Cooper Clinic, P.A. d/b/a Pro-Med Walk-In-Clinic v. Linda Barnes, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Trenton McMillan, a Minor
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COOPER CLINIC, P.A. d/b/a PROMED WALKINCLINIC v.
Linda BARNES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Trenton McMillan , a Minor
051166
___ S.W.3d ___
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered June 15, 2006
1.
STATUTES – “INSTITUTION” UNDER CHILD MALTREATMENT ACT – APPLICATION.– Upon
examination of sections 1212504 and 1212507 of the Child Maltreatment Act, the
supreme court could not say that the General Assemblyclearly intended the word “institution”
in section 1212504 to apply to organizations such as appellant, and it held that because
section 1212504 is open to two or more interpretations and because reasonable minds could
disagree as to its meaning, it is not “clear and unambiguous” on its face; the Child
Maltreatment Act itself contains no definition of the term “institution,” and while section 12
12507 lists the mandatory reporters, it never specifically designates a medical clinic, such as
appellant, as a mandatory reporter; rather, it is individuals, such as clergymen, social workers
and medical personnel, who are listed as mandatory reporters; yet section 1212507 does
refer to individuals in their capacity as employees of certain state and private groups, which
might be regarded as “institutions.”
2.
STATUTES – PENAL STATUTE AMBIGUOUS – CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF PARTY SOUGHT TO BE
PENALIZED.– Where a penal statute, such as Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504 is ambiguous,
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longstanding jurisprudence mandates that any ambiguities be construed in favor of the party
sought to be penalized; the supreme court therefore construed Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504
in favor of appellant and held that appellant was not directly liable as an “institution” for
failing to report the suspected child abuse of the minor child.
3.
STATUTES – VICARIOUS LIABILITY – EMPLOYEE’S RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT SUSPECTED
CHILD ABUSE WAS NO BENEFIT TO APPELLANT.– Where appellant’s employee had a duty under
the Child Maltreatment Act to report the suspected abuse of a child brought to the clinic for
treatment, but her statutorilyimposed duty was an individual duty that did not extend to the
appellant, and as the Act imposes no duty on the appellant to report the suspected child
abuse, the employee’s responsibility to report suspected child abuse cannot be said to benefit
the appellant, thus, not only did the appellant have no duty itself under the statute to report
suspected child abuse, it also cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s failure to
report; therefore, the circuit court erred in denying appellant’s directedverdict motion
because the appellant is not a mandatory reporter under Ark. Code Ann. § 1212507, nor can
it be vicariously liable when its employee, who had a statutorily imposed individual duty to
report under section 1212507, failed to report the suspected child abuse.
Appeal from Crawford County Circuit Court; John Jennings, Judge; reversed and dismissed.
Ledbetter, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, LLP, by: J. Michael Cogbill and Rebecca D.
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Hattabaugh, for appellant.
Milligan Law Offices, by Phillip J. Milligan, and Robinson Wooten, PLC, by: Jon P.
Robinson, for appellee/crossappellant.
ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Justice. On June 8, 2000, Trenton McMillan, a threeyear
old boy, was brought by his father, Ralph Lord, to Appellant Cooper Clinic, P.A. d/b/a Pro
Med WalkinClinic, for treatment of a bump on his head. Lord claimed that another child
had accidentally hit Trenton in the head with a golf club. Susan S. Staudt, D.O., a doctor of
osteopathic medicine and an employee of Cooper Clinic, examined Trenton, noting that in
addition to the large bump on the boy’s forehead, his body was covered in bruises and his
teeth were chipped and decaying. Dr. Staudt assessed Trenton as being a battered child.
Under the Child Maltreatment Act of 1991, Ark. Code Ann. § 1212501 et seq., a
physician that has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been subjected to maltreatment
is required to immediately report the abuse to the Arkansas child abuse hotline. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 1212507 (Supp. 2005). A mandatory reporter under the act is subject to civil
and criminal penalties for failure to report suspected abuse. Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504
(Repl. 2003). While Dr. Staudt was aware of the mandatory reporting requirement, she did
not report the suspected abuse of Trenton to the child abuse hotline. Instead, Dr. Staudt
relied on the father’s assertions that Trenton’s mother, Kim McMillan, who lived in
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Oklahoma at the time, had abused Trenton and that he would promptly report the abuse to
the police. Lord subsequently brought Trenton back into the clinic to undergo a blood
glucose test because he had been experiencing stomach pains, nausea, vomiting and mood
swings. Dr. Staudt was the attending physician when Trenton was brought in the second
time, but she did not ask Lord if he had reported the abuse and, once again, she did not report
the abuse herself.
On April 1, 2001, or approximately ten months after his visit to Cooper Clinic,
Trenton died from blunt force trauma to his abdomen. Trenton’s father and stepmother,
Ralph and Marilu Lord, were convicted of the negligent homicide of Trenton. Subsequently,
on March 29, 2002, Appellee Linda Barnes, as personal representative for the estate of
Trenton McMillan, deceased, filed a wrongfuldeath action in Crawford County Circuit
Court against Ralph and Marilu Lord, Susan S. Staudt, D.O., and Cooper Clinic. The
complaint alleged that Cooper Clinic was liable for damages to the estate because (1) Cooper
Clinic failed to report the suspected child abuse under Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504, (2)
Cooper Clinic was liable under the theory of respondeat superior for Dr. Staudt’s failure to
report the abuse, (3) Cooper Clinic was liable for the medical negligence of Dr. Staudt, and
(4) Cooper Clinic was liable for its own negligent supervision of Dr. Staudt and the attending
nurse, Carol Johnson. The medicalnegligence claims were eventually dismissed without
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prejudice.
Prior to trial, Dr. Staudt filed a motion to dismiss, based on the appellee’s failure to
complete service of process on Dr. Staudt within 120 days of filing the complaint as required
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (2006). Apparently, the appellee had made two separate attempts
to serve Dr. Staudt via certified mail, but service on the doctor had never been successfully
completed. The circuit court granted the doctor’s motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims
against her without prejudice. The appellee subsequently filed a separate suit against Dr.
Staudt that is currently pending.
During the trial, Cooper Clinic motioned for a directed verdict at the conclusion of
the plaintiff’s case, claiming that because the clinic did not qualify as a mandatory reporter
under the Child Maltreatment Act, it could not be held directly or vicariously liable for a
statutory violation of section 1212507, that the clinic was not vicariously liable for the
actions of Dr. Staudt because the statute of limitations on the estate’s claim had lapsed before
the action was filed against Dr. Staudt, and that the clinic’s acts did not proximately cause
Trenton’s death. The circuit court rejected these claims and ultimately denied the clinic’s
directedverdict motion.
The appellee also motioned for a directed verdict based on the theory that Cooper
Clinic had violated Ark. Code Ann. § 1212507. Under this point, the appellee contended
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the undisputed evidence that Dr. Staudt assessed Trenton as a battered child and did not
report the suspected abuse was sufficient to satisfy the requirements for holding a person
liable under the mandatory reporting provision of Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504. The circuit
court denied the appellee’s motion, and the case was submitted to the jury.
The jury was asked to answer special interrogatories, and it found in favor of the
appellee, affirmatively concluding that Cooper Clinic and its employees were liable for
failure to report the child abuse that proximately caused Trenton’s death. The clinic was
acquitted on the negligentsupervision claim. The jury awarded the estate $500,000 in
compensatory damages against Cooper Clinic and Ralph and Marilu Lord, and awarded an
additional $2,000,000 in punitive damages against the Lords. Cooper Clinic appeals from
the jury’s verdict.
I. Cooper Clinic as a Mandatory Reporter Under the Child Maltreatment Act
On appeal Cooper Clinic submits that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for
directed verdict because it is not a mandatory reporter under Ark. Code Ann. § 1212507
(Supp. 2005), and thus, as a matter of law, the clinic cannot be held liable, either directly
or vicariously, for failure to report suspected child abuse. In support of this argument,
Cooper Clinic states that it is not one of the individuals specifically listed under section 12
12507. Furthermore, the clinic points out that the statute does not specifically list a
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professional association, such as Cooper Clinic, as a mandatory reporter. The appellee
counters with the argument that Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504(b), the section that levies civil
liability on mandatory reporters who fail to report child abuse, provides that “[a]ny person,
official, or institution required . . . to make notification of suspected child abuse who
willfully fails to do so” shall be held civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the
omission. Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504(b) (Repl. 2003). According to the appelleee, the
inclusion of the term “institution” in the penalty portion of the Child Maltreatment Act
clearly encompasses the institutions that employ the mandated reporters specified in section
1212507.
This court reviews issues of statutory construction under a de novo standard.
Turnbough v. Mammoth Spring Sch. Dist. No. 2, 349 Ark. 341, 346, 78 S.W.3d 89, 92
(2002). Because it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute, we are not bound by
the trial court’s determination of the statute’s meaning. Id. The basic rule of statutory
construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. The first rule in
determining the meaning of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their
ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. This court will construe
a statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, with meaning and effect
given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. When the language of the statute is plain
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and unambiguous, conveying a clear and definite meaning, we need not resort to the rules
of statutory construction. Id. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more
constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds
might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, ___
S.W.3d ___ (2006). Additionally, it is a longstanding rule that this court construes statutes
that are penal in nature, and more specifically statutes imposing burdens and liabilities that
do not exist at common law, in favor of the party sought to be penalized. Cooper Realty
Invs. Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 355 Ark. 156, 162, 134 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2003)
(quoting Thompson v. Chadwick, 221 Ark. 720, 723, 255 S.W.2d 687, 689 (1953)).
We now apply these principles to the statute in question, Ark. Code Ann. § 1212
504(b), which provides:
Any person, official, or institution required by this subchapter to make
notification of suspected child maltreatment who willfully fails to do so shall
be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by that failure.
Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504(b) (Repl. 2003) (emphasis added).
The persons required to make notification of suspected child abuse are listed in Ark.
Code Ann. § 1212507(b):
When any of the following has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has
been subjected to child maltreatment . . . he or she shall immediately notify the
child abuse hotline:
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(1) Any child care worker or foster care worker;
(2) A coroner;
(3) A day care center worker;
(4) A dentist;
(5) A dental hygienist;
(6) A domestic abuse advocate;
(7) A domestic violence shelter employee;
(8) A domestic violence shelter volunteer;
(9) An employee of the Department of Health and Human Services;
(10) An employee working under contract for the Division Youth Services of
the Department of Human Services;
(11) Any foster parent;
(12) A judge;
(13) A law enforcement official;
(14) A licensed nurse;
(15) Any medical personnel who may be engaged in the admission,
examination, care, or treatment of persons;
(16) A mental health professional;
(17) An osteopath;
(18) A peace officer;
(19) A physician;
(20) A prosecuting attorney;
(21) A resident intern;
(22) A school counselor;
(23) A school official;
(24) A social worker;
(25) A surgeon;
(26) A teacher;
(27) A courtappointed special advocate program staff member or volunteer;
(28) A juvenile intake or probation officer; or
(29) Any clergyman . . . .
Ark. Code Ann. § 1212507(b) (Supp. 2005).
Upon examining these provisions, we cannot say that the General Assembly clearly
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intended the word “institution” in section 1212504 to apply to organizations such as
Cooper Clinic. The Child Maltreatment Act itself contains no definition of the term
“institution.” While section 1212507 lists the mandatory reporters, it never specifically
designates a medical clinic, such as Cooper Clinic, as a mandatory reporter; rather, it is
individuals, such as clergymen, social workers and medical personnel, who are listed as
mandatory reporters. Section 1212507, however, does refer to individuals in their capacity
as employees of certain state and private groups, such as employees of DHHS and employees
of day care centers and domestic violence shelters. Such state and private groups might be
regarded as “institutions.” This use would be harmonious with the dictionary definition of
institution, “[a]n established organization or foundation, especially one dedicated to
education, public service, or culture . . . [a] place for the care of persons who are destitute,
disabled, or mentally ill.” The American Heritage Dictionary 908 (4th ed. 2000).
What the General Assembly may have intended when it included the term
“institution” in section 1212504 is far from clear. Did the General Assembly intend for the
organizations that employ individuals listed under section 1212507 to be liable as
“institutions” under section 1212504, or did it intend for just those groups specifically
listed in section 1212507 as employers of mandated reporters to be liable, or did it intend
to designate some other type of “institution”? Because Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504 is open
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to two or more interpretations and because reasonable minds could disagree as to its
meaning, we cannot say that it is “clear and unambiguous” on its face.
When a penal statute, such as Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504, is ambiguous, our
longstanding jurisprudence mandates that any ambiguities be construed in favor of the party
sought to be penalized. Cooper Realty Investments Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd.,
supra. Section 1212504 subjects mandatory reporters to both criminal and civil liability
for failure to make a required notification; thus, it is penal in nature. This court must,
therefore, construe Ark. Code Ann. § 1212504 in favor of Cooper Clinic and hold that
Cooper Clinic is not directly liable as an “institution” for failing to report the suspected child
abuse of Trenton McMillan.
Similarly, Cooper Clinic is not vicariously liable for Dr. Staudt’s failure to report the
suspected child abuse. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an employee or agent if the evidence shows that
such conduct was committed within the scope of the agent’s employment. St. Joseph’s Reg’l
Health Ctr. v. Munos, 326 Ark. 605, 612, 934 S.W.2d 192, 195 (1996). The test for whether
an employee is acting within the scope of his employment is whether the individual is
carrying out the “object and purpose of the enterprise,” as opposed to acting exclusively in
his own interest. Porter v. Harshfield, 329 Ark. 130, 137, 948 S.W.2d 83 (1997). In other
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words, “a principal can be held liable for the intentional torts of its agent only when the
agent’s tortious conduct is taken in furtherance of the agency, where the agent is (ostensibly)
acting for the benefit of the principal. Davis v. Fulton County, Arkansas, 884 F. Supp. 1245
(1995)(citing National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark.
55, 58, 800 S.W.2d 694, 697 (1990); Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Stuckey, 256 Ark. 881,
882883, 511 S.W.2d 154, 155 (1974); St. Louis Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 75
Ark. 579, 58486, 88 S.W. 580, 582583 (1905) and Restatement (Second) of Agency §§
219(2)(d), 245 (1958)). In this case, we have already held that Cooper Clinic had no duty
under the statute to report the suspected child abuse of Trenton McMillan. Dr. Staudt
admittedly had a duty under the statute to report the suspected abuse, but her statutorily
imposed duty was an individual duty that did not extend to the clinic. As the Child
Maltreatment Act imposes no duty on the clinic to report the suspected child abuse, Dr.
Staudt’s responsibility to report suspected child abuse cannot be said to benefit Cooper
Clinic that is, Dr. Staudt’s decision to report or not to report suspected child abuse is not
the “object and purpose” of Cooper Clinic, but rather such a decision is “exclusively in [Dr.
Staudt’s] interests.” Thus, not only did the clinic have no duty itself under the statute to
report suspected child abuse, but it also cannot be held vicariously liable for Dr. Staudt’s
failure to report. We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred in denying Cooper
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Clinic’s directedverdict motion because the clinic is not a mandatory reporter under Ark.
Code Ann. § 1212507 (Supp. 2005); nor can it be vicariously liable when an employee
such as Dr. Staudt, who has a statutorilyimposed individual duty to report under section 12
12507, fails to report suspected child abuse. In view of our holding on this first point, we
need not address the appellant’s remaining points on direct appeal. Likewise, the appellee’s
two points of error on crossappeal are rendered moot by our reversal and dismissal on direct
appeal.
Reversed and dismissed.
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IMBER, J. 5
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