White County, Arkansas v. Cities of Judsonia, Kensett, and Pangburn, Arkansas
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. 06-649
WHITE COUNTY, ARKANSAS
APPELLANT,
VS.
CITIES OF JUDSONIA, KENSETT, AND
PANGBURN, ARKANSAS,
APPELLEES,
Opinion Delivered March 1, 2007
APPEAL FROM WHITE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO., 2005-507-1ST,
HON. JOHN COLE, JUDGE,
AFFIRMED.
JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice
This appeal arises from a declaratory-judgment order from the White County Circuit
Court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by appellant, White County, and
declaring, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 57 (2006), that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-129 (Supp.
2005), as amended, is not ambiguous. On June 18, 2003, the White County Quorum Court
enacted Ordinance 2003-10, which authorized the levy of an additional five dollar ($5.00)
fine to help defray the expense of housing prisoners in the White County Detention Center.
On appeal, White County argues that it passed the ordinance pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §
16-17-127 (Supp. 2005). We affirm.
On June 18, 2003, the White County Quorum Court enacted Ordinance 2003-10,
which authorized the levy of an additional five dollar ($5.00) fine to help defray the expense
of incarceration of prisoners pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-129. The ordinance was
enacted to alleviate the financial burden of the operation of the White County Detention
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Center. Appellee cities, Judsonia, Kensett, and Pangburn, are all located within White
County and did not comply with Ordinance 2003-10. On August 19, 2005, White County
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to resolve the dispute as to the enforceability of
Ordinance No. 2003-10 and also filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to
declare that Ordinance 2003-10 as county law that the cities must follow.
Section 16-17-129, as originally codified in 1999, authorized only cities with
populations less than 100,000 to levy and collect the $5.00 fine. 1999 Ark. Acts 1336. Act
1188 of 2003 amended this section to authorize counties to levy the same additional $5.00
fine. Act 1373 of 2005 amended this section by adding subsection (e). On February 27,
2006, the White County Circuit Court found that § 16-17-129, as amended, was not
ambiguous and that 2003-10 did not authorize appellee cities to impose the additional $5.00
fine because the cities’ councils must first adopt the ordinance authorizing the fine. From
this order, White County brings its appeal.
For its first point on appeal, White County argues that the circuit court erred in finding
that ordinance 2003-10 does not authorize appellees to impose or collect the additional $5.00
fine. By Ordinance 2003-10, the White County Quorum Court ordered the district and city
courts within White County to impose and collect the additional fine authorized by Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-17-129. The purpose was to alleviate the financial burden of the operation of
White County Detention Center.
The circuit court ruled that § 16-17-129 was not
ambiguous. White County agrees that the statute is not ambiguous, but disagrees with the
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court’s application of the statute. In response, appellees argue that while they agree with the
circuit court’s ruling that § 16-17-129 does not authorize White County to order appellees
to levy a $5.00 fine in their city courts, they contend the language of the statute is ambiguous.
Appellees ask us to look beyond the ordinary and usually accepted meaning of the language
of the code section to determine its true intent.
We review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide
what a statute means; thus, we are not bound by the trial court’s determination. Turnbough
v. Mammoth Spring School District No. 2, 349 Ark. 341, 78 S.W.3d 89 (2002). The basic
rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. See
Turnbough, supra. In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just
as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common
language.
Id.
We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or
insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id.
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and coveys a clear and definite
meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Id. A statute is
ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure
or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning.
State v. Britt, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Dec. 6, 2006).
Ordinance 2003-10 was enacted pursuant to Act 1188 of 2003, which is codified as
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-129 and states:
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(a) In addition to all fines now or as may hereafter be provided by law, the
governing body of each city of the first class, city of the second class,
incorporated town, and county in this state may by ordinance levy and collect
an additional fine not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) from each defendant who
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, is found guilty of, or forfeits bond for any
misdemeanor or traffic violation in the municipal court or city court of the city,
town, or county, or in the district court for the district in which the city or town
is located.
Id. (emphasis added.) Act 1188 of 2003 gave counties in the state the right to levy this
additional $5.00 fine. This right had been held exclusively by the cities and towns of the
state since Act 1136 of 1999.
Another amendment, Act 1185 of 2003, made technical corrections to the entire body
of Arkansas law in order to implement Amendment 80. Act 1185 removed the term
municipal court in favor of district court because district courts became vested with the
jurisdiction of municipal courts under section 19 of Amendment 80. Act 1373 of 2005 is the
most recent amendment to § 16-17-129. Act 1373 added subsection (e) stating that the fine
shall apply to each charge, count, violation, or offense of defendant.
White County argues that according to the plain language of Act 1188 of 2003, it had
the authority to impose the fine on appellees. White County asserts that since the municipal
courts or city courts of appellees are located in White County and the $5.00 fine was levied
by the Quorum Court of White County, Ordinance No. 2003-10 imposes on the municipal
courts or city courts of appellees the duty to pay the additional $5.00 fine.
Appellees respond, arguing that Act 1188 of 2003 created confusion and ambiguity
resulting in the present situation. Appellees rely on Attorney General’s Opinion No. 2005-4-
017. In his opinion, the attorney general states that § 16-17-129 “authorizes a county to levy
and collect, by quorum court ordinance, the additional $5.00 fine in district court only. The
authority does not extend, in my opinion to city court.” Id. Appellees explain that, while it
might seem at first glance that the statute authorizes the county to impose the fine on a city
court, “it becomes apparent upon further analysis that [“all courts within a . . . county in this
state that has by ordinancy levied the fine . . .”] is ambiguous given the fact that a city court
ordinarily is not considered a court ‘of the . . . county’.” Id. The attorney general does admit
that the language of 16-17-129 could include city courts by stating:
I recognize in this regard that Act 1373 of 2005 restates subsection (a)
of the statute as previously codified. This merely perpetuates the existing
ambiguity, however, rather than resolving it. I also note that Act 1373 includes
new language authorizing the fine’s imposition “[b]y all courts within a...
county...” See A.C.A. § 16-17-129(e)(2)(A), supra. While this language
admittedly could encompass city courts, its broad sweep raises more questions
than answers, in my opinion. It could just as easily be interpreted to mean all
district courts within the county. This interpretation may be reinforced,
moreover, by the title of Act 1373, which reflects only an intent to clarify that
the additional $5.00 fine applies to each offense.
Id. The attorney general states that legislative history remains the most authoritative source
on the issue, and that it is “relatively clear from the history that counties were given the same
authority to levy and collect the additional fine in district (former municipal) court as was
originally given to cities and towns.” Id. Appellees argue that the amendment did not
authorize or expand the jurisdiction of a governing body of the county to enact an ordinance
which could require an additional fine to be imposed in city courts.
We have held that attorney general opinions are not binding precedent on this court.
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Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 69 S.W.3d 855
(2002). However, we agree with appellees that the language of the statute is ambiguous.
Looking at the plain language of the statute, reasonable minds could differ as to whether it
limits White County to only collecting fines in district court or allows White County to
collect fines in city courts as well, thereby making the statute ambiguous. See Britt, supra.
The language “in the city court of the city, town, or county, or in the district court for the
district in which the city or town is located” is unclear because there is no “city court of the
county.” Since the statute is ambiguous, we look to the whole act including the legislative
history, the language, and the subject matter involved. Ainsworth v. State, __ Ark. __, __
S.W.3d (2006).
Considering the act as a whole, we agree with appellees’ assertion that the legislature
did not intend to authorize the governing body of a county or expand the jurisdiction of a
governing body of the county to enact an ordinance which would require an additional fine
to be imposed in city courts. A county is a municipal corporation. Stilley v. Henson, 342
Ark. 346, 28 S.W.3d 274 (2000) (citing City of Hot Springs v. Gray, 215 Ark. 243, 219
S.W.2d 930 (1949)). Municipal corporations are creatures of the legislature and as such have
only the power bestowed upon them by statute or the Arkansas Constitution. Id. (citing Jones
v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987)). It is well settled that
municipal corporations have no inherent powers and can exercise only (1) those expressly
given to them by state statute or the Arkansas Constitution, (2) those necessarily implied for
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the purposes of, or incident to, the express powers, and (3) those indispensable, not merely
convenient, to their objects and purposes. Cosgrove v. City of West Memphis, 327 Ark. 324,
938 S.W.2d 827 (1997). Finally, any substantial doubt about the existence of a power in a
municipal corporation must be resolved against it. Id.; City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark.
494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982); Town of Dyess v. Williams, 247 Ark. 155, 444 S.W.2d 701
(1969).
Here, it is clear that the legislature’s intent was to give counties the same authority to
collect the fine in district court as the cities’ authority to collect the fine in city court. The
legislature did not intend to authorize counties to collect the additional fine in city courts.
We do not agree with White County’s argument that the Emergency Clause set out in Act
1373 of 2005 clarified the legislature’s intent for the county to collect the additional fine in
city court. The emergency clause states:
It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas
that questions have arisen regarding the interpretation of Act 1188 of 2003;
that the fiscal burdens of incarcerating prisoners in city and county jails are
increasing; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to provide
financial relief to defray the cost of city and county prisoners. Therefore, an
emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on
. . . [act was approved on March 29, 2005].
Id. This emergency clause merely states the intent of the legislature to provide financial
relief to defray the cost of city and county prisoners. It does not state that counties can
collect the additional fine in city court. Even with the addition of the emergency clause, we
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still agree with appellees that the intent of the legislature was for counties to collect the fine
in district court and cities to collect the fine in city court. Keeping in mind that any
substantial doubt about the existence of a power in a county must be resolved against it, we
hold that the legislature did not bestow upon White County the power to collect the
additional fine in appellees’ city courts, see City of Little Rock, supra, and we affirm the trial
court’s ruling.
For its second point on appeal, White County argues that the circuit court erred in
finding that only a local city council could authorize the collection of the additional $5.00
fine in city courts by adoption of city ordinance. Section 1 of Act 1336 of 1999 states:
In addition to all fines now, or as may hereafter be provided by law, each first
class city, second class city, and incorporated town in this state may levy and
collect an additional fine not to exceed five dollars. . . for any misdemeanor or
traffic violation in the municipal court or city court of the city or town. . . The
additional court fine authorized by this act shall be levied by ordinance of the
governing body of the municipality where in the municipal court or city court
is located.
Id. (emphasis added). In Act 1185 of 2003, the above highlighted sentence was stricken and
the following highlighted words added:
In addition to all fines now or as may hereafter be provided by law, the
governing body of each city of the first class, city of the second class, and
incorporated town in this state may by ordinance levy and collect an additional
fine not to exceed five dollars. . . for any misdemeanor or traffic violation in
the city court of the city or town or in the district in which the city or town is
located.
Id. (emphasis added).
White County argues that the above amendment removed the language which gave
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exclusive right to the “municipality” to pass an ordinance levying the additional fine.
Appellees argue that the change simplified the code section while retaining the original intent
through the addition of the highlighted phrases. Appellees also assert that it would be
illogical for the General Assembly to intend for some other governing body other than that
specifically stated in the code section to be authorized to pass an ordinance which would
require a city or town to levy this additional tax.
Act 1188 of 2003 states:
(a)(1) In addition to all fines now or as may hereafter be provided by law, the
governing body of each city of the first class, city of the second class,
incorporated town, and county in this state may by ordinance levy and collect
an additional fine not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) from each defendant who
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, is found guilty of, or forfeits bond for any
misdemeanor or traffic violation in the municipal court or city court of the city,
town, or county.
(2) The additional court fine authorized by this section shall be levied by
ordinance of the governing body of the municipality or county wherein the
municipal court or city court is located.
Id. (emphasis added). Appellees argue that it is clear that the General Assembly intended
the additional fine to be levied by ordinance of the governing body of the municipality (city)
or the governing body of the county wherein the municipal court (district court) or city court
is located. In its reply brief, White County asserts that it does not dispute the authority of a
city or town to avail itself of the revenue raising mechanism provided by the law, but argues
that Arkansas counties are likewise empowered. White County argues that the Arkansas
General Assembly has specifically authorized the cities to collect a $5.00 fine and the
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counties to collect an additional $5.00 fine. We disagree.
Ordinance 2003-10 was enacted pursuant to Act 1188 of 2003, and although we agree
that this language is confusing, we hold that the intent of the general assembly was to give
counties the authority to levy and collect the additional fine in district court, the same way
it gave cities the authority to levy and collect the additional fine in city court. When a statute
is ambiguous, we look to the whole act including the legislative history, the language, and
the subject matter involved. See Ainsworth, supra. Looking at the entire act, we hold that
the intent of the statute was not to give counties the authority to levy and collect additional
fines in city courts, therefore only city ordinances adopted by the appellees’ city councils
could authorize the additional fine. Keeping in mind our de novo standard of review, we
hold that the circuit court did not err in finding that only a local city council could authorize
the collection of the additional $5.00 fine in city courts by adoption of a city ordinance.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling.
Affirmed.
Hannah, C.J. and Imber, J., not participating.
Special Associate Justices Hill and Mayton join.
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