Bruce Edward Leaks v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 07­912  Opinion Delivered  BRUCE EDWARD LEAKS  Appellant  v.  November 29, 2007  PRO SE MOTION FOR COPY OF  RECORD AT PUBLIC EXPENSE AND  FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE  APPELLANT’S BRIEF [CIRCUIT  COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, CR 97­  95, HON. JOE GRIFFIN, JUDGE]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  In 1997, appellant Bruce Edward Leaks was convicted by a jury of first­degree murder and  sentenced as a habitual offender to 480 months’ imprisonment.  This court reversed the judgment of  conviction from his first trial.  Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999).  On retrial, he was  again convicted of first­degree murder and a sentence of 540 months was imposed.  We affirmed.  Leaks v. State, 345 Ark. 182, 45 S.W.3d 363 (2001).  In 2007, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se “second, or successive petition – to, vacate  and/or  set­side  judgment”  pursuant  to  Act  1780  of 2001  as  amended  by Act  2250  of 2005  and  codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§16­112­201–16­112­208 (Repl. 2006).  The trial court denied the  petition without a hearing, and appellant has lodged an appeal here from the order.  Now before us is appellant’s pro se motion for a copy of the record at public expense and for  extension of time to file his brief­in­chief.  We need not consider the motion as it is apparent that  appellant could not prevail in this appeal if it were permitted to go forward.  Accordingly, we dismiss the  appeal  and  hold  the  motion  moot.    An  appeal  from  an  order  that  denied  a  petition  for  postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not  prevail.  Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324  Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam).  Appellant  was convicted of murdering William Earl Littlejohn during a heated argument.  Evidence adduced at trial showed that he went to his brother’s apartment, where the victim had been  staying, to confront the victim about various issues.  During the ensuing argument, appellant shot  Littlejohn from approximately four feet away with a .38 revolver.  The victim was able to reach a  bedroom where appellant’s nephew had been sleeping and identified appellant as the shooter before  he died.  Appellant fled the scene of the crime and initially denied any involvement in the murder  when questioned.  However, appellant eventually gave the police a statement in which he admitted  shooting the victim, but denied that he intended to kill the victim.  In his petition under  the  act, appellant asked for DNA testing, and for testing of “blood  pattern splatter,” “blood trace pattern” and “blood drops.”  Therein, he generally maintained that his  innocence would be proven by these tests, and contended that his identity was at issue at trial.  Act 1780 provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific evidence  proving a person actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted.  See  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­112­103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) and sections 16­112­201–208; see also Echols v.  State,  350  Ark.  42,  84  S.W.3d  424  (2002)  (per  curiam)  (decision  under  prior  law).    It  is  a  requirement of the statute that the “identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation  or prosecution of the offense being challenged[.]”  Section 16­112­202(7).  At  trial,  appellant’s  nephew  testified  as  to  the  victim’s  identification  of  appellant,  and ­2­  appellant’s confession was introduced into evidence.  Although appellant did not testify in his own  behalf,  his  defense  was  that  the  victim’s  murder  was  accidental  rather  than  deliberate  and  premeditated, and that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant’s mental state  supported the charge of first­degree murder.  Appellant’s petition failed to provide any cogent explanation that supported his claim that his  identity was at issue, and the evidence introduced at trial left no doubt that appellant committed the  crime.  The trial transcript pages to which appellant referred in the petition did  not  contain  any  indication that someone other than appellant could have committed the crime.  Thus, appellant failed  to  make  a  prima  facie  showing  that  his  identity  was  at  issue  during  either  the  investigation  or  prosecution of the criminal case.  Moreover, with regard to the requirement that the requested testing prove the petitioner’s  actual innocence, appellant failed to show that various tests of blood splatter patterns or blood drops  would  have  proved  that  he  was  actually  innocent  of  the  crime.  Instead,  appellant  made  mere  conclusory statements that he was innocent of the crime and that the testing would prove that he was  innocent.  Also, because appellant confessed to the crime, he cannot later claim actual innocence for  the purpose of obtaining scientific testing.  As the arguments made by appellant did not present a proper basis for postconviction relief  pursuant to Act 1780 with regard to actual innocence or identity, appellant could not be successful  on appeal. Appeal dismissed; motion moot. ­3­ 

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