Renda Kidwell v. Margie Rhew

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­886  Opinion Delivered November 15, 2007  RENDA KIDWELL,  APPELLANT,  VS.  AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT  COURT OF WHITE COUNTY,  ARKANSAS, NO. P­04­221­3,  HONORABLE ROBERT CRAIG  HANNAH, CIRCUIT JUDGE  MARGIE RHEW,  APPELLEE,  AFFIRMED.  TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice  In this case, appellant Renda Kidwell asks our court to determine whether Arkansas’s  pretermitted­heir statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 28­39­407(b) (Repl. 2004), should apply to a  revocable inter vivos trust.  Irene Winchester established the Irene Winchester Revocable  Trust on January 25, 2000. The trust named Winchester as trustee and her daughter, appellee  Margie Rhew, as successor trustee upon Winchester’s death.  Winchester conveyed various  parcels of property to the trust during her life, including tracts of real property in Jackson and  White counties.  Although  Winchester  created  the  trust,  she  never  executed  a  will,  and  she  died  intestate  on  March  14,  2004.    Following  her  death,  Kidwell  was  appointed  as  special  administrator of Winchester’s estate on October 15, 2005. As special administrator, Kidwell  identified  three  separate  assets  that  were  potentially  includable  in  Winchester’s  estate,  including the parcels of real estate that had been transferred to the trust during Winchester’s 07­886  lifetime.  On September 26, 2006, Kidwell petitioned the Probate Division of the White  County Circuit Court for an injunction against Rhew, preventing Rhew from disposing of the  property “until rightful ownership shall be determined.”  In a brief supporting her motion for  injunction, Kidwell argued that the pretermitted­heir statute should apply to “dispositions  made by testamentary will substitutes, such as an inter vivos trust.”  The circuit court entered an order on March 13, 2007, rejecting Kidwell’s argument  and finding that § 28­39­407(b) was “clear on its face and, by explicit terms, applies only to  wills and not to trusts created during the life of the settlor.”  Accordingly, the court denied  Kidwell’s  request  to  receive  an  intestate  share  of  Winchester’s  estate;  the  court  also  discharged Kidwell as administrator of the estate and declared that the estate was closed.  1  Kidwell filed a timely notice of appeal,  and now raises three points for reversal; however,  because each of her three arguments are similar, we treat them together in this opinion.  The fundamental question in this case involves the interpretation of § 28­39­407(b).  Our standard of review for issues involving the interpretation of  a  statute  is de novo on  appeal. See Health Facilities Management Corp. v. Hughes, 365 Ark. 237, 227 S.W.3d 910 1  On May 18, 2007, Kidwell filed a motion pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.—Civ.  4(b)(3) for an extension of time to file her notice of appeal.  In that motion, she alleged  that, despite repeated phone calls to the White County Clerk’s office, she was never  notified that the circuit court’s order had been entered; she did not receive word that the  order had been filed until May 16, 2007.  The trial court granted Kidwell’s motion on  May 25, 2007, finding that neither Kidwell nor her attorney had received notice of the  signing or entry of the court’s order; in addition, the court found that less than 180 days  had elapsed since the filing of the order, and no party would be prejudiced by the  requested extension.  Kidwell filed her notice of appeal on May 31, 2007.  ­2­  07­886  (2006); Wal­Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002).  The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it  reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.  See Hughes, supra.  When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no  need to resort to rules of statutory construction.  Id.  Moreover, the probate court is a court  of special and limited jurisdiction, having only such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred  by the constitution or by statute, or are necessarily incident to the exercise of the jurisdiction  and powers granted, and the authority and jurisdiction of probate courts are to be strictly  construed.  See Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612 (1978); Hilburn v. First State  Bank, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810 (1976).  A pretermitted heir is a “child or spouse who has been omitted from a will, as when  a testator makes a will naming his or her two children and then, sometime later, has two more  children who are not mentioned in the will.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 742 (8th ed. 2004).  Arkansas’s pretermitted­heir statute provides as follows:  If, at the time of the execution of a will, there is a living child of the  testator, or living child or issue of a deceased child of the testator, whom the  testator shall omit to mention or provide for, either specifically or as a member  of a class, the testator shall be deemed to have died intestate with respect to  the child or issue.  The child or issue shall  be  entitled to recover from the  devisees in proportion to the amounts of their respective shares, that portion  of the estate which he or she or they would have inherited had there been no  will.  § 28­39­407(b) (emphasis added). ­3­  07­886  The  purpose  of  the  pretermitted­child  statute  is  to  avoid  the  inadvertent  or  unintentional omission of children or issue of deceased children unless an intent to disinherit  is expressed in the will.  Alexander v. Estate of Alexander, 351 Ark. 359,  93 S.W.3d 688  (2002); Holland v. Willis, 293 Ark. 518, 739 S.W.2d 529 (1987).  This court has stated that  the object of the statute is “to prevent injustice to a child or descendant from occurring by  reason of the forgetfulness of a testator who might, at the time of making his will, overlook  the fact that he had such child or descendant.”  Petty v. Chaney, 281 Ark. 72, 73, 661 S.W.2d  373, 374 (1983).  On appeal, Kidwell argues that, “if Irene Winchester’s testamentary disposition of her  estate  had  been  by  a  Last  Will  and  Testament  containing  the  same  terms  of  the  Irene  Winchester Revocable Trust, Renda Kidwell would have rights as a pretermitted heir.” The  immediate and obvious difficulty with that argument is that Winchester did not dispose of  her property by way of a will. Instead, Winchester disposed of her property through an inter  vivos trust.  A will and a trust are two different things entirely.  A will is a disposition of property  to take effect upon the death of the maker of the instrument. See Edmundson v. Estate of  Fountain, 358 Ark. 302, 189 S.W.3d 427 (2004); Faith v. Singleton,  286 Ark. 403, 692  S.W.2d  239  (1985).  A  trust,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  fiduciary  relationship  in  which  one  person is the holder of the title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use  the property for the benefit of another.  See, e.g.,  Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Family  Trust, 28 Ark. App. 314, 773 S.W.2d 453 (1989).  As the terms are not interchangeable, it ­4­  07­886  follows that the pretermitted­heir statute, which speaks only in terms of the “execution of a  will,” does not apply in instances in which there is no will.  Nonetheless, Kidwell argues that this court should look to the Restatement (Second)  of Property, Donative Transfers § 34.2 (1992), which provides as follows:  (2) If the donative transfer is under a substitute for a will, or under a  transfer revocable by the donor at the time of the donor’s death, and an issue  of the donor who would take a share of the donor’s property on the donor’s  death intestate is omitted as a beneficiary, in the absence of a statute in the  controlling state, the policy of the statute in the controlling state applicable to  an omitted issue in a will should be applied by analogy to the omitted issue in  the substitute for a will, or in the transfer revocable by the donor at the time  of the donor’s death.  Kidwell  urges  the  court  to  adopt  this  language,  claiming  that  when  there  is  no  controlling  case  law,  this  court  will  “consistently  rely  on  the  Restatements.”    However,  Kidwell fails to note that the Statutory Note and Reporter’s Notes on Section 34.2 do not  favor her position.  The preface to the Statutory Note to Section 34.2 points out that the  statutes cited therein “are applicable in terms only to wills.  No statutes have been found  which apply generally to any omitted intestate beneficiary.  In addition, no statutes were  found  that  extend  the  policy  governing  the  omitted  child  statutes  to  will  substitutes.”  Further, the Reporter’s Note to Section 34.2 states the following:  No cases have been found in which the protections by statute or case  law afforded to a child omitted from a will have been extended to apply to a  child omitted from a will substitute used as a comprehensive dispositive plan.  Courts  that  have  addressed  the  issue  have  decided  against  expanding  the  policy. ­5­  07­886  We decline to adopt the Restatement’s provisions.  According to its clear language  and express terms, Arkansas’s statute applies only to wills.  When the language of the statute  is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction, as  Kidwell would have us do.  See City of Fort Smith v. Carter, 364 Ark. 100, 216 S.W.3d 594  (2005) (if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the analysis need go no  further).  Here, the pretermitted­heir statute speaks only in terms of wills, and not of trusts,  and  Kidwell  cites  no  convincing  authority  that  would  compel  this  court  to  reach  the  conclusion she urges.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that § 28­39­407(b)  applies only to wills and not to trusts created during the life of the settlor.  HANNAH, C. J., not participating. ­6­  07­886 

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