Allstate Property and Casualty Company v. Wilks, No. 2:2020cv00496 - Document 39 (M.D. Ala. 2021)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/28/2021. (bes, )
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Allstate Property and Casualty Company v. Wilks Doc. 39 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL WILKS, Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20cv496-MHT (WO) OPINION Defendant Michael Wilks was in a motorcycle crash, and he thereafter filed an uninsured motorist claim with plaintiff Allstate Property and Casualty Company under the policy of a relative named Ann Slaughter. Allstate then filed the current suit against Wilks under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaration that Wilks “is not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits” under Slaughter’s policy. Complaint (Doc. 1) at 1. The court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dockets.Justia.com This cause is now before the court on Allstate’s renewed motion for summary judgment.* For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted. I. Summary-Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 56(c)(2). as a matter Under Rule of 56, law.” the Fed. court R. must Civ. view P. the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Wilks previously filed two counterclaims, see Def.’s Answer to Compl. (Doc. 6), one of which he agreed to the dismissal of voluntarily, see Nov. 18 Judgment (Doc. 21), and one of which the court dismissed on Allstate’s original motion for summary judgment, see Allstate Property & Casualty Co. v. Wilks, No. 2:20cv496 MHT, 2021 WL 2404340 (M.D. Ala. June 11, 2021). 2 * II. Background The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Wilks, are as follows. Wilks and a friend crashed into each other while driving motorcycles. friend was driving At the time of the crash, Wilks’s a motorcycle belonging to Wilks, while Wilks was driving a motorcycle belonging to his friend’s husband. Wilks’s great aunt, Ann Slaughter, holds an auto insurance policy issued by Allstate. Wilks made an uninsured motorist claim under the policy stemming from the accident. The policy provides uninsured motorist coverage to only “insured persons.” 34-1) at others, 35. the These “Named covered Insured,” Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Doc. persons “resident and persons driving “insured auto[s].” 35. 3 include, among relative[s],” Id. at 16-17, Allstate originally issued the policy to Slaughter in 2007. In 2018, Slaughter purchased a Kia automobile for Wilks to use. She modified her policy to add the Kia as an insured auto, and to add Wilks as a listed driver, but not as a “Named Insured.” In a subsequent deposition in this litigation, Slaughter explained that when she modified the policy, she intended it “to cover Mr. Wilks drove.” for any motor Deposition of vehicle Ann whatsoever Slaughter, that Def.’s Ex. he A (Doc. 36-2) at 19. At the time of Wilks’s crash, Slaughter was the only “Named Insured” on the policy, and she and Wilks did not reside together. III. Discussion “The general rule is that identity of the insured and liability of the insurer is determined from the terms of the contract.” Armstrong v. Security Ins. Group, 288 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 1973). “If the policy 4 is not ambiguous, enforced as the written, insurance and courts contract should must not be defeat express provisions in a policy ... by making a new Thorn v. Am. States Ins. contract for the parties.” Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Thompson, J.). The policy terms covers of Slaughter’s policy “insured persons.” only (Doc. 34-1) at 35. state that Pl.’s the Ex. 1 “[I]nsured persons” include only the following: “you and any resident relative,” “any person while permission,” in and ... “any an insured other auto person who with is your legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you, a resident relative, or an occupant of your insured auto with your permission.” Id. “[Y]ou” and “your” refer to the policyholder listed as “Named Insured” and the policyholder’s resident spouse. Id. at 17. A “resident” is “a person who physically resides in your household with the intention 5 to continue residence Id. there.” And an “insured auto” is “an auto you own which is described on the Policy Declarations,” id. at 35, or an “auto used by you or a resident relative with the owner’s permission but which is not ... owned by you or a resident relative, ... or available or furnished for the regular use of you or a resident Id. at 16. relative.” It is undisputed that, at the time of the crash, Wilks was (1) not listed as “Named Insured” on Slaughter’s policy, (2) not residing with Slaughter, and (3) not automobile Slaughter driving that or permission. was a an “insured owned resident Therefore, by auto”--that Slaughter relative Wilks was with not or the an is, an used by owner’s “insured person” according to the terms of Slaughter’s insurance policy. Wilks produced argues a application, that, signed and because copy because 6 Allstate of Slaughter’s the policy that has not insurance Allstate submitted to the court does not contain her signature, there is an issue of material fact as to whether Slaughter accepted the terms of the policy. Allstate has previously explained that it does not have a copy of Slaughter’s application because it keeps applications for only seven years, and Slaughter filed hers over 13 years ago. 1–2. See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 28) at It has also explained that insureds do not sign insurance policies, but only applications, and that there is therefore no signed policy for it to produce. See id. at affidavit exhibit 2. Allstate attesting is, in that fact, agreed to be bound. has, the the however, policy policy it by produced filed which as an an Slaughter See Pl.s’ Ex. 1 (Doc. 34-1) at 2. The policy requests that Slaughter “notify [Allstate] immediately if [she] believe[s] any coverages are not listed or are inaccurately listed.” Id. at 8. Slaughter received a copy of her revised policy after adding the Kia as an insured auto and Wilks as a listed 7 driver, but she did not inform Allstate of any problems with her coverage, and instead continued to pay her monthly premiums. If a policy is accepted by the insured, she “is bound thereby.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 226 So. 2d 320, 545 (Ala. 1969). Given that Wilks has produced no evidence that Slaughter did not accept the policy, the court concludes that there is no issue of material fact as to whether she did so. Wilks also argues that Slaughter’s intention to provide coverage for Wilks no matter what vehicle he drove renders the scope of the policy ambiguous, and thereby raises an issue of material fact concerning his coverage. As stated above, if the insured accepts a policy, she bound by it; this is so “even though the terms do not correspond to what ‘assumed’ the coverages would be.” [she] ‘thought’ or Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 226 So. 2d 320, 545 (Ala. 1969); see also Tate v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 1997) (“A policy is not made ambiguous by the 8 fact that the parties interpret the policy differently.”). Here, Slaughter accepted the terms of the policy, which make clear that Wilks was not an “insured person.” Slaughter’s intention to provide coverage for Wilks is therefore irrelevant. Finally, Wilks argues that Allstate is not entitled to rescind Slaughter’s policy under Code of Alabama § 27-14-7(a), which allows insurers to rescind policies entered into misrepresentations. on the basis of material This argument seems to be premised on the notion that Slaughter contracted with Allstate to provide coverage for Wilks no matter what vehicle he drove, and that Allstate is now seeking to rescind that contract. But while Slaughter might have intended to enter such a contract with Allstate, the contract that she ultimately accepted did not cover Wilks while he was driving his friend’s motorcycle. There is thus no contract covering Wilks for Allstate to rescind. 9 Because Wilks was not an “insured person” according to the terms of Slaughter’s policy, he is not covered by the policy, and Allstate is entitled to summary judgment. * * * An appropriate judgment will be entered. DONE, this the 28th day of September, 2021. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10
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