Fielder v. Lee Staffing, Inc. et al, No. 2:2019cv00186 - Document 31 (M.D. Ala. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/27/2019. (amf, )
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Fielder v. Lee Staffing, Inc. et al Doc. 31 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION SHEKELA JONES FIELDER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) LEE STAFFING, INC., d/b/a ) Allegiance Staffing, and ) ITHAKA HOSPITALITY ) PARTNERS AUBURN HUMAN ) RESOURCES, LLC, d/b/a The ) Hotel at Auburn University ) And Dixon Conference ) Center, ) ) Defendants. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19cv186-MHT (WO) OPINION Plaintiff Shekela Jones race-discrimination-in-employment Fielder lawsuit filed this under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. She has named as defendants her Dockets.Justia.com “joint employers,” The Hotel of Auburn and Allegiance Staffing.1 Both The Hotel of Auburn and Allegiance Staffing have moved proceedings to dismiss and or, compel alternatively, arbitration to stay under the arbitration clause in Fielder’s employment agreement. For reasons motions to that follow, the extent the that court will arbitration grant the will be compelled and these federal-court proceedings stayed. 2 1. The Hotel of Auburn’s full and formal name is Ithaka Hospitality Partners Auburn Human Resources, LLC, doing business as The Hotel at Auburn University and Dixon Conference Center. Allegiance Staffing’s full and formal name is Lee Staffing, Inc., doing business as Allegiance Staffing. 2. Since the Federal Arbitration Act instructs that the court “shall ... stay the trial of the action” pending arbitration and there remains the possibility that the claims against The Hotel could still be tried in this forum if the arbitrator determines the claims are not arbitrable, the court will grant the relief to the extent of staying the action and compelling arbitration, not dismissal. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. 2 A. Fielder has consented to arbitration of her Title VII claims against Allegiance Staffing. Allegiance Staffing’s motion will therefore be granted, as stated, to the extent that arbitration will be compelled and these federal-court proceedings stayed as to it. However, Fielding objects to the arbitration of her Title VII claims against The Hotel of Auburn, which, unlike Allegiance Staffing, is a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement. She contends her claims against The Hotel should proceed in this court. replies that, as a substantive matter, The Hotel the claims against it are arbitrable and that, in any event, the question whether Fielder’s claims are arbitrable is for the arbitrator, not this court, to decide in the first instance. 3 B. The Federal Arbitration Act makes agreements to settle disputes by arbitration generally enforceable. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. “Under the Act, arbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms.” Harry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019). In arbitration agreements, “parties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute “arbitrability,” but such also as ‘“gateway” whether the questions parties of have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.’” West, Upon Inc. v. finding Jackson, that Id. (quoting Rent–A–Center, 561 there U.S. are one 63, or 68-69 more (2010)). arbitrable issues in the case, the court “shall on application of one of the parties pending arbitration. stay the trial 9 U.S.C. § 3. 4 of the action” In interpreting an arbitration agreement such as this one, this court questions: (1) who must consider decides--the answering court two or the arbitrator--whether a claim is arbitrable (the “who” question); and (2), if it is the court, whether that claim is, in fact, arbitrable under the terms of the agreement (the “what” question). This court now turns first to the “who” question. Whether a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may enforce that agreement governed by state law. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d is a threshold issue See Lawson v. Life of the South 1166, 1170–71 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630–31 (2009)). Under Alabama law, “whether an arbitration provision may be used to compel arbitration of a dispute between a nonsignatory and a signatory is a question of substantive arbitrability.” Anderton v. Practice–Monroeville, P.C., 164 So. 3d 1094, 1101 (Ala. 2014). “[S]ubstantive arbitrability 5 addresses both whether [] nonsignatories ... can enforce the agreement to arbitrate and whether the claims at issue encompassed by the arbitration provision.” Castellanos, --- So. 3d ---, No. are Carroll v. 1170197, 2019 WL 1305882, at *4 (Ala. Mar. 22, 2019). If the parties to an arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” substantive nonsignatory agree to arbitrate the arbitrability--including may compel respect that agreement. issue whether arbitration--the court of a must Anderton, 164 So. 3d at 1102; accord First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Anderton, supra, is instructive here. In Anderton, a medical practice contracted with a software company to purchase 6 software. The software company used another company to sell and service its software. The sales-and-service company, in turn, employed Anderton, who was also a partial owner. When the medical practice became dissatisfied with the software, it attempted to cancel its contract with the software company. sue the software company. sales-and-service Anderton, who agreement. were not Instead, and parties its it sued the owner–employee to the arbitration The sales-and-service company and Anderton nonetheless agreement company But it did not attempted against to the enforce medical the arbitration practice. And they argued that, under the agreement, the arbitrator, and not the court, should decide whether they could compel arbitration as nonsignatories. The state court looked first to the agreement itself, which included an arbitration provision that incorporated the rules Association (“AAA”). of the Under 7 American those Arbitration rules, “‘The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.’” Anderton, 164 So. 3d at 1102 (quoting the AAA rules). The court held that, by incorporating the AAA the rules, showed the agreement signers’ clearly intent to and have unmistakably the arbitrator decide whether a nonsignatory could compel arbitration. See id.; see also Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Properties of Willmar, LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting “the incorporation of the AAA Rules into a contract requiring arbitration to be a clear and unmistakable indication the parties intended for the arbitrator arbitrability”); to Joe decide Hudson threshold questions of Collision Center. v. Dymond, 40 So. 3d 704, 710 (Ala. 2009) (noting that an arbitration clearly and agreement incorporating unmistakably delegates the AAA rules arbitrability questions to the arbitrator); cf. Terminix Int’l Co. v. 8 Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (“By incorporating the AAA rules ... into their agreement, the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator arbitration “usually clause decided should is by decide valid.”). the whether Thus, court,” the the although question of enforcement by a nonsignatory “ha[d] been delegated to the arbitrator.” state court therefore question--that company and Anderton, 164 So. 3d at 1102. is, did not whether owner-employee reach the Anderton the The “what” sales-and-service could, compel the medical practice to arbitrate. in fact, See id. Anderton compels a similar conclusion here. As with Anderton and the sales-and-service company, who did not sign the software contract, The Hotel of Auburn did not sign Fielder’s employment contract. And as with the agreement in Anderton, Fielder’s arbitration agreement incorporates, and is thus governed, by the AAA rules. See Employment Agreement (doc. no. 21-1) at 9 3 (setting forth that disputes “shall be submitted to BINDING AARBIATION, according to the AAA, that is, the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration Association then existing in the County where the Employer maintains its principal place of business.”). And, finally, as in Anderton, Rule 6(a) of the AAA gives the arbitrator “the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of American Arbitration Arbitration Rules and the arbitration Association, Mediation agreement.” Employment Procedures (2009), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules_Web 2119.pdf. Therefore, just as was true in Anderton, Fielder’s arbitration delegates agreement the nonsignatory, clearly question such as of The arbitrator. 10 Hotel and unmistakably enforcement of Auburn, by to a the *** By agreement therefore, of grant the parties, Allegiance the court Staffing’s will, arbitration motion to the extent of compelling arbitration of the claims against proceedings. it and staying these federal-court The court will also grant The Hotel of Auburn’s arbitration motion to the extent of compelling arbitration of the claims against it (with the threshold issue for the arbitrator being whether the claims are even arbitrable) and staying these federal-court proceedings. An appropriate judgment will be entered. DONE, this the 27th day of November, 2019. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11
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