Grant v. Bostwick, No. 3:2015cv00874 - Document 49 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting motion to dismiss 40 filed by Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. The motion for sanctions and costs 38 is denied.Tthe "Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for a Decision on Dkt 38 & 40" 48 is denied as moot. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 7/20/16. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(dlg)
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Grant v. Bostwick Doc. 49 i' 1 ; Usses \n. Q k $ bw h. RrVJS « ^ »* 2 JUL 2 1 2016 3 CLERK US LnS I HiC ! COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT Or CALIFORNIA BY L-rUTY 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 CASE NO. 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM) JENNIFER GRANT, Plaintiff, ORDER v. HON. JEFFREY BOSTWICK, 13 Defendant. 14 HAYES, Judge: 15 The matters before the Court are: (1) the Motion for Sanctions and Costs (ECF 16 No. 38) filed by Plaintiff Jennifer Grant, (2) the Motion to Dismiss First Amended 17 Complaint (ECF No. 40) filed by Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick, and (3) the 18 Ex Parte Application to Shorten Time (ECF No. 48) filed by Plaintiff. 19 I. Background 20 On April 21,2015, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Complaint pursuant 21 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF 22 No. 1). 23 On July 15, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 9). On * .i 24 September 15 , 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to stay state 25 probate proceedings pending the resolution of this case. (ECF No. 15). On October 26 22, 2015, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for a 27 28 preliminary injunction to stay probate proceedings. (ECF No. 23). On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Altering the Judgment of -1 - 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM) Dockets.Justia.com i 1 i Docket#23.” (ECFNo.25). On January 13,2016, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion. 2 (ECF No. 32). t 3 On February 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended 4 Complaint. (ECF No. 33). On February 23, 2016, Defendant filed an opposition. 5 (ECF No. 34). On March 18,2016, the Court issued an Order granting the motion for 6 leave to file a First Amended Complaint (ECFNo. 36). OnMarch23,2016, Plaintiff 7 filed a First Amended Complaint, which became the operative pleading in this case. 8 (ECF No. 37). On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed the motion for sanctions and costs based on 9 10 Defendant’s opposition to the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF 11 No. 38). On April 7,2016, Defendant filed the motion to dismiss. (ECFNo. 40). On 12 April 22,2016, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion for sanctions. (ECF No. 13 42). On the same day, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14 41). On April 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a reply to the opposition to the motion for 15 sanctions and costs. (ECF No. 43). On the same day, Defendant filed a reply to the 16 opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 44). On May 27,2016, with the Court’s 17 permission, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply to the motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 47). Oh June 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application to shorten time for 18 19 decision on the motion for sanctions and costs and the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 20 48). 21 U. Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint 22 A. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint 23 Plaintiff Jennifer Grant is a beneficiary ofthe Schwichtenberg Revocable Family 24 Trust (“trust”), dated July 28,1982,'"and is the trustee of the B subsection of the trust. 25 (ECF No. 23 at ^ 2). Defendant Jeffrey Bostwick is the judge presiding over the 26 administration of the trust in San Diego Superior Court’s Central Probate Provision. 27 Id K 7. 28 “Defendant inherited Pro-Per Plaintiffs case ... in September 2012 ....” Id. -2- 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM) 1 Tf 13. Upon the death ofPlaintiff s mother, “Rusty [Grant], no relation to Plaintiff, was 2 to become the trustee of section A of Plaintiffs parents’ ABC inter-vivos trust. ...” 3 Id. 114. “With no legal authority, Rusty took over all three sections of the trust the day 4 Plaintiffs mother died.” Id. 115. 5 “Defendant lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Both Plaintiffs parent’s wills 6 specifically state that their intention in creating the trust was NOT to subject their 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 assets to probate court.” Id. f 16. Rusty/Larsen’s petition opened the case purporting to be an internal affairs petition .... It was illegally plead due to: 1) lack of capacity ... as Rusty claimed capacity as trustee ofthe whole trust 2) limitations ofthe trust terms regarding the duties accorded the trustee of section A post the last settlor’s death,... 3) failure to meet the standards for proper pleading since its intent was to harass Plaintiff.... Id. 118. Plaintiff tried to bring [to] Defendant’s attention . . . that not only was Rusty illegally acting as the administrative B section trustee . . . but she and Larsen were 1) purposefully trying to destroy the trust home and denying her access so that she was deprived for years of its enj oyment and use 2) had stolen from the trust home, 3) were acting beyond the duties permitted a trustee of section A, 4) were misusing trust funds, 5) were violating the duties of care and loyalty ... 6) and otherwise disobeying trust terms in a concentrated effort to force the sale of the trust home ... by bankrupting trust A so the home would end up in foreclosure abatement forcing its sale. 18 Id. 121. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Between September 2012 and June 2013, Defendant had not only denied Plaintiffs oral motion for a hearing to show cause on why Rusty should not be removed but continually postponed calendering trial on the Remove Trustee Petition_ Defendant also ignored allegations in case _ management statements and denied numerous ex-partes filed by Plaintiff as ‘not urgent’ despite clear and convincing exhibits that accompanied the ex-parte documents providing that Plaintiff was being injured by Rusty/Larsen in the manner described. Id. 124. “Defendant denied Plaintiff of her liberty to assume the ‘job’ her parents had given her under the trust instrument” and “suspended Plaintiff... for hostility with her brother and Larsen.” Id. 128. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied her the “choice of appointment of successor trustees” and “appointed a public administrator over all the trust sections.” Id. 129. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied “Plaintiff her 14th -3- 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM) 1 amendment rights through the conduction of a biased courtroom.” Id. f 32. Plaintiff 2 alleges that after she regained trusteeship over the B and C sections of the trust, 3 “Defendant continued to act with bias and restrict Plaintiff s liberty to act as trustee by 4 ignoring Plaintiff. .. Id. f 39. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to grant ex 5 parte applications, refused to provide her with a hearing, and “ignored Plaintiffs 6 protests over [a] violation of civil procedure.” Id. 7 Defendant, acting under color of law, has a long history with a well established pattern of abusing thepower ofhis office to deny Plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law with the intent of depriving Plaintiff of the property to which she is legitimately entitled under the trust instrument ana her earnings and savings while restricting her liberty to act as trust named administrative trustee. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 34, 40,42. Id. If 19. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive reliefunder42U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant has violated and continues to violate her Fourteenth Amendment rights by: (1) conducting proceedings without personal or subject matter jurisdiction, (2) denying Plaintiff a timely hearing on former trustee’s alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and state crimes, (3) appointing a temporary trustee, (4) acting without jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on the temporary trustee’s accounting/fee petition, (5) acting without jurisdiction should Defendant attempt to hear any fee petitions by former trustees, and (6) denying Plaintiff due process by refusing to hear her requests for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 36-39. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant “acted as an accessory after the fact to prevent the former trustee, Rusty Grant, from facing punishment for felony crimes. Id. at 39. With regard to injunctive relief, Plaintiff requests the Court to “exercise * supplemental jurisdiction” over certain probate petitions and order Defendant to either consolidate the petitions and immediately set them for trial or make a record ofthe trial and provide it to Plaintiff and this Court, to enable this Court to “conduct a timely judicial review ofthe proceedings.” Id. at 40-41. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that the trial “be conducted by Defendant before the District Court” or “be conducted by the -4- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 1 Honorable William Q. Hayes in District Court.” Id. at 41. Plaintiff requests similar 2 relief with regard to her request for attorney’s fees. Id. at 41-42. Plaintiff requests the 3 Court to “arrange with the local district attorney’s and federal prosecutor’s offices . . 4 . for a hearing before a grand jury.” Id. at 42. 5 B. Standard of Review 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state 7 a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain 9 ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 10 relief.” Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a 11 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See 12 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep % 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 13 When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all 14 “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 15 However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely 16 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. 17 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint 18 to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable 19 inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the 20 plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (quotations omitted). 22 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to 23 move for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subj ect matter. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has 25 subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Assoc, of Medical Colleges v. United States, 26 217 F.3d 770,778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). In resolving an attack on a court’s jurisdiction, 27 “the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the 28 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air For Everyone v. -5- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 4 1 Doyle, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Issues regarding subject matter 2 jurisdiction maj! be raised at anytime, even on appeal, by motion or suasponte by the 3 court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. Cleveland\ 316 F.3d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir. 4 2002). 5 C. Judicial Notice 6 “As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the 7 pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d 8 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, there are “exceptions to the requirement that 9 consideration of extrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment 10 motion.” Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially 11 notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it... is generally known 12 within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or . . . can be accurately and readily 13 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed R. 14 Evid. 201(b). “[Ujnder Fed.R.Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of‘matters 15 ofpublic record.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quoting South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 16 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts may take judicial notice of “proceedings in 17 other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 18 have a direct relation to matters at issue.” US. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens 19 Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal 20 quotations omitted). 21 Defendant requests judicial notice of certain filings and orders from the probate 22 case in which Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant arose. The documents requested 23 to be noticed are proceedings in another court that have a direct relation to the matters 24 at issue and are in the public recoitt. See US. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens 25 « Council, 971 F.2d at 248; Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Defendant’s request for judicial notice 26 is granted. 27 C. Contentions of the Parties 28 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice on the grounds -6- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 1 that (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction under the probate exception because the action in 2 state court is properly under the state probate court’s jurisdiction, (2) Defendant enjoys 3 absolute judicial immunity against Plaintiffs claim, (3) the Younger abstention 4 doctrine bars this action, (4) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs action 5 against Defendant, and (5) the First Amended Complaint fails to state sufficient facts 6 to state a cognizable claim against Defendant. 7 Plaintiff contends that she is suing Defendant only in his individual capacity for 8 acts and omissions committed as a judicial officer. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s 9 acts alleged in the First Amended Complaint were non-judicial. Plaintiff contends, that 10 she is not asking the Court to re-litigate Defendant’s previous rulings. Plaintiff 11 contends that Defendant acted without jurisdiction and therefore does not have 12 immunity. Plaintiff contends that the probate exception only applies to probate cases, 13 not to civil rights cases in which the Defendant is a .probate judge acting in a probate 14 courtroom. Plaintiff contends that the probate exception applies only to wills, not 15 trusts. Plaintiff contends that Younger abstention does not apply because the state does 16 not have an interest in the case because Defendant is sued only in his individual 17 capacity. 18 D. Discussion 19 Generally, “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in 20 civil actions for their judicial acts . . . 21 (1978). “Judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 22 judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e. actions not taken in the 23 judge’s judicial capacity. . . . Second, a judge is not immune from actions, though 24 judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 25 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “[Ajbsolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial 26 actions, i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive functions that judges ... may 27 on occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvallv. County of Kitsap, 260F.3dll24,1133 28 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four factors -7- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 4 1 2 3 4 relevant to resolving whether a particular act is judicial in nature: \t (1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity. 5 Id. (quoting Meekv. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). The 6 inquiry focuses on whether the “nature and function of the act” is normally performed 7 by a judge, “not the act itself.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. “[I]f only the particular act in 8 question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority 9 would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said 10 to be normally performed by a judge.” Id. at 12. 11 The First Amended Complaint challenges the decisions ofDefendant to proceed 12 as the judge in the pending probate case, to suspend Plaintiff as a trustee, and to 13 appoint a Public Administrator as temporary trustee, just as the original Complaint did. 14 Plaintiff also challenges Defendant’s decision to timely hear Plaintiffs petitions and 15 motions and Defendant’s failure to rule in her favor. Each of Defendant’s decisions 16 occurred within the scope of the ongoing state probate proceedings. Defendant’s 17 actions are normal judicial functions undertaken in state probate proceedings and arose 18 from interactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant in state probate court. Plaintiff 19 has not alleged sufficient factual allegations to show that Defendant acted “in complete 20 absence of all jurisdiction.” See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. The First Amended 21 Complaint challenges actions by the Defendant which are judicial in nature and taken 22 in an ongoing state proceeding within the state probate court’s jurisdiction. 23 In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), the Supreme Court held that while 24 judicial immunity bars actions against judges seeking monetary damages, “judicial % 25 immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting 26 in her judicial capacity.” Id. at 541-42. After Pulliam, however, Congress narrowed 27 the judicial immunity exception. Section 983 provides that “in any action brought 28 against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, -8- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 1 injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 2 declaratory relief was unavailable ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as amended by Pub. L. 3 104-307, Title III, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3852 (Oct. 19,1996)). 4 Plaintiff challenges actions taken by Defendant Judge Bostwick in his judicial 5 capacity in ongoing state probate proceedings seeking prospective injunctive relief 6 under § 1983. In the Order dismissing the original Complaint, the Court concluded, 7 “The Complaint fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that the exception to 8 judicial immunity from suit in a § 1983 action for injunctive relief—namely, violation 9 of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief—would apply in this 10 case.” (ECF No. 23 at 6). In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that 11 “injunctive relief is necessary because no declaratory decree is available that would 12 prevent Defendant continuing his pattern of behavior that violates Plaintiffs 14th 13 amendment rights_ ” (ECF No. 37 at 40). However, the First Amended Complaint _ 14 does not provide sufficient facts to infer that no declaratory relief is available. See 15 Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are 16 merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”) 17 (citation omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (“for a complaint to survive a motion to 18 dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content and reasonable inferences from that 19 content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief’) 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to 21 challenge the decisions Defendant has made in probate court proceedings, Plaintiff is 22 free to file an appeal with the California Court of Appeal. The Court concludes that 23 the First Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that an 24 exception to judicial immunity applies in this case. The facts alleged in the First 25 Amended Complaint do not state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. 26 In the Order dismissing Plaintiffs original Complaint, the Court concluded that 27 the Younger abstention doctrine and the probate exception to federal jurisdiction 28 provided alternate grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs claim. (ECF No. 23 at 7). The 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) i 1 Court concludes that Younger abstention and the probate exception also provide 2 grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs claim is 3 closely related to the issues pending in the underlying state probate court proceeding. 4 The relief requested would require the Court to determine issues that fall within the 5 purview of the state probate court. The Court declines to interfere with ongoing 6 judicial proceedings in state probate court. See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. 7 Council of City ofNew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,368 (1989) (holding that under Younger 8 abstention, federal courts should not enjoin pending civil proceedings involving 9 “orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 10 judicial functions”); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (prohibiting federal 11 courts from adjudicating rights that would interfere with the state probate court’s 12 administration of a decedent’s estate). 13 The motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice is granted. 14 Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend her pleadings and has only alleged facts 15 regarding Defendant’s actions that are covered by judicial immunity. The First 16 Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 17 m. Motion for Sanctions and Costs 18 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s counsel violated Federal Rule of Civil 19 Procedure 11(b) by making statements in Defendant’s opposition to the Plaintiff s 20 motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 34) that intentionally 21 attempted to mislead the court and by “presenting background facts regarding previous 22 rulings and Plaintiffs prayers out of context.” (ECF No. 38-1). Plaintiff contends that 23 Defendant’s counsel tried to commit fraud upon the Court with her arguments and 24 citation to inapplicable caselaw. 25 * Defendant contends that Plaintiffs motion should be denied as procedurally 26 improper because it was filed after the Court mled on the underlying motion for leave 27 to file an amended complaint. Defendant contends that the motion became moot when 28 the Court issued its Order granting Plaintiffs motion to amend the Complaint. -10- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM) 1 Defendant contends that the motion for sanctions is without merit because all factual 2 citations and legal arguments made in the opposition were accurate and made in good 3 faith. 4 “Rule 11 is intended to deter baseless filings in district court and imposes a duty 5 of ‘reasonable inquiry’ so that anything filed with the court is ‘well grounded in fact, 6 legally tenable, and not interposed for any improper purpose.’” Islamic Shura Council 7 of Southern California v. F.B.I., 757 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cooter & 8 Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 494 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Motions for Rule 11 attorney’s 9 fees cannot be served after the district court has decided the merits of the underlying 10 dispute giving rise to the questionable filing. This is because once the court has 11 decided the underlying dispute, the motion for fees cannot serve Rule 1 l's purpose of 12 judicial economy.” Id. at 873 (citing Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 1993 13 Amendments to Rule 11 (noting that a party may not serve a motion for Rule 11 14 sanctions after “judicial rejection of the offending contention”)). In this case, on February 9,20016, Plaintiff filed the motion for leave to file an 15 16 amended complaint. On February 23, 2016, Defendant filed the opposition to the 17 motion, which is the basis for the motion for sanctions. On March 18,2016, the Court 18 issued an Order granting the motion for leave to amend. On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff 19 filed the motion for sanctions and costs. Because the motion for sanctions was filed 20 after the Court decided the merits of the underlying motion for leave to amend and after 21 “judicial rejection” of the arguments made in Defendant’s opposition, the motion for 22 sanctions is denied. See Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, 757 F.3d at 873 23 (reversing an order granting a motion for sanctions where the motion for sanctions was 24 filed after the Court had ruled on the motion underlying the dispute); Advisory 25 Committee’s Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11. 26 ill 27 III 28 III -1T- 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM) 1 IV. Conclusion \< 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40) filed by 3 Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick is granted. The First Amended Complaint is 4 dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. f 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for sanctions and costs (ECF No. 6 38) is denied. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the “Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for a 8 Decision on Dkt 38 & 40” (ECF No. 48) is denied as moot. 9 10 DATED: 11 WILLIAM Q. HAYES United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -12- 15-CV-874 WQH (BLM)
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