Michael v. La Jolla Learning Institute, Inc., No. 3:2017cv00934 - Document 30 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 21 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 9/30/2019. (jpp)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAUL MICHAEL, Case No.: 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 LA JOLLA LEARNING INSTITUTE, INC., a California corporation; BALBOA SCHOOL CORPORATION, a California corporation, 15 16 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 21) Defendants. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendants La Jolla Learning Institute Inc. and Balboa 20 School Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 21). Also before the Court 21 are Plaintiff Paul Michael’s Response in Opposition to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 24) and 22 Defendants’ Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No. 25) the Motion, as well as Plaintiff’s 23 Sur-Reply to Defendants’ Reply (“Sur-Reply,” ECF No. 29). The Court vacated the 24 hearing and took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil 25 Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). ECF No. 26. Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, 26 the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion. 27 /// 28 /// 1 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a former employee of Balboa City School, a company Plaintiff believes 3 is wholly owned and operated by Defendant Balboa School Corporation doing business as 4 Defendant La Jolla Learning Institute (together, “Defendants”). 5 Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times, Defendants 6 employed twenty-five or more full-time employees. Id. ¶ 7–8. Second Amended 7 Defendants hired Plaintiff as a full-time Technical Coordinator in January 2001. Id. 8 ¶ 9. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff participated in Defendants’ 9 employee beneficiary plans. Id. ¶ 12. In spring of 2016, Plaintiff submitted a letter of 10 resignation and the employment relationship ended. Id. ¶ 13. On June 6, 2016, Defendants 11 informed Plaintiff that his health insurance plan was terminated. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s final 12 paycheck was dated June 15, 2016, id. ¶ 13, and his participation in Defendants’ health 13 insurance plan officially ended June 30, 2016. Id. ¶ 15. 14 Plaintiff alleges that “[b]etween June 15, 2016, and July 30, 2016, [he] did not 15 receive a notice of his Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) 16 election rights to continue coverage under [Defendants’] plan.” Id. ¶ 18. On July 1, 2016, 17 Plaintiff wrote to Defendants alerting them that he had not received a COBRA notification 18 or election notice and asked Defendants “to refrain from interfering with [his] rights under 19 [the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)].” Id. ¶ 19. 20 In late June and early July 2016, Plaintiff received two letters from Kaiser 21 Permanente, the healthcare provider under Defendants’ health insurance plan, informing 22 Plaintiff that his coverage was terminated but that Plaintiff may be eligible for, among other 23 services, COBRA coverage. Id. ¶ 20. The letters stated that Plaintiff would need to contact 24 his former employer to further explore his eligibility. Id. 25 Between August and December 2016, Plaintiff reached out to Defendants multiple 26 times regarding Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with a COBRA election 27 notice. 28 /// Id. ¶ 21. On or about December 16, 2016, Plaintiff contacted Kaiser to 2 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 learn more about his COBRA rights; Kaiser told Plaintiff to contact Defendants for such 2 information. Id. ¶ 23. 3 On December 20, 2016, Defendants contacted Plaintiff to inform him that 4 Defendants expected to receive documentation from Kaiser and, once received, that 5 documentation would be sent to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 24. In this letter, Defendants also provided 6 Plaintiff with Kaiser’s phone number to call to find out more information about COBRA. 7 Id. 8 On the same day, Plaintiff asked Defendants in writing for the identity of the plan 9 administrator. Id. ¶ 25. On or about December 23, 2016, Plaintiff contacted a Kaiser 10 representative, who confirmed that Defendant La Jolla Learning Institute was the plan 11 administrator and that Kaiser could provide no further information on Plaintiff’s COBRA 12 rights. Id. ¶ 26. 13 Plaintiff alleges that on January 16, 2017, he again requested in writing the identity 14 of the plan administrator from Defendants. Id. ¶ 27. On January 18, 2017, Defendants 15 responded that Kaiser was the healthcare provider and plan administrator; additionally, 16 Defendants stated that they informed Kaiser about Plaintiff’s termination within the 17 statutory time frame and that Kaiser sent Plaintiff information about his COBRA rights. 18 Id. ¶ 28. As of November 27, 2018, Plaintiff claims he never received a COBRA notice. 19 Id. ¶ 29. 20 On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants. See generally ECF No. 1. 21 On November 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, alleging 22 two causes of action under ERISA and COBRA. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff seeks statutory 23 penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), based on (1) Defendants’ alleged failure to provide 24 requested ERISA plan documents as required under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), and 25 (2) Defendants’ failure to provide a COBRA notice and election form within thirty-days of 26 Plaintiff’s termination as required under 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). See generally SAC. 27 Defendants then filed the present Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 28 Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See generally Mot. Defendants argue that both of 3 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 Plaintiff’s causes of action fail to state claims upon which the Court can grant relief. Mot. 2 at 3–6. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing because he 3 failed to allege a concrete injury in fact. See Mot. at 6–7. The Court will address the 4 standing issue first, moving then to the failure to state a claim. 5 6 MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(1) I. Legal Standard 7 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such have an obligation to 8 dismiss claims for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Demarest v. United States, 9 718 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). Because the issue of standing pertains to the 10 subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal court, motions raising lack of standing are properly 11 brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 12 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing he has standing to bring the 13 claims asserted. Takhar v. Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In re 14 Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The 15 party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction on 16 a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 17 Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge jurisdiction facially or factually. Safe Air for 18 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger 19 asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 20 federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the 21 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Here, 22 Defendants’ challenge is facial because it disputes whether Plaintiff alleged a sufficiently 23 particularized injury to confer Article III standing. Accordingly, the Court will assume the 24 truth of Plaintiff’s factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 25 Plaintiff. See Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005). 26 II. Analysis 27 Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court may only 28 adjudicate an action if it constitutes a justiciable “case” or a “controversy” that has real 4 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 consequences for the parties. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A 2 threshold requirement for justiciability in federal court is that the plaintiff have standing to 3 assert the claims brought. Id. Article III standing requires that the plaintiff “(1) suffered 4 an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and 5 (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 6 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 7 In this case, Defendants attack only the injury in fact element. “To establish injury 8 in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected 9 interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 10 hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “Particularized injuries ‘affect the 11 plaintiff in a personal and individual way,’ while a ‘concrete injury must be de facto; that 12 is, it must actually exist.’” Fleming v. Charles Schwab Corp., 878 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th 13 Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). Because Plaintiff is raising multiple 14 claims, he “must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.” DaimlerChrysler 15 Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 16 Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege standing because “Plaintiff has not 17 suffered anything other than an abstract injury” caused by alleged procedural statutory 18 violations. Mot. at 8. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations of statutory violations 19 alone are insufficient to confer standing. Id. Defendants rely primarily on their reading of 20 the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo to support these contentions. Id. 21 In Spokeo, a consumer brought an action alleging that a website published inaccurate 22 information about him, violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 23 1544–45. The Ninth Circuit, focusing only on the particularity prong of the injury in fact 24 element, found plaintiff’s alleged violations of his statutory rights alone were sufficient to 25 satisfy the injury in fact requirement of Article III. Id. at 1546. The Supreme Court 26 reversed, holding that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context 27 of a statutory violation” and, thus, a plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, 28 /// 5 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” 2 Id. at 1549. 3 The Supreme Court went on to explain, however, that “the violation of a procedural 4 right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” 5 Id. 6 ‘concreteness’ requirement of an injury in fact, it did not disturb the long-standing 7 principle, invoked by [Plaintiff] here, that a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact when she is 8 denied access to helpful information subject to disclosure under a statute.” McFarlane v. 9 First Unum Life Ins. Co., 274 F. Supp. 3d 150, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Examples in which 10 a violation of a procedural right constitutes injury in fact include a group voter’s “inability 11 to obtain information” that the Federal Election Campaign Act requires to be made publicly 12 available, see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998), and the inability to 13 receive documents from committees that are covered by the Federal Advisory Committee 14 Act, which requires that certain documents and meetings be accessible to the public, see 15 Pub. Citizens v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989). In these instances, where 16 a “plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a 17 statute,” Fed. Election Comm’n, 524 U.S. at 21, “a plaintiff . . . need not allege any 18 additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified” to show injury in fact. Spokeo, 19 136 S. Ct. at 1550. Thus, “[w]hile Spokeo may have clarified certain principles regarding the 20 In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to meet the injury in fact requirement. 21 “[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of ERISA’s disclosure requirement 22 is to ‘ensure that the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to 23 the plan.’” McFarlane, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 162 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 24 Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989) (internal alterations omitted)). 25 complained of in Federal Election Commission and Public Citizens, Plaintiff’s injuries in 26 this case stem from Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Plaintiff information required 27 by statute, specifically the ERISA plan documents and COBRA benefit information. SAC 28 ¶¶ 29–31. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to provide COBRA Like the injuries 6 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 information and an election form resulted in a concrete injury because it prevented Plaintiff 2 from obtaining COBRA continuation coverage. Id. at 31; Opp’n at 8–9. These are 3 sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries to confer Article III standing. 4 McFarlane, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (holding plaintiff’s allegations of failure to provide 5 ERISA plan documents sufficient to show injury in fact); see also Bryant v. Wal-Mart 6 Store, Inc., No. 16-24818-CIV, 2019 WL 3542827, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2019) (holding 7 plaintiff sufficiently alleged a concrete and particularized injury resulting from defendant’s 8 failure to provide COBRA notice). See 9 The Court also finds that Plaintiff satisfies the remaining standing requirements of 10 causation and redressability. Although Defendants do not challenge these elements, the 11 Court concludes that Plaintiff’s injury is fairly traceable to Defendants’ conduct and this 12 Court can provide the relief sought. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has Article III 13 standing to bring his claims and DENIES Defendants’ Motion under 12(b)(1). 14 15 MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) I. Legal Standard 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 17 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 18 generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 19 states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 21 pleader is entitled to relief.” 22 To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 24 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); 25 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow 26 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 27 alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept as true all material 28 allegations in the complaint and must construe the complaint and all reasonable inferences 7 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 2 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court 3 will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with 4 the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 5 Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 6 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 7 II. 8 Analysis A. 9 Request to Convert Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion Into a Rule 56 Motion 10 “In general, courts cannot consider material outside of the pleadings in ruling on a 11 motion to dismiss.” In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 12 1537 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), however, “gives courts the 13 discretion to accept and consider extrinsic materials offered in connection with these 14 motions, and to convert the motion to one for summary judgment when a party has notice 15 that the district court may look beyond the pleadings.” Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow 16 Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n 17 v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1981). Rule 12(d) specifically 18 states that “if, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are 19 presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary 20 judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all 21 the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 22 In their Reply, Defendants argue that the Court should convert the Motion to Dismiss 23 under Rule 12(b)(6) into a Motion for Summary Judgement under Rule 56. Reply at 3–4. 24 Defendants make this request because they submitted declarations and multiple exhibits, 25 external to Plaintiffs SAC, that they rely on in support of the Motion to Dismiss. See 26 generally ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2. Defendants contend that Plaintiff had sufficient notice that 27 the Court could convert the motion because Defendants attached the materials to their 28 /// 8 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 Motion, Plaintiff argued against conversion in his Opposition, and “Plaintiff submit[ted] 2 his own declaration (i.e., his own evidence) in support of the [O]pposition.” Reply at 4. 3 Plaintiff argues that converting the Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary 4 judgment is not appropriate in this case. Opp’n at 6–7; Sur-Reply at 4–5. Plaintiff contends 5 that discovery is necessary to uncover whether Defendants employed more than 6 twenty-five employees. Sur-Reply at 5. Plaintiff further argues that the evidence submitted 7 by Defendants is inadmissible and, thus, the Court could not consider it even if the Court 8 were to convert the Motion. Id. 9 The Court refuses to convert the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary 10 judgment. “Converting Defendants’ Motion into one for summary judgment would be 11 premature at this point in the case,” in part because “[t]he record discloses [that] no 12 discovery [has been] conducted.” Lacey v. Malandro Commc’n, Inc., No. CV-09-01429- 13 PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4755399, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 8, 2009). Plaintiff therefore has not 14 been afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to and present all material pertinent to 15 Defendants’ contentions that it did not employ over twenty employees during the relevant 16 period. See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting 17 a reasonable opportunity to respond “must include time for discovery necessary to develop 18 facts justifying opposition to the motion”) (citing Portland Retail, 662 F.2d at 645; Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 56) Accordingly, “the Court will not consider Defendant[s’] submissions that fall 20 outside the pleadings in resolving the Motion to Dismiss.” See Lacey, 2009 WL 4755399, 21 at *4. 22 23 24 B. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action: Failure to Produce Plan Documents Under ERISA Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with 25 documents and information he requested in writing, as required by ERISA. 26 ¶¶ 32–44. Under ERISA, the plan administrator is required to provide a copy of the “latest 27 updated summary, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the 28 bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan SAC 9 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 is established or operated” upon written request of any participant or beneficiary. 29 2 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). A plan administer that fails or refuses to provide the requested plan 3 documents “may in the court’s discretion be personally liable to such participant or 4 beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day.” 29 U.S.C. 1132(c)(1). 5 Plaintiff asserts in his SAC that he made three separate written requests for 6 information and plan documents, on July 1, 2016, December 20, 2016, and January 16, 7 2017.1 SAC ¶ 42. In his Opposition, Plaintiff abandons the allegation he made such a 8 request on July 1, 2016, focusing only on the later two alleged requests.2 Opp’n at 3–4. 9 In the December 20, 2016 request, Plaintiff’s counsel, in response to an email from 10 Defendants’ counsel regarding the COBRA benefits notification, wrote: “I still have [a] 11 question: Who is the Plan Administrator for the Plan?” ECF No. 14-1 at 33. Defendants’ 12 counsel replied minutes later, stating “I do not understand the question.” Id. Plaintiff’s 13 counsel responded: “A group benefits plan must have a designated Plan Administrator. 14 Who is the Plan Administrator for the health insurance plan offered through [Balboa City 15 School]?” Id. Defendants’ counsel did not respond. SAC ¶ 27. 16 17 On January 20, 2016, Plaintiff emailed Defendants once again. The email states in relevant part: 18 It has been more than seven months since Mr. Michael requested information regarding his COBRA election and notification rights. To my knowledge, he still has not received that documentation. I will be filing a complaint on his behalf in federal court on Friday, January 20[,] unless I receive 19 20 21 22 23 1 26 Plaintiff attached copies of the alleged requests made on December 20, 2016, and January 16, 2017, to his SAC. See ECF No. 14-1 at 33–35, 37. As part of the complaint, the Court may consider these documents. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] court may consider ‘material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint’ on a motion to dismiss.”) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)). 27 2 24 25 28 Even if Plaintiff did not abandon his allegation that he requested plan documents on July 1, 2016, based on the allegations in his SAC, Plaintiff does not state a claim for the same reasons the Court finds the December 20, 2016, and January 16, 2017 requests insufficient articulated below. 10 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) information from you that actually demonstrates your client’s compliance with [the] law. 1 2 3 ECF No. 14-1 at 37. 4 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s written requests were insufficient to support a 5 claim for failure to produce plan documents. Mot. at 5. Defendants assert that nowhere in 6 these communications does Plaintiff actually request a document production and, even if 7 the Court construes the requests as requests for documents, Plaintiff is referring to 8 COBRA-related documents, not documents covered under section 1124(b)(4). Id. 9 Plaintiff responds that the written requests are sufficient to fall under the mandatory 10 production rule of section 1024(b)(4). Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff contends that the identity of 11 the plan administrator is required to be in the summary plan documents governing any 12 health plan. Id. Plaintiff argues that because the identity of the plan administrator must be 13 contained in the summary plan document, Defendants were required to provide the 14 summary plan document. Id. In support of his argument, Plaintiff contends that a 15 “clear-notice” standard should apply and that, under this standard, Defendants had notice 16 of his request. Opp’n at 4–5. (citing Cultrona v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 698, 17 707 (6th Cir. 2014) (adopting clear-notice standard) (citing Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., 18 LLC, 487 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting the standard and collecting similar cases 19 from the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits)). The Court agrees that the clear- 20 notice standard is appropriate in this case. 21 “Under the clear-notice standard, claimants seeking documents pursuant to 22 § 1024(b)(4) must ‘provide clear notice to the plan administrator of the information they 23 desire.’” Cultrona, 748 F.3d at 707 (quoting Kollman, 487 F.3d at 145); see also Williams 24 v. Caterpillar, Inc., 944 F.2d 658, 667 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Some courts have suggested that 25 where a pension plan participant fails to make a specific request for the information at 26 issue, he has no litigable claim.”). In deciding whether there was clear-notice, the Court 27 may consider all “the circumstances surrounding the document request.” Cultrona, 748 28 F.3d at 707. 11 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for the identity of the plan administrator 2 failed to give clear notice to Defendants that Plaintiff sought the summary plan document. 3 As the December 20, 2016 and January 16, 2017 communications show, Plaintiff never 4 actually requested any document, let alone the summary plan document, by name. The 5 Court declines to require Defendants to connect the dots of Plaintiff’s request, forcing them 6 to determine that the information requested was included in the summary plan document 7 and that, despite his silence, Plaintiff was in fact asking for that document. While there 8 may be some requests for information that clearly indicate a document production is 9 necessary, “who is the plan administrator” is not such a request. Considering the context 10 of the communications, Plaintiff made the request in response to Defendants’ email 11 concerning COBRA beneficiary notices, and neither party even mentioned the summary 12 plan document. In fact, Defendants expressly indicated they did not understand the first 13 request, and Plaintiff’s follow-up did not make clear that he was in fact requesting the 14 summary plan document. 15 Moreover, under section 1024(b)(4), only “plan administrators are required, upon 16 the request of a participant or beneficiary, to provide the requesting party with a copy of 17 various plan documents.” Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 18 (emphasis added). The fact that Plaintiff requested the identity of the plan administrator 19 belies its argument that it was making a request to the plan administrator for the summary 20 plan document. 21 For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to provide clear-notice to 22 Defendants that he sought production of the summary plan document. See Williams, 944 23 F.2d at 667 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 24 appellants “failed to offer any proof . . . that they had ever requested any plan descriptions 25 from appellees”); see also Davenport v. Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 249 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 26 2001) (denying civil penalties where plaintiff did not ask for the summary plan document 27 but sought only specific information for type and amount of any vested benefits she had 28 /// 12 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 accrued). The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants Motion regarding Plaintiff’s first 2 cause of action. 3 C. 4 Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants failed to send a qualified 5 beneficiary notice following his termination, as required under COBRA. SAC ¶¶ 45–57. 6 Under COBRA, employers are required to provide notice to employees of continuation 7 rights within thirty days of a termination of coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a). That 8 requirement, however, applies only to employers with over twenty employees. 29 U.S.C. 9 § 1161(b). Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action: Failure to Provide COBRA Notice 10 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to provide 11 COBRA notice must be dismissed because “Defendant[s] did not employ more than 20 12 employees in any applicable pay period” and, thus, “COBRA does not apply.” Mot. at 6. 13 Defendants support this argument entirely with the declarations and exhibits attached to 14 their Motion. See generally ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2. As explained above, the Court does not 15 find these documents appropriate to consider at this time. See supra Section II.A. Without 16 these documents, the Court is left with Plaintiff’s allegations in his SAC that “at all times 17 relevant to [the] Complaint, Defendant[s] . . . employed 25 or more full-time employees.” 18 SAC ¶¶ 7–8. For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts these allegations as true, 19 see Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 20 556 U.S. at 678), and finds Plaintiff adequately pled his second cause of action. 21 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause 22 of action. 23 24 CONCLUSION Based on the forgoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 25 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21). Specifically, the Court DENIES 26 Defendants’ Motion under 12(b)(1) for lack of standing, GRANTS Defendants’ Motion 27 under 12(b)(6) regarding Plaintiff’s first cause of action, and DENIES Defendants’ Motion 28 under 12(b)(6) regarding Plaintiff’s second cause of action. Plaintiff may file an amended 13 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD) 1 complaint within 30 days of the date that this Order is electronically docketed. 2 Should Plaintiff fail timely to file an amended complaint, this action will proceed on 3 Plaintiff’s surviving second cause of action. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 30, 2019 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 17-CV-934 JLS (MDD)
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