Monica Lacy and Jackie Lacy v. Flake & Kelly Management, Inc., Mercantile Bank, Firstar Bank, U.S. Bank, National Association

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Monica LACY and Jackie LACY v. FLAKE & KELLEY  MANAGEMENT, INC., Mercantile Bank, Firstar Bank, U.S.  Bank, National Association  05­827  ___ S.W.3d ___  Supreme Court of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 18, 2006  1.  NEGLIGENCE – FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY – NO DUTY ASSUMED. –  A  plain reading of the lease between appellee bank, who was the owner of the building,  and appellant’s employer showed that appellee bank did not assume a duty to protect  appellant from criminal attacks; while appellee bank may have assumed a duty to  monitor entry into the building, there was nothing in the lease terms that gave rise to  a duty to protect tenants from criminal attacks by third parties in the parking lot, nor  did appellant point to any conduct by either the appellee bank or its appellee building­  management company that gave rise to such a comprehensive duty.  2.  NEGLIGENCE  –  APPELLANT  WAS  NOT  AN  INVITEE.  –  Where  appellant  was  not  an  employee of appellee bank, who was the owner of the building, but was a tenant,  where she made no allegations that she was on the property for the benefit of the  appellee  bank,  and  where  it  was  undisputed  that  appellant  did  not  work  for  the ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 2  appellee bank, nor was she banking with appellee bank at the time of the incident,  appellant was not an invitee and the appellee bank did not owe her an affirmative duty  to see that the premises were reasonably safe.  3.  NEGLIGENCE  – APPELLANT WAS  NOT A BUSINESS  INVITEE.  –  Appellant did not fall  under  the  definition  of  a  business  invitee  under  Arkansas  law;  thus,  neither  the  appellee bank, nor its appellee management company, owed a duty of ordinary care.  4.  NEGLIGENCE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. – Appellant failed to establish  the  element  of  duty;  because  no  duty  of  care  was  owed,  summary  judgment  was  appropriate  and  the  supreme  court  affirmed  the  trial  court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment in favor of appellees.  Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Christopher Charles Piazza, Judge; affirmed.  David A. Hodges, Attorney at Law, for appellant.  Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: John S. Cherry, Jr. and D. Keith Fortner,  for appellee Flake & Kelley Management, Inc.  Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by:  Gordon S. Rather, Jr., Patricia Sievers  Harris, ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 3  Kristi M. Moody, and Paul D. Morris, for appellees Mercantile Bank, N.A., Firstar Bank,  N.A., and U.S. Bank, National Association.  TOM GLAZE, Justice. On June 13, 2000, at approximately 4:17 p.m., Monica Lacy left  her office located on the fifth floor of the Mercantile Bank building in North Little Rock.  As Lacy approached her car in the parking lot, she was abducted by two men.  During the  course of her kidnapping, Lacy was robbed and raped by a total of four men.  Lacy worked for a part of the bankruptcy system that had offices in the Mercantile  Bank Building.  The building was originally owned by Mercantile Bank, which was acquired  by Firstar Bank, which was subsequently acquired by U.S. Bank.  At the time of the incident  in question, the building was owned by Firstar, who had a “Management Agreement” with  Flake & Kelley Management, Inc., whereby Flake was made the managing and leasing agent  for  the  building.  The  agreement  gave  Flake  the  authority  to  hire,  supervise,  and  fire  employees in the care, management, and operation of the premises.  Flake contracted with  Guardsmark, Inc., a security firm, to provide a lobby guard from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on  weekdays  and  8:00  a.m.  to  6:00  p.m.  on  weekends  and  holidays.  The  guards  were  not  required to patrol the parking lot or other common areas outside of the building.  On  April  4,  2003,  Lacy  filed  a  complaint  against  Mercantile,  Firstar,  U.S.  Bank, ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 4  Flake, and John Does I­III alleging that the defendants were negligent  in  their failure to  provide adequate security. In response, Mercantile, Firstar, and U.S. Bank (collectively U.S.  Bank), and Flake each filed motions for summary judgment.  The trial court then entered an  order granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank and Flake.  Lacy dismissed her  allegations against John Does I­III, making the trial court’s order final.  Lacy now appeals  from this order.  Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact,  and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Francis v. Francis, 343 Ark.  104, 31 S.W.3d 841 (2000); Wallace v. Broyles, 331 Ark. 58, 961 S.W.2d 712 (1998).  The  issue of whether a duty exists is always a question of law, not to be decided by a trier of fact.  Hall v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 323 Ark. 143, 913 S.W.2d 293 (1996).  If no duty of care is  owed, summary judgment is appropriate.  Smith v. Hanson, 323 Ark. 188, 914 S.W.2d 285  (1996).  On appeal, Lacy argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment  in favor of the defendants, U.S. Bank and Flake.  It is well settled that the law of negligence  requires as essential elements that the plaintiff show that a duty was owed and that the duty  was breached.  Young v. Paxton, 316 Ark. 655, 873 S.W.2d 546 (1994).  Lacy sets forth two  separate arguments in order to establish that both U.S. Bank and Flake had a duty to protect ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 5  1  her from her attackers.  First, Lacy argues that the lease agreement between her employer  and U.S. Bank imposed upon U.S. Bank – and ultimately Flake – a duty to protect Lacy from  the criminal activity she encountered.  The lease agreement provides in pertinent part as follows:  3.14  Tenant and Tenant’s agents, employees, and invitees will comply fully  with all requirements of Rules of the Building which are attached hereto and,  which are a part of this Lease as though fully set out herein:  . . . .  4.1  Landlord shall have the following rights exercisable without notice or  demand  and  without  liability  to  Tenant  for  damage  or  injury  to  property,  persons or business (all claims for damage therefore being hereby released by  Tenant), and without effecting an eviction or disturbance of Tenant’s use or  possession of the Premises or giving rise to any claim for setoffs or abatement  of rent:  . . . . Lacy’s  employer,  for  purposes  of  the  lease  with  U.S.  Bank,  was  United  States  Bankruptcy Chapter 13 Trustee David Coop.  1  ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 6  (g)  To take all such reasonable measures as Landlord may deem advisable for  the security of the Building and its occupants, including without limitation, the  search of all persons entering or leaving the Building, the evacuation of the  Building for cause, suspected cause, or for drill purposes, the temporary denial  of access to the Building, and the closing of the Building after normal business  hours and on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, subject, however, to Tenant’s  right to admittance when the Building is closed after normal business hours  under such reasonable regulations as Landlord may prescribe from time to time  which  may  include  by  way  of  example  but  not  of  limitation,  that  persons  entering or leaving the Building, whether or not during normal business hours,  identify themselves to a security officer by registration or otherwise and that  such persons establish this right to enter or leave the Building.  (1)  to  close  the  Building  at  6:00  p.m.  or  such  other  reasonable  time  as  Landlord may determine, subject, however, to Tenant’s right to admittance  under such regulations as shall be prescribed from time to time by Landlord  and set out in the rules of the Building.  Based on the above­cited provisions of the lease, Lacy argues that U.S. Bank assumed a duty  to provide security for the building.  In doing so, Lacy argues U.S. Bank also assumed a duty ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 7  to protect her from criminal attacks by third parties in the parking lot.  Arkansas follows the  general rule that a landlord does not owe a duty to protect the tenant from criminal acts.  See  Hall v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., supra; see also Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d  250 (1994).  Only an express agreement or assumption of duty by conduct can remove a  landlord from the general rule of nonliability.  Id.  In Bartley v. Sweetser, a tenant of an apartment complex, Jenny Bartley, was raped  by  a  co­tenant.  Bartley  filed  suit  against  the  owners  of  the  complex,  Jerry  and  Sharon  Sweetser, alleging that the Sweetsers had breached their duty to provide reasonable security  from  foreseeable  criminal  acts.    More  specifically,  Bartley  argued  that  the  Sweetsers  provided her with a windowless door which was latched with a simple push­button doorknob  lock, failed to provide adequate security and adequate lighting of the common areas, and  failed to warn Bartley that the apartment complex was prone to criminal activity.  Bartley,  319 Ark. at 118.  On appeal, the Bartley court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Sweetsers,  holding that “a landlord, under Arkansas law, is not the insurer of the safety of tenants or  others upon the premises.”  The court went on to add that “while circumstances could arise  under  the  terms  of  a  lease  between  a  landlord  and  tenant  so  as  to  impose  a  duty,  those  circumstances do not exist in this case.”  Id. at 122. ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 8  The Bartley court recognized that, as a matter of public policy, it is unfair to impose  such a high duty of protection on the landlord absent an agreement or statute.  Id. at 121  (citing American Law of Landlord Tenant § 4.14 (1980)).  The court then listed the reasons  for this approach as follows:  Judicial reluctance to tamper with the common law concept of the landlord­  tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third person in committing an  intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another; . . . the  often times difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the  vagueness  of  the  standard  which  the  landlord  must  meet;  the  economic  consequences of the imposition of the duty; and the conflict with public policy  allocating the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the government  rather than the private sector.  Id.  Two years after the Bartley decision, this court was called on to apply the rules in  Bartley to the facts and circumstances presented in Hall v. Rental Management, Inc., supra.  There,  Hazel  Hall,  a  resident  of  an  apartment  complex,  brought  an  action  against  her  landlord, RMI, after her son was shot and killed on RMI’s premises.  Hall claimed that RMI  voluntarily undertook  a  duty  to provide security and, having done so, was bound to use ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 9  reasonable care.  This court affirmed summary judgment in favor of RMI and reasoned as  follows:  [RMI’s] implementation of certain practices such as lighting, evening patrols,  and communicating with residents regarding suspicious activities help assure  the quiet enjoyment and basic safety of the tenants, in addition to providing a  modicum of deterrence to criminal activity. We are reluctant to hold that a  landlord's use of these modest, conscientious measures imposes a full blown  duty to protect tenants from third party criminal activities.  Hall, 323 Ark. at 149­50; see also Steward v. McDonald, 330 Ark. 837, 958 S.W.2d 297  (1997)  (holding  that,  without  an  assumption  of  responsibility  for  repairs,  there  is  no  common­law duty imposed upon landlords to provide a safe workplace for the employees  of their tenant).  Given this background, the relevant question in this case is whether U.S. Bank and  Flake removed themselves from the general rule by assuming a duty to protect Lacy from  criminal attacks.  A plain reading of the lease clearly shows that this has not occurred.  U.S.  Bank may have assumed a duty to monitor entry into the building; however, there is nothing  in the lease terms that could give rise to a duty to protect tenants from criminal attacks by  third parties in the parking lot.  Moreover, Lacy points to no conduct by either U.S. Bank or ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 10  Flake that could give rise to such a comprehensive duty.  As a result, Lacy’s first argument  must fail. Next, Lacy argues that she was an invitee because she was on the property for the  benefit of U.S. Bank.  Tucker v. Sullivan, 307 Ark. 440, 821 S.W.2d 470 (1991) (defining  invitee  as  “one  induced  to  come  onto  [the]  property  for  the  business  benefit  of  the  possessor”).  Under the law of this state, an owner owes an invitee an affirmative duty to see  that the premises are reasonably safe.  Kay v. Kay, 306 Ark. 322, 812 S.W.2d 685 (1991).  Lacy cites to this court’s decision in Kay, supra, in support of her position.  In the  Kay case, Mary Harris, a housekeeper, was bitten by a brown recluse spider while working  in the home of Thomas and Gladys Kay.  Harris’s complaint alleged that the Kays knew of  the presence of spiders in their home and did nothing to make the premises safe  for her.  Given the facts, it was clear that Harris was on the property for the benefit of the Kays, who  had dual roles as both employers and property owners.  As a result, this court labeled Harris  as an invitee and held that “an employee working on her employer’s premises is an invitee.”  Kay, 306 Ark. at 323.  The case at bar is easily distinguishable from the Kay case in that Lacy was not an  employee of U.S. Bank – she was a tenant.  Here, unlike the housekeeper in Kay, Lacy has  made  no  allegations  that  she  was  on  the  property  for  the  benefit  of  U.S.  Bank.  It  is ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2  LACY  v. FLAKE & KELLEY MGMT., INC.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 11  undisputed that Lacy did not work for U.S. Bank, nor was she banking with U.S. Bank at the  time of the incident in question.  Simply put, Lacy was not an invitee, and U.S. Bank did not  owe her an affirmative duty to see that the premises were reasonably safe.  For this reason,  Lacy’s second argument must also fail.  See Wheeler v. Phillips Dev. Corp., 329 Ark. 354,  947 S.W.2d 380 (1997) (holding that a tenant is not an invitee on her landlord’s premises).  Overall, neither U.S. Bank nor Flake assumed a duty to protect Lacy from the incident  in question.  In addition, under Arkansas law, Lacy does not fall under the definition of a  business invitee; thus, neither U.S. Bank nor Flake owed a duty of ordinary care.  In short,  Lacy has not established the element of duty.  Because of this holding, we need not address  Lacy’s remaining arguments.  The issue of whether a duty exists is always a question of law,  not to be decided by a trier of fact.  Hall,  supra.    If no duty of care is owed, summary  judgment is appropriate.  Smith v. Hanson, 323 Ark. 188, 914 S.W.2d 285 (1996).  Given  these standards, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mercantile  Bank, Firstar Bank, U.S. Bank, and Flake & Kelley Management, Inc.  Affirmed.  DICKEY, J., not participating. ___________________________  GLAZE, J. ­ 2 

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