Leslie A. Young v. State of Arkansas
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR06-1263
LESLIE A. YOUNG,
APPELLANT,
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
Opinion Delivered
May 31, 2007
APPEAL FROM THE SHARP
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR-06-6,
HON. HAROLD S. ERWIN, JUDGE,
REMANDED.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice
Appellant Leslie A. Young brings this criminal appeal from her convictions and
sentences for capital murder, aggravated robbery, attempted arson, and two counts of theft of
property. She raises four points of error: (1) that the circuit court erred in failing to grant her
motion for directed verdict when the State failed to prove that the death of Stephen Furr was
done in the course of or in furtherance of aggravated robbery, committed by the defendant
or a person acting with her; that she employed physical force in the taking of property; that
she knowingly took property of another; or that she started a fire for a proscribed purpose;
(2) that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress her custodial statement; (3)
that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress the search of her blue jeans; and
(4) that the circuit court erred in giving a separate accomplice instruction on the charge of
capital murder. While we hold that a limited remand is necessary on point two on appeal,
we affirm on all other points.
On January 2, 2006, Detective John Qualls of the Sharp County Sheriff’s Department
was dispatched to the scene of a homicide at the residence of Steve Furr, the victim. Upon
entry, he found Mr. Furr dead in his recliner. The medical examiner testified that Mr. Furr
died from multiple stab wounds and blunt force trauma. Mr. Furr had suffered twelve stab
wounds and twenty-two abrasion wounds. Numerous photographs of the crime scene were
taken, including photographs of empty boxes, areas from which it was obvious household
items had been stolen, a partially burned bag of dog food, weapons believed to have been
used in the commission of the crime, as well as Mr. Furr’s body.
In the course of the investigation, the chief investigating officer, Detective Sergeant
Huffmaster instructed Detective Qualls to contact the local pawnshops in search of suspects
that he had developed in the case. After contacting E-Z Pawnshop, Detective Qualls learned
that Bill Young, Leslie Young’s husband, had just left with a man named Jimmy Doug
Simpson after pawning several tools. The officers were able to locate Mr. Simpson and, after
his tip, apprehended both Leslie Young and her husband.
On January 5, 2006, the State charged Leslie Young (hereinafter “Young”) with capital
murder. Thereafter, on January 20, 2006, the State amended the information, charging
Young with capital murder, aggravated robbery, residential burglary, two counts of theft of
property, and attempted arson. The State alleged that Young, acting alone or with an
accomplice, killed Mr. Furr during a robbery or burglary of his home, attempted to set fire
to his home, and stole household items from Mr. Furr, valued at more than $2,500, as well
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as his truck, valued at more than $2,500.
After Young’s arrest, Sheriff Dale Weaver went to her jail cell upon receiving a phone
call from the jail administrator concerning possible blood stains on Young’s clothing, face, and
hands. While Sheriff Weaver testified that he did not intend to take a statement from Young,
she made several statements to him while he was in contact with her. She informed Sheriff
Weaver that on the night of January 1, 2006, she had been with her husband, riding around
Cave City, and that they were with Mr. Furr and his wife at the home of another couple.1
Young also told Sheriff Weaver that after they dropped off Mr. Furr’s wife, she and her
husband went to Mr. Furr’s home and stayed until around two o’clock in the morning, when
Mr. Furr took them home. Sheriff Weaver admittedly did not personally Mirandize Young;
however, he testified that he spoke with another officer that had read Young her rights and
that Young verbally expressed that she had been read her rights and understood them.
On July 18, 2006, Young was tried by a jury in the Sharp County Circuit Court. At
the conclusion of the State’s case, Young moved for a directed verdict, alleging that the State
did not meet its burden of proof. The circuit court denied the motion, and Young rested
without presenting a case. The jury found Young guilty of capital murder, aggravated
robbery, two counts of theft of property, and attempted arson and sentenced her to forty
years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, ten years’ imprisonment for one count of theft
of property, three years’ imprisonment for the second count of theft of property, ninety days’
Although Young referred to Mrs. Furr as Steven Furr’s wife, the record reveals that she is actually
his ex-wife and that she did not live with him at the time of his death.
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imprisonment for attempted arson, and life without parole for the capital murder of Mr. Furr.
The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Young filed a notice of appeal on August
17, 2006, and the record was lodged in this court on November 2, 2006.
I. Motion for Directed Verdict
Young first argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant her motion for
directed verdict because the State failed to meet its burden of proof on the charges of capital
murder, aggravated robbery, theft of property, and attempted arson. However, it is well
settled that we will not address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. See Davis
v. State, 368 Ark. 401, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). Here, Young failed to present to the circuit
court an argument on the charges of attempted arson and theft of property in her motion for
directed verdict. Therefore, we will not entertain the argument that the circuit court erred
in failing to grant Young’s motion for directed verdict on the charges of attempted arson and
theft of property.
In addition, Young argued to the circuit court that her motion for directed verdict on
the aggravated-robbery charge should have been granted because a conviction would violate
the Double Jeopardy provision of the United States and the Arkansas constitutions. However,
that is not the argument presented on appeal. Young now submits that the State failed to
meet its burden of proof to sustain her conviction of aggravated robbery. Because this
argument is also raised for the first time on appeal, we will not address it.
At the close of the State’s case, Young did move for a directed verdict on the charge
of capital murder, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Young
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employed force for the purpose of committing theft or that the death of Mr. Furr was in the
course of or in the furtherance of the robbery. This court treats a motion for directed verdict
as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Tubbs v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___
S.W.3d ___ (May 10, 2007). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this
court determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or
circumstantial. See id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a
conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. See id. This court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the
verdict will be considered. See id.
Testimony at trial revealed that Young and her husband were with Mr. Furr the
evening of January 1, 2006. The next day, Mr. Furr was found dead in his recliner, having
suffered multiple stab and blunt-trauma wounds. Two weapons, an Old Hickory butcher
knife and a screwdriver, were found underneath Furr’s body. Several household items were
missing from Mr. Furr’s home and there was blood splatter on his walls. The medical
examiner testified that Mr. Furr had several defensive injuries on his body. Investigators
found Mr. Furr’s gas stove twisted off the wall and leaking propane, as well as a bag of Alpo
dog food that had been set on fire and melted one of the walls. An empty carton was found
next to Mr. Furr’s recliner that described a canister of pepper spray and was labeled with the
brand name “Maxum.”
Mr. Nolan Henning testified that on January 2, 2006, Young and her husband tried
to sell him some tools or some guns after he saw them at the Sinclair gas station in Batesville,
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Arkansas. His testimony revealed they were driving a “utility truck.” Henning testified that
Young commented that they “needed some money” because they “needed to leave town
quick.”
David Drew, a friend of Young and her husband, testified that the couple came to his
home around 11 a.m. on January 2, 2006, and asked for his help to pawn some tools.
However, the pawn shop was closed. On January 3, 2006, Young and her husband were seen
operating the truck owned by Mr. Furr. Young’s husband had also been identified as having
pawned a large assortment of items, including tools positively identified as belonging to Mr.
Furr, at E-Z Pawn in Batesville, Arkansas. Mr. Furr’s truck was stopped by officers and the
driver, Jimmy Doug Simpson, explained that the truck had been turned over to him by
Young and her husband. Young’s fingerprints where identified in Mr. Furr’s truck.
Anita Miller, another friend of Young and her husband, testified that she was at a
doctor’s appointment on January 3, 2006, when the couple came to her and asked her for a
ride back to their house. Miller agreed and allowed them to stay in her vehicle as she finished
her appointment. However, the police apprehended Young and her husband before Miller
was finished. The next day, as Miller readjusted the seat in her car that Young had been
sitting in the previous day before she was arrested, she found a wallet containing identification
of Mr. Furr.
When Young was arrested, a canister of “Maxum” pepper spray was found on her
person. After her arrest and she had been given jail attire, blood splatter was noticed on the
jeans she had been wearing. The forensic biologist and blood-splatter specialist testified that
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the blood spots on Young’s jeans revealed that “the blood fell onto the inside of the pants”
and that the pants were “not in a normal wearing fashion” when the blood was deposited.
The chief forensic DNA examiner testified that the blood samples from Young’s jeans
matched the genetic profile of Mr. Furr.
In the instant case, we cannot say that the jury had to resort to speculation or
conjecture to conclude that Mr. Furr was killed in the course of or in furtherance of an
aggravated robbery. We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and substantial
and that the circuit court did not err in denying Young’s directed-verdict motion.
II. Custodial Statement
For her second point on appeal, Young argues that the circuit court erred in denying
her motion to suppress incriminating statements that she made to Sheriff Dale Weaver after
she was arrested. It is clear and undisputed that Young was in custody and that Sheriff
Weaver was not the individual that advised Young of her Miranda rights. Young argues that,
although Sheriff Weaver testified that Trooper Jeremy Page had told him that he advised
Young of her rights under Miranda and that Young had indicated she had been previously
advised of her rights, Sheriff Weaver’s testimony did not rebut the presumption that the
custodial statement was involuntary and that the State failed to prove that the statement was
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
A review of the record reveals that Sheriff Weaver testified about a conversation he
had with Young. The essence of that conversation was that Young admitted that she and her
husband were with Mr. Furr on the night of January 1, 2006, driving around and spending
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time at another couple’s home. In addition, Young stated that later in the evening she, her
husband, and Mr. Furr went to Mr. Furr’s home and stayed until around two o’ clock in the
morning, at which time Mr. Furr took her and her husband home. Young denied having
taken Mr. Furr’s truck home. Towards the end of their conversation, Sheriff Weaver stated
that something really bad had happened at Mr. Furr’s home and Young immediately stated
“I didn’t do it,” and shook her head in the negative.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a statement, we conduct a de novo
review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear
error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the circuit
court's findings. Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005). A statement made
while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was
knowingly and intelligently made. See Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).
In order to determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, this court looks to see
if the confession was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. See id.
According to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-89-107(b)(1) (Repl. 2005),
. . . the determination of fact concerning the admissibility of a confession shall
be made by the court when the issue is raised by the defendant; the trial court
shall hear the evidence concerning the admissibility and the voluntariness of the
confession out of the presence of the jury, and it shall be the court's duty before
admitting the confession into evidence to determine by a preponderance of the
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evidence that the confession has been made voluntarily.
Although the language of section 16-89-107(b)(1) suggests that the circuit court is only
required to consider the voluntariness of a statement, our case law requires the circuit court
to consider in a suppression hearing whether the statement was made after a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his or her constitutional rights. See Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948
S.W.2d 397 (1997).
In sum, Young's suppression motion raised the issue of the involuntariness of her
statements to the police, and because material witnesses were connected with her
controverted statements, it became the State's burden to produce those witnesses at the
suppression hearing or to explain their absence. See Brown v. State, 347 Ark. 44, 60 S.W.3d
422 (2001). The State did neither. Indeed, the State concedes that it failed to provide the
material witness to prove that Young had been properly Mirandized.2 In addition, the record
reveals discussion of a video tape of Young being read her rights, but no such evidence was
admitted for the record. We hold that the State failed to meet its burden; however, we note
that the deficiency in the circuit court's ruling does not in itself entitle Young to a new trial.
As a general rule, most trial errors, including constitutional ones, do not automatically
require reversal of a criminal conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Instead, we remand the cause for a new hearing on Young’s suppression motion. See, e.g.,
Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on
The State concedes that Trooper Jeremy Page was a material witness that was not called upon to
testify at the suppression hearing. A review of the record reveals that another individual, Deputy Wendy
Flynn, may have also been present while Sheriff Weaver was speaking with Young.
2
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voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore
v. State, 303 Ark. 1, 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271
Ark. 568, 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on
voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand
for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a
statement in return for immunity). Because this case is remanded for a suppression hearing,
we do not reach Young's argument that the circuit court erred in finding her custodial
statements should not have been suppressed, as the circuit court will be called upon to rule
on that argument after the new hearing. See Bell v. State, supra.
III. Clothing Search
On the second day of trial, Young moved to suppress the results of a warrantless search
of her blue jeans, which revealed the presence of the victim’s blood, arguing that she had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing and its physical integrity and that a second
seizure of her blue jeans occurred when the officers sent pieces of her jeans to the crime lab,
which required a warrant. The circuit court denied her motion, and Young now argues on
appeal that she had a “reasonable expectation that the physical integrity of her clothing would
be preserved,” but “does not contend that the State did not have the right to seize her blue
jeans.”
When considering a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo
review based on the totality of the circumstances, giving due weight to inferences drawn by
the circuit court. See Mhoon v. State, 369 Ark.134, 369 S.W.3d 134 (2007).
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Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.2(b) requires that a motion to suppress be
filed no later than ten days before the trial date. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 16.2 (2006). However,
a circuit court may entertain a motion to suppress at a later time for good cause. See Kimble
v. State, 331 Ark. 155, 959 S.W.2d 43 (1998). Here, the circuit court ruled first that the
motion was untimely, but went on to opine that there was not a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the clothing. While Rule 16.2 does not require every untimely motion to be
denied, we do not find error in the circuit court’s denial and affirm on this point.
IV. Separate Accomplice Instruction
For her final point on appeal, Young argues that the circuit court erred in giving a
separate accomplice instruction on the charge of capital murder. Young first contends that
she was denied her due process of law, in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution.
Furthermore, she states that it is error in a capital murder case to instruct on an alternative
ground for conviction, citing Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987).
The record reveals that the only objection Young made to the separate accomplice
instruction was that it was a “redundancy” because “accomplice liability is accomplished in
the very charge of Capital Murder.” Young now makes the constitutional argument and the
argument based on Ward v. State, supra, for the first time on appeal. As previously noted, this
court will not address arguments, even constitutional ones, that are raised for the first time on
appeal. See Davis v. State, supra. Furthermore, both of these issues are argued by one sentence
each, without further explanation of the merits. This court has repeatedly stated that it does
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not consider assignments of error that are unsupported by convincing argument or sufficient
legal authority. See Ward v. State, 350 Ark. 69, 84 S.W.3d 863 (2002). For these reasons, we
decline to address this point.
Rule 4-3(h) Review
In compliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has been examined for all
objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Young,
and no prejudicial error has been found.
Remanded.
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