Diana McSparrin v. Direct Insurance
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
DIANA McSPARRIN
07-934
Opinion Delivered April 24, 2008
APPELLANT,
VS.
DIRECT INSURANCE
APPELLEES,
AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF WASHINGTON
COUNTY, No. CV 2006-2523-6,
HONORABLE MARK LINDSAY,
CIRCUIT JUDGE
AFFIRMED
TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice
On July 19, 2006, at approximately 3:00 a.m., appellant Diana McSparrin repeatedly
rammed her car five or six times into Joshua Dark’s 1991 GMC Jimmy, which was parked
outside Dark’s home and unoccupied at the time. McSparrin’s successive impacts moved
Dark’s vehicle a distance of almost fifty feet, until it stopped against a car belonging to
McSparrin’s ex-boyfriend, Thomas Dennis. Dennis lived next door to the Dark family, and
McSparrin testified that she might have been upset with Dennis before she began drinking at
Dennis’s house, but said that she could not recall ramming into Dark’s vehicle because she
was intoxicated at the time.
After hearing McSparrin’s first impact into Dark’s vehicle, Dark’s father called 911.
Officers from the Fayetteville Police Department arrived at the scene and arrested McSparrin
for Driving While Intoxicated after she failed a sobriety test. McSparrin’s insurer, Direct
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Insurance Company (Direct), later filed an action for a declaratory judgment and alleged that
because McSparrin had intentionally driven her vehicle into Joshua Dark’s vehicle, Direct did
not have a duty to defend or indemnify McSparrin under an exclusionary clause in her
automobile policy which reads, “[Direct] do[es] not provide Liability Coverage for any
covered person who intentionally causes bodily injury or property damage.”
The trial court held a one-day bench trial, and found that, although “it is undisputed
Ms. McSparrin was drunk,” the facts demonstrated that McSparrin intentionally rammed
Dark’s vehicle. As a result, the trial court further held that the exclusionary clause applied,
and that Direct did not have a duty to defend or indemnify McSparrin. McSparrin raises one
point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred because she could not have intentionally
rammed Dark’s vehicle due to her voluntary intoxication.
The standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is whether the circuit court's
findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See
Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 101 S.W.3d 221 (2003). This court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee, resolving all inferences in favor of the
appellee. See Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 341 Ark. 317, 16 S.W.3d 545
(2000).
When construing insurance policies, this court adheres to the rule that, where terms
of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the policy language controls, and absent statutory
strictures to the contrary, exclusionary clauses are generally enforced according to their terms.
Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 208, 937 S.W.2d 180 (1997). “The insurer has the
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burden of proving an exclusion.” Arkansas Farm Bureau Ins. Fed’n v. Ryman, 309 Ark. 283,
286, 831 S.W.2d 133, 134 (1992).
This court has not directly addressed whether voluntary intoxication prevents an
individual from forming the intent required to trigger an exclusionary clause. Although the
parties concede that there are no Arkansas cases directly on point, McSparrin relies on a case
decided by the federal district court, Great American Insurance Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983
(E.D. Ark. 1965).1 There, an individual named Allen Holland repeatedly rammed T.J. Ratliff
from behind as the vehicles traveled on an Arkansas state highway. Eventually, Ratliff’s
vehicle turned over, causing him personal injuries. Ratliff filed suit against Holland for
damages, and Holland’s insurance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment,
asserting that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Holland due to an exclusionary
clause which provided that the policy did not apply to injuries “caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured.” Id. at 985. The federal district court found that a preponderance
of the evidence showed that Holland “intended to inflict at least some degree of injury and
damage upon Ratliff and his property” based on the principle that “a person in the possession
of his faculties intentionally does an act from which injury to another will probably and
forseeably result.” Id. at 992. Accordingly, “Ratliff’s injuries were excluded from the
coverage of [Holland’s] policy.” Id.
McSparrin also cites Talley v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 273 Ark. 269, 620
S.W.2d 160 (1981), for support. However, Talley involved the question of reconciling an
intentional act — firing a shotgun blast at a car occupied by two individuals — with the
unintended result of blindness.
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McSparrin asserts that the Ratliff decision was based on the ill will that existed between
the parties, which she contrasts with the facts in her case; she contends there was no evidence
of animus between herself and Joshua Dark. Additionally, McSparrin argues that the Ratliff
case suggests an individual’s actions are not intentional if he is not in complete control of his
faculties. However, in Ratliff, there never was an issue as to whether Holland was “in
possession of his faculties” when he rammed Ratliff. Regardless, more convincing and
applicable to the present appeal, is the Ratliff court’s statement that “the presence or absence
of particular intent can be inferred logically and legally from the facts and circumstances
leading up to, surrounding, and following the act or omission in question.” Id. Just as the
Ratliff court held that Holland acted intentionally because he pursued and repeatedly drove
into the rear of Ratliff’s car, finally causing it to overturn, the trial court in the present case
similarly found that after McSparrin’s initial impact with Joshua Dark’s vehicle, she rammed
it five additional times, backing up approximately ten feet and revving the engine before each
successive impact.
Direct responds to McSparrin’s point for reversal by asserting that the “key legal
principles” found in a decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in National Investors Life &
Casualty Insurance Co., v. Arrowood, 270 Ark. 617, 606 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. App. 1980), are
applicable to this appeal. In Arrowood, James Arrowood shot his ex-wife in the leg and his
insurance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the injuries to
Sandra Arrowood were intentionally caused and therefore excluded from coverage by either
James or Sandra Arrowood’s homeowner’s policies. James Arrowood testified that “he had
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no reason to shoot or kill Sandra,” and that he had no recollection of the events surrounding
the shooting of his ex-wife, other than taking “a bunch of Valium.” Id. at 620. The trial
court held that the policies’ exclusionary clauses were not applicable, and the insurance
companies appealed, arguing that the trial court “erred in finding that liability coverage was
not excluded under the policy for bodily injury which is either expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured.” Id. at 621, 606 S.W.2d at 100.
On review, the court of appeals first noted the general rule that coverage exists under
insuring contracts and exclusion clauses for the unintended results of an intentional act, but
not for damages assessed because of an injury which was intended to be inflicted. The
Arrowood court then cited Ratliff, supra, to hold that determining whether an act was
intentional was “a matter of weighing all the facts and circumstances bearing on the incident
in its entirety,” and reversed the trial court, noting the long history of James Arrowood’s
previous acts showing a propensity to violence against his ex-wife. Id. at 624, 606 S.W.2d
101. As to James Arrowood’s alleged Valium-induced memory loss, the court of appeals
stated the following:
[W]hile no firm conclusions can be founded upon it, even James’ professed
inability to remember any part of the incident, which we regard as credible,
seems more consistent with a finding that the injury was intentional rather than
accidental, as even the human mind often obliterates from its memory behavior
which it wants to disavow.
Id. Further, the court of appeals noted that “James Arrowood’s testimony is that he had no
recollection of any part of the events of the shooting, so how can he say what his intention
was at that exact moment if his memory is so lacking?” Id. at 624, 602 S.W.2d at 102.
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Similar to James Arrowood, McSparrin contends that her intoxication caused her to
“blackout” and that she has no recollection of ramming Dark’s vehicle repeatedly. Weighing
against her is the fact that she rammed Dark’s vehicle until it rested against that of her exboyfriend — whom she was upset with — that she giggled as she repeatedly backed up and
rammed Dark’s vehicle, and the fact that her intoxication was at least not so severe that she
was cognizant of the fact that Dark’s father had called the police to report her act and called
him an “asshole” for doing so before her arrest. And, while McSparrin was arrested for DWI,
showing at least some level of intoxication, she later made a recorded statement for her
insurance company admitting that her damage to Dark’s vehicle was intentional.
McSparrin also contends that the trial court’s decision violates public policy, arguing
the General Assembly has “endorsed the public policy in favor of compensating victims”
because it “has seen fit to mandate automobile insurance coverage while home owners
insurance is purely voluntary with the individual.” However, Ark. Code Ann. § 27-22101(a) (Repl. 2008) states that the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance
chapter “is not intended in any way to alter or affect the validity of any policy provisions,
exclusions, exceptions, or limitations contained in a motor vehicle policy required by this
chapter.” The trial court’s decision that McSparrin’s course of conduct showed that she acted
intentionally in repeatedly ramming into Dark’s vehicle is not clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence, nor is it contrary to any public policy our General Assembly
has announced.
Affirmed.
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