Reed v. State

Adrian REED v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-661                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 4, 1997


1.   Statutes -- construction of -- acts relating to same subject should be
     reconciled. -- Statutes relating to the same subject should be
     read in a harmonious manner if possible; all legislative acts
     relating to the same subject are said to be in pari materia
     and must be construed together and made to stand if they are
     capable of being reconciled.

2.   Statutes -- construction of -- determination of legislative intent. -- The
     supreme court adheres to the basic rule of statutory
     construction, which gives effect to the intent of the
     legislature, making use of common sense and giving the words
     their usual and ordinary meaning; in attempting to construe
     legislative intent, the court looks to the language of the
     statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished,
     the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative
     history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the
     subject; the commentary to a statute is a highly persuasive
     aid to construction, although it is not controlling over the
     clear language of the statute.

3.   Statutes -- construction of -- presumptions concerning legislative
     enactments. -- In construing two acts on the same subject, the
     supreme court first must presume that when the General
     Assembly passed the later act, it was well aware of the prior
     act; the court must also presume that the General Assembly did
     not intend to pass an act without purpose; furthermore, the
     General Assembly is presumed to have enacted a law with the
     full knowledge of court decisions on the subject and with
     reference to those decisions.

4.   Statutes -- construction of -- legislature intended to include constables
     within definition of "peace officer." -- Although Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-81-301 (1987) does not contain a definition of "peace
     officer," and the term is not defined within the other
     provisions of the Uniform Act on Intrastate Fresh Pursuit,
     Arkansas has long recognized that constables are peace
     officers; additionally, Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-104 (1987),
     which establishes the procedures for issuing and executing
     arrest warrants, refers to constables as peace officers;
     hence, the supreme court could discern from this provision
     that the legislature was aware of its previous holding and
     intended to include constables within the definition of "peace
     officer." 

5.   Statutes -- construction of -- two statutory provisions concerning
     constable's authority viewed as complementary. -- The supreme court
     viewed Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-301 and Ark. Code Ann.  16-19-
     301(d) as complementary of each other, with the former merely
     broadening or enhancing the authority described in the latter
     section; the plain language of section 16-19-301(d)
     demonstrated that the provision was not an affirmative grant
     of the power of fresh pursuit to constables; rather, that
     section was written in the negative, stating that nothing in
     it should be viewed as preventing a constable's authority to
     engage in the fresh pursuit of suspected felons; section 16-
     81-301, on the other hand, specifically provided to all peace
     officers in the state the authority to engage in the fresh
     pursuit of suspects beyond their particular jurisdictions.

6.   Statutes -- construction of -- supreme court held that two related statutes
     dealing with constable's authority should stand. -- Considering the
     language of Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-301 and Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-19-301, the respective subject matter, and the objectives
     sought to be accomplished by the legislature in passing them,
     the supreme court concluded that although a constable's
     general powers and duties were established by section 16-19-
     301, a constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of
     criminal suspects, whether suspected of committing felonies or
     misdemeanors, was derived from section 16-81-301; given that
     section 16-19-301 did not affirmatively establish a
     constable's authority to engage in fresh pursuit but merely
     provided that the authority to pursue suspected felons should
     not be taken from such officers, the supreme court determined
     that the two related statutes were capable of being reconciled
     and, therefore, that both should stand. 

7.   Sheriffs & constables -- constable acting as peace officer -- had authority
     to pursue appellant beyond township limits. -- The supreme court held
     that the trial court did not err in determining that, under
     the circumstances, the constable was acting as a peace officer
     and, as such, had the authority to pursue appellant beyond the
     limits of his township on the ground that appellant had
     committed an offense in the constable's presence.  


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Young & Finley, by: Richard H. Young, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Adrian Reed appeals the judgment of the Pope County
Circuit Court convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI),
second offense, and sentencing him to nine months in jail,
suspending his driver's license for twelve months, and assessing a
fine of $2,500.  This appeal was certified to us from the court of
appeals on the basis that it presents a question requiring
statutory interpretation; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(d).  Appellant's sole point for reversal is
that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal stop and arrest.  We find no
error and affirm.
     Appellant was arrested for DWI on June 15, 1996.  He was
initially stopped and detained by Constable Bill Parks in Pope
County near Pea Ridge, which is outside the constable's
jurisdiction of Jackson Township.  Appellant moved to suppress the
evidence that resulted from his arrest on the ground that the
constable lacked the authority to pursue a criminal suspect beyond
his jurisdiction without first having a reasonable belief that the
suspect had committed a felony.  The trial court concluded that
Constable Parks was a peace officer and that Ark. Code Ann.  16-
81-301 (1987) authorized him to stop and detain Appellant under the
circumstances, even though the constable admittedly did not suspect
that Appellant had committed a felony.  The trial court accordingly
denied Appellant's motion to suppress, and he was found guilty of
the charge by a jury.    
     On appeal, Appellant challenges Constable Parks's authority to
arrest him outside the constable's jurisdiction.  He contends that
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  16-19-301 (Repl. 1994) a constable is
not permitted to arrest a person for a misdemeanor offense outside
the jurisdiction of his township.  He asserts that such an arrest
is only permitted if the constable reasonably believes that a
felony has been committed within his jurisdiction.    
     Section 16-19-301, titled "Peacekeeping duties and authority 
-- Neglect of duty," provides in pertinent part:
          (a) Each constable shall be a conservator of the
     peace in his township and shall suppress all riots,
     affrays, fights, and unlawful assemblies, and shall keep
     the peace and cause offenders to be arrested and dealt
     with according to law.

          . . . . 

          (d) Nothing in this section shall prevent the fresh
     pursuit by a constable of a person suspected of having
     committed a supposed felony in his township, though no
     felony has actually been committed, if there are
     reasonable grounds for so believing. "Fresh pursuit" as
     used in this section shall not necessarily imply instant
     pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay. 
     [Emphasis added.]


Appellant asserts that the language in subsection (d) prohibits a
constable from engaging in the fresh pursuit of any person unless
that person is suspected of having committed a felony.      
     The State argues that the trial court correctly ruled that a
constable's authority to freshly pursue a suspect beyond his
jurisdiction is derived from section 16-81-301.  The State argues
that because section 16-81-301 was passed subsequent to the passage
of section 16-19-301, this court should conclude that the later act
controls.  
     Section 16-81-301, which is part of the Uniform Act on
Intrastate Fresh Pursuit, provides:
          Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of
     a person who is reasonably believed to have committed a
     felony in this state or has committed, or attempted to
     commit, any criminal offense in this state in the
     presence of such officer, or for whom the officer holds
     a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have
     the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person
     anywhere in this state.

The State contends that a constable is included within the
definition of the term "peace officer" as used in section 16-81-
301.  As such, the State asserts that Constable Parks had the
authority to pursue Appellant beyond the jurisdiction of his
township for a misdemeanor offense that was committed in the
officer's presence.  
     The sole issue for our resolution is whether a constable's
authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of a person suspected of
committing a misdemeanor beyond the limits of the constable's
jurisdiction originates from section 16-19-301 or from section 16-
81-301.  Both statutes were passed during the same legislative
session; the act containing section 16-81-301 was passed one day
after the act containing section 16-19-301.  Appellant contends
that because section 16-19-301 specifically addresses the powers
and duties of constables, it should prevail over section 16-81-301,
which, Appellant asserts, only generally addresses the authority of
"peace officers" to engage in fresh pursuit.  We disagree.  
     Statutes relating to the same subject should be read in a
harmonious manner if possible.  City of Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark.
405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (1993).  All legislative acts relating to the
same subject are said to be in pari materia and must be construed
together and made to stand if they are capable of being reconciled. 
Id.  We adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction, which
gives effect to the intent of the legislature, making use of common
sense and giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.  Kyle
v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993).  In attempting to
construe legislative intent, we look to the language of the
statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the
purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and
other appropriate matters that throw light on the subject.  Tate,
311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356.  The commentary to a statute is a
highly persuasive aid to construction, although it is not
controlling over the clear language of the statute.  Kyle, 312 Ark.
274, 849 S.W.2d 935.  
     In construing two acts on the same subject, we first must
presume that when the General Assembly passed the later act, it was
well aware of the prior act.  Salley v. Central Arkansas Transit
Auth., 326 Ark. 804, 934 S.W.2d 510 (1996).  We must also presume
that the General Assembly did not intend to pass an act without
purpose.  See Clark v. State, 308 Ark. 84, 824 S.W.2d 345 (1992). 
Furthermore, the General Assembly is presumed to have enacted a law
with the full knowledge of court decisions on the subject and with
reference to those decisions.  See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Cherokee
Enter., 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Tovey v. City of
Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991); J.L. McEntire &
Sons, Inc. v. Hart Cotton Co., Inc., 256 Ark. 937, 511 S.W.2d 179
(1974).  
     Section 16-81-301 does not contain a definition of "peace
officer."  Nor is that term defined within the other provisions of
the Uniform Act on Intrastate Fresh Pursuit.  Be that as it may,
Arkansas has long recognized that constables are peace officers. 
See Winkler v. State, 32 Ark. 539 (1877).  Additionally, Ark. Code
Ann.  16-81-104 (1987), which establishes the procedures for
issuing and executing arrest warrants, refers to constables as
peace officers.  Specifically, section 16-81-104(a)(1) provides in
pertinent part that "[a] warrant of arrest may be executed by the
following officers, who are called peace officers in this code: 
Sheriffs, constables, coroners, jailers, marshals, and police
officers."  (Emphasis added.)  Hence, we can discern from this
provision that the legislature was aware of our previous holding
and intended to include constables within the definition of "peace
officer."      
     Moreover, we are not convinced by Appellant's contention that
these two provisions are necessarily in conflict with one another. 
Instead, we view the two statutory provisions as complementary of
one another, with section 16-81-301 merely broadening or enhancing
the authority described in section 16-19-301(d).  The plain
language of section 16-19-301(d) demonstrates that this provision
is not an affirmative grant of the power of fresh pursuit to
constables.  Rather, that section is written in the negative --
that nothing in that section shall be viewed as preventing a
constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of suspected
felons.  Section 16-81-301, on the other hand, specifically
provides to all peace officers in this state the authority to
engage in the fresh pursuit of suspects beyond their particular
jurisdictions.  The legislative commentary on the Uniform Act on
Intrastate Fresh Pursuit demonstrates that the General Assembly
intended this Act to be a comprehensive statement of the law on
fresh pursuit within the geographical boundaries of this state. 
The prefatory note to the Act reflects:
          A great need was filled by the Interstate Fresh
     Pursuit Act, drafted by the Interstate Commission on
     Crime, to prevent criminals from utilizing state lines to
     handicap the police.  This is proven by its almost
     instant enactment in some two thirds of the states. 
     Furthermore, there have been repeated requests from the
     police to extend the principles of the interstate act to
     permit fresh pursuit of criminals across county and
     municipal lines.  
          The Act on Interstate Fresh Pursuit is the result. 
     This act follows the sovereignty into another, it applies
     not only to felonies, but to any criminal offense
     committed in the presence of the officer, or to a person
     for whom an officer holds a criminal warrant.  Simple
     provisions, as in the case of the interstate act, are
     made to safeguard the rights of the person arrested.  The
     requests of law enforcement authorities themselves prove
     the need for this new, simple, and sensible law.   
     Considering the language of both statutes, the respective
subject matters, and the objectives sought to be accomplished by
the legislature in passing them, we conclude that although a
constable's general powers and duties are established by section
16-19-301, a constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit
of criminal suspects, whether suspected of committing felonies or
misdemeanors, is derived from section 16-81-301.  Were we to hold
that a constable is not included within the definition of the term
"peace officer" found in section 16-81-301, the Act's clearly
expressed purpose of preventing criminal suspects from taking
advantage of jurisdictional boundaries would surely be thwarted. 
Given that section 16-19-301 does not affirmatively establish a
constable's authority to engage in fresh pursuit, but merely
provides that the authority to pursue suspected felons should not
be taken from such officers, these two related statutes are capable
of being reconciled and, therefore, both should stand.   
     Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
determining that, under the circumstances of this case, Constable
Parks was acting as a peace officer and, as such, had the authority
to pursue Appellant beyond the limits of his township on the ground
that Appellant had committed an offense in the constable's
presence.  
     Affirmed.