Ex parte Roger Dixon. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Roger Dixon v. State of Alabama)

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REL: 06/30/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1071564 Ex p a r t e Roger Dixon PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In r e : Roger Dixon v. S t a t e o f Alabama) (Escambia C i r c u i t C o u r t , Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals, MURDOCK, Justice. CC-06-82) CR-06-1916) 1071564 Roger Dixon discharging a motion ( 1 ) that during was a firearm for a convicted into new voir dire, attempted murder an o c c u p i e d v e h i c l e . trial several jurors of alleging, failed among 1 and o f Dixon other filed things, t o t r u t h f u l l y answer q u e s t i o n s and ( 2 ) t h a t the t r i a l court improperly r e s t r i c t e d Dixon's cross-examination of a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s . Dixon's motion hearing. convictions f o r a new t r i a l The Court of and sentences was d e n i e d a f t e r Criminal Appeals affirmed Dixon's b y a n u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum, w h i c h J u d g e W e l c h d i s s e n t e d , w i t h an o p i n i o n . June an e v i d e n t i a r y [No. CR-06-1916, App. 2008) (Welch, Dixon a Dixon v. S t a t e , J., dissenting). filed 27, 2008] from petition So. 3d for a writ (Ala. Crim. of certiorari c o n t e n d i n g , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t of 763 Criminal Appeals ( A l a . 2001), c o n f l i c t s w i t h E x p a r t e D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d and Tomlin v. S t a t e , 695 S o . 2 d 157 Crim. App. 1996), r e g a r d i n g Dixon's c l a i m s t h a t s e v e r a l (Ala. jurors D i x o n was s e n t e n c e d t o 20 y e a r s ' i m p r i s o n m e n t on t h e a t t e m p t e d - m u r d e r c h a r g e ; t h a t s e n t e n c e was s p l i t , a n d D i x o n was o r d e r e d t o s e r v e 5 y e a r s i n p r i s o n , f o l l o w e d by 5 y e a r s ' s u p e r v i s e d p r o b a t i o n . On t h e d i s c h a r g i n g - a - f i r e a r m c h a r g e , he was s e n t e n c e d t o 10 y e a r s ' i m p r i s o n m e n t , w h i c h s e n t e n c e was a l s o s p l i t , a n d he was o r d e r e d t o s e r v e 3 y e a r s i n p r i s o n f o l l o w e d b y 5 y e a r s ' s u p e r v i s e d p r o b a t i o n . The t w o s e n t e n c e s were t o be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y . 1 2 1071564 failed to reverse truthfully and answer remand. In argument r e g a r d i n g the pretermit consideration questions during voir light of dire voir our of of Dixon's I. In brief light of the 2004 a n d David Jackson estranged 2005, nature of convenience 2005, Dixon of the f a c t s Carey. According to several then rate of during speed the jurors, the we claims. dispositive facts had issue, i s necessary. only a Between repeated altercations relationship early morning Jackson testified and with hours Brad with Jackson's of May Carey Dixon Carey when Jackson, one and Dixon 14, at disputed the a Jackson left testified that because he 3 Jackson s t r u c k Carey's and him, vehicle, in his vehicle at a high convenience store. In the he State's threatened to k i l l of which they encounter and regarding h i s encounter with gunshots, chased contrast, one of Dixon's store. trial, and the encountered version fired Dixon During of other the concerning Dixon's wife. Dixon At May disposition We Facts summary o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e June dire. fired was h i s gun afraid of into the a i r Jackson and 1071564 Carey and left that he d i d not the convenience As that respond who served correctly dire of the J a c k s o n and Carey when they store. to the d i s p o s i t i v e L.A., voir follow to issue as the a in this juror at following case, Dixon his trial, question contends failed asked to during venire: " H a v e y o u o r a member o f y o u r i m m e d i a t e f a m i l y ever been a c r i m i n a l defendant i n a c r i m i n a l case i n e i t h e r the d i s t r i c t court or the c i r c u i t court i n t h i s c o u n t y where [ t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y o r any o f his a s s i s t a n t s ] p r o s e c u t e d the c a s e ? " L.A. d i d not respond to t h i s q u e s t i o n ; however, criminal c h a r g e s were p e n d i n g a g a i n s t h e r a t the t i m e of D i x o n ' s trial. About twice two charged months by before family members h a d b e e n s e r v e d on L.A., in each case. Dixon's with L.A. disposition L.A. a misdemeanor. A b o u t a week b e f o r e D i x o n ' s personally of the had 2 been The charges a n d s h e h a d p o s t e d an a p p e a r a n c e had been c o n t i n u e d by t h e t r i a l trial, trial, court. was with L.A.'s At the time of engaged charges trial, the in case Dixon's discussing district bond the attorney. The charge in each case was making a harassing c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n v i o l a t i o n o f A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 1 1 - 8 ( b ) . The c h a r g e s w e r e f i l e d b y L . A . ' s t e e n a g e d a u g h t e r a n d h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d and r e l a t e d t o a f a m i l y d i s p u t e . 2 4 1071564 Shortly after pretrial diversion status. At trial the hearing court counsel. fact Dixon's heard motion case dire trial question f r o m L.A. a n d f r o m placed in trial, the Dixon's trial c o u r t d i d n o t make a n y w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s o f charges to d i s c l o s e the i n response to the question posed on a n d d i d n o t i n d i c a t e on t h e r e c o r d t h e b a s i s f o r i t s d e n y i n g D i x o n ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l . court asked at the hearing during voir II. In was f o r a new as t o t h e c l a i m r e g a r d i n g L.A.'s f a i l u r e decision the L.A.'s on D i x o n ' s testimony The t r i a l pending criminal voir trial, Ex p a r t e dire suggest was Standard of that Comments b y i t thought the ambiguous. Review D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d a t 7 7 2 , t h i s Court stated: "[T]he proper standard to apply in determining w h e t h e r a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l i n t h i s circumstance [where a juror fails to respond c o r r e c t l y t o a q u e s t i o n on v o i r d i r e ] i s ' w h e t h e r the defendant might have been prejudiced by a veniremember's f a i l u r e t o make a p r o p e r r e s p o n s e . ' Ex p a r t e S t e w a r t , 659 S o . 2 d [ 1 2 2 ] a t 124 [ ( A l a . 1993)]. Further, the determination of whether a p a r t y might have been p r e j u d i c e d , i . e . , whether t h e r e was p r o b a b l e p r e j u d i c e , i s a m a t t e r w i t h i n t h e t r i a l court's d i s c r e t i o n . " Id. 824 See a l s o R e y n o l d s v. C i t y of Birmingham, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1998) ("'[T]he 5 ruling 723 S o . 2 d 8 2 2 , of the t r i a l judge 1071564 denying a motion absence of will his a showing indulge trial of abuse (quoting C r i m . App. Holt Dixon contends motion for a jury that disturbed d i s c r e t i o n , and i n favor v. State, 348 So. that new the trial trial court because L.A., who question during voir dire. As make d i d not to grounded, deny in In Criminal Appeals 87 0 , written indicate Dixon's on on findings the motion L.A.'s affirming that on above- fact the as which no than w i l l f u l . prejudice to That c o u r t Dixon by the of to L.A.'s pending against her did not 6 affect her was Court the also this to disclose was determined failure r e s p o n d b e c a u s e she l a t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t were trial for i t s respond failure the to basis conviction, L.A.'s the trial, to granted to the new failure have noted, of record for a Dixon's concluded rather was of 875 about the c r i m i n a l charges pending a g a i n s t her inadvertent, there any part, question. information Court served respond and 2d should to issue this Analysis failed d i d not i n the of the c o r r e c t n e s s him, court that be convicted referenced decision not 1977))). III. his will of every presumption ruling.'" (Ala. f o r new to charges verdict. We 1071564 granted certiorari of Court the of to review Criminal Dixon's c l a i m Appeals conflicts that with the decision Dobyne and Tomlin. In Dobyne, t h i s a new voir trial dire b a s e d on Court explained the a juror's failure standard for granting to answer q u e s t i o n s truthfully: "The proper standard for determining whether j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t w a r r a n t s a new t r i a l , as s e t o u t b y t h i s C o u r t ' s p r e c e d e n t , i s whether the misconduct might have p r e j u d i c e d , not whether i t a c t u a l l y did p r e j u d i c e , t h e d e f e n d a n t . See Ex p a r t e S t e w a r t , 659 So. 2d 122 ( A l a . 1993) .... The 'might-have-beenprejudiced' standard, of course, c a s t s a ' l i g h t e r ' b u r d e n on t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a n t h e actual-prejudice s t a n d a r d . See T o m l i n v . S t a t e , s u p r a , 695 So. 2d a t 170. ... "It i s t r u e t h a t the p a r t i e s i n a case are entitled to true and honest answers to their questions on v o i r d i r e , so t h a t t h e y may exercise t h e i r peremptory s t r i k e s wisely. ... However, not every failure to respond properly to questions propounded during v o i r d i r e ' a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e s [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] t o a new t r i a l or r e v e r s a l of the c a u s e on a p p e a l . ' F r e e m a n v . H a l l , 28 6 A l a . 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 3 3 0 , 335 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .... As stated previously, the proper standard to apply in determining whether a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to a new t r i a l i n t h i s circumstance i s 'whether the d e f e n d a n t might have been prejudiced by a veniremember's failure t o make a p r o p e r response.' Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d at 124. Further, the determination of whether a p a r t y might have been prejudiced, i.e., whether there was probable prejudice, i s a matter w i t h i n the trial court's discretion. ... 7 on 1071564 "'The determination of whether the complaining party was p r e j u d i c e d by a juror's failure to answer voir dire questions i s a matter w i t h i n thed i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t a n d w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d unless t h e court has abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . Some o f t h e f a c t o r s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s approved f o r using to determine whether there was probable prejudice include: "temporal remoteness of the matter i n q u i r e d about, the ambiguity of the question propounded, the prospective juror's inadvertence or w i l l f u l n e s s i n f a l s i f y i n g or f a i l i n g t o answer, t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e j u r o r t o r e c o l l e c t , and t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f the m a t t e r i n q u i r e d about."' "Union Mortgage 1342-43 [ ( A l a . C o . v . B a r l o w , 595 S o . 2 d [ 1 3 3 5 ] a t 1994)].... "The form of p r e j u d i c e that would e n t i t l e a party to relief f o r a juror's nondisclosure or f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n v o i r d i r e w o u l d be i t s e f f e c t , i f any, t o cause t h e p a r t y t o f o r g o c h a l l e n g i n g t h e j u r o r f o rcause or e x e r c i s i n g a peremptory c h a l l e n g e t o s t r i k e t h e j u r o r . E x p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 S o . 2 d 731 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) .... I f the party establishes that the j u r o r ' s d i s c l o s u r e of the t r u t h would have caused the party e i t h e r to ( s u c c e s s f u l l y ) challenge the j u r o r f o r cause or t o e x e r c i s e a peremptory c h a l l e n g e t o s t r i k e t h e j u r o r , then t h e p a r t y has made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e . I d . S u c h p r e j u d i c e c a n be e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e o b v i o u s t e n d e n c y of the true facts to bias the juror, as i n Ledbetter, supra, or by d i r e c t testimony of t r i a l c o u n s e l t h a t t h e t r u e f a c t s would have prompted a c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t t h e j u r o r , as i n S t a t e v. Freeman, 605 S o . 2 d 1258 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) . " Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 771-73 added). 8 (footnote omitted; emphasis 1071564 In Tomlin, a case cited with Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals d i s c u s s e d of the failure might-have-been-prejudiced to answer correctly approval in in detail the a p p l i c a t i o n standard questions posed Dobyne, to on concerning t h e j u r o r ' s t i e s t o law e n f o r c e m e n t and experience as a victim of a crime. That court a juror's voir the dire juror's stated: "'We s t a r t w i t h the b a s i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l premise t h a t e v e r y p e r s o n i s e n t i t l e d t o an i m p a r t i a l j u r y [pursuant to the S i x t h Amendment t o the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ] . ' K n i g h t v . S t a t e , 675 So. 2d 487 , 4 93-94 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1 995) .... 'It is f u n d a m e n t a l to our system of i m p a r t i a l j u s t i c e t h a t " ' [ p ] a r t i e s have a r i g h t to have q u e s t i o n s answered t r u t h f u l l y by p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s t o e n a b l e them t o exercise their discretion wisely in exercising their peremptory s t r i k e s . ' " ' S t a t e v . F r e e m a n , 605 So. 2 d 1258, 1259 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 992) ( q u o t i n g Ex parte O ' L e a r y , 438 So. 2d 1 3 7 2 , 1373 (Ala. 1983), quoting i n t u r n Ex p a r t e O ' L e a r y , 417 So. 2d 2 3 2 , 240 (Ala. 1982)). 'Voir dire' i s an a n c i e n t p h r a s e which l i t e r a l l y means ' t o s p e a k t h e t r u t h . ' W. L a F a v e & J. I s r a e l , C r i m i n a l Procedure § 22.3(a) (2d. ed. 1992). '"Where t h e p a r t y h a s e x a m i n e d t h e j u r o r s concerning their qualifications, and t h e y do not a n s w e r t r u l y , i t i s m a n i f e s t t h a t he i s d e p r i v e d o f his r i g h t o f c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e , and i s d e c e i v e d i n t o f o r e g o i n g h i s r i g h t of peremptory c h a l l e n g e . " ' Ex p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 So. 2d 7 3 1 , 733 (Ala. 1981) ( q u o t i n g L e a c h v . S t a t e , 31 A l a . A p p . 3 9 0 , 18 So. 2 d 285, cert. denied, 245 A l a . 539, 18 So. 2d 289 (1944)). ' F a i l u r e to enforce the r i g h t to e l i c i t from p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s t r u t h f u l answers to m a t e r i a l questions renders hollow the r i g h t of peremptory challenge.' Knight v . S t a t e , 675 So. 2d a t 494 ( q u o t i n g M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , 458 So. 2d 8 1 9 , 821 (Fla. D i s t . C t . App. 1984)). 9 the 1071564 " I n a d d r e s s i n g t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r a d e f e n d a n t was d e p r i v e d of the r i g h t to e x e r c i s e peremptory s t r i k e s b a s e d on t r u t h f u l a n s w e r s f r o m p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , the A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t r e c e n t l y r e i t e r a t e d t h e t e s t t o be ' w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t m i g h t h a v e b e e n p r e j u d i c e d by a veniremember's f a i l u r e t o make a p r o p e r r e s p o n s e . ' E x p a r t e S t e w a r t , 659 So. 2 d 1 2 2 , 124 ( A l a . 1993) (emphasis added). T h i s t e s t c a s t s a ' l i g h t b u r d e n ' on t h e d e f e n d a n t . ... " Tomlin, 695 the In exceeded trial So. present at 169-70. case, i t s discretion based question 2d on on L.A.'s analysis An most those factors L.A.'s failure The charges trial to matter had failure dire her. that to that Dixon's disclose criminal that trial motion for a were factors Dixon court i n response charges o f t h e Dobyne indicate the was new to a pending reveals that prejudiced by respond. was been conclude i n denying voir against of we not filed t e m p o r a l l y remote the criminal before Dixon's under pending at the time of Dixon's less and t h e y were s t i l l than two -- months trial. As conclude require to the that ambiguity the of question an a f f i r m a t i v e the was response propounded, sufficiently f r o m L.A. h e a r i n g on D i x o n ' s m o t i o n f o r a new 10 question trial, definite At the L.A. we to evidentiary testified that 1071564 her understanding of the question was such that require an a f f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r , b u t t h e r e c o r d provide adequate offer for this simply assertion. does n o t L.A. d i d not a s i n g l e r e a s o n she would u n d e r s t a n d t h e q u e s t i o n require an shifting affirmative series affirmatively been was not response; of explanations to the question, arrested, she support i t d i d not instead, that including (1) t h a t "served the charges that s h e knew t h a t find these inadequate, herself criminal (3) t h a t t h e c h a r g e s were g o i n g especially in light the d i s t r i c t the to and that April 3, 2007, that approximately her case one a n d (4) be before 3 We wholly that she about Dixon's trial had been week charges attorney d i s p o s i t i o n of those pending charges before aware (2) t h a t the matter o f L.A.'s t e s t i m o n y had been n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h respond t o be d r o p p e d . explanations a she had n o t t h e l a w , i t was a f a m i l y member," "hairsplitting" s h e was to papers," were because they r e l a t e d t o a f a m i l y dispute, "wasn't t r o u b l e w i t h offered f o r her f a i l u r e b u t had merely been aware she to not continued on the start of A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t made no e x p r e s s f i n d i n g on t h i s factor, i t indicated at the hearing that the question applied o n l y t o cases t h a t had been " p r o s e c u t e d , " n o t t o s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e t h e v e n i r e m e m b e r was " j u s t c h a r g e d w i t h a n o f f e n s e . " L.A. d i d n o t make t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n i n a n y o f h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s for not responding to the question. 3 11 1071564 Dixon's trial. require L.A. A t a minimum, t h e q u e s t i o n to mention the Even i f the q u e s t i o n attorney could disclosed have the f a c t avoided affirmatively himself was ambiguous, however, the district the 4 need f o r a new to the q u e s t i o n . charges in this against case has L.A. trial The never district o f L.A.'s denied had he failed c h a r g e s when L.A. n e g o t i a t i n g the d i s p o s i t i o n prosecutor pending so as t o of the pending respond the was framed charges. was to attorney cases, knowledge of A l t h o u g h v a r i o u s Alabama have h e l d t h a t the S t a t e does not have a g e n e r a l and the courts o b l i g a t i o n to We n o t e t h a t o t h e r v e n i r e m e m b e r s a p p e a r e d t o e r r i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t r e a t i n g v a r i o u s v o i r d i r e q u e s t i o n s as overi n c l u s i v e and o f d i s c l o s i n g remote e v e n t s o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t were a r g u a b l y r e s p o n s i v e t o the q u e s t i o n . In response to the question at issue, one veniremember disclosed a prosecution of a r e l a t i v e ( n o t a member o f h e r immediate family). Likewise, s e v e r a l j u r o r s responded broadly to a set of more g e n e r a l questions about the d i s t r i c t attorney's office's handling of bad-check cases and child-support collection. L.A. c o u l d not have h e a r d those r e s p o n s e s and honestly b e l i e v e d t h a t her cramped i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the q u e s t i o n p o s e d was l e g i t i m a t e . 4 We a l s o n o t e t h a t L.A. d i d n o t r e s p o n d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g question, which would seem t o r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e o f the pending charges and L.A.'s o n g o i n g negotiations with the d i s t r i c t attorney's office: "Now do a n y o f y o u know a n y r e a s o n why i f y o u were s e l e c t e d as a j u r o r i n t h i s c a s e t h a t you c o u l d n o t g i v e b o t h t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e S t a t e o f Alabama a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l ? " 12 1071564 disclose the information State responds cannot 1996), because v. the Court one who State, a question 678 with was fairness a staff present fails on dictates that to respond (or voir dire and the facts. So. of C r i m i n a l of the j u r o r s relationship office, to i s aware o f t h e t r u e Wright 5 s t a n d m u t e when a j u r o r incorrectly) prosecutor In on v e n i r e m e m b e r s , 2d 1216 Appeals ( A l a . Crim. reversed a failed to disclose member i n the d i s t r i c t i n the courtroom. The App. conviction a close family attorney's court stated: "We might have found [ t h e j u r o r ' s ] silence harmless and that the appellant suffered no prejudice ... w e r e i t n o t f o r t h e s i l e n c e o f [ t h e s t a f f member]. ... [W]e f i n d t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f probable prejudice e x i s t e d w h e r e b o t h a member o f t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ' s s t a f f , who was s e a t e d a t t h e prosecution's table a n d who p a r t i c i p a t e d in jury selection, and a juror failed to disclose i n f o r m a t i o n i n q u i r e d about d u r i n g v o i r d i r e r e l e v a n t to the defense in exercising i t s peremptory strikes." 678 S o . 2 d a t 1 2 2 0 . failed no to disclose indication that See a l s o pending Tomlin, 695 S o . 2 d a t 176 drug-possession prosecutors knew (juror charge; there of the pending was criminal S e e , e . g . , McGowan v . S t a t e , 990 S o . 2 d 9 3 1 , 967 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ( S t a t e h a s no d u t y t o d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n on p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ; S t a t e h a s no d u t y t o d i s c l o s e information available to the defendant from other sources, including q u e s t i o n s on v o i r d i r e ) . 5 13 1071564 charge, but "had considerations affirmative duty disclosure"); ("while as foul ones. methods one."); we have 295 U.S. hard blows, calculated every v. to produce believe created 7 8 , 87 he 680 So. (the "'"prudent prosecutor (1935) i s not at to a refrain wrongful l e g i t i m a t e means State, an t o make t h e I t i s much h i s d u t y Shields C r i m . App. 1996) would States, strike i t i s t o use a just (Ala. may known, of the prosecutors B e r g e r v. U n i t e d improper about fairness on t h e p a r t to strike conviction prosecutors basic [a p r o s e c u t o r ] liberty from of the to 2d bring 969, will 974 resolve doubtful questions i n favor of d i s c l o s u r e " ' " (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 419, v. United 514 States, The question testimony and 439 427 U.S. materiality the of trial hearing failure to counsel h i s peremptory challenges 14 Agurs to the are evidenced by the and by the nature of the Dixon's t r i a l that, i n turn respond Dixon had c h a r g e s , he w o u l d h a v e c h a l l e n g e d one quoting (1976))). L.A.'s not d i s c l o s e d . evidentiary (1995), 9 7 , 108 prejudice of Dixon's information the U.S. he L.A. to to counsel known of t e s t i f i e d at the f o r cause or remove her. pending exercised The direct 1071564 testimony of Dixon's prejudice counsel i s prima f a c i e evidence of to Dixon. Further, potential even i n the f o r juror circumstances. Court trial bias As Judge of Criminal absence i s Welch of such obvious stated testimony, the under the i n h i s dissent present to the A p p e a l s ' u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum: "Certainly i t would be a s e r i o u s concern i f a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was s u b j e c t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y decisions of the d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y . Human n a t u r e b e i n g what i t i s , i t w o u l d have been n a t u r a l f o r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o b e s u s p i c i o u s a b o u t a j u r o r who was b e h o l d e n t o t h e S t a t e , a n d t o b e r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e t h e c h a n c e t h a t t h e j u r o r m i g h t be b i a s e d a n d wanting t o c u r r y f a v o r w i t h t h e S t a t e by v o t i n g t o c o n v i c t . Indeed, t r i a l c o u n s e l t e s t i f i e d that had L.A. b e e n t r u t h f u l he w o u l d h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s t r i k e her f o r cause, and, f a i l i n g t h a t , he w o u l d have e x e r c i s e d a peremptory c h a l l e n g e and s t r u c k h e r from the venire." So. (juror's cocaine 3d at failure . See also to disclose warranted reversal Tomlin, pending of 695 charge conviction). So. 2d at 175 of possession of 6 See a l s o B r a z l e t o n v. S t a t e , 66 A l a . 9 6 , 98 (18 80 ) ( c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e p r o p e r w h e r e j u r o r was a s u r e t y on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a r a n c e b o n d ; e v e n t e m p o r a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s may " i m p o r t a j u s t b e l i e f o f a w a n t o f i m p a r t i a l i t y -- t h a t a j u r o r c a n n o t s t a n d i n d i f f e r e n t ... f r o m t h e f a v o r s p r i n g i n g o u t o f t h e r e l a t i o n " ) ; E x p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 S o . 2 d 7 3 1 , 734 (Ala. 1 9 8 1 ) ( j u r o r who i s a l s o a c r i m e v i c t i m o r who was former law-enforcement o f f i c e r "would s t a n d l e s s i n d i f f e r e n t than a layman, f r e e from t h e t u g of such former p r o f e s s i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s " ) ; W a l l a c e v . C a m p b e l l , 475 S o . 2 d 521 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) 6 15 1071564 The S t a t e rebutted for trial against contention whether to that the presumption the f a c t i s based upon L.A.'s h e r v e r d i c t was cites no that negative prejudiced the c r i m i n a l authority and response charges makes no against legal motion State's when asked relating her. The 7 argument of p r e j u d i c e statement was criminal The by c i r c u m s t a n c e s m e r e l y by a j u r o r ' s c o n c l u s o r y h e r v e r d i c t was on D i x o n ' s she had p e n d i n g support the a s s e r t i o n that the presumption rebutted of prejudice her d i d not a f f e c t her v e r d i c t . the pendency of State that by L.A.'s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g a new charges contends to c a n be that h i s or not a f f e c t e d by t h e p o t e n t i a l source o f b i a s . ( c i v i l case f o r i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d d u r i n g a high-speed p o l i c e c h a s e ; new t r i a l r e q u i r e d w h e r e j u r o r f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e t h a t s h e was r e l a t e d to the s h e r i f f of t h e c o u n t y where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d ) ; C a v a l i e r I n s . C o r p . v . F a u l k , 368 S o . 2 d 6, 8 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) (new t r i a l r e q u i r e d i n c i v i l c a s e w h e r e t w o jurors failed to disclose that they had p r e v i o u s l y been r e p r e s e n t e d i n a l a w s u i t b y one o f t h e l a w f i r m s i n v o l v e d i n the trial). At the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, the f o l l o w i n g b e t w e e n L.A. a n d t h e p r o s e c u t o r occurred: 7 exchange "Q: ... [ D ] i d t h e f a m i l y d i s p u t e t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e c h a r g e s i n E x h i b i t s One a n d Two a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s c a s e was p o s s i b l y p e n d i n g when y o u s a t a s a j u r o r , d i d t h a t have a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h your v e r d i c t i n the case? "A: A b s o l u t e l y n o t . " 16 1071564 In any event, impartiality evidence the juror's i n rendering question. the The p o i n t 8 effect the of hidden juror have responded of peremptory to the r e s u l t ) rebut (Ala. prejudices he o r s h e h a s " ) ; 1987) identifying biases. to i s to the reduce See B r u n e r v. (Maddox, J . , c o n c u r r i n g i n ( d i s c u s s i n g p o s s i b l e use of w r i t t e n q u e s t i o n n a i r e s " d i s c l o s e hidden suspect truthfully challenges or unconscious C a w t h o n , 681 S o . 2 d 173 ( A l a . l 9 9 6 ) to nothing to strike had would does to h i s or her the juror juror counsel verdict as challenged that trial a testimony cause o r would have used a p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e for that own (discussing and e x c l u d i n g that Ex p a r t e role the juror Branch, of not even 526 S o . 2 d 6 0 9 , 628 peremptory jurors likely might challenges t o be b i a s e d in against a party). Dobyne prejudice. years before i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from The j u r o r Dobyne's i n Dobyne trial the present failed case as t o to disclose that s h e h a d h a d some l i m i t e d many contact Here, that evidence takes the form of both "the obvious t e n d e n c y o f t h e t r u e f a c t s t o b i a s t h e j u r o r , as i n [Ex p a r t e ] Ledbetter, [ 4 0 4 S o . 2 d 731 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) ] , [and] by d i r e c t testimony o f t r i a l c o u n s e l t h a t t h e t r u e f a c t s would have prompted a challenge against the juror, as i n S t a t e v . F r e e m a n , 605 S o . 2 d 1258 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) . " D o b y n e , 805 So. 2 d a t 7 7 3 . 8 17 1071564 with the defendant coordinator. R. Crim. The P., court trial d i d not had that counsel the the her t o be that was no In the no charges. the also contact a desirable i n the juror. trial the hearing, but j u r o r i f he that, other defendant, This Court court's conclude occurred. the testified with present by As 32 Ala. defendant. had Rule 32, he concluded r e j e c t i o n of the claim. evidence, prejudiced at He Rule prejudice would have c h a l l e n g e d case, we a s s e r t i o n of i m p a r t i a l i t y i s not facie special-education remember t h e juror-misconduct the a defendant's that testified error as d i d not prior considered defendant's at relationship. juror's there capacity she found s t a t e t h a t he known o f than her testified hearing trial Dobyne's he She in both her direct failure Judge Welch to and the juror's s u f f i c i e n t to rebut the inferential, disclose stated that in his her that pending bare prima Dixon criminal dissent: " I t w o u l d s e e m t o me t h a t i t i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y dishonest t o p r e t e n d t h a t D i x o n was not prejudiced b y L . A . ' s s i l e n c e . The r e c o r d c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s t h a t at the time of voir dire L.A. was a criminal d e f e n d a n t , who f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s was i n t h e middle of n e g o t i a t i n g a plea agreement w i t h the S t a t e . I b e l i e v e t h a t i t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t f o r a j u r o r i n L . A . ' s p o s i t i o n t o be u n b i a s e d . I c e r t a i n l y do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t we c a n p r e s u m e , d e s p i t e L . A . ' s 18 was 1071564 p r o t e s t t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t she her r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the S t a t e . was unaffected by "... J u r o r s know t h a t i t i s t h e i r j o b t o be f a i r and t o a v o i d p r e j u d i c e and b i a s . They a r e so i n s t r u c t e d d u r i n g the c o u r t ' s o r a l charge. A f t e r a t r i a l , a s k i n g a j u r o r i f h e r v e r d i c t was a f f e c t e d b y anything t h a t w o u l d r e f l e c t on h e r a b i l i t y t o be fair, especially after that juror has been thoroughly questioned by defense counsel, is e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y to e l i c i t a p o s i t i v e response. In essence, the juror would have to admit her m i s c o n d u c t o r b i a s i n open c o u r t and t o t e s t i f y t h a t s h e i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s r e g a r d e d h e r d u t y t o be fair. The j u r o r w o u l d be u n f a m i l i a r w i t h w h a t w o u l d be t h e p e r s o n a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s u c h an a d m i s s i o n a n d m i g h t v e r y w e l l f e a r t h a t s h e w o u l d be h e l d i n c o n t e m p t o r c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e s u c h as o b s t r u c t i o n o f j u s t i c e i f s h e a d m i t t e d t h a t h e r v e r d i c t was t a i n t e d b y h e r b i a s . For these reasons i t i s unwise to p l a c e great w e i g h t on an a n s w e r a f f i r m i n g a l a c k o f b i a s . " So. 3d at . Therefore, the pending the very conclude that c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s was p r e j u d i c e d by ongoing we L.A.'s f a i l u r e negotiations time of with Dixon's L.A.'s t o d i s c l o s e t h o s e c h a r g e s and her trial. standard Further, we for bias conclude attorney's Even the 19 i f a f f e c t her i s unquestionably that that disclose was district and to Dixon the material b e l i e v e d t h a t those charges would not legal failure prejudice L.A. office at honestly decision, met in this was sufficient the case. to 1071564 w a r r a n t a new t r i a l , district attorney a new t r i a l We the could easily by d i s c l o s i n g reverse trial particularly court Dixon's convictions a new charges. and remand this case f o r trial. REMANDED. Cobb, C . J . , and L y o n s , W o o d a l l , Parker, that the have a v o i d e d t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r the pending t o conduct R E V E R S E D AND i n view of the fact Stuart, Smith, B o l i n , and J J . , concur. Shaw, J . , r e c u s e s * J u s t i c e Shaw was A p p e a l s when t h a t c o u r t himself.* a member o f t h e C o u r t considered t h i s case. 20 of Criminal

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