Jones et al v. County of San Diego et al, No. 3:2018cv02729 - Document 16 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 5 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Thomas J. Whelan on 6/7/2019. (jao)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 GAVIN JONES, et al., Case No.: 18-cv-2729 W (LL) Plaintiffs, 14 15 v. 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. 5] Defendants. 17 18 19 20 Defendants County of San Diego, David Jennings and Dennis Leggett move to 21 dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs Gavin 22 Jones and minors W.J. and E.J. oppose. 23 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 24 See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ 25 motion [Doc. 6]. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The following allegations are taken from the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”1), 3 and documents attached to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN” [Doc. 5-2]). 4 Plaintiff Gavin Jones is the father of minor Plaintiffs W.J. and E.J. (FAC ¶¶ 1–3, 5 14.) Defendant Christina Jones is W.J. and E.J.’s mother.2 (Id. ¶¶ 7, 14.) Defendant 6 David Jennings is employed by Defendant County of San Diego’s Health and Human 7 Services Agency (“HHSA”). (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) Defendant Dennis Leggett is Jennings’ 8 supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 26.) 9 In December 2016, Gavin filed for divorce in the San Diego Superior Court. (FAC 10 ¶ 17.) He contends his marriage with Christina began to fall apart in 2013 when Gavin 11 suspected she was unfaithful and addicted to illegal narcotics. (Id. ¶ 16.) Gavin also 12 contends he was disturbed by several incidents of domestic violence by Christina, “at 13 least one of which was reported to law enforcement.” (Id.) Within three weeks of filing for divorce, Gavin sought “temporary custody orders 14 15 because Christina wrongfully withheld the children from him and interfered with 16 visitation.” (FAC ¶ 18.) On the day of the hearing, the parties reached a custody 17 agreement, under which Christina had custody of the children from noon on Saturday 18 until 10 a.m. on Wednesday, and Gavin would have custody for the remainder of the 19 time. (Id.) The agreement was “entered as an interim order of the Court” (the “Custody 20 Order”). (Id.) 21 On Saturday, March 18, 2017, Gavin returned E.J. and W.J. to Christina as 22 required under the Custody Order. (FAC ¶ 19.) At the time, E.J. was 2 years old and 23 W.J. was 3 years old. (Id. ¶ 19.) The next day, Christina called Gavin and told him that a 24 “neighbor had noticed bruising on [E.J.]’s buttocks while changing his diapers.” (Id. ¶ 25 20.) Gavin responded that “the children had been learning to ride a pedal-less bike over 26 27 1 28 2 The First Amended Complaint is attached to the Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] as Exhibit C [Doc. 1-4]. Christina Jones is named as a nominal defendant under Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 376(a). 2 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 the weekend, and that [E.J.] had fallen off the bike.” (Id.) Gavin alleges that as of March 2 2017, he had never physically disciplined the children and he told Christina that if the 3 falling from the pedal-less bike did not cause the bruising, “perhaps the child had 4 sustained an injury while in Christina’s care….” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.) 5 On Monday, March 20, someone contacted Defendant HHSA to report suspected 6 child abuse. (FAC ¶ 22.) The next day, E.J. was examined by Dr. Marilyn Kaufhold at 7 Rady Children’s Chadwick Center to screen for physical abuse. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendant 8 Jennings was present during the examination. (Id.) After the exam, Dr. Kaufhold, 9 Jennings and Christina had a discussion wherein Christina stated: (1) she changed the 10 children’s diapers more than once on the day Gavin returned them and she did not notice 11 any bruises on E.J.; (2) she did not notice E.J.’s bruising until the next day; and (3) she 12 told them Gavin’s explanation for the bruising. (Id. ¶ 24.) Jennings then prepared a 13 “Safety Plan” that was to “go into effect immediately” and remain in place for 30 days. 14 (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) Under the plan, E.J. and W.J. would reside with Christina, who would go 15 to family court to obtain a temporary custody order, and Gavin was limited to only 16 supervised visits with his children. (Id. ¶ 25.) Christina and her mother signed the 17 document. (Id. ¶ 26.) Jennings consulted with Defendant Leggett, who authorized the 18 Safety Plan. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29.) 19 After the meeting, “Jennings called Gavin and informed him of the decision to 20 seize and detain the children in Christina’s care without his consent.” (FAC ¶ 28.) 21 “Jennings instructed Gavin that he was prohibited from picking up the children at the 22 regularly scheduled time on Wednesday, March 22, 2017” and he “ordered that Gavin 23 was not to have any unsupervised contact with the children.” (Id.) 24 On Wednesday, March 22, Gavin met with Jennings, who attempted to convince 25 Gavin to sign the Safety Plan. (FAC ¶ 32.) Gavin refused to sign the document and 26 objected to the interference with his parental rights. (Id.) 27 28 On or about Thursday, March 23, Christina filed an ex parte application with the family court for a temporary custody order. (MTD [Doc. 5] 3:21–22, citing RJN [Doc. 53 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 2] Ex. C.) The next day, Gavin and Christina appeared at the hearing. (FAC ¶ 33.) 2 Christina presented the Safety Plan as evidence of the need for the temporary custody 3 order. (Id.) Based on the Safety Plan’s statement that E.J. “has inflicted bruising to his 4 buttocks & lower back area after returning from the father’s care on 3/18/17,” the court 5 granted Christina’s request for temporary custody and restricted Gavin to supervised 6 visits. (Id. 34.) Approximately 30 days later, the family court reinstated the previous 7 Custody Order and Gavin’s custody over E.J. and W.J. (Id. ¶ 38.) 8 On April 24, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the San Diego Superior Court. 9 On December 3, 2018, Defendant County of San Diego, Jennings and Leggett removed 10 the case to this Court. Before the removal, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint 11 alleging a cause of action against Defendants Jennings and Leggett for violation of 12 Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a 13 cause of action against the County of San Diego under Monell v. Department of Social 14 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Defendants now move to dismiss the lawsuit. 15 16 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 18 relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 19 tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 20 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either 21 for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. 22 Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In ruling on the 23 motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the 24 complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 25 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). 26 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 27 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has 28 interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 4 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 2 (2007). The allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 3 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 4 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 5 Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, but a court is not required 6 to accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable 7 inferences. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State 8 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. 12 Defendants argue this lawsuit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because 13 Plaintiffs’ claims are “based on Social Workers’ conduct that occurred after the family 14 court issued its order” and thus the lawsuit is attempting to attack the family court’s 15 temporary custody order. (MTD [Doc. 5-1] 5:22–25, 6:14–16.) 16 The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district courts from reviewing “the 17 final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 18 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). The doctrine prevents losers in state court litigation from 19 bringing federal cases based on alleged “injuries caused by state-court judgments 20 rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 21 review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 22 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine applies if, 23 24 25 26 27 claims raised in the federal court action are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 5 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 In support of their argument, Defendants cite several federal cases holding the 2 Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the lawsuit. But Defendants cases involved direct 3 challenges to state-court proceedings that bear little resemblance to this case. For 4 example, in Ignacio v. Judges of the United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 5 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006), the pro-se plaintiff’s lawsuit “attempt[ed] to attack 6 collaterally the California superior court determination” suspending his access to his 7 minor son and dividing up marital assets between the plaintiff and his ex-wife. Id. at 8 1162, 1165. In Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, plaintiff filed federal due-process 9 claims aimed at challenging the state-appellate court’s decision denying plaintiff’s 10 attempt to recuse a Court of Appeal Justice from his state case. In contrast to Defendants’ cases, here, Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the 11 12 state-family court proceeding—which ultimately restored Gavin’s custody over E.J. and 13 W.J.—and therefore are not challenging the family court’s determination. Moreover, 14 contrary to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the social worker 15 Defendants’ conduct that occurred before Christina filed her ex parte request for 16 temporary custody. The FAC alleges Jennings’ Safety Plan went into effect immediately, 17 which was two days before Christina initiated the family-court proceeding seeking 18 temporary custody, and three days before the hearing. (FAC ¶¶ 27, 33; MTD 3:21–22, 19 citing RJN Ex. C.) Consistent with the allegation the Safety Plan was to take effect 20 immediately, the FAC also alleges that “[a]fter meeting with Christina and preparing the 21 Safety Plan, Defendant Jennings called Gavin and informed him of the decision to seize 22 and detain the children in Christina’s care….” (Id. ¶ 28.) Based on these factual 23 allegations, the Court finds Rooker-Feldman does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims.3 See D.M. v. 24 County of Berks, 929 F.Supp.2d 390, 399 n. 4 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (rejecting application of 25 26 27 3 28 At this time, the Court need not decide whether any alleged damages accruing after the temporarycustody order was entered are barred under Rooker-Feldman. 6 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 Rooker-Feldman because plaintiffs’ claims were based on conduct that occurred before 2 the state-court proceedings). 3 4 B. 5 Defendants next contend the lawsuit is barred by the Domestic-Relations The Domestic-Relations Exception. 6 Exception. As explained above, Plaintiffs’ claims are primarily based on the social 7 worker Defendants’ conduct that occurred before the family-court proceeding was filed. 8 Accordingly, the Domestic-Relations exception does not apply.4 9 10 C. Qualified Immunity. 11 Defendants next argue the social worker Defendants are entitled to qualified 12 immunity. (MTD 6:27–15:4.) In support of this argument, Defendants contend Plaintiffs 13 have not stated a constitutional violation and, even if they have, the right allegedly 14 violated was not clearly established. (Id.) 15 Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for monetary 16 damages unless the plaintiff establishes (1) the conduct violated a constitutional right, 17 and (2) the right was “clearly established” when the misconduct occurred. Pearson v. 18 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236–42 (2009) (modifying the two-step inquiry in Saucier 19 v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), to allow courts discretion in deciding which prong to 20 address first depending on the facts of the particular case). “Clearly established” means 21 “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 22 understand what he is doing violates that right” with careful consideration to the facts of 23 the particular case. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 24 25 26 27 28 4 In Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit stated that the Domestic-Relations Exception “applies only to the diversity jurisdiction statute.” Id. at 947 (citations omitted). This lawsuit involves federal-question claims. Thus, Atwood appears to bar application of the doctrine to this case on that basis as well. 7 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 2 1. Were Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights violated? The first cause of action alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’ “right to familial 3 association guaranteed under… the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments” based on 4 Defendants’ conduct in “removing, detaining, and continuing to detain, [W.J.] and [E.J.] 5 from the care, custody, and control of their father, Gavin Jones….” (FAC ¶¶ 41, 43.) 6 Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because the FAC’s factual 7 allegations fail to allege a Constitutional violation. (MTD 7:22–14:12.) 8 The “interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is 9 perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel 10 v. Granville, 550 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). “Parents and children have a well-elaborated 11 constitutional right to live together without governmental interference.” Wallis v. 12 Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). “Our cases hold that the Fourteenth, First, 13 and Fourth Amendments provide a guarantee ‘that parents will not be separated from 14 their children without due process of law except in emergencies.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 15 F.3d 1228, 1236 (2018) (citing Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 16 237 F.3d 1101, 1107–09 (9th Cir. 2001)). Despite the different constitutional sources of 17 the right to familial association, the Ninth Circuit has “held that ‘the same legal standard 18 applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of 19 children.” Id. (quoting Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1137 n.8). This standard provides: 20 21 22 23 24 Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138 (citations omitted). 25 Here, according to the FAC, Gavin had legal custody of E.J. and W.J. beginning on 26 Wednesday at 10:00 a.m. (FAC ¶ 18.) The FAC alleges that on Tuesday, March 22, the 27 social worker Defendants prepared a Safety Plan giving Christina full custody of the 28 children, and Jennings then “called Gavin and informed him of the decision to seize and 8 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 detain the children in Christina’s care without his consent.” (Id. ¶ 28.) “Jennings [also] 2 instructed Gavin that he was prohibited from picking up the children at the regularly 3 scheduled time on Wednesday, March 22, 2017” and he “ordered that Gavin was not to 4 have any unsupervised contact with the children.” (Id.) These facts clearly establish the 5 social worker Defendants interfered with Gavin, E.J. and W.J.’s constitutional right to 6 familial association. Therefore, whether this interference constitutes a violation depends 7 on (1) if the information provided to the social worker Defendants gave them reasonable 8 cause to believe E.J. and W.J. were in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, and (2) 9 if so, whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably necessary. 10 11 The FAC alleges that when Jennings prepared the Safety Plan and informed Gavin he was prohibited from picking up the children, Jennings was aware of the following: 12 (1) Gavin returned E.J. and W.J. to Christina on Saturday before noon; 13 (2) Christina did not see any bruising on E.J. on Saturday despite changing the children’s diapers more than once; 14 15 (3) the bruising on E.J. was first noticed on Sunday, the day after he returned from Gavin’s custody; and 16 17 (4) Gavin told Christina “the children had been learning to ride a pedal-less bike over the weekend, and that [E.J.] had fallen off the bike.” 18 19 20 (FAC ¶ 24.) Particularly relevant is the allegation that Christina admitted she did not notice any bruising when she changed E.J. on Saturday. Reading these facts in the light 21 most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is reasonable to infer that E.J.’s bruising was the result of 22 trauma that occurred after Christina last changed E.J.’s diaper on Saturday and before the 23 bruising was noticed on Sunday.5 These allegations do not remotely suggest the children 24 25 26 27 28 5 It is important to point out that there are no allegations and no evidence regarding the amount of time it would take for bruising to appear on a 2-year old. In the absence of such information, it is reasonable to assume bruising would not take more than a couple of hours to appear on E.J.. 9 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 were in imminent danger from Gavin. Given the lack of imminent danger and absence of 2 a court order, Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of the right to familial association. 3 Defendants nevertheless appear to dispute that the imminent-harm standard applies 4 to Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Instead, Defendants contend the 5 FAC must plead conduct that “shocks the conscience” or “offends the community’s sense 6 of fair play and decency.” (MTD [Doc. 5-1] 12:1–7; 13:15–14:1; Reply [Doc. 13] 5:1– 7 14.) Defendants are incorrect. 8 9 Although the shocks-the-conscience standard generally applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims, in the context of child-removal cases the Ninth Circuit uses the 10 imminent-harm standard discussed in Wallis.6 See Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236. For 11 example, in Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit applied 12 an imminent-harm analysis in analyzing the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claim based 13 on the defendant officer’s temporary removal of their child to secure medical tests and 14 treatment. See also James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the 15 Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of parental rights prohibits the state from separating 16 parents from their children ‘without due process of law except in an emergency’”). 17 18 19 6 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Consistent with this observation, none of the cases Defendants cite in support of their contention that the shocks-the-conscience standard applies involve a claim for the unlawful removal or separation of children from their parents. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (claim based on alleged failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in proceeding to terminate parental status); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (arrestee’s claim based on forcible removal from car after being stopped); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (transsexual prisoner’s claim against prison officials for placing plaintiff in general population); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (claim against officers for illegally breaking into criminal defendant’s apartment and forcibly extracting contents of his stomach); Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (claim that officers violated right to familial association by handcuffing and arresting father in front of his children and then making inappropriate comments); Tamas v. Department of Social & Health Services, 630 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2010) (claim against county for giving license to abusive foster parents and failing to protect foster children from abuse); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) (claim arising out of shooting incident); and Richardson v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 2015 WL 7295443 (D. Idaho 2015) (claim against social workers for failure to protect child from foster parents). 10 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 Moreover, even if the Court were to apply the shocks-the-conscience standard, 2 Plaintiffs satisfy this standard. As set forth above, based on the FAC’s allegations, the 3 social worker Defendants had no basis to separate Gavin from his children. Separating a 4 parent from his/her young children without any reasonable basis shocks the conscience.7 5 6 2. Was the law clearly established at the time of the interference? Defendants next argue that even if Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated, the 7 8 law was not clearly established at the time of Defendants’ conduct. According to 9 Defendants, when the alleged violation occurred, there was “no binding authority that a 10 social worker’s preparation of a safety plan that recommends a parent retain custody and 11 seek a temporary custody order from a family court violates the Fourth, Fourteenth, or 12 First Amendment rights.” (MTD 14:17–20.) “[A] defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the 13 14 right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s 15 shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 16 2012, 2023 (2014). However, “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by 17 qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, 18 but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” 19 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. In determining whether a right is clearly established, courts 20 “may look at unpublished decisions and the law of other circuits, in addition to Ninth 21 Circuit precedent.” Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 2005); 22 23 24 7 25 26 27 28 Defendants also argue E.J. and W.J. have failed to assert a Fourth Amendment claim because they were not seized. (MTD 9:9–24.) The Court need not decide the issue at this time. In the context of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the motion must be denied if the “operative complaint ‘contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would constitute a violation of a clearly established right.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018). Because the Court finds the FAC alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association, “plaintiffs are ‘entitled to go forward’ with their claims.” Id. 11 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (looking to “decisions of our sister 2 Circuits, district courts, and state courts” in evaluating if law was clearly established). 3 Here, Defendants’ argument is premised on the contention that they only 4 recommended Christina take full custody over the children. But the FAC alleges the 5 social worker Defendants’ Safety Plan was intended to immediately give full custody to 6 Christina, and limit Gavin to only supervised visits with his children. (FAC ¶¶ 25, 27.) 7 The FAC also alleges that after the Safety Plan was prepared, “Jennings called Gavin and 8 informed him of the decision to seize and detain the children in Christina’s care without 9 his consent.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Jennings then allegedly “instructed Gavin that he was 10 prohibited from picking up the children at the regularly scheduled time on Wednesday, 11 March 22, 2017” and he “ordered that Gavin was not to have any unsupervised contact 12 with the children.” (Id., emphasis added.) These allegations support the inference that 13 the social worker Defendants did more than simply recommend Christina take full 14 custody, and that they interfered with Gavin’s custody rights. Because at the time of the 15 interference Wallis had established the need for a court order or reasonable cause to 16 believe the children were in imminent danger, the social worker Defendants are not 17 entitled to qualified immunity. 18 19 D. 20 Defendants next argue that the FAC fails to state a claim against Defendant Supervisor Liability. 21 Leggett because the claim is “premised solely on his supervision of Jennings’ conduct, 22 rather than any direct involvement.” (MTD 15:7–8.) 23 “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff 24 must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 25 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Thus, “a 26 plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 27 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 28 (9th Cir. 2012). 12 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 Here, the FAC alleges that “Jennings consulted with defendant Dennis Legget, 2 who agreed to the said action of separating Gavin from [W.J.] and [E.J.], in advance.” 3 (FAC ¶ 29.) The FAC further alleges that Leggett “authorized the Safety Plan with the 4 understanding that (1) it would go into effect immediately, (2) that no application for a 5 protective custody warrant or juvenile dependency petition would be filed, and (3) that 6 the Safety Plan would be presented to the Family Court.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 7 The Court agrees that the FAC contains few allegations regarding Leggett’s 8 conduct. Nevertheless, based on those allegations, it is reasonable to infer that Leggett 9 was aware of the circumstances and, despite the lack of a court order or reasonable cause 10 to believe the children were in imminent danger, approved of and authorized the 11 separation of Gavin from the children. Accordingly, the Court finds the FAC states a 12 claim against Leggett. 13 14 E. 15 Defendants argue the Monell claim must be dismissed for two reasons. First, 16 Defendants argue the claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to allege a 17 constitutional violation. (MTD 16:14–22.) For the reasons discussed above, this 18 argument lacks merit. The Monell Claim. 19 Second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Monell claim should be dismissed because 20 they fail to “cite a formal policy nor do they sufficiently allege the existence of a long- 21 standing practice or custom.” (MTD 16:25–27.) According to Defendants, rather than 22 cite a formal County policy, Plaintiffs “allege a list of general policies in a conclusory 23 manner.” (MTD 17:9–13.) 24 Under Monell, “[m]unicipalities, their agents, and their supervisory personnel may 25 be held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights resulting from their formal policies 26 or customs. Id. at 691-95. However, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a 28 moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 13 18-cv-2729 W (LL) 1 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In Dougherty, the 2 Ninth Circuit found the following Monell allegations insufficient: (1) “Defendant CITY’s policies and/or customs caused the specific violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights at issue in this case” and (2) “Defendant CITY’s policies and/or customs were the moving force and/or affirmative link behind the violation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and injury, damage and/or harm caused thereby.” 3 4 5 6 7 Id. 654 F.3d at 900. In contrast to the allegations in Daugherty, the FAC’s allegations regarding the 8 9 County are far less formulaic and provide some specificity. According to the FAC, the 10 County had the following policies, customs, or practices: (1) “separating children from 11 their parents without first obtaining a protective custody warrant in the absence of exigent 12 circumstances;” and (2) “[s]eparating children from their parent, without a court order, if 13 the parent does not sign a Safety Plan that he does not agree with.” (FAC ¶ 55.) Given 14 the posture of this case, the Court must accept these allegations as true. Accordingly, the 15 Court finds Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a Monell claim against the County. 16 17 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion [Doc. 5]. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: June 7, 2019 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 18-cv-2729 W (LL)
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