James Cooper, Ulonzo Gordon, and Jeremy Moten v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 06­1151  Opinion Delivered  JAMES COOPER, ULONZO GORDON,  and JEREMY MOTEN  Appellants  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  October 25, 2007  PRO SE MOTIONS TO FILE  SUPPLEMENTAL ABSTRACT AND  ADDENDUM WITH REPLY BRIEF;  FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS; AND FOR  APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR  ORAL ARGUMENTS [CIRCUIT  COURT OF CRITTENDEN COUNTY,  CR 95­149, HON. CHARLES DAVID  BURNETT, JUDGE]  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  In 1996, appellant James Cooper was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  without  parole.    This  court  affirmed.  Cooper  v.  State,  324  Ark.  135,  919  S.W.2d 205 (1996).  Subsequently, appellant sought relief in the trial court pursuant to Ark. R. Crim.  P. 37.1.  This court affirmed denial of the petition.  Cooper v. State, CR 96­880 (Ark. Sept. 18, 1997)  (per curiam).  In 2002, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for relief pursuant to Act 1780 of  1  2001, codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16­112­201–207 (Supp. 2001).  The petition also listed Ulonzo 1  Appellant filed his petition prior to the enactment of Act 2250 of 2005, with an effective  date of August 12, 2005, that amended relevant portions of the statute.  As a result, appellant’s  petition for writ of habeas corpus remained subject to the requirements in effect at the time  appellant filed his petition.  2  Gordon and Jeremy Moten, his codefendants at  trial, as petitioners.  The  trial  court denied the  3  petition after a hearing, and appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on behalf of himself.  However, when the appeal was lodged, the record named all three men as appellants in this court.  We first note that appellant claims that he also included Gordon and Moten in the notice of  appeal filed in the trial court based upon the authority of a power of attorney purportedly executed  by Gordon and Moten, and is legally able to act on their behalf as a result.  The State argues that  appellant was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this appeal by purportedly attempting  to represent Gordon and Moten, and by conducting the appeal on their behalf.  However, we need  not reach that issue as Gordon and Moten have not perfected their appeal.  In civil matters, such as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a notice of appeal must be filed  by each party­appellant, either jointly or severally.  Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 3(c) and (e).  Here, appellant  timely filed a pro se notice of appeal in the trial court solely on behalf of himself, which he had the  right to do as a pro se litigant, as only his name appeared on the notice.  As Gordon and Moten did  not file a notice of appeal either individually or jointly with appellant’s, the notice filed in this matter  preserved only appellant’s right to an appeal of the trial court’s order denying the Act 1780 petition  for writ of habeas corpus.  Therefore, Gordon and Moten have failed to obtain appellate jurisdiction  with regard to an appeal of that order.  Now before us are appellant’s pro se motions to file a supplemental abstract and addendum 2  The Act 1780 petition was signed only by appellant.  At the hearing on the petition, an  attorney purported to represent all three men as petitioners, apparently with the trial court’s  acquiescence.  3  Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 4(a), a notice of appeal that is filed prior to entry of the  order from which the appeal will be taken “shall be treated as filed on the day after” the order is  entered.  Here, appellant filed the notice of appeal on August 16, 2006, and the trial court entered  the order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 25, 2006.  Therefore, the  notice of appeal was deemed timely filed on August 26, 2006.  ­2­  with the reply brief, for oral argument, and for appointment of counsel for oral argument.  We need  not consider the motions as it is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this appeal if it were  permitted to go forward.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and hold the motions moot.  This court  has consistently held that an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will  not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail.  Pardue v. State,  338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13  (1996) (per curiam).  Act 1780 of 2001 provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific  evidence  proving  a  person actually innocent  of the  offense  or  offenses  for  which he  or  she  was  convicted.  Ark. Code Ann. §16­112­103(a)(1) (Supp. 2001); sections 16­112­201–207; Echols v.  State, 350 Ark. 42, 84 S.W.3d 424 (2002) (per curiam).  Act 1780 testing is not authorized based on the slightest chance that it may yield a favorable  result.  Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004).  Scientific testing of evidence is  authorized only if testing or retesting can provide materially relevant evidence that will significantly  advance the defendant’s claim of innocence, in light of all the evidence presented.  Id.  There are a number of predicate requirements that must be met under the act before a circuit  court can order that testing be done.  Sections 16­112­201 to ­203.  Initially, the act requires a prima  facie showing of identity as an issue at trial when a petitioner contends that he is entitled to posttrial  scientific testing on the ground of actual innocence.  Section 16­112­202(b)(1); Graham v. State, 358  Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004) (per curiam).  At trial, the defense of appellant, Gordon and Moten revolved around the contention that the  victim, or another person, Tony Johnson, initiated the shooting near the intersection of 31st and S.L. ­3­  Henry Streets in West Memphis, Arkansas.  This location was approximately 130 yards from an open  field behind a housing project.  The shoot­out was later concluded on the field where the victim was  eventually shot.  Bullets and casings were recovered at both locations.  Only the evidence collected  at the scene of the shooting was processed by the Arkansas State Crime Lab.  Appellant’s primary defense at trial was that he had no knowledge that Gordon and Moten  intended to shoot the victim.  Gordon’s and Moten’s defense was that the victim was chasing them  after the initial exchange of gunfire at the street intersection, and that they were acting in self­defense.  However, the autopsy results indicated that the victim was shot from behind.  Eye witnesses testified  at trial that Moten advanced toward the victim as the victim ran from him.  The victim fell to the  ground after being shot, and Moten then walked over to the victim who was on the ground and shot  him several more times.  The Act 1780 petition sought fingerprint testing of the bullets found at 31st and Henry in  order to prove that the shooting was justified.  Appellant reasoned that if the victim’s or Johnson’s  prints were on any of the bullets or casings found at that location, the fingerprints would prove that  the victim was the aggressor in the gun fight.  Thus, according to the petition, all defendants would  be found innocent of the later shooting of the victim.  At the hearing on the Act 1780 petition, an attorney then representing all codefendants argued  to the trial court that the identity prerequisite was satisfied when attempting to determine the identity  of the victim/aggressor.  However, this interpretation of Act 1780 is patently incorrect.  The identity  issue goes only to  the person convicted of the crime, and only when scientific  testing  is  able to  exclude him or her from having committed the crime, thus proving the person’s innocence.  Section  16­112­103(a)(1) states that a petition for writ of habeas corpus shall issue to one “who has alleged ­4­  actual innocence of the offense . . . for which the person was convicted[.]”  (Emphasis ours.)  In addition to exoneration of one wrongly accused of committing a crime, the act allows the  state to commence prosecution against an unknown person identified in the information or indictment  only by his or her genetic information.  Ark. Code Ann. §5­1­109(i) (Supp. 2001),  as  amended  pursuant to §2, Act 1780 of 2001.  It is clear from the language of the statutes and Act 1780 that the  issue of identity is limited to the person accused or convicted of committing the crime, and not as  support  for  a  defense  of  justification,  or  based  upon  the  identity  of  a  third  person.    Moreover,  appellant has cited no authority to support this interpretation of the act  As to the identity of the shooter, evidence adduced at trial showed that the victim and Johnson  were in the field talking when all three of the defendants drove up in appellant’s car.  Gordon and  Moten, each holding a gun, got out of the car while appellant remained in the driver’s seat.  The  identity of the shooter was known, as Moten readily admitted that he shot the victim.  Appellant, who  remained in the car during the shooting, was convicted as an accomplice to the murder.  As the  identity of the  shooter  and  his  accomplices  was  never  an  issue  at  trial,  the  identity prerequisite  pursuant to section 16­112­202(b)(1) could not be met.  As to his claims of actual innocence, any fingerprint results would not advance appellant’s  claim, or exonerate appellant under section 16­112­202(c)(1)(B) to show that the testing would  produce  evidence  materially relevant  to  his  assertion  of actual innocence.  The  presence  of  the  victim’s or Johnson’s fingerprints on the bullets would not disprove the evidence introduced at trial  as outlined above.  Also, fingerprints could not prove that the victim or Johnson were the persons  firing the bullets, that the bullets were fired at the defendants, or when the bullets were discharged  in order to chronologically place the firing immediately prior to the victim’s murder.  At most, the ­5­  men’s fingerprints would merely confirm that the men touched the bullets at one time.  Therefore, even if direct  proof  existed that the victim was shot shortly after firing at the  defendants, evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming in spite of a claim of self­defense.  The  requested  scientific  testing  would  not  advance  appellant’s  claim  of  innocence.    Section  16­112­  202(c)(1)(B).  Moreover, a claim of self­defense cannot be proved by the presence of the victim’s  fingerprints, as appellant contends.  Finally, any scientific testing would be cumulative to evidence introduced to the jury under  section 16­112­202(c)(1)(B).  At trial, the jury was presented with the self­defense theory advanced  by Gordon and Moten, and with appellant’s claim that he had no knowledge that the victim was going  to be killed.  The scientific evidence requested would be solely for the purpose of attempting to  reinforce the self­defense claim, rather than proving the claim, as contended by appellant.  Therefore,  any fingerprint testing sought by appellant would be contrary to the requirement that scientific testing  produce new, non­cumulative evidence pursuant to section 16­112­202(c)(1)(B).  The scientific testing requested does not support appellant’s claim of innocence, or comply  with  the  prerequisites  mandated  by  statute.    Appellant  failed  to  meet  his  burden  of  establishing  entitlement to relief pursuant to Act 1780.  Appeal dismissed; motions moot.  Brown, J., not participating. ­6­ 

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