-CAB Technica LLC v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company et al, No. 3:2008cv01673 - Document 107 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER: denying 85 Motion for Determination that there is No Reason for Delay in Entering Final Judgment on Complaint; and Denying 86 Motion to Amend And/Or For Relief From Judgment. Based on the foregoing stated herein, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff's motion to amend or for relief from judgment is denied and their motion for determination for delay in entry of final judgment is denied. The Magistrate Judge is directed to set a case management conference in order to schedule all further proceedings in this case. Signed by Judge John A. Houston on 3/21/2011. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(leh) (jrl).
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-CAB Technica LLC v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company et al Doc. 107 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the use and benefit of TECHNICA, LLC, v. Plaintiff, CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et. al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 08cv1673 JAH (CAB) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND/OR FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT [DOC. # 86]; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION THAT THERE IS NO REASON FOR DELAY IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINT [DOC. # 85] INTRODUCTION 18 Pending before this Court are the motions to amend, and/or for relief from, this 19 Court’s judgment and for a determination that there is no reason for delay in entering 20 judgment filed by plaintiff Technica, L.L.C. (“Technica” or “plaintiff”). The motions have 21 been fully briefed by the parties. After a careful consideration of the record as a whole, 22 and for the reasons set below, this Court DENIES both of plaintiff’s motions. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff filed a complaint on September 8, 2008, alleging two causes of action: (1) 25 under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131, et seq., against defendant Candelaria Corporation 26 (“Candelaria”) and Candelaria’s payment bond surety, defendant Carolina Casualty 27 Insurance Company (“CCIC”); and (2) for breach of contract against defendant Otay 28 Group, Inc. (“Otay”). Plaintiff’s claims stem from construction work performed for a 08cv1673 Dockets.Justia.com 1 federal construction project known as “ICE El Centro SPC - Perimeter Fence 2 Replacement/Internal Devising Fence Replacement” located in El Centro, California (“the 3 project”). The project consisted of replacement and construction of fencing at the El 4 Centro United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention facility. 5 Candelaria was the general contractor for the project and CCIC was Candelaria’s surety 6 on the payment bond. Candelaria entered into a subcontract with Otay on December 12, 7 2007, in which Otay agreed to supply labor and equipment necessary to complete a 8 portion of the project. Technica subsequently entered into an agreement with Otay 9 concerning work on the project. On June 6, 2008, Otay’s subcontract with Candelaria was 10 terminated for cause. 11 Candelaria filed a counterclaim against Technica on May 4, 2009, and Technica 12 filed an answer to the counterclaim on May 26, 2009. Defendants Candelaria, CCIC and 13 Otay (collectively “defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment on September 28, 14 2009, seeking judgment in their favor on both of plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that 15 plaintiff was barred from filing suit in California because it did not hold a California 16 contractor’s license. This Court, on June 29, 2010, granted defendants’ motion. The 17 instant motions for reconsideration or for certification for interlocutory appeal of that 18 ruling were filed by plaintiff on July 27, 2010. Oppositions to the motions were filed on 19 October 12, 2010 and reply briefs were filed on October 19, 2010. 20 subsequently took the motions under submission without oral argument. See CivLR 21 7.1(d.1). This Court DISCUSSION 22 23 Plaintiff moves to amend, or for relief, from the judgment entered by this Court by 24 order filed on June 29, 2010, pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b). Plaintiff separately 25 moves for a determination by this Court that there is no just reason to delay entry of final 26 judgment on plaintiff’s claims against defendants for appeal purposes. 27 // 28 // 2 08cv1673 1 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend or for Relief from Judgment 2 a. 3 The reconsideration of a court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 4 (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (motion for 5 relief from final judgment or order) is appropriate only if the district court: (1) is presented 6 with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 7 manifestly unjust; or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law. See School 8 Dist. No. 1J, Multonomah County, Or. v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 9 1993). Materials available at the time of filing of an opposition are not “newly discovered 10 evidence” warranting a reconsideration of summary judgment. Trentacosta v. Frontier 11 Pacific Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1557 (9th Cir. 1987); Frederick S. Wyle 12 Professional Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1985). 13 Legal Standard Rule 60(b) permits relief from a judgment or an order for: (1) mistake, 14 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 15 diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial . . .; (3) fraud . 16 . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party; (4) a void judgment; (5) 17 satisfaction, release, or discharge of the judgment; or (6) “any other reason justifying relief 18 from the operation of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) “has been used 19 sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent injustice. The rule is to be utilized only where 20 extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or 21 correct an erroneous judgment.” United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir, Co., 984 F.2d 22 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993). 23 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “[i]n determining whether Rule 60(b) applies, 24 courts should be mindful that the rules are to be construed to achieve the just 25 determination of every action.” Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983). 26 However, there is also a compelling interest in the finality of judgments that should not 27 be disregarded lightly. Id. Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend 28 a judgment) or Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment) is appropriate if "the district court (1) 3 08cv1673 1 is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial 2 decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." 3 School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 4 1993). 5 b. Analysis 6 The Court finds that there are no grounds on which to grant plaintiff’s motion for 7 reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly 8 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 9 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling 10 law.” Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 11 omitted). Plaintiff’s only basis for challenging the order is the assertion that this Court 12 committed “clear error” in its understanding of the relevant law and facts. Plaintiff’s 13 arguments challenge virtually every aspect of this Court’s ruling and essentially amount 14 to a recapitulation of the motion for summary judgment. The Court notes that a motion 15 to reconsider is not a means for a party to rehash arguments that were previously 16 considered and rejected. Gutierrez v. Givens, 989 F. Supp. at 1047; see also, In re Oil Spill 17 by the “Amoco Cadiz”, 794 F. Supp. 261, 276 (N. D. Ill. 1992) (“motions to reconsider 18 are not at the disposal of parties who want to ‘rehash old arguments.”). Nonetheless, this 19 Court has reviewed its prior order in its entirety, the case law cited in the order, and both 20 those aspects of the record relied upon in the order and those to which plaintiff points in 21 its motion. 22 While reasonable minds may disagree on the nuances of the law and the facts 23 presented, differing interpretations of fact and law do not amount to “clear error” but are 24 a normal byproduct of legal advocacy. 25 conclusions drawn by this Court, the analysis can hardly be characterized as “clear error.” 26 The Court finds that this Court’s prior order granting summary judgment in defendants’ 27 favor is supported by the record and the law and therefore is not clearly erroneous. 28 // Although defendant may disagree with the 4 08cv1673 1 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of No Just Reason for Delay 2 a. 3 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 4 When more than one claim is presented in an action . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment. 5 6 7 Legal Standard Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 8 In determining whether to grant Rule 54(b) certification, the court must first decide 9 whether a final judgment was rendered, that is “an ultimate disposition of an individual 10 claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. 11 Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980). After making this threshold determination, the court 12 must then examine whether there is any just reason for delay, considering “the historic 13 federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id. at 8; Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 14 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 The court exercises its discretion to determine whether the matter is “ready for 16 appeal . . . tak[ing] into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities 17 involved.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8; see Wood, 422 F.3d at 878. The district court 18 acts as a “dispatcher” exercising its discretion to decide which dispositive decision on a 19 claim or counterclaim in a multi-claim action should be “finalized” (i.e., made appealable) 20 and which should be withheld pending resolution of the entire controversy. Spiegel v. 21 Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1988). 22 Judicial administration concerns include “whether certification would result in 23 unnecessary appellate review; whether the claims finally adjudicated were separate, 24 distinct, and independent of any other claims; whether review of the adjudicated claims 25 would be mooted by future developments in the case; whether an appellate court would 26 have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals; and 27 whether delay in payment of the judgment ... would inflict severe financial harm.” Wood, 28 422 F.3d at 878 n.2 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 5-6). However, “claims certified 5 08cv1673 1 for appeal do not need to be separate as long as resolving the claims would streamline the 2 ensuing litigation.” Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3de 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 b. Analysis 4 Plaintiff seeks this Court’s certification for interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b) 5 as to the Court’s ruling on summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims. The claims 6 presented by plaintiff in its complaint, and subsequently adjudicated on summary 7 judgment, were claims (1) for recovery under the Miller Act for payment on CCIC’s 8 payment bond for work Technica performed on the project against Candelaria and CCIC, 9 and (2) for breach of contract against Otay. Remaining to be resolved is Candelaria’s 10 counterclaim for breach of contract against Technica stemming from an assignment to 11 Candelaria of Otay’s claims against Technica. 12 It is undisputed that this Court’s summary judgment ruling was final and ended the 13 litigation with respect to plaintiff’s claims, rendering the first element under Rule 54(b) 14 satisfied. This Court now turns to whether there is a just reason for delay, taking into 15 account both judicial administrative interests along with the equities involved. Curtiss- 16 Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. 17 Here, plaintiff’s claims arose from the same contract and the same construction 18 work as the breach of contract claim still remaining to be litigated. Thus, both the claims 19 sought to be certified for interlocutory appeal and the remaining counterclaim contain 20 overlapping facts and the witnesses and evidence will most likely also overlap. The legal 21 issues clearly overlap since each party brings a breach of contract claim and plaintiff’s 22 Miller Act claim seeks payment under the Miller Act bond based on an alleged breach of 23 contract. Therefore, this Court finds that the factual and legal issues in these claims are 24 not separate, independent or distinct from each other such that any immediate appeal 25 would likely result in a duplication of efforts in any subsequent appeal. See RDLegal 26 Funding v. Erwin & Balingit, LLP, 2010 WL 1416968 *1 (S.D.Cal. April 8, 27 2010)(denying Rule 54(b) certification because the overlap in factual issues would result 28 in duplication of effort); Claver v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, 2009 WL 6 08cv1673 1 1606611 *2 (S.D.Cal. June 8, 2009)(same). 2 This Court further finds that the equities do not favor granting Rule 54(b) 3 certification. The Ninth Circuit commented that “[j]udgments under Rule 54(b) must be 4 reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 5 proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by the pressing 6 needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” 7 Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). As defendants 8 point out, discovery in this case has been completed and the counterclaim is ready for trial 9 which could take place in as little as six months from now. Conversely, should this Court 10 certify the interlocutory appeal and stay the counterclaim as suggested by plaintiff, the 11 conclusion of this case could take substantially longer to resolve. This is not, in this 12 Court’s view, the “unusual case” contemplated by Rule 54(b) such that certification is 13 warranted. 14 certification. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for certifications is denied. This Court, therefore, finds the equities also do not favor Rule 54(b) 15 Because the pretrial dates having been previously vacated pending resolution of 16 these motions, this Court deems it appropriate to now direct the magistrate judge to set 17 a case management conference in order to reschedule those dates. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 19 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 20 1. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b) is DENIED; 21 22 2. 3. The magistrate judge is directed to set a case management conference in order to schedule all further proceedings in this case. 25 26 Plaintiff’s motion for determination that there is no just reason for delay in entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) is DENIED; and 23 24 Plaintiff’s motion to amend or for relief from judgment pursuant to Dated: March 21, 2011 27 JOHN A. HOUSTON United States District Judge 28 7 08cv1673
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