NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pacific Southwest, Inc. et al., No. 3:2012cv01685 - Document 92 (S.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER denying Defendant Hanson Aggregates Pacific Southwest, Inc.'s 73 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 3/24/2015. (jah)
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NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pacific Southwest, Inc. et al. Doc. 92 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 NEI CONTRACTING AND ENGINEERING, INC., 17 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT HANSON AGGREGATES PACIFIC SOUTHWEST, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, 15 16 Case No. 3:12-cv-01685-BAS(JLB) v. HANSON AGGREGATES PACIFIC SOUTHWEST, INC., ET AL. 18 (ECF No. 73) Defendants. 19 20 21 On July 6, 2012, Plaintiff NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) 22 commenced this putative class action against Defendants Hanson Aggregates Pacific 23 Southwest, Inc. (“Hanson Pacific”), Hanson Aggregates, Inc., and Lehigh Hanson 24 Co. (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging a violation of California Penal Code 25 Section 630, et seq. 26 Complaint, the operative complaint, against Defendants, alleging a violation of 27 California Penal Code Section 632.7 (“Section 632.7”). (ECF No. 41 (“SAC”).) 28 Hanson Pacific now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition. On October 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended –1– 3:12cv01685 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Having reviewed the papers submitted and heard oral argument from both 2 parties, for the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for 3 summary judgment (ECF No. 73). 4 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 5 Defendants “are related entities and are all engaged in the business of 6 providing construction concrete, aggregate, ready mix and related materials to 7 contractors engaged in the construction industry.” (SAC ¶ 4.) Hanson Pacific 8 receives all orders for construction materials through a dedicated telephone line. 9 (ECF No. 73-3 (“Woods Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Prior to July 15, 2009, Hanson Pacific utilized 10 a “Voice Print International” (“VPI”) system, which created a recording of every call 11 made to or from the Ready Mix Dispatch or Aggregate Dispatch lines. (Id. at ¶ 10.) 12 While using the VPI system, Hanson Pacific used “beep tone generators” on all of 13 its telephones which received calls routed to its Ready Mix Dispatch or Aggregate 14 Dispatch lines, which produced an audible “beep tone” every fifteen seconds during 15 a call to provide notice to callers that the call was being recorded. (Id. at ¶ 11; ECF 16 No. 88 (Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (“JSUF”)) ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiff is 17 a contractor and placed numerous orders with Hanson Pacific for construction 18 materials. (SAC ¶ 4; JSUF ¶ 4.) During the pre-July 15, 2009 period, Plaintiff heard 19 the “beep tones” during its phone calls with Hanson Pacific. (JSUF ¶ 4.) 20 On July 15, 2009, Hanson Pacific replaced the VPI system and discontinued 21 its use of the “beep tone generators” and began using “a pre-recorded verbal 22 admonition,” which stated: 23 24 25 26 Thank you for calling Hanson Aggregate Material [Ready Mix] Dispatch. Your call may be monitored for quality assurance. Our hours of Operation are 6:00AM to 4:00PM, Monday thru [sic] Friday. Please remain on the line and your call will be answered as soon as possible. Thank you for your patience. 27 28 (JSUF ¶ 5; see also Woods Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14.) –2– 3:12cv01685 1 During the period between July 15, 2009 and July 5, 2011, Defendants 2 recorded forty-four of Plaintiff’s calls. 3 Defendants updated the verbal admonition to state that calls may be “monitored or 4 recorded for quality assurance purposes.” (Woods Decl. ¶ 17.) 5 II. (JSUF ¶ 5.) On December 23, 2013, STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 Federal courts sitting in diversity “apply state substantive law and federal 7 procedural law.” Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th 8 Cir. 2001) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). 9 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 10 appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 11 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); 12 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue of fact is “material” if 13 it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. 14 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834 15 (9th Cir. 2013). A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict 16 for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also FreecycleSunnyvale 17 v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010). “Disputes over irrelevant 18 or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. 19 Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 20 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 21 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the 22 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The 23 moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial can satisfy this 24 burden in two ways: (1) by producing “evidence negating an essential element of the 25 nonmoving party’s claim or defense;” or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving 26 party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 27 burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 28 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Fed. R. Civ. P. –3– 3:12cv01685 1 56(c)(1). Evidence may be offered “to support or dispute a fact” on summary 2 judgment only if it “could be presented in an admissible form at trial.” Fraser v. 3 Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 4 However, at the summary judgment stage, the focus is not on the admissibility of the 5 evidence’s form, but on the admissibility of its contents. 6 meets it burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce 7 admissible evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d 8 at 1102-03; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 9 (1986). Id. If the moving party 10 “[I]n granting summary judgment a district court cannot resolve disputed 11 questions of material fact; rather, that court must view all of the facts in the record in 12 the light most favorable to the non-moving party and rule, as a matter of law, based 13 on those facts.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014). “Credibility 14 determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 15 inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] 16 is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 17 III. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 DISCUSSION California Penal Code Section 632.7 states, in relevant part: Every person who, without the consent of all parties to a communication, intercepts or receives and intentionally records, or assists in the interception or reception and intentional recordation of, a communication transmitted between two cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone, two cordless telephones, a cordless telephone and a landline telephone, or a cordless telephone and a cellular radio telephone, shall be punished[.] 25 Cal. Penal Code § 632.7(a). A person injured under Section 632.7 may bring a civil 26 action for damages and injunctive relief against the person who committed the 27 violation. Cal. Penal Code § 637.2. 28 Hanson Pacific moves for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) –4– 3:12cv01685 1 Plaintiff consented to Defendants’ monitoring and recording of its calls; (2) 2 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Defendants’ 3 conduct falls within the “service observing” exemption in Section 632.7. (Mot. at 4 1.) 5 A. 6 Hanson Pacific argues that the privacy rights implicated by “recording” and 7 “monitoring” are the same, and by warning Plaintiff that its calls would be 8 “monitored,” it thus provided sufficient notice that calls would be “recorded.” (Mot. 9 at 11-17.) Consent Therefore, by continuing on each call, Plaintiff consented to each 10 recording. (Id.) “Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted 11 in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 12 84, 91 (2006) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). If the text of 13 the statute is “clear and unambiguous,” the Court’s inquiry ends. Mendiola v. CPS 14 Sec. Solutions, Inc., 60 Cal.4th 833, 840 (2015) (quoting Murphy v. Kenneth Cole 15 Prod., Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103 (2007)). 16 Section 632.7 expressly prohibits the “intentional[] recording” of a call 17 without the consent of all parties. Cal. Penal Code § 632.7(a). It does not expressly 18 prohibit “monitoring.” As a verb, “monitor” is defined as “to watch, observe, or 19 check esp. for a special purpose[.]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 20 1460 (1993). 21 indication of in some mechanical or automatic way[,]” or “to cause (sound, visual 22 images) to be transferred to and registered on something . . . by mechanical usu. 23 electronic means in such a way that the thing so transferred and registered can . . . be 24 subsequently reproduced.” Id. at 1898. Additionally, General Order 107-B,1 issued The verb “record” is defined as “to make an objective lasting 25 26 27 28 1 Hanson Pacific requests that the Court take judicial notice of several documents, including statements of legislative intent and a California Public Utilities Commission General Order. (ECF No. 73-6.) The Court GRANTS Hanson Pacific’s request to the extent it relies upon the documents. See Fed. R. –5– 3:12cv01685 1 by the California Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”), defines “monitoring” as 2 “the use of monitoring equipment to allow a third person to overhear [a] telephone 3 conversation[,]” and defines “recording” as “the recording or transcribing of any 4 telephone conversation by means of any electronic device.”2 (ECF No. 73-6, Ex. C.) 5 Based on these definitions, the Court finds that “monitor” is not synonymous with 6 “record.” 7 admonition alone was sufficient to warn of recording. The Court notes, however, 8 that whether or not Plaintiff consented to recording remains a factual issue. It may 9 well be that, given Plaintiff’s long history with Hanson Pacific, its consent to being 10 recorded in the past, its awareness of the prior beep system, coupled with the new 11 warning, Hanson Pacific can establish consent. This, however, is a question of fact 12 for a jury. Consequently, Hanson Pacific has failed to show that the verbal 13 The Court does not “weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, 14 but only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Am. Tower Corp. v. 15 City of San Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Balint v. Carson 16 City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Whether or not Plaintiff consented to recording is such an issue. Defendants are 18 thus not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 19 B. 20 Hanson Pacific argues that (1) Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on August Statute of Limitations 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Evid. 201(b)(2) (a court may take judicial notice of a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 966 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1024 n.4 (C.D. Cal 2013). 2 The Court finds unpersuasive Hanson Pacific’s argument that “monitoring equipment” includes machines that can record telephone calls, and thus notice of monitoring is also notice of recording. (Mot. at 16.) General Order 107-B clearly differentiates between “monitor” and “record,” and to engage in the semantics required by Hanson Pacific’s argument would render that distinction superfluous. –6– 3:12cv01685 1 27, 2002, the date Plaintiff placed its first order with Defendants, and, alternatively, 2 (2) Plaintiff should have suspected that its calls were still being recorded after 3 Defendants’ switch to the verbal admonition, and thus Plaintiff’s cause of action 4 accrued on the day it placed its first order after the warning was switched. (Mot. at 5 20-22.) The statute of limitations for a Section 637.2 civil action is one year. 6 Quesada v. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc., No. C–11–1703, 2012 WL 34228, at *1 7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(a); Montalti v. 8 Catanzariti, 191 Cal. App. 3d 96, 98 (1987)). The statute of limitations does not 9 begin to run “until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury.” Id. 10 Hanson Pacific’s first argument lacks merit. Prior to July 15, 2009, 11 Defendants utilized “beep tone generators” to notify customers that their calls were 12 being recorded. 13 requirements for recording set forth by the PUC. Thus, prior to July 15, 2009, 14 Plaintiff had no cause of action against Defendants. Both parties agree that the generators satisfied the notice 15 This Court is also unable to say that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff should have 16 known that Defendants continued to record its calls after switching to the verbal 17 admonition on July 15, 2009. As discussed above, “monitor” is not synonymous 18 with “record.” It follows, then, that abandoning a warning informing the caller that 19 calls are being recorded and replacing it with a warning that calls are being 20 monitored could lead callers to believe that their calls were not being recorded. 21 Plaintiff alleges that it was unaware its calls were being recorded, and that it did not 22 discover the existence of the recordings until March 12, 2012, when Defendant 23 produced them during an unrelated matter. (SAC ¶ 9; Opp. 18.) This action was 24 filed on July 6, 2012. 25 Viewing this allegation and this fact in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 26 the Court finds that Hanson Pacific has failed to carry its burden for purposes of this 27 summary judgment motion. Given that the parties disagree on the date of accrual for 28 Plaintiff’s claim (i.e., when Plaintiff knew or should have known of the recordings), –7– 3:12cv01685 1 that remains a question of fact not suitable for determination on a summary 2 judgment motion. See Nguyen v. W. Digital Corp., 229 Cal. App. 4th 1522, 1552 3 (2014) (explaining that “belated discovery” of one’s claim is a question of fact); see 4 also Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1191 (2013) (stating that 5 application of the statute of limitations is a legal question only when the facts are 6 “undisputed”). 7 C. 8 Hanson Pacific argues that its recordings are exempt from Section 632.7’s 9 prohibitions because the recordings fall within the statute’s “service observing” 10 exception. (Mot. at 22-25.) Section 632.7 expressly states that it does not apply to 11 “(1) Any public utility engaged in the business of providing communications 12 services and facilities[,]” or to “(2) The use of any instrument, equipment, facility, or 13 service furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of the public utility.” Cal. Penal 14 Code § 632.7(b)(1) & (2). For the following reasons, the Court declines to read a 15 “service observing” exemption into Section 632.7. “Service Observing” 16 Defendants do not provide communications services or facilities, and thus are 17 not public utilities within the meaning of the exception. Hanson Pacific argues that 18 a literal reading of Section 632.7 would produce “absurd results[,]” and urges the 19 Court to analyze the legislative history of Section 632,3 which, according to Hanson 20 Pacific, shows that the legislative intent was to create a broader “service observing” 21 exception. 22 legislative history of Section 632 and Section 632.7, however, on the ground that the 23 statutory language is unambiguous. See Ades v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., No. 24 2:13–CV–2468, 2014 WL 4577906, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014) (finding that 25 Section 632.7 is unambiguous and that it “does not contain a broad exception for (Mot. at 22-25.) Courts have frequently declined to examine the 26 27 28 3 This exemption language is almost identical to the language in California Penal Code section 632 (“Section 632”), which prohibits eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications involving landline telephones. –8– 3:12cv01685 1 routine service monitoring”); Zephyr v. Saxon Mortg. Serv.’s, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 2 1223, 1231 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining that a “business telephone monitoring” 3 exception would be contrary to the express language of Section 632 and Section 4 632.7); Dake v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC., No. 12-cv-01680, 2013 5 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160341, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (finding that both 6 Section 632 and Section 632.7 are unambiguous and that neither contains a “service 7 observing” exception); Bales v. Sierra Trading Post, No. 13cv1894, 2013 WL 8 6244529, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (declining to read a “service observing” 9 exception into Section 632 that would permit secret recording for quality assurance 10 11 purposes). Hanson Pacific cites three cases purportedly supporting its position that 12 Section 632.7 contains a “service observing” exception. 13 Worldwide, Inc., No. 2:12–cv–01788, 2014 WL 3434117 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2014); 14 Shin v. Digi-Key Corp., No. CV 12–5415, 2012 WL 5503847 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 15 2012); Sajfr v. BBG Commc’ns Inc., No. 10cv2341, 2012 WL 398991 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16 10, 2012). In Sajfr, the district court granted a motion to dismiss based on the lack 17 of subject matter jurisdiction. Sajfr, 2012 WL 398991, at *5. The district court 18 added as an “additional argument” that Section 632’s legislative history established 19 that the statute contained a “service observing” exception. Id. at *6. However, as 20 pointed out by the district court in Ades, the Sajfr judge “found in a later case that 21 reliance on the same ‘legislative history [was] misplaced as the statutory language is 22 clear and unambiguous,’ and explicitly stated that § 632 ‘does not create a “service- 23 observing” exemption.’” Ades, 2014 WL 4577906, at *5 (quoting Knell v. FIA Card 24 Serv.’s, N.A., No. 12-cv-0426, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187551, at *22 (S.D. Cal. 25 Feb. 21, 2013)) (alteration in original). See Young v. Hilton 26 In Shin, the district court relied solely on Sajfr as authority for reviewing the 27 legislative history of Section 632. Shin, 2012 WL 5503847, at *3. Notably, the 28 district court in Young cites to Shin as authority for the proposition that “the –9– 3:12cv01685 1 legislature did not limit the service observing monitoring of calls that [] is alleged 2 [against defendant].” Young, 2014 WL 3434117, at *2 (citing Shin, 2012 WL 3 5503847). Because the district court that decided Sajfr later abandoned its reliance 4 on the relevant statutes’ legislative history, the Court finds that Sajfr should not be 5 followed. Since Shin relied on Sajfr, and Young relied on Shin, the Court finds none 6 of the three cases persuasive on this point. In line with the greater weight of 7 authority, the Court declines to review the legislative history of either Section 632 or 8 Section 632.7, and also declines to read a “service observing” exemption into 9 Section 632.7. 10 11 12 13 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Hanson Pacific’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED (ECF No. 73). IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 DATED: March 24, 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 – 10 – 3:12cv01685
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