonable professional assistance” and review of performance must be “highly 4 deferential.” Id. at 689. 5 Chavarria can’t satisfy either prong. First, she does not explain how her counsel’s 6 performance was deficient. Id. at 687-91 (petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s 7 representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”); Shah v. United 8 States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (mere conclusory allegations are insufficient 9 to make out a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel). Second, she has not shown 10 prejudice. The Ninth Circuit expressly addressed whether Chavarria was prejudiced by 11 the denial of a sentencing continuance and found that there was none. Dkt. No. 104 at 12 4. The law of the case precludes relitigation of this finding. See Stein v. United States, 13 390 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Issues disposed of on a previous direct appeal are 14 not reviewable in a subsequent petition under 2255.”); United States v. Caterino, 29 F.3d 15 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The law of the case doctrine ‘ordinarily precludes a court 16 from re-examining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate 17 court, in the same case.’”) (citing United States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 18 1984)). Relief on the basis of this claim is denied. 19 20 C. Improper Intimidation of a Defense Witness Chavarria claims that the Court improperly intimidated a defense witness in 21 violation of her constitutional right to present a defense. 22 Chavarria’s argument is vague, but apparently relates to an event that occurred during 23 her first trial. See Dkt. Nos. 63-67. Any error in her first trial was corrected by the Ninth 24 Circuit’s reversal of the judgment in that proceeding. See United States v. Chavarria 25 (Case No. 07-50003). Id. This ground for relief also fails. 26 27 28 III. Dkt. No. 107 at 12-13. Conclusion Chavarria’s § 2255 motion is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. She has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to any of her claims, such -5- 1 that reasonable jurists would find the denial of her motion debatable or wrong. The Court 2 accordingly DENIES a certificate of appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 3 484 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The clerk is directed to enter judgment and close 4 this case. 5 6 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 14, 2019 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS Chief United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
