Barwick v. Gov't Employee Ins. Co.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. 128
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
10-1076
Opinion Delivered March 31, 2011
DUSTIN BARWICK
APPELLANT
VS.
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE
INSURANCE CO., INC.
APPELLEE
APPEAL FRO M THE BENTO N
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CV-10-820-5
HON. XOLLIE DUNCAN, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Associate Justice
Appellant Dustin Barwick brings this appeal from an order entered by the Benton
County Circuit Court granting summary judgment and dismissing his claim for medical
benefits under an automobile insurance policy issued by appellee Government Employee
Insurance Co., Inc. (GEICO).1 For reversal, appellant contends that the circuit court erred
in ruling that an electronically generated record containing an electronic signature meets the
requirement that a rejection of no-fault coverage be “in writing” under the terms of Arkansas
Code Annotated section 23-89-203 (Repl. 2004). Although this case was originally filed with
the court of appeals, we assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1) and (6),
as the appeal involves an issue of first impression and a question of statutory interpretation.
We find no error and affirm.
On June 14, 2009, Lucy Sheets, who subsequently married appellant, purchased
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GEICO asserted below and continues to state on appeal that it is properly identified
as “GEICO Indemnity Co.,” not “Government Employee Insurance Co., Inc.”
Cite as 2011 Ark. 128
automobile insurance coverage online at GEICO’s website. On January 5, 2010, a vehicle
struck appellant, who was then a named insured on the policy. Appellant presented a claim
to GEICO for the payment of $6284 in medical expenses that he incurred as a result of the
accident. GEICO denied liability on the ground that Ms. Barwick had rejected coverage for
medical benefits when she applied online for the purchase of insurance. On March 16, 2010,
appellant then filed suit against GEICO, claiming entitlement to medical benefits in the sum
of $5000, the minimum amount of coverage required under Arkansas Code Annotated section
23-89-202(1) (Repl. 2004). In its answer to the complaint, GEICO asserted that Ms. Barwick
specifically rejected coverage for medical benefits as indicated by the online application and
by her electronic signature, which GEICO claimed was valid under the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA), found at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-32-101 to -120
(Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2009).
On April 12, 2010, appellant moved for summary judgment, contending that Ms.
Barwick’s electronic signature on the application did not qualify as a written rejection of
coverage as required by section 23-89-203. GEICO responded with its own motion for
summary judgment, in which it argued that Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-32-107
(Repl. 2002) gives legal effect to electronic records, signatures, and contracts and that Ms.
Barwick’s electronic signature on the form satisfied the “in writing” requirement of section
23-89-203. In support of its motion, GEICO submitted excerpts from Ms. Barwick’s
deposition, and the “Arkansas Information and Option Form,” completed by Ms. Barwick
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Cite as 2011 Ark. 128
online. The form indicated that she rejected both medical benefits and medical-payments
coverage, and it bore an electronic signature of her name. In her deposition, Ms. Barwick
acknowledged that she completed the form on the website and that she did not select
coverage for medical benefits. She also testified that she signed the application electronically.
Ms. Barwick stated, however, that she had not physically signed any written document
provided by GEICO rejecting medical-benefits coverage.
After a hearing, and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, the circuit court granted
GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the online rejection of coverage and
electronic signature satisfied the statutory requirement for a rejection to be in writing under
section 23-89-203. Appellant filed a timely appeal from the order of summary judgment
entered on August 9, 2010.
In this appeal, appellant contends that a rejection of coverage must be in writing in
accordance with section 23-89-203 and that pressing a button on a computer is not a
“writing” that is contemplated by the terms of the statute. Relying on the settled principle
of law that a general statute does not apply when a specific one governs the subject matter,
see Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d 730 (2000),
he argues that section 23-89-203, which specifically applies to insurance claims, takes
precedence over the provisions in the UETA. While appellant does not dispute that a contract
may be entered into electronically pursuant to the UETA, appellant asserts that the ability to
form a contract by electronic medium should not be confounded with the statutory
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requirement that a rejection of coverage must be in writing. In support of the circuit court’s
decision, GEICO asserts that section 23-89-203 and the provisions of the UETA are not in
conflict and that the plain language of the UETA permits an electronic record to satisfy the
requirements of section 23-89-203. In the alternative, GEICO contends that appellant should
be estopped from questioning the validity of the electronic rejection of coverage because he
is also seeking to benefit from the insurance policy that Ms. Barwick obtained online.
This case is before us on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning a question
of statutory interpretation. A circuit court may grant summary judgment only when it is clear
that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated and that the party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Elkins, 2010 Ark. 481, ___
S.W.3d ___. Normally, we determine if summary judgment is proper based on whether
evidentiary items presented by the moving party leave a material fact unanswered, viewing
all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Massey v. Fulks, 2011 Ark. 4, ___ S.W.3d ___.
Here, however, the facts are not in dispute, and the circuit court decided the case purely as
a matter of statutory interpretation.
The question of the correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a
question of law, which this court decides de novo. Evans v. Hamby, 2011 Ark. 69, ___
S.W.3d ___. We are not bound by the circuit court’s decision; however, in the absence of
a showing that the circuit court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct. Racine v.
Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, ___ S.W.3d ___. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give
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effect to the intent of the General Assembly. McLane S., Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 2010
Ark. 498, ___ S.W.3d ___. Reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we first construe a
statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P., 374 Ark. 489, 288
S.W.3d 627 (2008). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys
a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Ryan
& Co. AR, Inc. v. Weiss, 371 Ark. 43, 263 S.W.3d 489 (2007). Our court also strives to
reconcile statutory provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Brock v.
Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179.
The coverage involved in this case is no-fault coverage that is mandated by the General
Assembly to be offered to prospective insureds. Section 23-89-202 sets out the required
minimum benefits that automobile liability-insurance policies must include for medical and
hospital benefits, income disability benefits, and accidental death benefits. As pertinent here,
the statute provides that every automobile liability-insurance policy covering any privatepassenger motor vehicle issued or delivered in this state shall provide minimum medical and
hospital benefits to the named insured for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred
within twenty-four months after the accident up to an aggregate of $5000 per person. Ark.
Code Ann. § 23-89-202(1). However, section 23-89-203(a) states that the “named insured
shall have the right to reject in writing all or any one (1) or more coverages enumerated in
§ 23-89-203.” Thus, these statutes encompass the mandatory offering of no-fault coverage
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accompanied by the right to reject such coverage in writing.
Along with forty-seven other states, Arkansas adopted the UETA in 2001. As set forth
in Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-32-106 (Repl. 2002), the provisions of the UETA
must be construed and applied to facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other
applicable law; to be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions
and with the continued expansion of those practices; and to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it. In
terms of scope, the UETA applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to
a transaction. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-32-103(a) (Repl. 2002). However, it does not apply to
transactions under certain articles of the Uniform Commercial Code and to those governed
by a law concerning the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts. Ark.
Code Ann. § 25-32-103(b). Also, a transaction subject to the act is subject to other applicable
substantive law. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-32-103(d). Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-32107 provides as follows:
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because it is in electronic form.
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because
an electronic record was used in its formation.
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the
law.
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.
As defined in the UETA, “electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent,
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communicated, received, or stored by electronic means. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-32-102(7)
(Repl. 2002). An “electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-32-102(8).
The issue in this case is whether an electronically generated record satisfies the
requirement of section 23-89-203 that a rejection of coverage for medical benefits must be
memorialized in writing. In our view, the meaning of section 25-32-107(c) could not be
more straightforward when it states that “[i]f a law requires a record to be in writing, an
electronic record satisfies the law.” We perceive no conflict between these two statutory
provisions, and they can be read harmoniously to mean that an electronic record fulfills the
requirement of a written rejection of coverage. In the present case, Ms. Barwick rejected
coverage for medical benefits when she completed the online application for insurance. She
also expressed her intention to forego those benefits with her electronic signature. We hold
that the electronic record memorializing her rejection of coverage qualifies as a written
rejection of benefits under section 23-89-203. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s grant
of summary judgment. In light of our holding, it is not necessary for us to address GEICO’s
estoppel argument.
Affirmed.
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