Tony Moncus v. Billingsley Logging & American Insurance Company

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Tony MONCUS v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING &  AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY  05­1353  ___ S.W.3d ___  Supreme Court of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 18, 2006  1.  WORKERS’  COMPENSATION  –  EXCEPTION  TO  THE  “GOING  AND  COMING”  RULE  –  EXCEPTION APPLIED. – An exception to the “going and coming” rule, which ordinarily  precludes recovery for an injury sustained while an employee is going to or coming  from his place of employment, was where the employee must travel from jobsite to  jobsite, whether or not he or she was paid for that travel time; because travel was a  necessary  part  of  appellant’s  employment  and  fit  within  the  jobsite­to­jobsite  exception to the “going and coming” rule, because appellant had no fixed place of  employment and was required to travel from jobsite to jobsite by his employer, and  because his employer testified that the loggers would occasionally switch jobsites in  the middle of the day, the supreme court concluded that travel from jobsite to jobsite  was an integral and necessary part of appellant’s employment.  2.  WORKERS’  COMPENSATION  –  “GOING  AND  COMING”  RULE  –  PREEMINENT  CONSIDERATION  WAS  WHETHER  THE  EMPLOYEE  WAS  DIRECTLY  OR  INDIRECTLY ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 2  ADVANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE EMPLOYER AT THE TIME OF THE INJURY. – Because  the  “going  and  coming”  rule  was  subordinate  to  the  preeminent  consideration  of  whether  the  employee  was  directly  or  indirectly  advancing  the  interests  of  the  employer at the time of the injury, a finding that injuries sustained while traveling to  and from work were not compensable had to reflect a determination that the travel  was not directly or indirectly furthering the interests of the employer; thus, to the  extent that the  “going and coming” rule prevented recovery for injuries sustained  while an employee was furthering the interests of his employer, it was overruled.  3.  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – EMPLOYMENT SERVICES – APPELLANT WAS FULFILLING  A DUTY PLACED ON HIM BY HIS EMPLOYER. – Despite the fact that the appellant was  not engaged in felling trees, the activity for which he was primarily employed, at the  time of his injury, he was carrying out the express directions of his employer at the  time of the accident and was fulfilling a duty placed upon him by his employer.  4.  WORKERS’  COMPENSATION  –  EMPLOYMENT  SERVICES  –  COMMISSION’S  DECISION  REVERSED.  –  The  supreme  court  concluded  that  the  Commission’s  decision  that  appellant  was  not  performing  employment  services  at  the  time  of  his  death  was ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 3  clearly erroneous, where appellant’s death occurred while he was carrying out the  express and immediate instructions of his employer, where he was doing something  specifically required by his employer, and where by the employer’s admission, the  meeting at  the  assembly  point  was  an  unusual  measure  undertaken  to  further  the  employer’s interest by insuring that the logging crew arrived at the jobsite intact; thus,  because the Commission’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and  reasonable minds could not have reached the same conclusion, the supreme court  reversed and remanded the Commission’s decision for a consideration of benefits.  Appeal  from  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission;  reversed  and  remanded; court of appeals reversed.  Hart Law Firm, L.L.P., by:  Neal L. Hart, for appellant.  Michael E. Ryburn, for appellees.  BETTY  C.  DICKEY,  Justice.  The  appellant,  Tony  Moncus,  was  killed  in  an  automobile collision on August 19, 2003, while following his employer, the appellee, to a  jobsite. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge determined that Moncus’s death  was not compensable, because he was not performing employment services at the time of his ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 4  death. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (hereinafter the Commission)  affirmed and fully adopted the decision of the administrative law judge. The Arkansas Court  of  Appeals  then  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  Commission.  We  granted  the  appellant’s  petition  for  review  of  that  decision  pursuant  to  Ark.  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1­2(e).  We  reverse  the  decision of the Commission.  Tony Moncus (Moncus) was a logger employed by Billingsley Logging, which is  owned by Mitchell Billingsley (Billingsley). Moncus operated a wood cutting machine, and  he was paid a fixed sum per ton of wood felled. The loggers would generally travel directly  from their homes to the jobsite to begin work, due to their familiarity with the area in which  the logging operations normally took place. However, on the day of the accident, logging was  slated to begin on a tract of land, the whereabouts of which were known only to Billingsley.  Billingsley therefore instructed the loggers to assemble at a central location so that they  could then follow him to the jobsite. On this particular day, the loggers were required to meet  at the prearranged location, because otherwise they would not be able to find the jobsite.  Because the loggers were generally familiar with the location of any particular jobsite, this  was an unusual situation, which occurred perhaps four or five times in a year.  Although the  other loggers would travel to the unknown site by following Billingsley in company vehicles,  Billingsley had given Moncus permission to use his own truck, because Moncus needed to ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 5  leave work early that day. After all the loggers had arrived that morning, the vehicles left the  meeting  place,  following  Billingsley  in  convoy  fashion.  Before  arriving  at  the  job  site,  Moncus was involved in the collision that caused his death.  Moncus’s representatives then filed a claim on his behalf for workers’­compensation  benefits, which was denied by an administrative law judge. The full Commission affirmed  that  decision  and  the  Commission’s  decision  was  subsequently  affirmed  by  the  court  of  appeals. The appellant brings this appeal from the Commission’s decision.  Upon a petition for review, we consider a case as though it has been originally filed  in this court.  Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001);  Estridge v. Waste Mgmt., 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000); White v. Georgia­Pacific  Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).  In appeals involving claims for workers’ compensation, our court views the evidence  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the  Commission’s  decision  and  affirms  the  decision  if  it  is  supported by substantial evidence.  Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 341 Ark. 548, 26 S.W.3d  771 (2000); Burlington Indus. v. Pickett, 336 Ark. 515, 988 S.W.2d 3 (1999).  Substantial  evidence  is  evidence  that  a  reasonable  mind  might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a  conclusion.  Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). The issue is  not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the Commission; ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 6  if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, the appellate court must  affirm  the  decision.  Minnesota  Mining  &  Mfg.  v.  Baker,  337  Ark.  94,  989  S.W.2d  151  (1999). Where the Commission denies a claim because of the claimant’s failure to meet his  burden of proof, the substantial evidence  standard of review requires that we affirm the  Commission’s decision if its  opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief.  Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 341 Ark. 751, 20 S.W.3d 326 (2000); Johnson v.  American Pulpwood Co., 38 Ark. App. 6, 826 S.W.2d 827 (1992).  A compensable injury is “an accidental injury. . . . arising out of and in the course of  employment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(A)(I) (Repl. 2002). A compensable injury does  not include injuries suffered at a time when employment services were not being performed.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(B)(iii). An employee is performing employment  services  when she is doing  something that is generally required by her employer. Pifer v. Single  Source  Transp.,  347  Ark 851,  69  S.W.3d  1  (2002).  We  use  the  same  test  to  determine  whether an employee was acting in the course of employment as we do when determining  whether the employee was performing employment services.  Id.  The test is whether the  injury occurred “within the time and space boundaries of employment, when the employee  was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest either directly  or indirectly.” White, 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100. ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 7  An employee traveling to and from the workplace is generally said not to be acting  within the course of employment. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944  S.W.2d 524 (1997). This “going and coming” rule ordinarily precludes recovery for an injury  sustained while the employee is going to or coming from his place of employment. Id. The  rationale behind this rule is that an employee is not within the course of employment while  traveling to or from his job. Id. However, there are exceptions to this rule. Id.  One such  exception is where the employee must travel from jobsite to jobsite, whether or not he or she  is  paid  for  that  travel  time.  Id.  (quoting  ARTHUR  LARSON,  THE  LAW  OF  WORKMEN’S  COMPENSATION  §  16.01  (1996)).  The  rationale  behind  this  exception  is  that  where  the  employee is required to travel from jobsite to jobsite, such travel is an integral part of the job  itself. Id.  In Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, supra, we held that injuries sustained by  a nurse while on her way to the home of a patient were compensable, even though she was  not paid for the travel. There, we noted that the employee was not required to report to the  employer’s office each day, but instead often went directly from her home to the home of a  patient, where she began to work. In reaching our conclusion, we held that the travel was  clearly for the benefit of the employer, whose business was to provide in­home nursing care.  Additionally, we stated: ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 8  [t]he fact that appellee had yet to begin her nursing duties that day does not  preclude  our  conclusion  that  she  was  nonetheless  performing  employment  services at the time of the accident. Whether or not she was being directly  compensated for her travel is not pertinent to our decision, as the fact of this  case clearly demonstrate that travel was a necessary part of her employment.  Pettey, 328 Ark. at 386, 944 S.W.2d at 527.  Similarly, the travel in the present case was a  necessary part of Moncus’s employment, and it fits within the jobsite­to­jobsite exception  to the “going and coming” rule. Moncus had no fixed place of employment, and was obliged  to travel from jobsite to jobsite as indicated by Billingsley. Also, Billingsley testified that the  loggers would occasionally switch jobsites in the middle of the day. Thus, the travel from  jobsite to jobsite was an integral and necessary part of Moncus’s employment.  In  cases  of  this  type,  where  the  injury  occurs  outside  of  the  time  and  space  boundaries of employment, the critical determination to be made is whether the employee  was directly or indirectly advancing the interests of the employer at the time of the injury.  The “going and coming” rule is best viewed as an analytical tool to be used in making this  determination.  Our  last  consideration  of  the  “going  and  coming  rule,”  in  Pettey,  supra,  indicates that the rule is subordinate to the preeminent consideration, which is whether the  employee was directly or indirectly advancing the interests of the employer at the time of the  injury.  If  injuries  sustained  while  traveling  to  and  from  work  are  found  to  be  not  compensable in a particular case, that finding should reflect a determination that the travel ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 9  was not directly or indirectly furthering the interests of the employer. To the extent that the  “going and coming rule” prevents recovery for injuries sustained while the employee was  furthering the interests of the employer, it is overruled.  Here,  it  is  significant  that  Moncus  was  carrying  out  the  express  directions  of  his  employer at the time of the accident, even though he was not engaged in the activity for  which he was primarily employed. This court has held several times that an employee is  performing “employment services” when she “is doing something that is generally required  by his or her employer.” Pifer, 347 Ark. at 817, 69 S.W.3d at 18;  Collins v. Excel Specialty  Prods., 347 Ark. 811, 69 S.W.3d 14 (2002); White, 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100; Pettey,  328  Ark.  381,  944  S.W.2d  524.  Thus,  in  White  v.  Georgia  Pacific,  supra,  we  held  that  injuries sustained by an employee while on a smoke break were nevertheless compensable,  because the employee was required to monitor his work area during the break. Also, the court  of appeals, in a line of cases, has held that injuries suffered by an employee while on a break  are compensable if the employer has imposed some duty to be fulfilled by the employee  during the break. See e.g., Wal­Mart Stores v. King, ____ Ark. App. ____, ____ S.W.3d  ____ (Nov. 9, 2005) (the employee was required to assist customers during breaks); Wal­  Mart Stores v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002) (the employee was required to  return personal items to a locker after the break); Ray v. University of Arkansas, 66 Ark. ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 10  App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558 (1999) (the employee was required to come off break in order to  assist students). The instant case is analogous. Even though Moncus was not performing his  primary employment activity of felling trees when he was injured, he was fulfilling a duty  placed upon him by his employer.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  fully  adopted  the  findings  and  conclusions  of  the  administrative law judge. The administrative law judge concluded that Moncus’s death was  not compensable because he was not performing employment services at the time of the  accident, and specifically that Moncus was not advancing his employer’s interests at the time  of the accident. In reaching this conclusion, the administrative law judge reasoned as follows:  [a]lthough the employees meet Mr. Billingsley and follow him to the tract of  land on the first day that timber is cut from such tracts, it cannot be said that  their travel to the tract of land advances the employer’s purpose or interest on  those days any more than any other day when the employees travel to the tract  of land where the timber is to be cut.  This conclusion is clearly erroneous. Billingsley testified that the logging crew functions as  a  team,  and  the  absence  of  one  member  frustrates  the  whole  operation.  Specifically,  Billingsley testified as follows:  I need everybody in my crew because they have a different job to perform.  The benefit of Tony showing up for work is that I would have somebody to  operate that piece of equipment. If he did not show up, that would have hurt  my crew and productivity for that day. ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 11  Thus, on the day in question, Billingsley was particularly concerned that the logging crew  arrive intact and on time to the new jobsite, and for this reason he instructed them to meet  him at the assembly point, so he could ensure that result. Accordingly, Billingsley stated the  following at the hearing before the Commission, “I wanted the guys to meet me at the service  station because they did not know where they were going and I did. I wanted them to follow  me to the tract of land to make sure they got there. So I could conduct my business.” The  meeting was mandatory, not optional.  The present situation is readily  distinguishable from the usual “going and coming”  scenario,  where  on  any  particular  day  the  employee  has  no  interaction  and  receives  no  instructions from his supervisor until after his arrival at the place of employment. Here, on  the day of the accident, Moncus was doing something specifically required by his employer.  Moncus had already arrived at a place specified by his employer, met with his employer  there, and received express and immediate instructions, which he was performing at the time  of the accident. Billingsley instructed Moncus to join the “convoy” and follow him to the  jobsite. Thus it was Billingsley, not Moncus, who dictated Moncus’s route, his rate of speed,  and his order of advance immediately prior to the accident, as well as the time of arrival and  departure from the meeting place and the location of the meeting place. In a real sense, his  employer  was  responsible  for  Moncus’s  precise  location  on  the  road  at  the  time  of  the ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6  MONCUS  v. BILLINGSLEY LOGGING & AM. INS. CO.  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 12  accident.  Thus, we conclude that because Moncus’s death occurred while he was carrying out  the  express  and  immediate  instructions  of  his  employer,  doing  something  specifically  required  by  his  employer,  and  because  by  the  employer’s  admission,  the  meeting  at  the  assembly point was an unusual measure undertaken to further the employer’s interest by  insuring that the logging crew arrived at the jobsite intact, the Commission’s conclusion that  Moncus  was  not  performing  employment  services  at  the  time  of  his  death  was  clearly  erroneous. That conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, and reasonable minds  could  not  have  reached  the  same  conclusion.  Therefore,  we  reverse  the  Commission’s  decision and remand for a consideration of benefits.  Reversed and remanded. ___________________________  DICKEY, J. ­ 6 

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