Unpublished Disposition, 904 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^* 

At issue in this class action is the interpretation of one provision of the consent decree that was the result of litigation that began when plaintiff construction laborers ("Ponce") in consolidated cases challenged the validity of the vesting and break-in-service rules of the Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California ("CLPT").

The provision in dispute, p 1.B, provides that one criterion a class member must meet to be eligible for Ponce benefits is that he must have " [i]ncurred a two-year break-in-service on or after October 1, 1970 with a consequent loss of pension credits." Excerpt of Record ("E.R.") at 2. Appellants contend that those who were out on disability prior to 1968 should still be eligible for Ponce benefits, whereas appellees assert that those who stopped doing construction work prior to 1968, for whatever reason, including disability, are excluded from receiving Ponce benefits.

* Like the interpretation of other contracts, the " [i]nterpretation of a consent decree is a matter of law reviewed de novo." Keith v. Volpe, 784 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1986). If the district court's interpretation of the decree turned on review of extrinsic evidence, then we would review its determination under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng'rs & Constructors Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, however, the type of extrinsic evidence available to the district court consisted of jointly presented documents, rather than evidence for which credibility is at issue. An appellate court is in as good a position as a trial court to assess documentary evidence and to decide what weight, if any, it should give to such evidence when interpreting the provision in dispute. For that reason, de novo review is appropriate. See also Jeff D. v. Andrus, No. 87-3586, slip op. at 2951 (9th Cir. amended Mar. 20, 1990) (de novo review is appropriate when the district court did not make findings as to credibility of extrinsic evidence).

II

Appellants argue that those class members who were disabled prior to 1968¹  should still be eligible for Ponce benefits. They construct this argument by first looking at CLPT's break-in-service rule, which provides in relevant part:

An Employee's previously accumulated credits ... shall be cancelled if he fails to earn Credited Service during a period of two consecutive calendar years. Such Credited Service shall not be cancelled if, in accordance with appropriate regulations adopted by the Board, the Employee

(a) is totally disabled from engaging in any occupation or employment on account of illness or injury. For purposes of this paragraph, if such total disability exists for at least 90 days in any calendar year such year shall not be counted as a break-in-service year.

Appellants' Brief at 20.

According to the break-in-service rule, then, a worker who becomes disabled has his credit frozen rather than cancelled. Appellants use this rule to argue that a class member who had accumulated more than 10, but less than 15, years of credit and then stopped working because of a disability before 1968 would still have his credit (though not the two consecutive plan years) by October 1, 1970 and therefore should be eligible for Ponce benefits.² 

Appellees argue that appellants' position is not supported by the plain language of p 1.B. In appellees' view, p 1.B does not confer benefits upon any participant who did not suffer a "consequent loss of pension credits" through the operation of the CLPT's break-in-service rule, and those who were disabled prior to 1968 would not fall into this category because they would not have had a consequent loss of pension credits on or after October 1, 1970.

Appellants address the issue of the "consequent loss of pension credits" language in several ways. First, they argue that if the language were taken literally, as appellees urge, then it would prohibit the payment of any Ponce disability pensions, even for people who worked after 1968, because anybody who had been disabled would never suffer a cancellation of credit, and that result would clearly be contrary to paragraphs 1.D and 2.A(1), which provide for the payment of disability pensions. Second, they argue that the language was added for the specific purpose of insuring that laborers who receive regular benefits from the fund are not also eligible for a Ponce benefit. (A laborer receives a regular pension if he could not lose his credit through a break. According to appellants, the drafters of the consent decree required workers to have a cancellation of credit to receive a Ponce benefit to insure that they would not also be eligible for regular benefits.) Finally, appellants argue that appellees' interpretation will place those disabled prior to 1968 in a "limbo status" because their ten or more years of pension credit will be frozen and yet they will never receive a pension.

We find appellants' arguments unpersuasive. As to the third argument, that some class members might find themselves in a limbo state, this argument is not compelling because the consent decree may necessarily exclude some class members; line drawing is always inevitable. As to the second argument, although appellants argue that the language was added for a particular purpose at the time, such an argument would require us to look beyond the four corners of the consent decree, which is something we need not do as long as we find the language of the consent decree to be unambiguous.³  It is only appellants' first argument, that if the "consequent loss of pension credits" language were interpreted literally then no persons who had been disabled would be eligible for Ponce benefits because they would never have suffered a cancellation in credit, which gives us pause. If appellants are right, then there is no way to reconcile the language of p 1.B with paragraphs 1.D and 2.A(1); but at the same time, if they are right, then there is no way to make sense of all of the language of p 1.B. Given this conundrum, we think that we must give meaning to all of the language that appears in the disputed provision which is now before us. We do not think that we can ignore the plain meaning of the language that appears in p 1.B and that language precludes the award of Ponce benefits to those who were disabled prior to 1968.

In sum, appellants' interpretation does not succeed in explaining away the language of "with a consequent loss of pension credits." In contrast, the strength of appellees' position is that it requires us simply to read the language that appears in p 1.B.

For the reasons stated above, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.