Jeffrey Olen Cochran v. State of Alabama

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REL: 06/29/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 CR-10-0516 J e f f r e y Olen Cochran v. S t a t e o f Alabama A p p e a l from H o u s t o n C i r c u i t C o u r t (CC-08-1228; CC-08-1229; CC-08-1587) BURKE, Judge. Jeffrey degree Olen Cochran appeals h i s c o n v i c t i o n s sodomy, a violation o f § 13A-6-64, p o s s e s s i o n o f obscene matter c o n t a i n i n g a person u n d e r 17 y e a r s f o r second- A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , a visual depiction of o f age engaged i n an o b s c e n e a c t , a CR-10-0516 v i o l a t i o n o f § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 1 9 2 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, and first-degree u n l a w f u l p o s s e s s i o n of m a r i j u a n a , a v i o l a t i o n of § 13A-12-213, Ala. Code 1 9 7 5 . for each C o c h r a n was conviction. sentenced t o 60 m o n t h s i n p r i s o n three were A l l sentences to run consecutively. Before evidence for trial, seized Cochran of obscene possession-of-marijuana indicating sexually After on matter, charge, that photographs a h e a r i n g , the trial July 1966. trial, 5, In the 1990, trial court to June 2003, C.K., that C.K. of to sever to the herself met to was Cochran unlawfulto had on through person. motions. t h a t she born present provided another a l l those testified Cochran the victim, suppress indictment a l l o w him court denied victim, and and C.K., explicit At the from h i s r e s i d e n c e , to d i s m i s s the possession testimony moved was January the born 29, Internet, and they began to r e g u l a r l y communicate w i t h each and Cochran communicated through the I n t e r n e t or by telephone for approximately During C.K. Cochran t h r e e months. that she was 13 C.K. t h a t he was 16 years face he admitted t h a t he years old. o l d , but was 37 2 that time, Initially, before years other. old. they In Cochran met C.K. told told face-to- August 2003, CR-10-0516 C.K. and Cochran meeting with some after her occurred testified January and they C.K. intercourse romantic sexual years sex with The C.K.'s m o t h e r was o u t that a couple o f weeks Cochran returned t o Cochran at h i s residence, t o C.K., once testified testified time. had s e x i n the back of h i s v e h i c l e . According approximately f o r the f i r s t face-to-face meeting, she had 1, 2 0 0 4 , parents. C.K. initial that face-to-face a t C.K.'s h o u s e w h i l e friends. their house met a month that she and o r a l sex. relationship encounters with which until she t u r n e d Cochran C.K. Cochran 16 that after about with h i s had sex years o l d . in s h e was According increased or then engaged believed Cochran. on he s h a r e d she and Cochran and with again C.K. sexual in a t o C.K., h e r she t u r n e d 16 o l d . (R. 93.) C.K. Cochran's also testified that while s o n , who i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y s h e was 1 year 16 years o l d , younger than C.K., t o o k a p h o t o g r a p h o f h e r and Cochran engaged i n a s e x u a l a c t . In September 2006, pharmacy where Cochran. C.K. his bedroom. C.K. developed she worked, testified that photograph and she gave that the photograph Cochran kept T h e p h o t o g r a p h was i n t r o d u c e d 3 a t t h e CVS to the photograph i n into evidence at CR-10-0516 trial, and i t i s t h e b a s i s o f t h e charge against Cochran. CVS o n e - h o u r p h o t o C.K. in June 2008. about on 3 a.m. that on J u n e Detective Bill Rafferty 9, 2 0 0 8 , having Later Rafferty. a eventually told with ended C.K.'s letter that sexual and b a n g i n g d a y , C.K.'s Department mother a n d met gave with Detective f r o m C o c h r a n t o C.K. relationship with mother C.K. C.K. was initially Cochran, b u t she the i n t e r v i e w e r about h e r s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p Cochran. On June 10, executed a search search, with Detective him Cochran, sexual loose Cochran a n d he was y e l l i n g then interviewed at the C h i l d Advocacy Center. denied by 27, 2006. County S h e r i f f ' s a hand-written date-stamped t o C.K., C o c h r a n came t o h e r h o u s e a t of the house. to the Houston was her r e l a t i o n s h i p with According t h e windows went The p h o t o g r a p h on S e p t e m b e r testified possession-of-obscene-matter 2008, Rafferty obtained w a r r a n t on C o c h r a n ' s r e s i d e n c e . Rafferty recovered act, a p l a s t i c and t h e o t h e r additional the photograph marijuana, Detective of Cochran bag h o l d i n g a plastic letters five and the who were C.K. and between engaged empty p l a s t i c bottle holding 4 During officers C.K. marijuana and in a bags and seeds, a CR-10-0516 plastic bottle holding marijuana plastic loose and seven p a r t i a l l y bags each marijuana partially spoon marijuana, burned that holding and some was 7.62 holding cigars, four marijuana, hand-rolled i n Cochran's marijuana burned s i x partially contained discovered a container a plastic burned residue. bedroom. grams. individual bag cigars cigarettes, scales, Cochran total was and items weight then holding four and a m e t a l A l l o f those The loose were o f the arrested and interviewed. Cochran testified turned any in testified that 16 y e a r s i n h i s own d e f e n s e he d i d n o t h a v e old. Cochran at t r i a l . Cochran sex with C.K. until after testified that he d i d n o t h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p h o t o g r a p h d e p i c t i n g h i m a n d C.K. a sexual drawer act before i n h i s bedroom. discovered i t was d i s c o v e r e d Cochran i n h i s bedroom b e l o n g e d engaged by the o f f i c e r s admitted that she in a the marijuana t o h i m , b u t he testified t h a t he o n l y s m o k e d m a r i j u a n a a n d t h a t he n e v e r s o l d m a r i j u a n a to anyone. testimony, C.K. Cochran's son t e s t i f i e d he d i d n o t t a k e engaged that, the photograph i n a sexual act. 5 contrary t o C.K.'s of his father and CR-10-0516 The jury possession of possession found of obscene denied. this guilty matter, marijuana. s e n t e n c e d , he f i l e d court Cochran of and After first-degree Cochran a m o t i o n f o r a new Cochran timely second-degree filed was trial, sodomy, unlawful convicted which his notice the and trial of appeal to Court. On "The appeal, Court trial of Cochran erred the by argument under court's under alleged Rule 1 denying marijuana c h a r g e s . " Cochran's legal states 13.3, this a t 15. issue Crim. C r i m . P., "(a) O f f e n s e s . Two j o i n e d i n an i n d i c t m e n t , i f they: "(1) Are from issue, motion the statement P., sever of concerns not the provides, the trial the 6 trial court's i n relevant "(2) Are based o n t h e same c o n d u c t or otherwise connected i n t h e i r commission; or " sex the o f f e n s e s character; t o have been p a r t the Cochran's o r m o r e o f f e n s e s may be information, or complaint, o f t h e same o r s i m i l a r "(3) Are a l l e g e d scheme o r p l a n . follows: a l l of consolidate 1 as to trial However, to properly A l a . R. R u l e 1 3 . 3 , A l a . R. Cochran's charge brief, failure his first or are o f a common part: CR-10-0516 alleged 13.4, error A l a . R. Until he Crim. 2 once sever they the had argue before the trial consolidated. concerning exchange P., to his posttrial improperly hearing failing Cochran f i l e d d i d not been in several offenses been different the Rule consolidated. m o t i o n f o r a new court At under t h a t the end motions, trial, offenses of the a had pretrial following occurred: " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : The l a s t w r i t t e n [ m o t i o n ] , I t h i n k I may h a v e s a i d . I f I may i n q u i r e t h a t e a c h of these cases are separate i n d i c t m e n t s . T h e r e f o r e , I d i d n o t f i l e a m o t i o n t o s e v e r . Am I c o r r e c t i n a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e was n o t p l a n n i n g on t r y i n g them a l l t o g e t h e r ? that. Court " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : I'm n o t s u r e who w i l l be t r y i n g I w o u l d a s s u m e t h a t we w o u l d p r o b a b l y a s k t h e t o c o n s o l i d a t e them. " ( c ) C o n s o l i d a t i o n . I f o f f e n s e s ... a r e c h a r g e d in separate indictments, informations, or c o m p l a i n t s , t h e c o u r t on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e o r on m o t i o n o f e i t h e r p a r t y may o r d e r t h a t t h e c h a r g e s b e t r i e d together ... i f t h e o f f e n s e s ... c o u l d h a v e been j o i n e d i n a s i n g l e i n d i c t m e n t , i n f o r m a t i o n , or complaint." R u l e 1 3 . 4 ( a ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., p r o v i d e s , i n p a r t : " I f i t appears t h a t a d e f e n d a n t or the s t a t e i s p r e j u d i c e d by a joinder of offenses or of defendants i n an indictment, information, or complaint o r by such j o i n d e r f o r trial t o g e t h e r , t h e c o u r t may o r d e r a n e l e c t i o n o r s e p a r a t e trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other r e l i e f j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s . " 2 7 CR-10-0516 " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : At t h a t t i m e , I w i l l have motion. Judge." (Supp. R. 18.) Immediately concerning exchange my before several the trial different began, motions, a h e a r i n g was and the held following o c c u r r e d at the b e g i n n i n g of t h a t h e a r i n g : " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : The c a s e 1 5 8 7 , Judge, we w o u l d a s k t h a t be s e v e r e d . T h e y w e r e n o t indicted t o g e t h e r . There are f o u r s e p a r a t e case numbers.[ ] Real b r i e f l y . Judge, the other cases deal with allegations of rape and child pornography. When t h o s e came u p , t h e r e was a s e a r c h w a r r a n t issued. When t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t , t h e y f o u n d a s m a l l a m o u n t o f m a r i j u a n a . We j u s t move t o s e v e r t h a t c o u n t f r o m t h e o t h e r s . We a r e a f r a i d t h a t w o u l d be u n d u l y p r e j u d i c i a l . 3 "[Prosecutor]: Judge, the State would be o p p o s e d . The m a r i j u a n a was f o u n d a t t h e same t i m e a s the obscene material that i s the b a s i s of the p o r n o g r a p h y c h a r g e was f o u n d . A n d , a l s o , i t i s a l l one c o n t i n u o u s t i e d c a s e . "The motion." (R. Court: Motion to sever denied. Next 6.) Clearly, sever the before trial, defense counsel moved unlawful-possession-of-marijuana offense only that to had In addition to second-degree sodomy, p o s s e s s i o n o f obscene m a t t e r , and f i r s t - d e g r e e p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i j u a n a , C o c h r a n was a l s o c h a r g e d w i t h r a p e i n t h e s e c o n d d e g r e e , b u t the j u r y found him not g u i l t y of t h a t charge. 3 8 CR-10-0516 p r e v i o u s l y been c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h the o t h e r motion was offenses based were prejudiced. properly Crim. the solely tried The In first m o t i o n was he concerning Rule Ala. court an Cochran b a s e d on argument P., issue t i m e l y r a i s e d and was for adverse r u l i n g obtained. issue to be court the State, for first 913 a new So. preserved opportunity 2d trial for 501, will that arose during they arose." App. 505 not R. the for trial court offenses under 200-02.) presented The the issue to the trial purpose of r e q u i r i n g is to allow the trial error." Mitchell ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2005). offenses Glass did until v. not he State, 14 challenge filed his 9 So. the objected v. "A motion review for appellate t h a t were not Ala. trial, review, t o c o r r e c t any preserve 13.3, to issues 2008). Cochran trial review unduly (C. appellate an the the of proper. and i f be f o r a new before specifically that alleged failure Rule motion and that, would an under consolidation Crim. an allegation offenses an the R. preserve m u s t be the made whether "To not Cochran's p o s t t r i a l time, 13.3, his together, consolidate P. on offenses, 3d 188, to at the 194 (Ala. consolidation motion for a new time Crim. of the trial. CR-10-0516 Therefore, objection failed Ala. b e c a u s e C o c h r a n d i d n o t make a t i m e l y a n d t o c o n s o l i d a t i o n , h i s argument t h a t t h e t r i a l to properly R. Crim. properly has In consolidate the offenses P., before Regarding sever i s not preserved this n o t shown Tariq-Madyun this severance v. and 13.3, i s not Court. the t r i a l that court under Rule f o r appeal court's d e n i a l of Cochran's motion to the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana 2010), specific the t r i a l State, Court of offenses court 59 addressed So. the exceeded 3d 744 law offense, Cochran i t s discretion. ( A l a . Crim. applicable to for trial: " R u l e 1 3 . 4 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., p r o v i d e s t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t may o r d e r s e p a r a t e t r i a l s of offenses joined i n an indictment i f i t appears that a d e f e n d a n t w o u l d be p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e j o i n d e r o f offenses. We r e v i e w a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o s e v e r f o r an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . " ' T h i s Court noted i n Summerlin v. S t a t e , 594 S o . 2 d 2 3 5 , 236 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) , that "the g r a n t i n g of a severance r e s t s w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court and i t s r e f u s a l t o s e v e r c o u n t s ... w i l l o n l y be r e v e r s e d for a clear abuse o f discretion." " ' " T h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f i s on t h e defendant to demonstrate s p e c i f i c and compelling prejudice which the trial court cannot protect a g a i n s t and w h i c h causes him t o 10 App. the CR-10-0516 r e c e i v e an u n f a i r t r i a l . United S t a t e s v . B u t e r a , 677 F . 2 d 1 3 7 6 , 1385 (11th C i r . 1982), cert. d e n i e d , 4 5 9 U.S. 1 1 0 8 , 103 S. C t . 7 3 5 , 74 L . E d . 2 d 958 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . It is only the most compelling prejudice, against which the t r i a l c o u r t w i l l n o t be a b l e t o afford protection, that w i l l be sufficient to show the court abused i t s discretion i n not granting a severance. United S t a t e s v . P e r e z , 489 F . 2 d 5 1 , 65 (5th C i r . 1973), c e r t . denied, 417 U.S. 9 4 5 , 94 S. C t . 3 0 6 7 , 41 L . E d . 2 d 664 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Moreover, a defendant seeking to overturn a denial of severance must demonstrate specific prejudice which r e s u l t e d from the d e n i a l . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W a l k e r , 45 6 F . 2 d 1037, 1 0 3 9 ( 5 t h C i r . 1972 ) . A m e r e s h o w i n g o f some p r e j u d i c e i s insufficient. U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Wilson, 657 F . 2 d 7 5 5 , 765 ( 5 t h Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 9 5 1 , 102 S. C t . 1 4 5 6 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1982); United S t a t e s v . S t a l l e r , 616 F . 2 d 1 2 8 4 , 1294 (5th C i r . ) , cert. denied, 4 4 9 U.S. 8 6 9 , 101 S. C t . 2 0 7 , 66 L . E d . 2 d 89 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . " " ' H i n t o n v . S t a t e , 548 S o . 2 d 5 4 7 , 555 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d , 548 S o . 2 d 562 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 493 U.S. 9 6 9 , 110 S. C t . 4 1 9 , 107 L . E d . 2 d 383 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . ' " M i n n i s v . S t a t e , 690 S o . 2 d 5 2 1 , 5 2 4 - 2 5 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) . M o r e o v e r , t h i s C o u r t h a s s t a t e d , 'No p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s w h e r e , as h e r e , t h e j u r y could easily separate the evidence of the separate 11 CR-10-0516 crimes.' Summerlin v. S t a t e , (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 594 S o . 2 d 2 3 5 , 2 3 6 - 3 7 "[The d e f e n d a n t ] has f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e o r even a l l e g e any s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c e t h a t resulted from the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o sever the counts of the indictment. As n o t e d above, A l a b a m a l a w p l a c e s u p o n an a p p e l l a n t t h e b u r d e n t o p r o v e t h a t he s u f f e r e d s p e c i f i c and c o m p e l l i n g p r e j u d i c e i n o r d e r to s e c u r e a r e v e r s a l b a s e d on t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling on t h e m o t i o n to sever. E.g., Ex p a r t e H i n t o n , 548 S o . 2 d 5 6 2 , 566 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ( u n d e r f o r m e r R u l e 1 5 . 3 , A l a . R. C r i m . P. T e m p . ) . In Hinton v. S t a t e , 548 S o . 2 d 547 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d by Ex p a r t e H i n t o n , s u p r a , t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h e m o s t common f o r m s o f p r e j u d i c e t h a t m i g h t result from improper j o i n d e r : "'"With r e s p e c t t o p r e j u d i c e of the defendant, i t i s [ g e n e r a l l y ] l i k e l y t o f a l l i n t o one o f t h r e e categories: ' ( 1 ) he may b e c o m e embarrassed or confounded in p r e s e n t i n g s e p a r a t e d e f e n s e s ; (2) the j u r y may u s e t h e e v i d e n c e o f one of the crimes charged to i n f e r a c r i m i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n on the part of the defendant from which i s found h i s g u i l t of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) t h e j u r y may c u m u l a t e t h e evidence of the various crimes c h a r g e d a n d f i n d g u i l t when, i f considered separately i t would not so f i n d . ' " "'2 LaFave and Israel, ... Criminal Procedure a t § 17.1(c) [(1984)].' "548 S o . 2 d a t 5 5 5 . [ T h e d e f e n d a n t ] h a s made o n l y a bare c l a i m that t h e S t a t e combined a l l s i x counts for trial i n order to overload the jury with 12 CR-10-0516 p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e and to convince the j u r y to c o n v i c t h i m b a s e d on t h e n u m b e r o f c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him. He c i t e s n o t h i n g f r o m t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e to support t h i s vague c l a i m . Nothing from the record demonstrates that the jury was either o v e r l o a d e d w i t h p r e j u d i c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n or t h a t i t s verdicts were b a s e d on anything other than the evidence presented as to each count. [The defendant]'s g e n e r i c a l l e g a t i o n does not e s t a b l i s h t h e ' s p e c i f i c and c o m p e l l i n g p r e j u d i c e ' n e c e s s a r y t o w a r r a n t the r e v e r s a l of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n here. "'His bare a l l e g a t i o n t h a t , i f the j u r y w e r e t o b e l i e v e t h a t he was i n v o l v e d i n one bank robbery, then i t might also ( i m p r o p e r l y ) be l e d t o b e l i e v e f r o m t h a t f a c t alone t h a t he was involved in the o t h e r , i s s i m p l y not enough. This type of s p i l l o v e r i s standard f a r e whenever counts i n v o l v i n g d i s c r e t e i n c i d e n t s are l i n k e d i n a single indictment. We h a v e repeatedly held that such a garden variety side e f f e c t , w i t h o u t more, i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to require severance. See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir.) ( c o l l e c t i n g c a s e s ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 498 U.S. 849, 111 S. Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1990). Moreover, the case f o r p r e j u d i c e i s e s p e c i a l l y weak i n t h i s i n s t a n c e b e c a u s e the district court's jury instructions d e l i n e a t e d the separateness of the three c o u n t s a n d made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e j u r y h a d t o c o n s i d e r e a c h c h a r g e on i t s own m e r i t s . ' " U n i t e d S t a t e s v. 19 9 5 ) . " Tariq-Madyun, 59 So. Taylor, 3d at 54 F.3d 749-50. 13 967, 974 (1st C i r . CR-10-0516 In the present proof. not In Cochran's demonstrate made a b a r e would be brief case, Cochran allegation any s p e c i f i c that court, prejudice. the denial prejudicial." before this h i s burden argument b e f o r e t h e t r i a l or allege "unduly h a s n o t met He of h i s motion Furthermore, in C o u r t , he d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e or a l l e g e of does mention this the word Court in prosecutor's sever. "prejudice" his initial response to m e r i t , but Cochran from the record Therefore, that that fact, Cochran i n t h e argument brief. the he Next, 1975, case i n denying Cochran motion to thus, that dismiss without of demonstrating has met his burden and compelling Cochran's alleges was the prejudice. not suffered i s unconstitutional and, sever that specific specific p r e j u d i c e , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l discretion even suffered Cochran he denial not alleges to motion any he p r e s e n t s t o He does not c a r r y h i s burden because establishing In merely Cochran's court's to he d i d to sever s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c e that r e s u l t e d from the t r i a l h i s motion of that as court d i d not exceed i t s motion § to sever. 13A-12-192(b), applied the t r i a l court A l a . Code to him i n the present erred i n denying h i s the possession-of-obscene-matter 14 of charge, CR-10-0516 w h i c h was engaged based in a on the sexual photograph act. that depicted Specifically, him C.K. argues Cochran and that the photograph d e p i c t e d n o n c r i m i n a l consensual sexual because photograph taken C.K. and was 16 16 years years is consent under Alabama of the the photograph Fourteenth o l d at the law; 4 age to the C o c h r a n b a s e s h i s a r g u m e n t on (2003), 4 time when thus, is protected Amendment the he by a the person contends the Due United is conduct capable that was of possession Process Clause of States C o n s t i t u t i o n . U.S. 558 which h e l d t h a t a Texas s t a t u t e making i t a crime for Section L a w r e n c e v. 13A-6-70, A l a . Code 1975, Texas, provides, 539 in relevant part: "(a) Whether or not s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d , i t i s an e l e m e n t o f e v e r y o f f e n s e d e f i n e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of s u b d i v i s i o n (a)(3) of S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 6 - 6 5 , t h a t t h e s e x u a l a c t was c o m m i t t e d w i t h o u t consent of the v i c t i m . " " ( c ) A p e r s o n i s deemed i n c a p a b l e he i s : than 16 "(1) Less "(2) Mentally d e f e c t i v e ; or "(3) Mentally i n c a p a c i t a t e d ; or "(4) Physically helpless." 15 years of consent i f o l d ; or CR-10-0516 two persons sexual of the conduct protected by same sex violated the Due to the engage in persons' Process Clause certain intimate liberty of the interests Fourteenth Amendment. Section 13A-12-192(b), A l a . Code 1975, provides: "Any p e r s o n who k n o w i n g l y p o s s e s s e s a n y o b s c e n e matter that contains a v i s u a l depiction of a person u n d e r t h e age o f 17 y e a r s e n g a g e d i n a n y a c t o f s a d o - m a s o c h i s t i c abuse, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , s e x u a l excitement, m a s t u r b a t i o n , g e n i t a l n u d i t y , or other s e x u a l c o n d u c t s h a l l be g u i l t y o f a C l a s s C f e l o n y . " The U n i t e d S t a t e s Court o f Appeals f o r the E i g h t h C i r c u i t has addressed and has Bach, found 400 Appeals F.3d an argument v e r y s i m i l a r i t to 622 be without merit. (8th C i r . 2005), f o r the E i g h t h C i r c u i t to Cochran's In argument United States v. the U n i t e d S t a t e s Court of held: " D i g i t a l photos which [ t h e defendant] took at h i s a p a r t m e n t o f s i x t e e n y e a r o l d RH a r e c o n n e c t e d t o c o u n t s 1, 4, a n d 7. T h e s e c o u n t s c h a r g e d [ t h e defendant] with p o s s e s s i n g v i s u a l d e p i c t i o n s which had been produced by u s i n g a minor engaged i n s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t c o n d u c t i n v i o l a t i o n o f 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (count 1), t r a n s m i t t i n g such a v i s u a l d e p i c t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n o f 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) ( c o u n t 4 ) , and u s i n g a m i n o r to produce visual d e p i c t i o n s of the minor engaged i n s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t c o n d u c t i n v i o l a t i o n o f § 2 2 5 1 ( a ) ( c o u n t 7 ) . Some o f these v i s u a l d e p i c t i o n s show RH m a s t u r b a t i n g a n d [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] p e r f o r m i n g o r a l s e x on h i m . 16 CR-10-0516 "[The defendant] argues that these photos portray noncriminal consensual sexual conduct b e c a u s e RH was s i x t e e n a n d t h e a g e o f c o n s e n t u n d e r M i n n e s o t a and f e d e r a l law i s s i x t e e n . Minn. S t a t . § 6 0 9 . 3 4 2 e t s e q . ; 18 U.S.C. § 2 2 4 3 . He c o n t e n d s t h a t the images a r e p r o t e c t e d b y t h e l i b e r t y and p r i v a c y c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e F i f t h Amendment u n d e r L a w r e n c e v . T e x a s , 539 U.S. 5 5 8 , 123 S. C t . 2472, 156 L. E d . 2d 508 (2003). The government responds t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t d e f i n i t i o n of a m i n o r f o r t h e s e o f f e n s e s i s f o u n d i n 18 U.S.C. § 2256, w h i c h d e f i n e s a m i n o r as a n y p e r s o n u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n y e a r s . I t a s s e r t s t h a t C o n g r e s s h a d a rational basis for criminalizing pornography i n v o l v i n g t h i s age g r o u p and t h a t [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s ] a c t i v i t i e s were n o t p r o t e c t e d under t h e F i r s t o r F i f t h Amendments, p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t Lawrence d i d n o t i n v o l v e a minor or t h e p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of c h i l d pornography. "[The defendant's] constitutional arguments relating to h i s prosecution f o r possession of p i c t u r e s of minors engaging i n sexually explicit c o n d u c t a r e f o u n d e d on L a w r e n c e . In t h a t case the Supreme Court recognized a protected liberty interest, under t h e due p r o c e s s clause of the F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, f o r p r i v a t e and c o n s e n s u a l s e x u a l c o n d u c t b e t w e e n same s e x a d u l t s . A s t h e C o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y p o i n t e d o u t , Lawrence d i d not i n v o l v e m i n o r s o r o t h e r s 'who m i g h t b e i n j u r e d o r c o e r c e d , ' 539 U.S. a t 5 7 8 , 123 S. C t . 2 4 7 2 , a n d t h e c o n d u c t protected there was very different from that i n v o l v e d i n [ t h e defendant's] p r o s e c u t i o n . Here, a f o r t y one y e a r o l d d e f e n d a n t took pictures of a s i x t e e n year o l d boy m a s t u r b a t i n g and engaging i n o r a l s e x , k e p t t h e p i c t u r e s , and then t r a n s m i t t e d one o f t h e m o v e r t h e i n t e r n e t . RH t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had at first refused many requests by [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] t o p o s e nude a n d f i n a l l y p o s e d w i t h o u t p a n t s a f t e r [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] o f f e r e d h i m money t o do it. 17 CR-10-0516 "The l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t t h e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d i n Lawrence was f o r adults engaging i n consensual sexual r e l a t i o n s i n p r i v a t e , but i n t h i s case [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] engaged i n sex w i t h a minor and p r e s s u r e d h i m t o p o s e n u d e f o r p h o t o g r a p h s , o n e o f w h i c h was sent over the i n t e r n e t . We find no s u p p o r t i n Lawrence to prevent [the defendant's] prosecution u n d e r §§ 2 2 5 1 a n d 2 2 5 2 . [The d e f e n d a n t ' s ] p r i v a c y argument a l s o f a i l s , f o r h i s a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d t o child pornography are not protected by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t o f p r i v a c y . See U n i t e d S t a t e s v . V i n c e n t , 167 F . 3 d 4 2 8 , 431 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) . A s we pointed out i n Vincent, '[t]he C o n s t i t u t i o n o f f e r s less protection when s e x u a l l y explicit material depicts minors rather than adults.' I d . [The d e f e n d a n t ] h a s n o t shown t h a t t h e c o n d u c t c h a r g e d i n c o u n t s 1, 4, a n d 7 was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d . "The First Amendment does not prevent prosecution for child pornography, New York v. F e r b e r , 458 U.S. 7 4 7 , 102 S. C t . 3 3 4 8 , 73 L. E d . 2 d 1113 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , a n d C o n g r e s s may r e g u l a t e p o r n o g r a p h y i n v o l v i n g a l l m i n o r s u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n i f i t has a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d o i n g s o . See U n i t e d S t a t e s v . F r e e m a n , 8 08 F . 2 d 12 90 , 12 93 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) . Congress changed the d e f i n i t i o n of minor i n the c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y l a w s i n 1984 t o a p p l y t o a n y o n e under e i g h t e e n . I t found t h a t the p r e v i o u s c e i l i n g of sixteen had hampered enforcement of child pornography laws. With that ceiling there was sometimes c o n f u s i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r a s u b j e c t was a minor since children enter puberty at d i f f e r i n g a g e s . H.R. R e p . No. 9 8 - 5 3 6 , a t 7-8 (1 9 8 3 ) , r e p r i n t e d i n 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4 9 2 , 4 9 8 - 9 9 ; F r e e m a n , 808 F . 2 d a t 1 2 9 3 . We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l c h o i c e t o r e g u l a t e c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y by d e f i n i n g m i n o r as an i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r e i g h t e e n i s r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to the government's l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n e n f o r c i n g child pornography laws, i d . , and that [the defendant's] convictions for possessing, t r a n s m i t t i n g , and m a n u f a c t u r i n g any v i s u a l d e p i c t i o n 18 CR-10-0516 produced using conduct should Bach, 400 As F.3d at a minor engaged i n s e x u a l l y be a f f i r m e d . " 628-29. Cochran constitutional acknowledges challenges to in 635 ( A l a . C r i m . App. First, Fourth, and Constitution pornography Fourteenth in one's 13A-12-192(b), A l a . is First v. and Georgia, of This held Court protected m a t e r i a l s may by be possession-of-child- defendant State, home 1975, a and, u n d e r w h i c h he defendant's U.S. 557 (1969), material the Stanley a and criminalized. that of the the States of thus, was child that relied which held that 394 child U.S. "the private at 568. this is of such Court held: "The State's interest in protecting i t s children from c r u e l p h y s i c a l , emotional, and p h y s i o l o g i c a l abuse occasioned by forcing a child t o be the subject of child pornography far outweighs the appellant's interest in possessing such m a t e r i a l s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , we f i n d t h a t the a p p e l l a n t ' s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment r i g h t s w e r e not 19 on pornography possession Specifically, § convicted, argument crime." possession So. United possession crime 526 that argued Amendments t o t h e the previous Amendments p r o h i b i t m a k i n g mere obscene that the The 394 Fourteenth possession not Code brief, In F e l t o n v. making own unconstitutional. Stanley 1986), prohibit his Alabama's p o r n o g r a p h y s t a t u t e have f a i l e d . 2d explicit CR-10-0516 violated, as c o n t e n d e d , and 1 9 2 ( b ) , Code o f A l a b a m a 1975, Felton, As 526 So. noted 2d in at t h a t S e c t i o n 13A-12is constitutional." 637. Bach, Lawrence explicitly applied f u l l y c o n s e n t i n g a d u l t s who engaged i n p r i v a t e s e x u a l Lawrence "minors" only d i d not apply to injured or coerced o r who are consent might easily be 578. § In the not present 2 6 - 1 - 1 , A l a . Code case, 1975 for Alabama, a a 16-year-old We C.K. was to between a 539 presents refused. Appeals We and possession the conclude, where as did consent the might Eighth years the of a v i s u a l engaged State's enforcing that legislative depiction i n sexual legitimate child-pornography of a person conduct interest in laws. 20 choice was to i t is not years easily be Court of to the present proscribe under the is rationally the age of related to protecting children Therefore, in female 13 Circuit i n Bach, t h a t Lawrence i s i n a p p l i c a b l e situation 17 situation See conduct 16-year-old old at of m a j o r i t y sexual a 4 0 - y e a r - o l d m a l e t h a t b e g a n when t h e f e m a l e a U.S. although and be where a minor. age that, consent relationship might in relationships f u r t h e r note to conduct. who r e f u s e d . " Lawrence, 16-year-old sexual situated "persons ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t the i n A l a b a m a i s 19 y e a r s ) . possible or to and Cochran's CR-10-0516 constitutional hold that motion the c h a l l e n g e to trial Cochran denying his result of warrant motion the residence. d i d not to was deficient that err of the fails; Cochran because, he trial search alleges says, Cochran's s u p p o r t e d by warrant i t was residence Cochran relating at the time to cause, a a his search supported particularity that the Cochran search argues s u p p o r t i n g the search crime the warrant was would be issued. to found warrant that the warrant believe in his Specifically, alleges: "In t h i s c a s e t h e w a r r a n t and a f f i d a v i t a l l e g e t h a t b e t w e e n A p r i l 2004 a n d J u l y o f 2 0 0 6 , Cochran e n g a g e d i n an u n l a w f u l s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a m i n o r , b u t t h e w a r r a n t was n o t i s s u e d u n t i l J u n e 10, 2008. Therefore, the crime a l l e g e d l y committed by C o c h r a n w o u l d h a v e t a k e n p l a c e two y e a r s e a r l i e r . These f a c t s were too remote to e s t a b l i s h p r o b a b l e 21 in as at the not were too remote i n time to e s t a b l i s h p r o b a b l e cause evidence erred searched. allegation probable charge. obtained that we Cochran's court and i t f a i l e d t o d e s c r i b e w i t h f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n the a f f i d a v i t that thus, i n denying evidence the o f t h e p l a c e t o be Concerning the suppress Specifically, location not alleges execution by p r o b a b l e cause was 13A-12-192(b) to d i s m i s s the possession-of-obscene-matter Next, the court § CR-10-0516 cause would Cochran's In to believe evidence r e l a t i n g t o the crime b e f o u n d a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e on t h e p r e m i s e s . " brief, a t 28. the a f f i d a v i t Detective Rafferty that testified supported the search warrant, that "he ha[d] probable cause to believe and [ d i d ] b e l i e v e t h a t a w h i t e m a l e b y t h e name o f J e f f r e y O l e n C o c h r a n , d a t e o f b i r t h 0 1 / 2 9 / 6 6 42 y e a r s o l d , w h o s e name i s o t h e r w i s e u n k n o w n d i d i n A p r i l , 2 0 0 4 and thereafter until July 05, 2006 h a v e sexual intercourse and performed oral sex w i t h [C.K.,] w h o s e b i r t h d a y i s J u l y 0 5 , 1 9 9 0 a n d was o v e r t h e a g e o f 12 y e a r s o l d b u t u n d e r t h e a g e o f 16 y e a r s o l d d u r i n g t h e time frame Cochran performed t h e a c t s a t his residence located a t 101 D a r l i n g t o n C i r c l e , Dothan, Houston County, Alabama. [C.K.] started communications w i t h C o c h r a n a t t h e a g e o f 12 y e a r s o l d over t h e i n t e r n e t and p r o g r e s s e d t o t e l e p h o n e conversations to meeting i n person. [C.K.] s t a t e s Cochran h a s t a k e n nude p h o t o s and v i d e o s o f h e r d u r i n g t h e time frame. Cochran ... w r o t e [C.K.] a l e t t e r i n December o f 2006 t h a t i n d i c a t e d t h e y h a v e been t o g e t h e r f o r t h r e e and h a l f years. Cochran t a l k s about t h e s e x u a l a c t s t h a t took p l a c e between him and h e r . Cochran talks about how h e b e c o m e s f u r i o u s when s h e t a l k s t o o t h e r b o y s h e r a g e a n d s h e i s h i s a n d o n l y h i s . [C.K.] h a s t o l d C o c h r a n that she d o e s n o t want t o s e e h i m anymore a n d he f o l l o w s h e r h e r e i n H o u s t o n C o u n t y a n d w i l l n o t s t a y away. Cochran has p a n t i e s and a w h i t e negligee that b e l o n g [ ] t o [C.K.] i n h i s room. [C.K.] a n d C o c h r a n h a d b e e n d a t i n g u n t i l t h e e n d o f May, 2 0 0 8 . C o c h r a n has t a k e n nude p h o t o s o f [C.K.] b e t w e e n J u l y 05, 2 0 0 6 a n d May 2 0 0 8 . [ C . K . ] i s u n d e r t h e a g e o f 18 years o l d . " (C. 99.) The a f f i d a v i t was d a t e d 22 June 10, 2008. CR-10-0516 Concerning a finding of probable cause to support issuance of a search warrant, t h i s Court stated i n McIntosh State, 64 S o . 3 d 1142 ( A l a .Crim. App. 2010): "The F o u r t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s , and i t p r o v i d e s t h a t s e a r c h w a r r a n t s s h a l l be i s s u e d o n l y upon a f i n d i n g o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e . I n Ex p a r t e Green, 15 S o . 3 d 48 9 (Ala.2008 ), t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t e x p l a i n e d : " ' T h u s , " [ a ] s e a r c h w a r r a n t may o n l y be i s s u e d upon a s h o w i n g o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e that evidence or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of a c r i m e o r c o n t r a b a n d w i l l be f o u n d i n t h e p l a c e t o be s e a r c h e d . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Gettel, 474 F.3d 1 0 8 1 , 1086 (8th C i r . 2007). Moreover, "'[s]ufficient evidence must be s t a t e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of p r o b a b l e cause f o r i s s u i n g the s e a r c h w a r r a n t , ' and ' [ t ] h e a f f i d a v i t must state s p e c i f i c f a c t s or circumstances which support a finding of probable cause[;] o t h e r w i s e t h e a f f i d a v i t i s f a u l t y and t h e w a r r a n t may n o t i s s u e . ' " E x p a r t e P a r k e r , 858 S o . 2 d 9 4 1 , 945 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g A l f o r d v . S t a t e , 381 S o . 2 d 2 0 3 , 205 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 9 ) ) . "'"A p r o b a b l e c a u s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s made a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " G e t t e l , 474 F . 3 d a t 1 0 8 6 . To p a s s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m u s t e r , " t h e f a c t s must be s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a c o n c l u s i o n that the p r o p e r t y which i s the o b j e c t of t h e s e a r c h i s p r o b a b l y on t h e p r e m i s e s t o be s e a r c h e d a t t h e t i m e t h e w a r r a n t i s i s s u e d . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . G r e a n y , 929 F . 2 d 523, 524-25 ( 9 t h C i r . 1991) (emphasis added). Thus, "[t]he police will ... 23 the v. CR-10-0516 encounter problems of ' s t a l e n e s s ' of t h e i r information i f they delay too long in s e e k i n g a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W a t s o n , 423 U.S. 4 1 1 , 450 n.14 (1976).' "15 64 So. So. 3d at 3d at 1145. Furthermore, 2001), 492." the Alabama i n Vinson v. Supreme C o u r t State, 843 So. 2d 229 (Ala. stated: " ' " P r o b a b l e c a u s e m u s t be determined b y an a n a l y s i s o f 'the t o t a l i t y of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' I l l i n o i s v . G a t e s , 462 U.S. 2 1 3 , 2 3 8 , 103 S. C t . 2 3 1 7 , 2 3 3 2 , 76 L. E d . 2d 527 (1983). In d e t e r m i n i n g whether to issue a search warrant, the issuing magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r , g i v e n a l l the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and b a s i s of knowledge of the person s u p p l y i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n , there i s a fair probability that contraband or e v i d e n c e o f a c r i m e w i l l be f o u n d i n a particular place."' " L o g g i n s v . S t a t e , 771 So. 2 d 1 0 7 0 , 1080 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999), aff'd, 771 So. 2d 1093 ( A l a . 2000 ) ( q u o t i n g M a r k s v . S t a t e , 575 So. 2d 611, 614-15 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1990)). "Whether the circumstances recited in an a f f i d a v i t o f f e r e d i n s u p p o r t o f an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a s e a r c h warrant are such t h a t the p r o b a b l e cause t h a t m i g h t once have been d e m o n s t r a t e d by them has g r o w n ' s t a l e ' i s a m a t t e r t h a t 'must be determined by t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h c a s e . ' Sgro v. U n i t e d 24 CR-10-0516 States, (1932). 287 U.S. 206, 53 S. C t . 1 3 8 , 77 L. E d . 260 "'Where t h e a f f i d a v i t r e c i t e s a m e r e isolated violation i t would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause dwindles r a t h e r q u i c k l y w i t h the passage of t i m e . However, where t h e a f f i d a v i t p r o p e r l y recites facts indicating activity of a p r o t r a c t e d and c o n t i n u o u s n a t u r e , a c o u r s e of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.' " U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Cir. 1972). Johnson, 461 F.2d 2 8 5 , 287 ( 1 0 t h "' [ T ] h e " b a s i c c r i t e r i o n a s t o t h e d u r a t i o n o f p r o b a b l e cause [or s t a l e n e s s ] i s the i n h e r e n t n a t u r e o f t h e c r i m e . " ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a g l u t a , 198 F . 3 d 1265, 1271 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1999) ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B a s c a r o , 742 F . 2 d 1 3 3 5 , 1345 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) ) . I n M o o r e v . S t a t e , 416 S o . 2 d 770 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1982), Alabama r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of ' s t a l e n e s s ' m u s t t u r n on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h case. In Moore, the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals concluded that t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n an affidavit s u p p o r t i n g a s e a r c h w a r r a n t was n o t s o s t a l e a s t o n e g a t e a f i n d i n g o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e , e v e n t h o u g h some of the i n f o r m a t i o n i n the a f f i d a v i t c o n c e r n i n g the a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n items sought by t h e w a r r a n t was a p p r o x i m a t e l y two m o n t h s o l d a t t h e t i m e t h e w a r r a n t was executed. The court in Moore considered staleness in terms of whether the affidavit i n f o r m a t i o n was ' f r e s h ' o r ' r e m o t e , ' a n d s t a t e d : "'What i s "fresh" and how is i t distinguished from "remote?" We do n o t p e r c e i v e o f any m a g i c a l f o r m u l a by w h i c h a p r e c i s e c o m p u t a t i o n o f t h e t i m e p e r i o d may be made. Rather, the underlying c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- i n c l u d i n g s u c h m a t t e r s a s the b a s i s of the informant's knowledge, the 25 CR-10-0516 ease or d i f f i c u l t y i n moving the items s i n c e t h e y were l a s t o b s e r v e d , the use or p r o b a b l e use t o w h i c h the i t e m s are p u t , and the mobile nature or degree of permanence of the p l a c e of concealment -¬ m u s t be e x a m i n e d b y a n e u t r a l a n d d e t a c h e d m a g i s t r a t e t o r e a c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o the p r o b a b i l i t y of whether the p r o o f speaks as o f t h e t i m e o f t h e i s s u a n c e o f the search warrant.' "416 So. 2d a t 7 7 2 . See a l s o N e l m s v . 2 d 384 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1990)." 843 So. 2d supporting Supreme at the Court circumstances,' 232-33. search we are reasonably facts, presented make t h e 'practical, holding warrant stated: inferences were In persuaded and to that issuing the was the logically the that i n Vinson "Considering State, not 568 So. information stale, of the sufficient facts, and derivable from judge common-sense d e c i s i o n ' 'totality to those enable that him to t h e r e was 'a f a i r p r o b a b i l i t y that contraband or evidence of a crime' still 843 be p r e s e n t a t So. In 1981), 2d at Mauldin this [the defendant's] our residence would Vinson, 235. v. Court State, stated 402 So. concerning 2d 1106 (Ala. Crim. staleness: "'"'The ultimate criterion in d e t e r m i n i n g the degree of e v a p o r a t i o n of p r o b a b l e cause, however, i s not case law but reason. The likelihood that the 26 App. CR-10-0516 evidence sought i s s t i l l i n place i s a f u n c t i o n n o t s i m p l y o f watch and c a l e n d a r b u t o f v a r i a b l e s t h a t do n o t p u n c h a c l o c k : the character of the crime (chance encounter i n the night or regenerating c o n s p i r a c y ? ) , o f t h e c r i m i n a l (nomadic o r entrenched?), o f t h e t h i n g t o be s e i z e d ( p e r i s h a b l e and e a s i l y t r a n s f e r a b l e o r o f enduring u t i l i t y to i t sholder?), of the p l a c e t o b e s e a r c h e d (mere c r i m i n a l f o r u m of convenience or secure operational base?), etc. The observation of a half-smoked marijuana cigarette i n an a s h t r a y a t a c o c k t a i l p a r t y may w e l l b e s t a l e t h e day a f t e r t h e c l e a n i n g l a d y has been i n ; t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e b u r i a l o f a c o r p s e i n a c e l l a r may w e l l n o t b e s t a l e three decades later. The h a r e and t h e t o r t o i s e do n o t d i s a p p e a r a t t h e same r a t e o f s p e e d . ' 24 Md. A p p . a t 1 7 2 , 331 A . 2 d a t 106."' " A n d r e s e n v . S t a t e , 24 Md. A p p . 1 2 8 , 331 A . 2 d 78 (1975), a f f i r m e d , A n d r e s e n v . M a r y l a n d , 427 U.S. 4 6 3 , 96 S. C t . 2 7 3 7 , 49 L. E d . 2 d 627 (1976)." 402 So. 2d a t 1108-09. To support h i s staleness above-quoted Green, 15 S o . 3 d 489 manufacture, substances. issue paragraphs d i d not reveal activities from (Ala. distribution, In Green, took place c l a i m , C o c h r a n q u o t e s one o f t h e Vinson 2008). or the Court when a n d he Both cases possession noted cites that of 27 held that parte involved the controlled the a f f i d a v i t any o f t h e r e l e v a n t and, thus, Ex at drug-related the a f f i d a v i t was CR-10-0516 d e f i c i e n t because i t f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the evidence was probably the warrant on the was premises discussed State, 589 So. 2d 384 So. 353 So. be searched i s s u e d . E x p a r t e G r e e n , 15 Green 568 to 2d sufficiency this 2d Court's 758 (Ala. Crim. ( A l a . Crim. 54 (Ala. of an prior affidavit the 3d 489 in and 1977), supporting a a l s o i n v o l v e d p o s s e s s i o n of c o n t r o l l e d not offenses In among the present other or the possession case, the things, that C.K. nude p h o t o g r a p h s and v i d e o s 05, 2006, also when C.K. contained C o c h r a n t o C.K. been in a Based on Cochran's pornography stated that under 16 years concerning relationship affidavit, a for evidence for three the warrant evidence of sexual 28 of substances, pornography. Cochran old. was The had taken July affidavit written that they one-half issued possession crimes. stated, 2004 a n d letter and the warrant. specifically i n December 2006 t h a t i n d i c a t e d residence and affidavit child of her between A p r i l testimony sexual that was of State, regarding search v. State, Thomas v . Those cases sexual Lewis 1 9 9 1 ) , Nelms v. 1990), App. time (Ala. 2008). decisions App. App. Crim. So. at to of by had years. search child CR-10-0516 Considering the t o t a l i t y staleness many claim other i s without merit. typically sought items obscene photograph likely had after relationship. the passage i n this enduring immediately of the circumstances, time an i t e m of time. in a to he and Furthermore, was continuing single, We render criminal was i n the a f f i d a v i t i n nature isolated that the search not l i k e l y an search the passage warrant were in a with judge could A d d i t i o n a l l y , the criminal activity period, that not a i n this case does n o t where the suspected deficient, was c o n t i n u i n g i n n a t u r e to dissipate. warrant. not merely and to dissipate extended of time and where t h e i t e m Only days passed Further, p l a c e where t h e a l l e g e d ongoing was that an i t e m i s u s u a l l y k e p t of Cochran's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e v i c t i m the item event. find activity concerned the during the issuing residence. over drugs and warrant, the victim i s not l i k e l y the p r i v a c y of the holder's allegations search i t s holder make a c o m m o n - s e n s e d e c i s i o n t h a t s u c h in illegal i s a nonperishable utility the Such case Unlike Cochran's and t h e i s s u a n c e o f Cochran's criminal between t h e end residence conduct o c c u r r e d and a random l o c a t i o n where a s i n g l e c r i m e 29 was t h e happened CR-10-0516 to take place. residence was It appears during the entire not nomadic, a l lthese staleness, that we the t r i a l suppress holding conclude court of Cochran t o be weigh that lived of events; forum against h i s claim the search was a secure of convenience. i s without claim merit h i s motion was d i s c o v e r e d a s a r e s u l t warrant. on t h e s t a l e n e s s i s s u e i n this We also case that Cochran Cochran's d i d not e r r i n denying that in thus, searched than a c r i m i n a l factors the evidence execution course and t h e p l a c e o p e r a t i o n a l base r a t h e r Because that note was we a d d r e s s invalid because, particularity search warrant the person Cochran's he the location says, claim i t failed that i s limited the search residence of Jeffrey Olen our case. warrant to describe t o conduct to to the o f t h e p l a c e t o be s e a r c h e d . authorized the o f f i c e r s of and/or that and of the v e r y r a r e f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d by t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Next, of with 5 The a s e a r c h "on Cochran and/or T h e F o u r t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n commands t h a t "no w a r r a n t s s h a l l i s s u e , b u t u p o n p r o b a b l e cause, s u p p o r t e d by oath o r a f f i r m a t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b i n g t h e p l a c e t o be s e a r c h e d , a n d t h e p e r s o n s o r t h i n g s t o be s e i z e d . " S i m i l a r l y , § 15-5-3, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ a ] s e a r c h w a r r a n t c a n o n l y be i s s u e d on p r o b a b l e c a u s e , s u p p o r t e d b y an a f f i d a v i t naming o r d e s c r i b i n g t h e p e r s o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b i n g t h e p r o p e r t y a n d t h e p l a c e t o be searched." 5 30 CR-10-0516 vehicles, the travel trailers, and out above d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s Cochran's warrant. residence was specifically r e s i d e n c e was "101 Alabama." On affidavit cannot appeal, be stated because the warrant by not express reference and there cert. denied, incorporated warrant into the or the present was facially Cochran's address into U.S. (concluding that of p a r t i c u l a r i t y In 464 warrant Cochran's motion 814, 1343, 104 is 1350 69, affidavit can be even as attach to suppress the evidence See used to is 2d cure either warrant). assuming a in into 78 L. E d . i f the a f f i d a v i t result that of affidavit the evidence 31 the (11th C i r . the the to search omission and t h e f a i l u r e t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e or that no n.6 Ct. a t t a c h e d to the invalid County, incorporated S. i n a warrant case, Cochran's a t t a c h e d to the warrant. F.2d an of of p a r t i c u l a r i t y was 1982), supporting argues affidavit S t a t e s v . W u a g n e u x , 683 lack lack of search Dothan, Houston the United the the a f f i d a v i t the upon address from specifically to cure i n and The t h a t the address t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t was (1983) and 100.) absent earlier, Cochran used warrant 83 (C. Darlington Circle, the indicating " completely H o w e v e r , as n o t e d the warrant buildings the of affidavit warrant, o b t a i n e d as a result CR-10-0516 of the the execution officers warrant of the warrant acted requirement within was p r o p e r l y d e n i e d the good-faith set forth i n United v. E l l i s , States Court 971 F . 2 d 701 of Appeals to the S t a t e s v. Leon, U.S. 8 97 , 104 S. C t . 3 4 0 5 , 82 L. E d . 2 d 677 States exception because (1 9 8 4 ) . ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1992 ) , f o r the Eleventh C i r c u i t In United the United explained: "The 'manifest purpose' of the ' p a r t i c u l a r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e F o u r t h Amendment' i s ' t o p r e v e n t g e n e r a l s e a r c h e s . ' L e o n , 468 U.S. a t 9 6 3 , 104 S. C t . a t 3447 ( S t e v e n s , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) . 'By l i m i t i n g t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o s e a r c h t o t h e s p e c i f i c areas and t h i n g s f o r which there i s probable cause t o search, the requirement ensures that the search w i l l be c a r e f u l l y t a i l o r e d t o i t sj u s t i f i c a t i o n s , and w i l l not take on t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.' M a r y l a n d v . G a r r i s o n , 4 80 U.S. 7 9 , 8 3 , 107 S. C t . 1 0 1 3 , 1 0 1 6 , 94 L. E d . 2 d 72 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . This policy has u n d e r g i r d e d the past cases i n which c o u r t s have c o n s i d e r e d t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e seized pursuant to a warrant that specified an erroneous address. See, e.g., U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Burke, 784 F . 2 d 1 0 9 0 , 1 0 9 2 - 9 3 ( 1 1 t h C i r . ) , cert. d e n . , 476 U.S. 1 1 7 4 , 106 S. C t . 2 9 0 1 , 90 L. E d . 2 d 987 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C o l l i n s , 830 F . 2 d 1 4 5 , 146 ( 9 t h C i r . 1987 ) . Many o f t h o s e c o u r t s h a v e upheld the admission of the evidence, either by holding that the warrant was sufficient o r by h o l d i n g t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s r e l i e d on t h e w a r r a n t i n good f a i t h . In a l lof those cases, however, the p o t e n t i a l f o r a g e n e r a l s e a r c h was m i n i m a l " E v e n t h o u g h t h e w a r r a n t was i n v a l i d , i t i s p o s s i b l e that the purposes of the e x c l u s i o n a r y rule 32 468 CR-10-0516 w o u l d n o t be s e r v e d by s u p p r e s s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e . I n Leon, 468 U.S. a t 900 , 1 04 S. C t . a t 340 9, t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e does not b a r t h e use o f evidence ' o b t a i n e d by o f f i c e r s a c t i n g i n r e a s o n a b l e r e l i a n c e on a s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d by a detached and n e u t r a l m a g i s t r a t e b u t ultimately found t o be u n s u p p o r t e d by p r o b a b l e cause.' The e x c e p t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d b e c a u s e ' t h e exclusionary rule i s designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of j u d g e s a n d m a g i s t r a t e s . ' I d . a t 9 1 6 , 104 S. C t . a t 3417. I n M a s s a c h u s e t t s v . S h e p p a r d , 468 U.S. 9 8 1 , 104 S. C t . 3 4 2 4 , 82 L. E d . 2 d 737 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , t h e C o u r t considered whether t h e Leon exception permitted e v i d e n c e t o be i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l even t h o u g h t h e j u d g e who i s s u e d t h e w a r r a n t h a d made a t e c h n i c a l error i n f i l l i n g out the warrant. In that case, the judge had f a i l e d t o i n c o r p o r a t e the substance of the supporting a f f i d a v i t , which i n d i c a t e d the things t o be seized. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule d i d not apply despite the error, b e c a u s e t h e o f f i c e r who e x e c u t e d t h e s e a r c h l i m i t e d i t s s c o p e t o t h e i t e m s named i n t h e a f f i d a v i t , a n d t h e o f f i c e r was e n t i t l e d t o r e l y on t h e j u d g e ' s w o r d t h a t t h e w a r r a n t was c o r r e c t . I n sum, ' i t was t h e judge, not the police officers, who made t h e c r i t i c a l m i s t a k e . ' I d . a t 9 9 0 , 104 S. C t . a t 3 4 2 9 . A t l e a s t two c i r c u i t c o u r t s have a p p l i e d S h e p p a r d t o warrants that f a i l e d to s p e c i f y the proper address o f t h e p l a c e t o be s e a r c h e d . See [ U n i t e d S t a t e s v . ] Bonner, 808 F . 2 d [ 8 6 4 , ] 867 [ ( 1 s t C i r . 1986)] (good-faith exception covers warrant despite omission of address because mistake was by magistrate and officers reasonably relied on w a r r a n t ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C u r r y , 911 F . 2 d 7 2 , 7 7 - 7 8 (8th C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) (when w a r r a n t f a i l e d to specify address but a f f i d a v i t d i d , good-faith exception c o v e r e d s e a r c h b e c a u s e e x e c u t i n g o f f i c e r knew w h e r e to s e a r c h and f a i l u r e of warrant to incorporate a f f i d a v i t was m e r e l y t e c h n i c a l e r r o r ) , c e r t . d e n . , 498 U.S. 1 0 9 4 , 111 S. C t . 9 8 0 , 112 L. E d . 2 d 1 0 6 5 (1991). 33 CR-10-0516 "Sheppard, Bonner, and C u r r y a r e a l l s i m i l a r . In a l l o f t h e s e d e c i s i o n s , t h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e o f f i c e r who e x e c u t e d t h e s e a r c h knew t h e i t e m s t o b e s e i z e d o r t h e l o c a l e t o b e s e a r c h e d b e c a u s e he h a d prepared the a f f i d a v i t supporting the warrant. S h e p p a r d , 4 68 U.S. a t 984 , 104 S. C t . a t 3 4 2 6 ; B o n n e r , 808 F . 2 d a t 8 6 7 ; C u r r y , 911 F . 2 d a t 7 8 . The c o u r t s f u r t h e r n o t e d t h a t any e r r o r i n t h e w a r r a n t was d u e t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e or judge's technical f a i l u r e to insure that the warrant r e f l e c t e d the i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e a f f i d a v i t . S h e p p a r d , 468 U.S. a t 990 , 104 S. C t . a t 3 4 2 9 ; B o n n e r , 8 08 F . 2 d a t 8 67 ; Curry, 911 F . 2 d a t 7 8 . Because the executing o f f i c e r s i n a l l t h r e e c a s e s knew w h e r e t o s e a r c h despite the t e c h n i c a l e r r o r i n the warrant, they seized the proper items or searched the proper l o c a t i o n . S h e p p a r d , 468 U.S. a t 9 8 7 , 104 S. C t . a t 3 4 2 7 ; B o n n e r , 808 F . 2 d a t 8 6 7 ; C u r r y , 911 F . 2 d a t 77-78 (implying but not s t a t i n g that search was executed p r o p e r l y based on d e t e c t i v e ' s personal knowledge). T h u s , i n a l l t h r e e c a s e s , t h e r e was no danger of the o f f i c e r s u n d e r t a k i n g a g e n e r a l search o f an e n t i r e neighborhood." 971 F . 2 d a t 704 (footnote In in the present case, good faith. There undertaking a general search the proper that they omitted). the o f f i c e r s was search, no relied danger of and, i n f a c t , on t h e the any wrong premises. 6 officers the o f f i c e r s d i d l o c a t i o n a n d t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e searched warrant indicating Detective Rafferty I n E l l i s , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s n o t e d t h a t " a t l e a s t one c o u r t has c o n s i d e r e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e wrong premises were searched integral to i t s conclusion that the search was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C o l l i n s , 830 F . 2 d 145 (9th C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) . " E l l i s , 971 F . 2 d a t 704 n . 5 . 6 34 CR-10-0516 prepared the a f f i d a v i t executed the search. supporting That the search affidavit warrant, contained the a n d he specific a d d r e s s o f C o c h r a n ' s r e s i d e n c e , w h i c h was t h e p a r t i c u l a r to be searched. where to search. error in failing Thus, the information the affidavit. designed errors The i s s u i n g to ensure judge that Considering that would n o t be s e r v e d court knew exactly made a t e c h n i c a l either or reflected incorporated the exclusionary r a t h e r than rule case because by s u p p r e s s i n g the purpose does n o t of the the evidence. d i d not e r r i n denying i s to punish the we h o l d t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i n the present trial simply affidavit to deter p o l i c e misconduct of judges, officer the warrant i n the supporting apply the the executing place Cochran's rule Therefore, motion to erred in suppress. Next, Cochran alleges that the trial court r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w h i m t o e x a m i n e C.K. a b o u t h e r s e x u a l before s h e met h i m . testimony concerning Rule opened Specifically, the door her past sexual conduct C o c h r a n a l l e g e s t h a t C.K.'s to otherwise inadmissible evidence activity. 4 1 2 , A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s , i n pertinent part: "(b) I n any p r o s e c u t i o n for criminal sexual conduct or f o r assault with i n t e n t t o commit, 35 CR-10-0516 a t t e m p t t o commit, o r c o n s p i r a c y t o commit c r i m i n a l sexual conduct, evidence r e l a t i n g to the past sexual b e h a v i o r o f t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s ... s h a l l n o t b e admissible, either as direct evidence or on cross-examination of the complaining witness or of other witnesses, except as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n this rule. "(c) I n any p r o s e c u t i o n f o r c r i m i n a l sexual conduct, evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness shall be introduced i f the court, f o l l o w i n g the procedure described i n section (d) o f t h i s r u l e , f i n d s t h a t such past sexual behavior directly involved the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the accused." In Alabama Ex parte D.L.H., Supreme C o u r t 806 So. 2d 1190 ( A l a .2001), held: "This Court has specifically rejected the h o l d i n g of the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals that Rule 412 absolutely forecloses the introduction of evidence o f a rape v i c t i m ' s p a s t s e x u a l e x p e r i e n c e except i n the instance of a past experience with the accused. Ex p a r t e Dennis, 730 So.2d 138, 140 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . T h e r e we c o n c l u d e d t h a t " ' t o r e a d R u l e 412 a s r e q u i r i n g an a b s o l u t e exclusion of a l l evidence of past sexual activity between the v i c t i m and third persons c o u l d , i n some c a s e s , v i o l a t e a c r i m i n a l defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . See C h a r l e s W. G a m b l e , M c E l r o y ' s Alabama E v i d e n c e , § 3 2 . 0 1 , p . 143 ( 5 t h e d . 1 9 9 6 ) ( " I t w o u l d a p p e a r , h o w e v e r , t h a t s u c h an a b s o l u t e e x c l u s i o n w o u l d be i n a p p l i c a b l e when t o e n f o r c e i t w o u l d v i o l a t e a c r i m i n a l defendant's constitutional rights."). T h e r e f o r e , we h o l d t h a t when R u l e 412 i s applied to preclude the admission of particular exculpatory evidence, the 36 the CR-10-0516 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s to be determined on a case-by-case basis. A c c o r d Tague v. R i c h a r d s , 3 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th C i r . 1993).' "Ex parte added). Dennis, 730 So. 2d at 141 (emphasis "When one p a r t y o p e n s t h e d o o r t o otherwise inadmissible evidence, the d o c t r i n e of 'curative a d m i s s i b i l i t y ' p r o v i d e s the o p p o s i n g p a r t y w i t h 'the right to rebut such evidence with other illegal e v i d e n c e . ' M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e , § 1 4 . 0 1 , p. 49 ( 5 t h e d . 1 9 9 6 ) . ' [ T ] h e l a w [ i s ] t h a t e v e n t h o u g h a p a r t y i n t r o d u c e s e v i d e n c e t h a t may be i m m a t e r i a l or i l l e g a l , h i s o p p o n e n t has t h e r i g h t t o r e b u t s u c h e v i d e n c e and t h i s r i g h t i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l . ' C l a r k v. S t a t e , 54 A l a . A p p . 183, 186, 30 6 So. 2d 5 1 , 54 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . '"A p a r t y who h a s b r o u g h t o u t e v i d e n c e on a c e r t a i n s u b j e c t h a s no v a l i d c o m p l a i n t as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c t i o n i n a l l o w i n g h i s opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same s u b j e c t . " ' H u b b a r d v . S t a t e , 471 So. 2 d 4 97 , 499 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1984) ( q u o t i n g B r o w n v . S t a t e , 392 So. 2 d 1248 , 12 60 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 98 0 ) , cert. d e n i e d , 392 So. 2d 1266 (Ala. 1981)). "The prosecutor's introduction of [the rape v i c t i m ' s ] t e s t i m o n y t h a t s h e h a d n e v e r 'had a n y k i n d of s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h anybody o t h e r than' the defendant ... r e i n f o r c e d [the v i c t i m ' s ] testimony that sexual i n t e r c o u r s e between her and [the d e f e n d a n t ] had a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d , t o the e x t e n t t h a t the jury thought she would not have known the physical characteristics and details of sexual intercourse without having actually experienced i t . T h i s r e i n f o r c e m e n t , an i m p o r t a n t tendency of the e v i d e n c e , w o u l d have been r e b u t t e d by e v i d e n c e t h a t [the victim] had, in fact, experienced sexual i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h others than [the d e f e n d a n t ] ; f o r 37 CR-10-0516 such other experience would e x p l a i n h e r knowledge of the p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and d e t a i l s o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e i n a way c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i n n o c e n c e of [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] . Such t e s t i m o n y o f p r i o r s e x u a l e x p e r i e n c e by [ t h e v i c t i m ] a l s o would have d i r e c t l y i m p e a c h e d h e r v e r a c i t y on a p o i n t intentionally i n j e c t e d b y t h e S t a t e . [The v i c t i m ' s ] v e r a c i t y was critical t o the p r o s e c u t i o n of the rape charges against the defendant " I n E x p a r t e D e n n i s , 730 S o . 2 d a t 1 4 1 , t h i s Court r e c o g n i z e d and summarized S t a t e v. P u l i z z a n o , 155 W i s . 2 d 6 3 3 , 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990 ) , t o t h e effect that "'constitutional guarantees of confrontation and compulsory process required t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t be a b l e t o cross-examine s e v e n - y e a r - o l d v i c t i m about prior sexual assault i n order to rebut prosecution's suggestion that the v i c t i m could have possessed explicit sexual knowledge o n l y i f defendant had committed the charged s e x u a l a s s a u l t . ' "Pulizzano i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of the probative value of evidence of prior sexual experience i n such a case. Third-party-witness testimony about the a l l e g e d v i c t i m ' s p r i o r sexual experience, i f l i k e the sexual a c t i v i t y alleged i n t h e c h a r g e b e i n g t r i e d , w o u l d be e q u a l l y p r o b a t i v e i n s u c h a c a s e . See Ex p a r t e D e n n i s , s u p r a . "Therefore, the p r o s e c u t o r ' s opening the door t o [the v i c t i m ' s ] p r i o r s e x u a l h i s t o r y e n t i t l e d [the defendant] to rebut a n d t o i m p e a c h on t h e same point, i f [the defendant], i n f a c t , had r e b u t t i n g e v i d e n c e on t h e same p o i n t . " D.L.H., 806 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 9 3 - 9 4 . 38 CR-10-0516 In t h e p r e s e n t door to otherwise sexual activity case, C o c h r a n a l l e g e s t h a t C.K. o p e n e d t h e i n a d m i s s i b l e evidence when s h e t e s t i f i e d , "[Prosecutor]: Advocacy Center? What as d i d you concerning her past follows: do at the Child " [ C . K . ] : W e l l , t h e y q u e s t i o n e d me s e v e r a l t i m e s . A n d I was v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n s , b e c a u s e , i n t r u t h , I d i d n ' t want t o g e t [Cochran] i n a n y t r o u b l e , b e c a u s e he h a d a c h i l d , a n d I n e v e r w a n t t o h u r t h i m o r h i s f a m i l y . B u t now t h a t I r e a l i z e d w h a t h a d h a p p e n e d t o me a n d t h a t I h a d my c h i l d h o o d s t o l e n f r o m me, I d o n ' t w a n t h i m t o b e a b l e t o do t h i s t o somebody e l s e . So I made a statement." (R. 99-100.) statement Specifically, says, that character Cochran sexual concerning her past statement and l a c k was "was of p r i o r the f i r s t a direct sexual person Cochran's allegation that open t h e door t o e v i d e n c e Contrary to Cochran's directly address remark conduct with whom i s without " I h a d my from childhood that me" C.K.'s opened t h e sexual behavior i n t e r c o u r s e . " Cochran's b r i e f , statement alleges t h a t " I h a d my c h i l d h o o d s t o l e n door to evidence he Cochran because, about h e r own and i m p l i e d t h a t she had engaged i n a t 36. merit. stolen C.K.'s from me" simple d i d not concerning her past sexual behavior. allegation, her prior sexual 39 C.K.'s statement d i d not conduct or imply that her CR-10-0516 first sexual statement experience does with not mention statement i s nothing in was like Cochran. sexual In f a c t , at a l l . conduct the e x p l i c i t C.K.'s C.K.'s s t a t e m e n t by t h e v i c t i m D.L.H. t h a t s h e " h a d n e v e r h a d a n y k i n d o f s e x u a l with anybody merely other expressed ultimately decided would the defendant." her personal Advocacy Center. C.K. than to to C.K.'s relations statement f e e l i n g s and e x p l a i n e d the interviewers at why s h e the Evidence of s p e c i f i c p r i o r s e x u a l conduct by not rebut her statement that she f e l t that c h i l d h o o d was s t o l e n f r o m h e r b y h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h nor would such Therefore, Cochran t o examine court C.K. any d i r e c t l y about her past that, C.K.'s videoed interview Center, the trial court after erroneously the e n t i r e interview into alleges that probative the t r i a l sexual he value. court introduced at the C h i l d evidence. the R. E v i d . , w h i c h p r o v i d e s : "When a p a r t y of e i t h e r a w r i t i n g or recorded statement, a Advocacy State to Specifically, misconstrued Ala. allow behavior. had allowed her Cochran d i d not e r r i n r e f u s i n g to alleges of introduce have Cochran portion Cochran evidence the t r i a l Next, Child Rule 106, introduces part an a d v e r s e party may r e q u i r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n a t t h a t t i m e o f a n y o t h e r p a r t o f 40 CR-10-0516 the writing considered or statement that contemporaneously alleges that allowed the admission the State to ought with of State after allowed the close afforded either testimony its was of an improperly Before trial, ... opportunity Cochran prohibit the State from evidence u n l e s s he a t t e m p t e d Cochran use video prior consistent interview, testimony to cross-examine brief, a the Without introducing any o b j e c t i o n not taped the jury motion in with limine the video interview "some t y p e o f impeachment w o u l d make t h e p r i o r c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t r e l e v a n t . " 3-4.) was a t 41. filed be further the defense to address to interview i t switness's and opportunity own e v i d e n c e . " C o c h r a n ' s 7 through the video to bolster evidence nor a second i t . " fairness the entire s t a t e m e n t s made b y C.K. a n d t h a t , "the in from the State, that to into that (Supp. motion R. was granted. At trial, C.K. his parents would get into trouble. testified have that her k i l l e d To i m p e a c h that Cochran had t o l d i f she e v e r her that caused him t o testimony, Cochran played T h i s r u l e i s o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as t h e "completeness d o c t r i n e . " S e e , e . g , B e l i s l e v . S t a t e , 11 S o . 3 d 2 5 6 , 284 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). 7 41 CR-10-0516 a short portion of the video t h a t Cochran never t o l d her then but to moved the the to introduce State jury did at Cochran's not that interview t h a t he the desire would k i l l entire to i n which the stated her. The into evidence, entire interview interview publish C.K. State time. counsel responded: "It's not a p r o b l e m w i t h t h a t i n t h e o r y . The p r o b l e m i s t h e y g e t i n some c o l l a t e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r g i r l s t h a t n e v e r m a t e r i a l i z e d . I f we are g o i n g t o mark i t , i t i s g o i n g t o have t o remain u n d e r c o n t r o l o f t h e C o u r t , i f [ t h e members o f t h e j u r y ] want to h e a r p a r t s of i t , b e c a u s e t h e y c a n ' t hear those p a r t s . " (R. 147.) Cochran's problem with serious with counsel everything regarding e r r o r s because the him and her The trial talked court further him and stated: her. "I But have there a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t have n o t h i n g about on that tape." (R. no are to do 148.) ruled: " W e l l , i f the j u r y wishes to hear the tape, I ' l l admit i t . I f they w i s h to p l a y i t , t h e n , w e ' l l have b o t h c o u n s e l t h e r e . And any i s s u e t h a t i s o b j e c t e d t o c a n be o b j e c t e d t o a t t h a t t i m e . B u t w e ' l l a d m i t i t on t h a t b a s i s . " (R. 148.) objection Cochran's to that counsel ruling. (R. then 148, 42 stated 150.) that When t h e he trial had no court CR-10-0516 admitted the video interview jury with i n accordance The the jury during and indicated against the Before jury from t h e j u r y and t h a t a g r e e m e n t was you redaction playing on when (R. 1 5 0 . ) and after the jury had the after that requested the video and defense during However, deliberations you you b o t h of the video to played had jury stated that they needed they had agreed t o simply The t r i a l and t h a t get to court the court that point, f o r the jury, "[Prosecutor]: minutes. It was to counsel]: The 43 timer video the agreed t o be "going kept that the t o depend impose the timer been had stated the following hasn't the t u r n down t h e c a n s t i p u l a t e t o . " (R. 2 6 8 . ) "[Defense counsel]: Apparently, the computer. "[Defense computer. view f o r the jury, of the interview portion. "fine" was counsel a two-minute p o r t i o n volume ruling. i t h a d r e a c h e d a v e r d i c t on some o f t h e c o u n t s Cochran, prosecutor i tinstructed the i n t e r v i e w was n e v e r p l a y e d f o r the t r i a l . began that interview. upon the court's remainder of the video retired that into evidence, whatever During the occurred: i s off forty-three i s o f f on t h e CR-10-0516 two or " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I move f o r a m i s t r i a l . was i n a d v e r t e n t . We d i d o u r b e s t . A n d t h a t was concern about p l a y i n g t h i s tape. It my three "[Prosecutor]: We'll minutes. jump f o r t h e record " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : T h e r e i s no d a m a g e . She d a t e d someone b e f o r e h e r . T h a t i s t h e o n l y knew he d a t e d . T h a t i s a l l s h e s a i d . s a i d he one she "The C o u r t : I'm n o t g o i n g t o d e c l a r e a m i s t r i a l on t h a t . I f y o u w a n t t o e x c u s e t h e j u r y a n d listen t o t h e p o r t i o n t h a t you want t o r e d a c t . P r i o r t o t h e beginning, I a s k e d b o t h of you t o s t i p u l a t e and a g r e e . I f you want t o e x c u s e t h e j u r y , l e t ' s h a v e the motion. "[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir. "The C o u r t : L a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n , e x e r c i s e day two. I f y o u w o u l d p l e a s e go b a c k t o t h e j u r y r o o m w h i l e we d i s c u s s a t e c h n i c a l i s s u e . "(Whereupon, the f o l l o w i n g o c c u r r e d h e a r i n g and p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y . ) out of the "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : Judge, f o r the r e c o r d , I want t o r e c a p what has h a p p e n e d y e s t e r d a y and j u s t h a p p e n e d now. Y e s t e r d a y when t h e State indicated a f t e r I had i m p e a c h e d [C.K.] f r o m p o r t i o n s o f t h i s tape t h a t they wanted to view the r e s t of the tape, I e x p r e s s e d r e s e r v a t i o n s about c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of this tape. "We u l t i m a t e l y a g r e e d , you know, i f we could r e d a c t p o r t i o n s I had c o n c e r n s a b o u t , w h i c h were the p o r t i o n s t h a t d i s c u s s e d him a l l e g e d l y d a t i n g other teenagers, t h a t i t c o u l d be p l a y e d . So w h a t I d i d t h e n was t o on a c o m p u t e r t h a t was p r o v i d e d , I f o u n d the l o c a t i o n time stamped where t h o s e p o r t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d . T h a t was a c o m p u t e r . 44 CR-10-0516 "Now, t o d a y , we a r e p l a y i n g t h i s on a TV DVD p l a y e r . A n d I h a v e no t e c h n o l o g i c a l i d e a how come t h e t i m e stamp would have been d i f f e r e n t , but i t i s . "We a t t e m p t e d t o t a k e a l l p r e c a u t i o n s . No o n e ' s f a u l t . B u t now t h e j u r y h a s h e a r d a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e he h a s a l l e g e d l y d a t e d a n o t h e r s e v e n t e e n - y e a r - o l d g i r l . That i s a l l t h e y have h e a r d t o t h i s p o i n t . But I t h i n k g i v e n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c a s e and a l l t h e f a c t s s u b m i t t e d , which I don't need to r e s t a t e h e r e , I t h i n k i t i s p r e j u d i c i a l . I w o u l d f o r m a l l y move f o r a m i s t r i a l on t h e c o u n t s f o r w h i c h a v e r d i c t h a s n o t been reached. " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : Judge, i n response, basically, t h e f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n as d e f e n s e c o u n s e l has r e l a t e d i s a c c u r a t e , e x c e p t f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a l l she s a i d i s -- a n d t h e e v i d e n c e w o u l d show t h a t a l l s h e s a i d w a s , I o n l y know h i m o f d a t i n g one o t h e r p e r s o n . A n d she s a i d -I think, she s a i d b e f o r e I got i t p a u s e d , a g i r l a b o u t my age. "Well, at the eighteen. Counsel seventeen. That i a l l e g i n g an i l l e g a l even a criminal p r e j u d i c i a l to the time of t h i s q u e s t i o n i n g , she's has related that the g i r l was s not illegal. So i t is not a c t on t h e d e f e n d a n t . I t i s n o t act of any kind. It is not defendant. " B u t , i n any e v e n t , t h a t i s a l l t h e y h e a r d a t t h i s p o i n t . N o t t h a t he h a s d o n e a n y t h i n g o r d i d a n y t h i n g w i t h her or a n y t h i n g e l s e . "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : But h a v i n g h e a r d t h a t , i t i s g o i n g t o be w i l d s p e c u l a t i o n now. "The C o u r t : W e l l , I'm n o t s u r e t h a t I a g r e e w i t h w i l d s p e c u l a t i o n . A n d I'm n o t g o i n g t o g r a n t y o u r m o t i o n f o r a m i s t r i a l . Y o u know, t h e r e d a c t i o n , b o t h s i d e s knew a b o u t t h e r e d a c t i o n . I t a p p e a r s to me t h i s was one l i m i t e d s i t u a t i o n . A n d I don't find that i t i s p r e j u d i c i a l . 45 CR-10-0516 " I do s u g g e s t t h a t i f t h e j u r y w a n t s t o c o n t i n u e to l i s t e n t o t h i s tape, t h a t you g e t t o g e t h e r and s t i p u l a t e . We s t a r t e d t h i s on t h a t b a s i s . A n d f o r w h a t e v e r r e a s o n , i t ' s t h e r e . You b o t h have h a d t h i s t a p e t h r o u g h d i s c o v e r y . You b o t h have r e v i e w e d i t numerous t i m e s . I f t h e r e i s any o t h e r p o r t i o n t h a t y o u w i s h t o o b j e c t t o a n d c o v e r , l e t ' s do i t now. "[Prosecutor]: Judge, I think we are i n agreement i t i s a two-minute p e r i o d that she's d i s c u s s i n g t h i s t h a t we s t o p p e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f . I would l i k e t o w h i l e t h e j u r y i s out p l a y t h i s and l e t ' s r e a c h a n a g r e e m e n t w h e r e we c a n p i c k i t up f r o m t h e r e a n d go f o r w a r d . "[Defense Judge. counsel]: I think that i s " ( W h e r e u p o n t h e t a p e was r e v i e w e d during which, the f o l l o w i n g occurred.) "[Defense fifteen there second counsel]: clip i s additional "[Prosecutor]: "(Whereupon, Maybe that I forgot talked about agreeable. by counsel, that little that. And -¬ The t o t a l counsel time continued i s right. to review the DVD.) fi "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : Judge, f o r the r e c o r d , I apologize. Apparently, t h a t l i t t l e b l u r b about the seventeen-year-old was n o t i n t h e p a r t o f w h a t I t h o u g h t i t was. T h e r e i s more l a t e r . I j u s t f o r g o t about t h a t l i t t l e b l u r b . I d i d n ' t r e a l i z e i t was t h e r e . So i t w a s n ' t a p p a r e n t l y -¬ "The Court: Well, I don't find that i t i s p r e j u d i c i a l , c o u n s e l . I t h i n k your main concern l i e s 46 CR-10-0516 with that the other time. section that you examined prior to "[Defense counsel]: Right. I j u s t want t h e r e c o r d t o be c l e a r t h a t t h a t w a s n ' t a n y b o d y ' s f a u l t , b u t m i n e f o r g e t t i n g t h a t t h a t was t h e r e . "The C o u r t : We a r e n o t c a s t i n g a n y d i s p e r s i o n s [sic] t o e i t h e r s i d e . We w a n t t o make s u r e t h a t b o t h of you i n f u r t h e r p l a y o f t h e t a p e s t i p u l a t e as t o t h o s e p o r t i o n s t h a t s h o u l d be r e d a c t e d . " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : I t i s t h e same p l a c e we t a l k e d a b o u t . T h a t was j u s t a p a r t t h a t was m i s s e d . "The C o u r t : A l l r i g h t . So a r e we a g r e e d u p o n t h e p r o c e d u r e s t o s t o p t h e DVD a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e ? " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : Y e s , s i r , I t h i n k s o . We still a g r e e t o t h e same n u m b e r s t h a t we h a d b e f o r e t o s t o p and f a s t forward. " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : Judge, g i v e n what t h e y d i d h e a r , a n d i t ' s c l e a r w h a t t h e y h e a r d , t h a t he h a d p o s s i b l y d a t e d a g i r l t h a t was s e v e n t e e n , I a s k f o r maybe a c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with another seventeen-year-old g i r l i s not relevant to t h i s cause. you "The have Court: That an o b j e c t i o n "[Prosecutor]: they i s not a problem to that? I guess "[Defense counsel]: come b a c k i n . "The Court: Let's with me. Do n o t , Judge. A n d I w o u l d a s k f o r i t when j u s t be s u r e we've g o t i t s e t . 47 CR-10-0516 going " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : We b a c k t o w h e r e we are left past off. the part. We are " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : A f t e r Mr. C o c h r a n g r a b b e d my a t t e n t i o n and after further discussion with him, w e ' l l waive that c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n that I j u s t requested. "The C o u r t : I t ' s up t o y o u , c o u n s e l . B e f o r e t h e j u r y comes i n , l e t t h e r e c o r d show t h a t c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n s e w a i v e d any c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e r e f e r e n c e t o a s e v e n t e e n - y e a r - o l d as c o n t a i n e d on t h e DVD. "All right. Are resume t h e i r p l a c e s right. we and ready? let's Will the get them "(Whereupon, the following occurred h e a r i n g and p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y . ) "The Court: Okay. L e t ' s begin the tape parties in. A l l in the again. " ( W h e r e u p o n , t h e t a p e was p l a y e d i n t h e h e a r i n g and p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y , a f t e r w h i c h , t h e f o l l o w i n g occurred.) the "The C o u r t : A l l r i g h t . L a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n j u r y , you can resume y o u r d e l i b e r a t i o n s . of " ( W h e r e u p o n , t h e j u r y was e x c u s e d t o c o n t i n u e d e l i b e r a t i o n s , a f t e r which, the f o l l o w i n g o c c u r r e d out o f t h e p r e s e n c e and h e a r i n g o f t h e j u r y . ) "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : Judge, just to recap a l i t t l e b i t . And the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y t h i n k s I'm remembering i t wrong. I ' l l l e t him g i v e how he r e m e m b e r s i t . B u t y e s t e r d a y when t h i s w h o l e i s s u e a b o u t p l a y i n g t h e t a p e came u p , how i t came up was I was i m p e a c h i n g [C.K.] w i t h p o r t i o n s o f t h a t t a p e 48 CR-10-0516 we j u s t saw w h e r e s h e h a d s t a t e d on t h e s t a n d t h a t s h e d i d n o t r e c a l l , s t a t i n g t h a t he h a d n o t t o l d h e r he w o u l d k i l l h e r . I p l a y e d s i m p l y t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e t a p e t o r e f r e s h h e r memory. "She t h e n a d m i t t e d he d i d n o t t e l l h e r he w i l l kill h e r . A f t e r t h a t , I f o r g e t e x a c t l y how long a f t e r t h a t , t h e S t a t e moved t o i n t r o d u c e t h e e n t i r e video tape. I t h i n k I o b j e c t e d i n terms of s t a t i n g t h a t s i m p l y because she p u t i t i n i s s u e by d e n y i n g and r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t s t a t e m e n t , I d i d not b e l i e v e t h e e n t i r e t a p e s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d . "And, f o r t h e r e c o r d , she had j u s t v i e w e d t h e t a p e p r o b a b l y a n h o u r b e f o r e t h a t . So h e r memory s h o u l d have been p r e t t y f r e s h i n remembering t h a t statement t h a t she had s u b s e q u e n t l y denied. " T h e r e a f t e r , a f t e r the Court i n d i c a t e d that i t inclined t o admit the tape, I then simply was stated, well, J u d g e , we n e e d t o r e d a c t certain p o r t i o n s , w h i c h we've done. And s i n c e t h e n , I ' v e n e v e r r a i s e d an o b j e c t i o n . " I s i m p l y want t h e r e c o r d t o r e f l e c t so t h a t f o r the r e c o r d w i t h o u t any r e v i e w i n c o u r t h a v i n g t o p l a y t h e t a p e , t h a t t h i s t a p e , w h i c h was an h o u r a n d twenty-two minutes l o n g , a n d t h e r e was probably about t h r e e o r f o u r m i n u t e s t h a t were s k i p p e d , n o t i n c l u d i n g t h e p a r t s t h a t w e r e s k i p p e d when t h e r e was no s p e a k i n g . So t h e r e was p r o b a b l y - - t h e a m o u n t o f i n t e r v i e w t h a t t h e j u r y w a t c h e d was, I w o u l d r o u g h l y g u e s s , a b o u t an h o u r a n d f i f t e e n minutes. "It encompassed pretty much the entire a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h i s case, n o t o n l y any t h r e a t s o r t h r e a t s t h a t w e r e n o t made. I t d i s c u s s e d a l l t h e s e x u a l a c t i v i t y a l l e g e d b e f o r e she t u r n e d s i x t e e n . It discussed sexual activity after she turned s i x t e e n . I t d i s c u s s e d c h i l d pornography -- w e l l , t h e a l l e g e d p i c t u r e s o f h e r naked, t a k e n a l l e g e d l y by -¬ I d o n ' t know i f s h e e v e r s a i d he a c t u a l l y t o o k t h e m . 49 CR-10-0516 But t h a t phone. she sent t o h i s phone that were on h i s "So, basically, Judge, she has had the opportunity now t o t e s t i f y twice. And n o t o n l y twice, b u t s h e h a s now on t h e s e c o n d day o f d e l i b e r a t i o n s been a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y i n f r o n t o f t h i s j u r y . And i t ' s been y e s t e r d a y t h a t Mr. C o c h r a n was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y . "So I t h i n k t h i s t a p e u n f a i r l y f o c u s e s - - n o t e x a c t l y w h a t I w a n t t o p u t -- f o c u s e s t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o h e r t e s t i m o n y and h e r t e s t i m o n y a l o n e . Emphasize i s t h e word I wanted, Judge. I t u n f a i r l y emphasizes h e r t e s t i m o n y alone. Not only they got t o hear another hour and f i f t e e n minutes o f t e s t i m o n y , b u t t h e y ' v e j u s t now g o t t o h e a r i t i n t h e m i d d l e o f their deliberations. "So, because of a l l that, I ' l l renew my o b j e c t i o n made f r o m y e s t e r d a y . I t i s t o o l a t e t o h a v e t h e m u n d o i t . So I g u e s s I w o u l d move f o r a m i s t r i a l . I'm s u r e t h e C o u r t i s n o t g o i n g t o g r a n t i t . B u t I'm n o t s u r e i f I h a v e t o do t h a t t o p r o t e c t my r e c o r d h e r e . A n d s o I move f o r i t . A n d I t h i n k t h a t i s a l l I have. " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : Judge, j u s t i n response, and I d i d n ' t b r i n g t h e r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e back up, because I t h o u g h t we w e r e d o n e w i t h t h e m . B u t t h e r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e t h a t i f one p a r t y u s e s any p o r t i o n o f a document o r t a p e t o i m p e a c h a party, then, the adverse party may choose any portions that i t wishes or introduce the entire d o c u m e n t . T h a t i s e f f e c t i v e l y what we've d o n e . " I t i s i n e v i d e n c e . The j u r y h a s a r i g h t t o s e e it. We h a v e t h r o u g h s t i p u l a t i o n s edited out the p o r t i o n s t h a t were r e q u e s t e d t o be e d i t e d o u t by t h e d e f e n s e . A n d we h a v e s k i p p e d t h o s e . T h e y h a v e n o t b e e n p l a y e d t o t h e j u r y . A n d , t h e r e f o r e , we s u b m i t 50 CR-10-0516 that a m i s t r i a l i s inappropriate. was p r o p e r l y p l a y e d t o t h e j u r y . And t h e e v i d e n c e " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I f I may p u t on t h e r e c o r d j u s t i n response, Judge, I t h i n k t h a t the r u l e , the intent of the rule i s there be a complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e e n t i r e s t a t e m e n t so t h a t t h e r e i s n o t a m i s l e a d i n g . So I w o u l d s u b m i t t h a t w h a t t h e r u l e meant i n a c a s e like this was t h e e n t i r e s t a t e m e n t i n v o l v i n g any a l l e g e d t h r e a t s o r even f e a r on h e r p a r t . "I don't b e l i e v e that i t should allow every single subject that has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e impeached t e s t i m o n y . And even i f i t does. Judge, I would argue t h i s , t h a t C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t h a t would be a v i o l a t i o n o f d u e p r o c e s s when i t j u s t u n f a i r l y -- s i m p l y , when a d e f e n d a n t i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s f o r c e d t o impeach a w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y when t h a t w i t n e s s d e n i e s knowledge o f a s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h she an h o u r b e f o r e h a d r e v i e w e d , w h i c h s h e h a d d i r e c t l y contradicted on t h e w i t n e s s stand a n d was then c o r r e c t e d b y t h e i m p e a c h m e n t , t h e d e f e n s e h a d no c h o i c e b u t t o have t o impeach h e r w i t h t h a t because i t was an i m p o r t a n t p i e c e o f t e s t i m o n y . A n d b y t h e i r own h a n d , t h e y c a n b o o t s t r a p t h i s e n t i r e a d d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n y . I t h i n k i t i s a v i o l a t i o n o f due p r o c e s s under t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f Alabama and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a . Thank y o u . Judge. "The (R. Court: formistrial i s denied." 269-82.) Initially, reopened jury Motion i t appears the case because after the court that the t r i a l the case allowed 51 had been objections court improperly submitted concerning to the which CR-10-0516 portions after v. of the video the j u r y had State, that 52 So. court to clear that reopen cases the the 979, 983 merit an the jury'" to the video the d i s c r e t i o n of close § 15-14-4[, error (quoting t o do of cross-examine v. State, there or to he thus (stating the invited trial 1975] 371 may have address the that So. 2d would be not p r e s e n t e d to the j u r y ; agreed to the procedure and Caver so a f t e r s u b m i s s i o n o f Thus, C.K. jury evidence, i t i s A l a . Code Harris 1979))). i n t e r v i e w was court, the 2010) a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l t h a t he was specifically trial ( A l a . C r i m . App. after i t t o be to Cochran's Cochran case ( A l a . C r i m . App. opportunity after 573 construing held to 570, to the a n d b e g a n d e l i b e r a t i o n s . See i t is within the consistently case retired 3d "' [ a ] l t h o u g h i n t e r v i e w c o u l d be p u b l i s h e d afforded the jury however, was used by error. "A p a r t y c a n n o t a s s u m e i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s a t t r i a l a n d on a p p e a l , a n d a p a r t y c a n n o t a l l e g e as error proceedings i n the t r i a l court that were i n v i t e d by him or were a n a t u r a l consequence o f h i s own a c t i o n . L e v e r e t t v . S t a t e , 462 So. 2 d 972 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 462 S o . 2 d 972 ( A l a . 1985). A defendant cannot invite error by his c o n d u c t a n d l a t e r p r o f i t b y t h e e r r o r . Timmons v . S t a t e , 487 So. 2 d 975 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 487 So. 2 d 975 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . " Fountain v. S t a t e , 586 So. 2 d 2 7 7 , 52 282 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991). CR-10-0516 In the present procedure used interview to the played C.K. by argument the jury. based to the deliberating. was agreed with Cochran trial specifically court Cochran to on jury Thus, played because video condition as video the v i e w e d t h e i n t e r v i e w and Cochran's wishes, e x a m i n e C.K. jury. A obtaining Because after he would played. the specifically able after began before i t had be Only the v i e w i n g had cannot then the retired to make jury n o t gone a c c o r d i n g after invited additional specifically attempt a mistrial Cochran objected the that was additional already Cochran f u r t h e r or to present and had have video cross-examine present jury jury the the interview able to to to to agree benefit that procedure the trial court argument to to from has an that been error to p u b l i s h the that him arguing from examining C.K. 53 that procedure based on the by video is from the completed. i t had began i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s , prevented to erroneous i n t e r v i e w to the j u r y a f t e r estopped had Cochran o b j e c t e d to not b e i n g a b l e to c r o s s - defendant procedure the the Instead, to was or could f o r the j u r y . sole objections video Cochran to p u b l i s h the the the agreed present knew b e f o r e f o r t h e j u r y t h a t he w o u l d n o t be further video case, he erroneously interview and CR-10-0516 from p r e s e n t i n g additional argument to the jury based on t h e trial court interview. Further, erroneously inaccurate the Cochran's admitted arguments the video based i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R u l e 1 0 6 , A l a . R. E v i d . , prior consistent statements b e c a u s e h e d i d n o t make a t i m e l y those the interview admission of the interview allowed use So. that grounds i n the t r i a l the State made by objection court. C.K. this an and t h a t improperly are waived b a s e d on e i t h e r o f In Shouldis 2d 1275 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) , to on Court v. S t a t e , 953 held: "[I]n order for this court t o r e v i e w an a l l e g e d erroneous admission of evidence, a timely objection m u s t b e made t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e e v i d e n c e , s p e c i f i c g r o u n d s f o r t h e o b j e c t i o n s h o u l d be s t a t e d , a n d a r u l i n g o n t h e o b j e c t i o n m u s t b e made b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t . S e e I n g r a m v . S t a t e , 7 2 9 S o . 2 d 883 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 6 ) . 'When a t i m e l y o b j e c t i o n a t the time of t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e evidence i s n o t made, t h e i s s u e i s n o t p r e s e r v e d f o r t h i s Court's r e v i e w . ' Z i g l a r v . S t a t e , 62 9 S o . 2 d 4 3 , 47 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1993)." 953 So. 2d a t 1284. In admitted the into objections. present case, evidence, In fact, when Cochran's Cochran's t h a t he h a d no o b j e c t i o n s the video counsel counsel interview was d i d n o t make a n y specifically stated t o t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e i n t e r v i e w so 54 CR-10-0516 long a s he c o u l d involved C.K. In accordance was p l a y e d with Cochran's contained C.K.'s testimony. the wishes were counsel other of Cochran's redacted d i d not mention than counsel, when t h e video the completeness statements the completeness to doctrine bolster the video had been p l a y e d deliberations. objection video not Because based on e i t h e r f o r the jury during Cochran d i d not of those i n t e r v i e w was o f f e r e d b y t h e S t a t e , preserved Finally, make grounds her nor the use of C.K.'s s t a t e m e n t s t o b o l s t e r h e r t e s t i m o n y was m e n t i o n e d after into 106 o r t h e a l l e g e d l y i m p r o p e r u s e consistent Neither and g i r l s that When t h e i n t e r v i e w was a d m i t t e d i n Rule prior of the interview Cochran of the interview f o rthe jury. evidence, doctrine to the portions allegations concerning those portions of object until the jury's a specific at the time the h i s allegations are f o r our review. Cochran a l l e g e s that the t r i a l court erroneously d e n i e d h i s m o t i o n t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t C.K. h a d provided person allow sexually explicit i n the past. Daniel explicit Lewis photographs photographs Cochran of h e r s e l f had asked to t e s t i f y of h e r s e l f 55 that C.K. t o him. to another the t r i a l had court sent In the t r i a l to sexually court, CR-10-0516 Cochran's counsel stated that he desired to t e s t i m o n y to support the defense's theory one that took the photograph of her developed. it, And she's the b e c a u s e we think that of h e r s e l f our t o Mr. belief Cochran." Lewis, that (R. she 19.) then, On combined w i t h the made the that Mr. C o c h r a n and inclined to pictures Cochran of the of his knowledge, possibly Cochran's brief, testimony w o u l d be Although court, placed at she not anticipation charge The trial court (R. addressed by under Alabama's r a p e - s h i e l d r u l e . conduct the that ... "[i]n evidence complaining any either ... As this [C.K.] took held without party to shall 56 the not for past be arrest." that or Lewis's the that criminal sexual trial inadmissible noted e a r l i e r , prosecution relating witness "this in his i t a p p e a r s t h a t L e w i s ' s t e s t i m o n y w o u l d be provides Mr. 19-20.) irrelevant. of of developed i t in his residence in 43. and that case, would have s u p p o r t e d Cochran's d e f e n s e t h a t t h e p h o t o , p r o d u c e d i t , and i t pictures her alleges pornography had i n support [C.K.'s] a d m i s s i o n t h a t basis the possessed send is relevant these Lewis's " [ C . K . was] i t and that appeal, that produced i f she's took evidence, photo one and present rule sexual behavior admissible," of unless CR-10-0516 "such past s e x u a l b e h a v i o r d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d the of it the accused." appears that photographs allegedly Cochran In Rule A l a . R. testimony of the taken 412, relating complaining i n the i s inadmissible past and irrelevant. In the p r e s e n t to sexually witness, sent under Rule any e v e n t , t h e t r i a l t e s t i m o n y was Evid. participation to explicit C.K., that were someone other than 412. court correctly held that Rule 402, case, A l a . R. Lewis's Evid., provides: " A l l r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i s a d m i s s i b l e , e x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r t h a t o f t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a , by s t a t u t e , by t h e s e r u l e s , o r by o t h e r r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e c o u r t s of t h i s S t a t e . Evidence which i s not r e l e v a n t i s not a d m i s s i b l e . " Rule 401, A l a . R. Evid, provides: " ' R e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e ' means e v i d e n c e h a v i n g a n y t e n d e n c y t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y f a c t t h a t i s of consequence to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the a c t i o n more p r o b a b l e o r l e s s p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be without the evidence." In 2005), Barrett this v. Court State, 918 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Crim. stated: "'The q u e s t i o n o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e i s g e n e r a l l y l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l c o u r t , a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h a t q u e s t i o n w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d e x c e p t u p o n a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . ' E x p a r t e L o g g i n s , 771 So. 2 d 1 0 9 3 , 1103 ( A l a . 2000). 57 App. CR-10-0516 "'To be competent and admissible, evidence m u s t be relevant -that i s , e v i d e n c e must t e n d t o p r o v e or d i s p r o v e t h e i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e j u r y . R u l e 4 0 1 , A l a . R. E v i d . The d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e l e v a n c y and a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e r e s t s l a r g e l y i n the sound d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge. The t r i a l j u d g e i s o b l i g e d t o l i m i t the evidence to that evidence that would be necessary to aid the fact-finders in d e c i d i n g t h e i s s u e s b e f o r e them, and to preclude evidence that i s too remote, i r r e l e v a n t , o r whose p r e j u d i c e o u t w e i g h s i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e . L o g g i n s v . S t a t e , 771 So. 2d 1070, 1077-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 771 So. 2 d 1093 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . ' " H a r r i n g t o n v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 2002)." 918 So. 2d In at o f h e r and Cochran she gave t h e p h o t o g r a p h sent d i f f e r e n t someone e l s e it more possessed act. would produced 2d 278 , 293 (Ala. a d m i t t e d t h a t she d e v e l o p e d engaged i n a s e x u a l a c t and t o him. Evidence probable or less the photograph to support i t , and of him i t and any that that in C.K. 58 tendency engaged "[C.K.] his that of h e r s e l f Cochran allegation, theory placed have probable Cochran's his not the indicating that s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t photographs i n the past would Contrary not So. 946. t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , C.K. photograph had 858 residence to t o make knowingly in a sexual Lewis's took C.K. testimony the photo, without his CR-10-0516 knowledge, p o s s i b l y i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of h i s a r r e s t . " no allegation planted photographs knowledge. prove court or disprove d i d not Based Lewis would on or i n h i s residence Therefore, t e s t i m o n y was is that him Lewis's any i s s u e exceed have testimony before on t h e f o r e g o i n g , would the jury; i t s discretion i r r e l e v a n t and testified There i s that C.K. without h i s not tend thus, i n holding the that to trial the inadmissible. the judgment of the t r i a l court affirmed. AFFIRMED. Windom, P . J . , a n d W e l c h a n d K e l l u m , J J . , c o n c u r . J., concurs i n the result. 59 Joiner,

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