Curtis Hunter v. Lieutenant Morris, et al, No. 22-11599 (11th Cir. 2023)
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USCA11 Case: 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Page: 1 of 13 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-11599 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CURTIS HUNTER, Plainti -Appellant, versus RIVERBEND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants, LIEUTENANT MORRIS, In his/her individual and o cial capacity, TAMMY BAILEY, THE GEO GROUP INC, USCA11 Case: 22-11599 2 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 2 of 13 22-11599 Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00491-MTT ____________________ Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Curtis Hunter, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s nal judgment in favor of defendants in his civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, Hunter challenges the district court’s orders (1) dismissing Hunter’s claims against Dr. Steven Niergarth; (2) extending the time to le dispositive motions; (3) denying Hunter’s motions to compel and to stay discovery; and (4) granting summary judgment in favor of The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) and Lieutenant Marcus Morris on Hunter’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect and conditions-of-con nement claims. 2 No reversible error has been shown; we a rm. We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 1 Construed liberally, Hunter’s appellate brief raises no substantive challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GEO and 2 USCA11 Case: 22-11599 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 3 of 13 3 I. Brie y stated, this civil action arises out of a physical altercation among inmates on 10 December 2017, while Hunter was incarcerated at Riverbend Correctional Facility (“Riverbend”): a prison owned and operated by GEO. An initial ght broke out between members of two di erent gangs, after which the instigating inmate was placed in restraints. Following the initial incident, Lieutenant Morris ordered inmates secured in their dormitory units. Shortly thereafter, a second ght erupted between members of the two gangs. Hunter was not a member of either gang. Nevertheless, Hunter says he intervened in the ght to try to calm the situation. During the incident, Hunter slipped on a wet area of the tiled oor, fell, and injured his right knee. Hunter was rst examined by the medical sta at Riverbend and was later referred to a private orthopedist, Dr. Niergarth. Hunter visited Dr. Niergarth three times between January and March 2018. Hunter was released from custody on 18 May 2018. In December 2019, Hunter led this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pertinent to this appeal, Hunter’s amended complaint asserted a claim against Dr. Niergarth for deliberate indi erence to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hunter also asserted Eighth Amendment claims (1) against Tammy Bailey on Hunter’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. That claim is thus not properly before us on appeal. USCA11 Case: 22-11599 4 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 4 of 13 22-11599 GEO 3 and Lieutenant Morris for failure to protect him from bodily harm and (2) against GEO for hazardous conditions of con nement. In December 2020, the district court granted Dr. Niergarth’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Hunter had failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. On 7 April 2022, the district court granted GEO and Lieutenant Morris’s motion for summary judgment. In the same order, the district court denied Hunter’s outstanding motions to compel and to stay discovery. II. A. Dismissal of Claims against Dr. Niergarth We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, accepting all properly alleged facts as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plainti . See Butler v. Sheri of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain su cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). To state a plausible claim for relief, plainti s must go beyond merely pleading the “sheer possibility” of unlawful activity by a defendant; plainti s must o er “factual content that Hunter’s amended complaint named Riverbend as a defendant. GEO was later substituted as the proper party. 3 USCA11 Case: 22-11599 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 5 of 13 5 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indi erence to a serious medical need, a plainti must allege facts su cient to demonstrate two things: (1) “an objectively serious medical need” and (2) “that prison o cials acted with deliberate indi erence to that need.” See Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). A prison o cial acts with deliberate indi erence when he “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2) disregarded that risk, and (3) acted with more than gross negligence.” Wade v. McDade, 67 F.4th 1363, 1374 (11th Cir. 2023) (emphasis omitted). The Eighth Amendment does not mandate that medical care for prisoners be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” See Ho er v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020). We have stressed that “medical treatment violates the Eighth Amendment only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See id. (brackets omitted). In his amended complaint, Hunter alleged these facts, which we accept as true and construe in Hunter’s favor. On 11 January 2018, Dr. Niergarth took x-rays of Hunter’s knee, provided Hunter with a stabilizing knee brace, and directed Hunter to return in one month. On 9 February, Dr. Niergarth took more x-rays and ordered an MRI on Hunter’s knee. USCA11 Case: 22-11599 6 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 6 of 13 22-11599 On 7 March, Dr. Niergarth discussed the MRI results with Hunter. Dr. Niergarth diagnosed Hunter with a tibial plateau fracture: an injury that could be xed only by total knee replacement. Dr. Niergarth, however, told Hunter that he was too young for a total knee replacement and that such a procedure would last only ten years. Hunter says Dr. Niergarth then had Hunter return the stabilizing brace, provided no other brace, crutches, or pain medicine, and failed to refer Hunter to another orthopedic surgeon for a second opinion. For purposes of this appeal, we accept that Hunter’s knee injury constitutes an objectively serious medical need. Hunter, however, has failed to allege facts showing plausibly that Dr. Niergarth’s medical care was so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or conscience-shocking that it rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. That Hunter disagrees with Dr. Niergarth’s medical opinions about Hunter’s candidacy for a total knee replacement and about the continuing need for a stabilizing knee brace is insuf cient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266 (“[A] simple di erence in medical opinion between the prison’s medical sta and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment fails to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” (brackets omitted)). The district court committed no error in dismissing -- for failure to state a claim -- Hunter’s deliberate-indi erence claim against Dr. Niergarth. B. Motions for Extension of Time USCA11 Case: 22-11599 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 7 of 13 7 Hunter next contends that the district court abused its discretion by twice granting GEO and Lieutenant Morris an extension of time to le a motion for summary judgment. We disagree. To the extent Hunter argues that the district court erred in granting an extension absent a showing of excusable neglect, that argument is without merit. We have said that “[a] timely motion to extend is reviewed for good cause, not excusable neglect, . . . and should be liberally granted absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice.” See Lizarazo v. Miami-Dade Corr. & Rehab. Dep’t, 878 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted, alteration adopted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must be done within a speci ed time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires[.]”). GEO and Lieutenant Morris twice moved for a 14-day extension of time to move for summary judgment. GEO and Lieutenant Morris asserted that they had worked diligently to prepare their summary-judgment motion. About the rst request, GEO and Lieutenant Morris also stated that an extension was necessary due to outstanding discovery issues and a pending hearing scheduled the day after the then-deadline for ling dispositive motions. Because each extension request was made before the applicable deadline then-in-e ect for ling dispositive motions, the requests were subject to good-cause review. The record supports a nding that good cause existed to grant the requested extensions. In addition, nothing evidences that the motions for extension were USCA11 Case: 22-11599 8 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 8 of 13 22-11599 led in bad faith or resulted in undue delay or prejudice. The district court abused no discretion in granting GEO and Lieutenant Morris’s motions for extensions of time. C. Motions to Compel Discovery and to Stay Discovery We next reject Hunter’s arguments challenging the district court’s denial of his motions to compel discovery and to stay discovery. We begin with some background. In June 2021, Hunter moved for sanctions based in part on GEO’s purported failure to produce speci c prison surveillance videos. The district court conducted a hearing on Hunter’s sanctions motion and ordered GEO to le a veri ed statement addressing the availability of the requested video evidence. GEO produced a sworn a davit from an investigator at Riverbend con rming that GEO had provided all available videos to Hunter. On 24 August 2021, the district court denied Hunter’s motion for sanctions. In doing so, the district court rejected Hunter’s assertion that GEO had been untruthful about the availability of the requested video evidence. One week later, Hunter led the motion to compel discovery at issue. In his motion, Hunter sought to compel the production of the same video evidence that was central to Hunter’s earlier sanctions motion. Given that the district court had already rejected Hunter’s arguments about GEO’s failure to produce additional video evidence, the district court committed no error in denying Hunter’s later- led motion to compel that same evidence. USCA11 Case: 22-11599 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 9 of 13 9 Nor did the district court err in denying Hunter’s motion to stay discovery: a motion led two months after the close of discovery and two weeks after GEO and Lieutenant Morris moved for summary judgment. We reject Hunter’s contention that the district court violated his due process rights (1) by ruling on his motion to compel and his motion to stay discovery several months after the motions were led, or (2) by ruling on Hunter’s motions on the same day the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the timing or manner of the district court’s rulings deprived him of a constitutionallyprotected interest or constituted constitutionally inadequate process. See Worthy v. Phenix City, Ala., 930 F.3d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 2019). D. Summary Judgment Hunter next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GEO and Lieutenant Morris on Hunter’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-con nement and failure-to-protect claims. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 836-37. 1. Conditions of Con nement USCA11 Case: 22-11599 10 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 10 of 13 22-11599 To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In a conditions-of-con nement context, a prisoner satis es the objective component by showing an “extreme” condition that posed an “unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” See Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1088 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). “[T]o satisfy the ‘subjective component,’ the prisoner must show that the prison o cial acted with deliberate indi erence.” Id. at 1088-89. “A prison o cial acts with deliberate indi erence when he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 1089 (quotations omitted). “[T]he o cial must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indi erence requires a defendant to have “acted with more than gross negligence.” See Wade, 67 F.4th at 1374 (emphasis in original). Hunter has failed to present evidence su cient to satisfy either the objective or subjective component of his conditions-ofcon nement claim against GEO. Hunter argues chie y that GEO knew about the condensation on the oor and failed to remedy it. But Hunter has not shown that the alleged condensation on the oor rose to the level of an “extreme” condition that posed an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” See Swain, 958 F.3d at 1088. Nor has Hunter presented evidence that would support a reasonable inference -- or evidence demonstrating that prison USCA11 Case: 22-11599 22-11599 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 11 of 13 11 o cials in fact drew the inference -- that the complained-of condition posed a substantial risk of serious harm. To the extent prison o cials knew about the alleged condensation on the oor or about a possible risk of a slip-and-fall, the alleged failure to remedy the situation is something more akin to negligence. Hunter has thus failed to demonstrate a su ciently culpable state of mind to trigger Eighth Amendment liability. 2. Failure to Protect Hunter also contends that GEO and Lieutenant Morris exhibited deliberate indi erence for his safety by failing to respond adequately to the 10 December 2017 altercation and by failing to implement appropriate policies and procedures for addressing inmate gang violence. “To survive summary judgment on a deliberate indi erence failure-to-protect claim, a plainti must produce su cient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant’s deliberate indi erence to that risk; and (3) causation.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation and brackets omitted). “[A] prison o cial violates the Eighth Amendment in [a failure-to-protect] context only when a substantial risk of harm, of which the o cial is subjectively aware, exists and the o cial does not respond reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 1276. About Hunter’s claim against Lieutenant Morris, Hunter has failed to present evidence su cient to show that Lieutenant Morris was subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to Hunter arising from the 10 December 2017 incident. Hunter was not a USCA11 Case: 22-11599 12 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 12 of 13 22-11599 member of either of the gangs involved in the initial altercation. Nor has Hunter shown that he was targeted for gang violence. The record supports the district court’s determination that Lieutenant Morris’s e orts to control the situation were reasonable and demonstrated no deliberate indi erence to a known risk. Moreover, Hunter cannot show that his knee injury was caused by Lieutenant Morris’s purported deliberate indi erence. Instead, Hunter participated voluntarily in the altercation and -while attempting to kick a fellow inmate -- slipped and fell on an area of the oor that Hunter says was known to collect condensation. In other words, Hunter’s injuries were caused by his own conduct, not by Lieutenant Morris’s response (or lack thereof ) to the situation. The district court also concluded reasonably that GEO was entitled to summary judgment on Hunter’s failure-to-protect claim. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim against a private company performing a state function -- like GEO -- a plainti must show that the company “advanced a policy or custom of deliberate indi erence that led to the violation of [the plainti ’s] constitutional right.” See Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations and emphasis omitted). “[T]o demonstrate a policy or custom, it is ‘generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice.’” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Ireland, 53 F.4th at 1290 (“[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not su cient to demonstrate a policy or custom for purposes of § 1983 liability.”). USCA11 Case: 22-11599 Document: 28-1 22-11599 Date Filed: 09/29/2023 Opinion of the Court Page: 13 of 13 13 Hunter has identi ed no persistent or widespread “policy or custom” that led to his injury. To the extent Hunter contends that the prison was routinely understa ed, we have said that prison understa ng does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation absent evidence of a “deliberate intent to inadequately sta ” the facility. See McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1291. We a rm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. AFFIRMED.
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