Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. John W. Wells

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Rel 04/23/10 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1070213 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. John W. Wells 1070214 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Harold Mitchell, as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e o f Reba Mae M i t c h e l l , deceased 1070215 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. James Newman 1070216 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Floyd Patterson 1070217 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Roger Hugh Young and D i n a h Young T a t e , as c o e x e c u t o r s e s t a t e o f P a u l i n e Young, d e c e a s e d 1070218 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 2 o f the R o s a l y n D i a n e D a v i s and M a r i l y n Joanne Woods, as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e e s t a t e o f Ruby W i l l i a m s , d e c e a s e d A p p e a l s from C o l b e r t C i r c u i t C o u r t ( C V - 0 6 - 3 1 9 . 8 0 ; CV-06-282.80; CV-06-298; CV-06-299; CV-06281; PER CURIAM. In the CV-05-321) s i x separate appeals purpose of w r i t i n g that have been one o p i n i o n , this I l l i n o i s , Inc. ("O-I"), a defendant involving asbestos court's denial claims of exposure, John representative W. Newman; F l o y d Young Tate, d e c e a s e d ; and Rosalyn personal deceased. plaintiffs"). See R u l e Facts Between separate August actions, defendants. deceased; Roger Hugh the estate Davis of Young of and M a r i l y n the estate referred o f Ruby collectively We 2005, and the p l a i n t i f f s Woods, Williams, as " t h e affirm. History July sued alleged Young, Joanne R. A p p . P. 3 and Dinah Pauline to and P r o c e d u r a l The p l a i n t i f f s on t h e personal 5, A l a . 5, the t r i a l o f R e b a Mae M i t c h e l l , Diane (hereinafter to appeal actions Mitchell, of representatives i n theunderlying Harold Patterson; coexecutors Owens- f o r a summary j u d g m e n t Wells; of the estate James Court granted permission of i t s motions consolidated f o r 24, 2006, O-I a n d v a r i o u s that O-I p r o d u c e d i ns i x other and/or 1070213; 1070214; 1070215; i n s t a l l e d products for certain exposure alleged and those that pipe O-I or deaths produced a n d t h a t O-I was t h a t were products. 1070218 allegedly Specifically, and/or I t i s undisputed thermal-insulation-products Fiberglas Corporation Kaylo I t i s also defense Alabama's by plaintiffs insulation that contained i t sentire to Kaylo Owens-Corning i n 1958 a n d t h a t O-I d i d n o t p r o d u c e o r undisputed 20-year evidence sold business asbestos-containing 1958. presented O-I caused block installed that liable the c o v e r i n g u n d e r t h e t r a d e name " K a y l o " asbestos. install 1070217; containing asbestos injuries to 1070216; products that common-law indicating that O-I, w h i c h the f i l i n g as April asserts 30, as a rule of repose, has not the manifest, present i n j u r y a l l e g e d l y s u f f e r e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f s 20 y e a r s b e f o r e after o c c u r r e d more 1 a defendant. In A p r i l of 2007, O-I m o v e d the s i x cases, barred trial arguing by Alabama's court denied o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t than 20-year n a m i n g O-I f o r a summary j u d g m e n t that the p l a i n t i f f s ' common-law rule i n each claims of repose. are The O - I ' s m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t i n e a c h S e e G r i f f i n v . U n o c a l C o r p . , 990 S o . 2 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 3 ( A l a . 2008) ( h o l d i n g t h a t i n t o x i c - s u b s t a n c e - e x p o s u r e cases, "a cause of a c t i o n accrues o n l y when t h e r e h a s o c c u r r e d a manifest, present injury"). 1 4 1070213; 1070214; of the s i x cases. 5, A l a . R. denying the question App. of difference orders would 1070215; law of P., certified as to which opinion, materially in that that court, the motions there an advance The trial 1070218 pursuant interlocutory involve a immediate the orders for from i t s t e r m i n a t i o n of avoid protracted court's certification Court h e l d as follows based "As there i s currently no affirmative evidence before the Court that the Plaintiff suffered a manifest, present injury such that a l l of the essential e l e m e n t s o f h i s c l a i m c o - e x i s t e d more t h a n twenty years before the filing of the A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t n a m i n g O-I as a p a r t y defendant, O-I's Motion for Summary J u d g m e n t on t h e G r o u n d s o f t h e R u l e of Repose i s DENIED. "See S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 O r d e r . T h i s C o u r t reached t h i s c o n c l u s i o n based upon i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Alabama law; however, there appears to be a substantial ground for difference of opinion c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e t w e n t y (20) y e a r common l a w R u l e o f R e p o s e g i v e n p r i o r c a s e s s u c h a s E x p a r t e L i b e r t y N a t ' l L i f e I n s . Co., 825 So. 2 d 758 (Ala. 2 0 0 2 ) , and A m e r i c a n G e n e r a l L i f e & A c c i d e n t I n s u r a n c e Co v . U n d e r w o o d , 8 8 6 So. 2 d 807 (Ala. 2003), and in this Court's o p i n i o n i t would be b e n e f i c i a l f o r an i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l t o be g r a n t e d 5 and i n each part: " S p e c i f i c a l l y , the upon c o n t r o l l i n g l a w : Rule ground appeal ultimate to controlling is substantial and t h a t t h e a p p e a l w o u l d expensive l i t i g a t i o n . stated, 1070217; However, the t r i a l summary-judgment the l i t i g a t i o n , case 1070216; 1070213; 1070214; 1070215; 1070216; and t h e r e be a r e v i e w Supreme C o u r t . " of t h i s We g r a n t e d O - I ' s p e t i t i o n six c a s e s , a n d we now a f f i r m the motions (Ala. this disputed L.L.C. (citing by t h e Alabama the t r i a l court's orders denying f o r a summary j u d g m e n t i n a l l s i x c a s e s . "Because Hosp., issue 1070218 f o rpermission to appeal i n a l l Standard material 1070217; case of Review involves facts, only our review v. W i l l i f o r d , 21 So. issues i s de 3d o f law and novo." 7 1 2 , 714 no Affinity ( A l a . 2009) P a d g e t t v . C o n e c u h C o u n t y Comm'n, 901 S o . 2 d 6 7 8 , 685 2004)). Discussion On appeal, the 20-year at the time claim or including the only issue before this Court i s whether c o m m o n - l a w r u l e o f r e p o s e b e g i n s t o r u n on a c l a i m of the defendant's when a l l the injury, file an a c t i o n . this Court essential coexist After addressed actions so t h a t very elements i n these issue 6 rise to the that claim, could validly c a s e s were in Collins Homes, I n c . , [Ms. 1 0 7 0 8 7 5 , J u n e 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 ] 2009). of the p l a i n t i f f the appeals that giving So. 3d v. taken, Scenic (Ala. 1070213; 1070214; In Collins, constructed the wantonness. in 1070216; residents 1070217; 1070218 of an 2004 w e r e p r o x i m a t e l y safe negligence the residents alleged that caused by t h e d e s i g n e r ' s and t h e owner's apartment building failure with to maintain, adequate safeguards and adequate escape r o u t e s . a judgment, summary claims against repose. entered Court the o f t h e b u i l d i n g and owner o f t h e b u i l d i n g , a l l e g i n g Specifically, building and injuries r e c e i v e d when t h e b u i l d i n g was s e t on f i r e b y a n a r s o n i s t construct, of apartment i n t h e 1980s sued t h e d e s i g n e r apparent they 1070215; i t were b a r r e d The a summary reversed common-law arguing, trial court's r u l e of repose The d e s i g n e r other agreed i n favor a things, moved f o r that rule and We On appeal, fully as f o l l o w s : "'Since 1858, causes of action a s s e r t e d i n A l a b a m a c o u r t s m o r e t h a n 20 years a f t e r they c o u l d have been a s s e r t e d have been considered to have been e x t i n g u i s h e d by t h e r u l e o f repose. See R e c t o r v . B e t t e r H o u s e s , I n c . , 820 S o . 2 d 7 5 , 77 n.2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ( " S i n c e t h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d M c A r t h u r v. C a r r i e ' s A d m i n i s t r a t o r , 32 A l a . 75 ( 1 8 5 8 ) , A l a b a m a h a s f o l l o w e d a this examined " I n Ex p a r t e L i b e r t y N a t i o n a l L i f e Insurance Co., 825 So. 2d 758 ( A l a . 2002), this Court discussed the r u l e of repose, stating: 7 the common-law of i t . and h e l d reasonably the designer with judgment. to fire-suppression by t h e 20-year court judgment the t r i a l among failure 1070213; 1070214; 1070215; 1070216; 1070217; 1070218 rule of repose, or r u l e of p r e s c r i p t i o n , of 20 years."). The w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d rule recognizes the r e a l i t i e s that surround the i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e passage o f time and t h e a b i l i t y t o f a i r l y and j u s t l y resolve disputes: "'"As a matter of p u b l i c policy, and f o r t h e repose o f society, i t has long been t h e s e t t l e d p o l i c y o f t h i s s t a t e , as of others, that antiquated demands w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d b y the courts, and t h a t , without regard to any statute of l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e r e must be a t i m e b e y o n d w h i c h human transactions w i l l n o t be i n q u i r e d i n t o It i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e peace and security of society that there s h o u l d be an e n d o f l i t i g a t i o n , and i t i s inequitable to allow t h o s e who h a v e s l e p t u p o n their r i g h t s f o r a p e r i o d o f 20 y e a r s , a f t e r t h e y m i g h t have [ b r o u g h t an action], and after, as i s g e n e r a l l y t h e c a s e , t h e memory o f transactions has faded and parties and witnesses passed a w a y , t o [ b r i n g a n a c t i o n ] . The consensus of opinion i n the present day i s that such presumption i s conclusive, and t h e p e r i o d o f 20 y e a r s , without some d i s t i n c t a c t i n r e c o g n i t i o n of the [claimant's right], a c o m p l e t e b a r ; a n d , as s a i d i n an early case, 'the presumption rests not only on t h e want o f diligence i n asserting rights, b u t on t h e h i g h e r g r o u n d t h a t i t i s necessary to suppress frauds, to avoid long dormant claims, 8 1 0 7 0 2 1 3 ; 1 0 7 0 2 1 4 ; 1 0 7 0 2 1 5 ; 1 0 7 0 2 1 6 ; 1 0 7 0 2 1 7 ; 1070218 which, i t has been said, have often more o f c r u e l t y than of j u s t i c e i n them, t h a t i t c o n d u c e s to peace of society and the happiness of families, "and relieves courts from the n e c e s s i t y of a d j u d i c a t i n g r i g h t s so o b s c u r e b y t h e l a p s e o f t i m e and the accidents of l i f e that the attainment of truth and j u s t i c e i s next to i m p o s s i b l e . " ' " " ' S n o d g r a s s v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 2 8 0 - 8 1 , 58 So. 2 0 1 , 2 0 1 - 0 2 (1 9 1 2 ) ; s e e a l s o O x f o r d v . E s t e s , 229 A l a . 606, 6 1 1 , 158 So. 534, 538 ( 1 9 3 4 ) ( " F a i l u r e o f memory, l o s s of evidence, death of parties, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e w h o l e t r u t h c a n n o t be a s c e r t a i n e d and j u s t i c e done, e n t e r into the e q u a t i o n as a r e a s o n f o r t h e r u l e [ o f repose]."). [T]he " r u l e i s c o u c h e d i n t e r m s of the 'running of the period against claims,' 'absolute bar to unasserted claims,' ' l a c k of d i l i g e n c e i n a s s e r t i n g rights,' 'sleeping upon their rights,' e t c . " and i s a c c o r d i n g l y b a s e d upon "the pre-existing r i g h t to assert a claim." B o s h e l l [ v . K e i t h ] , 418 So. 2d [ 8 9 , ] a t 92 [(Ala. 1982)]. Therefore, the 20-year p e r i o d b e g i n s to run a g a i n s t claims the first time those claims c o u l d have been asserted, regardless of the claimant's n o t i c e o f a c l a i m . See M o o r e [ v . L i b e r t y N a t ' l I n s . C o . ] , 108 F. S u p p . 2d [ 1 2 6 6 ] a t 1275 [(N.D. A l a . 2000)] ("Application of t h e r u l e o f r e p o s e h a s o n l y one e l e m e n t -¬ the passage of twenty years time from the moment t h a t t h e a c t i o n s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e 9 1070213; 1070214; 1070215; 1070216; 1070217; 1070218 c l a i m o c c u r r e d -- a n d , i f t h a t time e l a p s e d , no c l a i m c a n be p u r s u e d . " ) . ' has "825 So. 2d a t 7 6 3 - 6 4 (some e m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l ; some e m p h a s i s added) ( f o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d ) . T h u s , as we s t a t e d i n T i e r c e v . E l l i s , 624 So. 2d 5 5 3 , 554 ( A l a . 1993), the r u l e of repose 'bars a c t i o n s t h a t have n o t b e e n c o m m e n c e d w i t h i n 20 y e a r s f r o m t h e time they c o u l d have been commenced.' Alternatively, ' [ t ] h e r u l e o f r e p o s e b e g i n s r u n n i n g on a c l a i m a s s o o n as a l l o f t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h a t c l a i m c o e x i s t so t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f c o u l d v a l i d l y file s u i t . ' A m e r i c a n Gen. L i f e & A c c i d e n t I n s . C o . , 886 So. 2 d 8 0 7 , 812 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . "The residents contend that the 20-year common-law r u l e o f r e p o s e does n o t b a r t h e i r a c t i o n a g a i n s t [the d e s i g n e r ] because, they say, they d i d not have the r i g h t t o sue u n t i l a f t e r the fire o c c u r r e d . We agree. "'A p a r t y h a s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n ... on t h e date the f i r s t l e g a l i n j u r y o c c u r s , but not necessarily from the date of the act causing the i n j u r y That i s , where the act complained of does not itself c o n s t i t u t e a l e g a l i n j u r y at the time, but the p l a i n t i f f ' s injury comes o n l y a s a result of, and in furtherance and subsequent development o f , the a c t of the defendant, the cause of a c t i o n " a c c r u e s , " ... "'when, a n d o n l y w h e n , t h e d a m a g e s a r e sustained.'"' " S m i t h v . M e d t r o n i c , I n c . , 607 So. 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 ( A l a . 1992). See S p a i n v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco C o r p . , 872 So. 2d 1 0 1 , 117 ( A l a . 2003) (Johnstone, J., concurring in part, concurring specially in p a r t , and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) ; c f . G r i f f i n v. U n o c a l C o r p . , 990 So. 2d 291 ( A l a . 2008) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n a c c r u e s o n l y when t h e r e i s a manifest, present injury). 10 1070213; 1070214; 1070215; 1070216; 1070217; 1070218 "In t h i s c a s e , t h e r e s i d e n t s d i d n o t have a v i a b l e and c o g n i z a b l e c l a i m a g a i n s t [the designer] u n t i l t h e f i r e o c c u r r e d and t h e r e s i d e n t s suffered i n j u r i e s as a r e s u l t o f t h e f i r e . O n l y t h e n d i d t h e r e s i d e n t s have a r i g h t t o sue. Thus, because t h e 2 0 - y e a r common-law r u l e o f r e p o s e i s p r e m i s e d upon a p r e e x i s t i n g r i g h t t o a s s e r t a c l a i m and because the r e s i d e n t s d i d n o t have such a r i g h t u n t i l t h e fire o c c u r r e d and t h e y sustained injuries as a result o f an alleged breach of duty by [the d e s i g n e r ] a n d b e c a u s e t h e r e s i d e n t s s u e d w i t h i n 20 years of t h e i r injuries, the r u l e of repose i s inapplicable to this case. Therefore, the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t f o r [ t h e d e s i g n e r ] b a s e d on t h e r u l e o f r e p o s e . " Collins, In year So. 3d a t the present Rule of . case, Repose O-I runs argues from that the point "the twenty i n time (20) of the d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e c l a i m . " O-I's b r i e f , a t 16. However, Collins. begin depend court be Court directly Alabama's 20-year t o r u n on a c l a i m that claim, could this that argument i n common-law r u l e o f r e p o s e does n o t until a l l the e s s e n t i a l elements of i n c l u d i n g an i n j u r y , c o e x i s t so t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f validly solely file on an a c t i o n . the actions correctly held entered rejected that i n O-I's f a v o r rule of repose of the defendant. does n o t The trial i n o r d e r f o r a summary j u d g m e n t t o based t h e s e f a c t s , O-I was r e q u i r e d the p l a i n t i f f The on t h e r u l e of repose t o p r e s e n t evidence showing under that s u f f e r e d a m a n i f e s t , p r e s e n t i n j u r y m o r e t h a n 20 11 1070213; years before defendant coexisted trial 1070214; so the filing that at that court 1070215; 1070216; of the complaint a l lthe e s s e n t i a l time. properly 1070217; This 1070218 naming elements i t has n o t done. denied O-I's of O-I the as a claim Therefore, the motions for a summary court's d e n i a l o f O-I's judgment. Conclusion B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , summary-judgment motions 1070213 -- A F F I R M E D . 1070216 -- A F F I R M E D . 1070217 -- A F F I R M E D . 1070218 i s affirmed. -- A F F I R M E D . 1070215 i n a l l s i x actions -- A F F I R M E D . 1070214 the t r i a l -- A F F I R M E D . Cobb, C . J . , and L y o n s , W o o d a l l , S m i t h , B o l i n , JJ., concur. Stuart, J . , concurs i n the r e s u l t . Murdock a n d Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t . 12 and Parker, 1070213; 1070214; MURDOCK, J u s t i c e For the Collins v. So. 3d part 1070215; 1070216; 1070217; 1070218 (dissenting). reasons Scenic , and d i s s e n t i n g expressed Homes, in I n c . , [Ms. ( A l a . 2009) i n part), my special 1070875, writing June 30, 2009] (Murdock, J . , concurring I respectfully dissent. 13 in in 1070213; 1070214; SHAW, J u s t i c e I Collins 200 9] (on 1070215; Scenic So. 3d application 1070217; 1070218 (dissenting). respectfully v. 1070216; dissent. See Homes, Inc., , ( A l a . 2009) for rehearing). 14 [Ms. my special 1070875, (Shaw, writing November in 25, J., dissenting)

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