State of Alabama v. Dora Alicia Ramirez

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REL: 03/14/2014 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014 CR-13-0372 State o f Alabama v. Dora A l i c i a Ramirez Appeal from Limestone C i r c u i t (CC-05-780) Court KELLUM, J u d g e . Dora A l i c i a R a m i r e z was i n d i c t e d f o r m u r d e r , a v i o l a t i o n o f § 13A-6-2, A l a . Code 1975. The c i r c u i t c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e indictment on t h e grounds that Ramirez was denied her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l . P u r s u a n t t o R u l e 15.7, CR-13-0372 Ala. R. Crim. P., the State appeals judgment d i s m i s s i n g Ramirez's The 14, a c h a r g e o f m u r d e r . The murder i n d i c t m e n t circuit court's indictment. r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t R a m i r e z was 2005, on was the grand j u r y returned December 15, a g a i n s t R a m i r e z on r e l e a s e d on b o n d on J a n u a r y a r r e s t e d on O c t o b e r 2005; 4, 2006. On November 18, a she 2013, R a m i r e z f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s h e r i n d i c t m e n t on t h e g r o u n d that she State had been d e n i e d subsequently dismiss i n which filed her a right to response a speedy trial. to Ramirez's motion i t a r g u e d t h a t R a m i r e z was not denied r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the p l e a d i n g s both p a r t i e s , court entered 4, 2013, the c i r c u i t g r a n t i n g Ramirez's motion to an o r d e r on dismiss. The to her of December This appeal followed. The State contends that the circuit court erroneously granted Ramirez's motion to d i s m i s s the i n d i c t m e n t a g a i n s t her on s p e e d y - t r i a l g r o u n d s . "The The f a c t s b e f o r e us a r e undisputed. o n l y q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d i s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w , and r e v i e w i s t h e r e f o r e de n o v o . " Ex p a r t e H e a r d , 999 980 (Ala. ( A l a . 2003), c i t i n g Ex p a r t e Key, 2003). 2 890 So. 2d So. 2d 1056, our 978, 1059 CR-13-0372 In determining w h e t h e r a d e f e n d a n t has constitutional right e s t a b l i s h e d by the Wingo, 407 U.S. to a United 514 speedy States (1972), f a c t o r s are c o n s i d e r e d : trial, been d e n i e d we apply Supreme C o u r t in which the his the test i n Barker following (1) t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y ; (2) v. four the r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e l a y ; (3) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f h i s o r her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the ( A l a . 2005), the defendant. In Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t So. 2d 259, 263 stated: "'A s i n g l e f a c t o r i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e , because t h i s i s a " b a l a n c i n g t e s t , i n which the c o n d u c t o f b o t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e d e f e n s e a r e weighed."' Ex p a r t e C l o p t o n , 656 So. 2d [1243] a t 1245 [ ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ] ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 0 ) . We e x a m i n e e a c h f a c t o r i n t u r n . " A. Length of the d e l a y . R a m i r e z was a r r e s t e d on 14, 2005, and i n d i c t e d on December 15, 2 0 0 5 ; h e r t r i a l to t a k e p l a c e on December 3, 2013. over 97 The October was set d e l a y i n t h i s case was months. "In D o g g e t t v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e f i r s t f a c t o r -¬ l e n g t h of d e l a y ' i s a c t u a l l y a double enquiry.' 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The f i r s t i n q u i r y under t h i s f a c t o r i s whether the l e n g t h of the d e l a y i s ' " p r e s u m p t i v e l y prejudicial."' 505 U.S. a t 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 3 CR-13-0372 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2 1 8 2 ) . A f i n d i n g t h a t the l e n g t h of delay i s p r e s u m p t i v e l y prejudicial 'triggers' an examination of the remaining three Barker f a c t o r s . 505 U.S. a t 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ('[A]s t h e t e r m i s u s e d i n t h i s t h r e s h o l d c o n t e x t , " p r e s u m p t i v e p r e j u d i c e " does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e a s t a t i s t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y of p r e j u d i c e ; i t s i m p l y marks t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h c o u r t s deem t h e d e l a y u n r e a s o n a b l e enough t o t r i g g e r t h e B a r k e r e n q u i r y . ' ) . See a l s o R o b e r s o n v. S t a t e , 864 So. 2d 379, 394 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . "In Alabama, ' [ t ] h e l e n g t h of d e l a y i s measured from the date of the i n d i c t m e n t or the date of the issuance o f an a r r e s t w a r r a n t -- w h i c h e v e r is e a r l i e r t o t h e d a t e o f t h e t r i a l . ' R o b e r s o n , 864 So. 2d a t 394. C f . § 15-3-7, A l a . Code 1975 ('A p r o s e c u t i o n may be commenced w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h i s c h a p t e r by f i n d i n g an i n d i c t m e n t , t h e i s s u i n g o f a w a r r a n t o r by b i n d i n g o v e r t h e o f f e n d e r . ' ) ; Rule 2.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. ('All criminal p r o c e e d i n g s s h a l l be commenced e i t h e r by i n d i c t m e n t o r by c o m p l a i n t . ' ) . " Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 It i s well So. settled 2d a t 263-64. that this Court has found delays s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s t h a n t h e 97-month d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e t o be presumptively (Ala. Crim. prejudicial. App. Yocum v. 2011)(45-month delay p r e j u d i c i a l ) ; M o r r i s v. S t a t e , 60 So. 2 0 1 0 ) ( 7 3 - m o n t h d e l a y was v. S t a t e , 993 So. 2d 907 was State, was 3d 326 107 So. presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l ) ; 4 219 presumptively ( A l a . Crim. presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l ) ; ( A l a . C r i m . App. 3d App. Sharifi 2008) (61-month d e l a y S t a t e v. S t o v a l l , 947 So. 2d CR-13-0372 1149 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2006) (41-month d e l a y was prejudicial); App. 1992) Vincent v. S t a t e , 607 So. 2d 1290 (31-month d e l a y Accordingly, the presumptively presumptively 97-month was presumptively delay i n the ( A l a . Crim. prejudicial). instant case prejudicial. B. R e a s o n s f o r d e l a y . analyzing this The f o l l o w i n g d a t e s a r e h e l p f u l i n factor: O c t o b e r 14, 2005 -- R a m i r e z a r r e s t e d . December 15, 2005 -- R a m i r e z January was 4, 2006 indicted. R a m i r e z r e l e a s e d on b o n d . May 25, 2006 -- S t a t e f i l e d stating that i t "require[d] p r e p a r e . " (C. 27.) motion to additional continue time t o May 25, 2006 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t c a s e f o r t r i a l i n O c t o b e r 2006. September 11, 2006 -- S t a t e f i l e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e s t a t i n g t h a t i t was " a w a i t i n g t h e a r r e s t o f t h e c o defendant." (C. 33.) September 12, 2006 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n December 2006. O c t o b e r 30, 2006 -- S t a t e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e s t a t i n g t h a t i t was " a w a i t i n g t h e a r r e s t o f t h e c o defendant." (C. 34.) O c t o b e r 3 1 , 2006 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n A p r i l 2007. 5 CR-13-0372 M a r c h 29, 2007 -- R a m i r e z f i l e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t she was n o t r e a d y f o r t r i a l . A p r i l 2, 2007 c i r c u i t court granted motion t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n June 2007. May 9, 2007 -- S t a t e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e s t a t i n g t h a t i t was " a w a i t i n g t h e a r r e s t o f t h e c o d e f e n d a n t . " (C. 36.) May 10, 2007 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n O c t o b e r 2007. S e p t e m b e r 18, 2007 -- S t a t e f i l e d a motion c o n t i n u e s t a t i n g t h a t i t was " a w a i t i n g t h e a r r e s t S e p t e m b e r 24, 2007 c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n December 2007. November 27, 2007 State filed a motion t o c o n t i n u e s t a t i n g t h a t i t was " a w a i t i n g [ t h e ] a r r e s t of the co-defendant" and " [ d ] e f e n s e does n o t o b j e c t . " (C. 38.) November 28, 2007 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d m o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e a n d s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l i n A p r i l 2008. June 16, docket. 2008 -- case moved to administrative M a r c h 12, 2012 -- R a m i r e z f i l e d m o t i o n t o s e t t h e c a s e on t h e n e x t a v a i l a b l e t r i a l d o c k e t ; c i r c u i t c o u r t s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l on June 11, 2012. J u l y 19, 2012 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t S e p t e m b e r 2012 t r i a l d o c k e t . S e p t e m b e r 10, 2012 -t o December 2012 t r i a l c o n t i n u e d case c i r c u i t court docket. ket. 6 to c o n t i n u e d case CR-13-0372 J a n u a r y 9, 2013 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t c o n t i n u e d F e b r u a r y 2013 t r i a l d o c k e t . case t o M a r c h 12, 2013 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t June 2013 ttrriiaall d o c k e t . continued case t o J u n e 10, 2013 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t S e p t e m b e r 2013 t r i a l d o c k e t . continued case t o S e p t e m b e r 9, 2013 -- c i r c u i t c o u r t c o n t i n u e d c a s e t o December 2013 t r i a l d o c k e t . November dismiss. In 18, Ex p a r t e 2013 Walker, -- Ramirez supra, filed a motion to t h e A l a b a m a Supreme Court stated: "The S t a t e has t h e b u r d e n o f j u s t i f y i n g t h e d e l a y . See B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 531; S t e e l e y v. C i t y o f Gadsden, 533 So. 2d 671, 680 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1988) . Barker recognizes three c a t e g o r i e s of reasons f o r d e l a y : (1) d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y , (2) n e g l i g e n t d e l a y , and (3) j u s t i f i e d d e l a y . 407 U.S. a t 531. Courts a s s i g n d i f f e r e n t weight t o d i f f e r e n t reasons f o r delay. D e l i b e r a t e d e l a y i s 'weighted heavily' against the State. 407 U.S. a t 531. Deliberate d e l a y i n c l u d e s an ' a t t e m p t t o d e l a y t h e t r i a l i n o r d e r t o hamper t h e d e f e n s e ' o r ' " t o g a i n some t a c t i c a l advantage over (defendants) or to harass them."' 407 U.S. a t 531 & n. 32 ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d States v. M a r i o n , 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971)). Negligent delay i s weighted less h e a v i l y against the S t a t e t h a n i s d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 531; Ex p a r t e C a r r e l l , 565 So. 2d [104,] 108 [ ( A l a . 1990)]. Justified d e l a y -- w h i c h i n c l u d e s s u c h o c c u r r e n c e s as m i s s i n g w i t n e s s e s o r d e l a y f o r w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t i s p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e -- i s n o t weighted against the State. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 531; Zumbado v. S t a t e , 615 So. 2d 1223, 1234 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1993)('"Delays occasioned by the 7 CR-13-0372 d e f e n d a n t o r on h i s b e h a l f a r e e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y and a r e h e a v i l y c o u n t e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant i n applying the balancing test of B a r k e r . " ' ) ( q u o t i n g M c C a l l u m v. S t a t e , 407 So. 2d 865, 868 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 1 ) ) . " Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 So. 2d a t 265. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t R a m i r e z moved t o c o n t i n u e h e r c a s e once a n d t h e S t a t e moved t o c o n t i n u e times before docket. As asserted and, Ramirez's case s i x t h e c a s e was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e grounds that f o r the continuances i t was a w a i t i n g i n one i n s t a n c e , cited prepare f o rt r i a l . Although sought, the State the a r r e s t of the codefendant a need f o r a d d i t i o n a l time t o t h e r e c o r d does n o t i n d i c a t e w h i c h p a r t y moved t o p l a c e t h e c a s e on t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d o c k e t o r if t h e c o u r t a c t e d s u a s p o n t e , t h e r e c o r d does i n d i c a t e t h a t n e i t h e r the State nor Ramirez o b j e c t e d to the court's o r moved t o p l a c e t h e c a s e b a c k on t h e c i r c u i t docket f o r approximately placed the case sponte continued back trial on t h e a c t i v e be docket, the court court sua the case s i x times. of the record, f o r t h e 97-month d e l a y may court's active four years. A f t e r the c i r c u i t B a s e d on o u r e x a m i n a t i o n reasons action that between Ramirez's a r r e s t and a t t r i b u t e d t o both 8 i t appears the prosecution and t h e CR-13-0372 defense. Actions on the part of j u s t i f i e d and n e g l i g e n t d e l a y . The case several times c o d e f e n d a n t and the case docket. the while failed remained Further, circuit the circuit Ramirez w a i t e d to place A c c o r d i n g l y , we of State to evidence both S t a t e moved t o c o n t i n u e awaiting the docket. the State arrest of enhance four the f i n d no court's years case on while administrative before moved active the she trial d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y on t h e i t s own case or the Ramirez's to proceed w i t h the p r o s e c u t i o n on court the part to prejudice the trial. Ramirez was defense. C. Assertion of right to speedy a r r e s t e d f o r m u r d e r on O c t o b e r 14, December 15, 2005. 2005; she was i n d i c t e d on However, R a m i r e z d i d n o t f i l e a motion to d i s m i s s h e r i n d i c t m e n t on s p e e d y - t r i a l g r o u n d s u n t i l November 18, 2013, begin on l e s s than December 2, one month b e f o r e her trial was set 2013. "An a c c u s e d does n o t w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l s i m p l y by f a i l i n g t o a s s e r t i t . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Even s o , courts a p p l y i n g the Barker f a c t o r s are t o c o n s i d e r i n the weighing process whether and when t h e accused a s s e r t s t h e r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l , 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and n o t e v e r y a s s e r t i o n o f the r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l i s w e i g h t e d e q u a l l y . Compare K e l l e y v. S t a t e , 568 So. 2d 405, 410 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1990) ('Repeated r e q u e s t s f o r a s p e e d y 9 to CR-13-0372 t r i a l w e i g h h e a v i l y i n f a v o r o f an a c c u s e d . ' ) , w i t h C l a n c y v. S t a t e , 886 So. 2d 166, 172 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) ( w e i g h i n g t h i r d f a c t o r a g a i n s t an a c c u s e d who a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l two weeks before trial, and s t a t i n g : '"The fact that the a p p e l l a n t d i d not a s s e r t h i s r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l s o o n e r ' t e n d s t o s u g g e s t t h a t he e i t h e r a c q u i e s c e d i n the delays or s u f f e r e d o n l y m i n i m a l p r e j u d i c e p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e . ' " ' ) ( q u o t i n g B e n e f i e l d v. S t a t e , 726 So. 2d 286, 291 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997), a d d i t i o n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) , and Brown v. S t a t e , 392 So. 2d 1248, 1254 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1980) (no s p e e d y - t r i a l v i o l a t i o n where d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l t h r e e days b e f o r e trial)." Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 In the So. 2d a t i n s t a n t case, the 265-66. c a s e was a c t i v e docket f o r almost three on t h e years before circuit i t was court's placed on t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d o c k e t , where i t l a n g u i s h e d for approximately four years. the c a s e on that time, the R a m i r e z e v e n t u a l l y moved t o next a v a i l a b l e t r i a l no objection from Ramirez. a s s e r t her r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l before December 2013 her d i d not, r a i s e a s p e e d y - t r i a l c l a i m . A f t e r i t r e s e t the f o r t r i a l , the c i r c u i t c o u r t continued with docket but Ramirez's motion to trial dismiss until suggests at case t h e c a s e s i x more t i m e s Indeed, date. set Ramirez did l e s s t h a n one The that delayed month filing Ramirez, who not of had b e e n r e l e a s e d on b o n d s h o r t l y a f t e r h e r a r r e s t , a c q u i e s c e d i n 10 CR-13-0372 the delays. Accordingly, a g a i n s t R a m i r e z and D. the third i n f a v o r of the Barker factor weighs State. P r e j u d i c e to the defendant. In her motion t o d i s m i s s , R a m i r e z a l l e g e d t h a t she month delay under a because cloud of was "[f]or p r e j u d i c e d by nearly anxiety." a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n s why she was (C. a t h e more t h a n decade, 53.) she Ramirez has 97- lived offered no p r e j u d i c e d by t h e d e l a y o f her case. I n Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t the general principles concerning prejudice and discussed set forth g u i d e l i n e s r e g a r d i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e t y p e and w e i g h t o f p r e j u d i c e w i t h t h e c a u s e o f t h e d e l a y , and e x p l a i n e d how two f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c e d the defendant's burden of p r o v i n g f o u r t h prong of Barker: "Because 'pretrial delay is often both i n e v i t a b l e and wholly justifiable,' Doggett [v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ] , 505 U.S. [647,] 656 [ ( 1 9 9 2 ) ] , t h e f o u r t h B a r k e r f a c t o r e x a m i n e s w h e t h e r and t o what extent t h e d e l a y has p r e j u d i c e d the defendant. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 532. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t has r e c o g n i z e d t h r e e t y p e s o f harm t h a t may r e s u l t from d e p r i v i n g a defendant of the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l : ' " o p p r e s s i v e p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n , " " a n x i e t y and c o n c e r n o f t h e a c c u s e d , " and "the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the [accused's] defense w i l l be impaired" by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. at 654 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 532, and c i t i n g S m i t h 11 these the CR-13-0372 v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-79 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s 116, 120 (1966)). 'Of t h e s e v. E w e l l , 383 U.S. Ewell, f o r m s off p r e j u d i c e , " t h e most s e r i o u s i s t h e l a s t , o i n a b i l i t y of a defendant adequately t o b e c a u s e the p r e p a r e h i s c a s e skews t h e f a i r n e s s o f t h e e n t i r e s y s t e m . " ' 505 U.S. a t 654 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. at 5 3 2 ) . II "The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n D o g g e t t u s e d three hypothetical cases to demonstrate the accused's burden under the f o u r t h B a r k e r f a c t o r . 505 U.S. a t 656-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686. See R o b i n s o n v. W h i t l e y , 2 F.3d 562, 570 ( 5 t h C i r . 1993) ( d i s c u s s i n g Doggett). The a c c u s e d ' s b u r d e n 'of p r o o f i n e a c h s i t u a t i o n v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y w i t h the [ S t a t e ] ' s degree of c u l p a b i l i t y f o r t h e d e l a y . ' R o b i n s o n , 2 F.3d a t 570 ( c i t i n g D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686) . In the f i r s t s c e n a r i o , where t h e s t a t e pursues the accused 'with reasonable d i l i g e n c e , ' the d e l a y however l o n g g e n e r a l l y i s e x c u s e d u n l e s s the a c c u s e d d e m o n s t r a t e s ' s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c e t o h i s d e f e n s e . ' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Thus, when t h e s t a t e a c t s w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e in b r i n g i n g the defendant to t r i a l , the defendant has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g p r e j u d i c e c a u s e d by t h e delay. in to " [ D i s c u s s i o n of the second s i t u a t i o n r e c o g n i z e d D o g g e t t i n v o l v i n g b a d - f a i t h e f f o r t s by t h e s t a t e d e l a y the defendant's t r i a l ] . "The third scenario recognized i n Doggett i n v o l v e s d e l a y c a u s e d by t h e s t a t e ' s 'official n e g l i g e n c e . ' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686. O f f i c i a l negligence 'occupies the middle ground' between bad-faith delay and diligent prosecution. Id. I n e v a l u a t i n g and w e i g h i n g n e g l i g e n t d e l a y , t h e c o u r t must ' d e t e r m i n e what portion of the delay i s attributable to the [ s t a t e ] ' s n e g l i g e n c e and w h e t h e r t h i s negligent 12 CR-13-0372 d e l a y i s o f such a d u r a t i o n t h a t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be p r e s u m e d . ' R o b i n s o n , 2 F.3d a t 570 ( c i t i n g D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656-58, 112 S . C t . 2686) . The w e i g h t a s s i g n e d to negligent delay ' i n c r e a s e s as t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y i n c r e a s e s . ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S e r n a - V i l l a r r e a l , 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) ( c i t i n g D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656-57, 112 S . C t . 2 6 8 6 ) . N e g l i g e n t d e l a y may be so l e n g t h y -- o r t h e f i r s t t h r e e B a r k e r f a c t o r s may w e i g h s o h e a v i l y i n the accused's favor t h a t the accused becomes e n t i t l e d t o a f i n d i n g o f p r e s u m e d p r e j u d i c e . 352 F.3d a t 231 ( c i t i n g R o b i n s o n , 2 F.3d a t 570, c i t i n g i n t u r n D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 655, 112 S . C t . 2686). When p r e j u d i c e i s p r e s u m e d , t h e b u r d e n s h i f t s t o t h e s t a t e , w h i c h must t h e n a f f i r m a t i v e l y show e i t h e r t h a t t h e d e l a y i s ' e x t e n u a t e d , as b y t h e defendant's acquiescence,' or 'that the delay l e f t [the defendant's] ability t o defend himself unimpaired.' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 658 & n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2686." 928 So. 2d a t 266-68. In her motion to dismiss, Ramirez made o n l y a general a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e d e l a y c a u s e d h e r t o l i v e u n d e r "a c l o u d o f anxiety" f o r n e a r l y 10 y e a r s . (C. 53.) The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t R a m i r e z was n o t s u b j e c t t o e x t e n d e d p r e t r i a l confinement b e c a u s e s h e was r e l e a s e d on b o n d s h o r t l y a f t e r h e r i n d i c t m e n t . Moreover, Ramirez has f a i l e d h e r d e f e n s e was i m p a i r e d In t h i s trial by t h e d e l a y . case, the delay to a speedy t r i a l . t o a l l e g e , much l e s s show, t h a t d i d not v i o l a t e Ramirez's right See, D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 656 ("Our s p e e d y standards recognize that p r e t r i a l 13 delay i s often both CR-13-0372 i n e v i t a b l e and w h o l l y j u s t i f i a b l e . " ) ; Barker, 407 U.S. a t 521 ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t d e l a y i n b r i n g i n g an a c c u s e d t o t r i a l not always p r e j u d i c e t h e accused); S e r n a - V i l l a r r e a l , 352 F.3d a t 230 ( " O b v i o u s l y , i n this balancing the l e s s p r e j u d i c e [an a c c u s e d ] e x p e r i e n c e s , it i s t h a t a d e n i a l o f a speedy t r i a l In b a l a n c i n g t h e f o u r B a r k e r does [of the Barker factors], the less r i g h t w i l l be likely found."). f a c t o r s , we c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e d e l a y i n t h i s case e x p e r i e n c e d by Ramirez p r e j u d i c e d h e r t o a degree that would warrant Accordingly, the c i r c u i t the d i s m i s s a l of her indictment. court erred i n granting Ramirez's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s h e r i n d i c t m e n t on s p e e d y - t r i a l g r o u n d s . B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l is due remanded t o be, and i s hereby, f o r the circuit court reversed to and t h i s set aside court case i s i t s order d i s m i s s i n g t h e i n d i c t m e n t and t o r e s t o r e Ramirez's case t o i t s active t r i a l docket. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Windom, P . J . , a n d W e l c h a n d B u r k e , J J . , c o n c u r . J., dissents, with opinion. 14 Joiner, CR-13-0372 JOINER, J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g . I d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e m a j o r i t y the r e c o r d i n t h i s case; be t h i s case, remanded f o r a h e a r i n g specific, written dismiss speedy t r i a l on First, facts the before question --applies these findings are standard of review. before this Although are regarding prevents nature apparent exists record that "'[t]he "'[t]he of law'" So. 3d I disagree a p p l i c a t i o n of and from regarding those b a s i s of the the record; those delays which delays. i s the very facts at with a de be t r u e t h a t t h e r e from only novo exists As necessarily detail i t may to be not cold the motion I dissent. that of review. t o make may I e x p l a i n below, the case w e l l as a and should i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e f a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d . gleaned, Court Ramirez's Accordingly, i s a question as court opinion--concluding novo s t a n d a r d conclusions, circuit regarding undisputed'" decided a de at the very l e a s t , f o r the grounds. majority us t o be and analyzes delays thus, The a in this question paucity circumstance of that t h i s C o u r t f r o m e v a l u a t i n g t h i s c a s e f o r an abuse o f discretion. The circuit court, which has been involved in s c h e d u l i n g t h i s c a s e o v e r t h e c o u r s e o f 97 months, n e c e s s a r i l y 15 CR-13-0372 had to i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s p e e d y - t r i a l i s s u e and w o u l d be some d e f e r e n c e as to i t s the exercise were t h i s r e c o r d more c o m p l e t e . See 561, the 53 case Barker this ( A l a . C r i m . App. at v. bar did 1991) not case on speedy trial a b u s e d h i s d i s c r e t i o n by Next, indicate 514 the which party grounds. states moved "the record does case back on approximately Notably, docket." on which comprises out in dismissed trial judge place record the case c o u r t a c t e d sua not on the sponte," c o u r t ' s a c t i o n o r moved t o p l a c e the court's active So. 3d a t majority's only--notation the docket for (emphasis added). conclusion in the but nor circuit neither does State four years." however, the following--and transfer: the 2d judge i n set he the So. indictment."). "the indicate that Ramirez o b j e c t e d to the before Thus, that to the t r i a l guidelines (1972),] a d m i n i s t r a t i v e docket or i f the that the d i s m i s s i n g the majority i t s discretion S t a t e v. C l a y , 577 ("Likewise, follow W i n g o , [ 4 0 7 U.S. of entitled record i s b a s e d on the regarding the "Ordered, case i s t r a n s f e r r e d to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e (C. 17.) to T h i s , I b e l i e v e , i s an evaluate nearly the h a l f of nearly the insufficient 48-month delay--which 97-month d e l a y - - t h a t 16 basis resulted CR-13-0372 from p l a c i n g t h i s c a s e on t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d o c k e t . Itis a l s o c e r t a i n l y an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s on w h i c h t o r e v e r s e t h e judgment o f t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t , because t h e c i r c u i t court knew - - f r o m h a n d l i n g t h e c a s e o v e r t h e c o u r s e o f 97 months--why t h e case had been t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d o c k e t . Likewise, circuit the majority court placed Although the c i r c u i t "[a]fter the case s i x times." i t may be t r u e t h e c a s e was c o n t i n u e d states the t h e c a s e b a c k on t h e a c t i v e d o c k e t , t h e c o u r t sua sponte c o n t i n u e d . opinion So. 3d a t that the record reflects that o r r e s e t s i x t i m e s a f t e r R a m i r e z moved c o u r t t o s e t the case f o r t r i a l , the record fails t o p r o v i d e any i n s i g h t i n t o t h o s e a c t i o n s . A t most, t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s o n l y t h a t t h e c a s e was r e s e t o r c o n t i n u e d ; thus, any c o n c l u s i o n by t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e r e s e t t i n g o r c o n t i n u i n g was "sua on sponte" i s s p e c u l a t i v e . i t s experience about the with reasons Again, the c i r c u i t the case--would for each of have these court--based had six knowledge resets or continuances. Regarding Ramirez's trial, did a s s e r t i o n of her r i g h t to a the m a j o r i t y opinion concludes that "[i]ndeed, not a s s e r t her r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l 17 speedy Ramirez u n t i l l e s s t h a n one CR-13-0372 month b e f o r e h e r December 2013 The main o p i n i o n f a i l s months prior to th[e] [trial trial docket." motion. her court] (C. (C. 41.) t r i a l date." to address, So. s p e e d y - t r i a l motion, to set 40.) [her] The Although . fact that however, the 3d a t 20 Ramirez "move[d] c a u s e on t h e n e x t a v a i l a b l e circuit Ramirez court did not granted use the this words "speedy t r i a l " i n her motion, her motion p l a i n l y s e t s out her desire "The t o be 'character its tried of at the a pleading e s s e n t i a l substance, title.'" 1282 Ex i s d e t e r m i n e d and 1996) 285 Ala. 117, Gen. Union Springs 229 the prompt trial times. B a r k e r v. Wingo, 407 U.S. specific So. 2d t h a t R a m i r e z moved t h e setting, motion or i n t e r p r e t e d from I n s . Co., Despite a fact (quoting 114, date. and n o t f r o m i t s d e s c r i p t i v e name o r p a r t e A l f a Mut. (Ala. Green, next a v a i l a b l e court her case argument; was 514 684 2d Telephone 503, 505 circuit continued (1972), instead, So. Co. for a another United six require States Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : "We t h i n k t h e b e t t e r r u l e i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of or f a i l u r e to a s s e r t h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l i s one o f t h e f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e d e p r i v a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t . Such a f o r m u l a t i o n a v o i d s t h e r i g i d i t i e s o f t h e demand-waiver rule and the resulting possible 18 v. (1969)). court does n o t the 1281, CR-13-0372 unfairness i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . I t allows the t r i a l c o u r t t o e x e r c i s e a j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n b a s e d on t h e circumstances, i n c l u d i n g due c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f any a p p l i c a b l e formal procedural r u l e . I t would permit, for example, a c o u r t t o a t t a c h a d i f f e r e n t weight t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which the defendant knowingly f a i l s to o b j e c t from a s i t u a t i o n i n which h i s a t t o r n e y acquiesces in long delay without adequately i n f o r m i n g h i s c l i e n t , or from a s i t u a t i o n i n which no c o u n s e l i s a p p o i n t e d . I t w o u l d a l s o a l l o w a c o u r t t o weigh t h e f r e q u e n c y and f o r c e o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s as o p p o s e d t o a t t a c h i n g s i g n i f i c a n t w e i g h t t o a p u r e l y p r o forma o b j e c t i o n . " 407 U.S. requested I at (emphasis a prompt t r i a l believe regarding 529 that this added). Ramirez plainly s e t t i n g , a n d h e r m o t i o n was granted; request Here, i s entitled to consideration Ramirez's a s s e r t i o n of her s p e e d y - t r i a l r i g h t . Next--in addressing whether Ramirez has suffered any p r e j u d i c e from the p r e t r i a l d e l a y - - t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n s t a t e s that " R a m i r e z h a s f a i l e d t o a l l e g e , much l e s s show, t h a t h e r d e f e n s e was impaired by t h e d e l a y , " So. 3d a t t h a t "the d e l a y i n t h i s case experienced by Ramirez , and [did not] p r e j u d i c e [ ] her t o a degree t h a t would warrant the d i s m i s s a l of h e r i n d i c t m e n t . " however, consider So. 3d a t as p a r t . The m a j o r i t y does n o t , of the f o u r t h Barker f a c t o r the length of the p r e t r i a l delay; t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t in 505 U.S. D o g g e t t v. U n i t e d States, 19 647 (1992), recognized CR-13-0372 that, in addition to looking at pretrial delay for the p u r p o s e s o f t r i g g e r i n g a s p e e d y - t r i a l a n a l y s i s , a c o u r t must a l s o c o n s i d e r "the e x t e n t to which the d e l a y s t r e t c h e s beyond t h e b a r e minimum n e e d e d t o t r i g g e r j u d i c i a l e x a m i n a t i o n c l a i m . " 505 Doggett Court pretrial time." a t 652. This a n a l y s i s i s " s i g n i f i c a n t , " concluded, delay has "because ... presumption that accused p r e j u d i c e d the the intensifies over A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 (Ala. 2 0 0 5 ) - - i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s "second i n q u i r y " p r e t r i a l delay--concluded pretrial finding delay of factor, crosses a presumptive threshold, prejudice and, regarding under i n a d d i t i o n to the opinion, f a c t o r . " 928 however, appears first presumed p r e j u d i c e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h pretrial delay released on bond d e f e n s e was A finding in this shortly case after simply her [ n o t ] i m p a i r e d by of a Barker 2d a t 269. discount the the because indictment" the d e l a y . " presumed p r e j u d i c e - - a s 20 So. to possible . 2d an a c c u s e d becomes e n t i t l e d t o a f i n d i n g o f p r e s u m e d majority "her So. t h a t " [ a ] t some p o i n t , t h e l e n g t h o f p r e j u d i c e under the f o u r t h B a r k e r The the Id. The 259 U.S. of the significant Ramirez and "was because So. 3d at discussed in Ex CR-13-0372 parte Walker--does n o t depend s o l e l y on w h e t h e r the accused was i n c a r c e r a t e d o r s u f f e r e d d e m o n s t r a b l e , s p e c i f i c harm. s h o r t , the m a j o r i t y f a i l s t o a d e q u a t e l y address whether, the f a c t s of t h i s Finally, paucity of I the agree with record reply brief, suggests on the State that "[d]ue appeal--something to the that Ramirez i n her b r i e f - - i t i s impossible to f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d how t h e t r i a l State under c a s e , p r e j u d i c e may be p r e s u m e d . repeatedly references (State's In court p. 1.) reached [its]conclusion[.]" Accordingly, as an a l t e r n a t i v e avenue t h i s case f o r a B a r k e r h e a r i n g . I would--as the f o r relief--remand ( S t a t e ' s r e p l y b r i e f , p. 1.) I n P a r r i s v. S t a t e , 885 So. 2d 813 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , we remanded t h a t c a s e t o t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t f o r t h e c i r c u i t to enter regarding an "order containing detailed the Barker f a c t o r s " a f t e r written findings f i n d i n g the f o l l o w i n g : "From t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s , we a r e u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x a c t r e a s o n s f o r some o f t h e d e l a y s ; t h e r e f o r e , we a r e u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a s o n s were n e u t r a l o r w h e t h e r t h e y s h o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e government. F o r example, s e v e r a l continuances noted on t h e c a s e action summary c o n t a i n no r e a s o n f o r d e l a y ; s e v e r a l o t h e r s i n d i c a t e only that t h e c a s e was 'not r e a c h e d . ' Most t r o u b l i n g t o us i s t h a t , on A u g u s t 19, 1999, t h e t r i a l c o u r t removed t h e c a s e f r o m t h e d o c k e t a n d d i r e c t e d t h e c l e r k t o s e t t h e c a s e o n l y on a s p e c i f i c order of the court. This Court i s unable t o 21 court CR-13-0372 make an i n f o r m e d d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h i s lengthy delay without a d d i t i o n a l information from the t r i a l c o u r t . " Parris, 885 So. 2d a t 825 Toliver, [Ms. CR-12-2020, M a r c h 14, 2014] C r i m . App. App. (emphasis a d d e d ) . See a l s o S t a t e v. So. 3d 2 0 1 4 ) ; S t a t e v. R o b i n s o n , 79 So. 3d 606 2 0 1 1 ) ; S t a t e v. S t o v a l l , 947 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . Crim. App. 2006). In this case, like Parris, the b a s i s r e s e t s and c o n t i n u a n c e s a f t e r R a m i r e z be set for t r i a l i n d i c a t e why this i s unclear. c a s e was f o r the numerous asked f o r the matter to Further, the r e c o r d does not t r a n s f e r r e d to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e docket. A c c o r d i n g l y , because of the " p a u c i t y " of the r e c o r d , I would remand t h i s m a t t e r f o r a B a r k e r For the f o r e g o i n g hearing. reasons, I d i s s e n t . 22

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