Roy Edward Perkins v. State of Alabama
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REL: 11/02/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 CR-08-1927 Roy Edward P e r k i n s v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal from Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t (CC-92-478.60) Court WINDOM, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . Roy Edward Penitentiary, Perkins, appeals a death-row the c i r c u i t inmate court's at denial Holman of h i s p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f f i l e d pursuant t o Rule 32, CR-08-1927 Ala. R. Crim. P., i n which he attacked h i s capital-murder c o n v i c t i o n and sentence o f d e a t h . I n 1994, P e r k i n s was c o n v i c t e d o f m u r d e r i n g C a t h y Gilliam d u r i n g the course of a k i d n a p p i n g i n the f i r s t degree, 13A-5-40(a)(1), A l a . Code 1975. The j u r y see § recommended, b y a v o t e o f 10-2, t h a t P e r k i n s be s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h . The c i r c u i t c o u r t f o l l o w e d t h e j u r y ' s recommendation and s e n t e n c e d P e r k i n s to death. On d i r e c t a p p e a l , b o t h t h i s C o u r t and t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t death. affirmed 808 So. 2d 1143 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . the United Alabama and sentence of See P e r k i n s v. S t a t e , 808 So. 2d 1041 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999), a f f ' d , of Perkins's conviction States, Supreme C o u r t Virginia, 536 U.S. The Supreme C o u r t h o w e v e r , remanded t h e c a u s e in light 304 to the o f i t s h o l d i n g i n A t k i n s v. (2002), which held that i t is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t o sentence a m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d i n d i v i d u a l t o death. See remand from P e r k i n s v. A l a b a m a , 536 U.S. t h e Supreme Court of 953 (2002). On the United States, the A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e r e c o r d d i d n o t show t h a t P e r k i n s met t h e most l i b e r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f m e n t a l and a f f i r m e d P e r k i n s ' s d e a t h s e n t e n c e . 851 So. 2d 453 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . retardation See Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , T h e r e a f t e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t o f 2 CR-08-1927 the United Alabama, States 540 certificate denied U.S. c e r t i o r a r i review. 830 (2003). This See P e r k i n s v . Court issued the o f j u d g m e n t on F e b r u a r y 20, 2003. I n 2004, P e r k i n s f i l e d P., p e t i t i o n a 372-page R u l e 32, A l a . R. C r i m . i n the Tuscaloosa Circuit c o n v i c t i o n and sentence o f death. Court attacking h i s P e r k i n s f i l e d amendments t o s p e c i f i c i s s u e s i n September 2004, May 2005, A u g u s t 2007, a n d May 2009. The reason f o r the delay i n this case i s that Perkins f i l e d several extraordinary petitions while h i s postconviction p e t i t i o n was p e n d i n g i n t h e T u s c a l o o s a 2005, Perkins moved f o r discovery, Department o f Youth S e r v i c e s Resources ("DHR") r e c o r d s 2005), seeking access I n May toh i s ("DYS") a n d D e p a r t m e n t o f Human a n d t o DHR r e c o r d s mother, s t e p f a t h e r , and s i s t e r . motion. C i r c u i t Court. related to h i s The c i r c u i t c o u r t d e n i e d that I n Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 920 So. 2d 599 ( A l a . C r i m . App. this Court granted Perkins's petition f o r a writ of mandamus a n d d i r e c t e d t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t t o g r a n t h i m d i s c o v e r y of h i s own DYS a n d DHR records. I n May 2006, this Court denied P e r k i n s ' s second e x t r a o r d i n a r y p e t i t i o n r e q u e s t i n g t h a t this Court s e t aside the c i r c u i t court's 3 order granting the CR-08-1927 State reciprocal discovery. 0148, May an and 31, evidentiary hearing on J u l y 30, A u g u s t 17, those On 2006). 2009, See In A p r i l on parte 2008, t h e Perkins's issued 2009, P e r k i n s Ex an circuit denying circuit (CR-05- court postconviction order moved t h e Perkins, petition relief. court order 2009, t h e circuit On 1 to rule c l a i m s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d i n i t s J u l y 30 S e p t e m b e r 3, held on order. c o u r t amended i t s o r i g i n a l denying Perkins's p e t i t i o n . Perkins appealed to this Court. The order circuit sentencing court set Perkins to out the following facts in i t s death: "On A u g u s t 9, 1990, i n n o r t h T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y , [ P e r k i n s ] came t o t h e r e s i d e n c e o f C a t h y G i l l i a m , who was there alone except f o r her daughter. [ P e r k i n s ] , who was i d e n t i f i e d a t t r i a l , k i d n a p p e d t h e v i c t i m , C a t h y G i l l i a m , w i t h a handgun w h i l e v i c t i m ' s d a u g h t e r w a t c h e d . [ P e r k i n s ] t h e n d r o v e away w i t h t h e v i c t i m , and t h e d a u g h t e r c a l l e d f o r h e l p . "About an h o u r l a t e r , [ G i l l i a m ] showed up a t Maudeen Hoods' r e s i d e n c e , s t a t i n g s h e ' d b e e n s h o t , was d y i n g and n e e d e d h e l p . Ms. Hood c a l l e d t h e authorities. [State Trooper Eldon] Willingham got information on the suspect, his vehicle and d i r e c t i o n of t r a v e l from [ G i l l i a m ] . He n o t e d t h a t [ G i l l i a m ] had b e e n s h o t i n t h e c h e s t b u t n o t t h r o u g h the f r o n t of her s h i r t . The e v i d e n c e was that The c i r c u i t c o u r t n o t e d i n i t s o r d e r t h a t i t had w r i t t e n t h e o r d e r w i t h no a s s i s t a n c e . 1 4 CR-08-1927 [ G i l l i a m ] a l s o d i d n o t have gunpowder her s h i r t . [ G i l l i a m ] was t a k e n t o a died before g e t t i n g there. The b u l l e t e x i t point j u s t t o the r i g h t of center [ G i l l i a m ] a l s o h a d a s t a b wound n e a r and a b r o k e n bone i n h e r n e c k . s t i p p l i n g on hospital but wound h a d an on h e r b a c k . her c l a v i c l e " C h i e f D e p u t y B u t c h Hopson o f F a y e t t e , A l a b a m a , on A u g u s t 8, 1990, h e a r d a b o u t a s h o o t i n g o r k i d n a p p i n g by [ P e r k i n s ] o r someone f i t t i n g h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , over h i s r a d i o . He was d r i v i n g t o w a r d Tuscaloosa County a n d saw [ P e r k i n s ] , whom he r e c o g n i z e d , c o m i n g t o w a r d h i m i n a t r u c k . He t u r n e d a r o u n d a n d went a f t e r [ P e r k i n s ] , who d r o v e t o a r o a d and a b a n d o n e d t h e t r u c k . The t r u c k h a d b e e n m i s s i n g f r o m i t s owner a l o n g w i t h a l o n g r i f l e a n d a .357 Magnum c a l i b e r handgun. The t r u c k was a b a n d o n e d l e s s than a m i l e from [ P e r k i n s ' s ] mother's house. " [ P e r k i n s ] was c a p t u r e d a few d a y s l a t e r i n t h e woods a f t e r a b i g manhunt. I t was l a t e r learned t h a t [ P e r k i n s ] h a d gone t o D a r l e n e H a l l ' s h o u s e , w h i c h was n e a r [ G i l l i a m ' s ] h o u s e , j u s t b e f o r e g o i n g to [ G i l l i a m ' s ] house. Ms. H a l l g o t s u s p i c i o u s o f [ P e r k i n s ] , who a s k e d t o u s e h e r phone, a n d h a d s e e n h i s p i c t u r e i n t h e n e w s p a p e r as a s u s p e c t e d r a p i s t . She r a n h i m o f f w i t h an u n l o a d e d r i f l e . [Perkins] l e f t i n a truck. " [ P e r k i n s ] h a d been i n p r i s o n f o r r a p e , second d e g r e e , a n d was o u t on p a r o l e . A b o u t A u g u s t 1, 1990, he h a d a s k e d h i s c o u s i n , [ B . P . ] , t o h e l p h i m . [Perkins] drove h e r t o a b l o c k b u i l d i n g near h i s m o t h e r ' s h o u s e . [ P e r k i n s ] p u l l e d a k n i f e on h e r a n d f o r c e d h e r t o have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h him. She was able t o escape e v e n t u a l l y . A b o u t A u g u s t 6, 1990, [D.W.] was g r a b b e d b y [ P e r k i n s ] a n d t a k e n t o t h e same b l o c k b u i l d i n g a t k n i f e p o i n t a n d f o r c e d t o have r e p e t i t i v e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e a n d sodomy w i t h [Perkins]. H e r hands were t i e d d u r i n g t h e s e x u a l attacks. 5 CR-08-1927 "At t r i a l , e v i d e n c e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t [ P e r k i n s ] kidnapped [ G i l l i a m ] w i t h i n t e n t to v i o l a t e her sexually or to i n f l i c t physical i n j u r y on h e r a n d t h a t , d u r i n g t h i s k i d n a p p i n g , [ P e r k i n s ] i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused [ G i l l i a m ' s ] death by s h o o t i n g h e r w i t h a gun, s p e c i f i c a l l y a .357 magnum c a l i b e r handgun." ( T r i a l r e c o r d , p. At t r i a l , 345-47.) 2 Perkins's counsel s t i p u l a t e d t o the following: " [ P e r k i n s ] caused t h e death o f Cathy G i l l i a m w i t h a .357 Magnum p i s t o l . ... [ P e r k i n s ] was i n t h e 1979 C h e v r o l e t g r a y p i c k u p t r u c k shown i n S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t number 23. ... C a t h y G i l l i a m ' s b l o o d was f o u n d i n t h e 1979 g r a y C h e v r o l e t p i c k u p t r u c k shown i n S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t number 2 3 . " ( T r i a l r e c o r d , p. 2087.) Standard o f Review Perkins postconviction appeals petition the circuit he f i l e d court's denial i n the Tuscaloosa of a Circuit Court a t t a c k i n g h i s c a p i t a l - m u r d e r c o n v i c t i o n and sentence o f death. According t o Rule 3 2 . 3 , A l a . R. Crim. P., "The p e t i t i o n e r s h a l l have t h e b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g a n d p r o v i n g b y a preponderance the p e t i t i o n e r of the evidence the facts necessary t o e n t i t l e to r e l i e f . " T h i s Court has taken j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f our r e c o r d s r e l a t e d to Perkins's d i r e c t appeal. See H u l l v . S t a t e , 607 So. 2d 369, 371 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . 2 6 CR-08-1927 "Though we r e v i e w e d t h e c l a i m s on [ P e r k i n s ' s ] d i r e c t appeal f o r p l a i n e r r o r , the p l a i n - e r r o r standard of review does not apply to a postconviction p e t i t i o n attacking a capital-murder c o n v i c t i o n and death sentence. See F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 13 So. 3d 418, 424 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) ; W a l d r o p v . S t a t e , 987 So. 2d 1186 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ; H a l l v. S t a t e , 979 So. 2d 125 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ; Gaddy v. S t a t e , 952 So. 2d 1149 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) . 'In a d d i t i o n , " [ t ] h e p r o c e d u r a l b a r s o f R u l e 32 a p p l y w i t h e q u a l f o r c e t o a l l c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e i n which t h e death p e n a l t y has been imposed."' B r o w n l e e v. S t a t e , 666 So. 2d 91, 93 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) . When r e v i e w i n g t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s on t h e c l a i m s r a i s e d i n [ P e r k i n s ' s ] postconviction petition, we apply an a b u s e - o f - d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d a r d . Gaddy, 952 So. 2d a t 1154. " Ray v. S t a t e , With 80 So. 3d 965, 971 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) . these p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, claims Perkins raises i n h i s b r i e f this Court to this turns to the Court. I. Perkins first argues that the c i r c u i t court erred i n d e n y i n g h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e S t a t e v i o l a t e d B r a d y v. M a r y l a n d , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by f a i l i n g to disclose a statement the v i c t i m ' s d a u g h t e r made t o a v i c t i m s ' s e r v i c e s o f f i c e r w i t h t h e Tuscaloosa County D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e . At August scream. Perkins's t r i a l , 9, 1990, a t a r o u n d After this Candace Gilliam 4:00 p.m., testified she h e a r d t h a t on h e r mother s t a t e m e n t , Candace became v e r y e m o t i o n a l 7 CR-08-1927 and started stipulated crying. Perkins's to the following counsel i n lieu and o f Candace's the State continued testimony: "When [Candace] h e a r d h e r m o t h e r s c r e a m a s e c o n d t i m e , Candace went t o t h e k i t c h e n . T h e r e s h e saw a man h o l d i n g h e r m o t h e r a n d p o i n t i n g a b l a c k p i s t o l a t h e r m o t h e r ' s h e a d . She h e a r d h e r m o t h e r y e l l f o r h e l p and s a y 'something about a r a p i s t . ' (R. 1755.) Candace w a t c h e d as t h e man l e d h e r m o t h e r o u t s i d e t o a v e h i c l e p a r k e d b e h i n d h e r m o t h e r ' s c a r . She c o u l d n o t s e e t h e v e h i c l e w e l l , b u t d i d n o t i c e t h a t i t was b i g g e r t h a n a c a r a n d t h a t i t was g r a y i n c o l o r . A t t h a t p o i n t , Candace t e l e p h o n e d h e r g r a n d m o t h e r . Candace was u n a b l e t o g i v e a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e man who h a d a b d u c t e d h e r m o t h e r , b u t s h e d i d t e l l p o l i c e t h a t t h e man h a d b r o w n , s t r a i g h t h a i r and a t h i n b e a r d , a n d t h a t he was n o t much t a l l e r than h e r mother." Perkins, 808 So. 2 d a t 1053. When d e n y i n g relief on t h i s claim, the c i r c u i t court stated: "The evidence presented to this court e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t , a t t h e t r i a l s t a g e , [the] S t a t e r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D e f e n s e t h a t i t was f o l l o w i n g an 'open f i l e ' p o l i c y o f p e r m i t t i n g d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o have a c c e s s t o a l l d i s c o v e r y i n f o r m a t i o n . B a s e d on that understanding, trial counsel agreed to s t i p u l a t e t h a t Candace G i l l i a m ' s t e s t i m o n y w o u l d be t h a t t h e v i c t i m , h e r mother, y e l l e d 'something about a r a p i s t ' as s h e was b e i n g a b d u c t e d b y [ P e r k i n s ] . The e v i d e n c e was u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d i d not produce t o t h e defense a v i d e o t a p e d statement o f t h e w i t n e s s t h a t was made s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e c r i m e . The f i r s t t i m e t r i a l c o u n s e l h e a r d o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e t a p e was d u r i n g t h e R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s . I n 8 CR-08-1927 t h e v i d e o t a p e d i n t e r v i e w , Candace G i l l i a m s t a t e s she c o u l d n o t h e a r what h e r m o t h e r s a i d when she was abducted. F o r e x a m p l e , a t 4:45 o f t h e t a p e , t h e following occurred: "'Q: D i d y o u r Mom, do you remember y o u r saying? I know you s a i d she s c r e a m e d , Mom but "'A: ( I n a u d i b l e ) I t s o u n d e d l i k e she s a y i n g something but ( i n a u d i b l e ) was "'Q: I'm sorry I couldn't "'A: Sounded l i k e she was b u t , um, I d o n ' t know.' saying something "The s t i p u l a t i o n d i f f e r s from the statements made by t h e w i t n e s s i n t h e r e c o r d e d i n t e r v i e w . B o t h of [ P e r k i n s ' s ] t r i a l a t t o r n e y s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y n e v e r w o u l d have s t i p u l a t e d to the testimony of Candace G i l l i a m r e g a r d i n g what she h e a r d h e r m o t h e r s a y had t h e y known o f t h e t a p e . T h e r e was no t e s t i m o n y o r e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e R u l e 32 proceedings from the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s office r e g a r d i n g any r e a s o n why t h e v i d e o t a p e was not produced by the S t a t e , i . e . , no evidence was p r e s e n t e d as t o w h e t h e r t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o d u c e i t was i n a d v e r t e n t o r n o t . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s c o u r t has t o a c c e p t as u n d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e S t a t e w i t h h e l d the v i d e o t a p e d statement from the defense. N e i t h e r t r i a l n o r a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l c o u l d have known o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e t a p e , and t h e r e f o r e , t h e c l a i m i s n o t and c o u l d n o t be p r e c l u d e d . " B a s e d on t h e d i s c o v e r y o r d e r and a g r e e m e n t i n t h i s c a s e , t h e v i d e o t a p e s h o u l d have b e e n p r o d u c e d as i t was f a v o r a b l e impeachment e v i d e n c e o f t h e witness f o r the S t a t e . Furthermore, defense counsel w o u l d n o t have s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e e v i d e n c e p r o f f e r e d by t h e S t a t e i f t h e y had known o f t h e t a p e . To 9 CR-08-1927 warrant a r e v e r s a l , 'material': however, the evidence must be "'The e v i d e n c e i s m a t e r i a l o n l y i f t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , had the e v i d e n c e been d i s c l o s e d t o t h e d e f e n s e , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g w o u l d have been different. A 'reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y ' i s a probability sufficient t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome.' U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B a g l e y , 473 U.S. [667,] 682 [ ( 1 9 8 5 ) ] . Ex p a r t e B e l i s l e , [11 So. 3d 323, 330-31] (Ala. 2008). "Had d e f e n s e c o u n s e l known o f t h e t a p e , t h e s t i p u l a t i o n w o u l d n o t have been made and Candace G i l l i a m w o u l d have been r e q u i r e d t o t e s t i f y a t length. D e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o u l d have a t t e m p t e d t o i m p e a c h h e r t e s t i m o n y t h a t she h e a r d h e r m o t h e r s a y something about a ' r a p i s t ' by u s i n g t h e v i d e o t a p e . T h i s w o u l d n o t , h o w e v e r , have c h a n g e d t h e outcome o f the case. A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g and r e v i e w i n g t h e appropriate materials, i t i s apparent that the outcome w o u l d n o t have been d i f f e r e n t u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and no r e l i e f i s w a r r a n t e d on t h i s ground." (C. 4488-90) At the (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) postconviction evidentiary hearing, Perkins p r e s e n t e d t e s t i m o n y t h a t Candace h a d b e e n i n t e r v i e w e d b y P a t Lyons, shortly a victims' after services t h e murder. officer, In t h i s on August interview 22, 1990, Lyons asked Candace i f she h a d h e a r d what h e r m o t h e r h a d y e l l e d . responded "didn't that know." her mother Perkins yelled asserts 10 something but Candace that she t h a t Candace's statement t o CR-08-1927 L y o n s was not d i s c l o s e d to the defense, that the statement w o u l d have u n d e r m i n e d C a n d a c e ' s s t i p u l a t e d t e s t i m o n y , and t h a t the s t a t e m e n t was m a t e r i a l t o h i s d e f e n s e . T h i s C o u r t has r e v i e w e d t h e t a p e o f C a n d a c e ' s s t a t e m e n t . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n t e r v i e w , Candace was i n t h e s i x t h On the tape, she i s s i t t i n g on a sofa next to her grade. father. Candace a p p e a r s v i s i b l y s h y , n e r v o u s , and r e t i c e n t . When a s k e d questions, Lyons she f r e q u e n t l y l o o k e d t o h e r f a t h e r f o r g u i d a n c e . asked i f she Candace r e s p o n d e d had heard what h e r mother yelled, and t h a t i t s o u n d e d l i k e she was t r y i n g t o s a y s o m e t h i n g b u t t h a t she " d i d n ' t know." She s a i d t h a t she saw a man w i t h a b e a r d and brown h a i r t a k e h e r m o t h e r a t g u n p o i n t . In held Brady v. M a r y l a n d , the United States Supreme that "[t]he s u p p r e s s i o n by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n favorable t o an accused where the punishment, evidence is upon of evidence r e q u e s t v i o l a t e s due material either to Court guilt process or to i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e good f a i t h o r b a d f a i t h o f t h e prosecution." 373 U.S. a t 87. "A Brady [v. M a r y l a n d , 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] violation occurs where: (1) the prosecution s u p p r e s s e s e v i d e n c e ; (2) t h e e v i d e n c e i s f a v o r a b l e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d (3) m a t e r i a l t o t h e i s s u e s a t trial. S t a n o v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) ; D e l a p v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 11 CR-08-1927 1 9 8 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B l a s c o , 702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 464 U.S. 914, 104 S. C t . 275, 276, 78 L. Ed. 2d 256 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; Ex p a r t e Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106, 1110 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 474 U.S. 975, 106 S. C t . 340, 88 L. Ed. 2d 325 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B a g l e y , 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. C t . 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n by Blackmun, J . ) , d e f i n e d the s t a n d a r d of m a t e r i a l i t y r e q u i r e d t o show a B r a d y v i o l a t i o n as f o l l o w s : 'The evidence i s m a t e r i a l only i f there i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , had t h e e v i d e n c e b e e n d i s c l o s e d t o t h e d e f e n s e , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g w o u l d have been d i f f e r e n t . A " r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y " i s a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome.' See a l s o P e n n s y l v a n i a v. R i t c h i e , 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. C t . 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987); S t a n o v. Dugger, 901 F.2d a t 899; D e l a p v. D u g g e r , 890 F.2d a t 299; C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 954 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 2 ) ; Thompson v. S t a t e , 581 So. 2d 1216 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S. C t . 868, 116 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1992). "The same s t a n d a r d o f m a t e r i a l i t y and due process requirements apply whether the evidence i s e x c u l p a t o r y o r f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . United S t a t e s v. B a g l e y ; G i g l i o v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 4 05 U.S. 150, 92 S. C t . 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Ex p a r t e Womack[, 435 So. 2d 766 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ] . 'When t h e " r e l i a b i l i t y o f a g i v e n w i t n e s s may w e l l be d e t e r m i n a t i v e of g u i l t or innocence," n o n d i s c l o s u r e of e v i d e n c e a f f e c t i n g c r e d i b i l i t y f a l l s w i t h i n t h e general rule.' G i g l i o , 405 U.S. a t 154, 92 S. C t . a t 766 ( q u o t i n g Napue v. I l l i n o i s , 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. C t . 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ) . In s h o r t , due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o d i s c l o s e m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e , upon r e q u e s t by the d e f e n s e , when t h a t e v i d e n c e w o u l d t e n d t o e x c u l p a t e the accused or t o impeach the v e r a c i t y of a c r i t i c a l state's witness." 12 CR-08-1927 W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 1276, 1296-97 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1996). In this case, the Brady a p p e a l b u t i n s t e a d was proceeding. When c l a i m was not r a i s e d raised i n a postconviction addressing p r o c e e d i n g s , t h i s C o u r t has Brady claims in on direct collateral collateral stated: " B e c a u s e t h i s B r a d y [ v . M a r y l a n d , 373 U.S. 83 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , ] c l a i m was f i r s t p r e s e n t e d i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n , [the p e t i t i o n e r ] can o b t a i n r e l i e f o n l y i f it involves 'newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . ' Newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i s d e f i n e d under R u l e 32.1, A l a . R. C r i m . P., as f o l l o w s : "'Subject to the l i m i t a t i o n s of Rule 32.2, any d e f e n d a n t who has been c o n v i c t e d of a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e may institute a proceeding i n the court of original c o n v i c t i o n t o s e c u r e a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f on the g r o u n d t h a t : " ' "'(e) Newly d i s c o v e r e d m a t e r i a l f a c t s e x i s t which r e q u i r e t h a t the c o n v i c t i o n or s e n t e n c e be v a c a t e d b y t h e c o u r t , b e c a u s e : " ' ( 1 ) The f a c t s r e l i e d upon were n o t known by p e t i t i o n e r o r p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel at the time of t r i a l o r s e n t e n c i n g o r i n t i m e to file a post-trial motion p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 24, o r i n t i m e t o be i n c l u d e d i n any p r e v i o u s c o l l a t e r a l p r o c e e d i n g and c o u l d n o t have been d i s c o v e r e d b y any 13 CR-08-1927 of those times through the e x e r c i s e of reasonable d i l i g e n c e ; "'(2) The facts are not merely cumulative to other f a c t s t h a t were known; "'(3) The merely amount evidence; facts do not to impeachment " ' ( 4 ) I f t h e f a c t s h a d been known a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l o r o f sentencing, the r e s u l t probably w o u l d have b e e n d i f f e r e n t ; and "'(5) The facts establish that p e t i t i o n e r i s innocent of the crime f o r which petitioner was c o n v i c t e d o r s h o u l d n o t have received the sentence that petitioner received.' " R u l e 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. C r i m . b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n j u n c t i v e 'and' ( 5 ) , [ P e r k i n s ] must meet a l l f i v e R u l e 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., i n C f . Brown v. S t a t e , [807 So. 2d 1 1999)]." Payne v. S t a t e , 791 So. 2d 383, 397-98 P. We n o t e t h a t b e t w e e n (4) and p r e r e q u i s i t e s of order to p r e v a i l . ( A l a . C r i m . App. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999) . Not o n l y d i d P e r k i n s f a i l t o s a t i s f y the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a Brady v i o l a t i o n , P e r k i n s a l s o f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y the requirements f o r showing t h a t newly d i s c o v e r e d evidence. this claim was based on P e r k i n s d i d show t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e C a n d a c e ' s s t a t e m e n t and t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t 14 CR-08-1927 w o u l d have b e e n r e l e v a n t f o r impeachment. However, to Perkins's a s s e r t i o n s , the s t i p u l a t e d testimony only evidence that tended t o e s t a b l i s h Perkins's witnesses testified kidnapping and murder B.P. that in the of G i l l i a m , two was n o t t h e intent. Two before weeks Perkins contrary the had raped them. t e s t i f i e d t h a t she knew P e r k i n s a n d t h a t he h a d a s k e d h e r t o go w i t h him t o r e t u r n a c a r t o a f r i e n d . She s a i d a f t e r t h e y had been d r i v i n g f o r s e v e r a l m i n u t e s P e r k i n s down a d i r t D.W. road, testified turned p u t a k n i f e t o h e r t h r o a t , and raped h e r . t h a t , as she was g e t t i n g o u t o f h e r v e h i c l e a t her grandmother's house, P e r k i n s knife that to her throat. She said abandoned b u i l d i n g and r a p e d her. that minutes before came up b e h i n d h e r a n d p u t a that he drove Darlene H a l l a l s o h e r t o an testified G i l l i a m was a b d u c t e d , P e r k i n s came t o h e r h o u s e , k n o c k e d on h e r d o o r , a s k e d i f h e r h u s b a n d was a t home, and a s k e d t o u s e h e r t e l e p h o n e t o c a l l a tow t r u c k b e c a u s e , he said, not this h i s c a r was s t u c k i n a field. open t h e d o o r a n d t h a t Court held show P e r k i n s ' s Perkins that the c o l l a t e r a l intent. Perkins, 15 Hall left. s a i d t h a t she d i d On d i r e c t appeal, a c t s were a d m i s s i b l e t o 808 So. 2d a t 1084. CR-08-1927 Perkins to that, probability failed had establish that Candace's there is a pretrial reasonable statement been d i s c l o s e d , t h e outcome o f t h e t r i a l w o u l d have b e e n d i f f e r e n t . W i l l i a m s , 710 So. 2d a t 1296-97. Therefore, w i t h the c i r c u i t c o u r t t h a t P e r k i n s of p r o v i n g t h i s Court agrees f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n a Brady v i o l a t i o n . II. Perkins next constitutional argues r i g h t t o due that the p r o c e s s by State violated knowingly using testimony by i n f o r m i n g t h e d e f e n s e t h a t Candace w o u l d that mother y e l l e d her being forced from the something house. about a rapist According to Perkins, the by she d i d not testify was f a l s e because a p r e t r i a l Candace i n d i c a t e d t h a t false she S t a t e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was as his statement know what h e r mother yelled. "[A] conviction obtained known t o be s u c h by under the 269 representatives Fourteenth U.S. 264, t h r o u g h use Amendment of of the false evidence, S t a t e , must Napue v. Illinois, (1959) . " [ T ] h e k n o w i n g use o f m a t e r i a l f a l s e e v i d e n c e by t h e s t a t e i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n does v i o l a t e due process. G i g l i o v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S. C t . 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 108 16 fall 360 CR-08-1927 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Napue v. I l l i n o i s , 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. C t . 1173, 1177, 3 L. E d . 2d 1217, 1221 (1959); Mooney v. H o l o h a n , 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S. C t . 340, 341-42, 79 L. E d . 791, 794 (1935); S k i p p e r v. W a i n w r i g h t , 598 F.2d 425, 427 (5th C i r . ) (per c u r i a m ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. C t . 469, 62 L. E d . 2d 389 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . This rule a p p l i e s e q u a l l y when t h e s t a t e , a l t h o u g h n o t s o l i c i t i n g p e r j u r e d testimony, allows i t t o go u n c o r r e c t e d after learning of i t s f a l s i t y . G i g l i o , 405 U.S. a t 153, 92 S. C t . a t 766, 31 L. E d . 2d a t 108; N a p u f e ] , 360 U.S. a t 269, 79 S. C t . a t 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d a t 1221. I n a d d i t i o n , ' [ i ] t i s o f no c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e falsehood [ b e a r s ] upon t h e w i t n e s s ' credibility r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t l y upon [ t h e ] d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t . ' Napue, 360 U.S. a t 269, 79 S. C t . a t 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d a t 1221 ( q u o t i n g P e o p l e v. S a v v i d e s , 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 ( 1 9 5 6 ) ) ; s e e G i g l i o , 405 U.S. a t 154, 92 S. C t . a t 766, 31 L. E d . 2d a t 108." W i l l i a m s v. G r i s w a l d , 743 F.2d 1533, 1541 (11th C i r . 1984). See a l s o F a u l d e r v. J o h n s o n , 81 F.3d 515, 519 ( 5 t h C i r . 1996) . To p r o v e a G i g l i o v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 405 U.S. 150 violation, t h e p e t i t i o n e r must show t h a t : the testimony; (2) t h e t e s t i m o n y was f a l s e ; (1972), (1) t h e S t a t e u s e d (3) t h e S t a t e knew t h e t e s t i m o n y was f a l s e ; a n d (4) t h e t e s t i m o n y was m a t e r i a l t o the g u i l t or innocence of the accused. 743 F.2d at 1542. "[T]he s t a t e m e n t i n q u e s t i o n was merely misleading." Cir. W i l l i a m s v. G r i s w a l d , defendant must show 'indisputably false,' B y r d v. C o l l i n s , that the rather than 209 F.3d 486, 517 ( 6 t h 2000) ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 17 CR-08-1927 823 (6th C i r . 1989)). show that the testimony inconsistencies establish F.2d at "The was actually perjured, and i n t e s t i m o n y by g o v e r n m e n t w i t n e s s e s knowing use 822. b u r d e n i s on t h e d e f e n d a n t s of f a l s e " [ I ] t i s not c h a l l e n g e d by a n o t h e r testimony." enough witness that to mere do n o t Lochmondy, the 890 testimony or i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h is prior s t a t e m e n t s , and n o t e v e r y c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n f a c t o r argument i s material." Cir. 208 1991) U n i t e d S t a t e s v. or herself (E.D. M i c h . At not 2003) "[T]he or establish perjury." 753, 762 940 F.2d 286, ( c i t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B i g e l e i s e n , (8th C i r . 1980)). himself Payne, 625 F.2d 203, fact that a witness contradicts changes h i s or her story (citing Monroe v. Smith, 197 F. not 684 Supp. 2d 2001)). the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, t e s t i m o n y was, does Malcum v. B u r t , 276 F. Supp. 2d 664, (E.D. M i c h . testify. 291 ( 8 t h No e v i d e n c e i n fact, was presented false. t h a t the Candace d i d stipulated I n c o n s i s t e n t statements by a w i t n e s s do n o t , by t h e m s e l v e s , e s t a b l i s h t h a t one s t a t e m e n t i s false supra. and t h e o t h e r i s true. Accordingly, Perkins See failed 18 United S t a t e s v. Payne, t o meet h i s b u r d e n of CR-08-1927 proving denied a G i g l i o v i o l a t i o n , and the c i r c u i t relief on t h i s court correctly court erred claim. III. Perkins next argues that the c i r c u i t d e n y i n g h i s c l a i m t h a t he was d e n i e d of counsel during the e f f e c t i v e h i s capital-murder s e v e r a l grounds i n support o f t h i s 466 U.S. 668 (1984), assistance He cites argument. The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d Washington, proceedings. in States held that i n Strickland to prevail v. on a c l a i m o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l t h e p e t i t i o n e r must establish: (1) t h a t c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t , and (2) t h a t he was p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e d e f i c i e n t performance. " J u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y o f c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e must be h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l . I t i s a l l too tempting f o r a defendant t o second-guess counsel's assistance a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n o r a d v e r s e s e n t e n c e , and i t i s a l l too easy f o r a c o u r t , examining counsel's defense a f t e r i t has p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l , t o c o n c l u d e t h a t a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. C f . E n g l e v. I s a a c , 456 U.S. 107, 133-134, 102 S. C t . 1558, 1574-1575, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney p e r f o r m a n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t be made t o e l i m i n a t e the d i s t o r t i n g e f f e c t s of h i n d s i g h t , to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's c h a l l e n g e d c o n d u c t , and t o e v a l u a t e t h e c o n d u c t f r o m counsel's p e r s p e c t i v e at the time. Because o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n making t h e e v a l u a t i o n , a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct f a l l s w i t h i n t h e wide range o f 19 CR-08-1927 reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e ; t h a t i s , the d e f e n d a n t must overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n 'might be c o n s i d e r e d sound t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ' See M i c h e l v. L o u i s i a n a , [350 U.S. 91, 101 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ] . There are c o u n t l e s s ways t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i n any g i v e n c a s e . Even the b e s t c r i m i n a l defense a t t o r n e y s would not defend a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t i n t h e same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The p u r p o s e o f i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s r e v i e w i s n o t t o grade c o u n s e l ' s performance. See S t r i c k l a n d [v. W a s h i n g t o n ] , [466 U.S. 668,] 104 S. C t . [2052,] 2065 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; see a l s o W h i t e v. S i n g l e t a r y , 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1992) ('We a r e n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n g r a d i n g l a w y e r s ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ; we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n whether the a d v e r s a r i a l process at t r i a l , i n f a c t , worked a d e q u a t e l y . ' ) . We recognize that ' [ r ] e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an a r t , and an a c t o r o m i s s i o n t h a t i s u n p r o f e s s i o n a l i n one c a s e may be s o u n d o r even b r i l l i a n t i n a n o t h e r . ' S t r i c k l a n d , 104 S. C t . a t 2067. D i f f e r e n t l a w y e r s have d i f f e r e n t g i f t s ; t h i s f a c t , as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m c a s e t o c a s e , means t h e r a n g e o f what m i g h t be a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r o a c h a t t r i a l must be b r o a d . To s t a t e the obvious: the t r i a l l a w y e r s , i n every case, could have done something more or something different. So, o m i s s i o n s a r e i n e v i t a b l e . But, the i s s u e i s n o t what i s p o s s i b l e o r 'what i s p r u d e n t o r appropriate, but o n l y what i s constitutionally compelled.' B u r g e r v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S. C t . 3114, 3126, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . " Chandler 2000) v. United S t a t e s , 218 (footnote omitted). 20 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th C i r . CR-08-1927 At trial, Steverson and Perkins James was represented Smith. Both by attorneys attorneys Dennis testified at Perkins's postconviction evidentiary hearing. Initially, trial t h i s Court notes that the record of Perkins's shows t h a t i n O c t o b e r motion requesting that counsel. 60.) Perkins ( T r i a l C. 47.) (Trial R. affect, his 1992, P e r k i n s ' s be confronted "Whether standby of with Thus, t h i s ineffective a similar a defendant counsel allowed to filed a c t as a co- The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h a t m o t i o n . C o u r t must i f any, P e r k i n s ' s r e q u e s t claims counsel claim determine t o a c t as c o - c o u n s e l assistance fact may first of what h a s on counsel. situation, courts ineffective When have h e l d : assistance from d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r h y b r i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s more a k i n t o a d e f e n d a n t p r o c e e d i n g p r o se o r i s more a k i n t o a defense c o n t r o l l e d Warr v. S t a t e , 877 N.E.2d 817, 823 by c o u n s e l . " ( I n d . C t . App. 2007) (citing Henson v. S t a t e , 798 N.E.2d 540, 546 ( I n d . C t . App. 2 0 0 3 ) , c i t i n g i n t u r n C a r t e r v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 164 125 F e d . Appx. 215, 217 chooses t o r e p r e s e n t appointed counsel (Ind. 1987)). ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2004) See Lee v. ("A Hines, defendant who h i m s e l f and has t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u r t cannot succeed i n e s t a b l i s h i n g 21 ineffective CR-08-1927 assistance against defendant maintained Kevorkian, such counsel control when i t i s clear of h i s defense."); that the People 248 M i c h . App. 373, 639 N.W.2d 291 (2001) c a n n o t be h e l d t o t h e s t a n d a r d s v. (counsel of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e when defendant maintained c o n t r o l of h i s defense). See a l s o Thomas M. Place, Post C o n v i c t i o n Developments, 79 P a . B.A. Q. 145 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; G r e g o r y G. S a r n o , Modern S t a t u s o f R u l e s a n d S t a n d a r d s in State Courts Representation In this Perkins fact, case, the record P e r k i n s ' s defense assistance of Defense 2 A . L . R . 4 t h 27 nothing i n the t r i a l shows that counsel Counsel's (1980). r e c o r d suggests t o or d i d waive h i s r i g h t that to counsel. maintained control In of and t h a t P e r k i n s p l a y e d a minor r o l e i n t h e of t r i a l counsel, first use peremptory and those claims are properly i n t h i s p o s t c o n v i c t i o n proceeding. argues ineffective forfailing to Adequacy P e r k i n s d i d n o t w a i v e any c l a i m s o f i n e f f e c t i v e before t h i s Court Perkins to of C r i m i n a l C l i e n t , intended proceedings. as that his trial counsel was t o c h a l l e n g e f o r cause o r f o r f a i l i n g strikes t o remove a s s e r t s were b i a s e d o r i m p a r t i a l . 22 various jurors who he CR-08-1927 The circuit court stated the following concerning this claim: " T h i s c l a i m was r a i s e d on a p p e a l and r e j e c t e d by the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ( s ) . I t cannot form the b a s i s of an i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l c l a i m . Even i f i t c o u l d be r e - l i t i g a t e d , t h e c l a i m f a i l s as t h e r e i s no p r o o f t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e n o r t h a t any c h a l l e n g e t o t h e j u r o r s i n q u e s t i o n w o u l d have b e e n s u s t a i n e d by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . " (R. 4493.) This Court notes t h a t the p o r t i o n of the order holding that this erroneous. On addressed Perkins's denying found no 14 of c l a i m was direct appeal, claim Perkins's error in j u r o r s f o r cause. the i s challenged N.W., was also than Nonetheless, denying the relief these a f f i r m a lower court's for So. Court court erred cause. to This remove postconviction d i r e c t appeal court specifically 2d a t 1073-75. raised in court's d i r e c t appeal i s trial failure this on reason circuit on the 808 in challenged the this challenges Perkins, who reason that court's juror r a i s e d on circuit Court those 14 Only one proceeding, for a different this proceeding. gave a l t e r n a t i v e g r o u n d s claims. Moreover, in this Court for may r u l i n g on a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n i f 23 CR-08-1927 i t i s c o r r e c t f o r any r e a s o n . 313, See McNabb v. S t a t e , 991 So. 2d 333 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) . When counsel reviewing related examination, claims to counsel's of ineffective performance assistance during voir of dire t h i s Court gives great deference t o the counsel's decisions. " C o u n s e l i s ... a c c o r d e d p a r t i c u l a r d e f e r e n c e when c o n d u c t i n g v o i r d i r e . An a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n s d u r i n g v o i r d i r e a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be m a t t e r s o f t r i a l strategy. Nguyen v. R e y n o l d s , 131 F.3d 1340, 1349 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1997) ( c i t i n g Teague v. S c o t t , 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ) . A strategic decision c a n n o t be t h e b a s i s f o r a claim of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance unless counsel's d e c i s i o n i s shown t o be s o i l l - c h o s e n t h a t i t p e r m e a t e s t h e e n t i r e t r i a l with obvious u n f a i r n e s s . I d . " Hughes v . U n i t e d "[W]here counsel a States, postconviction was i n e f f e c t i v e cause c h a l l e n g e , motion for failing alleges that trial t o r a i s e or preserve a t h e d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t a j u r o r was a c t u a l l y b i a s e d . " 324 258 F.3d 453, 457 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) . ( F l a . 2007). Carratelli "Because v. S t a t e , 961 So. 2d 312, [the a p p e l l a n t ' s ] claim of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l i s f o u n d e d upon a c l a i m t h a t counsel f a i l e d t o s t r i k e a biased j u r o r , [the appellant] must show t h a t t h e j u r o r was a c t u a l l y b i a s e d a g a i n s t h i m . " Miller v. Hughes F r a n c i s , 269 F.3d 609, 616 ( 6 t h C i r . 2001) ( c i t i n g 24 CR-08-1927 v. U n i t e d States, appellant's] 258 F.3d 453, 458 claim of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance grounded i n the c l a i m t h a t counsel juror. him, To m a i n t a i n however, a claim a c t u a l l y b i a s e d a g a i n s t him." 75 ( 8 t h C i r . 1995) 215 (1981)). (citing " [ T ] o show defense counsel's failure [biased] veniremen, (N.D. Ga. 1999) . of counsel show juror that S m i t h v. P h i l l i p s , attorney to error use prejudiced the j u r o r 455 U.S. 209, strikes for f o r [the a p p e l l a n t ] harbor a c t u a l bias in to against 60 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1362 "Few d e c i s i o n s a t t r i a l a r e as s u b j e c t i v e o r where decisions are attorney often strategy made on as juror intangible voir dire, factors." 269 F.3d a t 620. " B e c a u s e a d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e i n a [post-conviction] proceeding, post-conviction r e l i e f b a s e d on a l a w y e r ' s i n c o m p e t e n c e w i t h r e g a r d to the composition of the j u r y i s reserved f o r a n a r r o w c l a s s o f c a s e s where p r e j u d i c e i s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e r e c o r d , where a b i a s e d j u r o r a c t u a l l y s e r v e d on t h e j u r y . " v. S t a t e , was and p r e j u d i c e peremptory i t i s necessary to individual Jenkins is G o e d e r s v. H u n d l e y , 59 F.3d 73, P a r k e r v. T u r p i n , prone Miller, a biased must show t h a t t h e v e n i r e m e n d i d i n d e e d [the a p p e l l a n t ] . " "[The f a i l e d to strike a biased that [the a p p e l l a n t ] (6th C i r . 2001)). 824 So. 2d 977, 982 25 ( F l a . App. 2002). CR-08-1927 With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, challenged this Court reviews each juror. A. First, Perkins argues t h a t failing to challenge strikes to remove f o r c a u s e o r use j u r o r V.H. e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t she she was 12 had raped. that she V.H. could was be testified t h a t he s t r i k e V.H., on who else choices." but that (R. during voir dire cousin when d a u g h t e r s who had had first two base her remember why and indicated decision on the Steverson they d i d not move t o a d d e d t h a t when s t r i k i n g a j u r y i t "depends 249.) Smith they d i d not ... And "may testified strike V.H. t h a t you s t r i k i n g them f o r o t h e r you reasons." 26 be b e t t e r o r w o r s e that but he that could "striking not a l o o k a t t h e p o s i t i v e s and s o m e t i m e s you w o u l d n ' t r e a l l y want on t h e r e , b u t up peremptory At the e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , jury i s a weighing process, negatives. of h i s extensively questioned d i d not for said [ i s ] on t h e j u r y " and who remember why the she ineffective one V.H. i m p a r t i a l and evidence presented. was b e e n r a p e d by h e r y e a r s o l d and been counsel have p e o p l e don't (R. you 441-42.) that you don't end CR-08-1927 T h i s C o u r t has examined t h e v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e prospective jurors. mainly of questions The v o i r d i r e was e x t e n s i v e regarding case and t h e p r o s p e c t i v e the p u b l i c i t y and c o n s i s t e d surrounding the j u r o r s ' v i e w s on c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t . V.H. r e s p o n d e d t h a t she d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e d e a t h 3 penalty was a d e t e r r e n t t o c r i m e , t h a t she b e l i e v e d t h a t a s e n t e n c e o f life i n prison was w a r r a n t e d i n some c a s e s , have t o w e i g h a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i n r e g a r d that she w o u l d t o punishment, and t h a t v o t i n g w h e t h e r a d e f e n d a n t l i v e d o r d i e d was a v e r y responsibility. The related grave ( T r i a l R. 1342.) Utah Court of Appeals discussed, to i n e f f e c t i v e assistance strike a prospective i n depth, of counsel the law f o r f a i l i n g to juror: "We a r e unaware o f , and d e f e n d a n t has n o t brought to our attention, any rule that a u t o m a t i c a l l y d i s q u a l i f i e s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s who have b e e n , o r have f r i e n d s o r r e l a t i v e s who have been, v i c t i m s o f crimes s i m i l a r t o those a t i s s u e i n the case where they might s i t as jurors. Furthermore, cases i n v a r i o u s s t a t e and f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t when t r i a l counsel a l l o w s t h e s e a t i n g o f j u r o r s , who upon i n i t i a l v o i r dire inquiry appear biased, courts deny t h e ineffective assistance claim unless counsel's T h i s C o u r t n o t e d on d i r e c t a p p e a l t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c a s e was e x t e n s i v e . P e r k i n s v. S t a t e , 808 So. 2d 1 0 4 1 , 1068 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) . 3 27 CR-08-1927 actions could not conceivably constitute legitimate trial tactics. See, e.g., S i n g l e t o n v. L o c k h a r t , 871 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 ( 8 t h C i r . 1989) ( i n c a p i t a l m u r d e r c a s e , r e l a t i v e o f a m u r d e r v i c t i m was n o t a c t u a l l y b i a s e d and counsel's f a i l u r e t o c h a l l e n g e him was t a c t i c a l ) ; H o u s t o n v . N e l s o n , 404 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (C.D. C a l . 1975) ( i n p r e - S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , ] c a s e , where j u r o r expressed 'a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g f e e l i n g a g a i n s t ' kidnapping, b u t gave a s s u r a n c e s of a b i l i t y to consider evidence f a i r l y , counsel's d e c i s i o n not t o c h a l l e n g e was l e g i t i m a t e t r i a l t a c t i c ) ; O g l e v . S t a t e , 807 S.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mo. App. 1991) (where j u r o r i n r a p e c a s e s a i d he ' [ p ] r o b a b l y w o u l d ' be able t o s e t a s i d e s i s t e r - i n - l a w ' s rape, d e c i s i o n n o t to challenge d i d not constitute ineffective a s s i s t a n c e ) ; C h i l d e r s v . S t a t e , 764 P.2d 900, 904 ( O k l a . C r i m . App. 1988) (no i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e where u n c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r i n r a p e c a s e s a i d she c o u l d s e t a s i d e t h e f a c t a f r i e n d ' s d a u g h t e r was r a p e d a n d m u r d e r e d , e v e n t h o u g h s h e was a f r a i d same c o u l d happen t o h e r d a u g h t e r ) . C f . S t a t e v . T e r r y , 601 So. 2d 1 6 1 , 163-64 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992) (where c o u n s e l t e s t i f i e d a t p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g t h a t he d i d n o t know how t o s t r i k e j u r o r s a n d j u r o r who s a i d she w o u l d s i d e w i t h t h e S t a t e r e m a i n e d u n c h a l l e n g e d , defendant r e c e i v e d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e ) ; P r e s l e y v. S t a t e , 750 S.W.2d 602, 604-608 (Mo. App. [1988]) ( a s s i s t a n c e i n e f f e c t i v e where j u r o r s a i d he a n d f a m i l y were c r i m e v i c t i m s a n d he w o u l d be p a r t i a l , b u t c o u n s e l t h o u g h t he s a i d i m p a r t i a l , a n d f a i l e d t o c h a l l e n g e ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488 U.S. 975, 109 S. C t . 514, 102 L. E d . 2d 549 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . " B e c a u s e we ' w i l l n o t s e c o n d - g u e s s a t r i a l a t t o r n e y ' s l e g i t i m a t e u s e o f j u d g m e n t as t o t r i a l t a c t i c s o r s t r a t e g y , ' S t a t e v . P a s c u a l , 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991) ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v . W i g h t , 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1 9 8 8 ) ) , we h o l d t h a t counsel's performance d i d not f a l l below an o b j e c t i v e standard of reasonableness. Consequently, d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o 'overcome t h e s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n 28 CR-08-1927 t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l r e n d e r e d a d e q u a t e a s s i s t a n c e and e x e r c i s e d r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment.' S t a t e v. B u l l o c k , 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270, 111 L.Ed.2d 780 (1990)." S t a t e v. T e n n y s o n , 850 Our research P.2d 461, shows t h a t 469-70 (Utah C t . App. other jurisdictions counsel's performance d e f i c i e n t only a f t e r counsel strike j u r o r who a biased against unequivocally the defendant stated and that the he 1993). have found failed or she juror was to was not rehabilitated. " I n V i r g i l [v. D r e t k e , 446 F.3d 598 (5th C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ] , t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d by a j u r y t h a t i n c l u d e d two j u r o r s , R o g e r S u m l i n and Thomas S i m s , who had e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d be u n a b l e t o be f a i r and i m p a r t i a l . We h e l d t h a t counsel's f a i l u r e t o c h a l l e n g e f o r cause or p e r e m p t o r i l y a f t e r S u m l i n and Sims had o f f e r e d u n c h a l l e n g e d statements of b i a s c o n s t i t u t e d d e f i c i e n t performance under S t r i c k l a n d [v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]." Biagas 2008) v. Valentine, 166, 171-72 (5th C i r . (not s e l e c t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e Federal Reporter) (footnotes 536, 541 omitted). 265 See ( 5 t h C i r . 2010) Federal Reporter) Fed. Appx. S e i g f r i e d v. G r e e r , 372 Fed. Appx. (not s e l e c t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e ("Because we have c o n c l u d e d t h a t J u r o r 2 d i d not demonstrate a c t u a l b i a s , however, t r i a l to r a i s e a for-cause challenge 29 does n o t counsel's failure constitute error."); CR-08-1927 Hughes, 258 F.3d a t 462 ("When a v e n i r e p e r s o n e x p r e s s l y a d m i t s b i a s on v o i r d i r e , w i t h o u t counsel not t o respond a court response t o follow-up, f o r i n turn e x e r c i s e t h e customary s k i l l i s simply failure 'to and d i l i g e n c e t h a t a competent a t t o r n e y would p r o v i d e . ' 961 a reasonably [ J o h n s o n v. A r m o n t r o u t , F.2d 748, 754 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ] . " ) . " I n P e o p l e v. Begay, 377 I l l . App. 3 d 417, 316 I l l . Dec. 574, 879 N.E.2d 962 ( 2 0 0 7 ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t challenged h i s t r i a l a t t o r n e y ' s f a i l u r e t o seek removal of a j u r o r f o r cause. During v o i r d i r e , t h e j u r o r s t a t e d t h a t h e r mother h a d been a s s a u l t e d a t k n i f e p o i n t during a robbery. When t h e t r i a l c o u r t asked t h e j u r o r whether t h a t experience would a f f e c t h e r a b i l i t y t o be f a i r a n d i m p a r t i a l , t h e j u r o r s a i d i t would. The c o u r t t h e n s t a t e d , ' A l l r i g h t . So you w o u l d n ' t be f a i r , e i t h e r ? ' The j u r o r r e p l i e d , 'No.' I d . a t 423, 316 I l l . Dec. 574, 879 N.E.2d 962. I n r e j e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t h e r c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t u n d e r S t r i c k l a n d [v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t h e o r i z e d t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o u l d have b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e j u r o r would sympathize w i t h the defendant, who c l a i m e d t h a t when t h e o f f e n s e s o c c u r r e d , s h e was b e i n g a t t a c k e d b y a k n i f e - w i e l d i n g aggressor." People 272, 948 N.E.2d 542, 552 In could v . M a n n i n g , 241 I l l . 2d 319, 336, 350 I l l . Dec. 2 6 2 , this (2011). c a s e , V.H. d i d n o t u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e t h a t s h e n o t be postconviction impartial. Nor d i d V.H. evidentiary hearing 30 testify at the about any p e r c e i v e d bias CR-08-1927 against aware Perkins. The r e c o r d clearly o f V.H.'s h i s t o r y and t h a t instead chose prejudicial support to concentrate pretrial publicity of c a p i t a l punishment. during she knew that responsibility questions and the a sentence of l i f e case, that this counsel he Perkins failed would be a in grave the death to conclude B a s e d on t h e r e c o r d the c i r c u i t that court's i n this conclusion t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t f o r n o t s t r i k i n g V.H. f a i l e d t o show t h a t c o u n s e l ' s other views j u r o r w o u l d be more f a v o r a b l e t o i n prison. was i n e f f e c t i v e was a n y t h i n g jurors' to c o u n s e l chose t o focus I t i s reasonable Court agrees w i t h Perkins related she d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t believed that this counsel v o i r d i r e , V.H. i n d i c a t e d t h a t sentencing p e n a l t y was a d e t e r r e n t . counsel dire was Given that counsel s t i p u l a t e d During and t h a t voir on t h a t Perkins caused the v i c t i m ' s death, on t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . shows t h a t c o u n s e l than Specifically, d e c i s i o n not to s t r i k e a strategic decision. "[The d e f e n d a n t s ' s ] t r i a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t s i m p l y 'go t h r o u g h t h e m o t i o n s ' i n v o i r d i r e . He s o u g h t a change o f v e n u e , was s u c c e s s f u l i n h a v i n g p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e v o i r d i r e b a s e d on t h e i r responses t o the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , challenged j u r o r s for cause d u r i n g v o i r d i r e , and e x e r c i s e d five peremptory challenges. These s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s were made b a s e d on h i s g o a l t o e d u c a t e t h e j u r y and 31 V.H. CR-08-1927 c h o o s e a f a i r , i m p a r t i a l j u r y w h i c h w o u l d n o t be i n f l u e n c e d by t h e p u b l i c i t y surrounding t h e case o r by r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e . T h i s i s n o t an u n r e a s o n a b l e goal i n choosing a jury, and t r i a l counsel's s t r a t e g y i n r e a c h i n g t h a t g o a l was n o t o b j e c t i v e l y unreasonable." G a r c i a v. S t a t e , Perkins 678 N.W.2d 568, 573 (N.D. 2 0 0 4 ) . failed to satisfy the S t r i c k l a n d t e s t i n regard t o V.H.; t h e r e f o r e , r e l i e f was c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d on t h i s claim. B. N e x t , P e r k i n s a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r failing to challenge f o r cause Perkins argues t h a t R.B. s a i d t h a t victims h a d enough rights a r g u e s , R.B. was b i a s e d Steverson i n this i n favor R.B. 4 Specifically, he d i d n o t b e l i e v e country; that therefore, he of the prosecution. at the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing that R.B.'s the question c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t s o f v i c t i m s was s u f f i c i e n t t o challenge did not testified juror believe that response to he R.B. f o r c a u s e . R.B. a n d t h e o t h e r c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r s s a t on P e r k i n s ' s jury. A p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n e r may make a c h a l l e n g e - f o r c a u s e argument r e l a t e d o n l y t o t h e j u r o r s who a c t u a l l y s a t on the defendant's j u r y . See H e a t h v. J o n e s , 941 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1991) ( c i t i n g R o s s v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988)). 4 32 CR-08-1927 Our review that counsel t h a t 88 of the lengthy voir d i r e examination a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the v o i r d i r e j u r o r s were on t h e v e n i r e , t h a t t h e j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , and counsel's more than 40 t h a t the trial challenges for shows process, j u r o r s completed court granted cause. 30 During of voir d i r e , defense counsel asked the e n t i r e v e n i r e i f they b e l i e v e d that victims in this 637.) R.B. was country one of had 19 jurors a f f i r m a t i v e to t h i s question. removed for cause based p u b l i c i t y i n the case. not move question to strike concerning The trial presume that required to present impartial. (R. does n o t that a responded in his answers j u r o r based regarding R. the C o u n s e l d i d move t h a t R.B. shows was any except 655; i n d i c a t e any Supp. R. 316.) (Trial be pretrial denied. Counsel d i d his to on answer the victims' rights. Perkins aside who T h a t m o t i o n was this record everything on enough r i g h t s . 674; that R.B. innocent, evidence, what 715.) the said that and court that Perkins that he he could was not could i n s t r u c t e d and R.B.'s j u r o r set be questionnaire b i a s a g a i n s t the p r o s e c u t i o n . (Fourth S e c t i o n 1 2 - 1 6 - 1 5 0 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code 1975, provides juror i s subject to removal 33 f o r cause i f "he has a CR-08-1927 fixed o p i n i o n as t o t h e g u i l t or innocence of the defendant which would b i a s h i s v e r d i c t . " victims do observation not have enough rights and d i d n o t r e f l e c t Perkins's guilt. challenge f o r cause, considered Whether a j u r o r is a fixed a thinks that nonjudgmental opinion concerning "These a n s w e r s w o u l d n o t have s u p p o r t e d and t h e r e f o r e , t r i a l ineffective counsel a c a n n o t be f o r f a i l i n g t o make s u c h a c h a l l e n g e . " S t a t e v. F r y , 125 O h i o S t . 3d 163, 198, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1277 (2010). raise 868, "[C]ounsel a baseless c o u l d n o t be i n e f f e c t i v e objection." B e a r d e n v. S t a t e , 872 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) . Court cannot say t h a t counsel challenge f o r failing to 825 So. 2d B a s e d on t h e r e c o r d , was i n e f f e c t i v e this f o r failing to R.B. f o r c a u s e . C. Perkins failing L.B. be next argues that counsel was ineffective for t o move t h a t j u r o r L.B. be removed f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e i n d i c a t e d t h a t P e r k i n s must have done s o m e t h i n g wrong t o i n court a n d b e c a u s e L.B. b e l i e v e d t h a t defendants were treated too leniently. At the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, he Steverson d i d n o t move t o s t r i k e L.B. f o r c a u s e . 34 d i d n o t r e c a l l why Steverson d i d say CR-08-1927 t h a t he c o u l d not look at individual responses i n i s o l a t i o n b u t t h a t he h a d t o c o n s i d e r t h a t q u e s t i o n questions asked d u r i n g v o i r The v o i r i n r e l a t i o n to other dire. d i r e examination shows t h a t L.B. was 1 o f 30 j u r o r s who r e s p o n d e d i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e when a s k e d b y d e f e n s e counsel w h e t h e r P e r k i n s must h a v e done s o m e t h i n g w r o n g t o be in court. several However, i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h i s q u e s t i o n was a s k e d , jurors question, indicated that which was very i n d i c a t e d that the question follow-up then question asked innocent, they lengthy, and was c o n f u s i n g -- w h i c h he d i d . i f everyone d i d not understand the believed defense a n d he w o u l d a s k a ( T r i a l R. 653.) that counsel Perkins was Counsel presumed a n d L.B. i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d . Defense counsel a l s o asked the e n t i r e v e n i r e whether they b e l i e v e d that people charged with crimes i n t h i s country treated too l e n i e n t l y . responded were Of t h e 88 j u r o r s on t h e v e n i r e , i n the a f f i r m a t i v e to t h i s question. (Trial 32 R. 640.) The consider record anything t h a t he c o u l d shows that L.B. said that e x c e p t what was p r e s e n t e d apply he would i n the courtroom, t h e l a w as i n s t r u c t e d b y t h e c o u r t , 35 not and CR-08-1927 that there trial. was no he could L.B.'s j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e against Perkins. have reason supported counsel "[The a d i d not f o r cause, considered such a c h a l l e n g e . " give Perkins a fair i n d i c a t e any bias p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s ] answers would not challenge c a n n o t be not F r y , 125 ineffective and therefore, for failing O h i o S t . 3d a t 198, trial t o make 926 N.E.2d a t 1277. C o u n s e l was for not i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g to c h a l l e n g e L.B. cause; t h e r e f o r e , P e r k i n s f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the S t r i c k l a n d test i n regard to t h i s claim. D. Perkins failing to next argues challenge that juror counsel D.G. for was ineffective cause because for D.G. i n d i c a t e d t h a t P e r k i n s must have done s o m e t h i n g wrong t o be i n court rights and that in this d i r e examination she d i d not country. of b e l i e v e t h a t v i c t i m s had Steverson d i d not recall enough the voir D.G. As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , t h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g w h e t h e r t h e j u r o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t P e r k i n s had done s o m e t h i n g wrong t o be i n c o u r t was confusing. t h i s q u e s t i o n , and T h i r t y j u r o r s responded a f f i r m a t i v e l y to s e v e r a l j u r o r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t they d i d not 36 CR-08-1927 understand the question a n d t h a t t h e y were c o n f u s e d . Counsel s t a t e d on t h e r e c o r d t h a t h i s q u e s t i o n was c o n f u s i n g and t h a t he asked a follow-up question. t h a t P e r k i n s was p r e s u m e d M o r e o v e r , 19 j u r o r s that victims jurors. Thereafter, D.G. responded innocent. i n d i c a t e d that they d i d not b e l i e v e h a d enough rights, a n d D.G. was one o f t h o s e Simply responding t o t h i s question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t D.G. was b i a s e d Here, P e r k i n s therefore, he against Perkins. f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t D.G. was failed t o meet h i s burden baised; of proving that counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e i n f a i l i n g t o move t o s t r i k e D.G. f o r cause. Thus, r e l i e f was c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d on t h i s claim. E. Perkins next argues that counsel was ineffective for f a i l i n g t o move t h a t j u r o r B.P. be removed f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e , according indicated to Perkins, Perkins something biased wrong in t o be d e f e n d a n t s were t r e a t e d t o o l e n i e n t l y . 37 favor of questions S p e c i f i c a l l y , P e r k i n s a s s e r t s t h a t B.P. r e s p o n d e d t h a t done was to certain State. have he answers the must that B.P.'s i n court and that CR-08-1927 Steverson d i r e o f B.P. testified and that he did not w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t s were t r e a t e d t o o w o u l d have s u p p o r t e d a s t r i k e f o r c a u s e . d o n ' t do based (R. record shows t h a t c o u n s e l on leniently (R. 242.) Steverson " [ I ] f I d o n ' t t h i n k I have a l e g i t i m a t e r e a s o n , I it." The voir t h a t he d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t B.P.'s r e s p o n s e to the q u e s t i o n testified: remember t h e his pretrial 242.) responses publicity. specifically to voir That answered that challenged dire motion he could B.P. questions was set for cause concerning denied. aside his B.P. personal b e l i e f s , t h a t P e r k i n s was presumed i n n o c e n t , and t h a t he could follow of and the law. These a s s e r t i o n t h a t B.P. was biased. the instructions answers r e b u t P e r k i n s ' s Therefore, that counsel was B.P. f o r cause. Perkins the failed ineffective R e l i e f was court t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f for failing t o move t o c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d on this proving strike claim. F. Perkins jurors J.T. indicated next argues t h a t and that N.W. be people counsel have moved that removed f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e t h e y both charged leniently. 38 with should crimes are treated too CR-08-1927 The they trial could r e c o r d shows t h a t J.T. a n d N.W. follow t h e law and t h a t J.T.'s o r N.W.'s against consider Neither Perkins. Moreover, juror would i f P e r k i n s were c o n v i c t e d . m i t i g a t i n g circumstances counsel questionnaire they indicated that indicated was n o t q u e s t i o n e d any concerning r e a s o n s f o r f a i l i n g t o move t o s t r i k e J.T. a n d N.W. bias their f o r cause. "An ambiguous o r s i l e n t r e c o r d i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o disprove t h e s t r o n g and c o n t i n u i n g p r e s u m p t i o n . Therefore, 'where t h e r e c o r d i s incomplete or u n c l e a r a b o u t [ c o u n s e l ] ' s a c t i o n s , we w i l l presume t h a t he d i d what he s h o u l d have done, a n d t h a t he exercised reasonable professional judgment.' W i l l i a m s [ v . Head,] 185 F.3d [1223,] 1228 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ] ; s e e a l s o W a t e r s [ v . Thomas,] 46 F.3d [1506,] 1516 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ] ( e n banc) ( n o t i n g t h a t even though t e s t i m o n y a t habeas e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g was a m b i g u o u s , a c t s a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e t h a t c o u n s e l e x e r c i s e d sound p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment)." C h a n d l e r v. U n i t e d Cir. States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n. 15 ( 1 1 t h 2000). H e r e , P e r k i n s f a i l e d t o show t h a t c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e for failing the circuit t o move t o s t r i k e J.T. a n d N.W. court d i d n o t abuse relief. IV. 39 f o r cause; i t s discretion thus, i n denying CR-08-1927 Perkins next argues that counsel was ineffective for f a i l i n g t o r e q u e s t a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e j u r y ' s u s e o f Perkins's two p r i o r collateral charges i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e g u i l t phase o f h i s When a d d r e s s i n g t h i s o f rape that were trial. claim, the c i r c u i t court stated: " T r i a l c o u n s e l made a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n n o t t o request a limiting instruction regarding the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l bad a c t evidence. The c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s o f Mr. S m i t h a n d Mr. S t e v e r s o n f u l l y e x p l a i n e d t h e burden o f p r o o f and t h e l i m i t e d use o f t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n , a n d made u s e o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n a manner t h e y r e a s o n a b l y t h o u g h t c o u l d be o f v a l u e t o [ P e r k i n s ] . T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e a limiting instruction f r o m t h e c o u r t w o u l d have impacted the jury decision i n any manner. F u r t h e r m o r e , u n d e r one c a s e , a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n may n o t have b e e n r e q u i r e d as t h e e v i d e n c e was n o t offered to challenge [Perkins's] c r e d i b i l i t y . " (R. 4493-94.) The a trial right to collateral-act 1705.) Perkins's This r e c o r d shows t h a t c o u n s e l was aware t h a t he h a d a limiting evidence issue trial. instruction on -- i f he r e q u e s t e d was discussed Steverson d e c i s i o n not t o ask f o r a l i m i t i n g 40 one. several testified h e a r i n g t h a t , a l t h o u g h he was u n s u r e , t h e use of the (Trial times R. during at the e v i d e n t i a r y he t h o u g h t instruction." t h e y "made a (R. 233.) CR-08-1927 C o u n s e l d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t i n h i n d s i g h t , he t h o u g h t he have r e q u e s t e d During State two 5 Counsel argued argued t h a t the h a d t h e i n t e n t t o commit that the only evidence b y t h e S t a t e was t h a t P e r k i n s h a d b e e n c h a r g e d w i t h other charges, an t o prove t h a t Perkins murder. presented instruction. c l o s i n g argument d e f e n s e c o u n s e l failed capital the l i m i t i n g should rapes, that the State had d i s m i s s e d one o f those a n d t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t c o n v i c t P e r k i n s b a s e d on unrelated strategic conviction. I t appears d e c i s i o n not t o request that a limiting counsel made a i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e u s e o f t h e c o l l a t e r a l - a c t e v i d e n c e -- an i n s t r u c t i o n that w o u l d have e m p h a s i z e d t h a t P e r k i n s ' s c o l l a t e r a l b a d a c t s were admissible As t o prove h i si n t e n t . t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , 962 So. 2d 272 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) : "[I]n the context o f a R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g and defending a claim of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of c o u n s e l , c o u n s e l may make a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n t o T h i s C o u r t h a s r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d : " T h i s c o u r t must a v o i d using ' h i n d s i g h t ' t o evaluate the performance of counsel. We must e v a l u a t e a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c a s e a t the time o f counsel's actions before determining whether c o u n s e l r e n d e r e d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . " H a l l f o r d v. S t a t e , 629 So. 2d 6, 9 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992) ( c i t i n g F a l k n e r v. S t a t e , 586 So. 2d 39 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 1 ) ) . 5 41 CR-08-1927 not c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o p r i o r bad a c t e v i d e n c e by n o t r e q u e s t i n g a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e u s e o f those acts. Though we h a v e n e v e r a d d r e s s e d t h i s s p e c i f i c i s s u e , many o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have f o u n d that an a t t o r n e y ' s decision not t o request a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n was a s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e t h a t was n o t s u b j e c t t o a t t a c k i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . As t h e O h i o C o u r t o f A p p e a l s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. J o n e s , (No. 20349, March 18, 2005) (Ohio C t . App. 2005) (unpublished): "'Jones argues t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t o a s k f o r an other-acts l i m i t i n g instruction regarding his prior criminal record. Counsel's decision not to request a limiting instruction may have b e e n a strategic d e c i s i o n i n order t o avoid drawing f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o Jones' c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y . T r i a l s t r a t e g y d e c i s i o n s w i l l n o t be t h e b a s i s o f a f i n d i n g of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance Moreover, even i f c o u n s e l should have requested a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , Jones must still demonstrate that he was p r e j u d i c e d by c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e i n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l upon an i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel claim [W]e c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y that a lack of a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n caused the j u r y ' s f i n d i n g of guilt. I n o t h e r w o r d s , we c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t J o n e s w o u l d have b e e n acquitted i f the i n s t r u c t i o n had been given.' " I n a d d r e s s i n g t h i s same i s s u e t h e Supreme C o u r t o f C a l i f o r n i a i n P e o p l e v. H e r n a n d e z , 33 C a l . 4 t h 1040, 94 P.3d 1080, 16 C a l . R p t r . 3d 880 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , stated: "'Defendants contend counsel were i n e f f e c t i v e i n not requesting a l i m i t i n g instruction. "To e s t a b l i s h ineffective 42 CR-08-1927 a s s i s t a n c e , defendant bears the burden of showing, f i r s t , t h a t counsel's performance was d e f i c i e n t , f a l l i n g b e l o w an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s under p r e v a i l i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l norms. Second, a d e f e n d a n t must establish that, absent counsel's e r r o r , i t i s r e a s o n a b l y p r o b a b l e t h a t the v e r d i c t w o u l d h a v e b e e n more f a v o r a b l e t o him." ( P e o p l e v. H a w k i n s , (1995) 10 C a l . 4 t h 920, 940, 42 C a l . R p t r . 2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) On t h i s r e c o r d , we c a n n o t s a y t h a t c o u n s e l were d e f i c i e n t f o r n o t requesting a limiting instruction. "A r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y may have tactically concluded t h a t the r i s k of a limiting i n s t r u c t i o n ... o u t w e i g h e d t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e b e n e f i t s such i n s t r u c t i o n would p r o v i d e . " ( P e o p l e v. M a u r y (2003) 30 C a l . 4 t h 342, 394, 133 C a l . R p t r . 2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; see a l s o H a w k i n s , s u p r a , a t p. 942, 42 C a l . R p t r . 2d 636, 897 P.2d 5 7 4 . ) ' " H e r n a n d e z , 33 C a l . 4 t h a t 1052-53, 94 P.3d a t 1088, 16 C a l . R p t r . 3d a t 889-90. See a l s o B u e h l v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 170 (3d C i r . 1999) ('In some circumstances, s u c h an i n s t r u c t i o n may be s t r o n g l y advisable; in others, counsel may reasonably conclude t h a t i t i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y p r e f e r a b l e to omit s u c h a r e q u e s t s i n c e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n m i g h t have t h e u n d e s i r e d e f f e c t of h i g h l i g h t i n g the other crimes e v i d e n c e . ' ) ; Commonwealth v. D e l o n g , 60 Mass. App. C t . 122, 132, 799 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (2003) ('We hold t h a t i t was a r e a s o n a b l e t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n n o t t o r e q u e s t a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , as s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s typically highlight the permissible uses of e v i d e n c e , as w e l l as t h e l i m i t a t i o n s . ' ) ; Hudson v. S t a t e , 277 Ga. 581, 585, 591 S.E.2d 807, 811 (2004) ('Hudson did not question his trial counsel r e g a r d i n g t h e r e a s o n s why c o u n s e l c h o s e n o t t o move for limiting i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding the jury's c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a c e r t i f i e d c o p y o f Hudson's p r i o r felony conviction. "In the absence of contrary 43 CR-08-1927 e v i d e n c e , defense c o u n s e l ' s a c t i o n s a r e presumed t o be p a r t o f t r i a l s t r a t e g y . " ' ( q u o t i n g Thomas v. S t a t e , 268 Ga. 135, 139-40, 485 S.E.2d 783, 790 (1997)))." 962 So. 2d a t 285-86. 1164, See a l s o v. S t a t e , 1174 (Wyo. 2001) ("[T]he d e c i s i o n t o r e q u e s t , from r e q u e s t i n g , that this Clark, court choose not will issue, to not second i t w o u l d be request a t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n to forgo Here, guess."); P.3d or r e f r a i n to counsel v. ("Having l o s t t h e f o r counsel i n s t r u c t i o n , making the i n s t r u c t i o n "bolster Biggerstaff reasonable limiting i n c l o s i n g arguments, evidence 18 a limiting instruction i s a tactical decision 999 F.2d 1153, 1155 ( 7 t h C i r . 1993) admissibility act Chapman to a "). used the p r i o r bad [Perkins's] defense." See Commonwealth v. D e l o n g , 60 Mass. App. C t . 122, 131, 799 N.E.2d 1267, 1276 (2003). that Perkins failed This Court agrees w i t h circuit court's court t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e u n d e r S t r i c k l a n d . the the c i r c u i t conclusion The r e c o r d that counsel supports made a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n not to request a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n ; therefore, the c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y d e n y i n g V. 44 relief. CR-08-1927 Perkins failing to proceeding, rape. was next argues i n v e s t i g a t e and Perkins's 1991 counsel to was challenge, ineffective in a conviction i n Fayette for collateral County for S p e c i f i c a l l y , P e r k i n s argues t h a t t h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n the only circumstance conviction used to support t h a t P e r k i n s p r e v i o u s l y had c r i m e i n v o l v i n g t h e use Ala. that Code 1975; thus, the aggravating been c o n v i c t e d of a or t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e , § 13A-5-49(2), counsel was ineffective for f a i l i n g to investigate that conviction. When denying relief on this claim, the circuit court stated: " T r i a l c o u n s e l had no d u t y o r o b l i g a t i o n t o engage i n a c o l l a t e r a l c h a l l e n g e t o [Perkins's] F a y e t t e County c o n v i c t i o n f o r rape. Even i f s u c h a duty or o b l i g a t i o n i s found to e x i s t , there i s i n s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e w o u l d have b e e n e f f e c t i v e o r m e a n i n g f u l as t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t [Perkins] i n t h a t case overwhelmingly e s t a b l i s h e d his (R. guilt." 4493.) At the introduced postconviction an affidavit evidentiary executed by hearing, attorney Perkins Steven Nolen. N o l e n w r o t e t h a t he had b e e n a p p o i n t e d to represent Perkins i n two and rape charges represented in Perkins's Fayette County uncle, 45 who had that been he had also charged with CR-08-1927 hindering prosecution by apprehension f o r those assisting rape charges. Perkins in avoiding Nolen s t a t e d : "On November 19, 1991, t h e day a f t e r Mr. P e r k i n s p l e d g u i l t y i n c a s e number CC-90-096, I r e p r e s e n t e d Raymond W a t k i n s [ P e r k i n s ' s u n c l e ] as he e n t e r e d a p l e a o f g u i l t y i n c a s e number CC-90-128. In r e t u r n f o r Mr. W a t k i n s ' s p l e a o f g u i l t y , t h e c h a r g e o f h i n d e r i n g p r o s e c u t i o n i n the f i r s t degree, a f e l o n y , was r e d u c e d t o h i n d e r i n g p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e s e c o n d degree, a misdemeanor. II "I have been shown by Mr. Perkins's p o s t c o n v i c t i o n c o u n s e l two ' w a i v e r s of c o n f l i c t ' p u r p o r t e d l y s i g n e d by Mr. P e r k i n s and Mr. W a t k i n s , b o t h d a t e d November 19, 1991, and b o t h w i t n e s s e d and n o t a r i z e d by me on t h a t day. I have no i n d e p e n d e n t r e c o l l e c t i o n o f any o t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h e i t h e r Mr. P e r k i n s o r Mr. W a t k i n s r e g a r d i n g any p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t i n my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f them. When I state that I have no independent r e c o l l e c t i o n , i t does n o t mean t h a t t h e r e c o u l d n o t have b e e n other conversations with either Mr. Perkins o r Mr. W a t k i n s regarding any p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t ; i t means I do n o t remember one way o r t h e other. I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o u r t may have r e q u i r e d some t y p e o f w r i t t e n w a i v e r b e f o r e a c c e p t i n g Mr. W a t k i n s ' s p l e a on November 19, 1991, and t h a t was the reason I secured the w a i v e r s . However, I do n o t have a c l e a r r e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t r e q u i r i n g a w r i t t e n w a i v e r p r i o r t o a c c e p t i n g Mr. W a t k i n s ' s p l e a o f g u i l t y i n c a s e number (C.R. At CC-90-128." 5233.) trial, when proof c o n v i c t i o n f o r r a p e was of Perkins's 1991 guilty-plea i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase, 46 CR-08-1927 Steverson counsel court the objected, s t a t i n g that the waiver was d a t e d t h e d a y a f t e r P e r k i n s p l e a d e d g u i l t y . overruled counsel's objection. evidentiary hearing a t t a c k i n g one o f h i s c l i e n t ' s victim testified, the conviction. was not ignorant Perkins's Perkins's concerning a postconviction prior convictions. r e c o r d a l s o shows t h a t e x t e n s i v e phase The a postconviction p e t i t i o n i n Fayette C o u n t y a n d t h a t he h a d n e v e r f i l e d guilt 6 Steverson t e s t i f i e d a t t h a t he d i d n o t c h a l l e n g e rape c o n v i c t i o n by f i l i n g the of c o n f l i c t of concerning The t r i a l t e s t i m o n y was i n t r o d u c e d a t Perkins's 1991 c o n v i c t i o n . i n depth, concerning the f a c t s The r e c o r d petition surrounding a f f i r m a t i v e l y shows t h a t the facts The counsel and circumstances o f 1991 r a p e c o n v i c t i o n . I n Hamm v . S t a t e , 913 So. 2 d 460 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) , we a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r i s s u e a n d s t a t e d : "Hamm c o n t e n d s , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t b e c a u s e he ' c o u l d have c h a l l e n g e d t h e T e n n e s s e e c o n v i c t i o n s i n Tennessee c o u r t s and h a d t h e c o u r t s address t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c l a i m s i n 1987.' (Hamm's b r i e f a t p. 25)(emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Hamm's a s s e r t i o n t h a t T h e r e c o r d shows t h a t c o u n s e l moved s e v e r a l t i m e s t o be g i v e n a d v a n c e n o t i c e o f t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s b u t no a d v a n c e n o t i c e was g i v e n . I t a p p e a r s t h a t c o u n s e l was g i v e n notice immediately before the sentencing hearing. 6 47 CR-08-1927 Alabama t r i a l c o u n s e l had a duty t o c h a l l e n g e i n a Tennessee c o u r t t h e m e r i t s o f t h e n i n e - y e a r - o l d convictions so that he could then prevent c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s a t t h e 1987 c a p i t a l s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g i s n o t s u p p o r t e d b y any legal authority." 913 So. 2d a t 479 ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . Our n e i g h b o r i n g S t a t e o f G e o r g i a i n B a r k e r v. B a r r o w , 290 Ga. 711, 723 S.E.2d 905 ( 2 0 1 2 ) , a d d r e s s e d ineffective conviction defendant's for failing the State sentence. counsel i n e f f e c t i v e , to research intended That to court, w h e t h e r c o u n s e l was a prior use to guilty-plea enhance i n declining to stated: "Barker maintains that h i s t r i a l counsel's p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t b e c a u s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o adequately i n v e s t i g a t e the v a l i d i t y of h i s p r i o r guilty pleas i n that counsel d i d not review t r a n s c r i p t s o f t h e p l e a c o l l o q u i e s , w h i c h he c l a i m s would have revealed the pleas' constitutional defects. R e l y i n g p r i n c i p a l l y upon R o m p i l l a v . B e a r d , 545 U.S. 374, 377, 125 S. C t . 2456, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 ( 2 0 0 5 ) , B a r k e r u r g e s t h a t , g i v e n t h e S t a t e ' s n o t i f i c a t i o n t h a t i t would seek t o enhance his sentence by h i s p r i o r p l e a s , h i s t r i a l counsel had a b a s i c l e g a l d u t y t o r e t r i e v e a n d r e a d t h e p l e a transcripts. " C e r t a i n l y , as B a r k e r m a i n t a i n s , t r i a l c o u n s e l has t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o make r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o r t o make a r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n t h a t makes a particular i n v e s t i g a t i o n unnecessary. T e r r y v. Jenkins, 280 Ga. 3 4 1 , 3 4 6 ( 2 ) ( c ) , 627 S.E.2d 7 (2006). B u t , i n any case i n which the ineffectiveness of counsel for inadequate 48 the find CR-08-1927 i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s claimed, the reasonableness of a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n t h e manner urged must be assessed in light of a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s a t t h a t t i m e , and s u c h a s s e s s m e n t must i n c l u d e a heavy measure of d e f e r e n c e t o c o u n s e l ' s judgments. I d ^ a t 3 4 7 ( 2 ) ( c ) , 627 S.E.2d 7. "The d e c i s i o n i n R o m p i l l a v. B e a r d does n o t alter this. The Supreme C o u r t e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t 'when a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t ' s f a m i l y members and t h e d e f e n d a n t h i m s e l f have s u g g e s t e d t h a t no m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e i s a v a i l a b l e , h i s l a w y e r i s b o u n d t o make r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n and r e v i e w m a t e r i a l t h a t c o u n s e l knows t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w i l l p r o b a b l y r e l y on as e v i d e n c e o f a g g r a v a t i o n a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase of t r i a l . ' 545 U.S. a t 377, 125 S.Ct. 2456. The C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h a t i t s a n a l y s i s d i d n o t c r e a t e a '"rigid, per se" r u l e t h a t r e q u i r e s defense c o u n s e l t o do a c o m p l e t e r e v i e w o f t h e f i l e on any p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n i n t r o d u c e d . ' I d . a t 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456. I n s t e a d , i t found c o u n s e l i n t h a t case l a c k i n g f o r f a i l i n g t o make r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t s t o review the f i l e of the defendant's p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n d e s p i t e knowledge t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n i n t e n d e d t o i n t r o d u c e R o m p i l l a ' s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n n o t ' m e r e l y by e n t e r i n g a n o t i c e o f c o n v i c t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e b u t by q u o t i n g damaging t e s t i m o n y of the rape v i c t i m i n that case.' Id. Thus, u n l i k e t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e r e was no v i a b l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r r e t r i e v a l and examination of the damaging testimony itself. Moreover, the Court noted that the found unreasonableness of not s e c u r i n g the a c t u a l f i l e f o r r e v i e w 'was h e i g h t e n e d by t h e e a s y a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e f i l e , ' and t h e ' g r e a t r i s k t h a t t e s t i m o n y a b o u t a s i m i l a r v i o l e n t crime would hamstring counsel's chosen defense of r e s i d u a l doubt.' The Supreme Court expressly cited these circumstances as rendering unacceptable the conclusion that R o m p i l l a ' s ' c o u n s e l c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y d e c l i n e t o make any e f f o r t [ w h a t s o e v e r ] t o r e v i e w t h e f i l e . ' I d . a t 389-390, 125 S. C t . 2456. The C o u r t e x p r e s s l y acknowledged that in situations i n which the 49 CR-08-1927 p r o s e c u t o r does n o t i n t e n d t o u s e a defendant's p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n i n t h e manner as i n R o m p i l l a v. Beard, a d i f f e r e n t assessment of reasonableness m i g h t w e l l be w a r r a n t e d . I d . a t 390, 125 S. C t . 2456. A n d , so i t i s i n t h i s c a s e . "In t h e p r e s e n t o r d e r denying B a r k e r t h e sought r e l i e f , t h e h a b e a s c o u r t made r e l e v a n t f i n d i n g s i n regard t o the issue of the reasonableness of t r i a l counsel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g but not l i m i t e d to: t r i a l c o u n s e l , who h a d b e e n a member o f t h e G e o r g i a b a r s i n c e 1 9 9 1 , was on a l i s t o f a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l a n d h a d done p r e d o m i n a n t l y c r i m i n a l work; a t the time o f r e p r e s e n t i n g B a r k e r , c o u n s e l had been second defense c h a i r a t c r i m i n a l j u r y t r i a l s and had handled at least 100 g u i l t y pleas; prior to r e p r e s e n t i n g Barker, counsel had handled a s i m i l a r case i n v o l v i n g a defendant's exposure t o punishment o f l i f e w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e b a s e d upon a d r u g s t a t u t e ; i t was o b v i o u s t o c o u n s e l t h a t t h e State intended t o pursue r e c i d i v i s t treatment, i f possible, as t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t referenced Barker's prior c o n v i c t i o n s ; counsel researched Barker's previous p l e a s , which i n v o l v e d counsel p h y s i c a l l y going t o the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e , t a k i n g the l i s t o f p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s , and r e v i e w i n g every f i l e to see i f a c e r t i f i e d copy o f each previous c o n v i c t i o n e x i s t e d ; c o u n s e l was a b l e t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e p l e a s were ' f a c t u a l l y e n t e r e d ' ; t h e p l e a s were p u r p o r t e d l y s i g n e d by B a r k e r , and e n t e r e d i n t h e c o u r t r e c o r d as p a r t o f t h e c l e r k ' s f i l e ; d u r i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n with Barker, counsel discussed the g r a v i t y o f B a r k e r ' s s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g from h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s ; c o u n s e l ' s n o r m a l p r a c t i c e was t o go over a defendant's p o s s i b l e punishment, i n c l u d i n g the impact o f any p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s ; c o u n s e l s e n t B a r k e r a l e t t e r o u t l i n i n g t h e way he w o u l d be s e n t e n c e d b a s e d upon h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s ; c o u n s e l was c o n f i d e n t t h a t B a r k e r was aware o f t h e t r i a l court's lack of d i s c r e t i o n i n sentencing should B a r k e r be c o n v i c t e d ; B a r k e r was v e r y h e l p f u l i n trying to think of things with which to 50 CR-08-1927 d i f f e r e n t i a t e h i s case from o t h e r s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d a s e n t e n c e o f l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , b u t he n e v e r made any c l a i m t h a t h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s were i m p r o p e r ; and t h e i s s u e o f p o s s i b l e i r r e g u l a r i t y w i t h any o f t h e p r i o r p l e a s h a d n e v e r a r i s e n u n t i l i t was r a i s e d by B a r k e r ' s h a b e a s c o u n s e l . What i s more, e v i d e n c e of a r o u t i n e o r s t a n d a r d p r a c t i c e o r p r o c e d u r e o f t h e c o u r t i n w h i c h t h e p l e a s a r e e n t e r e d can be u s e d in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards. Bazemore v. S t a t e , 273 Ga. 160, 1 6 2 ( 1 ) , 535 S.E.2d 760 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; J a c k s o n v. H o p p e r , 243 Ga. 41, 42, 252 S.E.2d 467 (1979). And, t h e h a b e a s c o u r t a d d i t i o n a l l y found t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l had experience w i t h g u i l t y p l e a s i n the county of B a r k e r ' s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s and w i t h t h e j u d g e who sentenced Barker i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h h i s p r i o r g u i l t y p l e a s : c o u n s e l p r a c t i c e d b e f o r e t h a t judge f r o m 1991 u n t i l t h e j u d g e ' s d e a t h a p p r o x i m a t e l y t e n y e a r s l a t e r , and s p e n t an e x t e n s i v e amount o f t i m e i n v a r i o u s c a p a c i t i e s i n f r o n t of t h a t judge; the j u d g e h a d a s t a n d a r d way o f d o i n g t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g a normal r o u t i n e w i t h h a n d l i n g g u i l t y p l e a s ; i n f a c t , a w r i t t e n c h e c k l i s t o f t h e B o y k i n r i g h t s was kept i n the courtroom. "The h a b e a s c o u r t f o u n d no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t r i a l counsel r e s e a r c h every aspect of the c o l l o q u y of e a c h o f B a r k e r ' s p r i o r g u i l t y p l e a s , and b a s e d upon t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f r e c o r d , c o n c l u d e d t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e as c o u n s e l had made reasonable efforts to o b t a i n and review Barker's p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s to ensure t h e i r v a l i d i t y . T h i s C o u r t l i k e w i s e d e c l i n e s t o , as B a r k e r i n e s s e n c e u r g e s , impose an a b s o l u t e d u t y upon d e f e n s e trial c o u n s e l when r e p r e s e n t i n g a r e c i d i v i s t t o retrieve and review transcripts of p r i o r plea proceedings o r o t h e r w i s e be deemed ineffective. T h i s i s n o t o n l y u n w a r r a n t e d as a m a t t e r o f l a w , b u t i n many i n s t a n c e s , w o u l d p r o v e u n w o r k a b l e as a matter of f a c t . " 290 Ga. a t 713-15, 723 S.E.2d a t 908-09. 51 CR-08-1927 The a n a l y s i s used by the Supreme a p p l i c a b l e to the f a c t s i n t h i s case. surrounding depth, P e r k i n s ' s 1991 during ineffective challenge for failing See case, we Georgia is In t h i s case, the f a c t s proceedings. to Counsel filing Barker v. say cannot Barrow. that B a s e d on counsel's was not aspect" every c o n v i c t i o n by 1991 "research i n another county during Perkins's proceedings. of r a p e c o n v i c t i o n were i n t r o d u c e d , i n guilt Perkins's proceeding this the Court and a collateral capital-murder the record actions in were unreasonable. Moreover, at the penalty phase of Perkins's S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t h a t P e r k i n s had f o r s e c o n d - d e g r e e r a p e and a 1991 rape. Perkins On direct convictions had aggravating convicted 1121-22. conviction appeal, been of that was not to the used Perkins Perkins's only conviction a r g u e d t h a t h i s two a crime of v i o l e n c e . Contrary the conviction for first-degree improperly circumstance a 1983 trial, to had support the previously been Perkins, 808 assertions, c o n v i c t i o n used prior to So. 2d at his 1991 support the aggravating circumstance t h a t he had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n c o n v i c t e d of a crime of v i o l e n c e . At the p e n a l t y phase, testimony 52 was CR-08-1927 presented that in 1983 Perkins mentally d e f i c i e n t 14-year-old defined in § 13A-11-70, was girl. Ala. convicted operation rob, (except Code 1975, as: "Any of the o f them, n a m e l y , manslaughter a r i s i n g out i n t e n t to murder, r o b b e r y , b u r g l a r y , Perkins's 1983 sufficient, circumstance ravish, assault with kidnapping of (Ala. C r i m . App. in violence. itself, See 1999). to of the his 1991 second degree the aggravating State, 797 So. Perkins failed a 1134 he challenge t o meet h i s i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel r e l i e f was 2d f a i l e d t o show how f a i l u r e to s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n v i c t i o n f o r rape. c l a i m , and to p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d of Thus, P e r k i n s p r e j u d i c e d by c o u n s e l ' s intent larceny." support Simmons v. was burden of p r o v i n g and c o n v i c t i o n f o r rape i n the t h a t P e r k i n s had crime to t h i s a o f a v e h i c l e ) , r a p e , mayhem, a s s a u l t w i t h i n t e n t t o assault with was raping A "crime of v i o l e n c e " i s f o l l o w i n g c r i m e s o r an a t t e m p t t o commit any murder, m a n s l a u g h t e r of in regard c o r r e c t l y denied. VI. Perkins next argues that his trial counsel i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o i n v e s t i g a t e and p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and for f a i l i n g t o e x p l a i n the 53 was mitigation s i g n i f i c a n c e of the CR-08-1927 m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t was p r e s e n t e d . argues that counsel presented a S p e c i f i c a l l y , Perkins "limited mitigation case," that counsel f a i l e d to present other a v a i l a b l e m i t i g a t i o n , and t h a t counsel's p r e s e n t a t i o n of the m i t i g a t i o n i t d i d p r e s e n t was deficient. In i t s order denying relief on this c l a i m , the circuit court stated: " A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l o f t h e a r g u m e n t s and t e s t i m o n y o f t h e a t t o r n e y s , e x p e r t s , and f a m i l y members, t h e e v i d e n c e does n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e i n any aspect of the p e n a l t y phase of the p r o c e e d i n g s . The m i t i g a t i n g evidence that allegedly was not presented was cumulative t o the m a t e r i a l s p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase. I t i s apparent t h a t [ P e r k i n s ' s ] t r i a l a t t o r n e y s were a b l e t o a d e q u a t e l y p r e s e n t t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n an e f f e c t i v e manner, as t h e t r i a l and s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i z e d and f o u n d t h e e v i d e n c e t o be m i t i g a t i n g i n i t s Sentencing Order: "'The Court c o n s i d e r s the f o l l o w i n g non-statutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstances to exist: "'(3) [Perkins] suffers from borderline personality d i s o r d e r , i s an a l c o h o l i c , i s of b o r d e r l i n e i n t e l l i g e n c e , and p r o b a b l y has o r g a n i c b r a i n d y s f u n c t i o n . "'(4) [ P e r k i n s ] was u n d e r m e n t a l emotional d i s t u r b a n c e , although not to extreme degree. 54 or an CR-08-1927 "'(5) [ P e r k i n s ] l a c k e d s o c i a l i z a t i o n and h a d a h o r r i b l e c h i l d h o o d , i n v o l v i n g t h e death of h i s f a t h e r , the drowning of h i s b r o t h e r i n h i s p r e s e n c e , t h e s e x u a l abuse of h i s s i s t e r b y h i s s t e p f a t h e r i n h i s p r e s e n c e , p h y s i c a l abuse o f [ P e r k i n s ] b y h i s s t e p f a t h e r , [ r u n n i n g ] away f r o m home a t a v e r y e a r l y age a n d b e i n g s e x u a l l y a b u s e d . "'(6) [ P e r k i n s ] a n d h i s f a m i l y were v e r y p o o r , and [ P e r k i n s ] had t o " r a i s e himself." H i s mother and s t e p f a t h e r and o t h e r f a m i l y members were a l c o h o l i c s . "'The Court considered a l l of the evidence as t o n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g circumstances, i n c l u d i n g the testimony of Mr. E d Owens, D r . J o h n G o f f a n d Ms. Kathleen Snow, the presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e v i d e o t a p e o f f e r e d by [ P e r k i n s ] and a l l o t h e r e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d on circumstances of [Perkins's] life, childhood, poor housing, and family background. The C o u r t c a r e f u l l y s e a r c h e d for and c o n s i d e r e d a l l e v i d e n c e i n t h i s case f o r circumstances of mitigation because t h i s i s a c a p i t a l murder c a s e . ( S e n t e n c i n g o r d e r o f Judge L a k e , pp. 8 - 9 . ) ' "The a f f i d a v i t o f Kathy Hocutt, [ P e r k i n s ' s ] s i s t e r , was r e c e i v e d i n t o e v i d e n c e d u r i n g t h e R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e v a l u a t i n g t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e t r i a l a t t o r n e y s were d e f i c i e n t i n t h e presentation of m i t i g a t i o n evidence. From t h i s a f f i d a v i t and from t h e s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t o f Dr. Susan S t r i c k l a n d , i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Ms. H o c u t t was n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t r i a l c o u n s e l t o t e s t i f y i n 1994 a n d w o u l d n o t have t e s t i f i e d i n p e r s o n e v e n i f asked. T h e r e f o r e , t r i a l c o u n s e l c o u l d n o t have c a l l e d h e r a t t r i a l , b u t c o u l d o n l y have c o n c e i v a b l y a t t e m p t e d t o c o n v i n c e t h e t r i a l j u d g e t o p e r m i t an a f f i d a v i t f r o m Ms. H o c u t t . T h i s c a s e was d e c i d e d 55 CR-08-1927 p r i o r t o t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e Alabama R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e , w h i c h s p e c i f i c a l l y p e r m i t h e a r s a y t o be considered at sentencing. I t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , f o r h e a r s a y t o be a c c e p t e d b y t h e t r i a l judge a t t h e time o f [ P e r k i n s ' s ] s e n t e n c i n g "Thus, i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e h e r e c o u l d have p e r m i t t e d some t y p e o f h e a r s a y t o be admitted. I t i s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d , however, t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e w o u l d have a c c e p t e d s u c h an a f f i d a v i t f r o m K a t h y H o c u t t . Even i f i t h a d b e e n a c c e p t e d , i t w o u l d have [been] c u m u l a t i v e a t b e s t b a s e d on t h e other evidence presented. "The e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e management and presentation of expert witnesses d i d not e s t a b l i s h t h a t c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e , b u t i n s t e a d c o n s i s t e d o f ' s e c o n d - g u e s s i n g ' t h e d e c i s i o n s made. The e v i d e n c e does n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t [Perkins's] trial attorneys were ineffective in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n or p r e s e n t a t i o n of m i t i g a t i n g evidence or i n any a s p e c t o f t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e a r e a s , n o r i s t h e r e e v i d e n c e t h a t any a l l e g e d d e f i c i e n c i e s were prejudicial to [Perkins]." (C. 4494-96.) In regard t o counsel's duty to investigate, this Court has e x p l a i n e d : " W h i l e c o u n s e l h a s a d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n an attempt to locate evidence favorable to the defendant, ' t h i s duty only requires a reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' S i n g l e t o n v. T h i g p e n , 847 F.2d 668, 669 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S. C t . 822, 102 L. E d . 2d 812 (1989) (emphasis added). See S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n ] , 466 U.S. [668,] 691, 104 S. C t . [2052,] 2066 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; M o r r i s o n v. S t a t e , 551 So. 2d 435 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 495 U.S. 911, 110 S. C t . 1938, 109 L. E d . 2d 301 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Counsel's o b l i g a t i o n i s 56 CR-08-1927 to conduct a ' s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o each of the p l a u s i b l e l i n e s of defense.' S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 681, 104 S. C t . a t 2061 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 'A s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s j u s t what t h e t e r m i m p l i e s ; i t does n o t demand t h a t c o u n s e l d i s c o v e r every shred of evidence but t h a t a reasonable i n q u i r y i n t o a l l p l a u s i b l e d e f e n s e s be made.' I d . , 466 U.S. a t 686, 104 S. C t . a t 2063. "'The reasonableness of counsel's a c t i o n s may be d e t e r m i n e d o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y influenced by the defendant's own statements or a c t i o n s . Counsel's actions are u s u a l l y based, quite properly, on i n f o r m e d s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made by t h e d e f e n d a n t and on i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends c r i t i c a l l y on s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n . ' "Id., 466 U.S. J o n e s v. S t a t e , As Dennis 691, 2066." 1191 above, Perkins's Steverson both and testified A l a b a m a S t a t e B a r i n 1982, of James evidentiary Steverson S. C t . A t 753 So. 2d 1174, stated postconviction 104 ( A l a . C r i m . App. Smith, trial 1999) . attorneys, testified at the hearing. that he had t h a t he was been admitted to the appointed to represent Perkins i n A p r i l 1993, and t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40% o f t h e c a s e s he criminal handled were cases. He testified Smith f i l e d a motion f o r i n v e s t i g a t i v e expenses. was granted, and he and Smith 57 retained the that That services he and motion of Ed CR-08-1927 Owens, a s o c i a l w o r k e r ; Dr. John G o f f , a and A l a n Kofman, a p r i v a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r . neuropsychologist, Steverson said that he met w i t h P e r k i n s on A p r i l 12, 1993; on December 8, 1993; on December 2 1 , 1993; on M a r c h 24, 1994; a n d on A p r i l In r e g a r d to their t r i a l strategy, he 13, 1994. testified: " [ O ] u r s t r a t e g y was t o t r y t o s a v e [ P e r k i n s ' s ] l i f e . We f i g u r e d t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y s u r r o u n d i n g [Perkins] and t h e f a c t o f a l l t h e s e p r i o r c r i m e s c o m i n g i n , t h a t t h e b e s t we c o u l d do was t r y t o h o l d down t h e e m o t i o n a l impact t h a t t h e j u r y might have. And, t h e r e f o r e , we made t h e d e c i s i o n t o a d m i t , b a s e d upon what [ P e r k i n s ] t o l d u s , t h a t he h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r , i n hopes t h a t t h a t m i g h t h e l p us s a v e h i s l i f e r a t h e r than t r y t o contest the f a c t of the m u r d e r . A n d s o t h a t was b a s i c a l l y o u r s t r a t e g y , t o t r y t o s a v e h i s l i f e b y h o l d i n g down t h e e m o t i o n a l e l e m e n t s o f a l l -- o f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t we h a d t o d e a l with." (R. 273.) They d i d n o t c o n c e d e t h a t Perkins was g u i l t y o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r , S t e v e r s o n s a i d , a n d t h e y a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e was no m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t G i l l i a m h a d b e e n r a p e d a n d that Perkins Perkins's said, d i d not intend aunt t o t e s t i f y t o commit m u r d e r . at the penalty t h e y w a n t e d a f a m i l y member They called phase because, to testify. Other he family members were n o t c a l l e d a t t r i a l , he s a i d , b e c a u s e c o u n s e l d i d not believe that their f a m i l y was n o t c l o s e t e s t i m o n y w o u l d be h e l p f u l and P e r k i n s 58 since the had been " a c c u s e d o f d o i n g CR-08-1927 some t h i n g s t o h i s own f a m i l y . " (R. 275.) Counsel s a i d that he t h o u g h t t h a t P e r k i n s h a d b e e n a c c u s e d o f " d o i n g his own d a u g h t e r a n d h i s c o u s i n . Smith t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h a d b e e n a d m i t t e d S t a t e B a r i n 1982, t h a t he was a p p o i n t e d in April cases. for things" to t o t h e Alabama to represent Perkins 1994, a n d t h a t 60% o f h i s p r a c t i c e i n v o l v e d c r i m i n a l On h i s a t t o r n e y - f e e d e c l a r a t i o n , he b i l l e d o u t - o f - c o u r t work on P e r k i n s ' s c a s e . 96 h o u r s Smith contacted the S o u t h e r n C e n t e r f o r Human R i g h t s t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d to preparing f o r a capital-murder trial. Trial counsel w i t h P e r k i n s , where he was i n c a r c e r a t e d , s e v e r a l t i m e s trial b u t , he s a i d , "during the f i r s t part fact witnesses "Although (R. 470.) went t o t h e m u r d e r s c e n e a n d s p o k e w i t h many a n d anyone e l s e who w o u l d s p e a k w i t h Petitioner's claim should have done lawyer d i d i n fact." 1305, before of our meetings w i t h Mr. P e r k i n s , he a p p e a r e d t o be i n t o x i c a t e d . " He a n d S t e v e r s o n met i s that h i s t r i a l s o m e t h i n g more, Chandler them. we first v. U n i t e d look counsel a t what t h e States, 218 F.3d 1320 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) . The hearing trial counsel record shows presented that at Perkins's the testimony 59 sentencing- of Kathleen Snow, CR-08-1927 Perkins's paternal testified that aunt, Perkins's Ed Owens, father and was Dr. Goff. murdered Snow soon after P e r k i n s was b o r n a n d t h a t P e r k i n s l i v e d w i t h h i s mother i n a run-down s h a c k i n B e r r y , A l a b a m a . According was on h i s own f o r most o f h i s c h i l d h o o d . t o Snow, Perkins Snow s t a t e d that P e r k i n s d i d n o t have a "good m o t h e r " -- t h a t h i s m o t h e r was an a l c o h o l i c who s t a y e d d r u n k most o f t h e t i m e . established that Perkins's The testimony s t e p f a t h e r began s e x u a l l y a b u s i n g Perkins's s i s t e r when she was s i x y e a r s o l d a n d t h a t witnessed t h e abuse. that Perkins Perkins cruel slept Counsel presented frequently outside t o him, t h a t had t o s t e a l evidence food Perkins indicating to survive, that t h e house b e c a u s e h i s s t e p f a t h e r h i s grandmother tried was to get custody of P e r k i n s b u t was t o l d t h a t she w o u l d n o t g e t c u s t o d y u n l e s s she could prove that Perkins's also presented s i s t e r was b e i n g abused. Counsel e v i d e n c e t h a t when P e r k i n s was 7 y e a r s o l d he was s e x u a l l y a b u s e d b y a man i n B e r r y a n d t h a t P e r k i n s married when he was 16 y e a r s o l d . Owens t e s t i f i e d that a s s e s s m e n t on P e r k i n s , other relatives, he c o m p i l e d a social t h a t he s p o k e t o P e r k i n s , and h i s p a t e r n a l 60 grandmother, history and h i s aunts, and t h a t he CR-08-1927 reviewed medical records and c o u r t records. According to Owens, P e r k i n s was r a i s e d i n p o v e r t y , he was c h a s e d o u t o f t h e house b y h i s s t e p f a t h e r when stepfather fired vehicles, and he was a gun o v e r h i s h e a d . when forced to 7 years o l d , and h i s Perkins often slept i n leave t h e house, he sometimes c r a w l back i n t o t h e house a t n i g h t t h r o u g h would a loose b o a r d i n t h e f l o o r so t h a t h i s s t e p f a t h e r d i d n o t know he was there. Owens s t a t e d t h a t P e r k i n s h a d b e e n s e x u a l l y a b u s e d b y a member o f t h e B e r r y community when he was young a n d t h a t h i s family had a history of alcohol a s s e s s m e n t o f P e r k i n s , Owens abuse. When asked h i s testified: " W e l l i t s o u n d s as i f he grew up w i t h v e r y l i t t l e , i f any, n u r t u r i n g o r s u p p o r t . Descriptions were t h a t he was o u t o f home more t h a n he was t h e r e f r o m t h e t i m e he was s e v e n y e a r s o f age on up. T h e r e w o u l d have b e e n more t h a n l i k e l y v e r y l i t t l e b o n d i n g w i t h t h e p r i m a r y care g i v e r . And because o f t h e f a c t t h a t he was n o t r e c e i v i n g t h e n u r t u r i n g t h a t he n e e d e d d u r i n g t h e e a r l y y e a r s , I w o u l d f e e l t h e r e w o u l d be d e l a y s a t b e s t i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a l s t a g e s , p r o b a b l y some a r e a s o f d e f i c i t , t h i n g s l i k e empathy, s o c i a l [ c o n s c i e n c e ] , a s e n s e o f r i g h t a n d wrong. P r o b l e m s o l v i n g s k i l l s w o u l d p r o b a b l y be weak. II " W e l l he w o u l d have a -- l i k e I s a y have -¬ d i f f i c u l t i e s empathizing with other people. He w o u l d have p r o b l e m s h a n d l i n g a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r , poor impulse c o n t r o l , poor i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s . 61 CR-08-1927 The e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t he grew up i n w o u l d -- as d e s c r i b e d w o u l d -- t e n d t o s o c i a l i z e him t o a c c e p t v i o l e n c e as a n o r m a l and a c c e p t a b l e b e h a v i o r as a way t o d e a l w i t h p r o b l e m s , as a method o f p r o b l e m solving." ( T r i a l R. Dr. 2833-34.) Goff testified that he completed n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t s on P e r k i n s . Perkins had I t was a his opinion a borderline personality disorder personality disorder. He battery and that antisocial explained: " B o r d e r l i n e p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be one o f t h r e e s e v e r e p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r s . And i t can be a d i s a b l i n g d i s o r d e r . And most p e o p l e t h i n k ... that i t ' s actually a level of p e r s o n a l i t y developed; t h a t i s t o say t h a t the person hasn't r e a l l y d e v e l o p e d a p e r s o n a l i t y . And so t h e symptoms t h a t you see a r e b a s e d on more a q u e s t i o n o f a r r e s t e d development than a c t u a l l y the development of a m a l a d a p t i v e k i n d of p a t t e r n . So t h e r e a r e a number o f c r i t e r i a t h a t have t o be met. And t h e y e s s e n t i a l l y amount t o d i f f i c u l t i e s i n terms of i d e n t i t y , p e o p l e d o n ' t e v e r r e a l l y have a good i d e a o f who t h e y a r e o r what t h e y want t o do o r who t h e y want t o be. They t e n d t o have a g r e a t d e a l o f d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e i r emotions. We c a l l it, a f f e c t , w o r d we use f o r emotion. They demonstrate sometimes what's called emotional flooding. They have a l o t o f p r o b l e m s with interpersonal relationships. That i s t o say t h a t they e i t h e r over i d e a l i z e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p or then when t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p r e a l l y g e t s t e r r i b l e and t h e y d e n i g r a t e i t t h i s r e a l up and down s t u f f -- t h e y have a t e n d e n c y towards suicidal gestures and s u i c i d a l a t t e m p t s . Many o f them w i l l engage i n what we c a l l d e l i c a t e s e l f c u t t i n g . They c u t t h e m s e l v e s a l o t . You see a l o t o f t h a t i n a p r i s o n s i t u a t i o n . 62 of CR-08-1927 And t h e y t e n d t o be g e n e r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d s i t u a t i o n tend towards ( T r i a l R. 2871-72.) symptoms. when n o t i n a volatility." P e r k i n s , he s a i d , e x h i b i t e d many o f t h e s e Dr. G o f f e x p l a i n e d t h a t an a n t i s o c i a l personality i s a p e r s o n who h a s f a i l e d t o d e v e l o p "one p a r t i c u l a r o f p e r s o n a l i t y " -- a c o n s c i e n c e . Perkins's In full-scale closing childhood had counsel was m a r k e d b y p o v e r t y , intellectual developed normally jury should argued that Perkins's abuse, and n e g l e c t ; functioning; that t h a t he he because of h i s heinous c h i l d h o o d ; consider show P e r k i n s In Dr. G o f f a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t IQ was 76. arguments, borderline aspect never that the r e s i d u a l doubt; and t h a t t h e j u r y should mercy. the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n proceedings, none of Perkins's f a m i l y members t e s t i f i e d a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . Hocutt, Perkins's o l d e r s i s t e r , e x e c u t e d an 18-page t h a t was a d m i t t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g . Kathy affidavit In the a f f i d a v i t , Hocutt gave a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f t h e abuse she s u f f e r e d a t t h e hands of her stepfather childhood. testimony and the poverty Her a f f i d a v i t that had been that marked was, i n l a r g e p a r t , presented hearing. 63 Perkins's cumulative to at Perkins's sentencing CR-08-1927 Dr. Georgia Susan S t r i c k l a n d , Department of Corrections, conducted a c l i n i c a l largely cumulative Strickland traumatic a l i c e n s e d s o c i a l worker w i t h the testified i n t e r v i e w of Perkins. t o Owens's testified in trial depth that she h a d Her t e s t i m o n y testimony. concerning was However, how Perkins's c h i l d h o o d a f f e c t e d h i s development. Owens t e s t i f i e d a t t h e p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g t h a t S m i t h had r e t a i n e d h i m t o work on P e r k i n s ' s c a s e a n d t o h e l p h i m i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e p e n a l t y phase o f P e r k i n s ' s t r i a l . r e g a r d i n g P e r k i n s ' s case had been d e s t r o y e d H i s notes i n a tornado that h i t h i s h o u s e , a n d he c o u l d n o t r e c a l l whom he h a d i n t e r v i e w e d to complete h i s assessment. Perkins's said, his aunts, and h i s p a t e r n a l he c o u l d n o t t e s t i f y provided 60 h o u r s t o P e r k i n s , two o f grandmother. as t o what t h e y n o t e s had been d e s t r o y e d . t h a t he s p e n t his He d i d t a l k case. records Smith, information records. he o b t a i n e d Owens was did testify from that Perkins's showed he him w i t h a box o f P e r k i n s ' s r e c o r d s , w h i c h medical he t o l d him because Owens's b i l l i n g on P e r k i n s ' s Again, much said, included of the f a m i l y members. Some s c h o o l r e c o r d s h a d n o t b e e n p r o v i d e d t o h i m , he s a i d , a n d he d i d not t a l k to Perkins's s i s t e r . 64 Owens testified: CR-08-1927 " [ A s s i s t a n t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ] : And had you s e e n t h e s c h o o l r e c o r d s , do you f e e l l i k e t h a t w o u l d have substantially changed your assessment of Mr. Perkins? " [ O w e n s ] : No. As I s a i d , i t w o u l d have made me s u b s t a n t i a t e i t s -- you know, made me f e e l more c o m f o r t a b l e i n some o f t h e t h i n g t h a t I was seeing. "[Assistant attorney general]: been f a i r l y c u m u l a t i v e "[Owens]: (R. i t would have -¬ Yes." 327.) Dr. that But he Goff had also been testified retained at three the postconviction months b e f o r e hearing trial to p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t s on P e r k i n s and t h a t he d i d n o t r e c e i v e information until evaluation, he three weeks b e f o r e administered many trial. To any complete h i s psychological P e r k i n s and t a l k e d t o P e r k i n s ' s a u n t , K a t h l e e n Snow. tests Dr. to Goff t e s t i f i e d t h a t P e r k i n s t o l d him t h a t t h e o n l y " p e r s o n t h a t Perkins c o u l d come up w i t h was t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was did not At presented school postconviction the (R. 344.) Dr. Mr. Goff f u r n i s h e d numerous documents b u t t h a t have P e r k i n s ' s the h i s aunt." testimony forensic psychologist. of Dr. do he records. evidentiary Dr. King 65 Glen hearing, King, testified a the clinical t h a t he State and conducted CR-08-1927 a clinical that a s s e s s m e n t o f P e r k i n s a n d t h a t i t was h i s o p i n i o n Perkins understood the d i f f e r e n c e between right and wrong. Perkins asserts that counsel's manner o f p r e s e n t i n g t h e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g was i n e f f e c t i v e . " ' G e n e r a l l y , t h e d e c i s i o n o f what m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e t o p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l i s a matter of t r i a l strategy. State v. K e i t h ( 1 9 9 7 ) , 79 O h i o S t . 3d 514, 530, 684 N.E.2d 47. M o r e o v e r , d e b a t a b l e t r i a l t a c t i c s g e n e r a l l y do not c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . [ S t a t e v.] C l a y t o n , 62 O h i o S t . 2d [45,] 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 [ ( 1 9 8 0 ) ] . T h i s c o u r t must i n d u l g e i n a strong presumption that t r i a l counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [ S t a t e v.] Hartman, 93 O h i o S t . 3d [274,] 300, 754 N.E.2d 1150 [ ( 2 0 0 1 ) ] . Significantly, the existence of a l t e r n a t i v e or a d d i t i o n a l m i t i g a t i o n t h e o r i e s g e n e r a l l y does n o t e s t a b l i s h i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel. [State ^ ] Combs, 100 O h i o App. 3d [90,] 105, 652 N.E.2d 205 [ ( 1 9 9 4 ) ] . ' " Phillips v. B r a d s h a w , 607 F.3d 199, 206-07 ( 6 t h C i r . 2010) ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v. P h i l l i p s , No. 20692, Feb. 27, 2002 (Ohio C t . App.) (not r e p o r t e d strategy[,] members counsel as w i t n e s s e s i n N.E.2d)). could well because "As decide a matter of not to c a l l f a m i l y members c a n be trial family easily impeached f o r b i a s . " Bergmann v. M c C a u g h t r y , 1380 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) . "The d e c i s i o n t o c a l l f a m i l y members as 66 65 F.3d 1372, CR-08-1927 witnesses [in mitigation] is a 'strategic decision.'" F r e t w e l l v. N o r r i s , 133 F.3d 621, 627 ( 8 t h C i r . 1998) ( c i t i n g G u i n a n v. A r m o n t r o u t , 909 F.2d 1224, 1231 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 498 U.S. 1074 As noted postconviction above, (1991)). the only evidentiary evidence hearing presented concerning at the additional m i t i g a t i o n t h a t c o u l d have b e e n p r e s e n t e d b y P e r k i n s ' s members was e v i d e n c e executed by P e r k i n s ' s introduced sister. family i n t h e f o r m o f an a f f i d a v i t In discussing the r e l i a b i l i t y of a f f i d a v i t s i n p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s , the U n i t e d Court of Appeals f o r the Eleventh C i r c u i t has a p t l y States stated: " P r e s e n t c o u n s e l have p r o f f e r e d a f f i d a v i t s f r o m Williams' f a t h e r and s i s t e r which, i f b e l i e v e d , i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y c o u l d have p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e e v i d e n c e i f t h e y had been c a l l e d as w i t n e s s e s . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that they have done s o . S i t t i n g en b a n c , we have o b s e r v e d that ' [ i ] t i s common p r a c t i c e for petitioners a t t a c k i n g t h e i r death sentences t o submit a f f i d a v i t s f r o m w i t n e s s e s who s a y t h e y c o u l d have s u p p l i e d a d d i t i o n a l m i t i g a t i n g circumstance evidence, had t h e y been c a l l e d , ' b u t 'the e x i s t e n c e o f such a f f i d a v i t s , a r t f u l l y d r a f t e d t h o u g h t h e y may b e , u s u a l l y proves l i t t l e o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . ' Waters [v. Thomas], 46 F.3d [1506,] 1513-14 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 19 9 5 ) ] . Such a f f i d a v i t s ' u s u a l l y p r o v e [] a t most t h e w h o l l y unremarkable f a c t t h a t w i t h t h e l u x u r y o f time and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o f o c u s r e s o u r c e s on s p e c i f i c p a r t s o f a made r e c o r d , post-conviction counsel will i n e v i t a b l y i d e n t i f y shortcomings i n the performance of p r i o r c o u n s e l . ' I d . a t 1514. 67 CR-08-1927 II "Even p u t t i n g t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g d i s p a r i t y of resources t o t h e s i d e , we have r e c o g n i z e d that '"[i]n retrospect, one may always identify s h o r t c o m i n g s , " but p e r f e c t i o n i s not the s t a n d a r d of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . ' [46 F.3d a t 1514] (quoting f r o m Cape v. F r a n c i s , 741 F.2d 1287, 1302 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1984)). As we h e l d i n A t k i n s v. S i n g l e t a r y , 965 F.2d 952, 960 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) , 'A l a w y e r can a l m o s t a l w a y s do s o m e t h i n g more i n e v e r y c a s e . But the C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s a good d e a l l e s s t h a n maximum performance.' And in Waters we explicitly r e i t e r a t e d t h a t : 'The mere f a c t t h a t o t h e r w i t n e s s e s m i g h t have b e e n a v a i l a b l e o r t h a t o t h e r testimony m i g h t have b e e n e l i c i t e d f r o m t h o s e who t e s t i f i e d i s not a s u f f i c i e n t ground t o prove i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of counsel.' W a t e r s , 46 F.3d a t 1514 ( q u o t a t i o n and c i t a t i o n omitted); accord, e.g., Provenzano [v. Singletary], 148 F.3d [1327,] 1333 [(11th C i r . 1998)]." Williams v. Head, 185 Here, Perkins investigation relating deficient into to his or Accordingly, F.3d failed or life, that 1223, he to 1236 (11th C i r . 1999). establish presentation of his background, was prejudiced that counsel's mitigation or the under evidence crime was Strickland. t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying r e l i e f on t h a t ground. Likewise, Perkins failed to prove that counsel i n e f f e c t i v e f o r r e l y i n g on t h e m e n t a l e v a l u a t i o n c o n d u c t e d 68 was by CR-08-1927 Dr. Goff even though Perkins challenged the s u f f i c i e n c y of that evaluation i n the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n proceeding. "[D]efense counsel i s entitled to rely on t h e e v a l u a t i o n s conducted by q u a l i f i e d m e n t a l h e a l t h e x p e r t s , even i f , i n r e t r o s p e c t , those e v a l u a t i o n s may n o t have b e e n as c o m p l e t e as o t h e r s may d e s i r e . See S t a t e v. S i r e c i , 502 So. 2d 1221, 1223 ( F l a . 1987). Even i f t h e e v a l u a t i o n b y [a r e t a i n e d m e n t a l - h e a l t h e x p e r t ] , w h i c h f o u n d no i n d i c a t i o n o f b r a i n damage t o w a r r a n t a n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i c a l w o r k u p , was somehow i n c o m p l e t e o r d e f i c i e n t i n t h e o p i n i o n of o t h e r s , t r i a l c o u n s e l w o u l d n o t be rendered i n e f f e c t i v e f o r r e l y i n g on [ t h e e x p e r t ' s ] q u a l i f i e d expert evaluation." D a r l i n g v. S t a t e , 966 So. 2d 366, 377 ( F l a . 2 0 0 7 ) . Counsel r e l i e d on t h e e x p e r t s t h e y r e t a i n e d t o do a g r e a t deal of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n 979 i n this case. " I n H a l l v. S t a t e , So. 2d 125 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) , t h i s C o u r t found that H a l l was n o t d e p r i v e d o f t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l when c o u n s e l the case delegated the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a subordinate." for investigating W a s h i n g t o n v. S t a t e , 95 So. 3d 26, 41 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 2 ) . " [ T ] r i a l c o u n s e l ' s r e l i a n c e on h i s r e t a i n e d experts i s not proven unreasonable another expert evaluations." 2010). ... q u e s t i o n s Stewart "Counsel the thoroughness simply because of the p r i o r v . S t a t e , 37 So. 3d 243, 252-53 ( F l a . cannot be deemed ineffective under the s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668, 69 CR-08-1927 104 S.Ct. relied 2052, on what 80 L.Ed.2d may have been psychiatric evaluations." 1223 (Fla. alternate trial 1987). is could not (1984), less Court provide L y n c h v. 2008) v. Darling has S t a t e , 2 So. State, 966 So. 2002); Sweet v. State, 810 So. 2d 2d that failing 854, i f testimony, to present 71 366, So. 1221, 'even 3d 47, 2d he pretrial So. detailed 2 0 0 7 ) , c i t i n g i n t u r n G u i d i n a s v. S t a t e , 816 (Fla. 502 held more because complete Sireci, ineffective for cumulative evidence.'" (quoting simply than S t a t e v. "[T]his witnesses counsel 674 (Fla. 377 (Fla. 2d 1095, 1106 863-64 (Fla. 2002)). Here, Perkins failed e s t a b l i s h t h a t c o u n s e l was Accordingly, provide was the sufficient evidence i n e f f e c t i v e f o r r e l y i n g on to experts. t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by d e n y i n g r e l i e f on To to present this extent claim. Perkins asserts testimony that explained presented, this claim that counsel failed the m i t i g a t i o n evidence i s also without merit. As to that stated a b o v e , Owens t e s t i f i e d t h a t p e o p l e w i t h P e r k i n s ' s h i s t o r y have delays i n developmental stages, no sense of r i g h t or wrong. delays Dr. 70 i n problem s o l v i n g , Goff t e s t i f i e d that and Perkins CR-08-1927 had a borderline personality disorder d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g h i s emotions. that Perkins that had and He an a n t i s o c i a l d i s o r d e r and type p e r s o n a l i t y i s t h a t the person that further he testified t h a t an a s p e c t fails had to develop of a conscience. This i s not investigation significant a c a s e where c o u n s e l or where mitigation counsel See H e r t z v. State, 941 failed evidence. p r e s e n t i n g m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e was So. 2d failed to to conduct present Counsel's manner a m a t t e r of t r i a l 1031, 1044 Moreover, "In a s s e s s i n g claims of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l i n the p e n a l t y phase of a c a p i t a l t r i a l , we a p p l y t h e s t a n d a r d d i s c u s s e d i n W i g g i n s v. S m i t h , 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. C t . 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003): 71 any of strategy. ( F l a . 2006). " ' I n S t r i c k l a n d [v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], we made c l e a r that, to e s t a b l i s h p r e j u d i c e , a " d e f e n d a n t must show that there i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , but for counsel's unprofessional e r r o r s , the r e s u l t of the p r o c e e d i n g would have been different. A reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y i s a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t to u n d e r m i n e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome." I d . , a t 694, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. C t . 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. I n a s s e s s i n g p r e j u d i c e , we reweigh the evidence i n a g g r a v a t i o n a g a i n s t the totality of available mitigating evidence.' any CR-08-1927 "539 U.S. M c W h o r t e r v. 3d a t 534, State, , [Ms. S. Perkins the existence of (1) that murder the kidnapping, three Ct. 2527." CR-09-1129, S e p t . 30, ( A l a . C r i m . App. In s e n t e n c i n g was 123 to death, the circuit statutory aggravating was imprisonment, while § So. 2011). committed during § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975; committed 2011] Perkins 13A-5-49(1), was Ala. found circumstances: the course of a (2) t h a t t h e m u r d e r under Code court a sentence 1975; and (3) of that P e r k i n s had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e use Ala. or t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e to another person, Code 1975. As § s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i o n , the 13A-5-49(2), circuit court found t h a t P e r k i n s ' s c a p a c i t y to a p p r e c i a t e the c r i m i n a l i t y of his Ala. c o n d u c t was Code nonstatutory 1975. substantially The circuit impaired, court m i t i g a t i n g circumstances see found to § 13A-5-51(6), the following exist: "(1) t h a t P e r k i n s t o o k Mrs. G i l l i a m t o t h e Hood r e s i d e n c e a f t e r s h o o t i n g h e r ; (2) t h a t P e r k i n s was d r i n k i n g and t a k i n g drugs d u r i n g the timeframe w i t h i n w h i c h t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d ; (3) t h a t Perkins suffers from borderline personality disorder, is of borderline intelligence, and p o s s i b l y has o r g a n i c b r a i n d y s f u n c t i o n ; (4) t h a t P e r k i n s was u n d e r some d e g r e e o f m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e , a l t h o u g h n o t an e x t r e m e d e g r e e ; (5) t h a t P e r k i n s had a t r a u m a t i c c h i l d h o o d and l a c k e d 72 CR-08-1927 s o c i a l i z a t i o n ; (6) t h a t P e r k i n s ' s IQ i s 76; and (7) t h a t P e r k i n s ' s f a m i l y was p o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n when he was g r o w i n g up." Perkins, 808 So. 2d a t This C o u r t has evidence presented alleged omitted omitted 1141-42. thoroughly at reviewed both Perkins's sentencing m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e and mitigation t e s t i m o n y t h a t was was, in large the mitigation hearing and that i s confident the the the part, cumulative to presented at Perkins's sentencing hearing and w o u l d n o t have a f f e c t e d t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f d e a t h in this case. W i g g i n s v. Accordingly, were d e f i c i e n t o r S m i t h , 539 510, 534 (2003). t h i s C o u r t cannot say t h a t c o u n s e l ' s that Perkins r e s u l t of c o u n s e l ' s a c t i o n s . that counsel U.S. suffered any Because P e r k i n s actions prejudice as a f a i l e d to prove were i n e f f e c t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r m i t i g a t i o n investigation and presentation, abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying the circuit court did not analyze the relief. VII. Perkins next argues that this Court should i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a n c e - o f - c o u n s e l c l a i m s c u m u l a t i v e l y and reversible As error. t h i s C o u r t has stated: 73 find CR-08-1927 " O t h e r s t a t e s and f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e n o t i n a g r e e m e n t as t o w h e t h e r t h e 'cumulative effect' a n a l y s i s a p p l i e s t o S t r i c k l a n d [v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] c l a i m s . As t h e Supreme C o u r t o f N o r t h D a k o t a n o t e d i n G a r c i a v. S t a t e , 678 N.W.2d 568, 578 (N.D. 2004) : " ' G a r c i a argues t h a t even i f t r i a l counsel's i n d i v i d u a l a c t s or omissions are insufficient to establish he was prejudiced, the cumulative effect was s u b s t a n t i a l enough t o meet S t r i c k l a n d ' s test. See W i l l i a m s v. W a s h i n g t o n , 59 F.3d 673, 682 ( 7 t h C i r . 1995) ("In m a k i n g t h i s s h o w i n g , a p e t i t i o n e r may d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was s u b s t a n t i a l enough t o meet S t r i c k l a n d ' s t e s t " ) ; b u t see S c o t t v. J o n e s , 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 ( 8 t h C i r . 1990) ("cumulative e r r o r does n o t c a l l f o r h a b e a s r e l i e f , as e a c h h a b e a s c l a i m must s t a n d o r f a l l on i t s own").' "See a l s o H o l l a n d v. S t a t e , 250 Ga. App. 24, 28, 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) ('Because t h e so-called cumulative e r r o r d o c t r i n e i s i n a p p l i c a b l e , each c l a i m o f i n a d e q u a c y must be e x a m i n e d independently of other c l a i m s , u s i n g the two-prong s t a n d a r d of S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n . ' (footnote omitted)); C a r l v. S t a t e , 234 Ga. App. 61, 65, 506 S.E.2d 207, 212 (1998) ('Georgia does not recognize the c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r r u l e . ' ) ; F i s h e r v. A n g e l o n e , 163 F.3d 835, 852 ( 4 t h C i r . 1998) ('Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i t has long been the p r a c t i c e of this Court to individually assess claims under S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. C t . 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . See, e.g., H o o t s v. A l l s b r o o k , 785 F.2d 1214, 1219 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering i n e f f e c t i v e assistance claims i n d i v i d u a l l y rather than c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r cumulative impact.).'). 74 CR-08-1927 "We can f i n d no c a s e where A l a b a m a a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have a p p l i e d t h e c u m u l a t i v e - e f f e c t a n a l y s i s to c l a i m s of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. However, t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has h e l d t h a t t h e cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct n e c e s s i t a t e d a new t r i a l i n Ex p a r t e T o m l i n , 540 So. 2d 668, 672 ( A l a . 1988) ('We n e e d n o t d e c i d e w h e t h e r e i t h e r o f t h e two e r r o r s , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , would r e q u i r e a r e v e r s a l ; we h o l d t h a t t h e cumulative e f f e c t of the e r r o r s p r o b a b l y a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d the s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t and s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d t h e f a i r n e s s and i n t e g r i t y o f t h e j u d i c i a l proceedings.'). A l s o , i n Ex p a r t e B r y a n t , [951 So. 2d 724] ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f e r r o r s may r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . " I f we were t o e v a l u a t e t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f the i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel c l a i m s , we w o u l d f i n d t h a t B r o o k s ' s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s were n o t i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d . See B r y a n t and R u l e 45, A l a . R. App. P." B r o o k s v. State, 929 So. 2d 491, 514 I f t h i s C o u r t were t o e v a l u a t e the ( A l a . C r i m . App. the cumulative ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, t h a t P e r k i n s i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f . prove viewing that counsel's a l l the performance actions Perkins was he prejudiced. Consequently, abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by the denying r e l i e f VIII. 75 i t would hold Perkins f a i l e d a l l e g e s counsel t h i s Court concludes that Perkins was e f f e c t of deficient. taken, 2005). to Further, should have f a i l e d t o show t h a t circuit court on claim. this did not CR-08-1927 Perkins denying next argues h i s claim that that the circuit the jurors engaged d e l i b e r a t i o n s d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase. postconviction petition, made up t h e i r court in erred in premature Specifically, in his P e r k i n s a s s e r t e d t h a t the j u r o r s had m i n d s t o recommend a d e a t h s e n t e n c e a f t e r t h e g u i l t phase b u t b e f o r e they h e a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y at the penalty phase. The circuit court, when d e n y i n g r e l i e f on t h i s claim, stated: " T h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f t h a t t h e j u r o r s f a i l e d to f o l l o w the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the court r e g a r d i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s , and t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence that the j u r y reached any decision regarding the penalty during the g u i l t phase. Therefore, t h i s claim i s denied." (C. 4551.) In support of J.T., testimony a of t h i s claim, Perkins presented juror on Perkins's A review of J.T.'s shows t h a t J.T. d i d n o t remember e v e r y t h i n g t h a t h a d happened a t P e r k i n s ' s t r i a l confused. case. the testimony 14 y e a r s The f o l l o w i n g o c c u r r e d during "[Assistant attorney general]: p h a s e o f t h e t r i a l , -"[J.T.]: Uh-huh. 76 ago a n d t h a t he was very cross-examination: During the guilt CR-08-1927 "[Assistant attorney general]: -the judge i n s t r u c t e d you t h a t you were t o f i n d him g u i l t y o r not g u i l t y of c a p i t a l murder; i s t h a t r i g h t ? "[J.T.]: Right. " [ A s s i s t a n t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ] : Did the judge t e l l you t h a t you were t o c o n s i d e r h i s s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h at t h a t time? " [ J . T . ] : No, n o t a t t h a t t i m e , o n l y f o r us t o go b a c k t o see i f he was g u i l t y . Not a t t h a t t i m e . " [ A s s i s t a n t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ] : You n i g h t on t h e phone t h a t -"[J.T.]: t o l d me the other Uh-huh. " [ A s s i s t a n t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ] : ... [T]he j u r o r s made t h e d e c i s i o n t o recommend a s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h f o r Mr. P e r k i n s a f t e r t h e t e s t i m o n y o f h i s a u n t ? "[J.T.]: Yes. " [ A s s i s t a n t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ] : And so t h a t w o u l d have t a k e n p l a c e d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e ? " [ J . T . ] : Um (R. 395-96.) This testimony that -- " the Therefore, Court agrees with the circuit court that J.T.'s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e jurors engaged in any premature the circuit c o u r t d i d not denying r e l i e f on t h i s claim. 77 deliberations. abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by CR-08-1927 More i m p o r t a n t l y , t e s t i f y regarding R. Evid., J.T. s h o u l d not have b e e n p e r m i t t e d the j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . to Rule 606(b), A l a . states: "Upon an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f a v e r d i c t or indictment, a juror may not testify in impeachment o f t h e v e r d i c t o r i n d i c t m e n t as t o any m a t t e r or statement o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of a n y t h i n g upon t h a t o r any o t h e r j u r o r ' s m i n d o r e m o t i o n s as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e j u r o r t o a s s e n t t o o r d i s s e n t from the v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t or c o n c e r n i n g the juror's mental processes in connection t h e r e w i t h , e x c e p t t h a t a j u r o r may t e s t i f y on t h e question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was i m p r o p e r l y brought to the jury's attention o r w h e t h e r any outside influence was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r upon any j u r o r . Nor may a j u r o r ' s a f f i d a v i t o r e v i d e n c e o f any s t a t e m e n t by the j u r o r c o n c e r n i n g a m a t t e r about which the j u r o r w o u l d be p r e c l u d e d f r o m t e s t i f y i n g be r e c e i v e d f o r these purposes." Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid., specifically admission of j u r o r testimony to a t t a c k "[P]otentially the premature d e l i b e r a t i o n s course of the trial" ... v. F.3d BNSF Ry., 351 350, 380-81 S.W.3d 13, that have b e e n h e l d testimony post-verdict premature deliberations is by occurred to United States See 24 2011) not a 78 C t . App. admissible juror."); during "constitute[] (6th C i r . 2001). (Mo. the "internal influences." a p o t e n t i a l i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e on t h e j u r y . " L o g a n , 250 excludes to also Ledure ("Jurors' show United v. alleged States v. CR-08-1927 Sabhnani, Court 529 F. finds that Supp. Rule 2d 384, 395 606(b)[, Fed. f i n a l i t y o f t h e v e r d i c t and b a r s any deliberative (E.D.N.Y. 2008) R. ("[T]he Evid.,] protects i n q u i r y i n t o the the jurors' processes."). "'[W]hen t h e r e a r e p r e m a t u r e d e l i b e r a t i o n s among j u r o r s w i t h no a l l e g a t i o n s o f e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e on the j u r y , the proper p r o c e s s f o r j u r y decision m a k i n g has b e e n v i o l a t e d , b u t t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o doubt t h a t the j u r y based i t s u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n o n l y on e v i d e n c e f o r m a l l y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . ' United S t a t e s v. R e s k o , 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) . Indeed, ' [ p ] r e s e r v i n g the f i n a l i t y of j u r y v e r d i c t s m i l i t a t e s s t r o n g l y i n favor of b a r r i n g p o s t - t r i a l juror assertions of p r e - d e l i b e r a t i o n discussion. The p r o b a b i l i t y of some a d v e r s e e f f e c t on the v e r d i c t i s f a r l e s s than f o r extraneous i n f l u e n c e s . ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W i l l i a m s - D a v i s , 90 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) . " Taylor v. State, 270 P.3d 471, 481 B e c a u s e J.T.'s t e s t i m o n y was have been considered, the (Utah 2 0 1 2 ) . inadmissible circuit court d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g r e l i e f on P e r k i n s ' s did and should not abuse i t s c l a i m t h a t the not jury engaged i n premature d e l i b e r a t i o n s . IX. Perkins next denying h i s claim argues that that jurors to i n f l u e n c e t h e i r v e r d i c t . the circuit improperly court permitted erred in religion S p e c i f i c a l l y , Perkins argues t h a t 79 CR-08-1927 the jurors consulted Biblical d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n the penalty The circuit court passages during the jury's phase. stated the f o l l o w i n g concerning claim: "[T]here i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence that the j u r o r s improperly permitted r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y to influence t h e i r v e r d i c t . J u r o r [J.T.] t e s t i f i e d about e v e n t s he r e c a l l e d f r o m a p p r o x i m a t e l y f o u r t e e n y e a r s p r i o r . He c l a i m e d t o remember t h a t some j u r o r s e n g a g e d i n some t y p e o f r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y on Sunday d u r i n g deliberations, prayed during d e l i b e r a t i o n s , and b r o u g h t B i b l e s t o t h e j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n room. He did n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c a l l much o f t h e a c t i v i t y , b u t c l a i m e d t o remember s o m e t h i n g b e i n g s a i d a b o u t 'eye f o r an e y e . ' He c o n f i r m e d t h a t he b a s e d h i s decision i n this case solely on t h e l a w a n d evidence. " A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y , I do n o t f i n d credible evidence that the j u r o r s engaged i n improper a c t i v i t i e s that improperly i n f l u e n c e d t h e i r verdict. I n M c N a i r v. S t a t e , 706 So. 2d 828, 837¬ 838 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals held: "'"It i s a w e l l s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e of law, and, f u r t h e r , i t i s f u n d a m e n t a l t o a fair trial, that jurors should consider only the evidence presented a t t r i a l . " Ex p a r t e T r o h a , 462 So. 2d [953,] 954 [ ( A l a . 1984)]. "Extraneous m a t e r i a l s , whether t h e y be d i c t i o n a r i e s , l a w b o o k s , o r B i b l e s , unless p r o p e r l y received i n evidence, are n o t a l l o w e d i n t h e j u r y room f o r u s e b y a d e l i b e r a t i n g j u r y . " J o n e s v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) . However, a new t r i a l i s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e q u i r e d when a j u r y i s e x p o s e d t o e x t r a n e o u s 80 this CR-08-1927 m a t e r i a l or evidence. The s t a n d a r d f o r d e c i d i n g whether j u r o r misconduct ( i n t h i s case the introduction of extraneous material in the jury room during d e l i b e r a t i o n ) r e q u i r e s a new t r i a l i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s s e t f o r t h i n Roan v. S t a t e , 225 A l a . [428,] 435, 143 So. [454,] 460 [(1932)]: "The t e s t of vitiating influence i s not that i t d i d influence a member o f t h e j u r y t o a c t w i t h o u t e v i d e n c e , but that i t might have unlawfully i n f l u e n c e d t h a t j u r o r a n d o t h e r s w i t h whom he d e l i b e r a t e d , a n d m i g h t have u n l a w f u l l y influenced i t s v e r d i c t rendered." See Ex p a r t e L a s l e y , 505 So. 2d 1263 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; Ex p a r t e T r o h a ; 23A C.J.S. C r i m i n a l Law § 1437 (1989). The Roan t e s t mandates r e v e r s a l when j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t m i g h t have influenced the v e r d i c t . " ' E a c h c a s e must t u r n on i t s own s e t of f a c t s . N i c h o l s v. S e a b o a r d C o a s t l i n e Ry., 341 So. 2d 671 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) ; A l l r e d v. S t a t e , 55 A l a . App. 74, 313 So. 2d 195, c e r t . d e n i e d , 294 A l a . 751, 313 So. 2d 203, c e r t . d e n i e d , 423 U.S. 859, 96 S. C t . 113, 46 L. E d . 2d 86 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . "'"Weighing h e a v i l y a g a i n s t the absolutism of a rule impeaching a l l extraneous matter v e r d i c t s i s the w e l l established rule that jury v e r d i c t s are p r e s u m e d t o be c o r r e c t , a n d t h a t t h i s presumption i s strengthened when t h e t r i a l c o u r t , as h e r e , r e f u s e d t o g r a n t a new t r i a l . A l l r e d v. Dobbs, 280 A l a . 159, 190 So. 2d 712 ( 1 9 6 6 ) . I t i s t h e h e a d on c o l l i s i o n c o u r s e o f t h e s e two dominant rules -the presumption of correctness of 81 CR-08-1927 j u r y v e r d i c t s versus the r i g h t to a fair and impartial trial, governed exclusively by the evidence g i v e n from the w i t n e s s s t a n d and t h e l a w g i v e n by t h e c o u r t -that r e q u i r e s us to r e s o l v e t h i s i s s u e on a c a s e by case b a s i s . "'"Only by individual c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l a t t e n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h c a s e can i t be d e t e r m i n e d w h i c h one o f t h e s e f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e s must g i v e way i n accommodation t o the o t h e r . We are u n w i l l i n g t o say every e x t r a n e o u s m a t t e r v e r d i c t must be set aside absent a factual showing to the reasonable s a t i s f a c t i o n of the t r i a l judge that the verdict is the prejudicial result of such extraneous matters. See, f o r e x a m p l e , C l a y v. C i t y C o u n c i l o f Montgomery, 102 A l a . 297, 14 So. 646 ( 1 8 9 3 ) . " " ' N i c h o l s v. S e a b o a r d C o a s t l i n e Ry., So. 2d a t 674 (emphasis o r i g i n a l ) . 341 " ' " G e n e r a l l y , a c c u s e d , s e e k i n g a new t r i a l on t h e g r o u n d o f m i s c o n d u c t o f t h e j u r y , s u s t a i n s the burden of p r o o f r e s t i n g on him when he shows t h a t t h e m i s c o n d u c t a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d , and t h a t i t was o f s u c h a c h a r a c t e r as m i g h t have b e e n p r e j u d i c i a l to him " 23A C.J.S. s u p r a , a t § 1437. The p e t i t i o n e r i n a R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g has the b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g and p r o v i n g by a preponderance of the evidence the f a c t s n e c e s s a r y t o e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f . Rule 3 2 . 3 [ , A l a . R. C r i m . P . ] ' 82 CR-08-1927 " [ J . T . ' s ] memory o f t h e e v e n t s was q u e s t i o n a b l e at b e s t . I n a n y e v e n t , t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t any e x t r a n e o u s event, i f i t occurred, improperly influenced the jury v e r d i c t . " (R. 4491-92.) J.T. testified at the postconviction hearing j u r o r s , who were s e q u e s t e r e d d u r i n g t r i a l , the Bible allowed on Sunday d u r i n g t o go t o c h u r c h . the t r i a l He that the read passages from because they further testified were n o t that some j u r o r s b r o u g h t B i b l e s i n t o t h e j u r y room, a l t h o u g h he was n o t one o f them. J.T. s a i d that during deliberations a whom he c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y , "comfort" asked, did J.T. his the jurors read passages juror, from t h e B i b l e t o i n making a d e c i s i o n . (R. 390.) When J.T. c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e s p e c i f i c B i b l e p a s s a g e s b u t s a y t h a t he remembered t h e p h r a s e testified "an e y e f o r an e y e . " t w i c e t h a t t h e B i b l e r e a d i n g h a d no i m p a c t on d e c i s i o n a n d t h a t h i s d e c i s i o n was b a s e d on t h e f a c t s a n d the law. Some o f J . T . ' s t e s t i m o n y subjected numerous to redirect-examination times. I t i s clear was i n c o n s i s t e n t . difficulty i n recalling that and He was recross-examination J.T. was having great what h a p p e n e d a t P e r k i n s ' s t r i a l y e a r s ago. 83 14 CR-08-1927 This Court deliberations has h e l d constitutes See M c N a i r v. S t a t e , reading t h e use of a an e x t e r n a l 706 So. 2d 828 B u t s e e R o b i n s o n v. P o l k , ("[T]he that influence Bible on t h e j u r y . 438 F.3d 350, 363-64 ( 4 t h C i r . 2006) of B i b l e i s n o t an during ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997) . passages invites the l i s t e n e r e x a m i n e h i s o r h e r own c o n s c i e n c e f r o m w i t h i n . the Bible 'external' influence. to I n t h i s way, In addition, r e a d i n g t h e B i b l e i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n where a j u r o r quotes the Bible f r o m memory, w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d an i m p r o p e r When r e v i e w i n g consideration assuredly would n o t be influence."). a claim o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t b a s e d on t h e of extraneous materials, o u r Supreme C o u r t h a s stated: " G e n e r a l l y , under Alabama law, j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t i n v o l v i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n of extraneous materials w a r r a n t s a new t r i a l when one o f two r e q u i r e m e n t s i s met: 1) t h e j u r y v e r d i c t i s shown t o have b e e n a c t u a l l y p r e j u d i c e d by t h e e x t r a n e o u s m a t e r i a l ; o r 2) t h e e x t r a n e o u s m a t e r i a l i s o f s u c h a n a t u r e as t o c o n s t i t u t e p r e j u d i c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . K n i g h t v . S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 5 1 1 , 517 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) . We c o n c l u d e t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s h a s b e e n met i n t h i s c a s e . "Apicella argues that when a court is d e t e r m i n i n g whether a j u r o r ' s conduct has caused a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t h e s t a n d a r d a p p l i e d i s whether t h e extraneous m a t e r i a l 'might have i n f l u e n c e d that j u r o r a n d o t h e r s w i t h whom he d e l i b e r a t e d , ' Roan v. 84 CR-08-1927 S t a t e , 225 A l a . 428, 435, 143 So. 454, 460 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . A p i c e l l a r e l i e s h e a v i l y upon t h i s s t a t e m e n t i n Roan: "'The t e s t o f v i t i a t i n g i n f l u e n c e i s n o t t h a t i t d i d i n f l u e n c e a member o f t h e j u r y to act without the evidence, but that i t m i g h t have u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d t h a t j u r o r and o t h e r s w i t h whom he d e l i b e r a t e d , and m i g h t have u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d i t s v e r d i c t rendered.' "225 A l a . a t 435, 143 So. a t 460. "On i t s face, this s t a n d a r d would require n o t h i n g more t h a n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t e s t a b l i s h t h a t j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d . As A p i c e l l a a r g u e s , t h e word 'might' encompasses the entire realm of possibility and t h e c o u r t cannot r u l e out a l l p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o s i n which the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t might have b e e n a f f e c t e d . "However, as o t h e r A l a b a m a c a s e s e s t a b l i s h , more i s r e q u i r e d o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . I n Reed v. S t a t e , 547 So. 2d 596, 598 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) , t h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r case of j u r o r misconduct: "'We b e g i n by n o t i n g t h a t no s i n g l e f a c t or c i r c u m s t a n c e w i l l determine whether the v e r d i c t rendered i n a g i v e n case might have been unlawfully influenced by a juror's [misconduct]. Rather, i t i s a c a s e ' s own p e c u l i a r s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t w i l l decide the i s s u e . In t h i s case, i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e j u r o r t o l d none o f t h e o t h e r members o f t h e j u r y o f h e r e x p e r i m e n t u n t i l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had been r e a c h e d . W h i l e t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r she m i g h t have b e e n u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d by the experiment s t i l l remains, the j u r o r t e s t i f i e d a t t h e p o s t - t r i a l h e a r i n g on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l t h a t h e r 85 CR-08-1927 vote had not [misconduct].' been affected by the " I t i s c l e a r , then, t h a t the q u e s t i o n whether t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n m i g h t have b e e n a f f e c t e d i s answered not by a bare showing o f j u r o r misconduct, b u t r a t h e r b y an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p a r t i c u l a r t o the case. I n t h i s c a s e , as i n Reed, t h e e f f e c t o f t h e m i s c o n d u c t was c o n f i n e d t o t h e j u r o r who c o m m i t t e d t h e m i s c o n d u c t . The Reed C o u r t stated: "'We c a n n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t the verdict rendered might have been u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d , where t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e [ m i s c o n d u c t ] were known o n l y t o t h e one j u r o r who [ c o m m i t t e d t h e m i s c o n d u c t ] a n d that juror remained u n a f f e c t e d by t h e [misconduct].' "547 So. 2d a t 598. B e c a u s e no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t S.B. s h a r e d t h e c o n t e n t o f h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r members o f t h e j u r y a n d b e c a u s e no evidence indicates that S.B.'s own vote was a f f e c t e d , we c a n n o t s a y t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n f i n d i n g no a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . " A p i c e l l a a l s o a r g u e s t h a t we s h o u l d h o l d t h e extraneous material introduced through S.B.'s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h T.R. t o be p r e j u d i c i a l as a m a t t e r o f l a w . A p i c e l l a s u p p o r t s t h i s argument w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e f r o m K n i g h t , 710 So. 2d a t 517: " ' " J u r o r m i s c o n d u c t w i l l j u s t i f y a new t r i a l ... when f r o m t h e e x t r a n e o u s f a c t s p r e j u d i c e may be p r e s u m e d as a m a t t e r o f law." W h i t t e n v. A l l s t a t e I n s . Co., 4 47 So. 2d 655, 658 ( A l a . 1984) .... However, i n some c a s e s , " t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d n a t u r e o f the extraneous material [constitute] p r e j u d i c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w a n d no s h o w i n g that t h e j u r y was i n f a c t influenced 86 CR-08-1927 thereby i n a r r i v i n g at t h e i r v e r d i c t i s necessary." I d . ( p r e j u d i c e p r e s u m e d as a matter of law from jury's consulting encyclopedia and d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s ...).' "(Quoting Minshew v. S t a t e , (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 1 ) ) . 594 So. 2d 703, 716 "On t h e o t h e r h a n d , we have a l s o h e l d t h a t 'mere e x p o s u r e t o [a] d e f i n i t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e a new t r i a l as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' P e a r s o n v. Fomby, 688 So. 2d 239, 245 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . Our h o l d i n g i n P e a r s o n serves t o emphasize the l i m i t a t i o n s of the d o c t r i n e o f ' p r e j u d i c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' "Generally, a presumption of p r e j u d i c e a p p l i e s o n l y i n a case i n which the j u r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e e x t r a n e o u s m a t e r i a l was ' " c r u c i a l i n r e s o l v i n g a key m a t e r i a l i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . " ' Dawson v. S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 472, 475 ( A l a . 1997) (citing H a l l m a r k v. A l l i s o n , 451 So. 2d 270, 271 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) , and Ex p a r t e Thomas, 666 So. 2d 855 ( A l a . 1995)). "We a r e n o t w i l l i n g t o presume p r e j u d i c e as a matter of law i n t h i s case. No e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s that extraneous information arising f r o m S.B.'s conversation i n f l u e n c e d S.B.'s v o t e o r t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was e v e r c o n s i d e r e d by any o t h e r member of the j u r y . This case i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from c a s e s s u c h as N i c h o l s v. S e a b o a r d C o a s t l i n e R a i l w a y , 341 So. 2d 671 ( A l a . 1976) ( p r e j u d i c e f o u n d as a m a t t e r o f l a w where j u r o r b r o u g h t d e f i n i t i o n s i n t o t h e j u r y room d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d c o p i e d them onto a c h a l k b o a r d ) . We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r circumstances o f t h i s c a s e p r o v i d e no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g p r e j u d i c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . " Ex p a r t e A p i c e l l a , 809 So. 2d 865, 870-72 87 ( A l a . 2001). CR-08-1927 In the federal jury's consultation is courts, collateral relief of B i b l i c a l passages during based on deliberations r o u t i n e l y d e n i e d where t h e r e i s no s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e . "In c o l l e c t i n g r e l e v a n t cases, the F i f t h C i r c u i t s t a t e d , 'Most c i r c u i t s h a v e r u l e d t h a t when a B i b l e i t s e l f e n t e r s a j u r y room, t h e j u r y h a s b e e n e x p o s e d t o an e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e . ' O l i v e r v. Q u a r t e r m a n , 541 F.3d 329, 339 ( 5 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . However, most h a b e a s c o u r t s have d e n i e d r e l i e f e v e n when t h e B i b l e was u s e d d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s i f t h e r e was a f i n d i n g o f no p r e j u d i c e . See i d . a t 336-39 ( f i n d i n g on c o l l a t e r a l r e v i e w t h a t , where s e v e r a l j u r o r s r e a d aloud B i b l e passages f a c t u a l l y r e l e v a n t t o the case, t h e j u r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e B i b l e ' c r o s s e d an i m p o r t a n t l i n e ' and d e p r i v e d defendant o f h i s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t s , b u t c o n c l u d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d not r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s of the state court's finding that the B i b l e d i d not p r e j u d i c e t h e j u r y d e c i s i o n ) ; F i e l d s v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 777, 780-81 ( 9 t h C i r . 2007) (en banc) (denying habeas relief where the foreperson consulted the Bible i n generating a l i s t with points both ' f o r ' and ' a g a i n s t ' t h e use o f t h e death penalty, w h i c h he t h e n u s e d i n d e l i b e r a t i o n s ) ; M c N a i r v. C a m p b e l l , 416 F.3d 1 2 9 1 , 1307-09 ( 1 1 t h Cir. 2005) ( f i n d i n g on h a b e a s r e v i e w t h a t t h e f o r e p e r s o n ' s r e a d i n g a l o u d from B i b l e and l e a d i n g j u r o r s i n p r a y e r d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s amounted t o consideration of e x t r i n s i c evidence i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e S i x t h Amendment, b u t c o n c l u d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d to rebut the state court's f i n d i n g that the v e r d i c t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d ) . B u t c f . J o n e s v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ( g r a n t i n g a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s b a s e d on i m p l i e d judicial sanction where juror had requested court's p e r m i s s i o n t o b r i n g a B i b l e i n t o t h e j u r y room, b u t distinguishing the s i t u a t i o n of jurors merely p o s s e s s i n g B i b l e s , e v e n i n t h e j u r y room, f o r 88 a CR-08-1927 personal inspiration guidance)." U n i t e d S t a t e s v. R o d r i g u e z , 2009) . or independent 667 F. Supp. 2d 218, 222 (D. Mass. See H e r n a n d e z v. M a r t e l , (C.D. C a l . 2011) spiritual 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, ("[P]etitioner falls 1145 f a r s h o r t o f s h o w i n g by a preponderance of the evidence t h a t the j u r y considered Bible i n i t s deliberations."). Injection? Sentencing The See a l s o J e r e m y S p o r n , Constitutionality of the B i b l e D e l i b e r a t i o n s , 83 T u l . L. Rev. Sanderford, The Sixth Intrusion into Jury Decision, 74 Tenn. Amendment, Deliberatons L. Rev. 167 Rule 813 the Legal i n Capital (2009); 606(B), Dean and of R e l i g i o u s P r i n c i p l e s (2007); Gregory the of Ashley, T h e o l o g y i n t h e J u r y Room: R e l i g i o u s D i s c u s s i o n as ' E x t r a n e o u s Material' i n the Course of C a p i t a l Punishment D e l i b e r a t i o n s , 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002). As one c o u r t h a s n o t e d : "We do n o t f i n d i t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t ' c o n s c i e n t i o u s p e o p l e who a r e f a c e d w i t h a l i f e and d e a t h d e c i s i o n r e s o r t t o t h e i r r e l i g i o u s s c r u p l e s i n r e a c h i n g such a decision. Such deep introspection neither v i o l a t e s p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e nor p r e j u d i c e s the defendant.' B i e g h l e r v. S t a t e , 690 N.E.2d 188, 203 ( I n d . 1 9 9 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. C t . 550, 142 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1998)." 89 CR-08-1927 Young v. S t a t e , 12 P.3d 20, 48-49 (footnote omitted). personal "Prayer decision-making (Okla. App. 2000) i s almost c e r t a i n l y a p a r t of the process o f many p e o p l e , t h a t i s e m p l o y e d when s e r v i n g on a j u r y . " 756 Crim. a process S t a t e v. D e M i l l e , P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . J.T. verdict testified i n the penalty W i t h o u t more, abused that this establish prejudice. Perkins phase. Court i t s discretion the B i b l e h a d no No cannot other say that i n finding that impact jurors on h i s testified. the c i r c u i t Perkins court failed to A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s c l a i m does n o t e n t i t l e t o any r e l i e f . X. L a s t , Perkins argues t h a t the c i r c u i t court erred i n finding Alabama that Department t h e documents "might have" he r e q u e s t e d o f Human R e s o u r c e s were from t h e not subject to discovery. In Ex parte Perkins, this Court held that although P e r k i n s was e n t i t l e d t o d i s c o v e r h i s own DHR r e c o r d s , he was n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e d t o d i s c o v e r t h e DHR r e c o r d s related to h i s mother, stated: h i s stepfather, "Because t h e s e r e c o r d s 90 or h i s s i s t e r . are c o n f i d e n t i a l , This Court t h e most a CR-08-1927 p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o , upon a s h o w i n g o f good c a u s e , i s an in camera i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e documents by court." 920 reviewed the So. 2d a t 605. After our a circuit decision, the circuit court documents r e l a t e d t o P e r k i n s ' s m o t h e r , s t e p f a t h e r , and and f o u n d t h a t t h e y were n o t s u b j e c t t o d i s c o v e r y . this Court here, requested and this reviewing the Court has s e a l e d documents be examined documents, t h i s court that they To t h a t the be are not entitled proceeding, the parte Land, 775 other g r o u n d s by T h i s C o u r t has petitioner So. 2d these appeal, forwarded documents. Court agrees w i t h subject to to On sister the After circuit discovery. discovery in a postconviction must e s t a b l i s h "good c a u s e . " 847, 852 (Ala. 2000), S t a t e v. M a r t i n , 69 So. 3d 94 overruled Ex on ( A l a . 2011) . h e l d t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h good c a u s e when t h e r e q u e s t e d i n t r u s i v e means. See 25, 2012] 3d the requested So. information i s a v a i l a b l e through l e s s J a c k s o n v. , information State, [Ms. CR-06-1026, ( A l a . C r i m . App. was a v a i l a b l e through f a m i l y members; t h e r e f o r e , P e r k i n s cause. 91 2012). failed May Here, Perkins's t o e s t a b l i s h good CR-08-1927 "'On the f i r s t counseled [postconviction] p e t i t i o n i n a d e a t h p e n a l t y c a s e , no d i s c o v e r y s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d a t any s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , except upon l e a v e o f c o u r t a f t e r a s h o w i n g o f good c a u s e . ' Pa R. C r i m . P. 9 0 2 ( E ) ( 2 ) . 'A s h o w i n g o f g o o d c a u s e requires more t h a n just a generic demand f o r p o t e n t i a l l y exculpatory evidence.' [Commonwealth ^] Collins, [598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237,] 272 [(2008)] ( q u o t i n g Commonwealth v. B r y a n t , 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ) . A g e n e r a l a s s e r t i o n of n e c e s s i t y w i l l not s u f f i c e t o e s t a b l i s h good cause." Commonwealth v. K e a t o n , 45 A.3d The to 1050, 1094 (Pa. 2012). c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d not e r r i n d e n y i n g P e r k i n s ' s motion discover confidential m o t h e r , s t e p f a t h e r , and DHR files related to Perkins's sister. For the f o r e g o i n g reasons, t h i s Court a f f i r m s the circuit c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of P e r k i n s ' s p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f attacking his capital-murder c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e o f AFFIRMED. Welch, Kellum, B u r k e , and J o i n e r , J J . , concur. 92 death.
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