Mario Dion Woodward, alias v. State of Alabama
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((334)
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ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
CR-08-0145
Mario Dion Woodward
v.
S t a t e o f Alabama
Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t
(CC-07-1388)
Court
WELCH, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e .
M a r i o D i o n Woodward
was i n d i c t e d b y a Montgomery C o u n t y
g r a n d j u r y on two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r f o r h i s i n v o l v e m e n t
i n t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h K e i t h H o u t s , a C i t y o f Montgomery p o l i c e
officer.
C o u n t 1 a l l e g e d t h a t Woodward
intentionally
killed
CR-08-0145
O f f i c e r H o u t s w h i l e H o u t s was
A l a . Code 1975,
by
firing
a
the
murder.
by
jury
weapon
found
o f 8-4,
from
inside
him
a
13A-5-40(a)(5),
vehicle,
Woodward was
guilty
t h a t the
imprisonment
separate
and
§
on
see
§
13A-5-
t r i e d before a jury,
both
counts
of
capital
F o l l o w i n g a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e j u r y recommended,
a vote
life
see
and c o u n t 2 a l l e g e d t h a t Woodward k i l l e d H o u t s
4 0 ( a ) ( 1 8 ) , A l a . Code 1975.
and
on d u t y ,
after
without
sentencing
c o u r t impose a s e n t e n c e
the
possibility
of
parole.
h e a r i n g was
held before
the
trial
that hearing,
v e r d i c t and s e n t e n c e d
trial
the
trial
court overrode
Woodward t o d e a t h .
the
This appeal
of
A
court
jury's
follows.
Facts
Montgomery p o l i c e o f f i c e r K e i t h H o u t s was
on p a t r o l i n a
n e i g h b o r h o o d i n n o r t h Montgomery on S e p t e m b e r 28, 2006, and
conducted a t r a f f i c
stop at approximately
L a t t i m o r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she was
saw
Lattimore
reach
being
d r i v e n by
testified
that
down f o r s o m e t h i n g
a black
she
as
saw
the
p.m.
a s t o p on a g r a y
man
wearing
the
driver
Impala
and
of
the
a
Impala
red
the
hat.
Impala
police
w i t h i t s emergency l i g h t s on, p a s s e d by t h e end o f h e r
2
Shonda
s i t t i n g on h e r p o r c h when she
a p o l i c e o f f i c e r begin to execute
automobile
12:30
he
car,
street,
CR-08-0145
b e f o r e t h e y went o u t
of her
sight,
she
of s i g h t .
Soon a f t e r t h e
heard f o u r or
cars passed
f i v e gunshots
fired.
D u r i n g the t r a f f i c s t o p O f f i c e r Houts e n t e r e d the
t a g of the I m p a l a i n t o the m o b i l e d a t a t e r m i n a l
car;
the
vehicle
Houts's
patrol
r e c o r d e d the
was
car
registered
was
was
played
Houts got
out
of
side
door of
the
bullet
of
the
jaw.
entered
Officer
his
of
the
times.
The
Just
as
reveal
vehicle
and
Houts's
patrol
because the
identity
car
assailant
was
in his
video
The
stop.
a gun
and
The
shooting
driver
d i d not
get
3
on
out
that
driver's
shot
severed
the
Officer
that
his
then
the
spine,
reached
H o u t s f o u r more
Although
the
videotape,
i t did
because
Officer
assailant
positioned
video
showed
established
shot O f f i c e r
the
The
that
Houts r e a c h e d
scene i n the Impala.
of
Officer
approached the
n e c k and
patrol
camera
video
Officer
instantly.
d r i v e r f l e d the
the
a
testimony
d a s h b o a r d camera c a p t u r e d t h e
not
and
Impala f i r e d
collapse
out
car
Houts's
to
with
jury.
Medical
c a u s i n g him
arm
the
Impala.
driver
Houts
for
license
Morrie Surles.
o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the
his patrol
the
door, the
in
equipped
events that
recording
to
out
behind
of the
the
Impala
vehicle.
and
CR-08-0145
Although
Officer
Houts
survived
the shooting,
r e g a i n e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d he d i e d two d a y s
The
Morrie
he
never
later.
p o l i c e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e I m p a l a was r e g i s t e r e d t o
Surles
purchased
("Morrie").
the
Impala
Morrie
f o r her
testified
daughter,
that
she h a d
Tiffany
Surles
("Surles") .
A t a r o u n d 9:30 on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g ,
visited
a family
friend,
Shirley
Porterfield.
Woodward
According to
P o r t e r f i e l d , Woodward was d r i v i n g a l i g h t - c o l o r e d I m p a l a , and
he was w e a r i n g b l u e j e a n s , a w h i t e t - s h i r t ,
jacket.
and a r e d f l e e c e
A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e t h e s h o o t i n g o c c u r r e d ,
Sharon Shephard,
a Montgomery A n i m a l C o n t r o l o f f i c e r
driving
i n t h e a r e a , saw an I m p a l a b e i n g d r i v e n b y a d a r k - s k i n n e d m a l e
pass by h e r a t a h i g h r a t e o f speed.
During
the evening
on
the date
the shooting
occurred
S u r l e s ' s I m p a l a was f o u n d b u r n e d i n a Montgomery n e i g h b o r h o o d .
Thalessa
Shipman
testified
that
she was
" N e i g h b o r h o o d Watch" f o r h e r s t r e e t .
a
loud
car driving
S e p t e m b e r 28, 2006.
around
a
captain
of the
She s a i d t h a t she h e a r d
t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d on t h e n i g h t o f
The c a r s t o p p e d a t h e r d r i v e w a y i n t h e
c u l - d e - s a c , t h e n b a c k e d up t o an empty l o t l o c a t e d n e x t t o h e r
4
CR-08-0145
lot.
She i d e n t i f i e d
Shipman l o o k e d
over
t h e c a r as a d a r k - c o l o r e d
the fence
into
Dodge
Neon.
t h e empty l o t a n d saw a
l i g h t - c o l o r e d c a r t h e r e , a n d someone s t a n d i n g b e s i d e t h a t c a r .
Seconds l a t e r ,
the
person
jumped
who
into
the l i g h t - c o l o r e d
had been
t h e Neon,
standing
and
contacted
identified
the Impala
on
evidence
the
next
t h e Neon
law-enforcement
based
c a r went up i n f l a m e s ,
as b e i n g
that
sped
authorities,
a
away.
Shipman
later
registered to Morrie
Surles
friend
and
car
they
vehicle-identification
established
to the burning
and
number.
Additional
o f Woodward's,
Joseph
P r i n g l e , owned a b l a c k Dodge Neon t h a t h a d a l o o s e m u f f l e r a n d
was
loud.
The S t a t e
played
a video
recording
of P r i n g l e ' s
Neon f o r S h i p m a n , a n d she i d e n t i f i e d t h e s o u n d o f t h e c a r as
t h e one she h a d h e a r d on t h e n i g h t t h e c a r was b u r n e d i n h e r
neighborhood.
A
detective
involved
in
the
murder
i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t a b l a c k Dodge Neon,
and
car.
on t h e d a y o f t h e m u r d e r he and h i s p a r t n e r
located the
J o s e p h P r i n g l e was i n t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t , and a n o t h e r man
was i n t h e p a s s e n g e r s e a t ; t h e t r u n k o f t h e v e h i c l e was o p e n .
A t h i r d man was s t a n d i n g n e x t t o t h e c a r , s p e a k i n g
t h a t man was h o l d i n g a g a s c a n .
5
to P r i n g l e ;
CR-08-0145
T i f f a n y S u r l e s , Woodward's g i r l f r i e n d
a t the time of the
s h o o t i n g , t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n S e p t e m b e r 2006 she was l i v i n g
Woodward i n an a p a r t m e n t t h e y h a d r e n t e d t o g e t h e r .
with
During the
e v e n i n g o f September 27, 2006, S u r l e s a n d Woodward a r g u e d , a n d
Woodward
later
left
that
the apartment
night.
i n her Impala,
Surles
testified
and he
that
m o r n i n g , on t h e d a y O f f i c e r H o u t s was s h o t ,
gone.
to
S u r l e s had decided
move
out of
Woodward h a d
and t h e I m p a l a
the night before
the apartment.
following
she was t a k i n g a
shower when Woodward l e f t t h e a p a r t m e n t a g a i n .
the keys t o her Impala the n i g h t before,
the
returned
After
t h a t she was
Woodward
a p a r t m e n t on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g
left
was
going
the
Surles telephoned a
f r i e n d , Wendy W a l k e r , a n d a s k e d h e r t o h e l p S u r l e s move o u t o f
the
apartment.
belongings
drive
Surles
Walker
and S u r l e s
moved
Surles's
personal
t o W a l k e r ' s a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h e two women d e c i d e d t o
t o Birmingham
before
t o go
shopping.
s h e and W a l k e r
left
Woodward
telephoned
f o r Birmingham,
and he
w a n t e d S u r l e s t o meet h i m . S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Woodward met
them a t W a l k e r ' s a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x a n d t h a t he g o t o u t o f a
small, dark c a r .
out
Walker t e s t i f i e d
o f was a b l a c k N e o n .
t h a t t h e c a r Woodward g o t
N e i t h e r woman saw S u r l e s ' s
6
Impala.
CR-08-0145
Woodward j o i n e d S u r l e s
and
they drove
that during
and W a l k e r
t o Birmingham.
Surles
the t r i p t o Birmingham
i n Walker's v e h i c l e ,
and Walker
testified
Woodward s a i d t h a t he h a d
"messed up" a n d t h a t he h a d s h o t a p o l i c e o f f i c e r who p u l l e d
him
over.
Walker
testified
that
Woodward
spoke
on h i s
c e l l u l a r t e l e p h o n e d u r i n g t h e t r i p and t h a t she h a d h e a r d h i m
tell
someone t o " g e t r i d h i s g i r l [ ' s ]
c a r . " (R. 963.)
Surles
stated
t h a t Woodward t o l d h e r t h a t he h a d t a k e n c a r e o f h e r
car.
Surles
s a i d she d i d n o t g e t h e r c a r b a c k .
Walker and
S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Woodward t h r e w s o m e t h i n g o u t o f W a l k e r ' s
vehicle
testified
while
they
were
en
route
Walker
t h a t t h e o b j e c t Woodward t h r e w was a gun.
Walker and S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d
t h a t i n Birmingham
to the Century P l a z a shopping m a l l .
of
t o Birmingham.
t h e y went
Woodward b o u g h t a change
c l o t h i n g a n d t h e n a s k e d t h e women t o d r o p
him o f f a t a
b u i l d i n g near the V a l l e y d a l e e x i t of the i n t e r s t a t e .
Vernon
Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t he i s a c q u a i n t e d w i t h Woodward, a n d
t h a t Woodward t e l e p h o n e d h i m on September
t o meet w i t h h i m .
and
said
two
28, 2006, a n d w a n t e d
Cunningham a r r a n g e d t o meet w i t h
girls
dropped
Woodward
Woodward
o f f at the arranged
m e e t i n g p l a c e on V a l l e y d a l e Road i n B i r m i n g h a m l a t e r t h a t d a y .
7
CR-08-0145
Cunningham d r o v e Woodward t o Cunningham's h o u s e .
to
Cunningham's
videotape
house,
from
the
they
stopped
store's
a red baseball
cap w i t h
at a grocery
security
Woodward was w e a r i n g b l u e - j e a n
On t h e way
camera
store; a
showed
that
shorts, a red sweatshirt,
a w h i t e emblem
on t h e f r o n t .
and
After
t h e y a r r i v e d a t Cunningham's h o u s e , Woodward gave Cunningham
the
sweatshirt
and r e d b a s e b a l l cap he h a d b e e n w e a r i n g , and
he t o l d Cunningham t o b u r n them.
Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
burned the items i n h i s outdoor g r i l l ,
remnants o f c l o t h i n g i n t h a t g r i l l .
that
Woodward
during
told
a traffic
him
that
he
and t h e p o l i c e
Cunningham a l s o
had
shot
found
testified
a police
officer
stop.
Cunningham t e s t i f i e d
t h a t Woodward a s k e d f o r a r i d e and
Cunningham a g r e e d t o t a k e h i m t o a l o c a l r e s t a u r a n t .
Roderick
J e t e r p i c k e d Woodward up a t t h e r e s t a u r a n t and d r o v e Woodward
t o A t l a n t a , where he d r o p p e d Woodward o f f a t a gas
Montgomery
witnesses,
and,
determined
that
police
from
the
detectives
information
Woodward h a d c o n f e s s e d
H o u t s and t h a t he was t h e n i n A t l a n t a .
8
interviewed
they
station.
numerous
received,
to shooting
they
Officer
CR-08-0145
Deputy U n i t e d S t a t e s Marshal Joe P a r k e r t e s t i f i e d
that a
b e - o n - t h e l o o k o u t , o r "BOLO," h a d b e e n i s s u e d f o r Woodward i n
the A t l a n t a
area
a n d t h a t on t h e day a f t e r
t h e s h o o t i n g he
r e c o g n i z e d Woodward w h i l e he was a t a gas s t a t i o n i n A t l a n t a .
P a r k e r a r r e s t e d Woodward.
He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d
t i m e o f t h e a r r e s t , Woodward s p o n t a n e o u s l y
g o i n g on?
I d i d n ' t shoot
anybody."
about
calls
placed
exclaimed,
"What's
(R. 1114.)
R e c o r d s c u s t o d i a n s f o r two c e l l u l a r
testified
that, at the
companies
Woodward's
from
telephone
cellular
t e l e p h o n e s a n d as t o w h i c h t o w e r s i n Montgomery and B i r m i n g h a m
that
the
calls
were
routed
through.
That
testimony
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Woodward was i n t h e a r e a where O f f i c e r H o u t s
was s h o t a t t h e same t i m e t h e s h o o t i n g t o o k p l a c e .
Finally,
Agent
A l Mattox
from
t h e Alabama
Bureau
of
I n v e s t i g a t i o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h a d r e v i e w e d and a t t e m p t e d t o
enhance t h e v i d e o t a p e
He
testified
that
from O f f i c e r Houts's dashboard
i t appeared
from
the videotape
camera.
that the
p e r s o n who k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s was a b l a c k m a l e .
The
both
jury
returned
verdicts
finding
counts, and t h e case proceeded
9
Woodward
guilty
t o the p e n a l t y phase.
on
CR-08-0145
At
the sentencing
hearing
before
the j u r y , the
State
attempted t o prove three s t a t u t o r y aggravating
circumstances:
that
of
Woodward
had been
previously
convicted
a
felony
i n v o l v i n g t h e use or t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e , § 13A-5-49(2), A l a .
Code 1975; t h a t Woodward c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r t o a v o i d
or to
p r e v e n t a l a w f u l a r r e s t , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 5 ) , A l a . Code 1975; a n d
t h a t Woodward c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r t o d i s r u p t o r t o h i n d e r t h e
lawful
exercise
of
any
governmental
function
or
the
e n f o r c e m e n t o f l a w s , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The S t a t e
presented
evidence
of
Woodward's
1990
conviction
for
manslaughter.
Woodward
circumstances,
d i d not
rely
on
any
statutory
mitigating
§ 13A-5-51, A l a . Code 1975, b u t he d i d s e e k t o
e s t a b l i s h n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s as p r o v i d e d i n
§
13A-5-52, A l a . Code
difficult,
family.
had
1975: that
that h i s family loved
Woodward's
childhood
was
h i m , a n d t h a t he l o v e d h i s
The d e f e n s e p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e a b o u t abuse Woodward
s u f f e r e d as a c h i l d .
The d e f e n s e a l s o p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e
a b o u t Woodward's i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e l i v e s o f h i s f i v e c h i l d r e n
who, a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l ,
nine
r a n g e d i n age f r o m f o u r y e a r s t o
years.
10
CR-08-0145
The
proffered
the
jury
entered
specific
written
aggravating circumstances.
proffered
aggravating
findings
The j u r y
circumstances
as t o t h e
f o u n d two o f
to exist,
but i t
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Woodward d i d n o t m u r d e r O f f i c e r H o u t s t o a v o i d
a lawful arrest.
The j u r y recommended, b y a v o t e o f 8-4, t h a t
t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e Woodward t o l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t
the p o s s i b i l i t y
The
trial
without
of parole.
court
held
a
separate
sentencing
hearing.
A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e from t h e t r i a l , t h e p r e s e n t e n c e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t , and a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e
separate
sentencing
hearing,
the
trial
court
sentenced
Woodward t o d e a t h .
Analysis
Woodward r a i s e s 24 i s s u e s i n h i s b r i e f , many o f w h i c h he
did
not f i r s t r a i s e i n the t r i a l
sentenced
t o death, h i s f a i l u r e
court.
to object at t r i a l
bar a p p e l l a t e review of those i s s u e s .
P.,
B e c a u s e Woodward was
does n o t
R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App.
states:
"In
a l l cases i n which t h e death p e n a l t y has been
imposed, t h e Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals s h a l l n o t i c e
any p l a i n e r r o r o r d e f e c t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r
review, whether or not brought t o the a t t e n t i o n o f
the t r i a l
c o u r t , and t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e
a c t i o n by r e a s o n t h e r e o f , whenever such e r r o r has o r
11
CR-08-0145
p r o b a b l y has a d v e r s e l y
affected
r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . "
the
substantial
The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s e x p l a i n e d
e r r o r r u l e i s t o be a p p l i e d
that the p l a i n -
sparingly:
"The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m u n d e r
the
plain-error doctrine
i s stricter
than the
standard
used
i n reviewing
an i s s u e
that
was
p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l .
As
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n U n i t e d
S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r
doctrine applies only i f the e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y
egregious'
and i f i t ' s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t [ s ] t h e
f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c reputation of j u d i c i a l
proceedings.'
See Ex p a r t e P r i c e , 725 So. 2d 1063
(Ala.
1998)."
Ex
parte
Hall
v.
Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935-36
State,
1999)(additional
820
So.
2d
113,
preclude
object
review
will
now makes.
( A l a . Crim.
i n Ex p a r t e
to object
weigh h e a v i l y a g a i n s t
App.
Brown).
at t r i a l
any c l a i m
See, e.g., P h i l l i p s v. S t a t e ,
C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; W i l l i a m s
1066
( A l a . Crim.
will
not
App.
The p r e j u d i c e
1991),
aff'd,
199,
1998)
App.
12
he
662
601 So. 2d 1062,
So.
2d
929 ( A l a .
a l l e g e d must be s u b s t a n t i a l b e f o r e
result.
( A l a . Crim.
of prejudice
to
65 So. 3d 971, 986
v. S t a t e ,
f i n d i n g of p l a i n e r r o r w i l l
209
quoting
o f any a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r , h i s f a i l u r e
(Ala.
1992).
121-22
c i t a t i o n s omitted
A l t h o u g h Woodward's f a i l u r e
( A l a . 2008),
a
Hyde v. S t a t e , 778 So. 2d
("To
rise
to the l e v e l
of
CR-08-0145
p l a i n e r r o r , t h e c l a i m e d e r r o r must n o t o n l y s e r i o u s l y
a defendant's
unfair
affect
' s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s , ' b u t i t must a l s o h a v e an
prejudicial
impact
a f f ' d , 778 So. 2d 237
on
the jury's
( A l a . 2000) .
deliberations."),
Finally,
"the p l a i n - e r r o r
e x c e p t i o n t o t h e c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s - o b j e c t i o n r u l e i s t o be 'used
sparingly,
solely
in
those
miscarriage
of
justice
would
circumstances
otherwise
in
which
result.'"
a
United
S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s
v. F r a d y , 456 U.S.
152, 163 n.14
(1982).
Guilt-phase
Issues
I.
Woodward
prohibited
argues
the defense
that
the
trial
court
erred
when i t
from p r e s e n t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f h i s
former a t t o r n e y , T i f f a n y McCord, d u r i n g h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f and
that the t r i a l
court's decision
resulted
i n a denial
of h i s
r i g h t t o p r e s e n t a d e f e n s e as p r o t e c t e d b y t h e S i x t h Amendment
and t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e
United
States Constitution.
South
Carolina,
547
U.S.
Woodward
319
argues
(2006),
t h a t Holmes v.
provides
that
the
e x c l u s i o n of testimony v i o l a t e s a defendant's r i g h t to present
a
defense
i f i t infringes
on
13
a
"weighty
interest
of the
CR-08-0145
a c c u s e d , " and i f i t i s a r b i t r a r y o r d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
purpose
i t i s designed
interest i n presenting
court's
ruling
to
serve,
that
he
had
to the
a
weighty
McCord's t e s t i m o n y , and t h a t t h e t r i a l
excluding
that
testimony
was
a r b i t r a r y and
disproportionate.
During the State's
c a s e - i n - c h i e f Agent Joe Parker
of the
U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r s h a l ' s S e r v i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw Woodward
a t a gas s t a t i o n i n A t l a n t a , G e o r g i a , and a r r e s t e d h i m t h e r e .
Parker
testified
custody,
didn't
that,
Woodward
immediately
spontaneously
shoot anybody."
upon
said,
(R. 1114.)
being
"What's g o i n g
w h e t h e r Woodward a l s o
been
h i s attorney
himself
not
in."
make t h a t
with
(R. 1115.)
Parker
I
the
s a i d t h a t he h a d
a n d "was
testified
into
on?
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
defense asked Parker
i n contact
taken
looking
to turn
t h a t Woodward d i d
s t a t e m e n t i n f r o n t o f h i m , n o r d i d he h e a r o f
s u c h a s t a t e m e n t a f t e r Woodward was t a k e n i n t o c u s t o d y .
After
notified
the State
the t r i a l
presented
court
that
i t s case-in-chief,
he
intended
to call
Woodward
Tiffany
M c C o r d -- an a t t o r n e y who was r e p r e s e n t i n g Woodward on a n o t h e r
matter a t the time of the shooting
had
contacted
her before
-- t o t e s t i f y t h a t Woodward
h i s a r r e s t , a n d t h a t "as a r e s u l t o f
14
CR-08-0145
t h a t , she c o n t a c t e d
t h e Montgomery P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t
make a r r a n g e m e n t s
court
to turn
him
in."
(R.
to t r y to
1233.)
The
trial
he
would
t o l d h i m t h a t i f he c a l l e d M c C o r d t o t e s t i f y ,
waive
his
attorney-client
privilege,
subject to cross-examination
and
McCord
on a l l c o n v e r s a t i o n s
would
be
she h a d
had
w i t h Woodward.
The d e f e n s e i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t w a n t e d t o
the q u e s t i o n i n g
of McCord f o r the purpose of showing t h a t
h a d had c o n t a c t w i t h Woodward and t h a t she h a d t h e n
the
Montgomery
turning himself
Police
Department
to
facilitate
limit
she
contacted
Woodward's
i n . The d e f e n s e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t
Parker's
t e s t i m o n y t h a t Woodward h a d s a i d " I d i d n ' t s h o o t a n y b o d y "
was
" t o t a l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g " and t h a t M c C o r d ' s t e s t i m o n y w o u l d show
that
Woodward
sought
Parker's
"was
after."
(R.
testimony
p r e j u d i c i a l because
and Wendy W a l k e r ,
already
1
aware
1238.)
about
The
that
trial
Woodward's
he
was,
court
basically,
stated
statement
the p o l i c e had c o n t a c t e d
was
that
not
McCord,
Surles,
"so t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i c e were
looking
The t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d "Wendy W i l l i a m s , " w h i c h t h e c o u r t
r e p o r t e r i n d i c a t e d was an e r r o r by p l a c i n g " ( s i c ) " a f t e r t h e
c o u r t s a i d t h a t name.
(R. 1238.) T h e r e f o r e , we presume t h a t
the t r i a l
court intended
t o g i v e t h e name o f t h e
trial
w i t n e s s , Wendy W a l k e r .
1
15
CR-08-0145
for
him should
trial
when
first,
court
stated
i t sintention to call
The
"And
again
stated that
i t d i d not b e l i e v e the defense
f o r a l l I know, he c o n f e s s e d
42.)
The t r i a l
to call
c o u r t t h e n d e n i e d Woodward's r e q u e s t
c o u r t had p e r m i t t e d
Woodward now a r g u e s
rebutted Parker's
was
taken
into
the
testified
testimony.
t h a t McCord's t e s t i m o n y
testimony
to allow
Woodward d i d n o t make an
t o e s t a b l i s h what M c C o r d w o u l d have
i f the t r i a l
he
with her c l i e n t ,
t o [McCord] t o o . " (R. 1241¬
M c C o r d as a w i t n e s s .
o f f e r of proof
when
h e r , McCord
t h e c o u r t t h a t she knew members o f t h e j u r y ; s e c o n d ,
could reveal only part of her conversations
to
2
M c C o r d h a d n o t b e e n l i s t e d as a w i t n e s s a n d ,
the defense
informed
him
(R. 1 2 3 8 . )
c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n s e h a d two p r o b l e m s i f M c C o r d
testified:
the
have come as no s u r p r i s e . "
would
have
a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t Woodward made
custody.
Specifically,
Woodward
argues:
" A g e n t P a r k e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t Mr. Woodward s a i d
'I d i d n ' t s h o o t a n y b o d y ' upon h i s a r r e s t c o u l d o n l y
mean t h a t Mr. Woodward knew t h a t he was
being
a r r e s t e d f o r s h o o t i n g someone.
The o n l y i n f e r e n c e
t h e j u r y c o u l d have drawn was t h a t t h e r e a s o n Mr.
A d d i t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n revealed that the d i s t r i c t attorney
had n o t i n t e n d e d f o r P a r k e r t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t ,
and she a g r e e d n o t t o m e n t i o n t h e s t a t e m e n t i n h e r c l o s i n g
argument t o t h e j u r y .
(R. 1241.)
2
16
CR-08-0145
Woodward
knew t h a t
he was b e i n g
arrested for
s h o o t i n g someone was t h a t he h a d , i n f a c t ,
shot
someone.
Ms. M c C o r d ' s t e s t i m o n y was n e c e s s a r y t o
r e f u t e t h a t damaging i n f e r e n c e by p r o v i d i n g a n o t h e r
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r how Mr. Woodward knew t h a t he was
b e i n g a r r e s t e d f o r s h o o t i n g someone: t h a t Ms. M c C o r d
had t o l d h i m t h a t he was s o u g h t b y l a w e n f o r c e m e n t
in connection with a shooting."
(Woodward's b r i e f ,
a t p. 2 1 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.)
B e c a u s e Woodward f a i l e d t o make an o f f e r
the
of proof
testimony
elicited
he
now
claims
M c C o r d , t h e i s s u e was n o t
he
would
have
as t o
from
preserved.
R u l e 103, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s ,
i n relevant
part:
" E r r o r may n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon a r u l i n g w h i c h
admits or excludes
evidence unless a s u b s t a n t i a l
r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y i s a f f e c t e d , and
"
"(2) O f f e r o f P r o o f .
I n c a s e t h e r u l i n g i s one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known t o t h e c o u r t b y o f f e r o r was a p p a r e n t
f r o m t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h q u e s t i o n s were a s k e d . "
Rule 103(a)(2),
This
A l a . R. E v i d .
Court reviewed a s i m i l a r
issue i n M i l l e r
v. S t a t e ,
63 So. 3d 676 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , when M i l l e r a r g u e d t h a t
the
trial
court
e r r e d when i t p r o h i b i t e d h i m f r o m
testimony
about
h i s mental
state
17
from
eliciting
two w i t n e s s e s .
We
CR-08-0145
r e j e c t e d M i l l e r ' s c l a i m b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t o make an o f f e r o f
p r o o f , a n d we e x p l a i n e d :
" R u l e 1 0 3 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s t h a t
' [ e ] r r o r may n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon a r u l i n g w h i c h
... e x c l u d e s e v i d e n c e u n l e s s a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f
t h e p a r t y i s a f f e c t e d , a n d ... t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e
e v i d e n c e was made known t o t h e c o u r t b y o f f e r o r was
apparent from t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n which q u e s t i o n s
were
asked.'
The A l a b a m a
Supreme
Court
has
e x p l a i n e d t h a t '[w]hen t h e t r i a l c o u r t s u s t a i n s an
o b j e c t i o n t o a q u e s t i o n t h a t does n o t on i t s f a c e
show t h e e x p e c t e d a n s w e r , a p a r t y must make an o f f e r
of p r o o f and e x p l a i n t h e r e l e v a n c y o f t h e e x p e c t e d
answer t o p r e s e r v e e r r o r f o r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . '
E n s o r v. W i l s o n , 519 So. 2d 1244, 1262 ( A l a . 1987)
(citing
Bessemer
Executive
Aviation,
I n c . v.
B a r n e t t , 469 So. 2d 1283 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ) .
'[I]n the
a b s e n c e o f an o f f e r o f p r o o f [ r e g a r d i n g a w i t n e s s ' s
expected answer], [ a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s ] cannot review
[the e x c l u s i o n o f t e s t i m o n y ] .
To a t t e m p t t o do so
would n e c e s s i t a t e i m p e r m i s s i b l e s p e c u l a t i o n by t h i s
Court.'
B u r k e t t v. A m e r i c a n Gen. F i n . , I n c . , 607
So. 2d 138, 140 ( A l a . 1992) ( c i t i n g E n s o r , 519 So.
2d
a t 1262, a n d C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s
Alabama
E v i d e n c e § 425.01(4) (4th ed. 1 9 9 1 ) ) .
" H e r e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o p r o f f e r what
a n s w e r s S m i t h a n d D r . G o f f w o u l d have g i v e n i f t h e
p r o s e c u t o r ' s o b j e c t i o n had n o t been s u s t a i n e d . I n
f a c t , he w i t h d r e w t h e q u e s t i o n t o D r . G o f f . B e c a u s e
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d i d n o t p r o f f e r what t h e w i t n e s s e s '
testimony
would
have
been,
this
Court
cannot
determine
that the e x c l u s i o n of the testimony
a f f e c t e d a ' s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t ' o r was p r e j u d i c i a l .
R u l e 1 0 3 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d .
Accordingly, Miller
f a i l e d t o preserve t h i s issue f o r a p p e l l a t e review.
See
Perry
v. S t a t e ,
568 So. 2d 873, 874-75
(Ala.Crim.App.1990)
('[B]ecause
[the a p p e l l a n t
f a i l e d ] t o make an o f f e r o f p r o o f as t o t h e e x p e c t e d
testimony
of the witness,
this
issue
i s not
18
CR-08-0145
preserved f o r review.').
Therefore,
n o t e n t i t l e M i l l e r t o any r e l i e f . "
M i l l e r v. S t a t e ,
63 So. 2d a t 699.
t h i s i s s u e does
See a l s o F u t r a l v. S t a t e ,
558 So. 2d 991 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) .
We do n o t c o n c l u d e
that
the substance of the testimony
Woodward now a l l e g e s he w o u l d have e l i c i t e d
made
known
to the court,
n o r do we
conclude
o t h e r w i s e f u l l y apparent from t h e r e c o r d .
at
trial
that
arrested
Woodward
and t h a t
had c o n t a c t e d
McCord had then
f r o m M c C o r d was
that
i t was
The d e f e n s e
McCord
contacted
before
stated
he was
t h e Montgomery
p o l i c e , b u t t h e r e c o r d does n o t r e f l e c t t h a t Woodward became
aware t h a t he was w a n t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n
Officer
Houts
Woodward
only
because
d i d n o t make
Woodward l e a r n e d
an
McCord
offer
with
told
the shooting
him so.
of proof
that,
of
Because
in
fact,
f r o m M c C o r d t h a t t h e p o l i c e were l o o k i n g f o r
him a n d was n o t o t h e r w i s e aware t h a t he was w a n t e d i n r e l a t i o n
to
the
shooting,
R e y n o l d s v. S t a t e ,
(Ala.
(Ala.
death,
error.
the
alleged
error
[Ms. CR-07-0443,
C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; M i l l e r
C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) .
however,
we must
was
not
O c t . 1, 2010]
v. S t a t e ,
preserved.
So. 3d
63 So. 2d 676
B e c a u s e Woodward was s e n t e n c e d t o
review
Woodward's
R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P.
19
claim
for plain
CR-08-0145
Woodward c l a i m s t h a t t h e t r i a l
his
court's r u l i n g denied
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to present a
him
defense.
" S t a t e s have s u b s t a n t i a l l a t i t u d e u n d e r t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n to d e f i n e r u l e s f o r the e x c l u s i o n of
evidence
and
to apply those
rules to
criminal
defendants.
See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S c h e f f e r , 523 U.S.
303,
308
(1998).
T h i s a u t h o r i t y , however,
has
constitutional limits.
'"Whether r o o t e d d i r e c t l y i n
t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment
or
i n the
Compulsory
Process
or C o n f r o n t a t i o n
C l a u s e s o f t h e S i x t h Amendment, t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
guarantees
criminal
defendants
'a
meaningful
opportunity
to
present
a
complete
defense.'"'
Holmes v. S o u t h C a r o l i n a , 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)
( q u o t i n g C r a n e v. K e n t u c k y ,
476
U.S.
683,
690
( 1 9 8 6 ) , i n t u r n q u o t i n g C a l i f o r n i a v. T r o m b e t t a , 467
U.S. 479, 485 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ) .
' T h i s r i g h t i s a b r i d g e d by
evidence
rules that "infring[e]
upon a
weighty
i n t e r e s t of the accused"
and a r e " ' a r b i t r a r y ' " o r
" ' d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the purposes they are designed
to
serve.'"'
Holmes,
supra,
a t 324
(quoting
S c h e f f e r , s u p r a , a t 308, i n t u r n c i t i n g and q u o t i n g
Rock v. A r k a n s a s , 483 U.S. 44, 58 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ) . "
C l a r k v. A r i z o n a , 548
U.S.
735,
789-90
(2006).
This Court, i n c o n s i d e r i n g a defendant's
trial
c o u r t had
proposed
e r r e d when
defense w i t n e s s ,
i t excluded
the
c l a i m t h a t the
testimony
stated:
"'The S i x t h Amendment g u a r a n t e e s a d e f e n d a n t ' s
r i g h t to p r e s e n t a defense, i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t to
c a l l w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y on h i s b e h a l f . W a s h i n g t o n
v. T e x a s , 388 U.S. 14, 19 ( 1 9 6 7 ) .
Commonwealth v.
D u r n i n g , 406 Mass. 485, 495 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .
Accord Taylor
v.
Illinois,
484
U.S.
400,
408-409
([1988]).
"However, t h e
right
to c a l l
witnesses
i s not
a b s o l u t e ; i n t h e f a c e o f ' l e g i t i m a t e demands o f t h e
20
of
a
CR-08-0145
adversarial
s y s t e m , ' t h i s r i g h t may be
tempered
a c c o r d i n g to the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge."
Commonwealth v. D u r n i n g , s u p r a a t 495, q u o t i n g
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. N o b l e s , 422 U.S. 225, 241 ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
I f a judge e x e r c i s e s h i s or her d i s c r e t i o n t o l i m i t
the
defendant's
right
to
call
w i t n e s s e s , the
r e s t r i c t i o n c a n n o t be a r b i t r a r y .
See W a s h i n g t o n v.
Texas, s u p r a a t 23....'"
J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 842, 859
quoting
Commonwealth
v.
plain-error
review
( A l a . C r i m . App.
Drumgold,
668
N.E.2d
300,
2000),
313-14
(1996).
Our
Woodward's
failure
to
make
of
this
claim
an
offer
of
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
testimony
d e n i e d him
defense because
he
proof.
by
Although
c o u r t ' s e x c l u s i o n o f McCord's
his constitutional
learned
i s hampered
right
from McCord t h a t
to present a
the
authorities
were s e a r c h i n g f o r h i m i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a s h o o t i n g and h i s
spontaneous
anybody,"
statement
therefore,
to
had
Parker
that
he
"didn't
shoot
a noninculpatory explanation,
the
r e c o r d b e f o r e us c o n t a i n s no e v i d e n c e f o r Woodward's p r e s e n t
argument, w h i c h
i s b a s e d e n t i r e l y on
M c C o r d w o u l d have s a i d .
67 So. 3d 936,
961
speculation
about
T h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n D o t c h v.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
State,
2010):
" S p e c u l a t i o n from a s i l e n t r e c o r d w i l l not s u p p o r t
a f i n d i n g o f p r e j u d i c e . Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972 So. 2d
737,
755
( A l a . 2007),
cert.
denied, Walker
v.
21
what
CR-08-0145
A l a b a m a , 552 U.S.
1077, 128 S.Ct. 806, 169 L.Ed.2d
608 ( 2 0 0 7 ) .
A r e v i e w i n g c o u r t can n o t presume e r r o r
from a s i l e n t r e c o r d .
' " T h i s c o u r t i s b o u n d by t h e
r e c o r d and n o t by a l l e g a t i o n s o r a r g u m e n t s i n b r i e f
r e c i t i n g m a t t e r s n o t d i s c l o s e d by t h e r e c o r d . " Webb
v. S t a t e , 565
So. 2d 1259,
1260
(Ala. Cr.
App.
1990) .
See a l s o A c r e s v. S t a t e , 548 So. 2d
459
( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 7 ) .
F u r t h e r , we c a n n o t p r e d i c a t e
e r r o r from a s i l e n t r e c o r d .
Owens v. S t a t e , 597 So.
2d 734 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 2 ) ; Woodyard v. S t a t e , 428
So. 2d 136 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , a f f ' d , 428 So. 2d
138 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . ' W h i t l e y v. S t a t e , 607 So. 2d 354,
361 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . "
Q u o t e d i n R e v i s v. S t a t e ,
So.
3d
( A l a . C r i m . App.
Nothing
present
with
the
that
had
the
he
the
us
he
not
informed
and
l e v e l of p l a i n e r r o r .
affecting
had
shooting
record,
before
reason
about McCord's
the
CR-06-0454, J a n .
2011]
shot
him
of
supports
Woodward's
spontaneously
Officer
testimony
i t cannot,
told
the
that
his
wanted
in
anyone was
that
he
was
Houts.
i s not
Woodward's
obvious
therefore,
P l a i n e r r o r has
defendant's
13,
2011).
record
that
attorney
assertion
of
the
officer
connection
face
in
claim
arresting
defense
[Ms.
from
rise
to
b e e n d e f i n e d as
substantial rights,
and
the
the
error
error
so
obvious t h a t the c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to n o t i c e i t would s e r i o u s l y
undermine
proceedings.
the
fundamental
See,
e.g.,
fairness
K u e n z e l v.
22
of
State,
the
577
So.
judicial
2d
474,
CR-08-0145
481-82
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1991).
I n Ex
parte
1990),
Walker,
aff'd,
972
So.
2d
577
So.
737
2d
531
(Ala.
( A l a . 2007),
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t e x a m i n e d W a l k e r ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e
c o u r t had
c o m m i t t e d p l a i n e r r o r when i t a d m i t t e d
a
trial
videotaped
s t a t e m e n t W a l k e r had g i v e n b e c a u s e , he s a i d , t h e s t a t e m e n t
taken
subsequent
to
an
unlawful
arrest
and
was
Court
rejected
present
more t h a n
an
the
claim
because
a l l e g a t i o n that
cause t o s u p p o r t h i s a r r e s t .
The
The
Walker
there
was
Court then
was
therefore
i n a d m i s s i b l e as t h e f r u i t o f t h e p o i s o n o u s t r e e .
Supreme
the
Alabama
failed
no
to
probable
stated:
" A d d i t i o n a l l y , the a l l e g e d e r r o r i s not p l a i n
b e c a u s e p l a i n e r r o r must be o b v i o u s on t h e f a c e o f
the r e c o r d .
A s i l e n t record, that i s a record that
on i t s f a c e c o n t a i n s no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
a l l e g e d e r r o r , does n o t e s t a b l i s h an o b v i o u s e r r o r .
Our p r e c e d e n t h o l d s t h a t t h e r e c o r d must a t l e a s t
p r e s e n t an i n f e r e n c e o f e r r o r b e f o r e an a p p e l l a t e
court w i l l hold that r e v e r s i b l e error occurred."
Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972
As
i n Ex p a r t e
So.
2d a t
W a l k e r and
752.
the
c a s e s on w h i c h i t r e l i e d ,
t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r Woodward a s s e r t s i s n o t o b v i o u s on t h e
of the r e c o r d .
The
r e c o r d i s s i l e n t as t o Woodward's
c l a i m t h a t M c C o r d had
authorities
i n f o r m e d him
i n connection
that t h i s testimony
with
t h a t he was
present
w a n t e d by
the
O f f i c e r Houts's shooting
and
would provide a n o n i n c u l p a t o r y
23
face
explanation
CR-08-0145
for
h i s spontaneous
statement
to Parker.
The t r a n s c r i p t
discloses only
repeated
statements from defense counsel
McCord
testify
that
would
Moreover,
Woodward
M c C o r d w o u l d have b e e n u n a b l e
Woodward h a d b e e n unaware -- p r i o r
that
Montgomery
he d i d n o t t e s t i f y
contacted
to t e s t i f y
to their
a u t h o r i t i e s wanted
w o u l d have b e e n i n f o r m a t i o n
and
had
to question
Any t e s t i m o n y
a b o u t what Woodward d i d o r d i d n o t know b e f o r e
McCord's t e s t i m o n y
whether
him.
-¬
That
himself,
from McCord
he t e l e p h o n e d
h e r w o u l d have b e e n p u r e s p e c u l a t i o n on h e r p a r t .
a s s e r t i o n o f e r r o r i s b a s e d on h i s c u r r e n t
her.
conversation
known o n l y t o Woodward,
at t r i a l .
that
Woodward's
speculation
about
-- t h a t she w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d t h a t she
informed him t h a t the p o l i c e suspected him i n the s h o o t i n g o f
O f f i c e r H o u t s -- a n d s p e c u l a t i o n b a s e d on a s i l e n t r e c o r d does
not
support a f i n d i n g of p l a i n e r r o r .
A
finding
of
plain
error
is
unwarranted
f o r the
a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n t h a t t h e r e c o r d does n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e
trial
court's
error
adversely
R u l e 401, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
provides:
substantial
alleged
affected
Woodward's
rights.
"'Relevant
evidence'
means e v i d e n c e h a v i n g
any
t e n d e n c y t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any f a c t t h a t i s
24
CR-08-0145
of consequence t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n
more p r o b a b l e
or l e s s probable
t h a n i t w o u l d be
without the evidence."
R u l e 402, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
provides:
"All
r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i s a d m i s s i b l e , e x c e p t as
o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s o r t h a t o f t h e S t a t e o f Alabama, by s t a t u t e ,
by t h e s e r u l e s , o r b y o t h e r r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e
courts
of t h i s
State.
Evidence which i s not
relevant i s not admissible."
"The
left
question
of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence i s g e n e r a l l y
to the d i s c r e t i o n
court's
determination
of the t r i a l
court,
on t h a t q u e s t i o n
will
and t h e
n o t be
reversed
e x c e p t upon a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . "
Loggins,
trial
Ex p a r t e
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) .
Woodward a s s e r t e d a t t r i a l o n l y t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d t e s t i f y
that
she s p o k e
testimony
would
determination
Houts.
t o Woodward
have
when
he
telephoned
h a d no p r o b a t i v e
value
her.
on t h e j u r y ' s
o f t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r Woodward h a d s h o t
McCord's t e s t i m o n y
he was en r o u t e
That
Officer
t h a t Woodward c o n t a c t e d
her while
t o A t l a n t a w o u l d n o t have p r o v i d e d
evidence,
o r e v e n an i n f e r e n c e , t h a t Woodward became aware t h a t he was
wanted by t h e p o l i c e o n l y because McCord had t o l d him s o .
the c o n t r a r y , a reasonable
i m p l i c a t i o n from McCord's
w o u l d have b e e n t h a t Woodward c o n t a c t e d
25
h i s defense
To
testimony
attorney
CR-08-0145
during
his flight
Houts.
to Atlanta
because
he
had shot
Because McCord's t e s t i m o n y would
existence
o f any f a c t
Officer
n o t have made t h e
o f c o n s e q u e n c e more p r o b a b l e
or
less
p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be w i t h o u t t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e t e s t i m o n y
w o u l d have b e e n i r r e l e v a n t .
t h i s was n o t t h e t r i a l
R u l e 402, A l a . R. E v i d .
c o u r t ' s s t a t e d reason f o r r e f u s i n g t o
a l l o w M c C o r d t o t e s t i f y , we c a n a f f i r m a t r i a l
affirm
f o r a reason
Peraita
v.
State,
2003), a f f ' d ,
other than
897
Although
the stated
So. 2d 1161, 1183
897 So. 2d 1227 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) .
court's ruling
one.
See, e . g . ,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
Because the t r i a l
c o u r t c o u l d have r e f u s e d t o p e r m i t t h e t e s t i m o n y on t h e g r o u n d
that
i t was
irrelevant,
we
hold
that
the t r i a l
court's
j u d g m e n t was due t o be a f f i r m e d on t h i s a d d i t i o n a l g r o u n d , a n d
t h a t t h i s g r o u n d p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r r e a s o n t h a t Woodward i s n o t
entitled to relief
The
Sixth
on h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r .
Amendment
does
v i o l a t e the rules of evidence.
400
(1988)("The
n o t empower
a
defendant
T a y l o r v. I l l i n o i s ,
to
484 U.S.
a c c u s e d does n o t have an u n f e t t e r e d r i g h t t o
o f f e r testimony that i s incompetent, p r i v i l e g e d , or otherwise
inadmissible
under
the
standard
rules
of
evidence.").
C o n t r a r y t o Woodward's a s s e r t i o n on a p p e a l , he c o u l d have no
26
CR-08-0145
"weighty
interest"
in
the
presentation
t e s t i m o n y , and t h e t r i a l
court's
evidence
considered
could
not
be
of
irrelevant
enforcement of the r u l e s of
arbitrary.
Certainly
Woodward h a d a S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s t h a t
were
material
and
favorable
t o h i s defense.
S i n g l e t a r y , 122 F.3d 1390 ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
Taylor
v.
To e s t a b l i s h m a t e r i a l i t y o f
excluded evidence,
h o w e v e r , Woodward w o u l d have h a d t o show
that the "evidence
[unavailable at t r i a l ]
c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be
t a k e n t o p u t t h e whole case i n such a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t
undermine
quoting
confidence
Kyles
v.
i n the v e r d i c t . "
Whitley,
514
U.S.
122
419,
as t o
F.3d a t 1395,
434-35
(1995).
T e s t i m o n y f r o m M c C o r d t h a t she t o l d Woodward t h a t t h e p o l i c e
were
looking
f o r him
different light.
travels
of
n o t have
put
the
case
in a
Woodward t o l d t h r e e p e o p l e t h a t he h a d s h o t
a police o f f i c e r during
solicitation
would
a traffic
the assistance
out of the c i t y
and
stop.
of
then
Further,
several
Woodward's
people
in his
out of the s t a t e , h i s
i n s t r u c t i o n t o Cunningham t o b u r n some o f t h e c l o t h i n g he h a d
been w e a r i n g , and h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o a n o t h e r f r i e n d t o d i s p o s e
of
Surles's
vehicle
a l l indicated
w o u l d be l o o k i n g f o r h i m .
that
His i n a b i l i t y
27
he
knew
the p o l i c e
t o p r e s e n t McCord's
CR-08-0145
t e s t i m o n y t h a t she t o l d h i m t h e Montgomery p o l i c e were l o o k i n g
for
him d i d not p r e c l u d e
undermine confidence
him from p u t t i n g
on a d e f e n s e o r
i n the v e r d i c t s .
Even a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n e d
a p r o f f e r showing
t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d as Woodward a l l e g e s she w o u l d
h a v e , t h a t i s , e v e n a s s u m i n g Woodward e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h an
o f f e r o f p r o o f t h a t M c C o r d w o u l d have t e s t i f i e d t h a t she t o l d
Woodward
that
he
was
testimony
would
Woodward's
statement
g u i l t y knowledge.
not
being
sought
have
by
rebutted
the
the
police,
inference
to the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r
that
that
was b a s e d
on
T h a t Woodward h e a r d f r o m M c C o r d t h a t he was
w a n t e d b y t h e p o l i c e does n o t e l i m i n a t e o r e v e n d i m i n i s h t h e
inference
court
that
noted,
Woodward
shot
O f f i c e r Houts.
testimony already
witnesses
earlier
i n t h e day t h a t he h a d s h o t someone.
no
record
that
at t r i a l
State's
the
established
received
As t h e
Woodward
s u p p o r t e d Woodward's c u r r e n t
from
had t o l d
3
trial
three
them
Thus, e v e n i f
c l a i m , we w o u l d
e r r o r , a n d c e r t a i n l y no p l a i n e r r o r , i n t h e t r i a l
find
court's
d e n i a l o f h i s r e q u e s t t o a l l o w McCord t o t e s t i f y , because h e r
I n f a c t , i t was t h r o u g h i n v e s t i g a t o r s ' q u e s t i o n i n g o f
t h o s e same w i t n e s s e s t h a t t h e y l e a r n e d t h a t Woodward was i n
Atlanta.
3
28
CR-08-0145
testimony
would
have
been
irrelevant
and
immaterial
and
therefore not probative.
Finally,
as M c C o r d h e r s e l f n o t e d t o t h e t r i a l
c o u r t when
Woodward a n n o u n c e d h i s i n t e n t t o c a l l h e r as a w i t n e s s M c C o r d
had b e e n unaware t h a t she was a p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s a n d she knew
s e v e r a l o f t h e j u r o r s , who h a d n o t b e e n a s k e d d u r i n g v o i r
about
prevent
their
relationship
with
h e r and whether
them f r o m b e i n g i m p a r t i a l
For a l l the f o r e g o i n g reasons,
to
relief
on t h i s
that
dire
would
jurors.
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d
claim of error.
II.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s
that the t r i a l
p e r m i t t e d Agent A l Mattox,
Bureau of I n v e s t i g a t i o n
c o u r t e r r e d when i t
an i n v e s t i g a t o r w i t h t h e A l a b a m a
("the A B I " ) , t o t e s t i f y as an e x p e r t
t h a t he h a d v i e w e d t h e v i d e o t a k e n f r o m O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s p a t r o l
car
a n d t h a t he h a d d e t e r m i n e d
male.
Woodward a r g u e s
t h a t t h e a s s a i l a n t was a b l a c k
t h a t Agent Mattox's
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
t h e r a c e o f t h e s h o o t e r was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e e x p e r t
under Rule
Mattox
his
702, A l a . R. E v i d .
The S t a t e a r g u e s
testimony
t h a t Agent
gave b o t h e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y a n d l a y t e s t i m o n y a n d t h a t
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s h o o t e r as a b l a c k male
29
constituted
CR-08-0145
only
l a y testimony,
R u l e 701, A l a . R.
Before
Woodward
the
a n d t h e r e f o r e was a d m i s s i b l e
Evid.
State
argued
presented
to the t r i a l
v i e w e d an e n h a n c e d v i d e o t a p e
camera a n d t h a t he s h o u l d
conclusions
that the shooter
Woodward a l s o s t a t e d ,
[that
the shooter
already.
And
Agent
court
Mattox's
that
from O f f i c e r
[could]
testimony,
Agent
Mattox
Houts's
n o t be p e r m i t t e d
"which the j u r y
particularly
pursuant to
reach
dashboard
to t e s t i f y
just
as
was a b l a c k m a l e .
was]
that
"[h]is
ability
dark-skinned
video
c a r and
i s not
from
what
going
to
(R. 1142.)
4
we've
"'this
i s what
witness
court
that
o r any j u r o r . "
the
State
could
heard
definitively
He a r g u e d t h a t
videotape
I eyeballed,'"
t o e y e b a l l w h a t ' s on t h e v i d e o
t h a n any o t h e r
stated
easily,"
(R. 1 1 4 2 . )
A g e n t M a t t o x w o u l d t e s t i f y t h a t he h a d e n h a n c e d t h e
the p a t r o l
as t o
"What t h e e v i d e n c e h a s e s t a b l i s h e d i s
determine t h a t i t ' s a b l a c k male."
from
had
i s not b e t t e r
(R. 1144.)
use
and
Agent
The
trial
Mattox's
P o w e r P o i n t p r e s e n t a t i o n t o e m p h a s i z e t h e p o i n t s i t was
trying
to
Agent
make a n d t h a t
defense
counsel
could
cross-examine
T h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y n o t e s t h a t two w i t n e s s e s h a d a l r e a d y
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e I m p a l a t h e y saw i n t h e a r e a
a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s h o o t i n g was a b l a c k m a l e .
(R. 786, 833.)
4
30
CR-08-0145
M a t t o x on w h e t h e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n s he drew f r o m t h e v i d e o were
valid.
the
Woodward t h e n r e q u e s t e d
jury that
facts,
that the t r i a l
i t , and n o t Agent Mattox,
and t h e t r i a l
court
instruct
was t h e f i n d e r o f
c o u r t a g r e e d t o do s o .
Agent Mattox then t e s t i f i e d
t h a t he was a e m p l o y e d
t h e A B I i n t h e Bomb Squad a n d T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s U n i t .
Mattox
stated
Services
Unit
surveillance
videos,
be
that
he was t h e s u p e r v i s o r
and
that
a n d was
he
responsible
that i s , attempting
seen.
Agent
handled
Mattox
a l l the large-scale
f o r t h e enhancement
about
so they
in
video
enhancement, a n d t h e t r i a l
court
c a r had a v i d e o t a p e ,
as an e x p e r t .
and s a f e k e e p i n g ,
n o t damaged o r d e s t r o y e d .
Agent
Agent Mattox
Houts's
a n d he d o w n l o a d e d t h e t a p e
t h e c o m p u t e r h a r d d r i v e o f an I n t e r g r a p h v i d e o - a n a l y s t
storage
used t o
stated that
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n - c a r d a s h b o a r d camera i n O f f i c e r
for
he
The S t a t e p r o f f e r e d A g e n t M a t t o x as an e x p e r t
Mattox could o f f e r h i s opinions
patrol
of
could
the t r a i n i n g
r e c e i v e d i n v i d e o enhancement a n d a b o u t t h e t e c h n i q u e s
enhance v i d e o s .
Agent
of the Technical
t o c l e a r up v i d e o s
testified
by
so t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l
onto
system
video
was
Agent M a t t o x s a i d t h a t t h e computer
s y s t e m made i t p o s s i b l e t o v i e w t h e v i d e o
31
frame b y f r a m e a n d
CR-08-0145
provided
for additional
magnification
and a l t e r a t i o n
of the
l i g h t c o n t r a s t f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e images b u t t h a t i t d i d
not
alter
the video
itself.
Agent
Mattox
had prepared
a
P o w e r P o i n t p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e v i d e o enhancement t o a s s i s t h i m
in
h i s explanation
objected
to the jury.
on t h e g r o u n d s
Woodward
he h a d s t a t e d
stated
before
Agent
that
he
Mattox
t e s t i f i e d , a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y as f o l l o w s :
" L a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n , l e t me t e l l you t h i s : The
PowerPoint p r e s e n t a t i o n i n and o f i t s e l f , t h a t ' s n o t
evidence.
That's j u s t something the p r o s e c u t i o n i s
o f f e r i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e t o h e l p them make c e r t a i n
points
t o you.
Just
because
the PowerPoint
p r e s e n t a t i o n s a y s one t h i n g , t h a t d o e s n ' t mean t h a t
you have t o a g r e e t o i t . A n d t h e S t a t e s t i l l h a s
i t s b u r d e n o f p r o o f t o p r o v e t o y o u what t h e y s a y
the
t a p e shows.
A n d y o u ' r e n o t b o u n d b y any
w i t n e s s ' s c o n c l u s i o n as t o what t h e S t a t e -- what
t h e t a p e -- shows. You, c e r t a i n l y , c a n r e l y on y o u r
own i n d e p e n d e n t e v a l u a t i o n a n d r e v i e w o f t h e t a p e .
And y o u c a n draw w h a t e v e r c o n c l u s i o n s y o u want t o
draw f r o m t h a t t a p e .
I n o t h e r w o r d s , y o u d o n ' t have
t o go w i t h what t h e y s a y t h e t a p e s a y s .
R e l y on i t
b a s e d on y o u r own o b s e r v a t i o n . "
(R.
1196-97.)
Following
the
trial
PowerPoint p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
Y o u r Honor."
court's
instruction
defense counsel
about
the
s t a t e d , "Thank y o u ,
(R. 1197.)
Agent Mattox then
Department had r e q u e s t e d
testified
that
t h e Montgomery
Police
t h a t he a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e s e v e r a l
32
CR-08-0145
pieces
of information
from t h e v i d e o t a p e :
t h e v e h i c l e ; t h e make, m o d e l , y e a r ,
t h e t a g number o f
and c o l o r o f t h e v e h i c l e ;
t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e p e r s o n i n s i d e t h e v e h i c l e ; w h e t h e r t h e gun
was
fired
with
the shooter's
right
hand
or l e f t
hand; t h e
make, m o d e l , a n d c a l i b e r o f t h e weapon u s e d i n t h e s h o o t i n g ;
t h e number o f s h o t s
trajectory
casings;
of
fired;
the s h e l l
the duration of the shooting; the
casings;
the color
of
the
shell
a n d a n y a c t i o n s O f f i c e r H o u t s t o o k as he a p p r o a c h e d
the v e h i c l e .
A g e n t M a t t o x t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
tag
number
Chevrolet;
car.
on
the
he c o u l d
vehicle
and
not determine
that
the
vehicle
a
t h e make o r model o f t h e
A g e n t M a t t o x s a i d t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e was t h e
shooter
and t h a t
he h a d f i r e d
t h e gun w i t h
his right
A g e n t M a t t o x f o u n d no e v i d e n c e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t
second occupant i n the v e h i c l e .
to conclude that the shooter
determined
that
the
semiautomatic p i s t o l ,
model,
that
was
or c a l i b e r
five
shots
had
b u t he c o u l d
o f t h e weapon.
were f i r e d ,
fired
a
Agent Mattox
large-frame,
not determine
He was a b l e
and t h e s h o t s
33
was a
A g e n t M a t t o x s a i d he was a b l e
was a b l a c k m a l e .
driver
there
hand.
t h e make,
to determine
had been f i r e d i n
CR-08-0145
2.89
seconds.
— and you
can see
t o o k any
of
F i n a l l y , Agent Mattox t e s t i f i e d ,
f r o m t h e v i d e o -- t h a t
"I concluded
[ O f f i c e r Houts] never
a c t i o n s t h a t w o u l d have b e e n i n r e s p o n s e t o any
threat
he
perceived
from
...
i n s i d e the
type
vehicle."
(R.
1204.)
Woodward
permitted
shooter
that
the
Agent Mattox to o f f e r
was
claimed
argues
a b l a c k male.
to
base
his
trial
h i s expert
1220),
subject
was
and
for expert
not
identification
an
officer,
this
as
he
when i t
that
an
expert
because
the
the
was
to
not
a
proper
Agent Mattox
make
a
racial
amounted t o l i t t l e
the
must have b e e n a b l a c k
shooter's
[and] p h y s i c a l t r a i t s "
e v e n i f i t was,
"Mattox's testimony
assertion that
opinion
on
identification
o p i n i o n and,
qualified
identification.
than
that
erred
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t A g e n t M a t t o x
" m a n n e r i s m s , movement, c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s
(R.
court
a s s a i l a n t shot
m a l e , " and
the
more
a police
testimony
v i o l a t e d Woodward's r i g h t s u n d e r t h e E q u a l - P r o t e c t i o n and
Process
Clauses
(Woodward's b r i e f ,
trial
before
Agent
of
a t p.
the
United
28.)
Mattox
States
Due-
Constitution.
A l t h o u g h Woodward o b j e c t e d
testified
M a t t o x ' s a b i l i t y t o draw c o n c l u s i o n s
34
and
argued
at
that
Agent
from the enhanced
video
CR-08-0145
was
no b e t t e r t h a n
the j u r y ' s ,
he now
argues
f o r the
first
t i m e t h a t A g e n t M a t t o x ' s t e s t i m o n y was r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
and
that
i t violated
protection.
trial,
we
his rights
t o due
process
and
equal
B e c a u s e Woodward o b j e c t s on g r o u n d s n o t r a i s e d a t
review
that p o r t i o n of the c l a i m f o r p l a i n
error
only.
"The
left
question of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence
to the d i s c r e t i o n
court's determination
of
the
trial
court,
and
the
trial
n o t be
reversed
e x c e p t upon a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . "
Ex p a r t e
Loggins,
Evid.,
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103
provides:
specialized
understand
witness
on t h a t q u e s t i o n w i l l
i s generally
"If
knowledge
the evidence
qualified
as
( A l a . 2000) .
scientific,
will
assist
technical,
the
or t o determine
an
expert
R u l e 702, A l a . R.
trier
a fact
by
or
of
other
fact
to
i n issue, a
knowledge,
skill,
e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n , may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e
f o r m o f an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e . "
rule
5
Thus,
i s not whether the s u b j e c t matter
within
t h e common k n o w l e d g e
the focus
of the
of the testimony
or understanding
of the
is
jurors,
Rule
702, A l a . R. E v i d . , has been amended.
The
amendment, e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 2012, keeps t h i s p r o v i s i o n i n
s u b s e c t i o n (a) and adds s u b s e c t i o n s (b) and ( c ) .
5
35
CR-08-0145
but whether t h e e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n or testimony w i l l a s s i s t t h e
trier
of fact
i n understanding
issue of fact.
video
the evidence
The S t a t e o f f e r e d A g e n t M a t t o x as an e x p e r t i n
enhancement,
and Agent
Mattox
testified
p r o c e s s he u s e d t o enhance t h e v i d e o t a p e
patrol
c a r ; he
enhanced
o r d e c i d i n g an
video
testified
he
about
prepared
as
to the
from O f f i c e r
Houts's
the photographs
during
that
and t h e
process;
a n d he
t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s a n d o b s e r v a t i o n s he made as a
r e s u l t of that process.
A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t t e s t i f y i n g as a
r a c i a l - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n expert.
his
conclusions
regarding
Agent Mattox's testimony
the race
of the person
about
who
shot
O f f i c e r H o u t s i s no d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e t e s t i m o n y a b o u t a n y o f
the
other
conclusions
enhancement
of the video
enhanced v i d e o
All
o f Agent
he
reached
as
a
and h i s r e p e a t e d
result
viewing
Mattox's
opinions
were
offered to a s s i s t the
the evidence or i n determining
i s s u e s o f f a c t and were, t h e r e f o r e , p e r m i s s i b l e .
vehicle,
which
of the
a n d t h e p h o t o g r a p h s he made f r o m t h e v i d e o .
t r i e r s of fact i nunderstanding
Agent Mattox
of the
testified
about t h e l i c e n s e
F o r example,
t a g number o f t h e
a b o u t t h e number o f s h o t s f i r e d a n d t h e d i r e c t i o n i n
the casings
were
ejected,
36
about
the color
of the
CR-08-0145
c a s i n g s , a n d t h a t t h e s h o o t e r was r i g h t - h a n d e d .
jury,
t o o , w o u l d have b e e n a b l e
enhanced
video
and
the
not
t o (and d i d ) " e y e b a l l " t h e
photographs
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , Woodward does
Although the
to
make
those
n o t now a r g u e -- a n d we
would
f i n d -- t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t
permitted
Agent
Mattox
to
testify
about
the d e t a i l s
he
o b s e r v e d a n d a b o u t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e s e m a t t e r s b e c a u s e ,
we
c o n c l u d e , Agent
Mattox's testimony a s s i s t e d
the jury i n
understanding the evidence or i n determining a fact i n issue.
Woodward a l s o does
n o t a r g u e on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l
court
e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d A g e n t M a t t o x t o t e s t i f y as t o t h e make
of
t h e v e h i c l e , e v e n t h o u g h A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t q u a l i f i e d as
an e x p e r t i n v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;
that the t r i a l
Agent
Mattox
shooting,
n o r does Woodward a r g u e
c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t p e r m i t t e d
to t e s t i f y
even
though
about
Agent
t h e t y p e o f gun u s e d
Mattox
was n o t p r o f f e r e d
weapons e x p e r t ; n o r does Woodward a r g u e t h a t t h e t r i a l
abused
i t s discretion
when
i n the
i t permitted
Agent
as a
court
Mattox
to
t e s t i f y t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s a c t i o n s d i d n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t he
was r e s p o n d i n g t o any t y p e o f t h r e a t he p e r c e i v e d f r o m anyone
in
t h e v e h i c l e , e v e n t h o u g h A g e n t M a t t o x was n o t an e x p e r t i n
37
CR-08-0145
human b e h a v i o r o r p s y c h o l o g y .
a r g u m e n t s , we
Even i f Woodward had made t h o s e
would conclude
t h a t t h e r e had b e e n no abuse o f
d i s c r e t i o n i n the admission of t h a t testimony because i t ,
helped the j u r y to understand
fact i n issue.
as
to
his
The
opinion
the evidence
or to determine
same i s t r u e o f A g e n t M a t t o x ' s
about
the
race
of
too,
the
a
testimony
shooter.
That
t e s t i m o n y was b a s e d on A g e n t M a t t o x ' s
repeated viewings of the
d i g i t i z e d and e n h a n c e d v i d e o , as was
the testimony about a l l
t h e o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s and o p i n i o n s he gave a t t r i a l .
There i s
no i n d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e r a c e o f
the
assailant
was
o f f e r e d or
used
by
the
prosecution
to
i n f l a m e t h e j u r y o r t o c a u s e undue p r e j u d i c e b a s e d on r a c e , o r
for
a
purpose
Mattox's
other
testimony.
than
any
of
the
of
Agent
offered to
assist
or to determine
a fact
A l l t h e t e s t i m o n y was
the j u r y i n understanding the evidence
in
remainder
issue.
Furthermore,
examination
i t is
Woodward
important
vigorously
to
note
challenged
that
Agent
on
crossMattox's
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e a s s a i l a n t was
a b l a c k m a l e , and he c h a l l e n g e d
other c o n c l u s i o n s Agent Mattox
reached,
a s s a i l a n t was
alone i n the v e h i c l e .
38
i n c l u d i n g whether the
(R.
1216-20.)
CR-08-0145
F i n a l l y , the t r i a l c o u r t e m p h a t i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y
t h a t i t was
t h e u l t i m a t e f i n d e r o f f a c t and
t h a t the j u r y
n o t b o u n d by A g e n t M a t t o x ' s o p i n i o n s a b o u t what t h e
showed.
Jurors
instructions.
(Ala.
2008)
follows
are
See,
presumed
e.g.,
("[A]n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t
the
1169,
follow
trial
1176
the
court's
videotape
trial
Ex p a r t e B e l i s l e , 11 So.
evidence to the c o n t r a r y . ' "
2d
to
was
court's
3d 323,
'presume[s] t h a t the
i n s t r u c t i o n s unless
333
jury
there
is
( q u o t i n g C o c h r a n v. Ward, 935
So.
(Ala. 2006))).
Nothing
i n the
record i n
case i n d i c a t e s t h a t the j u r y d i d not f o l l o w the t r i a l
this
court's
instruction.
Thus,
we
find
admission
of
Agent
violation
of
equal-protection
Woodward has
no
abuse
of
Mattox's
discretion
testimony
b e l a t e d l y argued.
t h a t the
State
Finally,
even i f the t r i a l
Agent Mattox's testimony
Impala,
the
error
r e c o r d does n o t
supporting
form of
rights
as
contain
Woodward's
racial
Agent Mattox's
bias
or
testimony.
c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d
have
39
no
The
about the
would
the
certainly
and
in
due-process
e n g a g e d i n any
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n when i t p r e s e n t e d
error
or
e v e n an i n f e r e n c e , much l e s s e v i d e n c e ,
claim
or
race of the d r i v e r of
been
harmless
the
because
CR-08-0145
eyewitnesses
man.
h a d a l r e a d y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r was a b l a c k
R u l e 4 5A,
A l a . R. App. P.
III.
Woodward
several
next
errors
argues
related
testimony
a l l e g e d l y made
to
and d e m o n s t r a t i v e
calls
that
he
the
the
trial
State's
court
committed
presentation
of
evidence about c e l l u l a r - t e l e p h o n e
near
the time
of O f f i c e r
Houts's
murder.
P e t e DeLeon, a c u s t o d i a n
testified
about
information,
accounts,
the user
call
of records
records,
at A l l t e l
including
f o r three d i f f e r e n t accounts.
but the records
Wireless,
cell-tower
Woodward
indicated that Tiffany Surles
o f t h e c e l l phone a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one o f
accounts.
The t h i r d
Walker's.
DeLeon i d e n t i f i e d
r e c o r d DeLeon t e s t i f i e d
engineers;
a b o u t was Wendy
two maps: one map c o n t a i n e d
that
DeLeon t e s t i f i e d
f r o m Woodward's
cell
i n the
area
a second
witness
map
t o w e r s t h a t were " h i t "
t o w e r s were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
where
only
created
phone on t h e day o f t h e s h o o t i n g .
l o c a t i o n s of the c e l l
being
t h a t he c r e a t e d
showed t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e c e l l
was
Woodward's
t h e l o c a t i o n f o r A l l t e l ' s c e l l t o w e r s a n d t h a t map was
by
h a d two
Shirley
[ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 40]
The
Woodward's
Porterfield
had
CR-08-0145
testified
she h a d s e e n h i m on t h e m o r n i n g
d r i v i n g a l i g h t - c o l o r e d Impala.
of the shooting,
DeLeon t e s t i f i e d t h a t A l l t e l
r e c o r d s d i d n o t p e r m i t even a r a d i o - f r e q u e n c y
("RF") e n g i n e e r
to
using the c e l l
pinpoint the exact
phone; t h e r e c o r d s
location
of the person
only provided
i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e c e l l
t o w e r s t h a t were u s e d d u r i n g a c a l l .
Jennifer
Nextel,
Scheid,
testified
information,
a
about
f o r three
custodian
call
of
records,
accounts:
records
for Sprint
including
cell-tower
one a c c o u n t
was a p r e p a i d
phone; one s u b s c r i b e r was P a u l L e w i s b u t t h e r e g i s t e r e d u s e r ' s
name on t h a t a c c o u n t
used
by Joseph
Deramus's.
ordinary
Pringle;
She s a i d
course
was J o e a n d was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
and t h e f i n a l
the records
of business
account
was
Brittne
kept
were t h e t y p e
f o r Sprint
being
i n the
Nextel.
Scheid
t e s t i f i e d w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n t h a t S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 63 c o n s i s t e d
o f maps d i s p l a y i n g t h e l o c a t i o n s o f S p r i n t N e x t e l ' s c e l l - p h o n e
towers,
b a s e d on t h e l a t i t u d e
company's
accurately
database.
and l o n g i t u d e r e a d i n g s
She s t a t e d
represented
that
the c e l l - s i t e
t h e maps
i nthe
fairly
l o c a t i o n s of
and
Sprint
N e x t e l , and t h a t they would a i d i n h e r e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e j u r y
a b o u t t h e c a l l s made on t h e d a y o f t h e m u r d e r .
admitted without o b j e c t i o n .
[ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 41]
The maps were
CR-08-0145
Scheid
records
testified
without
objection
one
of the
d i s p l a y e d o u t g o i n g phone c a l l s f r o m t h e p r e p a i d
a t 12:36 p.m. a n d a g a i n
a t 12:38 p.m. t o a number t h a t
e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d was T i f f a n y S u r l e s ' s
Those c a l l s
were p l a c e d
Montgomery, S c h e i d
Woodward.
prepaid
that
Scheid
phone
using
t h e tower l o c a t e d
t e s t i f i e d -- a g a i n
testified
that
one o f w h i c h
about other
calls
i n downtown
from
made f r o m t h e
went
through
a
o f Montgomery a n d a n o t h e r u s e d a
tower l o c a t e d i n A t l a n t a , Georgia.
received
other
number.
without objection
a b o u t phone c a l l s
afternoon,
t o w e r l o c a t e d on I-65 n o r t h
cell-phone
phone
A d d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n y was
made t h a t d a y ; some o f t h e c a l l s
went t h r o u g h a t o w e r t h a t was c l o s e t o C e n t u r y P l a z a m a l l i n
Birmingham.
A f t e r S c h e i d t e s t i f i e d t h a t one o f t h e c a l l s went t h r o u g h
a
tower
located
whether the c e l l
on I n t e r s t a t e
65 t h e p r o s e c u t o r
phone c u s t o m e r h a d b e e n t r a v e l i n g
the i n t e r s t a t e a t t h e time.
Defense counsel
objected
asked her
north
on
that the
q u e s t i o n was b e y o n d S c h e i d ' s e x p e r t i s e , a n d he s a i d , "They c a n
talk
a b o u t t o w e r s where t h e c e l l
phone went t h r o u g h b u t n o t
the p h y s i c a l l o c a t i o n o f any p e r s o n making t h e c a l l ,
foundation
predicate."
(R. 1159.)
42
The S t a t e
improper
withdrew the
CR-08-0145
question.
The S t a t e l a t e r p o i n t e d a t a c e l l - p h o n e t o w e r on
one o f t h e maps a n d a s k e d S c h e i d , " I f t h e r e h a d b e e n t e s t i m o n y
s a y i n g t h a t t h i s phone h a d b e e n u s e d g o i n g up I - 6 5 , w o u l d t h a t
be
consistent with
phone t o w e r ? "
an i n d i v i d u a l
(R. 1160-61.)
being
close to this
cell¬
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d on t h e
g r o u n d t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was l i m i t e d t o t e s t i f y i n g a b o u t w h i c h
t o w e r s were u s e d d u r i n g
certain
calls,
and t h e t r i a l
court
overruled that objection.
On
that
cross-examination
she h a d
"some l e v e l
defense
counsel
stated to
of e x p e r t i s e , obviously,
p h o n e s and t o w e r s a n d t h a t k i n d o f t h i n g , " a n d S c h e i d
(R. 1165.)
an RF e n g i n e e r
and S c h e i d agreed,
cell
agreed.
typically
when d e f e n s e
counsel
comes i n t o d e t e r m i n e
o f a p e r s o n m a k i n g a phone c a l l ,
the w i t n e s s ,
then t e s t i f i e d
i s someone who w o r k s w i t h t h e a c t u a l
f u r t h e r agreed
engineer
to
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h e n s t a t e d t o S c h e i d t h a t she was
n o t an "RF e n g i n e e r , "
Scheid
Scheid
"And t h a t ' s why
said
that
towers.
t h a t an
RF
the a c t u a l l o c a t i o n
a n d when he f u r t h e r s t a t e d t o
you were o n l y a b l e t o t e l l t h e
j u r y a b o u t what t o w e r s were u s e d b u t n o t , b a s i c a l l y , where t h e
person
from?"
was, t h e a p p r o x i m a t e a r e a where t h e c a l l s o r i g i n a t e d
(R. 1166.)
Defense counsel then asked S c h e i d a s e r i e s
43
CR-08-0145
of q u e s t i o n s about the c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of c e l l - p h o n e towers
she
answered those
about
the
towers,
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of
Scheid
information.
testified
into
that
antennas
an
tower the
S c h e i d was
evidence
on
engineer
counsel
the
asked
cell-phone
would
know
company's
that
cell-phone
o r t h r e e " s e c t o r s , " w h i c h she s a i d " r e f e r s
s i d e of the
1169.)
the
Scheid t e s t i f i e d t h a t her
t o w e r s have two
which
q u e s t i o n s , b u t when d e f e n s e
call
was
hitting
off of."
a b l e t o i d e n t i f y from the r e c o r d s
which
sector a c a l l
had
been
to b e t t e r determine
had
created,
admitted
routed
through;
Woodward p r o v i d e d
i t purported
Woodward's phone on
the
day
to
well
foundation
qualified
"considering
just
like
to
S c h e i d w i t h a map
represent
of the
o b j e c t e d t o Woodward's use o f t h e map
a proper
calls
murder.
made
When t h e
State
for i t ,
Woodward a r g u e d t h a t S c h e i d
answer
some
questions
from
(R.
1172.)
Woodward a l s o
the
helps
--
enables
--
her
44
to
e x p l a i n --
(R.
was
[were]
stated,
"
laid
map,
"And,
Judge, the s e c t o r l a y o u t i s n ' t c r u c i a l t o the t e s t i m o n y .
just
he
from
b e c a u s e he had n o t
a l l t h e maps s h e ' s b e e n l o o k i n g a t t h a t
this."
able
t h e l o c a t i o n o f a c a l l e r by k n o w i n g w h i c h
used.
and
to
(R.
h o w e v e r , she a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t an RF e n g i n e e r m i g h t be
sector a c a l l
and
It
1173.)
CR-08-0145
After reviewing
admitted
the records
i n t o e v i d e n c e S c h e i d t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e 12:36
phone c a l l f r o m Woodward's
t h a n d i d t h e 12:38 p.m.
Scheid
call
from S p r i n t N e x t e l t h a t had been
testified
signal,
sector
c a l l he made.
on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
u s u a l l y i s routed
strongest
phone came f r o m a d i f f e r e n t
p.m.
through
but that
that a
cell-phone
the c l o s e s t tower
i f there
was
with
the
a problem with the
c l o s e s t t o w e r o r i f a t o w e r was a t maximum c a p a c i t y , t h e c e l l ¬
phone h a n d s e t w o u l d t h e n u s e a n o t h e r n e a r b y t o w e r o r t h e t o w e r
p r o v i d i n g the next strongest
signal.
Woodward r a i s e s t h r e e c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g t h i s e v i d e n c e ,
and
we a d d r e s s e a c h i n t u r n .
A.
present
Woodward
first
l i v e testimony
argues:
"Because
from the engineers
the State
d i d not
who c r e a t e d t h e c e l l
phone r e c o r d s a n d maps, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g t h e
records
that
a n d maps."
the
through
violated
State's
the
risk
presentation
testimony
of
of
the
h i s S i x t h Amendment
examine w i t n e s s e s
the
(Woodward's b r i e f , a t p. 45.)
He a s s e r t s
the
cell-phone
custodians
of
right
evidence
the
to confront
and
records
cross-
who h a d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r e c o r d s a n d maps o r
o f e r r o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them.
45
He c i t e s
Melendez-
CR-08-0145
Diaz
v. M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 557 U.S.
, 129 S. C t . 2527
Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l ,
it
now
only
for plain
error.
discretion
i n determining
evidence,
and
the
A
whether
trial
trial
court's
so we
court
t o exclude
(2009).
has
review
wide
o r t o admit
determination
on
the
a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d i n t h e a b s e n c e
o f an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n .
S e e , e . g . , Hudson v . S t a t e ,
[Ms.
CR-09-1913, Aug. 26, 2011]
App.
2011).
We
court's admission
find
no abuse
So. 3d
(Ala. Crim.
of d i s c r e t i o n
of the evidence;
i n the t r i a l
t h e r e f o r e , we f i n d no p l a i n
error.
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
i n Melendez-Diaz
held
t h a t t h e S i x t h Amendment g e n e r a l l y p r o h i b i t s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n
o f a f o r e n s i c l a b o r a t o r y r e p o r t t h a t was c r e a t e d
to
has
serve
no o p p o r t u n i t y
report.
not
as e v i d e n c e i n a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g
specifically
i f the defense
t o c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h e p e r s o n who made t h e
F o r t h e r e a s o n s e x p l a i n e d b e l o w , M e l e n d e z - D i a z does
support
First,
Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r .
DeLeon o f A l l t e l
testified
on
cross-examination
t h a t he c r e a t e d t h e map t h a t d i s p l a y e d e a c h c a l l made a n d t h e
tower
through which the c a l l
was r o u t e d .
46
"The a c t u a l
call
CR-08-0145
records
i n d i c a t e the exact
DeLeon s a i d .
t o w e r t h a t t h e c a l l went t h r o u g h , "
(R. 1133.)
DeLeon a n s w e r e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y when
Woodward a s k e d d u r i n g c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,
" [ Y ] o u d o n ' t have t o
be an e n g i n e e r t o do t h a t p a r t , r i g h t ? "
u s e d a t Woodward's
location
cell-phone
The
map
t r i a l t h a t d i s p l a y e d t h e c a l l s made a n d t h e
of the towers
Furthermore,
(R. 1131.)
DeLeon
was
not generated
testified
that
by
an
engineer.
he h a d i d e n t i f i e d
which
t o w e r e a c h c a l l went t h r o u g h , b u t t h a t he was n o t
t e s t i f y i n g about the exact
l o c a t i o n of the person holding the
cell
was
phone
whether
an
when t h e c a l l
RF
engineer
o p i n i o n on t h e e x a c t
would
be
When Woodward
required
give
queried
an
expert
l o c a t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n m a k i n g t h e phone
c a l l , DeLeon s t a t e d , "No.
exact
made.
p i n p o i n t i n g --
"
The A l l t e l s y s t e m does n o t a l l o w an
(R. 1132.)
Therefore,
as t h e
State
c o r r e c t l y a r g u e s , t h e r e i s no b a s i s i n t h e r e c o r d f o r Woodward
t o now a r g u e t h a t t h e A l l t e l maps were c r e a t e d b y an e n g i n e e r
and
t h a t he was d e n i e d
someone
h i s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o q u e s t i o n
k n o w l e d g e a b l e a b o u t t h e maps.
S e c o n d , as t o S c h e i d ' s t e s t i m o n y
records
and maps, t h e o n l y
relevant
about the S p r i n t
testimony
i n the record
a b o u t t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e maps i s t h a t t h e r e c o r d s
47
Nextel
from which
CR-08-0145
they
were
business
all
generated
and t h a t t h e y
Sprint Nextel
Scheid,
were
kept
i n the
ordinary
course
a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t e d the l o c a t i o n s of
cell
towers throughout the U n i t e d
t o o , t e s t i f i e d o n l y about the c e l l - p h o n e
States.
towers
r o u t e d c a l l s f r o m c e r t a i n p h o n e s r e l e v a n t t o Woodward's
calls
on t h e day o f t h e m u r d e r .
Defense
more t h a n one o c c a s i o n d u r i n g t r i a l
to
give
information
about
that
he
was
denied
counsel
Woodward's
phone
the
qualified
cell-phone
a r g u m e n t on
his constitutional
that
s t a t e d on
t h a t S c h e i d was
the l o c a t i o n of
t o w e r s t h e c a l l s went t h r o u g h .
--
of
right
to
appeal
cross-
e x a m i n e t h e w i t n e s s e s who g e n e r a t e d t h e maps -- was n o t t i m e l y
raised,
not
i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e p o s i t i o n he t o o k a t t r i a l ,
supported
by t h e r e c o r d .
We a r e aware o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s
decision i n Bullcoming
2705
(2011).
v. New M e x i c o , 564 U.S.
The U n i t e d
States
Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e
the prosecution
a
as
forensic-laboratory
report
recent
, 131 S. C t .
S i x t h Amendment does n o t p e r m i t
proceeding
and i s
evidence
through the i n - c o u r t testimony
in
to introduce
a
criminal
of a s c i e n t i s t
who
did
n o t p e r f o r m o r o b s e r v e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e t e s t o r who
did
not sign the c e r t i f i c a t i o n
48
of the r e s u l t s .
The
accused
CR-08-0145
has
the right
t o be c o n f r o n t e d
at t r i a l
by t h e a n a l y s t
who
c e r t i f i e d the t e s t r e s u l t s unless that analyst i s unavailable
at t r i a l
him
a n d t h e a c c u s e d h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y
pretrial,
here,
the Court h e l d .
either,
records
T h a t c a s e h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n
f o r t h e same r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d
Melendez-Diaz.
the
t o cross-examine
Bullcoming
custodians
with
regard to
i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t one o f
who t e s t i f i e d a t Woodward's t r i a l h a d
c r e a t e d t h e map s h o w i n g t h e t o w e r s u s e d t o r o u t e t h e r e l e v a n t
phone c a l l s
and t h e o t h e r
used the c a l l
records
i n court to
d e m o n s t r a t e t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e t o w e r b a s e d on d a t a
from the
call
both
witnesses
e x t e n s i v e l y r e g a r d i n g t h e s c o p e and l i m i t s o f t h e i r
testimony,
records.
making
Woodward
i t clear that
Woodward's
precise
Therefore,
there
cross-examined
neither
witness
was
location
during
any
was
no
violation
Amendment r i g h t o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
plain error,
B.
of
testifying
of
the
Woodward's
about
calls.
Sixth
No e r r o r , a n d c e r t a i n l y no
occurred.
I n a r e l a t e d a r g u m e n t , Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d
witnesses
cell-phone
DeLeon a n d S c h e i d
-- b o t h l a y
-- t o o f f e r t h e i r o p i n i o n s as t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e
records
and maps,
rather
49
than
testifying
about
CR-08-0145
matters
within their
personal
Specifically,
he
S c h e i d were e r r o n e o u s l y p e r m i t t e d
a r g u e s t h a t DeLeon and
knowledge.
to
t e s t i f y t h a t the c e l l - p h o n e records i n d i c a t e d the l o c a t i o n s of
the c a l l e r s
at c e r t a i n
of the t r a n s c r i p t
correctly
notes
d u r i n g any
we
times.
Woodward c i t e s
i n t h i s p o r t i o n of h i s argument.
t h a t Woodward d i d n o t
o f DeLeon's t e s t i m o n y ;
review
this
o n l y two
claim for plain
raise
The
there
had
been t e s t i m o n y
State
this
objection
t h u s , as t o h i s
testimony,
error.
Woodward d i d o b j e c t
d u r i n g S c h e i d ' s t e s t i m o n y , when t h e p r o s e c u t o r a s k e d
if
pages
whether,
t h a t Woodward's phone had
been
u s e d as he t r a v e l e d on I n t e r s t a t e 65, w o u l d t h a t be c o n s i s t e n t
with
(R.
the
caller
1160-61.)
qualified
being
close to
Woodward
then
a
certain
argued
that
that question.
We
review the t r i a l
Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o
discretion.
Scheid's
Scheid
t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e a r e a t h e phone was
and he a r g u e d t h a t an e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n was
2000) .
cell-phone
We
Scheid's
See Ex p a r t e L o g g i n s ,
tower.
was
used
not
from,
r e q u i r e d t o answer
c o u r t ' s adverse
testimony
ruling
on
abuse
of
f o r an
771 So. 2d 1093,
1103
(Ala.
f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r i n any o f DeLeon's t e s t i m o n y
testimony,
and we
f i n d no abuse o f t h e t r i a l
50
or
court's
CR-08-0145
d i s c r e t i o n i n i t s r u l i n g on Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o S c h e i d ' s
testimony.
R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s :
" I f a w i t n e s s i s n o t t e s t i f y i n g as an e x p e r t ,
the w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n t h e form o f o p i n i o n s o r
inferences
i s limited
to
those
opinions
or
i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h a r e (a) r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on t h e
p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e w i t n e s s and (b) h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r
understanding of the witness's testimony or the
determination of a fact i n issue."
R u l e 702, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
6
provides:
" I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , or other s p e c i a l i z e d
knowledge w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s s i s t t h e t r i e r o f
f a c t t o understand the evidence or t o determine a
f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t b y
knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n
may t e s t i f y i n t h e f o r m o f an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e . "
A l t h o u g h o u r r e s e a r c h has d i s c l o s e d no A l a b a m a c a s e
addresses t h i s i s s u e , t h e Tennessee Court o f C r i m i n a l
addressed
a similar
that the t r i a l
testify
issue
i n dicta
when
Appeals
a defendant
c o u r t had e r r e d i n p e r m i t t i n g
that
argued
a detective to
as an e x p e r t r e g a r d i n g c e l l - p h o n e t o w e r s .
S t a t e v.
H a y e s , (No. M2008-02689-CCA-R3-CD, Dec. 23, 2010) (Tenn. C r i m .
App.
2 0 1 0 ) ( n o t p u b l i s h e d i n S.W.3d).
C r i m i n a l Appeals
r e j e c t e d t h e argument,
R u l e 702 was
s u p r a N o t e 5.
6
The T e n n e s s e e C o u r t o f
amended e f f e c t i v e
51
stating:
January
1, 2012.
See
CR-08-0145
"The d e t e c t i v e m e r e l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw t h e
l o c a t i o n s o f t h e c e l l phone t o w e r s l i s t e d on t h e
c e l l phone r e c o r d s and p l o t t e d t h o s e l o c a t i o n s on a
map.
He i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t t r a v e l e d n e a r
those
towers.
Detective Fitzgerald
explicitly
s t a t e d t h a t he was n o t an e x p e r t i n how t h e c e l l
phone t o w e r s w o r k e d .
We c o n c l u d e t h a t a l a y p e r s o n
c o u l d p l o t t h e l o c a t i o n s o f t h e t o w e r s on a map and
draw t h e same i n f e r e n c e ; t h e r e f o r e , h i s t e s t i m o n y
did
not
require
specialized
knowledge
as
c o n t e m p l a t e d by T e n n e s s e e R u l e o f E v i d e n c e
702,
w h i c h g o v e r n s e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t
d i d n o t e r r by a l l o w i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y . "
7
We
adopt
agree
with
i t here.
the
Tennessee
DeLeon and
court's analysis,
Scheid t e s t i f i e d
based
and
on
r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d s o f t h e c e l l - p h o n e company e a c h
for
as
a
records
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e manner i n w h i c h t h o s e r e c o r d s a r e
generated
and
Scheid's
testimony
The t e s t i m o n y was
offered to
DeLeon's
r e q u i r e d s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge.
assist
the
jury
to
based
reach
a
nor
clear
w i t n e s s ' s testimony or t o determine
on
worked
personal
Neither
and
their
their
recorded.
custodian
we
understanding
a fact i n issue,
t h u s p r o p e r l y o f f e r e d as l a y - w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y .
the
S t a t e d i d not
trial
court,
offer
therefore,
the
did
witnesses
not
as
accept
of
the
and
was
Furthermore,
e x p e r t s , and
them
as
the
experts.
R u l e 701 and R u l e 702 o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e
a r e s u b s t a n t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l t o R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , and t o
R u l e 702, A l a . R. E v i d . , b e f o r e t h e amendment t o R u l e 702.
7
52
CR-08-0145
Moreover,
Woodward
established
through
was
cross-examined
each
his cross-examination
witness,
t h a t each
and
witness
a b l e t o e x p l a i n t o the j u r y which c e l l - p h o n e tower a
went t h r o u g h
when t h e c a l l was
made b u t was
call
not able t o g i v e
t h e e x a c t l o c a t i o n o f t h e c a l l e r when t h e c a l l was
made.
(R.
1131-33, 1166.)
The w i t n e s s e s d i d n o t t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e e x a c t l o c a t i o n o f
the
caller
a t any
time
during
Woodward's a s s e r t i o n on
that A l l t e l
was
not
their
appeal.
In
testimony,
fact,
able to p i n p o i n t the
contrary
DeLeon
location
testified
of a
b a s e d on c e l l - t o w e r i n f o r m a t i o n .
did
commit p l a i n
user
We h o l d t h a t t h e t r i a l
not
abuse
permitted
records
i t s discretion
the
and
witnesses
cell
towers
to
or
testify
used
during
about
to
court
e r r o r when i t
the
certain
cell
phone
phone
calls.
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on t h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r .
C.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
discretion
procure
the
when
the
i t denied
h i s motion
s e r v i c e s o f an RF
an
RF
engineer
continuance
Woodward a r g u e s
would
that
S t a t e ' s a r g u m e n t and w o u l d have d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t he was
not
s c e n e when O f f i c e r H o u t s was
53
have
to
the
the crime
of
for a
rebutted
at
testimony
expert.
c o u r t abused i t s
shot.
CR-08-0145
"'"[I]n
Alabama,
our
courts
have
always h e l d i t i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y w i t h the
trial
c o u r t whether i t s h o u l d h a l t
or
suspend the t r i a l t o enable a p a r t y t o
secure or produce witness i n court
And, i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n t h e
t r i a l c o u r t i s n o t t o be r e v e r s e d s a v e f o r
g r o s s abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . "
A l o n z o v.
S t a t e ex r e l . B o o t h , 283 A l a . 607, 610, 219
So.
2d 858,
861
(1969).
I n Ex p a r t e
S a r a n t h u s , 501 So. 2d 1256 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e
of a p r e t r i a l c o n t i n u a n c e :
"'"A
motion
for
a
continuance i s addressed to the
d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e c o u r t and t h e
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on i t w i l l n o t be
disturbed
unless
there
is
an
abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n .
F l e t c h e r v.
S t a t e , 291 A l a . 67, 277 So. 2d
882
(1973).
I f the
following
p r i n c i p l e s are s a t i s f i e d , a t r i a l
court should grant a motion f o r
c o n t i n u a n c e on t h e g r o u n d t h a t a
witness or evidence i s absent:
(1) t h e e x p e c t e d e v i d e n c e must be
m a t e r i a l and c o m p e t e n t ; (2) t h e r e
must be a p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e
e v i d e n c e w i l l be f o r t h c o m i n g i f
t h e c a s e i s c o n t i n u e d ; and
(3)
the
moving
party
must
have
e x e r c i s e d due d i l i g e n c e t o s e c u r e
the evidence.
K n o w l e s v. B l u e ,
209 A l a . 27,
32,
95 So.
481,
485-86 ( 1 9 2 3 ) . "
" ' S a r a n t h u s , 501 So. 2d a t 1257.
"'There
a r e no m e c h a n i c a l t e s t s f o r d e c i d i n g when
a d e n i a l o f a c o n t i n u a n c e i s so a r b i t r a r y
as t o v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s . The a n s w e r must
be f o u n d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t i n
54
CR-08-0145
every case, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the reasons
p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l judge a t the time
t h e r e q u e s t i s d e n i e d . ' Ungar v. S a r a f i t e ,
376 U.S. 575, 589 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . " G l a s s v. S t a t e ,
557 So. 2d 845, 848 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 0 ) .
"'"The
reversal
of
a
conviction
because o f the r e f u s a l o f the t r i a l judge
t o g r a n t a c o n t i n u a n c e r e q u i r e s 'a p o s i t i v e
demonstration
of
abuse
of
judicial
discretion.'
C l a y t o n v. S t a t e , 45 A l a .
App. 127, 129, 226 So. 2d 671, 672 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . "
B e a u r e g a r d v. S t a t e , 372 So. 2d 37, 43
(Ala.
C r . App.
1979) .
A
"positive
demonstration
of
abuse
of
judicial
d i s c r e t i o n " i s r e q u i r e d e v e n where t h e
refusal
to grant
the continuance
is
"somewhat h a r s h " a n d t h i s C o u r t does n o t
"condone l i k e c o n d u c t i n f u t u r e s i m i l a r
circumstances."
Hays v. S t a t e , 518 So.2d
749, 759 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f i r m e d i n
p a r t , r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 518 So.2d
768 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . '
"McGlown v. S t a t e , 598 So. 2d 1027, 1028-29 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) .
" ' " T r i a l judges n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e a g r e a t
d e a l o f l a t i t u d e i n s c h e d u l i n g t r i a l s . Not
the l e a s t of t h e i r problems i s t h a t o f
assembling
t h e w i t n e s s e s , l a w y e r s , and
j u r o r s a t t h e same p l a c e a t t h e same t i m e ,
and
this
burdens
counsels
against
continuances except f o r compelling reasons.
Consequently,
broad
d i s c r e t i o n must be
granted
trial
courts
on
matters
of
continuances."'
" P r i c e v. S t a t e , 725 So. 2d 1003, 1061 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g M o r r i s v. S l a p p y , 461 U.S. 1,
11-12
(1983).
See a l s o S u l l i v a n v . S t a t e , 939 So.
2d 58, 66 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2006) ('"As a g e n e r a l
55
CR-08-0145
r u l e , c o n t i n u a n c e s a r e n o t f a v o r e d , " I n r e R.F.,
656
So. 2d 1237, 1238 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , and " [ o ] n l y
r a r e l y w i l l [an] a p p e l l a t e c o u r t f i n d an abuse o f
discretion"
i n the
denial
of a motion
for a
continuance.')."
G o b b l e v.
,
State,
[Ms.
CR-05-0225, Feb.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
5,
2010]
So.
3d
2010).
Viewing the circumstances
of t h i s case, d i s c u s s e d below,
w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g g u i d e l i n e s i n m i n d , we h o l d t h a t t h e
trial
c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t d e n i e d Woodward's
m i d - t r i a l motion
any
f o r a continuance.
of the t h r e e requirements
1.
First,
Woodward
Woodward d i d n o t
for a
failed
continuance.
to
t e s t i m o n y w o u l d have b e e n m a t e r i a l .
p.m.
phone c a l l
he
the
which
because
sector
of
the
t h a t he
would t e s t i f y t h a t the
s e c t o r three of the c e l l
tower,
This
testimony
the
S t a t e d i d not
the
cell
tower
the
would not
present
phone
have
testimony
call
been
about
hit.
S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d o n l y t h a t t h e c a l l went t h r o u g h
tower near
the
crime
two
t h e s e c t o r o f t h e t o w e r c l o s e s t t o where
shooting occurred.
material
that
placed to Surles approximately
minutes a f t e r the murder " h i t "
w h i l e s e c t o r one was
establish
Woodward a r g u e d
n e e d e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e x p e r t who
12:36
satisfy
scene.
T e s t i m o n y by
56
a defense
The
the
expert
CR-08-0145
about which
s e c t o r o f t h e c e l l t o w e r t h e c a l l h i t two
a f t e r t h e m u r d e r o c c u r r e d w o u l d n o t have r e b u t t e d any
t h e S t a t e a d m i t t e d a b o u t t h e phone c a l l .
phone
call
murder,
was
the
placed
testimony
approximately
evidence
Rather, because the
two
Woodward a r g u e d
minutes
minutes
he
after
needed t o
the
present
w o u l d h a v e , i n f a c t , p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e t h a t he
in
t h e a r e a where t h e s h o o t i n g o c c u r r e d w i t h i n m i n u t e s
the s h o o t i n g .
I m p o r t a n t l y , the S t a t e d i d not p r e s e n t
was
after
evidence
a b o u t Woodward's p r e c i s e p a t h i n t h e moments a f t e r he l e f t
the
scene
the
of
the
testimony
present
shooting.
Woodward
would
not
As
argues
have
the
he
State
should
correctly
have
c o n t r a d i c t e d the
argues,
been
allowed
State's
testimony
a b o u t t h e phone c a l l o r h i s g e n e r a l l o c a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y
the
shooting.
would
not
have
The
trial
been
c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the
material.
argument i n s u p p o r t o f t h e m o t i o n
stated
that
testimony
caller's
Woodward had
about a c e l l
exact
understands
"more
response
to
evidence
Woodward's
to continue the t r i a l
than
after
court
established" that
the
tower b e i n g h i t d i d not p i n p o i n t the
location;
the
court said:
a l l i t does i s p u t
going to h i t a c e l l
In
to
you
i n an
" I t h i n k everybody
area.
t o w e r i n downtown Montgomery
57
You're
not
[ i f ] you're
CR-08-0145
c a l l i n g f r o m B i r m i n g h a m o r y o u ' r e c a l l i n g f r o m E a s t Montgomery
....
I t h i n k we
As
to
the
a l l got t h a t . "
competence
of
(R.
the
1229-30.)
evidence,
nothing
in
r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a w i t n e s s Woodward m i g h t p r e s e n t
the
would
n o t be c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e s e c t o r o f t h e c e l l phone
tower h i t d u r i n g the
establish
failed
t h a t the
to
call.
However, Woodward's f a i l u r e
evidence
establish
the
was
m a t e r i a l means t h a t he
first
requirement
e s t a b l i s h i n order to support h i s motion
2.
Woodward a l s o f a i l e d
to
he
for a
to e s t a b l i s h
has
needed
to
continuance.
t h a t t h e r e was
a
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y w o u l d have b e e n f o r t h c o m i n g i f
t h e t r i a l c o u r t had c o n t i n u e d t h e c a s e .
the motion
to continue, which
d u r i n g the t r i a l ,
was
on A u g u s t 22,
D u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g on
h e l d on a F r i d a y a f t e r n o o n
2008, t h e t r i a l
court
asked
w h e t h e r Woodward had an e x p e r t " h e r e , r e a d y t o go r i g h t now?"
(R. 1226.)
Woodward r e p l i e d , "We
d o n ' t have one."
Woodward f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d "But we
to get i t out of
f i g u r e d , we
(R. 1226.)
w o u l d be
able
[the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s ] a t c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n .
B u t we were u n a b l e t o o b t a i n o u r own b e c a u s e o f t h e v e r y , v e r y
s h o r t t i m e , t h e t i m e t h e C o u r t had
funds."
(R. 1226.)
granted that approval f o r
Woodward t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n s e
58
had
CR-08-0145
to request
(R.
a c o n t i n u a n c e " t o be a b l e t o o b t a i n t h a t
1227.)
filed
Woodward
then
a w r i t t e n order
experts,
he
a r r a n g e and c o o r d i n a t e
s t a t e d that a f t e r the t r i a l
granting
"made c a l l s
person."
funds t o h i r e the c e l l
to the appropriate
one f o r u s . "
people
(R. 1227.)
and
the court granted
t h e f o l l o w i n g week o f t r i a l .
"So a r e you r e p r e s e n t i n g
that
can
Woodward s a i d
between
the motion f o r funds
The t r i a l
t o me
phone
that
he h a d b e e n u n a b l e t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an e x p e r t
the Thursday a f t e r n o o n
court
court then asked,
there's
r e a d y t o come i n n e x t week a n d t e s t i f y ? "
somebody
(R. 1227.)
whose
Woodward
t h e n s t a t e d t h a t "Mr. P i t t s " -- who i s o t h e r w i s e u n i d e n t i f i e d
in
the record
information.
witness,
would
-- w o u l d be a b l e
Defense
be
able
to testify
he h a d s p o k e n
Nextel
further
I b e l i e v e , w o u l d be a b l e
s e c t o r -- t h r e e means."
that
counsel
to t e s t i f y
who
requested
knew
what
(R. 1227.)
e x c l u d e t h e e v i d e n c e on t h e c e l l
59
that
Finally,
records
the sector
e i t h e r a continuance
stated:
"The
t o g e t -- Any RF
to the f a c t
t o another
about the s e c t o r
data
engineer
sector
--
Woodward
custodian
meant,
" t o g e t him here
towers."
State's
at
and
what
stated
Sprint
he
then
o r move t o
(R. 1228.)
CR-08-0145
The
evidence
record
does
not d i s c l o s e
w o u l d have b e e n f o r t h c o m i n g
granted a continuance.
he h a d a t t e m p t e d
probability
that the
i f the t r i a l
c o u r t had
Woodward i n f o r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t
before t r i a l
e x p e r t b u t had been u n a b l e
His
a
t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF
t o do so i n t h e t i m e
argument on a p p e a l t h a t i f t h e t r i a l
available.
c o u r t had g i v e n him
" s l i g h t l y more t i m e , i t [was] v e r y l i k e l y " t h a t he c o u l d have
o b t a i n e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e x p e r t , Woodward's b r i e f , a t p.
53,
i s n o t r e a s o n a b l e , b a s e d on Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n s
his
f a i l e d attempts before t r i a l
about
t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an
RF e x p e r t .
The
State acknowledged a t t r i a l ,
h o w e v e r , t h a t Woodward
had s p o k e n t o Mr. P i t t s a n d c o u l d have s u b p o e n a e d h i m , t h a t he
had s p o k e n t o e x p e r t s a t S p r i n t N e x t e l , a n d t h a t a j u r y member
was an RF e n g i n e e r
(R. 1228.)
and
" [ s ] othey're
not that hard
to locate."
Even i f Woodward h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s
requirement
h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t was p r o b a b l e
would
have
been
forthcoming,
remaining requirements
his failure
w o u l d have w a r r a n t e d
d e n i a l of h i s request f o r a
continuance.
60
that the
evidence
to establish
the t r i a l
the
court's
CR-08-0145
3.
is
Finally,
entitled
i n order t o prove
t o a continuance
to a t r i a l
because
c o u r t t h a t he
o f t h e absence
of a
w i t n e s s t h e m o v i n g p a r t y must have e x e r c i s e d due d i l i g e n c e t o
secure the presence
due d i l i g e n c e .
had
failed
of the witness.
Woodward d i d n o t e x e r c i s e
Woodward a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l
t o grant
h i s motion
f o r funds
to retain
e x p e r t u n t i l t h r e e b u s i n e s s days b e f o r e t r i a l .
when he made h i s m o t i o n
attempts
court
an RF
He a l s o a r g u e d
t o c o n t i n u e t h a t he h a d i n i t i a t e d h i s
t o o b t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s o f an RF e n g i n e e r
after
he
r e c e i v e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s w r i t t e n o r d e r g r a n t i n g him funds t o
retain
an e x p e r t a few d a y s e a r l i e r .
c o r r e c t l y argues
However, as t h e S t a t e
on a p p e a l a n d as i t p o i n t e d o u t t o t h e t r i a l
c o u r t when Woodward moved
f o r a continuance,
the t r i a l
had
o r a l l y g r a n t e d Woodward's m o t i o n f o r f u n d s weeks b e f o r e t r i a l ,
and Woodward c o u l d have s o u g h t a n d r e t a i n e d an e x p e r t d u r i n g
that
time.
A pretrial
a
h e a r i n g was h e l d on J u l y 7, 2008, a n d d u r i n g
d i s c u s s i o n about
whether
the State
was g o i n g
to present
t e s t i m o n y f r o m a c e l l - p h o n e e x p e r t Woodward made a m o t i o n f o r
funds t o employ a c e l l - p h o n e e x p e r t .
the motion.
T h a t Woodward h a d p l a n n e d
61
The t r i a l
court granted
a t t h a t time t o h i r e a
CR-08-0145
cell-phone
telephone
day.
expert
call
i n the t r a n s c r i p t
of a
Woodward made f r o m t h e c o u n t y j a i l t h a t
same
Woodward
8
attorneys
i s also
told
reflected
h i s father
during
t o l d h i m t h a t t h e y were g o i n g
that
call
to get a
that h i s
"cell-phone
s p e c i a l i s t " who w o u l d a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e h i s l o c a t i o n
certain
trial,
c a l l s were made.
Thus, Woodward's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t
on A u g u s t 22, 2008, t h a t he h a d h a d v e r y l i t t l e t i m e t o
attempt t o h i r e
For
an e x p e r t
a l l the
trial
an e x p e r t
was i n a c c u r a t e ,
foregoing
d i s c r e t i o n i n the t r i a l
the
when
reasons,
we
at best.
find
no
abuse
of
c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o h a l t or t o suspend
t o e n a b l e Woodward t o a t t e m p t t o s e c u r e o r p r o d u c e
witness.
Woodward f a i l e d t o meet any o f t h e t h r e e
r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o a
continuance,
this
a n d he i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on a p p e a l as t o
issue.
IV.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
allowed
Officer
Houts's
widow,
Ashley
c o u r t e r r e d when i t
Houts,
to
testify
e x t e n s i v e l y about h e r husband's background and h i s c h a r a c t e r
A r e c o r d i n g a n d a t r a n s c r i p t o f Woodward's t e l e p h o n e c a l l
were a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e
the t r i a l c o u r t .
(C. 1260, R. 1722.)
8
62
CR-08-0145
and
about her
l a s t moments w i t h
her
husband b e f o r e
Woodward c o n t e n d s t h a t A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y was
he
died.
improper v i c t i m -
impact t e s t i m o n y t h a t i s p r o h i b i t e d d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of
a capital t r i a l .
Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s o b j e c t i o n
A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y , and
be
he
acknowledges t h a t t h i s
c l a i m must
reviewed for p l a i n e r r o r .
"Although
[plain-error]
the
failure
review,
to
i t will
prejudice."
S a l e v. S t a t e , 8 So.
2008) .
"To
rise
must
not
error
'substantial
prejudicial
State,
So.
during
778
2d 237
The
to
the
only
rights,'
impact
So.
weigh
the
209
i t
will
not
against
any
3d 330,
of
claim
(Ala. Crim.
plain error,
the
affect
must
jury's
preclude
345
seriously
but
on
2d 199,
level
object
a
also
have
App.
claimed
defendant's
deliberations."
( A l a . C r i m . App.
of
an
unfair
Hyde
v.
1998), a f f ' d ,
778
( A l a . 2000).
Alabama
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
victim-impact
statements
"are a d m i s s i b l e d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of a c r i m i n a l
t r i a l o n l y i f the statements are r e l e v a n t to a
m a t e r i a l i s s u e of the g u i l t phase.
Testimony t h a t
has no p r o b a t i v e v a l u e on any m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n o f
f a c t or i n q u i r y i s i n a d m i s s i b l e .
See C. Gamble,
M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e § 21.01
( 4 t h ed. 1 9 9 1 ) ,
c i t i n g , i n t e r a l i a , F i n c h e r v. S t a t e , 58 A l a .
215
(1877) (a f a c t t h a t i s i n c a p a b l e o f a f f o r d i n g any
63
CR-08-0145
reasonable inference i n reference to a material fact
or i n q u i r y i n v o l v e d i n t h e i s s u e c a n n o t be g i v e n i n
evidence).
I f t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e n o t m a t e r i a l and
r e l e v a n t , they are not a d m i s s i b l e . "
Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630
So.
2d 125,
126
( A l a . 1993).
"[T]he i n t r o d u c t i o n of v i c t i m impact evidence d u r i n g the
g u i l t p h a s e o f a c a p i t a l m u r d e r t r i a l can r e s u l t i n r e v e r s i b l e
e r r o r i f the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t p r o b a b l y d i s t r a c t e d the
j u r y and k e p t i t f r o m p e r f o r m i n g i t s d u t y o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e
guilt
or innocence
of the defendant
e v i d e n c e and t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w . "
999,
1006
( A l a . 1995) .
The
based
on t h e a d m i s s i b l e
Ex p a r t e R i e b e r , 663 So.
Court
i n Ex
parte Rieber
2d
also
said:
"However, i n Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630 So. 2d 125 ( A l a .
1993), a p l u r a l i t y of t h i s Court h e l d i n a c a p i t a l
m u r d e r c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o
l i f e imprisonment w i t h o u t p a r o l e t h a t a judgment of
c o n v i c t i o n can be u p h e l d i f t h e r e c o r d c o n c l u s i v e l y
shows t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e v i c t i m
impact
e v i d e n c e d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of the t r i a l d i d not
affect
the
outcome o f t h e
trial
or
otherwise
p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of the defendant."
663
So.
2d a t
First,
evidence.
1005.
much o f A s h l e y ' s t e s t i m o n y was
She
explained
that
Officer
not v i c t i m - i m p a c t
Houts
was
working
o v e r t i m e on t h e day he was
s h o t ; t h a t he a l w a y s t e l e p h o n e d h e r
halfway through h i s s h i f t
b u t t h a t he d i d n o t c a l l
64
her
that
CR-08-0145
day
and
she
l a t e r f o u n d o u t t h a t he had n o t c a l l e d h e r
he had b e e n s h o t ;
a f t e r he
was
and
he
that
because
t h a t she went t o t h e h o s p i t a l t o be w i t h
s h o t and
died
two
t h a t he
days
never regained
after
he
was
him
consciousness;
shot.
Ashley
also
i d e n t i f i e d an a u t o p s y p h o t o g r a p h o f O f f i c e r H o u t s t o i d e n t i f y
him.
The
foregoing
testimony
c i r c u m s t a n c e s l e a d i n g up
death
days
Houts
as
properly
later,
the
victim
admitted.
2236, A p r i l 29,
We
and
was
not
t h e r e f o r e , was
See,
the
relevant
So.
Stanley
to
inadmissible.
any
stationed
Houts
had
before
he
recently
left
and
purchased
f o r work on
identify
Officer
That
v.
testimony
State,
was
[Ms.
CR-062011).
that
some o f
in
the
Ashley's
case
For example, the S t a t e
both
military
the
Houts's
issue
Officer
the
prove
( A l a . C r i m . App.
3d
Woodward, h o w e v e r ,
relevant
to
to O f f i c e r
to
shooting.
t e s t i m o n y t h a t A s h l e y and
in
relevant
c r i m e and
e.g.,
2011]
agree w i t h
testimony
to the
i t was
of
was
an
the
H o u t s met
while
overseas;
exercise
m o r n i n g he
was
elicited
t h e y were
that
machine
and,
Officer
and
that
s h o t he
had
j o k e d w i t h A s h l e y about her p u t t i n g the machine t o g e t h e r ;
and
t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s d o n a t e d p l a s m a on a r e g u l a r b a s i s and
he
and
Ashley
both
had
a
policy
65
to
give
of
themselves
that
to
CR-08-0145
others.
Ashley
Although
was
this
irrelevant,
e n t i r e t y , we
testimony
having
the
State
examined
the
elicited
record
in i t s
conclude t h a t the i r r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of
d i d not
otherwise
p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f Woodward's.
j u r y was
g u i l t y unless
doubt.
The
sympathy,
the
deny Woodward a
i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t c o u l d not
fair
a l s o i n s t r u c t e d not
emotion
to allow
affect i t s verdict.
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t d i d i n Ex p a r t e
We
trial
or
f i n d Woodward
State proved h i s g u i l t beyond a
j u r y was
or
to
Ashley's
testimony
The
operate
from
reasonable
prejudice,
note,
as
the
Rieber:
"It
i s p r e s u m e d t h a t j u r o r s do n o t l e a v e
their
common s e n s e a t t h e c o u r t h o u s e d o o r .
I t would
e l e v a t e f o r m o v e r s u b s t a n c e f o r us t o h o l d , b a s e d on
the
record before
us,
that
[Woodward] d i d
not
r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e j u r o r s were
t o l d what t h e y p r o b a b l y had a l r e a d y s u s p e c t e d -¬
t h a t [ O f f i c e r H o u t s ] was n o t a 'human i s l a n d , ' b u t
a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l whose m u r d e r had i n e v i t a b l y had
a
profound
impact
on
[his]
children,
spouse,
parents,
f r i e n d s , or dependents
(paraphrasing
a
p o r t i o n of J u s t i c e Souter's o p i n i o n c o n c u r r i n g i n
t h e j u d g m e n t i n Payne v. T e n n e s s e e , 501 U.S.
808,
838
(1991))."
663
So.
2d a t
Although
1006.
some o f A s h l e y ' s
testimony
was
irrelevant,
f i n d t h a t i t d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e outcome o f t h e t r i a l ,
did
not
prejudice
Woodward's
substantial rights,
66
we
that i t
and
that
CR-08-0145
allowing
i t d i d not
rise
Woodward i s due no r e l i e f
to
the
on t h i s
level
of
plain
error.
claim.
V.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
permitted
Tiffany
Surles
to testify
court
that
e r r e d when i t
Woodward
p o s s e s s i o n o f h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e s h o o t i n g .
t h a t S u r l e s d i d n o t have p e r s o n a l
was i n
He s a y s
knowledge o f t h a t f a c t , and
t h a t h e r t e s t i m o n y was p r e j u d i c i a l b e c a u s e i t went d i r e c t l y t o
the
c r u c i a l question
o f w h e t h e r Woodward was d r i v i n g h e r c a r
on t h e d a y o f t h e s h o o t i n g .
S u r l e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e e v e n i n g o f S e p t e m b e r 27,
2006, she a n d h e r m o t h e r went t o c h u r c h .
S u r l e s s a i d she a n d
Woodward a r g u e d when she r e t u r n e d home b e c a u s e he was s u p p o s e d
t o have gone t o c h u r c h w i t h h e r b u t h a d w a n t e d t o do s o m e t h i n g
else that night.
S u r l e s s a i d t h a t "one t h i n g l e d t o a n o t h e r , "
and
Woodward l e f t
their
apartment f o r a w h i l e ,
and
spent the n i g h t there.
but
returned
S u r l e s s a i d t h a t on t h e m o r n i n g o f
September 28, 2006, w h i l e she was i n t h e s h o w e r , Woodward
the apartment.
her C h e v r o l e t
left
S u r l e s s a i d t h a t Woodward h a d h a d t h e k e y s t o
I m p a l a on t h e p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g , a n d t h a t when he
67
CR-08-0145
l e f t t h a t m o r n i n g , she d i d n o t have t h e k e y s a n d Woodward d i d
not
leave
the keys.
Surles
asked
testified
Walker
apartment
that
t o help
she t e l e p h o n e d
h e r move
she s h a r e d w i t h
Wendy W a l k e r a n d
her belongings
Woodward.
Surles
t h e y u s e d W a l k e r ' s c a r t o move t h e b e l o n g i n g s
did
n o t have h e r own c a r a t t h e t i m e .
from
the
testified
that
because
Surles
The p r o s e c u t o r
asked
S u r l e s where h e r c a r was, a n d she s t a t e d , " I g u e s s M a r i o h a d
it."
(R. 851.)
know."
Woodward o b j e c t e d
(R. 851.)
The t r i a l
court
Woodward d i d n o t move t o s t r i k e
Woodward's
preserve
695
this
issue
Surles's
untimely,
f o r review.
the objection.
answer.
and i t f a i l e d
to
See, e . g . , R o p e r v. S t a t e ,
made a f t e r an answer i s g i v e n ,
not preserve
State,
the issue
624 So. 2d 230, 234
Chambers
v.
State,
1978)("The g e n e r a l
and
was
overruled
"She d o e s n ' t
So. 2d 244, 246 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996) ("'An o b j e c t i o n t o
a question,
will
objection
and s t a t e d :
a responsive
and t h e t r i a l
f o r review.'"
( A l a . Crim.
356 So. 2d
i s n o t t i m e l y and
(quoting
App. 1 9 9 3 ) ) ) ;
767, 768
( A l a . Crim.
rule i s , that, after a question
answer g i v e n ,
S c o t t v.
an o b j e c t i o n
and
App.
i s asked,
comes t o o l a t e ,
c o u r t w i l l n o t be p u t i n e r r o r i n t h e a b s e n c e o f
68
CR-08-0145
a motion
t o exclude or s t r i k e ,
the motion.").
a n d a l s o an a d v e r s e
r u l i n g on
T h e r e f o r e , o u r r e v i e w o f Woodward's argument
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t p e r m i t t e d S u r l e s t o t e s t i f y
t h a t she " g u e s s e d "
Woodward h a d h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e
murder i s f o r p l a i n e r r o r o n l y .
Rule
45A, A l a . R. App. P.
"A w i t n e s s may n o t t e s t i f y t o a m a t t e r u n l e s s e v i d e n c e i s
introduced
has
sufficient
personal
t o support
knowledge
a finding
of the matter.
that the witness
Evidence
to
prove
p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e may, b u t n e e d n o t , c o n s i s t o f t h e w i t n e s s ' s
own t e s t i m o n y . "
Rule
602, A l a . R. E v i d .
s e t t l e d t h a t a w i t n e s s can t e s t i f y
or
impressions
Williams
v.
where
State,
he
375
had
So.
" I t i s also
to h i s beliefs,
the opportunity
2d
1257
d e n i e d , 375 So. 2d 1271 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . "
thoughts,
to
and
6.9
witness
which
phrased
who
he
Evidence,
§
h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e
testifies
may
testify
"even
i n s u c h t e r m s as ' I t h i n k '
cert.
S h e r i d a n v . S t a t e , 591
See a l s o W.
Alabama
observe.
(Ala.Cr.App.),
So. 2d 129, 133 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991) .
J . Hoffman,
well
(3d e d .
Schroeder
2006) (a
the facts
about
i f h i s testimony i s
or 'I b e l i e v e . '
However,
a w i t n e s s may n o t engage i n p u r e s p e c u l a t i o n [and a] w i t n e s s
69
CR-08-0145
may
testify
t o h i s own
they are based
beliefs,
on h i s own
R u l e 701, A l a . R.
thoughts
or
impressions i f
knowledge.")(footnotes omitted).
Evid., provides:
" I f t h e w i t n e s s i s n o t t e s t i f y i n g as an e x p e r t ,
the w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n the form of o p i n i o n s or
inferences
is
limited
to
those
opinions
or
i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h a r e (a) r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on t h e
p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e w i t n e s s and (b) h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r
understanding of the w i t n e s s ' s testimony or the
determination of a f a c t i n i s s u e . "
The
relevant
A d v i s o r y Committee's Notes
to Rule
701
provide, i n
part:
"Traditional
common l a w ,
including that i n
A l a b a m a , g e n e r a l l y has p r e c l u d e d a l a y w i t n e s s f r o m
g i v i n g an o p i n i o n .
The l a w has r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e
w i t n e s s p l a c e a l l the f a c t s b e f o r e the t r i e r of
f a c t , t h u s p l a c i n g t h e t r i e r o f f a c t i n j u s t as good
a p o s i t i o n as t h e w i t n e s s t o draw a c o n c l u s i o n i n
the
matter.
Indeed,
i t has
been
said
that
p e r m i t t i n g a l a y w i t n e s s t o g i v e an o p i n i o n p r e e m p t s
the r o l e a s s i g n e d to the j u r o r s .
B o a t w r i g h t v.
S t a t e , 351 So. 2d 1366
( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) ; C. Gamble,
M c E l r o y ' s Alabama E v i d e n c e § 127.01(2)
( 4 t h ed.
1991).
"The r u l e e x c l u d i n g o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e has b e e n
under
consistent
attack
through
the
years.
P r o f e s s o r Morgan a r g u e d t h a t i t m e r e l y f u r n i s h e s t h e
basis
for
both
foolish
appeals
and
foolish
reversals.
E. Morgan, B a s i c P r o b l e m s o f E v i d e n c e
220
(1963) .
Dean Wigmore a r g u e d f o r i t s t o t a l
abolition.
7 J . Wigmore, Wigmore on E v i d e n c e § 1929
(Chadbourn
r e v . 1978).
C r i t i c i s m of t h i s
rule
f i n a l l y l e d t o Fed. R. E v i d . 701, w h i c h v e s t s t h e
t r i a l court with d i s c r e t i o n to permit l a y witnesses
to g i v e o p i n i o n s but o n l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s .
70
CR-08-0145
"Alabama
Rule
of Evidence
701, l i k e i t s
i d e n t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t under t h e F e d e r a l Rules of
Evidence,
permits l a y witnesses to give
opinions
w h e n e v e r two c o n d i t i o n s a r e met. F i r s t , t h e o p i n i o n
must be r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d upon t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e
witness.
T h i s i s no more t h a n a r e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e
' f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e r u l e , ' f o u n d i n A l a . R. E v i d .
602, t a i l o r e d t o o p i n i o n s .
No l a y w i t n e s s may g i v e
an o p i n i o n b a s e d upon f a c t s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s d i d n o t
p e r s o n a l l y observe.
Second, a l a y w i t n e s s
with
f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e may g i v e an o p i n i o n o n l y i f i t
i s h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r understanding of the witness's
testimony
or to the determination
of a fact i n
i s s u e . A f a i r amount o f d i s c r e t i o n i s v e s t e d i n t h e
t r i a l judge r e g a r d i n g the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether
opinions are h e l p f u l .
I t i s c l e a r , however, t h a t
o p i n i o n s s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d as n o t b e i n g h e l p f u l i f
t h e y a r e ' m e a n i n g l e s s a s s e r t i o n s w h i c h amount t o
l i t t l e more t h a n c h o o s i n g up s i d e s . ' F e d . R. E v i d .
701 a d v i s o r y c o m m i t t e e ' s n o t e . "
R u l e 701, A l a . R. E v i d . , A d v i s o r y
Surles
testified,
Committee's Notes.
essentially,
that
s h e was
inferring
t h a t Woodward t o o k h e r k e y s a n d h e r c a r on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e
murder.
Her t e s t i m o n y
was r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d on h e r f i r s t h a n d
k n o w l e d g e t h a t Woodward h a d u s e d h e r c a r t h e n i g h t b e f o r e and
he k e p t t h e k e y s t h e r e a f t e r , t h a t he h a d l e f t t h e i r
apartment
t h e f o l l o w i n g m o r n i n g , a n d t h a t h e r c a r was n o t a v a i l a b l e when
she
w a n t e d t o move h e r b e l o n g i n g s
testimony
regarding
determination
from t h e i r
apartment.
Her
h e r i n f e r e n c e was h e l p f u l t o t h e j u r y ' s
of a fact
i n i s s u e , t h a t i s , whether
Woodward
was d r i v i n g S u r l e s ' s v e h i c l e l a t e r t h a t d a y when O f f i c e r H o u t s
71
CR-08-0145
stopped the Impala.
Surles's
as t h e r e s u l t o f
testimony.
The
the
No p l a i n e r r o r o c c u r r e d
t r i a l c o u r t has s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g
admissibility
of
evidence,
and
i t s ruling
on
the
a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e w i l l be r e v e r s e d o n l y when t h e r e h a s
been a c l e a r
s h o w i n g o f an abuse o f t h a t
e.g.,
Ex p a r t e
Even
i f Woodward
review,
we
discretion
is
Loggins,
would
had
have
discretion.
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103
preserved
found
this
no abuse
issue
n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f
( A l a . 2000) .
for appellate
i n the t r i a l
i n the admission of the testimony
See,
here.
court's
Woodward
on t h i s c l a i m o f e r r o r .
VI.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
admitted
in
Officer
admitted
the
i n t o evidence the videotape
occurred
patrol
f r o m t h e d a s h b o a r d camera
c a r and t h a t
i t erred
t h e enhanced v e r s i o n of t h a t v i d e o .
State
establish
Houts's
c o u r t e r r e d when i t
failed
that
to
they
or that
authenticate
accurately
the videotapes
disagree.
72
the
He a r g u e s
videotapes
reproduced
when i t
and
the events
had n o t been
altered.
that
to
that
We
CR-08-0145
A g e n t C h r i s Gruhn w i t h t h e A l a b a m a S t a t e P o l i c e t e s t i f i e d
t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s m u r d e r he was a d e t e c t i v e
with
t h e Montgomery
P o l i c e Department.
He a n d h i s p a r t n e r
r e s p o n d e d t o t h e c a l l t h a t an o f f i c e r h a d been s h o t , a n d t h e y
were t h e f i r s t
officers
a t t h e scene o f t h e s h o o t i n g .
Gruhn s t a y e d w i t h O f f i c e r H o u t s u n t i l
and p r e p a r e d t o t r a n s p o r t
the paramedics a r r i v e d
O f f i c e r Houts t o t h e h o s p i t a l .
that time, another o f f i c e r ,
the
Agent
At
S e r g e a n t Simmons, h a d a r r i v e d a t
scene and mentioned t h e i n - c a r v i d e o
camera,
and Agent
Gruhn s a i d t h a t he went t o H o u t s ' s p a t r o l c a r a n d v i e w e d t h e
v i d e o r e c o r d e d by t h e i n - c a r dash
A g e n t Gruhn t e s t i f i e d
camera.
a b o u t t h e camera s y s t e m i n p a t r o l
cars:
" I n s i d e t h e p a t r o l c a r s , t h e y have a MDT.
What
t h a t i s , i s a M o b i l e Data T e r m i n a l .
I t ' s a laptop
t h a t ' s mounted i n t h e v e h i c l e .
And w i t h
that,
o f f i c e r s c a n u t i l i z e t h a t when t h e y s t o p a v e h i c l e
or r u n a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .
They c a n g e t r e a l - t i m e
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the system,
driver's license, r e g i s t r a t i o n , that sort of thing."
(R. 814.)
Agent
terminal
Gruhn
identified
photographs of the mobile
data
("MDT") i n O f f i c e r H o u t s ' s v e h i c l e a n d o f t h e s c r e e n
o f t h a t MDT -- d e p i c t i n g t h e l i c e n s e t a g d a t a t h a t was on t h e
73
CR-08-0145
s c r e e n when o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g .
that
the
MDT
standard
(R.
h a r d w i r e d i n t o the
i n Montgomery
816.)
video
was
v e h i c l e and
P o l i c e Department
A g e n t G r u h n was
He
testified
was
"pretty
patrol vehicles."
a s k e d t o e x p l a i n f u r t h e r how
system i n the p a t r o l cars operated,
and
he
the
testified:
"They're q u i t e s i m p l e .
I n s i d e of the p a t r o l car
t h e r e ' s a v i e w i n g monitor over the r e a r - v i e w m i r r o r .
The a c t u a l r e c o r d e r i s i n t h e t r u n k .
And i n t h i s
c a s e , i t ' s a VHS
recorder.
And
t h e camera i s
mounted.
And i t comes o u t t h r o u g h t h e w i n d s h i e l d .
And i t ' s b a s i c a l l y , j u s t a t h r e e - p i e c e , p o r t a b l e ,
VHS camera, a l i t t l e b i t more modern.
But i t a l l
operates o f f of i t s i n t e r n a l system of the
car's
power."
(R.
818.)
A g e n t Gruhn t e s t i f i e d
on
the
Officer
d i s p l a y monitor,
t h a t the video
like
a VCR.
Simmons o p e r a t e d t h e v i d e o ,
was
p l a y i n g , and
car
to
view
the
played
back
further stated
He
can
be
that
announced t h a t the
video
t h a t i s when A g e n t Gruhn went t o t h e p a t r o l
video
with
O f f i c e r Simmons.
Agent
Gruhn
i d e n t i f i e d S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 16 as t h e v i d e o t a p e c o l l e c t e d f r o m
Houts's
vehicle.
Officer
H o u t s ' s v e h i c l e on
had
He
reviewed i t again
said that
the
he
day
had
of the
s i n c e t h a t day,
74
viewed
and
the
video
in
shooting,
that
he
t h a t i t was
a
fair
CR-08-0145
and a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e v i d e o t a p e he h a d v i e w e d on
the day o f t h e s h o o t i n g .
Kevin
Police
Murphy
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was t h e D e p u t y C h i e f o f
f o r t h e Montgomery
Police
Department
a n d t h a t he h a d
been t h e commander o f t h e P a t r o l D i v i s i o n on t h e d a y O f f i c e r
H o u t s was s h o t .
standard p a t r o l
the
shooting,
Murphy
He t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e e q u i p m e n t i n s i d e t h e
car Officer
including
H o u t s was d r i v i n g
an MDT
e x p l a i n e d how t h e camera
unit
and a
on t h e d a y o f
video
camera.
operated:
"The v i d e o camera i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e b l u e
lights.
The moment t h e b l u e l i g h t s come on, t h e
video
camera
i s programmed t o i n s t a n t l y
start
recording.
I t r e c o r d s t r a f f i c s t o p s . I t can r e c o r d
anything.
You c a n p u l l up t o a b u i l d i n g .
And i f
you t u r n on y o u r b l u e l i g h t s , t h e camera t u r n s on.
You d o n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o have t h e b l u e l i g h t s
on t o a c t i v a t e t h e camera.
The o f f i c e r c a n , a l s o ,
m a n u a l l y , touch a b u t t o n and s t a r t r e c o r d i n g w i t h o u t
n e c e s s a r i l y h a v i n g t h e b l u e l i g h t s o n . B u t i f you
t u r n t h e b l u e l i g h t s on, t h e camera w i l l come on
automatically."
(R.
1029.)
Agent
A l Mattox
of
t h e ABI
testified
that
he
was
r e q u e s t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e i n Montgomery
t o v i e w t h e v i d e o c a p t u r e d b y t h e i n - c a r d a s h b o a r d camera i n
Officer
Houts's p a t r o l
State's
Exhibit
car.
Agent
16 as t h e v i d e o
75
Mattox
then
identified
he h a d v i e w e d a c o u p l e
of
CR-08-0145
weeks e a r l i e r i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s
to
be t h e o r i g i n a l
When
the State
objected,
videotape
sought
o f f i c e a n d t h a t he b e l i e v e d
from O f f i c e r
to introduce
Houts's v e h i c l e .
the videotape
Woodward
i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , as f o l l o w s : " [ T h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s ]
f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a proper foundation
-- C o r p o r a l
Mattox
has j u s t
testified,
i n t h a t Agent Mattox
he saw i t a t
their
o f f i c e b u t d o e s n ' t know i f i t ' s t h e same one o r n o t , t h a t was
the
original
video."
(R. 1187.)
He a l s o
objected
on t h e
ground t h a t the State had "not e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t ' s a
and
accurate
nobody
d e p i c t i o n o f what h a p p e n e d b e c a u s e t h e y ' v e h a d
t o show t h a t
i t is."
(R. 1188.)
The t r i a l
considered the l e g a l requirements f o r the admission
r e c o r d i n g o f an e v e n t ,
says,
the State
presenting
court
of a tape-
a n d i t o v e r r u l e d Woodward's o b j e c t i o n s .
Woodward now a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
he
fair
failed
court erred
to authenticate
e i t h e r a witness
to t e s t i f y
because,
the videotape
that
the
videotape
a c c u r a t e l y r e p r o d u c e d t h e e v e n t s he o r she h a d w i t n e s s e d ,
a witness
to t e s t i f y that the videotape
the foregoing
required
ways, Woodward
to establish a
proper
76
continues,
chain
or
had n o t been a l t e r e d .
Because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o a u t h e n t i c a t e t h e v i d e o
of
by
of
i n either
the State
custody
was
f o r the
CR-08-0145
videotape,
concludes,
which
i t d i d not
the videotape
do.
should
Therefore,
n o t have
been
Woodward
admitted
at
trial.
As we have n o t e d i n p r e v i o u s p o r t i o n s o f t h i s o p i n i o n , a
trial
court i s afforded s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n determining
the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence,
court's
and t h i s C o u r t w i l l
judgment o r e x e r c i s i n g
of that d i s c r e t i o n
reverse a
only
when
t h e r e h a s b e e n a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n .
E.g.,
Ex p a r t e L o g g i n s ,
Rule
901(a),
authentication
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) .
Ala.
R.
Evid.,
requirement
"is
provides
satisfied
that
by
the
evidence
s u f f i c i e n t t o support a f i n d i n g that the matter i n question i s
what i t s p r o p o n e n t c l a i m s . "
Rule
9 0 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. E v i d . ,
p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t ] e s t i m o n y t h a t a m a t t e r i s what i t i s c l a i m e d
to
be"
i s sufficient
requirements
In
of t h i s
Ex p a r t e
a u t h e n t i c a t i o n "conforming
with
the
( A l a . 1993),
the
rule."
Fuller,
620
So.
2d
675
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h e two methods f o r l a y i n g t h e
foundation
for
the
videotapes,
and s i m i l a r
admissibility
of
sound
recordings,
evidence:
"The p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r a d m i s s i o n i n t o
e v i d e n c e o f a s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium b y
77
CR-08-0145
which
a scene
or event
i s recorded
(e.g.,
a
p h o t o g r a p h , m o t i o n p i c t u r e , v i d e o t a p e , e t c . ) depends
upon t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
I f t h e r e i s no
q u a l i f i e d and c o m p e t e n t w i t n e s s who can t e s t i f y t h a t
t h e s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a c c u r a t e l y and
r e l i a b l y r e p r e s e n t s what he o r she s e n s e d a t t h e
time
in
question,
then
the
'silent
witness'
f o u n d a t i o n must be l a i d .
Under t h e ' s i l e n t w i t n e s s '
t h e o r y , a w i t n e s s must e x p l a i n how t h e p r o c e s s o r
m e c h a n i s m t h a t c r e a t e d t h e i t e m w o r k s and how t h e
p r o c e s s o r mechanism e n s u r e s r e l i a b i l i t y .
When t h e
' s i l e n t w i t n e s s ' t h e o r y i s used, the p a r t y s e e k i n g
t o have t h e s o u n d r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a d m i t t e d
i n t o e v i d e n c e must meet t h e s e v e n - p r o n g V o u d r i e [ v.
S t a t e , 387 So. 2d 248 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 0 ) , ] t e s t .
R e w r i t t e n t o have more g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n ,
the
Voudrie standard r e q u i r e s :
"(1) a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e d e v i c e o r p r o c e s s o r
mechanism t h a t p r o d u c e d t h e i t e m b e i n g o f f e r e d as
e v i d e n c e was c a p a b l e o f r e c o r d i n g what a w i t n e s s
w o u l d have s e e n o r h e a r d had a w i t n e s s b e e n p r e s e n t
at the scene or event r e c o r d e d ,
or
"(2) a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e o p e r a t o r o f t h e
p r o c e s s o r mechanism was c o m p e t e n t ,
device
"(3)
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the a u t h e n t i c i t y
and
c o r r e c t n e s s of the r e s u l t i n g r e c o r d i n g , photograph,
videotape, etc.,
"(4) a s h o w i n g t h a t no
d e l e t i o n s have b e e n made,
"(5) a
recording,
preserved,
showing of
photograph,
changes, a d d i t i o n s ,
t h e manner i n w h i c h
videotape,
etc.,
"(6) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r s , o r
p i c t u r e d , and
78
or
the
was
persons
CR-08-0145
"(7) f o r c r i m i n a l c a s e s o n l y , a s h o w i n g t h a t any
s t a t e m e n t made i n t h e r e c o r d i n g , t a p e , e t c . , was
voluntarily
made w i t h o u t any k i n d o f c o e r c i o n o r
improper inducement.
"On t h e o t h e r
h a n d , when a q u a l i f i e d
and
competent w i t n e s s
can t e s t i f y
that
t h e sound
r e c o r d i n g o r o t h e r medium a c c u r a t e l y a n d r e l i a b l y
r e p r e s e n t s what t h e w i t n e s s s e n s e d a t t h e t i m e i n
q u e s t i o n , then the foundation r e q u i r e d i s t h a t f o r
the ' p i c t o r i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' t h e o r y .
Under t h i s
theory, the party o f f e r i n g
t h e i t e m must p r e s e n t
sufficient
evidence
to
meet
the
'reliable
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' s t a n d a r d , t h a t i s , t h e w i t n e s s must
t e s t i f y t h a t t h e w i t n e s s has s u f f i c i e n t
personal
knowledge o f t h e scene o r events p i c t u r e d o r t h e
sounds r e c o r d e d and t h a t t h e i t e m o f f e r e d a c c u r a t e l y
and r e l i a b l y r e p r e s e n t s t h e a c t u a l s c e n e o r s o u n d s . "
620
So. 2d a t 678.
The
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t
i n Ex p a r t e
Fuller
explained
the b a s i s f o r t h e " s i l e n t - w i t n e s s " t h e o r y :
"The ' s i l e n t w i t n e s s ' t h e o r y i s t h a t a p h o t o g r a p h ,
etc.,
i s a d m i s s i b l e , e v e n i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an
observing or sensing w i t n e s s , because the process o r
mechanism b y w h i c h t h e p h o t o g r a p h , e t c . , i s made
ensures
reliability
and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s .
In
e s s e n c e , t h e p r o c e s s o r mechanism s u b s t i t u t e s f o r
the w i t n e s s ' s senses, and because t h e p r o c e s s o r
mechanism i s e x p l a i n e d b e f o r e t h e p h o t o g r a p h , e t c . ,
i s admitted, the t r u s t placed i n i t s t r u t h f u l n e s s
comes f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , h a d a w i t n e s s b e e n
there,
the witness
w o u l d have s e n s e d what t h e
photograph, e t c . , records."
620
So. 2d a t 678.
79
CR-08-0145
Here,
the State
relied
on t h e s i l e n t - w i t n e s s t h e o r y t o
e s t a b l i s h the predicate f o r admission
presented
the
reliability
process
the
testimony
of the video-recording
system of the p a t r o l
required Voudrie
altered.
and i t
f r o m A g e n t G r u h n a n d Murphy t o e s t a b l i s h
and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s
i n video
videotape
of thevideotape,
had been
c a r , and i t s a t i s f i e d
standards,
i n c l u d i n g a showing t h a t t h e
preserved
and
that
i t had
n o t been
9
Because the videotape
testimony
of
was p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d b y t h e
the law-enforcement
officers
through
the
" s i l e n t - w i t n e s s t h e o r y " and because t h e S t a t e e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t
the v i d e o
camera i n t h e p a t r o l
t h a t was c a p a b l e
of accurately
c a r was a r e l i a b l e
recording
mechanism
the shooting, the
S t a t e was n o t r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h a c h a i n o f c u s t o d y
videotape.
App.
2002).
H a r r i s o n v. S t a t e , 869 So. 2d 509,
The v i d e o t a p e
for the
515 ( A l a . C r i m .
was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d a t Woodward's
trial.
Woodward
court's
has f a i l e d
substantial
t o show
discretion
a n y abuse
of the
i n the admission
trial
of the
T h e v i d e o t a p e does n o t c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t b y Woodward,
so c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e v e n t h r e q u i r e m e n t o f V o u d r i e -- a
s h o w i n g t h a t any s t a t e m e n t made i n t h e r e c o r d i n g was made
v o l u n t a r i l y -- was n o t n e c e s s a r y .
9
80
CR-08-0145
videotape
testimony.
r e l i e f on t h i s
Therefore,
c l a i m of
he
i s not
entitled
to
any
error.
VII.
Woodward n e x t
argues
that during
the
State's
rebuttal
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t a t t h e g u i l t p h a s e t h e p r o s e c u t o r commented
on h i s f a i l u r e
prove
his
t o t e s t i f y and i m p l i e d t h a t he had a b u r d e n t o
innocence.
D u r i n g r e b u t t a l c l o s i n g argument the S t a t e b e g a n :
"He w a n t s h i s s c i e n c e b u t he d o e s n ' t .
He w a n t s
t o p r e d i c t what I'm g o i n g t o s a y .
He can r e a d my
m i n d . L a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n , smoke s c r e e n s .
That's
a l l y o u ' v e h e a r d f o r t h e l a s t 20 m i n u t e s ,
smoke
screens.
He w a n t s t o a t t a c k t h e c a s e b u t c a n ' t do
i t , any l o g i c a l , e v i d e n t i a r y way.
" I s a t t h e r e , and I t r i e d t o t h i n k , l o o k a t t h i s
case from the r e v e r s e .
We s p e n t a l o t o f t i m e
t a l k i n g a b o u t what c o n n e c t s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e
crime.
What e v i d e n c e , b e f o r e you, f r o m w i t n e s s e s ,
e x h i b i t s , common s e n s e , d i s c o n n e c t t h e
defendant
from the c r i m e ?
What?"
(R. 1322.)
Woodward o b j e c t e d : "We
1322.)
trial
The
Woodward's
attempting
to
have no b u r d e n h e r e . "
c o u r t o v e r r u l e d the
objection at
shift
the
trial
burden
of
(R.
objection.
was
that
proof
the
State
was
t o him,
while
his
o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l a l s o i n c l u d e s a c l a i m t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r
made a p r o h i b i t e d comment on h i s f a i l u r e
81
to t e s t i f y .
Because
CR-08-0145
Woodward
d i d not object
at t r i a l
on
the ground
a r g u m e n t c o n s t i t u t e d a comment on h i s f a i l u r e
that
the
to t e s t i f y ,
we
r e v i e w t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e argument f o r p l a i n e r r o r o n l y .
Q u e s t i o n s about the p r o p r i e t y o f c o u n s e l ' s statements i n
c l o s i n g argument a r e m a t t e r s f o r t h e b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e
trial
court.
Feb.
5,
See, e . g . , G o b b l e
2 0 1 0 ] ___
2010) ( q u o t i n g A c k l i n
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ) .
So.
3d
v. S t a t e ,
___ ,
v. S t a t e ,
___
2d
36,
64
App.
790 So. 2d 975, 1002 ( A l a .
every
legitimate
"and may e x a m i n e , c o l l a t e ,
and t r e a t t h e e v i d e n c e i n h i s own way."
So.
( A l a . Crim.
A p r o s e c u t o r may a r g u e
i n f e r e n c e from the e v i d e n c e
[Ms. CR-05-0225,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
shift
T a y l o r v . S t a t e , 666
1994).
A
prosecutor's
a r g u m e n t s a r e t o be e x a m i n e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c o m p l e t e
closing
arguments
whole.
The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t
was
and i n the c o n t e x t o f the e v i d e n c e
p r e j u d i c e d by
infected
a
the t r i a l
conviction
b u t whether
t h e comment " s o
w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o make t h e r e s u l t i n g
a denial
477 U.S. 168, 169
comment,
as a
o f due p r o c e s s . "
Darden v.
Wainwright,
(1986).
The p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment was d i r e c t e d t o t h e s t r e n g t h o f
the
S t a t e ' s case
and t o t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g weakness
82
i n the
CR-08-0145
defense's theory o f the case,
on
the prosecutor's
case.
The
inferences
comment
372,
423-24
therein.
also
the burden
of proof,
as
See, e . g . , M i n o r v. S t a t e , 914 So.
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2004),
and
cases
cited
Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s c o n s i d e r a b l e
discretion
We
from a l l the e v i d e n c e i n the
d i d not s h i f t
Woodward a r g u e d a t t r i a l .
2d
a n d i t was a f a i r comment b a s e d
when i t o v e r r u l e d Woodward's o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l .
hold
that
Woodward's f a i l u r e
the
argument
to testify,
was
not
a
comment
as Woodward a r g u e s on
on
appeal.
See,
e.g., A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 711 So. 2d 1031, 1049 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1996).
jury
that
We n o t e ,
the
State
too, that the t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the
had
the burden
a r g u m e n t s o f c o u n s e l were n o t e v i d e n c e ,
of
proof,
that
the
a n d t h a t t h e j u r y was
n o t t o draw any a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e s f r o m Woodward's f a i l u r e t o
testify.
Jurors
instructions.
a r e presumed
to follow
C a l h o u n v. S t a t e ,
the t r i a l
court's
932 So. 2d 923, 962 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) .
No e r r o r , p l a i n o r o t h e r w i s e ,
is
n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f
occurred here,
on t h i s
VIII.
83
claim.
a n d Woodward
CR-08-0145
Woodward
reversal
next
when
argues
that
i t refused
to
the
trial
instruct
d e c i s i o n s h o u l d n o t be d e t e r m i n e d
court
the
jury
erred
to
that i t s
b y t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s
c a l l e d by the p a r t i e s .
Woodward's
fourth
written
requested
jury
instruction
stated:
"Your d e c i s i o n on t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e s h o u l d
n o t be d e t e r m i n e d
b y t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s
t e s t i f y i n g f o r or against a party.
You s h o u l d
c o n s i d e r a l l t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n e v i d e n c e
to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o f t h e w i t n e s s e s you c h o o s e t o
b e l i e v e or not b e l i e v e .
You may f i n d t h a t t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f a s m a l l e r number o f w i t n e s s e s on one
s i d e i s more c r e d i b l e t h a n t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a
g r e a t e r number o f w i t n e s s e s on t h e o t h e r s i d e .
"At a l l t i m e s , the burden o f p r o o f
the S t a t e t o p r e s e n t p r o o f beyond a
doubt."
r e m a i n s on
reasonable
(C. 941.)
During
the charge
" D e f e n s e number f o u r ,
witnesses
have
self-evident,
witnesses."
conference
I'm n o t g o i n g
testified
they're
(R. 1283.)
f o r the
not
to
the t r i a l
to give that.
defendant,
weigh
Woodward
court
the
stated:
When no
i t ' s pretty
number
of
the
objected to the court's
f a i l u r e to give the requested j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r the t r i a l
84
CR-08-0145
court charged the j u r y .
We f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
decision.
"A
trial
court
has
broad
discretion
in
f o r m u l a t i n g i t s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , p r o v i d i n g they
are
an a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e l a w a n d f a c t s o f
the c a s e . Coon v. S t a t e , 494 So. 2d 184 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1986).
When r e q u e s t e d c h a r g e s a r e e i t h e r
fairly
and s u b s t a n t i a l l y
covered by the
trial
judge's o r a l charge o r are c o n f u s i n g , m i s l e a d i n g ,
u n g r a m m a t i c a l , n o t p r e d i c a t e d on a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the
evidence,
argumentative,
abstract,
or
a
misstatement
o f the law, the t r i a l
judge
may
p r o p e r l y r e f u s e t o g i v e such charges.
Ex p a r t e
W i l h i t e , 485 So. 2d 787 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . "
Ward v. S t a t e ,
This
Court
610 So. 2d 1190, 1194
has
upheld
a
trial
defendant's request f o r a v i r t u a l l y
( A l a . C r i m . App.
court's
identical
1992).
refusal
jury
charge:
"The r e f u s a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t e d c h a r g e
number 8 was p r o p e r l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e
t r i a l judge.
T h a t c h a r g e was:
"'The w e i g h t
of the evidence
i s not
n e c e s s a r i l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e number o f
w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g on e i t h e r s i d e .
The
j u r y s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e f a c t s and
circumstances
i n evidence to determine
which
of the witnesses are worthy of
g r e a t e r credence.
The j u r y may f i n d t h a t
the
testimony of a smaller
number o f
w i t n e s s e s on one s i d e i s more c r e d i b l e t h a n
the
t e s t i m o n y o f a g r e a t e r number o f
w i t n e s s e s on t h e o t h e r s i d e . '
" T h i s c h a r g e a t t e m p t s t o e x p r e s s , i n an awkward
f a s h i o n , t h e c o n c e p t t h a t t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s i n
a c r i m i n a l t r i a l i s not the b a s i s f o r determining
85
of
a
CR-08-0145
t h e i s s u e o f g u i l t s i n c e a f a c t may be e s t a b l i s h e d
as f i r m l y b y t h e t e s t i m o n y o f one w i t n e s s as b y t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f an e n t i r e community.
S m i t h v. S t a t e ,
338
So. 2d 1030 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 6 ) ,
cert.
d e n i e d , 338 So. 2d 1033 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) ; Mann v . S t a t e ,
20 A l a . App. 540, 103 So. 604 ( 1 9 2 5 ) .
However,
disparity
i n t h e number
of witnesses
is a
c i r c u m s t a n c e n o t t o be o v e r l o o k e d , e s p e c i a l l y where
the
witnesses
have
h a d an
equal
chance f o r
o b s e r v a t i o n and a r e o f e q u a l c r e d i b i l i t y a n d t h e
j u r y may p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s
testifying.
88 C.J.S. T r i a l , S e c t i o n 369 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ;
23A C.J.S. C r i m i n a l Law, S e c t i o n 1248 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
"We a l s o f i n d t h e c h a r g e somewhat c o n f u s i n g i n
t h a t i t d i s c u s s e s t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e and t h e
c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses."
W h i t e v. S t a t e , 410 So. 2d 135, 137
( A l a . C r i m . App.
B a s e d on t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n W h i t e ,
here
clearly
the t r i a l
d i d n o t e r r when i t r e f u s e d t o g i v e
requested charge.
As t h i s C o u r t n o t e d
was a m i s s t a t e m e n t
o f t h e l a w a n d was c o n f u s i n g .
McMillian
v.
State,
448
So.
2d
463
1981).
i n White,
Woodward's
t h e charge
See a l s o
( A l a . Crim.
1 9 8 4 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t " d i s p a r i t y i n t h e number o f w i t n e s s e s
circumstance
court
App.
is a
t h e j u r y may p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r i n r e a c h i n g i t s
verdict").
Because
charge,
of
the t r i a l
court p r o p e r l y refused the requested
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f on t h i s
error.
86
claim
CR-08-0145
Penalty-phase Issues
IX.
Woodward
Amendment
next
right
argues
to
an
that
he
was
individualized
denied
his
sentence
Eighth
because,
he
s a y s , when d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s e n t e n c e f o r Woodward,
the
trial
capital
c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d the
cases i n v o l v i n g
argues t h a t the t r i a l
determining
Code
1975,
imposed
the murder of a p o l i c e
i n other
officer.
He
c o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of other cases i n
h i s sentence
because,
sentences
he
also
violated
§
13A-5-53(b),
says, p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y
d u t y o f t h i s C o u r t and n o t o f a t r i a l c o u r t .
Ala.
review i s the
Woodward d i d n o t
r a i s e t h i s i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t , so we r e v i e w t h e a r g u m e n t
for
plain error
The
of
only.
l a w i s c l e a r t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who
has b e e n
convicted
c a p i t a l m u r d e r i s e n t i t l e d t o an i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i s b a s e d on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c r i m e
c o m m i t t e d and on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r .
462
U.S.
862
(1983).
Alabama
d e c i d i n g upon t h e p r o p e r s e n t e n c e
the
trial
court
circumstances
must
i t finds
determine
to
exist
87
law
Z a n t v.
establishes
Stephens,
that,
in
i n a c a p i t a l - m u r d e r case,
whether
outweigh
the
the
aggravating
mitigating
CR-08-0145
circumstances
i t finds
to exist,
a n d i t must
consideration the advisory v e r d i c t of the jury.
imposed
on
defendant's
trial
App.
an
alleged
sentence,
accomplice
The s e n t e n c e
bearing
on
a
n o t be c o n s i d e r e d
by a
Crim.
1982), a f f ' d ,
438 So. 2d 352 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) .
p r i n c i p l e s were n o t v i o l a t e d i n t h i s
A review
and
no
into
C o u l t e r v. S t a t e , 438 So. 2d 336 ( A l a .
court.
and i t s h o u l d
has
take
of the t r i a l
i t s oral
case.
c o u r t ' s thorough
pronouncement
The f o r e g o i n g
of the death
sentencing
sentence
order
a t the
conclusion of the f i n a l sentencing hearing d i s c l o s e s that the
trial
court's
sentence
was
based
p r e s e n t e d a t both phases o f the t r i a l
solely
on
the
evidence
a n d on t h e t e s t i m o n y a n d
evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e f i n a l s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g and t h a t i t
took i n t o account
the j u r y ' s advisory v e r d i c t .
sentencing order the t r i a l
In i t s w r i t t e n
c o u r t made f i n d i n g s o f f a c t ,
made
s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and
the m i t i g a t i n g
overriding
circumstances,
the
jury's
recommended
imprisonment without p a r o l e .
trial
court
relied
on
and e x p l a i n e d i t s reasons f o r
sentence
of
life
T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e
improper
evidence
sentencing determination or that, i n weighing
88
i n reaching i t s
the aggravating
CR-08-0145
circumstances
and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
t h e s e n t e n c e i m p o s e d i n any o t h e r c a s e s .
record
discloses that
sentencing
Woodward
t o w h i c h he was
Although
we
i t considered
To t h e c o n t r a r y ,
received
the
the
individualized
entitled.
f i n d t h a t Woodward r e c e i v e d an
note t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n
individualized
sentence,
we
i n c o r r e c t l y argued
the t r i a l
c o u r t i n i t s amended s e n t e n c i n g memorandum t h a t
the
t r i a l c o u r t had a d u t y u n d e r § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975,
to
a d d r e s s w h e t h e r t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s s e n t e n c e was
or
excessive
in
that review
of
t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f a d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s t o be p e r f o r m e d
by
this
cases.
Court,
compared
The
subject
A proportionality
to
other
disproportionate
involved
similar
when
to
statute c l e a r l y provides
to review
review
by
i s not
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975.
So.
2d 216
sentences
t h e A l a b a m a Supreme
a duty
See
( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ; Ex p a r t e
f o r the
Tomlin,
2003).
court
to
State's
909
However, Woodward d i d n o t
memorandum, n o r
Near the
hearing
of
the
i t s closing
trial
court,
89
the
in
2d 283,
i n the
its
460
286
trial
sentencing
argument.
argument a t
the
So.
object
argument
d i d he move t o s t r i k e
end
before
erroneous
court.
a l s o Ex p a r t e Thomas,
(Ala.
the
trial
Court.
State
the
sentencing
mentioned
the
CR-08-0145
sentencing
memorandum
and i t s c i t a t i o n
t o other
cases.
It
argued:
"Our memorandum b r i e f shows t h e C o u r t e v e r y c a s e
we c o u l d f i n d i n w h i c h a l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r h a s
been k i l l e d i n t h e S t a t e o f Alabama and p r o s e c u t e d
f o r c a p i t a l murder.
T h e r e were some 23 c a s e s .
Of
t h o s e c a s e s , n e a r l y h a l f -- 10 -- a j u r y recommended
l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , a judge overrode.
And n o t one
o f t h o s e c a s e s was r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e o f t h e o v e r r i d e .
Some were r e v e r s e d -- a n d we p o i n t e d t h a t o u t i n o u r
memorandum -- b e c a u s e o f e r r o r s o r u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n
s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r s and o t h e r t h i n g s .
But, c l e a r l y ,
the law of t h i s
s t a t e i s t h a t t h i s Court can
override.
And when y o u compare o u r c a s e t o t h e
f a c t s of other cases, t h i s f i t s r i g h t i n . In f a c t ,
o n l y two c a s e s
t h a t we c o u l d f i n d where a l a w
e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r was k i l l e d , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , t h e
defendants got l i f e
without
parole.
One, t h e
v i c t i m s came t o t h e S t a t e a n d s a i d , S t a t e , r e q u e s t
l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e . The S t a t e d i d . The Judge t o l d
the j u r y .
And t h e y came b a c k , l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e .
The
o t h e r one, [ c a s e name o m i t t e d ] ,
apparently,
according to the opinion i n t h i s l a s t
paragraph,
s t a t e s t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e j u r y came b a c k
l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e because of the evidence of
mental disease or d e f e c t which i s not present here.
Those two c a s e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . "
(R. 1 7 7 7 - 7 8 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.)
As
noted
argument.
a b o v e , Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e S t a t e ' s
In fact,
argument t o t h e t r i a l
i n h i s opening
statement
during h i s
c o u r t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g Woodward
s t a t e d : "Your Honor, t h e d e f e n d a n t w o u l d n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e
e n t i r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f [the p r o s e c u t o r ' s ]
90
grounds f o r a j u r y
CR-08-0145
override."
(R. 1779.)
He a l s o a r g u e d t h a t s e v e r a l d e f e n d a n t s
who h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f k i l l i n g l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s h a d
been s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e .
Later
i n h i s argument
cases
i n which
to the t r i a l
Alabama's
appellate
judgments i n which t h e t r i a l
of
life
imprisonment without
imposed a death sentence,
challenge
court,
when
courts
discussing
had
reversed
judge overrode a j u r y ' s v e r d i c t
the p o s s i b i l i t y
of parole
and
Woodward e v e n a r g u e d : "And I w o u l d
t h e S t a t e t o come up w i t h c a s e s where t h e j u r i e s -¬
where t h e J u d g e s
-- a r e j u s t
ignoring jury verdicts."
(R.
1786.)
Thus, a r e v i e w
of the record i n d i c a t e s that the State's
primary
p u r p o s e i n e v e n d i s c u s s i n g o t h e r c a s e s was t o p r o v i d e
support
f o r i t s argument t h a t t h e t r i a l
to
c o u r t was
authorized
o v e r r i d e t h e j u r y ' s s e n t e n c e recommendation and s h o u l d
so i n Woodward's c a s e ;
trial
do
Woodward, t o o , i n h i s a r g u m e n t t o t h e
court encouraging the court not to override the j u r y ' s
verdict
mentioned
other
cases
involving
jury-verdict
Court that the t r i a l
court d i d not
overrides.
It
i s clear to this
r e l y on e i t h e r p a r t y ' s r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r c a s e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g
91
CR-08-0145
of
the proper
sentence
f o r Woodward.
The t r i a l
court set
forth c l e a r l y i t s findings regarding aggravating circumstances
and
the m i t i g a t i n g
weighing
of those
circumstances,
factors
T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n
and
i t s discussed i t s
to reach i t s sentencing d e c i s i o n .
that the t r i a l
court r e l i e d
cases i n r e a c h i n g t h a t s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
on o t h e r
Apart
from
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g
that
the
trial
court r e l i e d
Woodward's
sentence,
we
on
improper
note,
factors
too, that
p r e s u m e d t o know a n d t o f o l l o w t h e l a w .
i n determining
trial
judges
See, e . g . , Ex p a r t e
Slaton,
680 So. 2d 909 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; B e l i s l e v . S t a t e ,
3d
( A l a . Crim.
256
2008).
We
presume
App. 2 0 0 7 ) ,
that
aff'd,
the t r i a l
are
11 So.
11 So. 3d 323 ( A l a .
court d i d not r e l y
on
f a c t o r s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e mandated i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g s t a t u t e .
We a r e aware -- as Woodward a r g u e s
a p p e a l -- t h a t t h e t r i a l
f o r the f i r s t
t i m e on
court noted a t the c o n c l u s i o n of i t s
s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r t h a t "a d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e
murder
of
a
police
officer
disproportionate."
(C. 994.)
the
had
trial
aggravating
court
not
This statement
already
circumstances
is
clearly
outweighed
92
unusual
was made
stated
the
that
or
after
the
mitigating
CR-08-0145
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g the j u r y ' s s e n t e n c i n g recommendation,
which
i s the s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e d f o r the i m p o s i t i o n of a
sentence.
§§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , 13A-5-48, A l a . Code 1975.
Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l ,
852
this
the
Court
that
sentences
have
murder
a police
of
So. 2d 833
been
trial
p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review.
not
demonstrate
court's
imposed
officer
that
( A l a . 2002) .
in
d i d not
See
also
I t i s clear to
statement
other
death
cases
that
death
involving
constitute
an
the
improper
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t a l s o does
the
trial
court's
weighing
of
the
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r
its
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
the
proper
sentence
in this
b a s e d on i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f any o t h e r c a s e s .
case
was
A t most, the
trial
c o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t s u m m a r i z e s a r g u m e n t s made by b o t h t h e
State
and
Woodward t o t h e e f f e c t
that
the murder of
o f f i c e r s had r e s u l t e d i n d e a t h s e n t e n c e s
See
S o c k w e l l v.
State,
675
So.
2d
4,
f o r the
30
police
defendants.
(Ala. Crim.
App.
1993)(reference i n sentencing order to extraneous matters d i d
not r e q u i r e
that
trial
r e v e r s a l where s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r d i d n o t
court
considered
extraneous
i m p o s i t i o n o f s e n t e n c e ) , a f f ' d , 675 So. 2d 38
a case p r e s e n t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s v e r y s i m i l a r
93
matter
reflect
in
the
( A l a . 1994).
to those
In
here,
CR-08-0145
Harris
v. S t a t e ,
2 So. 3d 880, 930
t h i s C o u r t f o u n d no p l a i n e r r o r .
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2007),
H a r r i s was f o u n d g u i l t y o f
c a p i t a l murder f o l l o w i n g t h e s h o o t i n g deaths o f s i x v i c t i m s ,
and
the j u r y
recommended
without parole.
verdict
for
The t r i a l
a
sentence
of
life
imprisonment
court overrode the j u r y ' s
advisory
and, i n i t s s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r , e x p l a i n e d i t s r e a s o n s
i t s decision,
i n c l u d i n g a review of other cases:
"In i t s o r d e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t o u t l i n e d i t s r e a s o n s
for
o v e r r i d i n g t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t recommending a
sentence of l i f e without p a r o l e .
I t added t h a t i t
h a d s e e n no c a s e i n w h i c h a d e f e n d a n t h a d k i l l e d s i x
v i c t i m s p u r s u a n t t o one scheme o r c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t .
I t c i t e d a number o f c a s e s w i t h m u l t i p l e v i c t i m s -¬
a l l o f w h i c h i n v o l v e d f e w e r t h a n s i x v i c t i m s -- i n
which
the t r i a l
courts
overrode
the
juries'
recommendations f o r l i f e
i n p r i s o n without the
p o s s i b i l i t y of parole.
In each case, t h i s C o u r t
upheld the t r i a l courts' d e c i s i o n s to override the
j u r i e s ' r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . As t h e t r i a l c o u r t p o i n t e d
out,
when compared w i t h t h e f a c t o f s i m i l a r c a s e s ,
a t a s k the j u r y c o u l d n o t u n d e r t a k e , 'the o n l y
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s e n t e n c e i n t h i s c a s e w o u l d be t o
sentence H a r r i s to l i f e without p a r o l e i n s t e a d of
death.'
... "
H a r r i s v. S t a t e , 2 So. 3d a t 930.
F i n d i n g no p l a i n e r r o r i n
H a r r i s , we l i k e w i s e f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
i s o l a t e d statement i n t h i s
case.
The c a s e s Woodward r e l i e s on, i n c l u d i n g Ex p a r t e T o m l i n ,
909 So. 2d 283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , a n d A p i c e l l a v. S t a t e , 945 So. 2d
94
CR-08-0145
485
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) , a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .
Tomlin, the t r i a l
I n Ex p a r t e
c o u r t overrode t h e j u r y ' s recommendation o f
l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t p a r o l e b a s e d on t h e s e n t e n c e
on T o m l i n ' s c o d e f e n d a n t .
dismissal
imposed
In A p i c e l l a , t h i s Court reversed the
of a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n
Rule
32, A l a . R.
Crim.
p e t i t i o n a n d remanded t h e c a s e f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s
P.,
based
on p l e a d i n g s t h a t r e v e a l e d t h a t a t r i a l j u d g e m i g h t have b a s e d
his
override
of a jury's
imprisonment
s e n t e n c i n g recommendation
w i t h o u t p a r o l e on t h e s e n t e n c e
imposed
of
life
on t h e
codefendant.
In
issue
view
of the f a c t
i n the t r i a l
indicates
that
the t r i a l
other defendants
circumstances
this
the
court
that
and
Woodward
that
d i d not raise
nothing
i n the
this
record
court considered the sentences of
i n w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g
i n order
to determine
the proper
sentence i n
c a s e , we f i n d no e r r o r a n d c e r t a i n l y no e r r o r r i s i n g t o
l e v e l o f p l a i n e r r o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g any o f Woodward's
substantial
rights.
X.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n a n d
consideration
of e x h i b i t s
that
95
were
not i n t r o d u c e d a t the
CR-08-0145
sentencing
hearing
before
the
jury
and
that
were
not
the
s u b j e c t of a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e i n the p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n
report
he
the
says,
PSI
("PSI") v i o l a t e d § 13A-5-47, A l a . Code 1975,
that statute permits
and
a trial
e v i d e n c e a b o u t any
part
s u b j e c t of a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e .
because,
court to consider
of
the
PSI
Specifically,
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d n o t have a d m i t t e d
only
t h a t was
the
Woodward a r g u e s
i n t o evidence or
c o n s i d e r e d a u d i o r e c o r d i n g s and t r a n s c r i p t s o f t e l e p h o n e c a l l s
Woodward made f r o m t h e
jail.
Woodward o b j e c t e d
the
to the
a d m i s s i o n of these e x h i b i t s a t
sentencing
before
the
hearing
trial
o n l y t h a t t h e e x h i b i t s were i r r e l e v a n t .
preserve
f o r review
t h e c l a i m he now
argument
for plain
error
only.
We
c o u r t , but
he
Therefore,
makes, and we
find
no
argued
he d i d n o t
review
error
or
plain
error.
Section
1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975,
provides:
"Before making the sentence d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,
the
trial
court
shall
order
and
receive a written
p r e - s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t . The r e p o r t s h a l l
c o n t a i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s c r i b e d by l a w o r c o u r t
r u l e f o r f e l o n y c a s e s g e n e r a l l y and any a d d i t i o n a l
i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i f i e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .
No p a r t
o f t h e r e p o r t s h a l l be k e p t c o n f i d e n t i a l , and t h e
p a r t i e s s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o r e s p o n d t o i t and t o
p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o u r t a b o u t any p a r t o f t h e
r e p o r t which i s the s u b j e c t of f a c t u a l d i s p u t e .
The
96
the
CR-08-0145
r e p o r t a n d any e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
i t s h a l l be made p a r t o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h e c a s e . "
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e l i m i t s t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t
can
be a d m i t t e d
a t a sentence before
the judge t o o n l y
that
evidence addressing
any p a r t o f t h e P S I t h a t i s t h e s u b j e c t o f
a factual dispute.
He f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( d ) , A l a .
Code 1975, s t a t i n g t h a t p r o b a t i v e ,
received
at
sentencing
any
the
sentencing
hearing before
r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e s h a l l be
hearing
the j u r y .
applies
only
Woodward does n o t c i t e t o
c o n t r o l l i n g precedent f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n .
reveals
only
authority that
to the
directly
Our
contradicts
research
Woodward's
argument.
First,
sentencing
the United
States
a u t h o r i t y must
Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d
consider
a l l evidence
that
offered
a
as
m i t i g a t i n g , t h a t i s , "any a s p e c t o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r o r
record
and any o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
of the offense
that the
d e f e n d a n t p r o f f e r s as a b a s i s f o r a s e n t e n c e l e s s t h a n d e a t h . "
Lockett
See
as
v. O h i o , 438 U.S.
586, 604
(1978)(footnote
a l s o E d d i n g s v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
t h e S t a t e may
n o t by s t a t u t e p r e c l u d e
c o n s i d e r i n g any m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r ,
refuse
to
104, 114
consider,
as
a
(1982)("Just
the sentencer
n e i t h e r may t h e
matter
97
omitted).
of
law,
any
from
sentencer
relevant
CR-08-0145
mitigating
evidence.").
sentencing
authority,
In Alabama the
and
the
jury's
recommendation t h a t i s not b i n d i n g
(a),
( e ) , A l a . Code 1975;
826-27 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) .
Ex
advisory
on
parte
trial
the
is
verdict
judge.
Carroll,
I f , as Woodward now
judge
the
is
a
§ 13A-5-47
852
So.
2d
821,
a r g u e s , § 13A-5-47(d)
excludes a l l relevant evidence except that evidence concerning
a
factual dispute
argument
is
defendant
hearing
that
could
before
concerned
a
in
no
be
a
the
PSI,
a
logical
extension
additional mitigation
admitted
trial
factual
into
judge
dispute
evidence
unless
in
proffered
at
that
the
of
a
by
too,
Woodward's
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u t e c o u l d r e s u l t i n the e x c l u s i o n
relevant
proffered
mitigation
and
a
sentencing
evidence,
PSI.
that
of
create
reversible
error
b e c a u s e i t m i g h t deny a s e n t e n c e r r e l e v a n t
information
about
a defendant's c h a r a c t e r or background, i n v i o l a t i o n of
and
i t s progeny.
Lockett
1 0
We
a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t i n B o y d v. S t a t e , 746 So. 2d 364,
398 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n d i c t a t h a t §
13A-5-47,
Ala.
Code
1975,
does
not
provide
for
the
p r e s e n t a t i o n of m i t i g a t i o n evidence at a s e n t e n c i n g
hearing
before
the t r i a l
court.
" B e c a u s e o b i t e r d i c t u m i s , by
d e f i n i t i o n , not e s s e n t i a l to the judgment of the c o u r t which
s t a t e s the d i c t u m , i t i s not the law of the case e s t a b l i s h e d
by t h a t j u d g m e n t .
G r a y v. R e y n o l d s , 553 So. 2d 79, 81 ( A l a .
1 9 8 9 ) . " Ex p a r t e W i l l i a m s , 838 So. 2d 1028, 1031 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) .
10
98
CR-08-0145
Second,
Woodward's
inconsistent
Alabama.
trial
with
Both
judge
the
interpretation
current practice
parties
in a
of
a t the
capital
the
in capital
852
So.
2d 833
CR-08-1954, Nov.
2010);
So.
3d
5,
case
routinely
present
( A l a . C r i m . App.
[Ms. CR-05-1297, May
2007) ( o p i n i o n on
[Ms.
3d
McGahee v.
15,
So.
So. 3d
2011]
So.
2d 1065,
S t a t e , 885
So.
1071
2d
191
the
sentencing
"Trial
penalty-phase
App.
( A l a . Crim.
on
other
3d
App.
grounds,
( A l a . 2011);
( A l a . Crim.
rendered
2005) .
App.
2003),
ineffective
f a i l e d to present a d d i t i o n a l testimony
hearing
counsel
[Ms.
State,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
when r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m t h a t c o u n s e l had
a s s i s t a n c e when he
parte
27, 2010]
2 0 1 0 ) ; W a s h i n g t o n v.
30, 2008]
1071607, A p r i l
Ex
(Ala. Crim.
r e t u r n t o remand), r e v ' d
S c o t t v. S t a t e , 937
In
So.
could
before
have
hearing before
the
trial
called
more
the
trial
judge,
we
witnesses
judge,
at
stated:
at
the
w i t h the
hope
t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n w o u l d have c o n v i n c e d t h e
j u d g e t o a g r e e w i t h t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and t o
99
in
the
( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ; M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e ,
2010]
is
additional
E.g.,
M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug.
,
cases
sentencing hearing before
t e s t i m o n y not n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d to the PSI.
Carroll,
statute
trial
sentence
CR-08-0145
McGahee t o l i f e
imprisonment without p a r o l e . "
221
(footnote omitted).
for
t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t has
may
judge.
a t the
aggravating
before
trial
PSI
in
--
(Ala.
F.3d
returned
trial
1043,
i t s advisory
judge orders
report,
hears
evidence
2d
70
argument
broad
at
--
that
admission
the
the
of
1997),
the
the
sentencing
capital-
a l l
evidence
hearing
i n a sentence hearing
held
while
before
t o § 13A-5-47, A l a . Code 1975,
concerning
i n Alabama.
( A l a . Crim.
and
further
concerning
factual
disputes
i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o v e r a l l t h e o r y of
So.
1050
t o § 13A-5-45, A l a . Code 1975,
to that evidence
c a p i t a l cases
695
the
only
court held pursuant
limited
has
306
factors.").
allows
a j u r y pursuant
of
jury
investigation
Woodward's
sentence
admission
Haley,
receive a d d i t i o n a l evidence
statute
to
v.
phase,
and m i t i g a t i n g
Finally,
relevant
the
sentencing
a r g u m e n t s , and may
the
Brownlee
a presentence
sentencing
Appeals
sentencing
e.g.,
also recognized
of
at
additional
C i r . 2002)("After
receives
States Court
2d
that
See,
verdict
United
So.
be a d m i t t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e
evidence
(11th
The
885
1995), a f f ' d ,
a p p e l l a n t argued
100
that
the
695
trial
is
the
sentencing
F o r e x a m p l e , i n B u s h v.
App.
in
the
So.
State,
2d
138
court
had
CR-08-0145
c o n s i d e r e d i m p r o p e r i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t when
i t overrode the j u r y ' s s e n t e n c i n g
determined
that
the
trial
recommendation.
court
had
properly
i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and
This
Court
considered
stated:
"We
are c o n v i n c e d a f t e r r e v i e w i n g the r e c o r d
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s use o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t
in
determining
the
appellant's
sentence
was
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h § 13A-5-45(d), which s t a t e s :
"'Any
e v i d e n c e w h i c h has
probative
v a l u e and i s r e l e v a n t t o s e n t e n c e s h a l l be
r e c e i v e d a t the sentence h e a r i n g r e g a r d l e s s
of i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y under the e x c l u s i o n a r y
rules
of
evidence,
provided
that
the
defendant i s accorded a f a i r opportunity to
rebut
any
hearsay
statements.
This
subsection
shall
not
be
construed
to
a u t h o r i z e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any e v i d e n c e
secured i n v i o l a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of
the
United
States
or
the
State
of
Alabama.'"
B u s h v. S t a t e , 695
So.
2d 199,
So.
2d a t 92.
See
218-19 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
a l s o Hyde v. S t a t e ,
1998)
5-45(d) and § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975,
(quoting both §
778
13A-
when d i s c u s s i n g t h e
evidence used a t a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e the t r i a l c o u r t ) ,
aff'd,
778
So.
Therefore,
2d 237
( A l a . 2000).
c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's a r g u m e n t on
13A-5-47(b) does n o t
exclude
from admission
101
appeal,
a l l evidence
§
at
CR-08-0145
the
sentencing
hearing
before
the
trial
evidence t h a t concerns a f a c t u a l dispute
judge
i n the
except
for
PSI.
F i n d i n g no g e n e r a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e v i d e n c e u n r e l a t e d
t o a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e i n t h e P S I , we
as t o h i s n e w l y r a i s e d c l a i m on
We
and
hold,
i n the
t r a n s c r i p t s of
r e j e c t Woodward's argument
appeal.
a l t e r n a t i v e , that
telephone
calls
the
audio
recordings
Woodward made
from
Montgomery j a i l were r e l e v a n t t o i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d
PSI t h a t was
--
r e l a t e d to the p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i n g
Woodward's u p b r i n g i n g
relationship
l o v e d him.
with
The
his
own
in a dysfunctional
c h i l d r e n , whom he
the
i n the
circumstances
family
and
his
loved
and
who
t e l e p h o n e c a l l s i n c l u d e d i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t went
to the sources of h i s f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to h i s c h i l d r e n
and
t h e i r m o t h e r s , and
the c a l l s i n c l u d e d i n f o r m a t i o n
calling
i n t o q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Woodward's f a t h e r had b e e n as a b u s i v e
Woodward as Woodward had p o r t r a y e d .
admitted
The
e v i d e n c e was
e v e n u n d e r Woodward's c o n s t r i c t e d v i e w o f
to
properly
§
13A-5-
47(b).
B e c a u s e we
not
f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r , we
e n t i t l e d t o any
r e l i e f on
this
XI.
102
h o l d t h a t Woodward i s
claim.
CR-08-0145
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o m m i t t e d
e r r o r when, a t t h e f i n a l
then
considered
the
s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , i t a d m i t t e d and
report
of
the
court-ordered
e v a l u a t i o n o f Woodward c o n d u c t e d b e f o r e
During p r e t r i a l
his
plain
proceedings
mental
trial.
Woodward
filed
a notice of
i n t e n t t o pursue a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y by reason o f mental
disease
or defect,
and t h e t r i a l
c o u r t o r d e r e d Woodward t o
undergo a m e n t a l - h e a l t h e v a l u a t i o n .
t h e e v a l u a t i o n and d e t e r m i n e d
Dr. G l e n K i n g
conducted
t h a t Woodward was c o m p e t e n t t o
s t a n d t r i a l a n d t h a t , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e , Woodward was
not
suffering
from
a serious
mental
illness
or defect
that
r e n d e r e d him i n c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e n a t u r e and q u a l i t y
or
wrongfulness
of h i s actions.
Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e
an
i n s a n i t y defense a t t r i a l .
At
the sentencing hearing before
State
offered
Dr. K i n g ' s
court
admitted
report into
judge
evidence.
trial
Woodward.
should
n o t have
a d m i t t e d t h e r e p o r t i n t o e v i d e n c e b e c a u s e he n e v e r
presented
now
argues
that
objection
The
the
from
Woodward
the r e p o r t without
the t r i a l
the t r i a l
court
any e v i d e n c e a b o u t h i s m e n t a l
c o n d i t i o n a n d t h e S t a t e h a d no
basis
the
f o r the
admission
of
103
report.
He
cites
Rule
CR-08-0145
11.2(b)(2),
Woodward
A l a . R. C r i m .
also
consideration
privilege
Smith,
that
argues
that
P., i n s u p p o r t
the t r i a l
451 U.S. 454
Dr. K i n g
c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n and
of the report v i o l a t e d
against self-incrimination,
(1981).
o f h i s argument.
his Fifth
Amendment
a n d he c i t e s E s t e l l e v.
Specifically,
d i d not i n f o r m him t h a t
Woodward
the r e s u l t s
e v a l u a t i o n c o u l d be u s e d a g a i n s t h i m a t s e n t e n c i n g .
claims
of the
Woodward
a l s o argues t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n o f Dr. K i n g ' s r e p o r t p r e j u d i c e d
h i m b e c a u s e , he s a y s , t h e t r i a l
c o u r t r e l i e d on t h e r e p o r t i n
sentencing him t o death.
R u l e 1 1 . 2 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., g o v e r n s t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y
of
testimony about
mental examination.
statements
made b y a d e f e n d a n t
during a
Rule 11.2(b)(2), p r o v i d e s :
"(2) The r e s u l t s o f m e n t a l e x a m i n a t i o n s made
pursuant
to subsection
(a)(2)
of
this
rule
[providing f o r examination of the defendant's mental
c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f t h e o f f e n s e ] and t h e
results
of similar
examinations
regarding the
defendant's mental c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f the
o f f e n s e c o n d u c t e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 11.4 s h a l l be
admissible
i n evidence
on t h e i s s u e
of the
defendant's mental c o n d i t i o n a t the time o f the
o f f e n s e o n l y i f t h e defendant has n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y
withdrawn h i s o r h e r p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y by reason o f
mental disease or defect.
Whether t h e e x a m i n a t i o n
is
conducted
with
or without
the defendant's
c o n s e n t , no s t a t e m e n t made b y t h e d e f e n d a n t d u r i n g
t h e c o u r s e o f a n y e x a m i n a t i o n , no t e s t i m o n y b y an
e x a m i n i n g p s y c h i a t r i s t o r p s y c h o l o g i s t b a s e d upon
104
CR-08-0145
such a statement,
d e r i v e d from the
admitted
against
proceeding, except
c o n d i t i o n on w h i c h
Woodward d i d n o t
language
of
occurred
i n the
report.
See
Although
admitted
the
Rule
and no o t h e r e v i d e n c e
directly
defendant's
statement
shall
be
t h e d e f e n d a n t i n any
criminal
on an i s s u e r e s p e c t i n g m e n t a l
t h e d e f e n d a n t has t e s t i f i e d . "
testify
at t r i a l .
11.2(b) ( 2 ) , we
admission
o f Dr.
must
King's
forensic
rose
to
the
level
of
that
plain
error
forensic evaluation
3d 43
evaluation should
a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , we
error
conclude
Ex p a r t e B r o w n f i e l d , 44 So.
the
A p p l y i n g the
( A l a . 2009).
not
have
been
must c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r
plain
error.
Woodward's
f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t w e i g h s h e a v i l y a g a i n s t him i n o u r r e v i e w f o r
plain
App.
error.
Roberts
v.
S t a t e , 735
So.
2d
1244
( A l a . Crim.
1997).
"The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m
under the p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e i s s t r i c t e r than the
standard
used
i n reviewing
an
issue that
was
p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l .
As
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n U n i t e d
S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r
d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s o n l y i f the e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y
egregious'
and
i f i t 'seriously
affect[s]
the
f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n of j u d i c i a l
proceedings.'
See Ex p a r t e P r i c e , 725 So.2d 1063
( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ; B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , 723 So.2d 742 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 723 So.2d 770 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ;
J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 620 So.2d 679, 701
( A l a . Crim.
App. 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 620 So.2d 709
( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , on remand, 620 So.2d 714 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 9 3 ) . "
105
CR-08-0145
H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 113, 121-22 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ,
aff'd,
820 So. 2d 152 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) .
Woodward
King's
e s t a b l i s h that
r e p o r t was p l a i n e r r o r .
assertion
that
cannot
on a p p e a l ,
the t r i a l
sentencing
First,
the sentencing
court
relied
determination,
the admission
of Dr.
c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's
order
does n o t d i s c l o s e
on D r . K i n g ' s
and t h e s e n t e n c i n g
report
order
in
i t s
does n o t
r e f e r t o t h e r e p o r t o r t o any e v i d e n c e d e r i v e d f r o m s t a t e m e n t s
Woodward made t o D r . K i n g d u r i n g h i s e v a l u a t i o n o f Woodward.
Therefore,
any e r r o r
r e l i a n c e on D r . K i n g ' s
record.
i n the t r i a l
court's
improper
r e p o r t was n o t p l a i n on t h e f a c e o f t h e
Second, a l t h o u g h
the State twice mentioned Dr. King's
r e p o r t i n i t s argument t o t h e t r i a l
hearing,
alleged
once s t a t i n g t h a t D r . K i n g ' s
court
at the
sentencing
r e p o r t p r o v e d Woodward
was a d r u g d e a l e r a n d once s t a t i n g t h a t Woodward t o l d D r . K i n g
t h a t he s t o p p e d a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l b e c a u s e he c h o s e t h e s t r e e t s
o v e r s c h o o l , e v i d e n c e o f Woodward's d r u g d e a l i n g a n d c h o i c e o f
a life
other
on t h e s t r e e t s i n s t e a d o f i n s c h o o l was o b v i o u s
evidence
presentence
presented
report
w h i l e he was i n j a i l
at the t r i a l
and t h e t e l e p h o n e
-- p a r t i c u l a r l y
calls
Woodward
-- a n d n o t o n l y f r o m D r . K i n g ' s
106
from
the
placed
report.
CR-08-0145
Therefore,
t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y
egregious
and
integrity,
or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n of the j u d i c i a l
i t d i d not
seriously
affect
the f a i r n e s s ,
proceedings.
T h e r e was no p l a i n e r r o r as t o t h i s i s s u e , a n d Woodward i s n o t
e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f
on t h i s
claim.
XII.
Woodward
overrode
argues
that
the
the j u r y ' s advisory
d e a t h b e c a u s e , he s a y s ,
trial
sentence
the t r i a l
court
erred
when i t
and s e n t e n c e d h i m t o
c o u r t d i d n o t have a p r o p e r
basis to override the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t .
Specifically,
Woodward
argues t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e t h e j u r y d i d n o t hear and t h a t t h e
trial
court
undermine
relied
a
on
i n sentencing
mitigating
circumstance
Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e t r i a l
or
the court's
error only.
f i n d i n g s , s o we
him t o death
he
had
d i d not
proffered.
court's sentencing
review
this
issue
order
for plain
See R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P.
S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975, commonly r e f e r r e d t o
as A l a b a m a ' s j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e
statute, states:
" I n d e c i d i n g upon t h e s e n t e n c e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
shall
determine
whether
the
aggravating
circumstances
i t finds
to exist
outweigh the
m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t f i n d s t o e x i s t , and i n
doing
so t h e t r i a l
court
shall
consider
the
recommendation o f t h e j u r y c o n t a i n e d i n i t s a d v i s o r y
107
CR-08-0145
unless
pursuant
to
13A-5-46(g).
While
the
jury's
recommendation
c o n c e r n i n g s e n t e n c e s h a l l be g i v e n c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i t
i s n o t b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t . "
In
Ex
parte
Carroll,
852
So.
2d
833
(Ala.
2002),
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n due
the
a jury's
a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t i n d e c i d i n g the proper sentence, pursuant to
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code
1975:
"We t a k e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u r t h e r e x p l a i n t h e
effect
of
a
jury's
recommendation
of
life
imprisonment without
the p o s s i b i l i t y of
parole.
Such a
recommendation
i s t o be
t r e a t e d as
a
m i t i g a t i n g circumstance.
The w e i g h t t o be
given
t h a t m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s h o u l d d e p e n d upon t h e
number o f j u r o r s recommending a s e n t e n c e o f
life
imprisonment without
parole,
and
a l s o upon
the
strength
of
the
factual
basis
for
such
a
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f i n f o r m a t i o n known t o
852
So.
In
judicial
2d a t 836
order
override
extensively
order.
to
The
from
trial
(footnote
omitted).
address
Woodward's
of
jury's
the
court
the
circuit
claim
recommendation,
court's
thorough
stated, in relevant
108
regarding
part:
we
the
quote
sentencing
CR-08-0145
"Mitigating Factors
"The D e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g
t h e s t a t u t o r y f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-51,
and t h e C o u r t h e a r d no e v i d e n c e t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o
i n d i c a t e t h a t any o f t h e s t a t u t o r y f a c t o r s
are
applicable.
S p e c i f i c a l l y t h i s Court finds
the
following statutory mitigating
f a c t o r s were n o t
p r o v e n : 1. There was no e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t has
no s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y o f p r i o r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y :
i n f a c t he has c o n v i c t i o n s f o r M a n s l a u g h t e r
and
[Possession of M a r i j u a n a , F i r s t Degree].
2. There
was no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d w h i l e
t h e D e f e n d a n t was u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f e x t r e m e
m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e . 3. The V i c t i m was
not a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the Defendant's
conduct or
c o n s e n t e d t o i t ; O f f i c e r H o u t s was s i m p l y d o i n g h i s
job.
4. The D e f e n d a n t was n o t an a c c o m p l i c e i n t h e
c a p i t a l o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d by a n o t h e r p e r s o n and h i s
p a r t i c i p a t i o n was n o t r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r ; he a c t e d
alone.
5. The D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a c t u n d e r e x t r e m e
duress
or under the
substantial
domination
of
a n o t h e r p e r s o n . 6. The c a p a c i t y o f t h e D e f e n d a n t t o
a p p r e c i a t e the c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct or to
c o n f o r m h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l a w was
not
substantially
i m p a i r e d ; he
has
vehemently
maintained
that
he
has
never
suffered
mental
i n f i r m i t i e s and a m e n t a l e v a l u a t i o n s u p p o r t e d h i s
c o n t e n t i o n . 7. The age o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e
o f t h e c r i m e was n e a r l y t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s o f age.
" P u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 13A-5-52, D e f e n d a n t d i d
offer
evidence
o f two
non-statutory mitigating
f a c t o r s : h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n and h i s
dysfunctional family.
"Defendant
has f i v e c h i l d r e n by f o u r women.
T h r e e o f t h e c h i l d r e n and one o f t h e i r m o t h e r s
t e s t i f i e d a t t h e h e a r i n g . The g i s t o f t h e t e s t i m o n y
was t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t was a good f a t h e r , v i s i t e d
w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n , p u r c h a s e d c l o t h e s f o r them, and
109
CR-08-0145
t o o k them p l a c e s .
He a l s o e n c o u r a g e d them
w e l l i n s c h o o l and s t a y o u t o f t r o u b l e .
t o do
T h e r e was t e s t i m o n y a b o u t D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d h o o d .
His
f a t h e r was i n t h e A i r F o r c e u n t i l he was
d i s c h a r g e d f o r d e a l i n g d r u g s . The f a m i l y s e t t l e d i n
Montgomery.
Defendant's mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e
p a r e n t ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p was s t o r m y -- s e v e r a l t i m e s
she moved h e r c h i l d r e n w i t h h e r t o D e t r o i t , c i t i n g
physical
and emotional
abuse
t o h e r and h e r
children.
Defendant's f a t h e r supported the f a m i l y
by s e l l i n g d r u g s u n t i l he s e r v e d f i v e y e a r s i n
federal prison f o r s e l l i n g marijuana.
The p a r e n t s
d i v o r c e d soon a f t e r t h e f a t h e r was r e l e a s e d f r o m
p r i s o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t when
D e f e n d a n t was a b o u t f o u r t e e n y e a r s o l d , D e f e n d a n t
was b a n i s h e d f r o m t h e home b y h i s f a t h e r f o r a vague
i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g t h e f a m i l y dog.
Incredibly,
D e f e n d a n t was n o t a l l o w e d t o r e t u r n home e v e n when
t h e f a t h e r was s e n t t o p r i s o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s a c a d e m i c
career had already t e r m i n a t e d d e s p i t e the f a c t the
D e f e n d a n t e a r n e d A's a n d B's e a r l y i n h i s a c a d e m i c
career.
"The
third
mitigating
factor
recommendation o f t h e j u r y f o r l i f e
without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole
l3A-5-47(e)].
i s t h e 8-4
imprisonment
[see S e c t i o n
"This Court considered a l l the evidence o f f e r e d
i n s u p p o r t o f these t h r e e m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s and
finds their existence.
"Weighing t h e F a c t o r s
"Section
13A-5-47 mandates t h a t
this
Court
u n d e r t a k e an i n d e p e n d e n t w e i g h i n g o f t h e a g g r a v a t i n g
and
mitigating
factors
in
determining
the
appropriate
sentence.
Turning
first
to the
m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , t h e C o u r t i s underwhelmed by
Defendant's f a m i l y s i t u a t i o n .
Defendant's very
young c h i l d r e n l i k e h i m ; he b o u g h t them c l o t h e s ,
110
CR-08-0145
t o o k them p l a c e s , a n d was a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e on
them. What young c h i l d does n o t a d o r e a p a r e n t ? As
f o r b e i n g a p r o v i d e r , D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d t o do a
b a r e minimum f o r h i s b r o o d .
He d i d n o t p r o v i d e a
home f o r any o f them o r t h e i r m o t h e r s .
He l i v e d i n
an a p a r t m e n t w i t h y e t a n o t h e r woman.
When h i s
c h i l d r e n v i s i t e d , t h e y met a t D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r ' s
house.
B u y i n g c l o t h e s f o r h i s c h i l d r e n on o c c a s i o n
i s hardly being a responsible parent.
He d i d n o t
pay c h i l d
support; the weight of the evidence
i n d i c a t e s t h a t he l a c k e d a l e g i t i m a t e o c c u p a t i o n
t h a t w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e means t o s u p p o r t f a m i l i e s .
"Counsel f o r Defendant suggested t h a t Defendant
was a good f a t h e r b e c a u s e he t o l d h i s c h i l d r e n t o
s t a y i n s c h o o l a n d make good g r a d e s . I f a c t i o n s do,
i n d e e d , s p e a k l o u d e r t h a n w o r d s , t h e n D e f e n d a n t made
a v e r y poor p a r e n t i n g r o l e model.
D e f e n d a n t was
convicted
of possession
of nearly
a pound
of
marihuana.
H i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y r e v e a l s numerous
weapons c h a r g e s as a j u v e n i l e , a n d h i s t i m e i n
p r i s o n was r i f e
with
infractions
ranging
from
narcotics to assault.
" L i k e w i s e , Defendant's evidence of problems i n
h i s own c h i l d h o o d does n o t w i t h s t a n d c l o s e s c r u t i n y .
H i s m o t h e r a n d s i s t e r p o r t r a y e d D e f e n d a n t ' s y o u t h as
r e p l e t e w i t h b e a t i n g s a n d v e r b a l abuse f r o m h i s
father.
The d e f e n s e c o n t e n d e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s
f a t h e r ' s abuse r u i n e d h i s a c a d e m i c c a r e e r a n d t h a t
the f a t h e r e v e n t u a l l y e x p e l l e d Defendant from t h e
house.
"On t h e o t h e r hand, no d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f t h e
abuse was i n t r o d u c e d . H i s t r u n c a t e d a c a d e m i c c a r e e r
may w e l l have been t h e r e s u l t o f h i s b r i n g i n g
weapons t o s c h o o l , n o t t h e r e s u l t o f f a m i l y i s s u e s .
D u r i n g an e s t r a n g e m e n t i n t h e m a r r i a g e . D e f e n d a n t ' s
mother s e n t h e r c h i l d r e n back t o Alabama t o l i v e
w i t h t h e i r f a t h e r f o r t h e summer.
What k i n d o f
mother sends h e r c h i l d r e n t o l i v e a l o n e , u n p r o t e c t e d
w i t h an a b u s i v e man?
In a d d i t i o n , i ts t r a i n s l o g i c
111
CR-08-0145
to accept the s t o r y t h a t Defendant's f a t h e r e v i c t e d
him.
Even a f t e r t h e f a t h e r went o f f t o p r i s o n f o r
f i v e y e a r s , Defendant's mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s
i n f l u e n c e was so s t r o n g t h a t D e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t
r e t u r n home. Y e t , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e
t h i s Court, the p r o s e c u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t h a t
D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r r e p o r t e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t had r u n
away f r o m home two y e a r s a f t e r t h e f a t h e r a l l e g e d l y
e v i c t e d him.
"Finally,
in
recordings
of
telephone
c o n v e r s a t i o n s f r o m j a i l b e t w e e n D e f e n d a n t and h i s
f a t h e r , a p i c t u r e emerged o f a c o n c e r n e d p a r e n t
who
rued h i s son's r e j e c t i o n of h i s a d v i c e to t r a v e l a
d i f f e r e n t road.
The C o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e s e
conversations
occurred
long
after
the
alleged
eviction
and
that
father
and
son
could
have
r e c o n c i l e d i n t h e i n t e r i m , b u t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s do
n o t mesh w i t h t h e p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by t h e d e f e n s e a t
t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . W h i l e D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d h o o d was
n o t t h e s t u f f o f f a i r y t a l e s , h i s y o u t h a p p e a r s more
i d y l l i c t h a n t h o s e o f o t h e r s he c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y .
One f r i e n d e v e n d e s c r i b e d him as ' s p o i l e d , ' n o t i n g
t h a t he l i v e d i n a n i c e house w i t h a swimming p o o l .
The C o u r t a l s o n o t e s t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s s i b l i n g s have
managed t o l e a d p r o d u c t i v e l i v e s .
"Even v i e w e d i n t h e k i n d e s t p o s s i b l e l i g h t , t h e
m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by D e f e n d a n t i s n o t v e r y
persuasive.
However, when e x p o s e d t o t h e g l a r e o f
all
the evidence,
these
m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s are
s u b s t a n t i a l l y diminished.
"The t h i r d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r i s t h e one w h i c h
gives
this
Court
the
most p a u s e :
the
jury's
recommendation of l i f e w i t h o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y of
p a r o l e by
8-4
vote.
The
C o u r t was
genuinely
impressed w i t h the j u r y .
F o l l o w i n g the e x t e n s i v e
v o i r d i r e , t h e C o u r t was c o n v i n c e d , and s t i l l i s ,
t h a t t h e s e j u r o r s were i n t e l l i g e n t ,
conscientious
citizens.
112
CR-08-0145
"However, t h i s C o u r t has a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n
which the j u r y d i d not hear, r e b u t t i n g the evidence
a b o u t t h e f i r s t two m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s .
Defendant
has an e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l r e c o r d i n v o l v i n g f i r e a r m s
and t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a l a r g e q u a n t i t y o f m a r i h u a n a .
He a c c u m u l a t e d an i m p r e s s i v e l i s t o f d i s c i p l i n a r y
c i t a t i o n s while incarcerated.
I t i s unlikely that
t h e j u r y w o u l d have c o n s i d e r e d D e f e n d a n t t o be a
v i a b l e c a n d i d a t e as a r o l e m o d e l f o r h i s c h i l d r e n i f
t h e j u r o r s had h e a r d t h i s t e s t i m o n y .
" M o r e o v e r , t h e j u r y was
t o l d by D e f e n d a n t ' s
w i t n e s s e s d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase t h a t Defendant
was
a p r o v i d e r f o r h i s c h i l d r e n and t h e v a r i o u s
mothers. Witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t Defendant worked
f o r a r e a l t y company, i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y ,
and f o r h i s f a t h e r . The e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t c a s t s a s t r o n g d o u b t on
t h e p o r t r a y a l o f D e f e n d a n t as a r e s p o n s i b l e f a t h e r
w o r k i n g t o p r o v i d e f o r h i s c h i l d r e n . D e f e n d a n t has
n e v e r p a i d t a x e s o r f i l e d a t a x r e t u r n . T h e r e i s no
r e c o r d w i t h the S t a t e of h i s h a v i n g ever h e l d a
l e g i t i m a t e job.
How t h e n does he p r o v i d e f o r h i s
children?
After his
release
from p r i s o n
for
M a n s l a u g h t e r , he was c o n v i c t e d o f p o s s e s s i n g a l m o s t
a pound of m a r i j u a n a .
His recorded
conversations
from j a i l p l a y e d at the s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e f o r e
t h i s C o u r t l e n d c r e d e n c e t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t he was
s t i l l i n v o l v e d i n the n a r c o t i c s t r a d e .
" F i n a l l y , when t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d w i t h a v e r d i c t
of g u i l t y , the Court observed t h a t s e v e r a l of the
j u r o r s were v i s i b l y d i s t r a u g h t . S i n c e t h e e v i d e n c e
o f D e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t was
overwhelming, the Court
s u r m i s e s t h a t a t l e a s t some o f t h e j u r o r s were
d a u n t e d by t h e t a s k w h i c h t h e y knew t h e y w o u l d f a c e
upon
a
finding
of
guilt.
Then,
during
the
s e n t e n c i n g phase, the j u r y heard from Defendant's
children.
Unquestionably,
w i s e l y , and
apparently
e f f e c t i v e l y , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was p l a y i n g , i n p a r t ,
to the sympathies of the j u r o r s .
In a r g u i n g f o r a
recommendation of l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , counsel f o r
113
CR-08-0145
D e f e n d a n t a s k e d t h e j u r y w h e t h e r t h e y w o u l d be a b l e
to l o o k i n t o t h e eyes o f Defendant's c h i l d r e n a f t e r
t h e i r d e c i s i o n . I t was a p o w e r f u l , e m o t i o n a l a p p e a l
to
c i t i z e n s who were f a c e d w i t h a most awesome
decision."
(C. 1 0 0 0 - 0 3 . ) ( E m p h a s i s added.)
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n
Woodward
was
a poor
parenting
role
undermine t h e m i t i g a t i n g circumstance
family
and
that
circumstance,
h i s family
Woodward s a y s ,
loved
model
that
d i d not properly
t h a t Woodward l o v e d h i s
him.
That
was u n d i s p u t e d .
mitigating
Woodward
also
argues t h a t the t r i a l court's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t the telephone
conversations
jail
he h a d w i t h
d i d not
undermine
h i s father while
the m i t i g a t i n g
Woodward h a d h a d a d i f f i c u l t
upbringing.
Woodward was i n
circumstance
This
that
newly r a i s e d
c l a i m o f e r r o r i s b a s e d on an u n r e a s o n a b l e p a r s i n g o f p o r t i o n s
of
the sentencing
order
that
as a w h o l e .
the t r i a l
order
a n d n o t on a c o n s i d e r a t i o n
I t i s significant
court's
override
t o note a t the o u t s e t
of the j u r y ' s
v e r d i c t was
b a s e d on f a r more t h a n t h e two s t a t e m e n t s on w h i c h
now
focuses
hear.
t h a t were r e l a t e d t o e v i d e n c e
A f t e r reviewing the t r i a l
we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l
Woodward
the j u r y d i d not
court's very thorough
court meticulously
114
of the
complied
order,
with
CR-08-0145
Alabama law r e g a r d i n g o v e r r i d e o f a j u r y ' s recommendation and
t h a t i t s s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n had a proper b a s i s .
trial
In fact, the
court at the j u d i c i a l sentencing hearing stated that i t
was aware o f a n d h a d r e a d Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l .
(R. 1740-41.)
The t r i a l c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t as
a
mitigating
circumstance
recommendation
great weight.
that
the jury
and
i t
gave
the
The c o u r t m e n t i o n e d
d i d not hear,
jury's
evidence
and i t e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l
how
t h a t evidence undermined t h e m i t i g a t i n g evidence p r o f f e r e d by
Woodward -- e v i d e n c e t h e t r i a l
afforded
little
weight.
argument
to the t r i a l
understanding that
c o u r t had a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d i t
Woodward, h i m s e l f , i n h i s c l o s i n g
court at the hearing, expressed h i s
the a d d i t i o n a l
evidence might
c o u r t ' s s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d he e n c o u r a g e d
n o t t o g i v e t h a t e v i d e n c e any w e i g h t .
1 1
Woodward
impact the
the court
stated:
"The
j u r y vote
for life
[is] entitled to
d e f e r e n c e , b u t we do a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t s u c h a v o t e
may be u n d e r m i n e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f e v i d e n c e t o
w h i c h t h e j u r y was n o t e x p o s e d .
You've h e a r d
a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e h e r e t o d a y t h a t we d o n ' t d i s p u t e
the j u r y d i d n ' t hear.
However, a g a i n , Judge, t h i s
e v i d e n c e does n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l t o a g g r a v a t e
"The w e i g h t t o be a t t a c h e d t o t h e a g g r a v a t i n g a n d t h e
m i t i g a t i n g evidence i s s t r i c t l y w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the
sentencing authority."
S m i t h v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 273, 298
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) .
11
115
CR-08-0145
t h i s o f f e n s e o r t o i g n o r e t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and
up w i t h a j u r y o v e r r i d e .
come
"
"
"No e v i d e n c e was w i t h h e l d f r o m t h e j u r y t h a t
w o u l d a c t u a l l y s e r v e as a b a s i s f o r o v e r r i d i n g .
J u d g e , I w o u l d s u b m i t t o you, t h e j u r y c o u l d have
h e a r d a l l o f t h i s , w h e t h e r o r n o t he was on a c h i l d
s u p p o r t o r d e r , w h e t h e r o r n o t he was a good f a t h e r
o r w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e ' s t a x r e c o r d s somewhere i n
t h e s t a t e s i n c e t h e p a s t number o f y e a r s .
I don't
t h i n k t h a t w o u l d have c h a n g e d t h e j u r y ' s m i n d .
Those
aren't
aggravating
factors,
regardless.
T h e y ' r e f a c t o r s -- T h e y ' r e e x p l a n a t i o n s a b o u t t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s l i f e h i s t o r y and t h e way he was g r o w i n g
up and t h e way
he's b e e n as a f a t h e r o r as
an
e m p l o y e e . And t h e y ' r e j u s t t h i n g s t h a t -- We a d m i t ,
J u d g e , he's
not
a p e r f e c t f a t h e r or the
most
tax-paying, productive
citizen.
But those a r e n ' t
r e a s o n s when someone's a l r e a d y
going to get l i f e
w i t h o u t p a r o l e t o p u t them on d e a t h
row."
(R. 1783-84.)
(Emphasis added.)
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r c l e a r l y e x p l a i n s how
jury
did
not
hear
diminished
a r g u m e n t s Woodward o f f e r e d .
that
the
trial
even p r i m a r i l y
court's
--
on
The
the
evidence
m i t i g a t i n g evidence
an
adequate
o v e r r i d e was
that evidence.
basis
for
116
and
order also c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s
not
As
based
solely
--
or
demonstrated i n
the
above-quoted p o r t i o n s of the s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r , the t r i a l
provided
the
i t s override
of
the
court
jury's
CR-08-0145
advisory
verdict.
r e l i e f on t h i s
Therefore,
Woodward
i s not e n t i t l e d
to
claim of error.
XIII.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
permitted
court
e r r e d when i t
L o r i Holsomback, t h e v i c t i m ' s s i s t e r , t o t e s t i f y i n
r e b u t t a l a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e i n a manner Woodward s a y s
exceeded
the
Specifically,
overruled
daughter
limitations
he a r g u e s
that
h i s objections
"thought Jesus
on
victim-impact
the t r i a l
court
testimony.
erred
t o Holsomback's t e s t i m o n y
could
that
when i t
that her
d e l i v e r Christmas presents
to
O f f i c e r H o u t s i n h e a v e n " b e c a u s e , he s a y s ,
the testimony d i d
not
victim's
address
any
(Woodward's b r i e f ,
specific
a t p.
loss
106.)
to
the
He
argues,
too, that
e v i d e n c e f a i l e d t o r e b u t any e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d
and
that the testimony
Holsomback
was u n d u l y
testified
in
family.
the
by t h e defense
prejudicial.
rebuttal
at
the
sentencing
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e j u r y about t h e impact O f f i c e r Houts's death
had
on h e r two o l d e r
uncle.
c h i l d r e n , who h a d b e e n c l o s e
She s t a t e d t h a t
a few weeks b e f o r e
to their
Christmas i n the
y e a r O f f i c e r H o u t s was k i l l e d h e r d a u g h t e r s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e y
buy
her uncle
a Christmas present
117
and p u t i t o u t s i d e
so t h a t
CR-08-0145
Jesus
might
take
i t to
Officer
Houts.
In
response
to
Woodward's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s t e s t i m o n y t h e p r o s e c u t o r s t a t e d :
"They o f f e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a p h o t o g r a p h o f t h e
defendant w i t h c h i l d r e n opening Christmas p r e s e n t s .
They've i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e o f what C h r i s t m a s was
l i k e w i t h o u t him b e i n g t h e r e .
T h a t ' s a l l we're
t r y i n g t o do t h r o u g h t h e one w i t n e s s . And i t does
d i r e c t l y i m p a c t h e r d a u g h t e r and h e r s e l f . "
(R. 1622.)
The
trial
Holsomback f u r t h e r
daughter
court
overruled
Woodward's
testified
that
she
t h a t they c o u l d not
send
Officer
p r e s e n t , and t h a t he was
t h a t h e r d a u g h t e r was
had
not coming back.
objection.
to explain
Houts a
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i t was
forever."
stated
"couldn't
(R. 1623.)
T h i s C o u r t has u p h e l d t h e a d m i s s i o n o f s i m i l a r
testimony
o f f e r e d d u r i n g t h e S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l c a s e , and we f i n d no
i n the t r i a l
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g h e r e , w h i c h we
an abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n .
C r i m . App.
2007),
her
Christmas
Holsomback
t h e n s e v e n y e a r s o l d and she
to
error
have r e v i e w e d f o r
I n Woods v. S t a t e , 13 So. 3d 1 ( A l a .
t h i s Court
stated:
" I n Payne v. T e n n e s s e e , 501 U.S.
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d :
808
(1991), the
"'[A] S t a t e may p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e t h a t f o r
the
jury
to
assess
meaningfully
the
defendant's
moral
culpability
and
b l a m e w o r t h i n e s s , i t s h o u l d have b e f o r e i t
118
CR-08-0145
at t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase e v i d e n c e o f t h e
s p e c i f i c harm c a u s e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t .
"[T]he S t a t e has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n
c o u n t e r a c t i n g the m i t i g a t i n g evidence which
the defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o p u t i n , by
r e m i n d i n g t h e s e n t e n c e r t h a t j u s t as t h e
murderer
should
be
considered
as
an
individual,
so t o o t h e v i c t i m
i s an
i n d i v i d u a l whose d e a t h r e p r e s e n t s a u n i q u e
l o s s t o s o c i e t y and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o h i s
family."
Booth
[v. M a r y l a n d ] , 482 U.S.
[496, 517 (1987)] ( W h i t e , J . , d i s s e n t i n g )
( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . By t u r n i n g t h e v i c t i m
i n t o a "faceless stranger at the penalty
phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l , " [South C a r o l i n a
^ ] G a t h e r s , 490 U.S. [805, 821 (1989)]
(O'Connor, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) , B o o t h d e p r i v e s
the S t a t e of the f u l l moral f o r c e of i t s
e v i d e n c e a n d may p r e v e n t t h e j u r y
from
having
before
i t a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n
necessary
to
determine
the
proper
punishment f o r a f i r s t - d e g r e e murder.
"501 U.S. a t 825.
The Supreme C o u r t f u r t h e r
stated:
"'We
thus h o l d t h a t i f the S t a t e
chooses t o p e r m i t t h e a d m i s s i o n of v i c t i m
i m p a c t e v i d e n c e and p r o s e c u t o r i a l argument
on
that
subject,
t h e E i g h t h Amendment
erects
no p e r se b a r .
A State
may
l e g i t i m a t e l y conclude t h a t e v i d e n c e about
t h e v i c t i m and a b o u t t h e i m p a c t o f t h e
m u r d e r on t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y i s r e l e v a n t
t o t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n as t o w h e t h e r o r n o t
t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h o u l d be i m p o s e d .
There
is
no
reason
to treat
such
evidence
d i f f e r e n t l y than other r e l e v a n t evidence i s
treated.'
"Payne,
501 U.S.
a t 827.
The Supreme
Court
recognized that victim-impact evidence ' i s designed
to
show i n s t e a d e a c h v i c t i m ' s " u n i q u e n e s s as an
119
CR-08-0145
i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g , " w h a t e v e r t h e j u r y m i g h t
t h i n k t h e l o s s t o t h e community r e s u l t i n g f r o m h i s
d e a t h m i g h t b e . ' Payne, 501 U.S. a t 823.
"Here, t h e t e s t i m o n y p r o v i d e d by t h e o f f i c e r s '
widows was o f f e r e d t o show t h a t e a c h o f f i c e r ' s d e a t h
c a u s e d a u n i q u e l o s s t o h i s f a m i l y a n d t o show t h e
i m p a c t t h e m u r d e r s h a d on t h e f a m i l y members.
Part
of t h a t testimony,
t h e p o r t i o n a b o u t w h i c h Woods
a p p a r e n t l y i s c o m p l a i n i n g h e r e , was e l i c i t e d t o show
t h a t O f f i c e r Owen was m a r r i e d a n d h a d c h i l d r e n a n d
g r a n d c h i l d r e n , t h a t O f f i c e r B e n n e t t was m a r r i e d a n d
had a c h i l d , a n d t h a t O f f i c e r C h i s o l m was m a r r i e d
and h a d p l a n n e d t o s t a r t a f a m i l y .
This
testimony
was o f f e r e d i n r e b u t t a l t o t h e e v i d e n c e
Woods
o f f e r e d as m i t i g a t i o n -- t h a t he was a f a t h e r o f
t h r e e c h i l d r e n whom he l o v e d v e r y much.
T h i s was
legitimate victim-impact
evidence,
w h i c h we have
p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t o be a d m i s s i b l e d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y
phase o f a c a p i t a l - m u r d e r t r i a l .
See, e . g . , B e l i s l e
v. S t a t e , 11 So.3d 256, 317 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) .
The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t
p e r m i t t e d t h e witnesses t o t e s t i f y about t h e v i c t i m s
and t h e i r f a m i l i e s .
Woods v. S t a t e , 13 So. 3d a t 35-36 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ;
emphasis
added).
As
hold
we h e l d
that
i n Woods, a n d f o r t h e same r e a s o n s ,
the t r i a l
court
discretion
here
i t admitted
rebuttal.
We
when
note,
d i d n o t abuse
too, that
court
also
and t h e c o u r t
gave
that
i n s t r u c t e d the jury
120
testimony
requested
t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y s p e c i f i c a l l y about
evidence,
in
that the
victim-impact
instruction.
that
now
i t s considerable
Holsomback's
Woodward
we
i t s verdict
The
trial
should
be
CR-08-0145
based
on
prejudice,
the evidence
and
o r any a r b i t r a r y
Woodward
t h e law, and
n o t on
passion,
factor.
i s not e n t i t l e d
to relief
on
this
claim
of
error.
XIV.
Woodward
argues
that
the
trial
court
erred
when i t
r e f u s e d t o admit i n t o evidence a t the sentence h e a r i n g
the
j u r y a videotape
before
of a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t t a l k i n g
f o u r o f Woodward's c h i l d r e n a n d two o f h i s nephews.
with
He s a y s
that the video depicted the c h i l d r e n r e c a l l i n g fun experiences
they
had had w i t h
him.
Woodward a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h a t
they
He f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w o u l d have
a "glimpse
missed
provided
o f f a m i l y members who d i d n o t t e s t i f y , " a l o n g
"expressions
with
o f a f f e c t i o n f o r Mr. Woodward," a n d t h a t t h e r e i s
a s t r o n g p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e m i g h t have c h a n g e d t h e
v o t e o f a t l e a s t one j u r o r who h a d v o t e d f o r a d e a t h
A
trial
court
has
substantial discretion
whether t o admit evidence a t a s e n t e n c i n g
parte
sentence.
i n deciding
hearing.
E.g., Ex
P e r a i t a , 897 So. 2d 1227, 1231 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) .
Woodward
hearing before
argued
at the beginning
of the
the j u r y that the videotape
121
penalty-phase
with the c h i l d r e n
CR-08-0145
s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d .
arguably
Woodward a r g u e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h
p u t t h e s e young c h i l d r e n on t h e s t a n d l i v e ,
be a c e r t a i n t r a u m a t i c
that
and
facing l i f e
court
testimony
that
parole
that
and i n c l u d e d
sentence
father convicted
without
stated
should
the
videotape
the thoughts
be
offered
of the family
testimony
that
statute
o r by case
law.
counsel
t h e n s a i d t h a t he was t r y i n g
but that
murder
(R. 1354.)
imposed,
by t h e s e n t e n c i n g
to testify,
of c a p i t a l
or death."
allowed
court
i t would
e f f e c t t o do t h a t i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t
they j u s t had t h e i r
trial
he " c o u l d
The
unsworn
on t h e
was
not
Defense
to get the c h i l d r e n to
Woodward
had t o l d
some
of the
c h i l d r e n ' s m o t h e r s n o t t o come t o c o u r t .
The
trial
c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n
when i t e x c l u d e d
the videotape
t a l k i n g with the c h i l d r e n .
that
family
members'
of the m i t i g a t i o n
The t r i a l
opinions
as
court
to
specialist
correctly stated
sentencing
a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h a t e v i d e n c e was n o t r e l e v a n t .
are not
See, e.g.,
T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666 So. 2d 36, 51-53 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) ,
aff'd,
666 So. 2d 73 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) .
correctly
presented
points
testimony
out
in
F u r t h e r m o r e , as t h e S t a t e
i t s brief
at the sentencing
122
on
appeal,
hearing
Woodward
from t h r e e o f
CR-08-0145
his
five children.
The c h i l d r e n t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e p o s i t i v e
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e y h a d w i t h Woodward a n d a b o u t t h e i r
him.
Thus,
that
portion
of
the p r o f f e r e d
c u m u l a t i v e a n d w o u l d have b e e n s u b j e c t
basis.
love f o r
evidence
to exclusion
on
was
that
D o t c h v. S t a t e , 67 So. 3d 936, 973-74 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
2010).
Finally,
even
i f we
had determined
that
the
trial
c o u r t had abused i t s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n e x c l u d i n g the
videotape
for
from e v i d e n c e ,
two r e a s o n s : f i r s t ,
t h e e r r o r w o u l d have b e e n
harmless
t h e j u r y recommended t h a t Woodward be
sentenced t o l i f e i n p r i s o n without the p o s s i b i l i t y of parole.
M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e ,
3d
[Ms. CR-06-0827, A u g u s t 27, 2010]
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , a n d , s e c o n d , t h e t r i a l
found
Woodward's
nonstatutory
mitigating
admission of the
For
to r e l i e f
relationship
circumstance,
his
children
even
without
court
as
a
the
videotape.
a l l the foregoing
on t h i s
with
So.
r e a s o n s , Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d
claim of error.
XV.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r s
made i m p r o p e r
remarks i n t h e i r c l o s i n g arguments t o t h e j u r y a t t h e p e n a l t y
phase.
Specifically,
Woodward
123
argues
that
the
prosecutors
CR-08-0145
m i s s t a t e d t h e l a w , p r e s e n t e d p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s , drew
improper
c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n Woodward and t h e v i c t i m , commented on h i s
failure
to
testify,
sentence
Woodward
to
improper
a r g u m e n t s --
and
argued
death.
He
deterrence
argues
i n d i v i d u a l l y and
as
that
a
the
reason
allegedly
c o l l e c t i v e l y --
might
have i n f l u e n c e d t h e j u r y by a f f e c t i n g e v e n one j u r o r ' s v o t e
to
a r g u e s were i m p r o p e r ,
only.
Rule
45,
object to
so we
A l a . R.
any
of
the
comments he
App.
P.
"This
c o u r t has
concluded
p r o s e c u t o r i a l arguments
s h o u l d be w e i g h e d as p a r t o f o u r e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e
claim
on t h e m e r i t s b e c a u s e o f i t s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n s e
consider
harmful."
App.
the
Kuenzel
comments
v.
in
S t a t e , 577
1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 577 So. 2d 531
v. W a i n w r i g h t ,
778
F.2d
623,
now
review t h i s c l a i m f o r p l a i n e r r o r
t h a t the f a i l u r e to o b j e c t to improper
not
as
sentencing.
Woodward d i d n o t
...
to
629
question
So.
to
2d 474,
be
489
particularly
( A l a . Crim.
( A l a . 1991), q u o t i n g Johnson
n.6
(11th C i r . 1985).
"The
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t has s t a t e d
that,
when
considering a
prosecutor's
closing
a r g u m e n t , t h e s t a n d a r d i s w h e t h e r t h e a r g u m e n t '"so
i n f e c t e d t h e t r i a l w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o make t h e
r e s u l t i n g c o n v i c t i o n a d e n i a l o f due
process."'
D a r d e n v. W a i n w r i g h t ,
477
U.S.
168,
181
(1986)
( q u o t i n g D o n n e l l y v. D e C h r i s t o f o r o , 416 U.S.
637,
643 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) .
The argument i s t o be v i e w e d i n i t s
124
did
CR-08-0145
e n t i r e t y , and, t o j u s t i f y r e v e r s a l , t h e argument
must have r e s u l t e d i n s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e
defendant.
C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 954, 985
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . "
Ex p a r t e
Brown,
(Ala.
[Ms. 1091767, June 30, 2011]
So. 3d
,
2011).
"'"In
reviewing
allegedly
improper
prosecutorial
comments,
conduct,
and
q u e s t i o n i n g of witnesses, the task of t h i s
Court i s t o consider t h e i r impact i n the
c o n t e x t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l , and n o t t o
view the a l l e g e d l y improper acts i n the
abstract.
W h i t l o w v. S t a t e , 509 So. 2d
252, 256 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 7 ) ; W y s i n g e r
v. S t a t e , 448 So. 2d 435, 438 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 8 3 ) ; C a r p e n t e r v. S t a t e , 404 So. 2d
89, 97 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1980) ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) .
M o r e o v e r , t h i s C o u r t has a l s o h e l d t h a t
s t a t e m e n t s o f c o u n s e l i n argument t o t h e
j u r y must be v i e w e d as d e l i v e r e d i n t h e
heat of debate; such statements are u s u a l l y
v a l u e d b y t h e j u r y a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h and
a r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o become f a c t o r s i n t h e
formation of the v e r d i c t .
O r r v. S t a t e ,
462 So. 2d 1013, 1016 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 8 4 ) ; S a n d e r s v. S t a t e , 426 So. 2d 497,
509 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . " '
" B a r b e r v. S t a t e , 952 So. 2d 393, 437-38 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 2 0 0 5 ) , q u o t i n g B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 So.2d 97,
106-07 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) . "
Brown
aff'd,
We
v. S t a t e ,
11 So. 3d 866,
11 So. 3d 933
note
that
several occasions
909
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2007),
( A l a . 2008).
the
trial
court
i n s t r u c t e d the
jury
on
t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y s ' a r g u m e n t s were n o t t o be
125
CR-08-0145
c o n s i d e r e d e v i d e n c e and t h a t t h e c o u r t w o u l d i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y
as t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e
We
have r e v i e w e d
prosecution's
law.
a l l o f Woodward's c l a i m s
a r g u m e n t s , and we
regarding
the
f i n d no e r r o r o r p l a i n e r r o r .
A.
Woodward
argues
law
that
misstated
the
when
mitigating
circumstances
the
i t
as
17,
State
mislead
characterized
"excuses."
[Ms.
CR-06-0360, Dec.
2010]
App.
2010), t h i s Court c o n s i d e r e d
So.
the
his
jury
proffered
I n M c C r a y v.
3d
McCray
stated,
"[didn't]
mean
squat."
State,
(Ala. Crim.
whether the p r o s e c u t o r
i m p e r m i s s i b l y argued t h a t the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances
by
We
found
no
had
offered
error
in relevant part:
" F u r t h e r , when r e a d i n c o n t e x t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s
argument t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
offered
by M c C r a y 'don't mean s q u a t ' was c l e a r l y n o t h i n g
more t h a n an argument t h a t t h e t h r e e
aggravating
circumstances
offered
by
the
prosecution
far
o u t w e i g h e d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f f e r e d by
t h e d e f e n s e and t h a t M c C r a y s h o u l d be s e n t e n c e d t o
death.
This,
too,
was
a
proper
argument.
'"[I]mpeachment o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f a d e f e n d a n t and
the matter of impairment of i t s weight are p r o p e r l y
m a t t e r s f o r argument o f c o u n s e l
B u r g e s s [v.
S t a t e ] , 827 So. 2d [134,] 162 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1998)
( q u o t i n g M o s l e y v. S t a t e , 241 A l a . 132, 136, 1 So.
2d 593, 595 ( 1 9 4 1 ) ) .
' F u r t h e r , "[a] p r o s e c u t o r
may
present
an
argument t o the
jury regarding
the
a p p r o p r i a t e weight to a f f o r d the m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s
126
and
and
CR-08-0145
o f f e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . " ' V a n p e l t v. S t a t e , [Ms.
CR-06-1539, December 18, 2009]
So. 3d
,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) ( q u o t i n g M a l i c o a t v. M u l l i n ,
426 F.3d 1241, 1257 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ) .
That i s ,
'the p r o s e c u t o r , as an a d v o c a t e , may a r g u e t o t h e
j u r y that i t should give the defendant's m i t i g a t i n g
e v i d e n c e l i t t l e o r no w e i g h t . ' M i t c h e l l [ v . S t a t e ,
[Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug. 27, 2 0 1 0 ] ] ,
So. 3d [
,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ] .
See a l s o S t a t e v.
S t o r e y , 40 S.W.3d 898, 910-11 (Mo. 2001) ( h o l d i n g
that
no
error
resulted
from
the
prosecutor's
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i o n as e x c u s e s b e c a u s e
the
'State
i s not required
t o agree w i t h the
defendant that the evidence o f f e r e d during the
p e n a l t y phase i s s u f f i c i e n t l y m i t i g a t i n g t o p r e c l u d e
i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e [ , and] t h e S t a t e i s
f r e e t o argue t h a t the evidence i s not m i t i g a t i n g a t
all')."
M c C r a y v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d a t
Viewing the prosecution's
.
a r g u m e n t a t a w h o l e , we f i n d no
e r r o r and, t h e r e f o r e , no p l a i n e r r o r , i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
of
some o f Woodward's
prosecutor
p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i o n as e x c u s e s .
The
p e r m i s s i b l y asserted that the p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i o n
was e n t i t l e d t o no w e i g h t b e c a u s e i t was n o t t r u l y m i t i g a t i n g .
B.
Woodward
argues
that
t h e one
of the prosecutors
erred
when she a r g u e d t h a t t h e " e x c u s e s " p e r s o n a l l y o f f e n d e d h e r a n d
that
the
rebuttal
district
that
sacrificed
attorney
she was
his
erred
offended
children
by
when
that
having
127
she
Woodward
them
argued
during
had used
testify
at
and
the
CR-08-0145
sentencing hearing.
Woodward d i d n o t o b j e c t t o e i t h e r comment
when
The j u r y recommended a s e n t e n c e o f
i t was made.
imprisonment
without
prosecution's
a r g u m e n t s was h a r m l e s s .
So.
parole;
therefore,
any
The p r o s e c u t o r s
opinions
regarding
the ultimate
jury.
Rather,
impressions
of
the
Having
reviewed
i n w h i c h t h e y were made, h o w e v e r ,
we f i n d no e r r o r .
the
i n the
F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814
2d 925, 948-49 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) .
t h e comments i n t h e c o n t e x t
error
life
were n o t s t a t i n g
issue
prosecutors
evidence
and
personal
t o be d e c i d e d
were
by t h e
presenting
testimony
their
proffered
by
Woodward as m i t i g a t i o n , a n d o f t h e d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y o f c a l l i n g
Woodward's young c h i l d r e n t o t e s t i f y .
The a r g u m e n t s d i d n o t
c r o s s t h e l i n e o f what i s p e r m i s s i b l e , a n d t h e y c e r t a i n l y d i d
n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t Woodward's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o r have an
u n f a i r i m p a c t on t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
C.
Woodward n e x t
comments t h a t
argues t h a t
improperly
the prosecution
encouraged
made s e v e r a l
t h e j u r y t o impose t h e
d e a t h s e n t e n c e b a s e d on c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n t h e l i f e
Woodward made a n d t h e l i f e
objected
c h o i c e s t h e v i c t i m made.
choices
Woodward
t o o n l y one o f t h e comments, a n d he d i d n o t r e c e i v e
128
CR-08-0145
an a d v e r s e r u l i n g on t h e o b j e c t i o n ; t h e r e f o r e , we r e v i e w
issue
for plain error
The p r o s e c u t i o n
his
life
that
the
State
this
only.
a r g u e d t h a t Woodward h a d made c h o i c e s i n
supported the three
had p r o f f e r e d :
that
aggravating
circumstances
Woodward h a d been
previously
c o n v i c t e d o f a v i o l e n t f e l o n y ; t h a t he k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s t o
a v o i d an a r r e s t as an e x - f e l o n
i n possession
o f a p i s t o l ; and
t h a t he k i l l e d O f f i c e r H o u t s t o d i s r u p t t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e
law.
that
The p r o s e c u t i o n
placed
penalty,
him i n the p o s i t i o n
including
prosecution
a r g u e d t h a t Woodward made t h e c h o i c e s
choosing
from
warranted
the death
f o r O f f i c e r Houts.
The
a l s o s a i d t h a t O f f i c e r H o u t s h a d made t h e c h o i c e
to serve h i s country
The
death
that
a n d h i s community.
prosecution's
the evidence
comments
were
reasonable
and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s
inferences
summation
of the
evidence i tb e l i e v e d supported the aggravating-circumstances
findings.
similar
The comments were
t o those
i n McNair
n o t , as Woodward
v. S t a t e ,
has argued,
653 So. 2d 320
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , c o m p a r i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t s t o t h o s e o f
the
victim's.
Even
i f we f o u n d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s
comments
h e r e t o have b e e n i m p r o p e r , h o w e v e r , we w o u l d have f o u n d , as
129
CR-08-0145
we d i d i n M c N a i r , t h a t t h e comments d i d n o t r i s e t o t h e
of p l a i n e r r o r .
it
was
improper
references
M c N a i r v. S t a t e , 653 So. 2d a t 336-38
f o r the
prosecutor
to
have
made
level
(though
numerous
t o t h e v i c t i m ' s r i g h t s and i m p l i e d t h a t h i s r i g h t s
were t o be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t s , t h e r e m a r k s
were u t t e r e d i n t h e h e a t o f d e b a t e and were v a l u e d
the j u r y ) .
Moreover,
as s u c h by
t h e j u r y h e r e d i d n o t recommend a d e a t h
s e n t e n c e f o r Woodward, so any e r r o r i n t h a t r e g a r d w o u l d have
been h a r m l e s s .
D.
Woodward n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t i n i t s r e b u t t a l argument t h e
prosecution
and he
improperly
c i t e s Ex p a r t e
commented on h i s f a i l u r e
Williams,
461
So.
2d 852
f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that a d i r e c t reference
f a i l u r e to t e s t i f y requires r e v e r s a l .
comment on Woodward's f a i l u r e
to
to
testify,
( A l a . 1984),
to a defendant's
The p r o s e c u t i o n d i d n o t
testify.
D u r i n g h i s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e j u r y a t t h e
phase
defense counsel
moral choice
argued:
"There
c a n n o t be a more s t a r k ,
f o r y o u , l a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n ,
Look a t h i m s i t t i n g
over there.
130
penalty
t o have t o make.
T h e r e he i s , he s i t s
there.
CR-08-0145
You
didn't
get
t o hear
from
him."
(R.
1654.)
During i t s
r e b u t t a l argument t h e S t a t e argued:
"What h i t me as I was l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t e s t i m o n y
and t o t h e words t o d a y i s , you were b o m b a r d e d w i t h
l o t s o f words y e s t e r d a y .
And I w r o t e t h i s down:
'You d i d n ' t g e t t o h e a r f r o m t h e d e f e n d a n t . '
But
l e t me s u b m i t t o you t h i s : A c t i o n s s p e a k l o u d e r t h a n
words; don't they? You're not h e a r i n g t h r o u g h o t h e r
people.
Look a t what he d i d . Look a t what he d i d
with his l i f e . "
(R. 1675.)
C l e a r l y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was
failure
to
argument.
testify,
but
T h i s was
a permissible
c o u n s e l ' s argument.
29,
2011]
So.
was
n o t commenting on Woodward's
quoting defense
reply
S t a n l e y v. S t a t e ,
3d
i n kind
1135
to
own
defense
[Ms. CR-06-2236, A p r i l
( A l a . C r i m . App.
B a l l a r d v. S t a t e , 767 So. 2d 1123,
counsel's
2011).
See
( A l a . C r i m . App.
also
1999)
("A p r o s e c u t o r has a r i g h t t o r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e argument o f
defense
counsel.
fundamental
This
'reply-in-kind'
doctrine
i s based
on
fairness.").
No e r r o r o c c u r r e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s d i r e c t
q u o t a t i o n of defense counsel's statement t o the
jury.
E.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t , when t h e p r o s e c u t i o n u r g e d t h e
j u r y t o s e n t e n c e Woodward t o d e a t h b e c a u s e
131
the death p e n a l t y
CR-08-0145
i s a d e t e r r e n t , i t was i m p e r m i s s i b l y a r g u i n g d e t e r r e n c e
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.
as a
Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e s
t h a t t h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d t h e argument t h a t t h e
invocation
error,
of deterrence
i n closing
b u t he d i s a g r e e s
with
this
argument
Court's
i s reversible
prior
holding
on
that issue.
The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d : " [ U ] r g i n g t h e j u r y
to render
protect
a v e r d i c t i n such
t h e p u b l i c from
from committing
Ex p a r t e
similar
similar
Walker,
972
a manner as t o p u n i s h t h e c r i m e ,
offenses,
offenses
i s not improper
So. 2d 737, 747
S o c k w e l l v. S t a t e , 675 So. 2d 4, 36
We a r e b o u n d b y p r e c e d e n t
Court
and f i n d
and d e t e r
no e r r o r i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s
sentence
quoting
App. 1993) .
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Alabama
note, too, t h a t the j u r y d i d not r e t u r n a v e r d i c t
the death
argument."
( A l a . 2007),
( A l a . Crim.
others
Supreme
comment.
We
recommending
f o r Woodward.
Conclusion
We
have
prosecutorial
prosecutors
examined
Woodward's
argument
d i d not
o p i n i o n s , draw i m p r o p e r
and
allegations
have
misstate
the
found
law,
no
of
improper
error.
present
The
personal
c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n Woodward a n d t h e
132
CR-08-0145
victim,
or
comment
Furthermore,
deterrence
individual
comments,
on
Woodward's
the prosecution
as a r e a s o n
comments
failure
d i d n o t e r r when
t o sentence
constituted
cumulatively,
to
also
Woodward
error;
d i d not
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e l i e f
testify.
i t argued
t o death.
the
complained-of
constitute
on t h i s
No
error.
claim.
XVI.
Woodward
permitted
argues
that
the t r i a l
t h e u s e o f an o f f e n s e
j u v e n i l e t o support
court
erred
when i t
he c o m m i t t e d when he was a
an a g g r a v a t i n g
circumstance
-- t h a t he h a d
p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f a v i o l e n t f e l o n y , § 13A-5-49(2),
Ala.
Code 1975.
sentencing
under
capital
offenders
t o death
t h e age o f 18 a t t h e t i m e
Simmons,
543
consideration
juvenile
offense
raise
He a r g u e s t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment p r o h i b i t s
U.S.
of
a
551
(2005),
prior
felony
i s prohibited
as
as an a g g r a v a t i n g
this
an
of the offense,
and
circumstance.
p l a i n error only.
133
he
committed
indirect
argument i n t h e t r i a l
i f the offender
court,
use
Roper
contends
when
was
he
of a
v.
that
was
a
juvenile
Woodward
so we r e v i e w
d i d not
i t for
CR-08-0145
The
State
Woodward's
presented
trial
evidence
to establish
at the penalty
that
Woodward
phase
had
a
of
prior
c o n v i c t i o n f o r m a n s l a u g h t e r , a n d Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e d t o t h e
j u r y t h a t he h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f m a n s l a u g h t e r a n d t h a t t h a t
c o n v i c t i o n c o u l d be u s e d as an a g g r a v a t i n g
1368.)
as
The j u r y f o u n d t h a t a g g r a v a t i n g
d i d the t r i a l
judge
circumstance.
circumstance
i n h i s sentencing
to exist,
order.
Although
Woodward was a j u v e n i l e when he c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e ,
tried
as an a d u l t
a n d was
years' imprisonment.
properly
considered
circumstance.
convicted
(C. 918.)
by
the t r i a l
Y a n c e y v. S t a t e ,
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) .
The o p i n i o n
he was
and s e n t e n c e d
Therefore,
(R.
to
15
t h e c o n v i c t i o n was
court
as
an
aggravating
65 So. 3d 452, 477-78 ( A l a .
i n Y a n c e y was r e n d e r e d
years
after
t h e d e c i s i o n i n Roper; the r e a s o n i n g
then,
a n d i t does n o t now, p r o h i b i t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , as an
aggravating
circumstance,
of a p r i o r
i n Roper d i d n o t
adult conviction f o r a
c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e , e v e n i f t h e c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d when t h e
o f f e n d e r was u n d e r t h e age o f 18.
expressed
2006),
i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W i l k s , 464 F.3d 1240 ( 1 1 t h C i r .
i n which the United
Eleventh
We a g r e e w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g
Circuit
held
that
States
Court
the reasoning
134
of Appeals
f o r the
i n Roper
d i d not
CR-08-0145
prohibit using a youthful-offender
s e n t e n c e o f an a d u l t o f f e n d e r .
The
c o n v i c t i o n t o enhance
the
Court stated:
"Roper h e l d o n l y t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment p r o h i b i t s
sentencing
capital
offenders
to
death
i f
the
o f f e n d e r was u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n a t t h e t i m e
of the o f f e n s e .
"Our
conclusion
that
youthful
offender
c o n v i c t i o n s can q u a l i f y as p r e d i c a t e o f f e n s e s f o r
s e n t e n c e enhancement p u r p o s e s r e m a i n s v a l i d b e c a u s e
Roper
does
not
deal
specifically
-or
even
t a n g e n t i a l l y -- w i t h s e n t e n c e enhancement.
It is
one t h i n g t o p r o h i b i t c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t f o r t h o s e
u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n , b u t an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t
t h i n g to p r o h i b i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i o r y o u t h f u l
o f f e n s e s when s e n t e n c i n g
c r i m i n a l s who
continue
t h e i r i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y i n t o adulthood.
R o p e r does
n o t mandate t h a t we w i p e c l e a n t h e r e c o r d s o f e v e r y
c r i m i n a l on h i s o r h e r e i g h t e e n t h b i r t h d a y . "
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W i l k s ,
Woodward
is
not
464
F.3d
entitled
at
to
1243.
relief
on
this
claim
of
error.
XVII.
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t d e n i e d
his
m o t i o n f o r a change o f venue b e c a u s e , he
says,
the
trial
court f a i l e d to consider inflammatory
and p r e j u d i c i a l comments
posted
articles
by
version
Websites.
of
readers
the
He
in
response
local
contends
to
newspapers
that
135
the
and
on
Internet
in
the
other
online
Internet
sources,
when
CR-08-0145
considered
pervasive,
with
traditional
prejudicial
publicity
n e c e s s i t a t e d a change o f
Before
trial
news
sources,
demonstrated
i n Montgomery
County
venue.
Woodward
filed
a motion
for a
change
venue i n w h i c h he c i t e d numerous news r e p o r t s a b o u t t h e
t h e v i c t i m , and t h e p e r p e t r a t o r .
has
been
reported
inadmissible."
(C.
that
in
the
320.)
crime,
He s t a t e d t h a t "much o f what
media
He
of
also
about
quoted
the
case
is
statements
l e t t e r s t o t h e e d i t o r i n t h e l o c a l n e w s p a p e r and f r o m
from
various
I n t e r n e t p o s t i n g s t h a t , he s a i d , showed "a v i s c e r a l h a t r e d "
him
and w o u l d
l e a d one
t o c o n c l u d e t h a t he
could
of
not get
a
f a i r t r i a l i n Montgomery C o u n t y as a r e s u l t o f t h e p r e s u m p t i v e
prejudice.
(C. 313.)
The
S t a t e o f Alabama f i l e d a response
t o Woodward's m o t i o n and a r g u e d t h a t a change o f venue was
warranted.
The
trial
court
held
a hearing
on
the
a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g Woodward's m o t i o n and t h e a t t a c h e d
the
State's
response,
issue,
the t r i a l
stated
that
police
officer,
court
and
the
denied
the p u b l i c i t y
had
parties's
the motion.
focused
motion;
exhibits,
arguments
The
not
on
trial
the
court
on
the
death
of
the
and t h a t t h e i s s u e o f who
had
committed
the
k i l l i n g had not been p r e j u d g e d i n t h e newspapers.
136
(R.
58.)
CR-08-0145
Woodward's
ruling,
--
primary
argument
on
appeal
i s that,
t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r "new m e d i a
i.e.,
t h e comments
consideration
of
traditional
made
those
on
i n so
sources"
the Internet
--
comments
addition
online
in
and
We
disagree.
F i r s t , t o t h e e x t e n t Woodward a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
to
consider
Woodward's m o t i o n
otherwise.
Internet
During the hearing
received
comments
when
and
read
both
stated,
my
" I b e l i e v e the Court
motion
with
i t s several
court responded, " S e v e r a l . "
Woodward
the prosecution
with
another
attention
online
news
t o the reader
reveals
on t h e m o t i o n f o r a change o f
attachments," the t r i a l
than provided
court
evaluating
f o r a change o f v e n u e , t h e r e c o r d
v e n u e , when Woodward i n i t i a l l y
has
to
news s o u r c e s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a change i n venue
was r e q u i r e d .
failed
that
article
and
comments p o s t e d
(R. 36.)
and t h e t r i a l
called
after
the
court
court's
the a r t i c l e ,
a r g u i n g t h a t the defense had e s t a b l i s h e d presumptive p r e j u d i c e
b a s e d on a l l t h e p u b l i c i t y
media a r t i c l e s .
Woodward t h e n d i s c u s s e d a n d q u o t e d f r o m many
of t h e I n t e r n e t p o s t s
and
the t r i a l
a n d comments a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
court
he h a d i n c l u d e d a l o n g w i t h t h e m o t i o n ,
knowledgeably
137
commented on some o f t h e
CR-08-0145
posts,
and c l e a r l y
stated
that
46.)
i t had read
Woodward's
motion.
(R.
Woodward's
primary
assertion
--
to consider
t h e "new"
media
failed
Thus,
that
the
and
record
the t r i a l
sources
considered
belies
court
had
i n t h e form o f
o n l i n e comments a n d p o s t s .
Second,
to the extent
Woodward
c o u r t e r r e d when i t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n
argues
that
the
f o r a change o f venue
b e c a u s e t h e community was s a t u r a t e d w i t h p r e j u d i c i a l
publicity,
we
trial
pretrial
disagree.
"The r i g h t o f an a c c u s e d t o be t r i e d b y a f a i r
and
i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s guaranteed by the S i x t h
Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h
states that
'In a l l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , the
a c c u s e d s h a l l e n j o y t h e r i g h t t o a speedy and p u b l i c
t r i a l , b y an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . A r t i c l e I , § 6 o f
t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901 s t a t e s , i n p a r t :
'That i n a l l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h e a c c u s e d h a s
a r i g h t t o ... a s p e e d y ,
public t r i a l ,
b y an
impartial jury
'
"The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s h e l d
t h a t i f an a c c u s e d c a n n o t o b t a i n an i m p a r t i a l j u r y
i n t h e d i s t r i c t where he i s b e i n g t r i e d t h e n t h e
c o u r t s h o u l d t r a n s f e r the case t o another d i s t r i c t
where t h e j u r o r s a r e f r e e o f b i a s .
R i d e a u v.
L o u i s i a n a , 373 U.S. 723 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . T h i s g u a r a n t e e h a s
a l s o been c o d i f i e d i n t h i s s t a t e i n A l a . Code 1975,
§ 15-2-20.
R u l e 1 0 . 1 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., i s t o t h e
same e f f e c t . "
Hunt v. S t a t e ,
aff'd,
642 So. 2d 999, 1042
642 So. 2d 1060 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) .
138
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1993),
CR-08-0145
R u l e 1 0 . 1 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P.,
provides:
"The b u r d e n i s
upon t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n
the
court
that
a
fair
and
impartial
trial
and
an
of
unbiased
v e r d i c t c a n n o t be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d i n t h e c o u n t y i n w h i c h
the
defendant
motion
for a
i s t o be
change
tried."
of
venue
A trial
court's
i s reviewed
ruling
f o r an
on
abuse
a
of
discretion.
"'Absent
a
showing
of
abuse
of
d i s c r e t i o n , a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a
m o t i o n f o r change o f venue w i l l n o t be
overturned.
Ex p a r t e Magwood, 426 So. 2d
929, 931 ( A l a . 1983) . I n o r d e r t o g r a n t a
m o t i o n f o r change o f v e n u e , t h e d e f e n d a n t
must p r o v e
that
there existed
actual
p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t the defendant or that the
community was s a t u r a t e d w i t h p r e j u d i c i a l
publicity.
S h e p p a r d v. M a x w e l l , 384 U.S.
333 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; F r a n k l i n v. S t a t e , 424 So. 2d
1353
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) .
Newspaper
a r t i c l e s or widespread p u b l i c i t y , w i t h o u t
more, a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o g r a n t a m o t i o n
f o r change o f v e n u e .
A n d e r s o n v. S t a t e ,
362 So. 2d 1296, 1298
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1978).
Ex p a r t e G r a y s o n ,
When
exists,
a
479
defendant
the defendant
sufficiently
prejudicial
So. 2d 76, 80
alleges
( A l a . 1985).
that
must show t h a t
prejudicial
and
pretrial publicity
139
"presumed
prejudice"
pretrial publicity
inflammatory
and
that
is
the
s a t u r a t e d t h e community where
CR-08-0145
the
trials
was t o be h e l d .
(11th C i r . 1985).
same
thing.
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487
" ' P u b l i c i t y ' and ' p r e j u d i c e ' a r e n o t t h e
Excess
publicity
does
not automatically or
n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y was p r e j u d i c i a l . "
State,
642 So. 2d a t 1043.
presumed
bitter
p r e j u d i c e must
prejudice exists
publicity."
citing
Rather,
show
that
a defendant
"a f e e l i n g
i n [the county]
Holladay
1988), a f f ' d ,
v. S t a t e ,
549 So. 2d 122
Ex p a r t e H o l l a d a y ,
the t r i a l
surrounding
court
must
circumstances.
( 1 9 8 4 ) ; Murphy v. F l o r i d a ,
366
U.S. 717 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
"rarely"
applicable,
( A l a . Crim.
situations."
Finally,
App.
549 So. 2d 135 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) .
consider
Patton
the t o t a l i t y
v. Yount,
standard
of the
467 U.S. 1025
421 U.S. 794 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; I r v i n v . Dowd,
The p r e s u m p t i v e - p r e j u d i c e
and
of the
747 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ,
In d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e " p r e s u m e d - p r e j u d i c e "
exists
alleging
o f deep a n d
as a r e s u l t
Ex p a r t e F o w l e r , 574 So. 2d 745,
Hunt v.
i s reserved
standard i s
f o r only
"extreme
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d a t 1537.
a
trial
motion i s not l i g h t l y
court's
ruling
on a
change-of-venue
overturned.
"[T]he d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether o r n o t t o grant
a m o t i o n f o r change o f venue i s g e n e r a l l y l e f t t o
t h e s o u n d d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e b e c a u s e he
has t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o a s s e s s a n y p r e j u d i c i a l
140
CR-08-0145
p u b l i c i t y a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t and any p r e j u d i c i a l
f e e l i n g a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e community w h i c h
w o u l d make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o r e c e i v e
a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . "
N e l s o n v. S t a t e , 440 So. 2d 1130, 1132 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 3 ) ,
q u o t e d i n J o i n e r v. S t a t e , 651 So. 2d 1155, 1156
App.
1994).
Woodward
presented
the
trial
court
anonymous p o s t s f r o m o n l i n e I n t e r n e t s i t e s .
with
Woodward
nothing
that
some o f t h e comments
i n the record
anonymous
and
(Ala. Crim.
posters
bitter
Although
were
numerous
we a g r e e
inflammatory,
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e o n l i n e comments
were t h e e q u i v a l e n t
prejudice"
media coverage.
with
of proof
i n the e n t i r e county
Rather,
by
o f t h e "deep
resulting
from
as t h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t a t
t h e h e a r i n g , t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t many o f t h e p o s t i n g s
were n o t s u b m i t t e d
is
b y r e s i d e n t s o f Montgomery C o u n t y , a n d i t
c l e a r from e x h i b i t s t h a t
the posts
represented
personal
o p i n i o n a n d commentary a n d were n o t c r e a t e d b y news w r i t e r s o r
o f f e r e d as news c o v e r a g e .
an i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h o s e
Nothing
i n t h e r e c o r d even w a r r a n t s
o n l i n e s t a t e m e n t s were w i d e l y r e a d by
Montgomery C o u n t y r e s i d e n t s who made up t h e p o t e n t i a l p o o l o f
jurors.
posted
Furthermore, nothing i n the record i n d i c a t e s that the
entries
reflected
the f i x e d
141
opinions
o f anyone
who
CR-08-0145
might
be
i n the
pool
of
the
potential
j u r o r s or
even
the
g e n e r a l p u b l i c i n Montgomery C o u n t y a t t h e t i m e o f Woodward's
trial.
In
So.
M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e ,
3d
( A l a . Crim.
argument
held,
similar
to
the
[Ms.
App.
one
CR-08-1954, Nov.
2010),
this
Woodward has
Court
5, 2010]
rejected
r a i s e d here.
in relevant part:
"Despite
McMillan's
reference
to
certain
u n f l a t t e r i n g comments made on b l o g s on c e r t a i n
Web
s i t e s , t h i s a l o n e d i d n o t r e q u i r e a change o f v e n u e .
See
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Happ,
(No.
CR2-0 6-12 9 ( 8 ) ,
November 25, 2008) (S.D. O h i o 2008) (not r e p o r t e d i n
F. Supp. 2d) ('the p r e s e n c e o f a web b l o g c o n t a i n i n g
n e g a t i v e a r t i c l e s r e g a r d i n g Happ does n o t r e q u i r e a
change o f venue t o a n o t h e r d i s t r i c t .
The c o v e r a g e
on
t h a t b l o g has
not
c r e a t e d an
inflammatory,
c i r c u s - l i k e atmosphere i n the court-house
and t h e
Columbus j u r y p o o l .
F o l e y [v. P a r k e r ] , 488
F.3d
[377]
a t 387
[(2007)].
F u r t h e r m o r e , web
based
c o v e r a g e i s n o t l o c a l i z e d and has an e q u a l p o t e n t i a l
t o t a i n t a j u r y p o o l i n any d i s t r i c t . ' ) .
Gotbaum v.
C i t y of Phoenix,
617 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881-82 (D.
Ariz.
2008)
('To
be
sure,
some o f
the
blog
s t a t e m e n t s a r e d i s t u r b i n g l y m a l i c i o u s . The q u e s t i o n
b e f o r e the C o u r t , however, i s not whether the b l o g
a u t h o r s c o u l d s e r v e as f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r o r s ,
b u t w h e t h e r an i m p a r t i a l j u r y can be s e l e c t e d f r o m
among t h e 1.6 m i l l i o n c i t i z e n s , f r o m f i v e c o u n t i e s ,
who make up t h e C o u r t ' s j u r y p o o l . ' ) .
S t a t e v.
B e r e c z , (No. 08CA48, J a n u a r y 21, 2 0 1 0 ) ( O h i o C t . App.
2010)
(not r e p o r t e d i n N.E.2d) ('In t h e a b s e n c e o f
s h o w i n g r e s u l t i n g b i a s , " p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y -- e v e n
p e r v a s i v e , a d v e r s e p u b l i c i t y -- does n o t i n e v i t a b l y
l e a d t o an u n f a i r t r i a l . "
S t a t e v. L u n d g r e n , 73
O h i o S t . 3d 474, 479, 1 9 9 5 - O h i o - 2 2 7 , 653 N.E.2d 304,
142
an
We
CR-08-0145
q u o t i n g N e b r a s k a P r e s s A s s n . v.
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 427 U.S. 539, 5 5 4 . ' ) . "
M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d a t
Stewart
[Stuart]
.
As i n M c M i l l a n , we f i n d t h a t t h e u n s o l i c i t e d ,
unreviewed,
l a r g e l y anonymous o n l i n e comments d i d n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f
s a t u r a t e d , p r e j u d i c i a l media coverage.
Moreover,
we
believe
t h a t any r e a d e r s o f t h e comments w o u l d v a l u e t h o s e comments a t
t h e i r t r u e w o r t h a n d n o t as "news c o v e r a g e " a t a l l .
As
f o r Woodward's a l l e g a t i o n s
t h a t t h e news a r t i c l e s i n
p r i n t and o n l i n e a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d p r o o f t h a t a change o f venue
was
necessary,
we
disagree.
Certainly
the shooting of a
Montgomery p o l i c e o f f i c e r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a t r a f f i c
and
the a r r e s t
generated
however,
The
and upcoming
widespread
media
trial
coverage.
could not support a f i n d i n g
media
coverage,
of the accused
moreover,
That
fact,
o f presumed
contained
stop
shooter
alone,
prejudice.
largely
factual
r e p o r t s about t h e s h o o t i n g and t h e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g O f f i c e r
Houts's
death
and about
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n
and p r o s e c u t i o n .
The r e p o r t s were n o t i n h e r e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l , i n f l a m m a t o r y , o r
sensational.
Furthermore, the p u b l i c i t y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e case
diminished substantially
i n t h e n e a r l y two y e a r s b e t w e e n t h e
s h o o t i n g and t h e time o f t r i a l .
143
"The p a s s a g e o f t i m e t e n d s t o
CR-08-0145
b r i n g o b j e c t i v i t y t o a case i n w h i c h t h e r e has been
pretrial publicity."
(Ala.
extensive
Ex p a r t e F o w l e r , 574 So. 2d 745, 748-49
1990).
The
presumptive-prejudice
v. L o u i s i a n a ,
373 U.S.
723
standard
(1963),
recognized
i n Rideau
i s t o be a p p l i e d o n l y i n
e x t r e m e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a d e f e n d a n t c a n show t h a t he o r
she c a n n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r
trial
b e c a u s e t h e community was so
saturated with p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y .
Woodward d i d
n o t make a s h o w i n g t h a t h i s c a s e i s i n t h a t r a r e c a t e g o r y .
hold
that
the t r i a l
court
d i s c r e t i o n when i t d e n i e d
We
d i d n o t abuse
i t s substantial
Woodward's m o t i o n
f o r a change o f
venue.
XVIII.
Woodward n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
f a i l e d t o conduct a reasonable
upon
learning
during
a break
that
a
juror
c o u r t e r r e d when i t
i n q u i r y i n t o j u r o r misconduct
had spoken
i n the t r i a l .
He
t o a news
argues
that
reporter
a remand i s
r e q u i r e d t o c o n d u c t an i n q u i r y i n t o p o s s i b l e j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t .
During a recess near the b e g i n n i n g
of the t r i a l the court
i n f o r m e d t h e p a r t i e s t h a t a d e p u t y t o l d h i m t h a t he h a d s e e n
a reporter
for a local
television
144
station talking
t o one o f
CR-08-0145
the
jurors.
The
court
stated
that
reporter not t o t a l k t o the j u r o r s .
the
the deputy
The t r i a l
told
the
court brought
r e p o r t e r i n t o t h e c o u r t r o o m and, i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f b o t h
p a r t i e s , asked t h e r e p o r t e r about t h e i n c i d e n t .
The r e p o r t e r
e x p l a i n e d t h a t she knew t h e j u r o r b e c a u s e t h e j u r o r w o r k e d a t
a department s t o r e , and t h e y had spoken about t h e j u r o r ' s j o b .
The t r i a l
c o u r t a s k e d t h e r e p o r t e r i f t h e o n l y t o p i c she and
t h e j u r o r h a d d i s c u s s e d was t h e j u r o r ' s j o b , a n d t h e r e p o r t e r
assured
the court
that
i t was, a n d she s a i d she w o u l d n o t
s p e a k t o t h e j u r o r anymore d u r i n g
the t r i a l .
(R. 844-45.)
A f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t spoke t o t h e r e p o r t e r , Woodward d i d
n o t make r a i s e any o b j e c t i o n s o r r e q u e s t any a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n
from
the t r i a l
court
failed
court.
t o conduct
Woodward now
a reasonable
argues
that
the
trial
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the
c o n t a c t between t h e j u r o r and t h e r e p o r t e r and t h a t t h e c o u r t
failed to protect h i s constitutional rights.
no o b j e c t i o n i n t h e t r i a l
of
for
the issue; therefore,
Woodward r a i s e d
c o u r t about t h e c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n
we r e v i e w Woodward's a r g u m e n t
plain error.
145
only
CR-08-0145
First,
failed
Woodward
t o do
and
does
not
argue
what
what a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s by
w o u l d have c o n s t i t u t e d a " r e a s o n a b l e
Second,
we
the
find
conduct a reasonable
that
the
trial
court
trial
court
the
i n q u i r y " by
trial
court
i n q u i r y under the
the
did,
court.
in
circumstances
fact,
and
we
f i n d no r e a s o n t o remand t h e c a s e f o r a d d i t i o n a l p r o c e e d i n g s ,
particularly
in
i n d i c a t e any
did
not
motion
the
for
of
the
fact
that
Woodward
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the t r i a l
raise
conducted
view
a
an
objection
inquiry into
mistrial
at
the
when
trial
when
not
court's inquiry,
the
matter,
and
trial
court
the
did
trial
d i d not
court
make
a
completed i t s
inquiry.
"Whether t h e r e has
been a communication w i t h a j u r o r
w h e t h e r i t has
caused p r e j u d i c e are
questions
determined
the
the
by
discretion."
C r i m . App.
and
Gaffney
1976).
a witness
mistrial.
trial
in
State,
342
"An u n a u t h o r i z e d
So.
fact
exercise
2d
403,
to
be
of
sound
404
(Ala.
c o n t a c t between the j u r o r s
does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e t h e g r a n t i n g o f a
I t i s w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r an
w i t n e s s was
v.
court
of
and
improper contact
b e t w e e n a j u r o r and
p r e j u d i c i a l to the accused."
146
court
Ex p a r t e Weeks,
to
a
456
CR-08-0145
So. 2d 404, 407 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) , q u o t e d i n Knox v . S t a t e , 571 So.
2d 389, 391 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) .
" I n H o l l a n d v. S t a t e , 588 So. 2d 543 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1991),
a
case
involving
alleged
juror
c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t h i s c o u r t r e v e r s e d because t h e t r i a l
c o u r t u n d e r t o o k no i n q u i r y i n t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f
the
a l l e g e d improper communication.
We o b s e r v e d
that
"'[a]
motion f o r m i s t r i a l " i s addressed t o
the
sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ,
and i t s r u l i n g w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d i n t h e
a b s e n c e o f a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f abuse o f
discretion."
Ex p a r t e J e f f e r s o n , 473 So.
2d 1110, 1114 ( A l a . 1985) ( 1 9 8 6 ) . I n c a s e s
i n v o l v i n g j u r o r misconduct, a t r i a l court
g e n e r a l l y w i l l n o t be h e l d t o have a b u s e d
its
discretion
"where t h e t r i a l
court
i n v e s t i g a t e s t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which
the
r e m a r k was made, i t s s u b s t a n c e , a n d
determines that the r i g h t s of the appellant
were n o t p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e r e m a r k . "
p
Bascom
v. S t a t e , 344 So. 2d 218, 222 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 7 7 ) .
However, t h e t r i a l j u d g e h a s
a
duty
to
conduct
a
"reasonable
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s claimed to
have b e e n c o m m i t t e d "
b e f o r e he c o n c l u d e s
t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e a c c u s e d have n o t
been compromised.
P h i l l i p s v. S t a t e , 462
So. 2d 981, 990 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) . '
" H o l l a n d , 588 So. 2d a t 546.
What c o n s t i t u t e s a
'reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s claimed
t o have b e e n c o m m i t t e d ' w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r i n
each case.
A s i g n i f i c a n t part of the d i s c r e t i o n
enjoyed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h i s area l i e s i n
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e scope o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n
that
s h o u l d be c o n d u c t e d . "
147
CR-08-0145
Sistrunk
v.
State,
596
So.
2d
644,
648
(Ala. Crim.
App.
1992).
Upon b e i n g i n f o r m e d
the
juror
parties,
and
the
then
questioning
the
the
its
reporter
A f t e r being
c o n v e r s a t i o n was
reporter
reporter,
exercised
conversation.
the
by a d e p u t y a b o u t t h e c o n t a c t b e t w e e n
trial
about
assured
no
trial,
and
was
by
the
the
by
content
of
the
reporter that
the
u n r e l a t e d t o the t r i a l , the c o u r t admonished
was
satisfied
i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the
there
the
informed
discretion
considerable
with
i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t Woodward was
being
court
no
the
i n q u i r y , and
s a t i s f i e d as w e l l .
c o n v e r s a t i o n was
a l l
There
r e l a t e d to
the
reason to conduct a d d i t i o n a l i n q u i r y to
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r j u r o r s w o u l d have b e e n a f f e c t e d by
a c o n v e r s a t i o n u n r e l a t e d to the t r i a l .
r a i s e any
at
the
Woodward's f a i l u r e
o b j e c t i o n t o the scope of the t r i a l
time
i t was
p r e j u d i c e now.
We
conducted
f i n d no
weighs
to
court's inquiry
against
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n
his
claim
i n the
of
trial
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to forgo a d d i t i o n a l i n q u i r y i n t o the
matter,
and
court's
we
failure
certainly
to
find
conduct
no
plain
error
additional
circumstances.
148
i n the
inquiry
trial
under
these
CR-08-0145
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f
on t h i s
claim.
XIX.
Woodward
argues
that
the t r i a l
court
violated
A r i z o n a , 536 U.S. 584 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , i n s e v e r a l ways.
the t r i a l
State
provide
circumstances
aggravating
pretrial
i t intended
State to prosecute
He a r g u e s t h a t
t o prove;
of
the
when
directly
In
aggravating
i t permitted the
t h e case even though i t d i d n o t a l l e g e t h e
circumstances
the
notice
jury's
i n the indictment;
sentencing
a n d when i t
recommendation
imprisonment without the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e .
is
v.
c o u r t v i o l a t e d R i n g : When i t f a i l e d t o r e q u i r e t h e
to
overrode
Ring
of
life
Alabama law
c o n t r a r y t o Woodward's c l a i m s o f e r r o r .
Ring,
the United
earlier
holding
(2000),
to death-penalty
capital
cases
States
i n Apprendi
v.
cases
"are e n t i t l e d
Supreme
New
Court
Jersey,
applied i t s
530
U.S.
and h e l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s
to a jury
determination
466
in
on a n y
f a c t on w h i c h t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n d i t i o n s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r
maximum p u n i s h m e n t . "
R i n g , 53 6 U.S. a t 58 9.
Alabama's
death-
p e n a l t y s t a t u t e , w h i c h p r o v i d e s f o r a j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n as
to
s e n t e n c i n g and p l a c e s u l t i m a t e s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y i n t h e
149
CR-08-0145
t r i a l c o u r t , was n o t i n v a l i d a t e d b y R i n g .
Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936
See, e.g., Ex p a r t e
( A l a . 2003).
A.
In
this
L e w i s v. S t a t e , 24 So. 3d 480
Court
Woodward now
considered,
( A l a . Crim.
and r e j e c t e d , t h e f i r s t
App. 2 0 0 6 ) ,
two
claims
raises:
"This
Court,
in
Stallworth
v.
State,
specifically
rejected
an
argument
virtually
i d e n t i c a l t o L e w i s ' s -- n a m e l y , t h a t ' t h e i n d i c t m e n t
[ a g a i n s t him] was v o i d b e c a u s e i t f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e
in the indictment the aggravating
circumstances'
that supported the c a p i t a l offense.
868 So. 2d a t
1186.
We r e j e c t e d S t a l l w o r t h ' s a r g u m e n t , h o l d i n g
t h a t n e i t h e r R i n g v. A r i z o n a n o r A p p r e n d i v. New
J e r s e y m o d i f i e d p r i o r A l a b a m a c a s e l a w , 'which h o l d s
t h a t a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s do n o t have t o be
a l l e g e d i n the indictment.'
868 So. 2d a t 1186.
The i n d i c t m e n t r e t u r n e d a g a i n s t L e w i s a d v i s e d h i m o f
t h e c r i m e w i t h w h i c h he was c h a r g e d -- t h e c a p i t a l
o f f e n s e o f murder d u r i n g k i d n a p p i n g , i n v i o l a t i o n o f
§ 13A-5-40(a)(1),
A l a . Code 1975 -- a n d s e t f o r t h
t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e t h a t t h e S t a t e was
r e q u i r e d t o prove.
I n c l u d e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t was
the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance of kidnapping i n the
f i r s t d e g r e e , t h u s p l a c i n g L e w i s on n o t i c e t h a t , i f
c o n v i c t e d , he c o u l d be f a c i n g a d e a t h
sentence.
Because t h i s s i n g l e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance p l a c e d
L e w i s on n o t i c e t h a t , i f c o n v i c t e d o f t h e c h a r g e d
offense
he c o u l d be f a c i n g a p o t e n t i a l
death
s e n t e n c e , i t was u n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e S t a t e t o amend
t h e i n d i c t m e n t so t h a t i t i n c l u d e d a l l o f t h e
aggravating
circumstances
the State intended to
prove at t r i a l .
v.
" L i k e w i s e , n e i t h e r R i n g v. A r i z o n a n o r A p p r e n d i
New J e r s e y r e q u i r e s t h a t an a c c u s e d be p r o v i d e d
150
CR-08-0145
w i t h advance n o t i c e o f a l l a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
upon w h i c h t h e S t a t e i n t e n d s t o r e l y .
Indeed, t h i s
C o u r t has s t a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
o t h e r enumerated a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances l i s t e d i n
§ 13A-5-49 t h a t a r e n o t e l e m e n t s o f a c a p i t a l
offense:
"'The
aggravating
circumstances
e n u m e r a t e d i n § 13A-5-49 t h a t may l e a d t o
the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y i n a
capital
case
are not elements of the
o f f e n s e a n d a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o be s e t
f o r t h i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t . D o b a r d v. S t a t e ,
435 So. 2d 1338, 1347 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 8 2 ) , a f f ' d , 435 So. 2d 1351 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) .
A d e f e n d a n t h a s no r i g h t t o a d v a n c e n o t i c e
o f t h e s t a t e ' s i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on any o f
the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances.
C l a r k v.
Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1566 ( 1 1 t h C i r .
1 9 8 7 ) ; K n o t t s v. S t a t e , 686 So. 2d 431
( A l a . C r i m . App. [ 1 9 9 5 ] ) ; R u f f i n v. S t a t e ,
397 So. 2d 277, 282 ( F l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . The l i s t
o f a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n § 13A-5-49
i s e x c l u s i v e and p u t s t h e d e f e n d a n t charged
w i t h a c a p i t a l f e l o n y on n o t i c e o f t h o s e
circumstances a g a i n s t which the defendant
may be r e q u i r e d t o d e f e n d .
This s t a t u t o r y
not ic e
s at i sfie s
c o ns t i t u t i o n a l
requirements.'
"Bush v. S t a t e , 695 So. 2d 70, 87 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 5 ) , a f f ' d , 695 So.2d 138 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . C f . A r t h u r
v. S t a t e , 711 So. 2d 1031 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) ,
a f f ' d , 711 So. 2d 1097 ( A l a . 1997) (when a g g r a v a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e l i e d on b y t h e S t a t e a r e e l e m e n t s o f
t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e t h e y must be c h a r g e d i n t h e
indictment)."
L e w i s v. S t a t e , 24 So. 3d a t 534-35.
151
CR-08-0145
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on e i t h e r o f h i s f i r s t
two
claims
for relief;
circumstances
he r e c e i v e d t h e n o t i c e o f
aggravating
he was l e g a l l y due.
B.
The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s a l s o
third
a r g u m e n t -- t h a t R i n g
trial
court
outweigh
that
the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances.
Harris
a j u r y and n o t a
determine whether the a g g r a v a t i n g
Supreme C o u r t i n R i n g
in
requires
r e j e c t e d Woodward's
circumstances
"The U n i t e d
d i d not i n v a l i d a t e i t s e a r l i e r
v. A l a b a m a , 513 U.S.
1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code
504
(1995),
which
States
holding
upheld
§
1975 -- commonly r e f e r r e d t o as t h e
judicial-override
s t a t u t e -- a g a i n s t
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l attack."
T o m l i n v. S t a t e ,
909 So. 2d 213, 282
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ,
r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 909 So. 2d 283 ( A l a . 2003) .
Woodward
a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t i n Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1181 ( A l a .
2 0 0 2 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e w e i g h i n g o f t h e
aggravating
not
circumstances
and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
a f a c t u a l determination
is
t h a t must be made b y a j u r y , b u t
he a r g u e s t h a t t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g was w r o n g .
Having faced
Waldrop,
this
previous
Court
challenges
has s t a t e d :
152
to the holding
"The
decision
i n Ex
parte
i n Ex
parte
CR-08-0145
Waldrop has been c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l l o w e d and u p h e l d . "
v. S t a t e ,
(Ala.
[Ms. CR-06-2236, A p r i l 29, 2011]
Crim.
App.
2011),
CR-06-0827, A u g u s t
App. 2 0 1 0 ) ;
citing
27, 2010]
Spencer
v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d
Mitchell
So. 3d
Stanley
v.
,
,
State
[Ms.
( A l a . Crim.
58 So. 3d 215, 248
( A l a . Crim.
App. 2 0 0 8 ) ; Yeomans v. S t a t e , 898 So. 2d 878, 903 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
2004);
2004).
Ex p a r t e
McNabb,
887
F u r t h e r m o r e , as we a g a i n s t a t e d i n S t a n l e y , t h i s C o u r t
i s b o u n d b y Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p ,
of
t h e Alabama
Supreme
12-3-16, A l a . Code 1975
shall
So. 2d 998, 1005-06 ( A l a .
govern
appeals,
Court.
Id. at
.
also
and
decisions
§
Court
of the courts
of
and t h e d e c i s i o n s and p r o c e e d i n g s o f such c o u r t s o f
shall
control
o f t h e Supreme
Amendment No.
jury
aggravating
be s u b j e c t
to the general
Court
as p r o v i d e d
s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e and
by C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
328.").
unanimously
found
the
existence
of
two
c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- t h a t Woodward h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n
c o n v i c t e d of a v i o l e n t f e l o n y , § 13A-5-49(2),
and t h a t Woodward
hinder
See
("The d e c i s i o n s o f t h e Supreme
the holdings
appeals
The
as we a r e b o u n d by a l l d e c i s i o n s
committed
A l a . Code 1975,
t h e c a p i t a l murder t o d i s r u p t o r
the l a w f u l e x e r c i s e of a governmental
153
function or the
CR-08-0145
enforcement
aggravating
of laws, § 13A-5-49(7),
circumstance
must
A l a . Code 1975.
exist
i n order
O n l y one
t o impose
a
s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( f ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d a j u r y ' s
f i n d i n g o f j u s t one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e c o m p l i e s w i t h t h e
requirement
i n R i n g t h a t a j u r y make a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t h a t makes a d e f e n d a n t
eligible
f o r the death
p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d a t 1188-90.
the
aggravating
and
sentencer, the t r i a l
mitigating
penalty.
Ex
The p r o c e s s o f w e i g h i n g
circumstances
was
f o r the
court, to perform.
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d
to r e l i e f
on any o f t h e R i n g
claims.
XX.
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t A l a b a m a ' s c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g scheme
is
unconstitutional
for several
reasons.
He
argues
that
e x e c u t i o n o f an o f f e n d e r f o l l o w i n g a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n b y a j u r y
of
a sentence of l i f e
imprisonment
without the p o s s i b i l i t y of
p a r o l e v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment a n d t h e n a t i o n ' s e v o l v i n g
standards
of
decency,
the death
and
imposition
of
Alabama's
judicial-override
i t results
penalty.
system
He
in
the
argues,
has
no
arbitrary
also,
that
meaningful
r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g r o l e s o f j u r i e s and t r i a l c o u r t s ,
154
CR-08-0145
and
that r e s u l t s i n the a r b i t r a r y , unequal a p p l i c a t i o n of the
death
sentence.
The m a j o r i t y o f Woodward's a r g u m e n t s have been
and
r e j e c t e d by t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s o f t h i s
have a l s o b e e n c o n s i d e r e d
Supreme
(1995);
Court.
12
and r e j e c t e d by t h e U n i t e d
Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936
d i s c u s s e d i n M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d
S t a t e , and some
See, e.g., H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a ,
Ex p a r t e
considered
( A l a . C r i m . App.
States
513 U.S.
( A l a . 2003).
As
504
we
[Ms. CR-06-0827 Aug. 27, 2010]
2010):
"Initially,
this
Court
notes
that
the
C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s does n o t p r o h i b i t
vesting
the f i n a l
sentencing
a u t h o r i t y i n the
c i r c u i t court.
See S p a z i a n o v. F l o r i d a , 468 U.S.
[447
(1984)].
F u r t h e r , i n H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a , t h e
Supreme
Court
of the United
States
held
that
Alabama's s e n t e n c i n g s t a n d a r d , which (at t h a t time)
r e q u i r e d o n l y t h a t the judge c o n s i d e r the j u r y ' s
a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n , was ' c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . ' 513 U.S. 504, 511 ( 1 9 9 5 ) .
The
C o u r t went on t o e x p l a i n t h a t ' t h e E i g h t h Amendment
does n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o d e f i n e t h e w e i g h t t h e
sentencing
j u d g e must
accord
an a d v i s o r y
jury
verdict.'
I d . a t 512.
Woodward a c k n o w l e d g e s i n a f o o t n o t e o f h i s b r i e f t h a t
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
has
upheld
Alabama's
s e n t e n c i n g - o v e r r i d e scheme a g a i n s t an a r b i t r a r i n e s s c h a l l e n g e ,
c i t i n g H a r r i s v. A l a b a m a , 513 U.S. 504 ( 1 9 9 5 ) .
He a r g u e s ,
h o w e v e r , t h a t H a r r i s s h o u l d be o v e r r u l e d .
(Woodward's b r i e f ,
a t p. 145 n.89.)
Of c o u r s e , t h i s C o u r t has no a u t h o r i t y t o
o v e r r u l e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t .
12
155
CR-08-0145
"Therefore,
M i t c h e l l ' s argument t h a t A l a b a m a '
judicial-override provision is unconstitutional i
without merit.
"Moreover, Alabama's j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e p r o v i s i o n
i s not,
as M i t c h e l l a s s e r t s , s t a n d a r d l e s s .
In
rejecting
the
argument
that
Alabama's
judicial-override provision i s standardless,
the
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has h e l d :
" ' T h i s C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e A p i c e l l a , 809
So.
2d
865
(Ala.
2001),
upheld
the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of h a v i n g a judge, not
the j u r y , determine the punishment i n a
c a p i t a l case.
I n Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 808 So.
2d 1215
( A l a . 2001), t h i s Court h e l d t h a t
the c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g procedure s e t f o r t h
i n §§ 13A-5-47 and
13A-5-53, A l a . Code
1975,
provided
sufficient
guidance
to
prevent
the
a r b i t r a r y and
capricious
imposition
of
a
death
sentence.
Specifically,
the Court noted t h a t
the
c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g procedure "ensures t h a t
the
trial
judge
is
given
adequate
information
and
sufficient
guidance
in
d e c i d i n g whether to accept or to r e j e c t a
j u r y ' s recommended s e n t e n c e " and t h a t §
13A-5-53,
Ala.
Code
1975,
provided
sufficient
guidelines
f o r an
appellate
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of "whether a t r i a l judge's
o v e r r i d e of the j u r y ' s recommendation i s
a p p r o p r i a t e i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . " 808 So.
2d a t 1219.'
"Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n , 836 So. 2d 979, 989 ( A l a . 2002) .
See a l s o Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l , 852 So. 2d 833, 836 ( A l a .
2002) ( e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d u n d e r w h i c h t h e c i r c u i t
c o u r t must w e i g h a j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f l i f e i n
prison
without
the
possibility
of
parole).
Accordingly,
M i t c h e l l ' s argument t h a t
Alabama's
156
CR-08-0145
j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e provision i s 'standardless'
thus ' u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' i s without m e r i t . "
M i t c h e l l v.
State,
So.
Woodward c l a i m s
and
that
3d a t
the
.
(Footnote
evolving
omitted.)
standards
of
decency
" w o r l d o p i n i o n " d e m o n s t r a t e an o p p o s i t i o n t o i m p o s i n g
d e a t h s e n t e n c e on
sentence of l i f e
that
judicial
life
an
offender
imprisonment without
override
imprisonment
of
a
U.S.
407
jury's
violates
(2008),
parole.
He a l s o a r g u e s
recommended s e n t e n c e
the
R o p e r v.
Eighth
Simmons, 543
and A t k i n s v. V i r g i n i a , 536 U.S.
t h o s e c a s e s do
not
the
f o r whom a j u r y recommended a
304
U.S.
(2002).
Louisiana,
551
The
s u p p o r t Woodward's c l a i m ,
(2005),
r a t i o n a l e of
however.
I n Kennedy, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t
Eighth
Amendment p r o h i b i t s t h e
child
where
victim.
held
imposition
578.
crime
did
not
death penalty
result in
f o r rape
the
death
the
of
of
a
the
I n R o p e r v. Simmons, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
that
t h e age
the
of
Amendment's
p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , and he c i t e s Kennedy v.
554
and
"[t]he
Eighth
of
death penalty
the
and
Fourteenth
on
Amendments
offenders
who
o f 18 when t h e i r c r i m e s were c o m m i t t e d . "
forbid
were u n d e r
543
U.S.
at
Kennedy, R o p e r , and A t k i n s e a c h l i m i t a p p l i c a t i o n o f
the
d e a t h p e n a l t y and p r o s c r i b e e x e c u t i o n o f c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s
157
of
CR-08-0145
d e f e n d a n t s , b u t none o f t h e c a s e s a p p l y t o t h e d e a t h
generally
or t o the system of j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e .
I n S p a z i a n o v. F l o r i d a , t h e U n i t e d
long
penalty
ago s t a t e d , when r e v i e w i n g
States
Florida's
Supreme C o u r t
capital-sentencing
statute:
"We
are
not
persuaded
that
placing
the
responsibility
on a t r i a l
judge t o impose t h e
s e n t e n c e i n a c a p i t a l c a s e i s so f u n d a m e n t a l l y a t
odds w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y s t a n d a r d s o f f a i r n e s s and
d e c e n c y t h a t F l o r i d a must be r e q u i r e d t o a l t e r i t s
scheme and g i v e f i n a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h e j u r y t o make
the l i f e - o r - d e a t h d e c i s i o n . "
468 U.S.
447, 465
(1984).
Kennedy, R o p e r , o r A t k i n s
The Supreme C o u r t ' s
verdict
for judicial
in
do n o t i n d i c a t e a r e v e r s a l o f t h e
Court's p r i o r determination
providing
opinions
that a capital-sentencing
override
i s constitutional.
of
Woodward's
a
jury's
system
recommended
expansive
reading
of
those cases i s unwarranted.
The m a j o r i t y
of h i s c l a i m s
the
claims
o f t h e a r g u m e n t s Woodward r a i s e s i n s u p p o r t
have b e e n c o n s i d e r e d
are m e r i t l e s s .
and r e j e c t e d ,
and a l l o f
For a l l the foregoing
reasons,
Woodward's a r g u m e n t s as t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f A l a b a m a ' s
capital-sentencing
s t a t u t e a r e due t o be
XXI.
158
rejected.
CR-08-0145
Woodward makes t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the death
argument
as t o t h e
penalty:
"Objective evidence of the nation's evolving
standards
of decency i n d i c a t e s t h a t
the death
p e n a l t y v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment. L e g i s l a t u r e s
across
the country
are c l e a r l y
moving
toward
a b o l i t i o n , and t h e a n n u a l e x e c u t i o n t a l l y has f a l l e n
i n recent years.
Therefore,
the death
penalty
v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h Amendment, a n d r e v e r s a l o f Mr.
Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s r e q u i r e d . "
(Woodward's b r i e f ,
a t p. 1 4 9 . ) ( F o o t n o t e s
omitted.)
Woodward d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s argument i n t h e t r i a l
so
we
review
error.
The
considered
argument
2010]
error only,
Woodward
and r e j e c t e d
Supreme C o u r t .
27,
i t for plain
by
raises
this
cases c i t e d t h e r e i n .
Kentucky's
lethal
Amendment,
the United
,
on
Court
See M i t c h e l l v . S t a t e ,
So. 3d
a n d we
find
appeal
and by
JJ.)."
plain
has
the
( A l a . Crim.
been
Alabama
App. 2 0 1 0 ) ,
and
A d d i t i o n a l l y , when c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r
injection
States
protocol
satisfied
Supreme C o u r t
the
Eighth
"We
begin
said,
428 U.S. 153
t h a t c a p i t a l punishment i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
U.S., a t 177
no
[Ms. CR-06-0827, Aug.
w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e , s e t t l e d by Gregg [v. G e o r g i a ,
(1976)],
court,
( j o i n t opinion of Stewart,
Baze v . R e e s , 535 U.S. 35, 47
159
See 428
P o w e l l , and S t e v e n s ,
(2008).
CR-08-0145
Woodward o f f e r s
no b i n d i n g
precedent
i n support
argument, and t h i s C o u r t i s n o t f r e e t o reexamine o r
binding
p r e c e d e n t f r o m h i g h e r c o u r t s on t h i s
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f
of h i s
overrule
issue.
on t h i s
claim.
XXII.
Woodward a r g u e s t h a t
the cumulative e f f e c t of the errors
enumerated i n h i s b r i e f r e q u i r e s
and
sentence.
"[W]hen
distinguished
reversible),
Ex
a reversal of h i s conviction
no
one
instance
from e r r o r
amounts
to error
not s u f f i c i e n t l y
(as
p r e j u d i c i a l t o be
t h e cumulative e f f e c t cannot warrant
p a r t e Woods, 789 So. 2d 941, 942-43 n.1
at a l l
reversal."
(Ala. 2001).
The
C o u r t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r a n a l y s i s as f o l l o w s :
" [ W ] h i l e , u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , no
single
error
among
multiple
errors
may
be
s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l under
R u l e 45, i f t h e a c c u m u l a t e d e r r o r s have ' p r o b a b l y
injuriously
affected
substantial
rights
of the
p a r t i e s , ' then the cumulative e f f e c t of the e r r o r s
may r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . "
I d . , q u o t i n g R u l e 45, A l a . R. App. P.
After
applying
the
[ s u b s t i t u t e d p. 160]
CR-08-0145
c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r s t a n d a r d s e t o u t i n Ex p a r t e Woods, s u p r a , t o
Woodward's
allegation
scrupulously
indicating
reviewed
that
aforementioned
the
of
the
cumulative
record
cumulative
and
error,
find
effect
nonreversible errors
no
of
i n this
we
have
evidence
any
of
case
the
affected
Woodward's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s a t t r i a l .
Woodward i s n o t e n t i t l e d
cumulative
t o any r e l i e f
on h i s c l a i m o f
error.
XXIII.
As
required
by
§
13A-5-53,
A l a . Code
a d d r e s s t h e p r o p r i e t y o f Woodward's d e a t h
1975, we
sentence.
Woodward was c o n v i c t e d o f two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l
murder o f a p o l i c e
will
o f f i c e r while the o f f i c e r
murder,
was on d u t y , a
v i o l a t i o n o f § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d m u r d e r b y
f i r i n g a weapon f r o m i n s i d e a v e h i c l e , a v i o l a t i o n o f §13A-54 0 ( a ) ( 1 8 ) , A l a . Code 1975.
Pursuant
reviewed
to
§
13A-5-53(a),
A l a . Code
the sentencing proceedings
adversely
proceedings.
considered
affecting
Woodward's
a n d we
rights
1975,
find
we
no
during
have
error
those
Before determining the sentence, the t r i a l court
a l l of
the
available
161
evidence,
including
the
CR-08-0145
presentence
the
investigation
aggravating
and
r e p o r t , and
mitigating
s e n t e n c i n g order, the c i r c u i t
heard
arguments
circumstances.
about
In
its
court entered w r i t t e n findings
o f f a c t s u m m a r i z i n g t h e o f f e n s e and Woodward's p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in
it.
The
trial
c o u r t a l s o made s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s
a b o u t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
The
court
s t a t e d i t f o u n d two a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s : 1) Woodward was
p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f a f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e use
o f v i o l e n c e , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975;
and
or t h r e a t
2)
Woodward
committed the murder t o d i s r u p t or h i n d e r the e n f o r c e m e n t of
laws,
§
13A-5-49(7),
considered
the
Ala.
Code
1975.
statutory mitigating
t h a t none a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e .
The
The
trial
circumstances
c o u r t found
court
and
found
nonstatutory
m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f f e r e d by Woodward t o e x i s t : 1) t h a t
Woodward had
a good r e l a t i o n s h i p
t h a t Woodward grew up
in a dysfunctional family.
c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e j u r y ' s 8-4
of l i f e
with his children;
The
recommendation f o r a
2 0 0 2 ) , and
852
sentence
So.
i n d i c a t e d i t gave t h a t f a c t o r most
162
2)
trial
i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e as
t h i r d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r , see Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l ,
(Ala.
and
2d
the
833
weight.
CR-08-0145
The
circuit
mitigating
thorough
court
then
circumstances
weighed
and,
with
the
a
explanation f o r i t s reasons,
aggravating
circumstances
aggravating
well
reasoned
determined
outweighed
and
and
that the
the
mitigating
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and s e n t e n c e d Woodward t o d e a t h .
The p r o c e s s
of w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g a n d m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- o f
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w e i g h t t o a t t a c h t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s -- i s a
matter
that i s s t r i c t l y
court.
within
the d i s c r e t i o n
S m i t h v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 273, 298
2000).
c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r o f f e r e d b y Woodward l i t t l e w e i g h t .
The r e c o r d
supports
circuit
court
the c i r c u i t
court
clearly
gave
( A l a . C r i m . App.
mitigating
the
trial
trial
the
fully
The
of the
court's findings,
f o r i t s thorough
a n d we
sentencing
commend
order.
The
r e c o r d does n o t r e f l e c t t h a t Woodward's s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h was
i m p o s e d as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e ,
or
any o t h e r
arbitrary
factor.
See § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) ( 1 ) , A l a .
Code 1975.
Section
13A-5-53(b)(2),
A l a . Code
1975, r e q u i r e s
C o u r t t o reweigh t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g
in
order
proper.
t o determine
We
have
w h e t h e r Woodward's
independently
163
weighed
this
circumstances
death
sentence i s
the
aggravating
CR-08-0145
circumstances
a n d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d we
find
t h a t Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s a p p r o p r i a t e .
Section
Court
to
excessive
13A-5-53(b)(3),
determine
A l a . Code
whether
Woodward's
or disproportionate
imposed i n s i m i l a r cases.
1975, r e q u i r e s
when
death
compared
this
sentence
to the
is
penalty
Woodward was c o n v i c t e d o f one c o u n t
of murder o f a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w h i l e
t h e o f f i c e r was on d u t y
and
a weapon
one
count
vehicle.
o f murder
Sentences
State,
firing
o f d e a t h have been
crimes i n t h i s State.
J u l y 29, 2011]
by
inside
a
imposed f o r s i m i l a r
See A l b a r r a n v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d
from
[Ms. CR-07-2147,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Woods v .
13 So. 3d 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ; McNabb v .
State,
887 So. 2d 929 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f ' d , 887 So. 2d 998
(Ala.
2004)(all
police
imposing
officers).
death
Considering
sentence
i n f o r murder
of
b o t h t h e crime committed and
t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Woodward's d e a t h s e n t e n c e
is neither excessive
Finally,
any
error
this
that
nor d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e .
C o u r t has s e a r c h e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d f o r
may
have
adversely
affected
Woodward's
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s , s e e R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P., a n d we have
f o u n d none.
164
CR-08-0145
Woodward's c o n v i c t i o n s a n d d e a t h s e n t e n c e a r e due t o b e ,
and a r e h e r e b y ,
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Windom, K e l l u m , B u r k e , a n d J o i n e r , J J . , c o n c u r .
165
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