Adam Dwayne Lucas v. State of Alabama

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Rel: 12/18/2009 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-08-0575 Adam Dwayne Lucas v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal PER Court CURIAM. The counts 41, from Morgan C i r c u i t (CC-07-279) a p p e l l a n t , Adam of robbery A l a . Code 20 years i nthef i r s t 1975. i nprison Dwayne Lucas, degree, v i o l a t i o n s He was s e n t e n c e d f o r each was c o n v i c t e d o f t w o count. o f § 13A-8- to concurrent terms o f CR-08-0575 The State's January was 1, and by DeQuesada, a black man ordered him that to 2 0 0 7 , a b l a c k man her. She Neither although driving both wearing that identify said Shutt, 3, c o l o r e d SUV, had suspects being pursued a the a hooded j a c k e t the his man pointed money. the robber as the pizzas Lucas person ski at him Horsewood January 2, s k i mask r o b b e d a who who gun at robbed robbed her. them, them was v e h i c l e ("SUV"). reported been s t o l e n . The that his testified vehicle, a v e h i c l e was later that police. Pieces Greg Pinkard of a toy gun on pewterrecovered i n a home i n v a s i o n a b a n d o n e d t h e v e h i c l e by On a a gun on pointed individual and Diana a h o o d e d j a c k e t and the following. pizza-delivery driver, delivering Lucas that show a Decatur p o l i c e o f f i c e r , 2007, after the was a sport-utility David January she testified could that surrender when to wearing DeQuesada t e s t i f i e d testified from tended Daniel 2007, robbed mask. evidence were while recovered vehicle. Investigator of the Franklin S h e r i f f ' s Department t e s t i f i e d that Lucas admitted his had codefendant, Ira Harris, drivers. 2 robbed two County t h a t he and pizza-delivery CR-08-0575 The jury convicted first degree. court made At L u c a s o f two c o u n t s Lucas's the following sentencing findings of of robbery hearing, the i nthe circuit fact: " I ' l l make a f i n d i n g t h a t i t ' s a p l a s t i c t o y gun. I don't think there's any d i s p u t e that [ i n t e r r u p t i o n b y c o u n s e l ] t h a t -¬ " I ' l l make t h a t f i n d i n g r e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t t h e analysis would or would n o t show. I'm enough [ i n t e r r u p t i o n by c o u n s e l ] s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h a t ' s a p l a s t i c t o y g u n ; h o w e v e r , I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e law i s t h a t i t c o u l d be a l o a d e d gun o r an u n l o a d e d gun o r i t c o u l d be a f a c s i m i l e o r p l a s t i c o r t o y gun. B u t t h e s t a n d a r d i s t h a t i t i s a d e a d l y weapon under the terms of the d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t u t e i f it would lead any p e r s o n p r e s e n t to reasonably b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y weapon o r a d a n g e r o u s instrument. " I think the testimony there i s uncontroverted t h a t r e g a r d l e s s w h e t h e r i t was a t o y o r c o c k e d a n d l o a d e d p i s t o l , t h e p e r s o n b e l i e v e d i t t o be a d e a d l y weapon o r d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t . They b e l i e v e d i t t o be a t o y -- n o t a t o y b u t a r e a l p i s t o l . " (R. 358-59.) The only issue Lucas circuit court erred when statute, sentence the § 13A-5-6(a)(4), f o r robbery robberies weapon." was He r e l i e s raises on i t applied A l a . Code appeal t o y gun 1975, t o and n o t a on S a n d e r s v . S t a t e , 3 the the firearm-enhancement b e c a u s e , he a s s e r t s , a i s whether enhance h i s t h e g u n he u s e d i n "firearm or 947 S o . 2 d 432 deadly (Ala. CR-08-0575 Crim. App. 2006), and Crim. App. 2002), to support Section first Snowden v. his State, "(a) the f i r s t he: So. 2d 24 (Ala. argument. 13A-8-41, A l a . Code 1975, degree, 842 defines robbery i n the and p r o v i d e s : A person commits the crime o f robbery i n d e g r e e i f he v i o l a t e s S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 4 3 a n d "(1) I s armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon dangerous i n s t r u m e n t ; or or fi " ( b ) P o s s e s s i o n t h e n a n d t h e r e o f an article u s e d o r f a s h i o n e d i n a m a n n e r t o l e a d a n y p e r s o n who i s p r e s e n t r e a s o n a b l y t o b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y weapon o r d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t , o r any v e r b a l or o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by the defendant t h a t he i s t h e n and t h e r e so armed, i s p r i m a f a c i e evidence u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t he was s o armed." S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 4 3 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , provides, in pertinent part: "(a) A person commits the c r i m e of r o b b e r y i n the t h i r d degree i f i n the c o u r s e of c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t he: "(1) Uses f o r c e a g a i n s t the p e r s o n of t h e owner o r any p e r s o n p r e s e n t w i t h i n t e n t to overcome h i s p h y s i c a l resistance or p h y s i c a l power of r e s i s t a n c e ; or "(2) T h r e a t e n s the imminent use of f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n of t h e owner o r any p e r s o n p r e s e n t w i t h i n t e n t t o c o m p e l 4 CR-08-0575 acquiescence to the taking with the property." Section as of or escaping 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, o f t e n the firearm-enhancement statute, referred to provides: "For a C l a s s A f e l o n y i n which a f i r e a r m or deadly w e a p o n was u s e d o r a t t e m p t e d t o b e u s e d i n t h e commission of the felony, or a Class A felony c r i m i n a l s e x o f f e n s e i n v o l v i n g a c h i l d as d e f i n e d i n Section 15-20-21(5), [ t h e sentence s h a l l b e ] not l e s s t h a n 20 y e a r s . " Subsection to § (a)(4), 13A-5-6 legislature 13A-5-6, wrote Code imprisonment or in of A l a . Code 1981. that 1 9 7 5 , was In amending i t s purpose Alabama for felonies, 1975, Title Section firearm t o A c t No. 13A-5-6, § statute, " [ t ] o amend relating to the Section sentences of f o r using i n the commission 1975, However, d i s c h a r g e d by gunpowder." 13A-1-2(7), amendment of a 81-840, A l a . A c t s 1981. A l a . Code o r d e a d l y weapon. this so as t o s e t t h e p e n a l t y § 1 3 A - 8 - 1 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a s : is was a t t e m p t i n g t o use a d e a d l y weapon felony." a d d e d b y an does "firearm" not define i s defined i n "A w e a p o n f r o m w h i c h a s h o t "Deadly weapon" i s d e f i n e d i n A l a . Code 1975, a s : "A f i r e a r m o r a n y t h i n g m a n i f e s t l y d e s i g n e d , m a d e , o r adapted f o r the purpose of i n f l i c t i n g death or serious physical injury. The t e r m i n c l u d e s , b u t i s not l i m i t e d t o , a p i s t o l , r i f l e , or shotgun; or a 5 a CR-08-0575 switchblade knife, o r d a g g e r ; o r any metal knuckles." In examining following gravity knife, stiletto, sword, b i l l y , b l a c k - j a c k , bludgeon, or the principles above of statutes, statutory we keep in mind the construction: "'The f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t o f the l e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g the s t a t u t e . I f p o s s i b l e , t h e i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s h o u l d be gathered from the language of the s t a t u t e i t s e l f . ' Volkswagen o f A m e r i c a , I n c . v . D i l l a r d , 579 S o . 2 d 1 3 0 1 , 1305 (Ala. 1991). 'Where a s t a t u t o r y p r o n o u n c e m e n t i s d i s t i n c t a n d u n e q u i v o c a l , t h e r e r e m a i n s no r o o m f o r judicial c o n s t r u c t i o n and the clearly expressed i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e m u s t be g i v e n e f f e c t . ' Ex p a r t e H o l l a d a y , 466 So. 2d 956, 960 (Ala. 1985) ( c i t i n g Dumas B r o s . M f g . Co. v . S o u t h e r n G u a r . I n s . C o . , 431 S o . 2 d 534 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ) . " Ex p a r t e Soto, 991 So. 2d 691, 692 (Ala. 2008). "A b a s i c r u l e o f r e v i e w i s t h a t c r i m i n a l statutes a r e t o be strictly construed i n favor of those p e r s o n s s o u g h t t o be s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i r o p e r a t i o n . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n d e a t h p e n a l t y c a s e s . Ex p a r t e C l e m e n t s , A l a . , 370 S o . 2 d 723 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; S c h e n h e r v . S t a t e , 38 A l a . A p p . 5 7 3 , 90 S o . 2 d 2 3 4 , cert. d e n i e d , 265 A l a . 7 0 0 , 90 S o . 2 d 238 (1956). Penal s t a t u t e s a r e t o r e a c h no f u r t h e r i n m e a n i n g t h a n t h e i r w o r d s . C l e m e n t s , s u p r a ; F u l l e r v . S t a t e , 257 A l a . 5 0 2 , 60 S o . 2 d 202 (1952)." B e r a r d v . S t a t e , 402 As stated above, support h i s argument. of robbery i n the So. 2d 1044, Lucas 1050 relies In Sanders, first degree and 6 on ( A l a . C r i m . App. Sanders and the defendant h i s sentence 1980) . Snowden was was to convicted enhanced CR-08-0575 p u r s u a n t t o § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975. trial showed t h a t hand under appeared the that shirt he had with a gun, his and circuit court incorrectly 1975. I t was undisputed Code see his Sanders entered that Sanders finger to mimic a 32 Rule was fact. We not during the a remand t o the finger that In the a Snowden, that robbery, trial sticking demanded armed w i t h a weapon. testimony he when court $200. out i t held that 13A-5-6(a)(4), § We his so Ala. v i c t i m could gun but this using Court merely in was clearly his held that stated fact for specific he that was he not, findings stated: "The a p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t may be meritorious. The firearm enhancement set forth in § 13A-56 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a p p l i e s o n l y i n t h o s e c a s e s ' i n w h i c h a f i r e a r m o r d e a d l y w e a p o n was used or attempted to be used i n the commission of the felony.' I n t h i s c a s e , b a s e d on s t a t e m e n t s i t made d u r i n g the g u i l t y p l e a proceedings, i t appears that the t r i a l c o u r t m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the f i r e a r m e n h a n c e m e n t c o u l d be a p p l i e d e v e n i n c a s e s i n w h i c h the defendant o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t he was armed with a firearm. H o w e v e r , s u c h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t r a r y to the p l a i n language of § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , Ala. Code 1975. D u r i n g t h e R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s , the S t a t e d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f u t e , and t h e circuit c o u r t d i d not a d d r e s s , the a p p e l l a n t ' s contention. T h e r e f o r e , we r e m a n d t h i s c a s e t o t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t t h a t c o u r t make specific, written f i n d i n g s of f a c t as to the appellant's contention." 7 at a Texaco Food Mart, put applied petitioner's claim armed required was The of CR-08-0575 842 So. 2d a t 25. Our r e s e a r c h scope of § revealed 13A-5-6(a)(4), M c C r e e , 554 S o . 2 d 336 applied to only those conduct); App. court even regard 2d Sorrells 1994) i n the "absence App. is no c a s e t h a t a robbery enhancement to v. S t a t e , to the sentence revealed support 1988) See Ex parte ( f i r e a r m e n h a n c e m e n t may 667 S o . 2 d 1 4 2 , 144 ( f i r e a r m e n h a n c e m e n t may codefendant In (Ala. 1 975. address the be felonies involving intentional criminal ( A l a . Crim. applied during A l a . Code of a 1986) of an unarmed holds with 4 97 enhancement our circuit finding codefendant Indeed, specifically jury Hammond v . S t a t e , (firearm armed). ( A l a . Crim. be a p p l i e d b y t h e specific t o the use of a f i r e a r m , " ) ; 558 other few Alabama c a s e s t h a t So. may be when research that using the has a t o y gun n e c e s s i t a t e s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the f i r e a r m - statute. determining whether there a c o n v i c t i o n f o r robbery the victim's i s sufficient i n the f i r s t evidence d e g r e e , we perceptions: "In a p r o s e c u t i o n f o r f i r s t degree robbery, the robbery v i c t i m does n o t a c t u a l l y have t o see a weapon t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e l e m e n t o f f o r c e ; h i s o r h e r reasonable belief that the robber i s armed i s s u f f i c i e n t . D i n k i n s v . S t a t e , 584 S o . 2 d 932 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) ; B r e e d l o v e v . S t a t e , 482 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 7 8 to look CR-08-0575 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) . The t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a p e r s o n r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t an o b j e c t i s a d e a d l y weapon i s a ' s u b j e c t i v e ' one. James v. S t a t e , 549 S o . 2 d 562 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) . ' I t f o c u s e s o n the " r e a c t i o n of the v i c t i m to the t h r e a t s of the r o b b e r . " S t a t e v . H o p s o n , 122 W i s . 2 d 3 9 5 , 362 N.W.2d 1 6 6 , 169 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . ' 482 S o . 2 d a t 1 2 8 1 . " R i c e v. State, 620 So. 2d 140, 141-42 ( A l a . C r i m . App. H o w e v e r , when d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a d e f e n d a n t ' s should 1975, be we enhanced pursuant must l o o k t o the "firearm" and "deadly ("In t h i s Ala. Code sentence w e a p o n was the Clearly, § So. or attempted 'BB gun' less than i s not a 13A-8-1(4)."); v. require Sumpter 1985) that 1178 ("The 20 used of of the provides a firearm i n the terms App. that or 2d deadly time to the deadly commission Emphasis which So. loaded at the 9 Code (Ala. Crim. years.' 480 Ala. 13A-5-6(a)(4). of added. i s defined i s d i s c h a r g e d by definition a f i r e a r m be which 'firearm' State, sentence sentenced pursuant i n which t o be a shot App. 2d 1175, felony '[a] weapon f r o m w h i c h Crim. definitions contained i n § 13A-5-6(a)(4), [ i s ] not a 648 'a C l a s s A used felony, 13A-5-6(a)(4), c a s e , t h e a p p e l l a n t was 1975, for § statutory weapon" See M c C a s k i l l v . S t a t e , 1994) to 1993). as gunpowder.' 608, weapon 614 § (Ala. does not of the o f f e n s e . CR-08-0575 ... The cause trial judge p r o p e r l y sentenced the a p p e l l a n t s i n i n accordance with Because have there looked comparable § to who the 18 commit 13A-5-6(a)(4)]."). little Alabama federal federal 2B3.1(b) (2), those is [§ law courts sentencing U.S.C., this on for this guidance. guideline, provides issue, enhanced we The U.S.S.G. penalties for robbery: "(A) I f a f i r e a r m was discharged, i n c r e a s e by 7 levels; (B) i f a firearm was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) i f a firearm was b r a n d i s h e d or p o s s e s s e d , i n c r e a s e by 5 l e v e l s ; (D) i f a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n was o t h e r w i s e u s e d , i n c r e a s e by 4 levels; (E) i f a dangerous weapon was brandished, or p o s s e s s e d , i n c r e a s e by 3 l e v e l s ; or (F) i f a t h r e a t o f d e a t h was made, i n c r e a s e b y 2 levels." In addressing United States United States the Court v. of scope of Appeals Koonce, 991 this for F.2d federal the 693 statute, Eleventh (11th Circuit Cir. in 1993), stated: "The i s s u e s q u a r e l y p r e s e n t e d by the f a c t s of t h i s c a s e i s how t o t r e a t f o r r o b b e r y o f f e n s e l e v e l e n h a n c e m e n t p u r p o s e s an o b j e c t t h a t a p p e a r s t o b e a firearm but in reality i s merely a dangerous i n s t r u m e n t , as t h o s e t e r m s a r e c u r r e n t l y d e f i n e d i n the Sentencing Guidelines. This i s s u e i s one of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n , due i n l a r g e p a r t t o t h e f a c t t h a t until a November 1, 1991 amendment to the G u i d e l i n e s , b r a n d i s h i n g a f i r e a r m and b r a n d i s h i n g a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n w e r e t r e a t e d t h e same. O l d U.S.S.G. 10 the CR-08-0575 § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) provided that a robbery defendant who had brandished, displayed, or possessed 'a firearm or other dangerous weapon' received an enhancement of three o f f e n s e levels. "The amendment d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n firearms and d a n g e r o u s weapons. Under t h e amended v e r s i o n o f the G u i d e l i n e s , a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s case, the two t y p e s of weapons are t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . Guideline provisions in effect now and at the time of sentencing provide that a robbery defendant who 'brandished, d i s p l a y e d , or possessed' a f i r e a r m i s to have h i s base o f f e n s e l e v e l i n c r e a s e d by five levels. U.S.S.G. § 2 B 3 . 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( C ) . I f the object 'brandished, d i s p l a y e d , or possessed' i s a dangerous weapon i n s t e a d of a f i r e a r m , t h e n the enhancement i s three l e v e l s , not f i v e . Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). "Supporting K o o n c e ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t a BB g u n i s a dangerous weapon and not a firearm is this seemingly s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d d e f i n i t i o n of f i r e a r m : " ' " F i r e a r m " means ( i ) any weapon ( i n c l u d i n g a s t a r t e r gun) w h i c h w i l l o r i s d e s i g n e d t o o r may r e a d i l y be converted to expel a p r o j e c t i l e b y t h e a c t i o n o f an e x p l o s i v e ; (ii) the frame o r r e c e i v e r o f any such weapon; ( i i i ) any firearm muffler or s i l e n c e r ; o r ( i v ) any d e s t r u c t i v e device. A weapon, commonly known as a "BB" or p e l l e t gun, t h a t u s e s a i r o r c a r b o n d i o x i d e pressure to expel a projectile is a d a n g e r o u s weapon b u t not a f i r e a r m . ' "Id. That § 1 B 1 . 1 , comment. (n. seems s i m p l e e n o u g h . 1(e)) (emphasis added). "The G o v e r n m e n t a r g u e s , a n d t h e d i s t r i c t court found, however, t h a t the v i c t i m i n t h i s case q u i t e r e a s o n a b l y t h o u g h t t h a t t h e p i s t o l was the real thing, a firearm. Koonce cannot question the reasonableness of such a p e r c e p t i o n , because he 11 CR-08-0575 c o n f e s s e d t h a t h e h a d u s e d 'a BB g u n o f m i n e t h a t looks like a real gun, somewhat like a 45 a u t o m a t i c . ' Koonce's c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t r e a l i t y , and not appearance, i s the c r i t e r i o n i n s o f a r as t h e G u i d e l i n e s ' d e f i n i t i o n o f f i r e a r m s i s c o n c e r n e d . The strongest support f o r h i s p o s i t i o n a r i s e s from the f a c t t h a t commentary t o t h e G u i d e l i n e s expressly provides that insofar as d a n g e r o u s weapons a r e c o n c e r n e d , a p p e a r a n c e s c o u n t as w e l l as r e a l i t y ; b u t n o s u c h p r o v i s i o n i s made c o n c e r n i n g f i r e a r m s . The same a p p l i c a t i o n n o t e t h a t g i v e s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f 'firearm' quoted above a l s o contains i n another subpart this d e f i n i t i o n : " ' " D a n g e r o u s w e a p o n " means a n i n s t r u m e n t capable of i n f l i c t i n g death or serious bodily injury. Where an object that appeared t o be a d a n g e r o u s weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, t r e a t the o b j e c t as a d a n g e r o u s weapon.' "Id. comment. (n. 1 ( d ) ) (emphasis added). " T h a t i s n o t a l l . The c o m m e n t a r y s a y s t h e same thing again in a second place. The second application note to the robbery offense level s e c t i o n o f t h e G u i d e l i n e s , U.S.S.G. § 2 B 3 . 1 , p l a i n l y states: "'When a n o b j e c t t h a t a p p e a r e d t o be a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n was b r a n d i s h e d , d i s p l a y e d , or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon f o r the purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E).' "Subsection (b)(2)(E) i s the p r o v i s i o n for a t h r e e - l e v e l i n c r e a s e i n t h e o f f e n s e l e v e l where a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or p o s s e s s e d . B y c o n t r a s t , t h e r e i s no p r o v i s i o n t h a t an o b j e c t t h a t a p p e a r e d t o be a f i r e a r m s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as a f i r e a r m f o r p u r p o s e s o f a f i v e - l e v e l increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). 12 CR-08-0575 "The district c o u r t s t a t e d no rationale for t r e a t i n g t h e BB gun as a r e a l f i r e a r m e x c e p t to s t a t e i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , ' T h i n k i n g t h a t i t was r e a l e q u a t e s i t w i t h b e i n g a f i r e a r m t h a t c o u l d do h e r harm and t h e r e f o r e f i v e l e v e l s a r e appropriate i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . ' Under the G u i d e l i n e s and their commentary, that would be true insofar as a three-step increase for dangerous weapons is concerned, but i t i s at l e a s t i m p l i e d l y not true with look-alike firearms and a five-step enhancement. "The G o v e r n m e n t c o n t e n d s t h a t , ' t h e o n l y s u p p o r t f o r defendant's argument t h a t v i c t i m p e r c e p t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t i s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n n o t e ' s s i l e n c e on t h e issue,' and says, '[t]hat silence is only c o n s p i c u o u s b e c a u s e t h e a n a l o g o u s d a n g e r o u s weapon application note expressly addresses victim p e r c e p t i o n . ' T h a t may be t r u e , b u t m e r e l y d e s c r i b i n g the argument does not r e b u t i t . C o n s p i c u o u s l y absent from the Government's brief is any credible e x p l a n a t i o n f o r why t h e S e n t e n c i n g C o m m i s s i o n , i f i t intended v i c t i m perception to c o n t r o l over r e a l i t y f o r f i r e a r m s e n h a n c e m e n t , w o u l d n o t h a v e s a i d so as i t d i d t w i c e f o r d a n g e r o u s weapon enhancement. "From t h a t w h i c h i s and t h a t w h i c h i s n o t i n t h e commentary, we conclude that i f the Sentencing Commission had i n t e n d e d t o have appearances count over r e a l i t y f o r 'firearm' d e f i n i t i o n purposes i t w o u l d have s a i d so, as i t d i d f o r ' d a n g e r o u s weapon' definition purposes. The canon of statutory c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n o f one i m p l i e s t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s i s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d . See, e.g., Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 , 111 S.Ct. 840, 8 4 6 - 4 7 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ; R u s s e l l o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L . E d . 2 d 17 (1983); United S t a t e s v . G i l t n e r , 972 F . 2 d 1563, 1565 (11th C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. J o r d a n , 915 F . 2 d 622, 628 (11th C i r . 1990), c e r t . denied, [499] U.S. [979], 111 S.Ct. 1629, 113 L.Ed.2d 725 (1991). The 13 CR-08-0575 p o p u l a r i t y o f t h a t canon w i t h c o u r t s stems f r o m more than the fact that i t dresses well in Latin: i n c l u s i o u n i u s e s t e x c l u s i o a l t e r i u s . The c a n o n i s frequently cited and employed because i n many c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t makes g o o d s e n s e . T h i s c a s e i s a prime example. "We h o l d t h a t a BB g u n t h a t l o o k s l i k e a r e a l f i r e a r m and i s p e r c e i v e d by the v i c t i m o f a r o b b e r y t o be s u c h i s n o t a f i r e a r m f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e f i v e - s t e p enhancement of the base o f f e n s e l e v e l f o r r o b b e r y u n d e r U.S.S.G. § 2 B 3 . 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( C ) . I t i s a dangerous weapon which leads to a three-step enhancement under 991 F.2d at 696-98. 270 § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E)." See United States (7th C i r . 1994). U n l i k e Congress, Alabama has v. Robinson, not e n l a r g e d the 20 definition o f " d e a d l y weapon" c o n t a i n e d i n § 1 3 A - 1 - 2 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code to encompass statutes. defined A a toy toy gun gun. is i n § 13A-8-1(4), We not are a F.3d 1975, bound by the relevant "firearm" as that term A l a . Code 1975. Nor i s a t o y gun is a " d e a d l y weapon" as t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n § 1 3 A - 1 - 2 ( 7 ) , A l a . Code 1975. Herndon v. (See State, the Alabama 563 So. 2d Supreme C o u r t ' s d i s c u s s i o n 1065 (Ala. 1990).). A c c o r d i n g l y , the c i r c u i t court e r r e d i n enhancing sentences under the firearm-enhancement hereby remanded resentence Lucas to the without circuit statute. court application 14 in for of This case i s that the Lucas's court to enhancement CR-08-0575 contained should this i n § be f i l e d 13A-5-6(a)(4), i n this 1975. Due return C o u r t w i t h i n 52 d a y s f r o m t h e d a t e o f opinion. REMANDED WITH Wise, J., A l a . Code INSTRUCTIONS. P . J . , and Kellum and Main, concurs i n the r e s u l t . J J . ,concur. Windom, Welch, J . , d i s s e n t s , w i t h opinion. WELCH, J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g . The j u r y i n t h i s whether Adam Dwayne dangerous case heard d i s p u t e d Lucas instrument effect of the 13A-8-41(b), armed w i t h verdicts was a r m e d w i t h during pizza-delivery drivers. the course a deadly f o r both The j u r y as found the robberies course a deadly of counts defined that o f f e r e d as e v i d e n c e p i e c e s At Lucas § was returned of first-degree robbery. t h a t L u c a s was weapon o r d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t of the robberies. in and thus, T h e j u r y t h e r e f o r e made a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n armed w i t h weapon o r o f two r o b b e r i e s presumption 1975. a firearm during of g u i l t concerning T h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e rebuttable A l a . Code testimony the sentence of a p l a s t i c during the hearing, t o y gun r e c o v e r e d Lucas from a different c r i m e s c e n e i n v o l v i n g L u c a s t o show t h a t L u c a s was not armed truly with a firearm 15 when he committed the CR-08-0575 robberies. to The t r i a l the jury's robberies, because found t h a t Lucas had n o t , c o n t r a r y determination, but enhancement, court § been armed w i t h a gun d u r i n g determined the nevertheless, 13A-5-6, the v i c t i m s A l a . Code believed that that 1975, applied L u c a s was the firearm to Lucas armed d u r i n g the robberies. I believe that the trial court properly f i r e a r m enhancement t o L u c a s ' s sentence, reasons. reason the I believe enhancement i s t h a t and then made Therefore, Lucas's I firearm the jury's factual believe albeit finding that because the § that majority the t r i a l court 13A-5-6, the f o r the wrong f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the j u r y considered enhancement, disputed Lucas evidence was opinion reversing improperly A l a . Code armed. 1975, applied negates factual finding. Contrary legal a sentences the system, dealing with The the proper applied fact that to the majority each g o v e r n m e n t may criminal issues enact I note that guide 13A-5-6, A l a . Code 1975. our d i f f e r e n t methods t h e f e d e r a l government has d e c i d e d should under of arising within i t s jurisdiction. a d i f f e r e n t method o f d e a l i n g a factor that opinion, with f i r e a r m enhancement i s not our d e c i s i o n The about federal decisions 16 to implement the scope regarding of § the CR-08-0575 federal government's enhancement s t a t u t e s are not constitutional another law sovereign issue. writing deciding principles regarding Such construed. but Alabama's For the thus how decisions legislation, how and i t will might they are be have set forth as a criminalguide to effect in statute should be persuasive firearm-enhancement reasons by deal with a useful no on decisions merely grounded below, I respectfully dissent. L u c a s and with two counts I r a Joe H a r r i s , J r . , were c h a r g e d by of robbery § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 , A l a . Code 1975. The indictment, in i n the The first cases pertinent indictment degree, v i o l a t i o n s were s e v e r e d part, charged for trial. Lucas follows: "The G r a n d J u r y o f s a i d C o u n t y c h a r g e s t h a t b e f o r e the f i n d i n g of t h i s i n d i c t m e n t I r a Joe H a r r i s J r . a n d Adam D w a y n e L u c a s , w h o s e names a r e t o t h e G r a n d Jury otherwise unknown, did, i n the course of c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t o f a m i x e d q u a n t i t y o f money i n l a w f u l c u r r e n c y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a , the property of Villarreal Pizza, Incorporated, a c o r p o r a t i o n d o i n g b u s i n e s s as D o m i n o ' s P i z z a , o f a total aggregate value of $42.00, a further and b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n of which i s to the Grand J u r y otherwise unknown, t h r e a t e n the imminent use of f o r c e a g a i n s t the p e r s o n of D a n i e l A s h l e y deQuesada, w i t h the i n t e n t to compel acquiescence to the t a k i n g of or e s c a p i n g w i t h the p r o p e r t y , w h i l e the said d e f e n d a n t s were armed w i t h a deadly weapon, or dangerous instrument, t o - w i t : a p i s t o l , i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 13A-8-41 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a , 17 of as CR-08-0575 "COUNT I I "The G r a n d J u r y o f s a i d C o u n t y f u r t h e r c h a r g e s t h a t b e f o r e the f i n d i n g of t h i s i n d i c t m e n t I r a Joe H a r r i s J r . a n d Adam Dwayne L u c a s , w h o s e names a r e t o t h e Grand J u r y o t h e r w i s e unknown, d i d , i n the c o u r s e of c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t o f a m i x e d q u a n t i t y o f money i n l a w f u l c u r r e n c y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a , the property of Villarreal Pizza, Incorporated, a c o r p o r a t i o n d o i n g b u s i n e s s as D o m i n o ' s P i z z a , o f a total aggregate value of $31.00, a further and b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n of which i s to the Grand J u r y otherwise unknown, t h r e a t e n the imminent use of f o r c e a g a i n s t the p e r s o n of Diana Horsewood, w i t h the i n t e n t to compel acquiescence to the t a k i n g of or escaping with the property, while the said d e f e n d a n t s were armed w i t h a deadly weapon, or dangerous instrument, t o - w i t ; a p i s t o l , i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 13A-8-41 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a , a g a i n s t t h e p e a c e and d i g n i t y o f t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a . " (C. 53.) A robbery jury found Lucas g u i l t y charged i n the of both indictment. The counts trial of f i r s t - d e g r e e court imposed 20-year sentence f o r each c o n v i c t i o n , to run c o n c u r r e n t l y , applied § an enhancement pursuant 13A-5-6, A l a . Code to the and f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n of 1975: "(a) Sentences for felonies shall be for a d e f i n i t e term of imprisonment, which imprisonment includes hard labor, within the following limitations: fi "(4) For a C l a s s A f e l o n y i n w h i c h a firearm or deadly weapon was used or a t t e m p t e d t o be u s e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f 18 a CR-08-0575 the f e l o n y , or a C l a s s A f e l o n y c r i m i n a l s e x o f f e n s e i n v o l v i n g a c h i l d as d e f i n e d i n Section 15-20-21(5), not less than 20 years." The and evidence presented Harris occasions on he 1, 2007, had evening, jacket, at while he was him Daniel he confronted a black shirt, and t e n d e d t o show t h a t pizza-delivery drivers returning to occupants by a b l a c k man blue jeans, and ordered him to on two that to his of that surrender "Q. [Prosecutor:] O k a y . Was a n y t h i n g or have anything "A. [Dequesada:] Yeah. He g o t p r e t t y c l o s e t o me away a n d he h a d a g u n . "Q. What d i d he "A. He j u s t p o i n t e d i t a t me, a n d he g i v e me a l l h i s -- o r g i v e h i m money. "Q. Did "A. Why "A. Well, you do d i d you do with the the man money he he armed with with him? a p p r o a c h e d me. a b o u t maybe a He foot gun? t o l d me a l l of because he him your had a gun to my 19 money? pointed at covered pointed that? give room w e a r i n g a hooded Yes, s i r . "Q. the vehicle a hotel a s k i mask t h a t DeQuesada t e s t i f i e d Lucas testified DeQuesada was delivered a pizza most of h i s f a c e . gun robbed i n Morgan County. January after one together at t r i a l me." had. a CR-08-0575 (R. 181-82.) On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , when a s k e d weapon u s e d , DeQuesada specifically about the testified: "Q. [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l : ] A n d a s f a r as t h e g u n t h a t y o u saw, y o u d o n ' t know i f i t was a r e a l g u n o r t o y g u n o r w h a t , do y o u ? "A. [DeQuesada] I don't know t h a t much a b o u t g u n s t o tell." (R. 185.) D e Q u e s a d a c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e r o b b e r , a n d he that Lucas was taller than t h e man Diana Horsewood t e s t i f i e d and that s h e was she had robbed completed a that who had she robbed also testified him. delivered a t g u n p o i n t on J a n u a r y 2, 2007, [Prosecutor:] So tell us h a p p e n e d on J a n u a r y , 2 0 0 7 . "A. [Horsewood:] ... I w e n t on u p a n d made my delivery. A n d when I was c o m i n g b a c k down t h e s t a i r s s o m e b o d y was c o m i n g u p . So I g o t o v e r t o t h e r i g h t s o he c o u l d p a s s me. When I m o v e d t o t h e r i g h t he m o v e d t o t h e r i g h t t o o , a n d t h e n I l o o k e d down a n d he h a d a g u n p o i n t e d a t me a n d t o l d me to g i v e h i m a l l t h e money t h a t I h a d . " about what 189.) She he after delivery. "Q. (R. pizzas was f u r t h e r d e s c r i b e d the appearance a black man wearing of the robber a hooded j a c k e t 20 and saying a s k i mask. CR-08-0575 "Q. "A. He h a d a s k i m a s k o n , w e a r i n g a j a c k e t . If I r e m e m b e r r i g h t he h a d a h o o d o n , b u t he d e f i n i t e l y h a d a d a r k s k i mask a n d a gun l o w down h e r e l i k e t h i s a n d p o i n t e d u p a t me. T h a t was r e a l l y a l l I saw. "Q. The gun? "A. The gun. "Q. T e l l us a b o u t about i t . "A. (R. When t h e person steps, tell us looked. I t looked l i k e going to shoot the gun, a gun. me." what I you that you on the person remember thought he was 191-92.) The robber prosecutor had questioned Horsewood about the brandished: "Q. Do "A. Not too "Q. Did i t look "A. (R. confronted about how you know a n y t h i n g I t looked r e a l . otherwise." about guns? much. like a real I had gun no to you? reason to think 194.) On "Q. cross-examination Horsewood s t a t e d : [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l : ] And you, say I'm going anything? 21 he to didn't shoot threaten you or gun the CR-08-0575 "A. [ H o r s e w o o d : ] I saw t h a t g u n p o i n t e d and t h a t ' s enough o f a t h r e a t . " a t me fi "Q. "A. I t looked "Q. I t was r e a l t o y o u , b u t y o u d o n ' t k n o w f o r s u r e w h a t i t was o r n o t ? "Q. (R. Y o u d o n ' t k n o w i f t h a t was a r e a l t o y g u n o r w h a t , do y o u ? No." real gun o r t o me. 195-96.) Horsewood indicated utility a gold that was not able identify ("SUV"), and DeQuesada SUV n e a r t h e l o c a t i o n w h e r e police officer January 3, 2 0 0 7 , colored SUV, h a d b e e n to the robber. t h e r o b b e r was i n a l a r g e , l i g h t vehicle Decatur report to stolen. the police, brown sport- that h e saw testified he was r o b b e d . David Lucas reported She Shutt that By testified hisvehicle, the time the vehicle Lucas had been that on a pewtermade t h e recovered in F r a n k l i n C o u n t y when s u s p e c t s i n a home i n v a s i o n fled enforcement abandoned i t during officers i n the vehicle and then from law the pursuit. Investigator L t . Greg P i n k a r d with the Franklin County S h e r i f f ' s D e p a r t m e n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t an e l d e r l y c o u p l e h a d b e e n 22 CR-08-0575 assaulted January and robbed 2, 2 0 0 7 , reportedly i n their and t h a t involved passenger abandoned the sheriff's department locate the suspects deputies i n that the revealed that further investigation arrest. He was a r r e s t e d crime. a and f l e d robbed admitted i n t o the woods; but d i d not motor-vehicle was of to Lucas. obtained After f o r Lucas's i n M o r g a n C o u n t y a n d was t a k e n t o t h e D e c a t u r p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t w h e r e he was Lucas to L t . Pinkard interviewed. that he and H a r r i s two p i z z a - d e l i v e r y d r i v e r s . "Adam L u c a s s t a t e d a c o u p l e o f d a y s a g o Snow a n d I w e r e r i d i n g a r o u n d a n d g o t t h e i d e a o f t a k i n g my l i t t l e b o y ' s p l a s t i c g u n a n d f o l l o w i n g t h e p i z z a man and t a k i n g t h e money. I d r o v e my S u b u r b a n [SUV] a n d Snow g o t o u t a n d t o o k t h e i r m o n e y . Snow g o t o u t both times with the p l a s t i c p i s t o l . B o t h t i m e s we got a b o u t $60 t o $70 c a s h (both t i m e s ) . "When t h e c o p s g o t b e h i n d u s I t h r e w t h e s t u f f o u t t h e w i n d o w . A f t e r t h a t we r a n a n d f o u n d o u r way back to Decatur. I first a s k e d f o r an attorney d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w , a n d when L i e u t e n a n t Pinkard s t a r t e d t o leave I asked him t o stay, that I wanted t o t e l l t h e t r u t h a n d d i d n ' t want an a t t o r n e y . " (R. was the vehicle belonged warrant t h e SUV t h a t of A check time. SUV the evening T h e d r i v e r o f t h e SUV a n d recovered the during pursued the vehicle at that records home 231-32.) 23 had CR-08-0575 Lt. Pinkard involvement However, and that testified that i n the robberies Harris told Lucas Harris also the he drove robberies. the and b o t h that when like the vehicle they the Decatur SUV DeQuesada H o r s e w o o d v i e w e d a p h o t o g r a p h o f L u c a s ' s SUV, i t looked his of the p i z z a - d e l i v e r y d r i v e r s . the i n v e s t i g a t o r that committed admitted saw and stated they were robbed. Sgt. Rick participated Archer i n the pizza-delivery of investigation drivers. After was i n i t i a l e d but not signed, was accurate and o b t a i n e d cross-examination Archer toy. testified Sgt. Archer a toy. Lucas the that Lucas's gun was a of the statement or that a t o y gun." how they the p o l i c e had o b t a i n e d had used When toy " I don't b e l i e v e i t was and H a r r i s robberies signature. d i d not b e l i e v e where department he a s k e d L u c a s i f t h e s t a t e m e n t the testified, stating Archer said that "Q. he I don't b e l i e v e Without believed that noting Lucas's whether of police or asked not, Sgt. t h e g u n was a the firearm i s (R. 274.) were obtained, Sgt. parts o f t h e gun they i n the robberies. [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l : ] Now, a r e you f a m i l i a r w i t h b o t h o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s as f a r as I r a H a r r i s and [Lucas's] statement, both of t h e m s a i d i t was a p l a s t i c t o y g u n , d i d n ' t they? 24 on CR-08-0575 "A. [ S g t . A r c h e r : ] I would have t o l o o k a t t h e s p e c i f i c s of Ira's statement, but I b e l i e v e he d i d r e f e r t o t h e g u n a s a t o y . I d o n ' t know i f he s a i d i t was p l a s t i c o r w h a t , b u t I t h i n k he r e f e r r e d t o i t a s a t o y . "Q. As "A. I "Q. Now, M r . H a r r i s d i d g i v e a s t a t e m e n t c o n f e s s e d , d i d n ' t he? "A. That's "Q. Mr. Harris pleaded y e s t e r d a y , d i d n ' t he? "A. He d i d . "Q. To "A. He d i d . "Q. Do "A. I h a v e p a r t s o f w h a t we b e l i e v e was w h a t t h e y u s e d , was t h e f i r e a r m t h e y u s e d . "Q. And "A. We p r o c e s s e d t h o s e . I have photographs of them. I can't tell you b a s e d on t h e photographs. "Q. Do "A. They "Q. I'm "A. They a toy? believe. correct. these guilty in here two r o b b e r i e s ? you have the are those they a n d he appear appear sorry, appear gun? parts plastic? t o be t o be plastic? metal. what? t o be metal. 25 CR-08-0575 "Q. "A. (R. B u t y o u ' r e j u s t b a s i n g t h a t on w h e r e y o u ' v e seen them? The p i c t u r e s I've seen, yes." 284-86.) On redirect examination, Sgt. Archer explained his reasoning: "Q. [ P r o s e c u t o r : ] A n y t h i n g e l s e about t h e gun a p p e a r t o be p l a s t i c o r t o y o r r e a l f r o m what you've seen? "A. [ S g t . A r c h e r : ] I t appeared me. "Q. What a b o u t "A. T h e r e ' s a s t a m p on i t , t h e W a l t h e r s t a m p . Walther i s a type o f f i r e a r m , and t h e W a l t h e r s t a m p i s on t h e s l i d e o f t h e f r a m e o f t h i s f i r e a r m , a n d t h a t ' s t h e same s t a m p t h a t W a l t h e r p u t s on a l l o f t h e i r h a n d g u n s . I t ' s a v e r y s i g n a t u r e stamp f o r W a l t h e r . T h e f i r e a r m l o o k s r e a l a n d i t ' s made t o look real, and certainly the victims b e l i e v e d i t was r e a l . " i t appeared t o be a r e a l t o be a r e a l gun t o gun? (R. 2 8 6 . ) Sgt. toy Archer acknowledged gun so t h a t i t appears that a stamp c a n be p l a c e d on a t o be a r e a l gun. "Q. [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l : ] O f f i c e r , a t o y gun c a n h a v e a s t a m p o n i t t o b e made t o l o o k l i k e a r e a l gun? "A. [Sgt. Archer:] Certainly 26 i t could. CR-08-0575 "Q. "A. No, t h e y ' r e a c t u a l s i z e . T h e y w o u l d be t h e actual size of a f i r e a r m . Again, I can't t e l l y o u t h a t i t was a t o y . I t l o o k s t o be a firearm. "Q. But you don't know t e s t s come b a c k ? "A. (R. How big are these pieces that you're t a l k i n g a b o u t : an i n c h , two i n c h e s ? No, and there's been no ma'am." 287.) Lucas citing the moved lack for a judgment of of proof of a deadly acquittal specifically weapon. "Judge, I would f i l l [ s i c ] a motion f o r judgment of a c q u i t t a l i n t h e c a s e t h a t t h e S t a t e -- t h a t t h e evidence presented is insufficient to support a f i n d i n g of g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. "There's (R. rested without No charged in proof that this was a deadly weapon." 289.) Lucas the no charge conference the j u r y indictment. the first "(a) the f i r s t he: p r e s e n t i n g any on appears robbery degree, i n the i n the A l a . Code 1975, testimony. record. first d e g r e e as The court s e t out § 13A-8-41, d e f i n i n g robbery provides, in pertinent part: A person commits the crime of r o b b e r y i n d e g r e e i f he v i o l a t e s S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 4 3 a n d 27 in CR-08-0575 "(1) I s armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon dangerous i n s t r u m e n t ; or or fi "(b) P o s s e s s i o n t h e n and t h e r e o f an article u s e d o r f a s h i o n e d i n a manner t o l e a d any p e r s o n who i s p r e s e n t r e a s o n a b l y t o b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y weapon or d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t , or any v e r b a l or other representation b y t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t he is t h e n and there so a r m e d , i s p r i m a f a c i e evidence under s u b s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t he was so armed." Section third 13A-8-43, degree, Ala. Code provides, 1975, defining in pertinent robbery in the part: "(a) A p e r s o n commits the c r i m e of r o b b e r y i n the t h i r d degree i f i n the course of c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t he: "(1) Uses f o r c e a g a i n s t the p e r s o n of t h e owner o r any p e r s o n p r e s e n t w i t h i n t e n t to overcome h i s p h y s i c a l resistance or p h y s i c a l power of r e s i s t a n c e ; or "(2) T h r e a t e n s the i m m i n e n t use of f o r c e a g a i n s t the p e r s o n of the owner or any p e r s o n p r e s e n t w i t h i n t e n t t o c o m p e l a c q u i e s c e n c e to the t a k i n g of or escaping w i t h the property." The the that first the dangerous guilty. court charged the j u r y on degree i n c l u d i n g the defendant instrument" Included was in the elements requirement "armed before the i t with a could return court's 28 that oral of robbery the deadly a jury in find weapon or verdict of charge was an CR-08-0575 explanation of the rebuttable presumption 41(b). Lucas made no second degree. The verdict forms f o r each choice only between finding Lucas guilty first to the he degree the or f i n d i n g court's oral lesser-included would request found him charge. f o r a charge not g u i l t y . Had Lucas o f f e n s e of robbery have been e n t i t l e d on of Lucas robbery count 13A-8in d i d not in a charge second a the object on degree, to i t . "While we think that the presumption in § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 ( b ) c a n be r e b u t t e d ( s u c h a s b y evidence t h a t t h e gun was o b v i o u s l y a t o y ) , we t h i n k t h a t t h e Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals erred i n holding that e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e gun was u n l o a d e d can r e b u t the presumption that i t was a 'deadly weapon or dangerous i n s t r u m e n t . ' This Court holds t h a t an unloaded gun qualifies as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument under § 13A-8-41(b), because t h a t s t a t u t e ' s c o n c e r n i s w i t h w h e t h e r any person p r e s e n t i s l e d ' r e a s o n a b l y t o b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y weapon o r d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t . ' "We hold that the better rule i s that an u n l o a d e d gun i s a ' d e a d l y w e a p o n ' f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 , a n d t h a t when t h e e v i d e n c e s h o w s , a s i t d o e s i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was 'armed' with a pistol at the time of the robbery, the s h o w i n g t h a t i t w a s , i n f a c t , n o t l o a d e d , i s n o t an a f f i r m a t i v e defense, nor i s i t evidence t h a t will e n t i t l e the defendant to a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e instruction." 29 the allowed robbery requested i n the in § CR-08-0575 Herndon v. State, 1990)(emphasis At Lucas's recovered during an charges. sentencing from attempted i s located the pieces i n the magazine. Chief McWhorter the firearm. that, (Ala. Moulton police of a p l a s t i c victim unrelated i n Lawrence as p l a s t i c , chief gun t h a t h a d of a robbery the present County. Chief with metal to some i n h i s opinion, he s a i d . t h e g u n was (R. 3 5 1 - 5 2 . ) the pieces from h i s two-year-old evidence 1070-71 No a m m u n i t i o n was r e c o v e r e d , testified Lucas i d e n t i f i e d were 10 65, of a carjacking identified a real pieces the vehicle parts not 2d hearing, identified Moulton McWhorter So. in original). Lyndon McWhorter been 563 son's adduced d u r i n g o f t h e gun and s a i d t h a t t o y gun. the t r i a l His testimony they and of the substance of h i s c o d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t was t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the t o y f o u n d i n L a w r e n c e C o u n t y was u s e d i n t h e M o r g a n County robberies. The a plastic trial court made a f i n d i n g of fact that t h e g u n was t o y gun: " I ' l l make a f i n d i n g t h a t i t ' s a p l a s t i c t o y gun. I don't think there's any d i s p u t e that [ i n t e r r u p t i o n b y c o u n s e l ] t h a t -- 30 CR-08-0575 " I ' l l make t h a t f i n d i n g r e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t t h e analysis would or would not show. I'm enough [ i n t e r r u p t i o n by c o u n s e l ] s a t i s f i e d that that's a p l a s t i c t o y g u n ; h o w e v e r , I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e l a w i s t h a t i t c o u l d be a l o a d e d gun o r an unloaded gun o r i t c o u l d be a f a c s i m i l e o r p l a s t i c o r t o y gun. But t h e s t a n d a r d i s t h a t i t i s a d e a d l y weapon under the terms of the d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t u t e i f it would l e a d any person present to reasonably b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y w e a p o n o r a d a n g e r o u s instrument. " I t h i n k the t e s t i m o n y t h e r e i s u n c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t r e g a r d l e s s w h e t h e r i t was a t o y o r c o c k e d and l o a d e d p i s t o l , t h e p e r s o n t h e r e b e l i e v e d i t t o be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. They b e l i e v e d i t t o be a t o y -- n o t a t o y b u t a r e a l pistol. " I l o o k e d a t i t c l o s e l y and f r o m s t a n d i n g , and we're e i g h t f e e t a p a r t at the most, I c o u l d n ' t t e l l i f i t was t o y or r e a l . That b a r r e l looked very r e a l , a n d t h e s l i d e on t o p l o o k e d v e r y r e a l , and I've seen hundreds of handguns." (R. 358-59.) When the trial court imposed s t a t e d t h a t e v e n t h o u g h L u c a s and "it appeared from anybody w h i c h makes i t a d e a d l y it's a 20 Lucas § year 13A-5-6(a)(4), sentences that the A l a . Code f o r crimes looking (R. 20-year sentence, H a r r i s were u s i n g a t o y at weapon u n d e r our minimum." argues the i t to be a statute. real i t gun, gun, Therefore, 369.) trial court e r r e d when i t a p p l i e d 1975, which provides for i n which a f i r e a r m or a deadly 31 enhanced weapon i s CR-08-0575 used or attempted Lucas argues resulted not t o be u s e d that the firearm in illegal a firearm o r a d e a d l y weapon. 842 S o . 2 d 24 State, 947 S o . 2 d 432 relies 2002), C r i m . App. used that jury Lucas found, on the basis o r h i s c o d e f e n d a n t was a dangerous robbery he fashioned instrument. or his in a reasonably and on S n o w d e n v . and Sanders 2006), v. i n support of to believe to evidence, a deadly undisputed that used lead i t t o be conflicting armed w i t h I t was codefendant manner of any an who i n each "article person a d e a d l y weapon weapon used or dangerous The o n l y presented not a f i r e a r m to the jury confession that t h e a r t i c l e was or i s present i n s t r u m e n t , " § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975. his and claim. The or Lucas felony. improper a t o y g u n was ( A l a . C r i m . App. (Ala. of a e n h a n c e m e n t was sentences because State, his i n the commission evidence and t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n f e s s i o n was of h i s codefendant. Under the i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o the j u r y i n t h i s case, i t could first before degree, the find jury reasonable doubt dangerous instrument. presumption that that he he was Lucas was was guilty required to the so armed, 32 jury robbery beyond a or had which find i n the a d e a d l y weapon armed w i t h If of found that i s set out in the § CR-08-0575 13A-8-41 to find ( b ) , had been him not court's oral charge. of Lucas law, rebutted, guilty was under the i n s t r u c t i o n s given a c q u i t , so guilty of weapon or d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t . charge to the j u r y on in second degree the the p r e s u m p t i o n had The only guilty choice of the and armed w i t h being matter a deadly Lucas c o u l d have r e q u e s t e d could the the a have argued to b e e n r e b u t t e d ; h o w e v e r , he in in as lesser-included offense t h e j u r y was robbery required j u r y d i d not The found i t would have been left first w i t h was degree or of the t h a t he not robbery jury d i d not was guilty a do that so. either of any offense. The in f u n c t i o n of James v. State, the 405 rebuttable So. 2d 71 presumption (Ala. Crim. App. is explained 1981). "The relevant portions of Section 13A-8-41, A l a b a m a C o d e 1975 (Amended 1 9 7 7 ) , d e f i n i n g r o b b e r y i n the f i r s t degree, p r o v i d e : "'(a) A p e r s o n commits the crime of i n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e i f he v i o l a t e s 13A-8-43 and he: "'(1) Is weapon or robbery section armed with a deadly dangerous instrument; * * * * * * (b) Possession then and there of an a r t i c l e u s e d or f a s h i o n e d i n a manner t o l e a d a n y p e r s o n who i s present reasonably 33 CR-08-0575 t o b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y w e a p o n o r dangerous i n s t r u m e n t , or any verbal or o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t he i s t h e n a n d t h e r e so a r m e d , i s p r i m a f a c i e e v i d e n c e u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t he was s o a r m e d . ' "The c o m m e n t s t o S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 4 4 a r e h e l p f u l i n d e c i d i n g the i s s u e under review. "'A d i f f i c u l t a r e a i s r o b b e r y b y u s e o f an u n l o a d e d , i n o p e r a b l e o r dummy w e a p o n . The b a s i c t h e o r y of t h i s a r t i c l e i s to p r o t e c t the c i t i z e n from f e a r f o r h i s or another's health and safety. This should be aggravated only when there is actual s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d o r when t h e r o b b e r p o s s e s s e s an i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h i s readily capable of inflicting such injuries. However, i t is sometimes d i f f i c u l t to prove that defendant a c t u a l l y was a r m e d w i t h a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n , u n l e s s he i s a p p r e h e n d e d a t t h e s c e n e . In an e f f o r t t o b a l a n c e the needs f o r enforcement w i t h t h e demands f o r a p p r o p r i a t e p e n a l t i e s , Section 13A-8-41 makes p o s s e s s i o n o f an o b j e c t r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d t o be a " d e a d l y weapon" or "dangerous instrument", as defined in Section 13A-1-2, or a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t he h a s o n e , p r i m a f a c i e e v i d e n c e t h a t he i s a r m e d . I f i n f a c t t h e d e f e n d a n t r e f u t e s t h i s , he may still be c o n v i c t e d o f r o b b e r y i n a l e s s e r degree.' "A c o n v i c t i o n o f f i r s t d e g r e e r o b b e r y d o e s n o t require evidence that the accused brandished or displayed any weapon. Indeed, i n order to be c o n v i c t e d o f f i r s t d e g r e e r o b b e r y an a c c u s e d n e e d n o t e v e n be a r m e d w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n o r d a n g e r o u s instrument where (1) he possesses any object reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon or d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t o r r e p r e s e n t s i n some m a n n e r 34 CR-08-0575 t h a t he h a s one a n d (2) t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t o rebut or refute this reasonable belief or representation. To f i n d as a m a t t e r o f l a w t h a t w h e r e a gun i s not seen a defendant cannot be c o n v i c t e d of f i r s t degree robbery would a l l o w a l l w o u l d - b e r o b b e r s t o k e e p a gun o r o t h e r dangerous w e a p o n c o n c e a l e d d u r i n g t h e c r i m e t o be u s e d o n l y i f needed. S t a t e v. C o o p e r , 140 N . J . S u p e r . 2 8 , 354 A.2d 713 (1976). Under our statute, such an interpretation would defeat the intent of the l e g i s l a t u r e and 'basic t h e o r y ' of the s t a t u t e to ' p r o t e c t the c i t i z e n from f e a r f o r h i s or another's h e a l t h and s a f e t y . ' "Here the d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s i n s t i l l e d i n the v i c t i m t h e r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t he was a r m e d w i t h a pistol. Under Section 13A-8-41(b) this c o n s t i t u t e d prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e that the defendant was so a r m e d . S i n c e t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o r e b u t t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n a n d as t h e S t a t e p r o v e d a l l t h e other elements of robbery i n the f i r s t degree, the d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n must s t a n d . 1 II1 'Prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e . Evidence good and sufficient on i t s face; such e v i d e n c e as, i n the judgment of the law, i s s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h a g i v e n f a c t , or the group or c h a i n of f a c t s constituting the p a r t y ' s c l a i m o r d e f e n s e , and w h i c h i f not r e b u t t e d or c o n t r a d i c t e d , w i l l remain sufficient. Prima facie evidence is evidence which, i f unexplained or uncontradicted, i s s u f f i c i e n t to sustain a judgment i n f a v o r of the i s s u e which i t s u p p o r t s , b u t w h i c h may be c o n t r a d i c t e d b y other evidence.' "Black's 405 So. 2d at Law Dictionary, 1071 73. 35 (5th ed. 1979)." CR-08-0575 The quantum law established of proof first degree model of c l a r i t y . which the court to sustain explains use o f a d e a d l y weapon cases For Crim. not i n which 1996), i n Dick a case was a r m e d w i t h displayed i tto the v i c t i m , use to court that element cases in needed t o prove i s discussing instrument the element decided explained the function of the 13A-8-41(b). v. State, 677 i t was So. 2d 1267 ( A l a . that the the robbery and i n explaining that threatening the a .357 p i s t o l o f a d e a d l y weapon i s s u f f i c i e n t prove to distinguish as an i n which appellant i n the At times, previously degree. in § the A l a . Code 1975, i s n o t a the court or dangerous adequately presumption example, App. those regarding f o r robbery the type of evidence i n the f i r s t have rebuttable from cases a conviction I t i s important of force robbery previous under § 13A-8-41(a)(1), use of by under undisputed during proof of the use of f o r c e A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-8-43, t h e stated: " ' T h i s c o u r t h a s h e l d on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h a t it i s not necessary to prove that a defendant d i s p l a y e d a g u n d u r i n g a r o b b e r y o r t h a t he a c t u a l l y had a gun t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r R o b b e r y i n t h e F i r s t Degree. M i l l e r v . S t a t e , 431 S o . 2 d 586 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1983); Bender v. S t a t e , 420 S o . 2 d 843 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 2 ) ; J a m e s v . S t a t e , 405 S o . 2 d 71 ( A l a . C r . App. 1981). I n James v . S t a t e , s u p r a , t h e c o u r t s t a t e d , " I n d e e d , i n o r d e r t o be c o n v i c t e d o f 36 CR-08-0575 f i r s t d e g r e e r o b b e r y an a c c u s e d n e e d n o t e v e n b e armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon o r d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t where (1) he possesses any object reasonably believed t o be a deadly weapon or dangerous i n s t r u m e n t o r r e p r e s e n t s i n some m a n n e r t h a t he h a s one a n d (2) t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t o r e b u t o r r e f u t e t h i s reasonable b e l i e f or representation." James v . State, supra, at 73.'" 677 So. 2d a t 1270 State, 443 S o . 2 d 1 3 6 2 , 1 3 6 3 - 6 4 This by (Ala. Crim. statement the offender A p p . 19 9 6 ) ( q u o t i n g (Ala. Crim. correctly explains to the v i c t i m that App. that a that but the State i n some statements the App. cases i t has been of law regarding weapon i s found i n Holt 2006), i s sufficient the requirement prove the use of force pursuant t o § use of a deadly example 1984)). representation he i s a r m e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t f o r c e was u s e d a n d s a t i s f i e s Stewart v. i n which the foundation proof of prima pursuant v. S t a t e , to § of erroneous f a c i e evidence of 13A-8-41(b). 960 S o . 2 d 726 the following 13A-8-43, language (Ala. Crim. appears in a footnote: "At t h e h e a r i n g , H o l t a r g u e d t h a t t h e r o b b e r y conviction was based on h i s walking into a c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e and g i v i n g t h e c l e r k a note t h a t s t a t e d : '"[T]his i s a robbery, d o n ' t make i t a murder."'; that Holt c a u s e d no s e r i o u s physical i n j u r y t o t h e c l e r k ; a n d t h a t H o l t was n o t a r m e d a t the time. Robbery i n the f i r s t degree r e q u i r e s that the accused either use f o r c e or threaten the i m m i n e n t u s e o f f o r c e , s e e § 13A-8-43, A l a . Code 1975, and t h a t t h e accused e i t h e r ' c a u s e [ ] s e r i o u s 37 One CR-08-0575 p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r , ' § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) , o r be 'armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,' § 13A-8-41(a)(1). Section 13A-8-41(b), however, provides that 'any verbal or other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t he i s t h e n a n d there so armed, i s prima facie evidence under subsection (a) o f t h i s section that he was so armed.' T h u s , an a c c u s e d n e e d n o t a c t u a l l y be a r m e d w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n t o be c o n v i c t e d o f r o b b e r y i n the f i r s t d e g r e e u n d e r § 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; he need o n l y r e p r e s e n t t h a t he i s s o a r m e d . See, e.g., D i c k v . S t a t e , 677 So. 2 d 1267 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1996)." 960 So. 2d The a t 739 statement founded upon State, supra. allows a defendant of the e f f e c t I t i s more that rebutted, supplied). statement erroneous presumption presumption (Ala. an evidence correct (emphasis above-emphasized incomplete facie n.6 to the i s not arise, to § that § and is i n Dick v. 13A-8-41(b) i.e., i t constitutes would be armed, prima and unless the authorized to f i n d the Compare the guilty of robbery i n the f i r s t statement o f law i n Matthews v. C r i m . App. 13A-8-41 say o f f e n d e r was a jury i t i s an of the presumption r e a d i n g of correct correct; degree. State, 671 So. 2d 1995): "The appellant contends that the state's e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t b e c a u s e , he s a y s , S a m p l e did not actually see the weapon used by the a p p e l l a n t , a n d b e c a u s e a k n i f e o r o t h e r w e a p o n was never recovered. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the testimony of Sample, Smith, and Watkins constituted legal e v i d e n c e from w h i c h the j u r y c o u l d have c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was a r m e d w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n 38 146 CR-08-0575 d u r i n g the c o u r s e of the r o b b e r y . Furthermore, the a p p e l l a n t ' s t h r e a t t o c u t S a m p l e ' s t h r o a t was prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e t h a t the a p p e l l a n t had the present a b i l i t y to c a r r y out h i s t h r e a t . § 13A-8-41(b)." 671 So. State, 2d 666 at 147, So. 2d with 106 the i n c o r r e c t statement (Ala. Crim. App. in Porter 1995): "The appellant a l s o contends t h a t the state failed to prove that he was armed or that he a p p e a r e d t o be a r m e d . S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 8 - 4 1 , Code o f A l a b a m a 1975, which d e f i n e s r o b b e r y i n the first degree, s t a t e s : " ' ( b ) P o s s e s s i o n t h e n a n d t h e r e o f an a r t i c l e u s e d or f a s h i o n e d i n a manner to l e a d a n y p e r s o n who i s present reasonably t o b e l i e v e i t t o be [a] d e a d l y w e a p o n o r dangerous instrument, or any verbal or o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t he i s t h e n a n d t h e r e so a r m e d , i s p r i m a f a c i e e v i d e n c e u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t he was so a r m e d . ' "The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s t a t e d i d n o t p r o v e t h i s e l e m e n t b e c a u s e Hyde n e v e r s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t she saw a gun a n d b e c a u s e a gun was never recovered. He c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e a s s u m e d he h a d a gun b e c a u s e s h e s t a t e d s h e f e l t s o m e t h i n g h a r d being pushed i n t o her r i b cage and because she developed a round b r u i s e i n that spot. A l s o , i n the a p p e l l a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o l i c e he maintained t h a t he was n o t a r m e d . "'In a prosecution for f i r s t degree robbery, the robbery victim does not a c t u a l l y have t o see a weapon t o e s t a b l i s h the element of f o r c e ; h i s or her reasonable belief that the robber is armed is sufficient. D i n k i n s v . S t a t e , 584 So. 2d 932 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1991); Breedlove v. State, 482 So. 2d 1277 ( A l a . Cr. App. 39 v. CR-08-0575 1985). The t e s t to determine whether a p e r s o n r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t an object i s a d e a d l y weapon i s a " s u b j e c t i v e " one. J a m e s v . S t a t e , 549 So. 2d 562 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1989). " I t f o c u s e s on t h e 'reaction of the victim to the threats of the robber.' S t a t e v . H o p s o n , 122 W i s . 2d 395, 362 N.W.2d 166, 169 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . " 482 So. 2d a t 1281.' " R i c e v. 19 9 3 ) . " State, 620 So. 2d 140, 141-2 ( A l a . Cr. App. "Hyde's t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e from which the jury could find that she had a s u b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t the appellant was a r m e d , e v e n t h o u g h c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e was also presented. Any i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and c o n f l i c t s i n t h e e v i d e n c e are f o r the j u r y to r e s o l v e . O ' B a r r v. S t a t e , 639 So. 2d 5 3 3 , 536 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 993). This court i s not a f i n d e r of f a c t and will not s e c o n d - g u e s s j u r i e s i n t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s as t o t h e f a c t s of a case. O ' B a r r , 639 So. 2d a t 536. We will not s u b s t i t u t e our judgment f o r t h a t of the j u r y . Owens v . S t a t e , 597 So. 2d 734, 737 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1992)." 666 So. To 1281 2d at like (Ala. Goodwin v. 108. effect i s Breedlove Crim. App. State, 641 1985), So. 2d v. which 128 9 State, cites (Ala. discussing a subjective test for determining as authority for using the rebuttable 13A-8-41(b). 40 482 that Crim. So. 2d 1277, portion App. 1 994), i f f o r c e was presumption of used of § CR-08-0575 This court establishing was has p r e v i o u s l y that conclusive, codefendant receive a defendant albeit who was held that the jury was a r m e d w i t h i n the context n o t armed a deadly of addressing with a verdict deadly weapon whether a weapon should a n e n h a n c e d s e n t e n c e when h i s a c c o m p l i c e was s o a r m e d . "The appellant further asserts that the t r i a l court erred i n enhancing his sentence pursuant t o § 13A-5-6, Code of Alabama 1975, which provides e n h a n c e d s e n t e n c e s i f a f i r e a r m o r d e a d l y weapon i s used i n the commission of a f e l o n y . Specifically, the a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h e enhancement s t a t u t e was i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d b e c a u s e , he s a y s , h e d i d n o t p o s s e s s a d e a d l y weapon d u r i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e crime. This argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . "The State, i n i t s brief to this Court, accurately notes that this Court addressed this p r e c i s e i s s u e i n Hammond v . S t a t e , 497 S o . 2 d 558 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). I n Hammond, we h e l d that e v e n i f t h e d e f e n d a n t was a c t u a l l y u n a r m e d , t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t encompassed i n i ta f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a r m e d w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t was r e q u i r e d t o s e n t e n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t i n accordance w i t h t h e enhancement s t a t u t e . I d . at 566. Hammond i s applicable to this case. Therefore, we a f f i r m t h e s e n t e n c e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t imposed upon t h e a p p e l l a n t . " Miller rev'd v. S t a t e , on o t h e r With State, analyzed. grounds, these 947 So. In 650 S o . 2 d 9 4 0 , 945 ( A l a . C r i m . 650 S o . 2 d 947 ( A l a . principles 2d 432 Sanders, i n mind, (Ala. App. the undisputed 41 1993). the effect Crim. App. 1993), of Sanders v. 200 6 ) , evidence must was be that CR-08-0575 Sanders robbed the T e x a c o F o o d M a r t by his shirt index the b a r r e l o f a gun with his undisputed that using finger his and the appeal apparently Sanders to threatening simulate believed established stated that sticking clerk could p r o o f of r o b b e r y i n the evidence finger a that he to the appear to be It was that Sanders was counsel on see was sufficient d e g r e e , e v e n when t h e undisputed was oral threat clerk. under Sanders's gun. an out to k i l l clearly that first p l a c i n g h i s hand not armed. In his brief, he " a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t , b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , the jury could f i n d him guilty of first degree r o b b e r y b a s e d on t h e v e r b a l t h r e a t a r t i c u l a t e d t o the convenience s t o r e c l e r k . " (Sanders' Thus, argument finding first b r i e f on in that by the degree. appeal Sanders, the this evidence jury that This at court p. 9.) court 1 was not presented was insufficient S a n d e r s was guilty of to with warrant robbery in an a the stated: "The single issue presented for review is whether the t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n applying the firearm-enhancement statute to the sentence for Sanders' first-degree-robbery conviction. Sanders argues that there was no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t any f i r e a r m was T h i s c o u r t may t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f i t s own records. H u l l v . S t a t e , 607 So. 2 d 3 6 9 , 371 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1992) . 1 See 42 CR-08-0575 seen time Sanders v. S t a t e , The weapon i n the h i s p o s s e s s i o n or used t h e r o b b e r y was committed." 947 S o . 2 d 4 3 2 , 433 undisputed was used evidence was or attempted (Ala. that no t o be u s e d the robbery, because Sanders was n e v e r a deadly the s i n g l e court remanded without that weapon. Based the case on to the t r i a l by him C r i m . App. firearm armed w i t h issue court App. So. 2002), petition Ala. R. Crim. a court, P., pursuant to by merely stated he was deadly weapon § armed findings of a that but i n fact remand to ( A l a . Crim. pursuant was the and the 1975, trial 32, held robbery n o t armed a sentence he with court fact. "The a p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t may b e m e r i t o r i o u s . The firearm enhancement set forth in § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, a p p l i e s o n l y i n t h o s e c a s e s ' i n w h i c h a f i r e a r m o r d e a d l y w e a p o n was u s e d o r a t t e m p t e d t o be u s e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n of the felony.' I n t h i s c a s e , b a s e d on s t a t e m e n t s i t made 43 of to Rule A l a . Code during undisputed the d e n i a l of g u i l t y 13A-5-6(a)(4), this weapon. 25-26 from filed a plea the p e t i t i o n e r required 24, appeal relief challenging claim specific i n an for postconviction enhanced that this 2d of a firearm or i t was In 842 deadly for resentencing t o use a d e a d l y State, or presented, he d i d n o t u s e o r a t t e m p t v. 2006). i n the commission the use of the enhancement because Snowden at the a for CR-08-0575 d u r i n g the g u i l t y p l e a proceedings, i t appears that the t r i a l c o u r t m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the f i r e a r m e n h a n c e m e n t c o u l d be a p p l i e d e v e n i n c a s e s i n w h i c h the defendant o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t he was armed with a firearm. H o w e v e r , s u c h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t r a r y to the p l a i n language of § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , Ala. Code 1975. D u r i n g t h e R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s , the S t a t e d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f u t e , and t h e circuit c o u r t d i d not a d d r e s s , the a p p e l l a n t ' s contention. T h e r e f o r e , we r e m a n d t h i s c a s e t o t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t t h a t c o u r t make specific, written f i n d i n g s of f a c t as to the appellant's contention." 842 So. 2d at 25. This court presented with, conviction the Snowden and for factual in d i d not robbery basis robbery i n the of discussion armed w i t h court the showing court would he evidence was degree been to robbery Code of the was his was not defendant's supported guilty plea to There was Snowden was such the that f o r the p l e a , e i t h e r s u p p l i e d authorized with a by in the 1975. 44 § deadly authorized to first by a s h o w i n g when showing Without armed have Ala. whether during necessity not 13A-8-41(a)(1), first apparently degree under § 13A-8-41(a)(1). factual basis facie facts conviction the a d e a d l y weapon. heard the prima the State discuss, articulated first no in v. 13A-8-41(b) weapon, enter a degree the or by by trial judgment of under § CR-08-0575 To be to c o n v i c t e d of robbery § 13A-8-41(a)(1) deadly deadly a There cannot Snowden this was conviction an rare cases d i s c e r n e d by pursuant where looking to § have used a the offender weapon, in his a t him, w h i l e representing that to a deadly v. of he he or i s arrested then i s armed at could never illustration the armed with, but would c o u r t remanded the case for a defendant used had not, i n the posture remand the case for a in In each the first case, 45 "hard that supported Snowden undisputed armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon. o f t h e adage t h a t deadly determination degree. i t was a i n which b a s i s f o r the p l e a adequately f o r robbery to Sanders. be weapon. whether court was he w o u l d State, this presented, defendant enhancement f o r e x a m p l e he h a s a k n i f e without whether the f a c t u a l similar be the deadly determination case may pursuant have been armed w i t h a 1975, t h e o f f e n d e r must In t h a t case have used, weapon; degree i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e c r i m e , w h e r e u p o n t h e weapon i s discovered. In be referring the scene the weapon, robbery otherwise apply A l a . Code a deadly that commits not To weapon. possesses pocket t h e o f f e n d e r must weapon. 13A-5-6(a)(4), i n the f i r s t facts of a is that the Each case i s make b a d l a w . " CR-08-0575 During armed with deadly where a firearm Lucas weapon. i t was simulate a gun weapon commit true represented fact to that not armed used or robbery, Snowden v. a that weapon a to and deadly accepted Snowden with State, finger t o use evidence State v. his deadly attempted the jury had been armed used with or The i n Sanders Sanders t h a t he was a r m e d w i t h the j u r y was Lucas used hearing whether a d e a d l y weapon with argues that was a deadly the a r t i c l e t o commit Lucas judge regarding armed weapon Code disputed. the evidence not have in was toy was as merely a d e a d l y w e a p o n , b u t was i n n o t so armed, i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d armed w i t h he a or h i s codefendant or h i s codefendant was the he or Unlike and could to whether undisputed therefore possibly trial, that determined a Lucas's The j u r y f o u n d I t was undisputed that that found by t h e j u r y t o have been a d e a d l y that since the judge the a r t i c l e I t i s true incorrect reasoning 960 So. 726 disputed. was the robbery. the 2d or h i s codefendant weapon. used t o enhance h i s sentence 1975. Lucas that a t o y , i t was pursuant the judge found ( A l a . Crim. was found at the i n cases App. 46 2006), sentencing e r r o r f o r the to § 13A-5-6(4), A l a . seems t o have s u c h as H o l t Porter v. v. applied State, State, 666 CR-08-0575 So. 2d 106, 482 So. 2d (Ala. Crim. 1277, 1281 App. 1995), (Ala. Crim. and App. Breedlove 1985), v. when he State, stated: "But t h e s t a n d a r d i s t h a t i t i s a d e a d l y weapon under the terms of the d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t u t e i f it would lead any person present to reasonably b e l i e v e i t t o be a d e a d l y w e a p o n o r a d a n g e r o u s instrument. "I t h i n k the t e s t i m o n y t h e r e i s u n c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t r e g a r d l e s s w h e t h e r i t was a t o y o r c o c k e d and l o a d e d p i s t o l , t h e p e r s o n t h e r e b e l i e v e d i t t o be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. They b e l i e v e d i t t o be a t o y - - n o t a t o y b u t a r e a l pistol." (R. 358.) But, the first because the jury degree pursuant t h a t v e r d i c t was found armed w i t h apply the t h a t he a deadly enhancement, guilty to § 13A-8-41(a)(1) a finding indeed Lucas he of and robbery implicit in or h i s codefendant weapon, had would have the judge imposed had been refused an to illegal sentence. "However, our e x a m i n a t i o n of the r e c o r d r e v e a l s that the trial court improperly sentenced the a p p e l l a n t t o s e r v e a t e r m o f 13 y e a r s i n p r i s o n . The a p p e l l a n t was i n d i c t e d f o r f i r s t - d e g r e e r o b b e r y w h i l e armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon, and t h e j u r y f o u n d him guilty as charged in the indictment. First-degree robbery i s a Class A felony. See § 13A-8-41(c), Ala. Code 1975. In addition, § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , p r o v i d e s t h a t , when a f i r e a r m i s used i n the commission of a C l a s s A f e l o n y , t h e m i n i m u m s e n t e n c e i s 20 y e a r s i n p r i s o n . The a p p e l l a n t ' s 1 3 - y e a r sentence f a l l s below t h i s 47 in CR-08-0575 m a n d a t o r y minimum. A c c o r d i n g l y , we r e m a n d t h i s c a s e to the t r i a l court with i n s t r u c t i o n s that that court resentence the appellant i n accordance with § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . " Washington v. S t a t e , 2001 ). App. Accord, 816 S o . 2 d 1 0 7 8 , 1 0 7 8 - 7 9 Moore v. State, 677 So. 2d (Ala. Crim. 819 ( A l a . Crim. 1996). " W h i l e we a f f i r m t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n , we must n e v e r t h e l e s s remand t h i s cause t o t h e t r i a l court because a review of the record r e v e a l s that t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s s e n t e n c e o f 10 y e a r s ' imprisonment i s not i n compliance with the law. See, S c o t t v. State, 627 So. 2d 1133 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1993) (wherein t h i s Court took n o t i c e that the t r i a l court i n c o r r e c t l y ordered that the defendant's enhanced s e n t e n c e s were t o r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y , and t h i s C o u r t remanded the cause to the trial court with i n s t r u c t i o n s that the t r i a l court resentence the appellant i n accordance with the l a w ) . See a l s o , H o p p i n s v . S t a t e , 451 S o . 2 d 3 6 5 , 365 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ( w h e r e i n t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t ' [ i ] n a p p r o v i n g R u l e 45B [ A l a . R . A p p . P . ] , t h i s C o u r t d i d not i n t e n d to r e s t r i c t the a u t h o r i t y of the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals to consider obvious e r r o r s ' ). 1 "As noted, the appellant was convicted of b u r g l a r y i n the f i r s t degree. Burglary i n the f i r s t degree i s a Class A f e l o n y . 1 3 A - 7 - 5 ( b ) , Code o f Alabama 1975. Section 13A-5-6, Code o f A l a b a m a 1975, p r o v i d e s , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : " ' ( a ) S e n t e n c e s f o r f e l o n i e s s h a l l be for a d e f i n i t e term of imprisonment, which imprisonment includes hard labor, w i t h i n the f o l l o w i n g l i m i t a t i o n s : "'(1) For a C l a s s A f e l o n y , for life o r n o t more t h a n 99 y e a r s o r l e s s t h a n 10 y e a r s . 48 App. CR-08-0575 fl I "'(4) F o r a C l a s s A f e l o n y in which a firearm or deadly w e a p o n was u s e d o r a t t e m p t e d t o be u s e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e f e l o n y , n o t l e s s t h a n 20 " y e a r s . ' "(Emphasis added.) " I n Hammond v . S t a t e , 497 S o . 2 d 558 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , t h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a c o n t e n t i o n b y a defendant that because the evidence d i d not establish t h a t he a c t u a l l y possessed the deadly weapon d u r i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n of the robbery f o r which he was c o n v i c t e d , h i s s e n t e n c e had been i l l e g a l l y e n h a n c e d p u r s u a n t t o § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , Code o f A l a b a m a 1 9 7 5 . I n r e j e c t i n g t h i s c o n t e n t i o n , we held: " ' [ E ] v e n i f Hammond was a c t u a l l y u n a r m e d , we f i n d h i s c o n t e n t i o n t o b e w i t h o u t m e r i t . By v i r t u e of the jury's verdict, which e n c o m p a s s e s i t s f i n d i n g t h a t Hammond was armed w i t h a d e a d l y weapon, t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d no a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o s e n t e n c e Hammond in accordance with § 13A-5-6(a)(4). H o l l o w a y v . S t a t e , 477 S o . 2 d 487 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1985). This holds true r e g a r d l e s s of whether the j u r y based i t s verdict on complicity, embraced in § 13A-2-23(2). " I t i s well established that a person present, aiding and a b e t t i n g a n o t h e r i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f [a c r i m e ] , i s guilty as a principal and p u n i s h a b l e equally with theperpetrator of the crime." Biggs v. State, 3 3 1 S o . 2 d 7 6 3 , 764 ( A l a . C r . App.) c e r t . d e n i e d , 331 So. 2 d 765 ( A l a . C r . App. 1976) (emphasis added [ i n Hammond]). "'Furthermore, i f we Hammond's c o n t e n t i o n , we w o u l d 49 accepted be g i v i n g CR-08-0575 the t r i a l c o u r t d i s c r e t i o n e x c e e d i n g t h a t conferred by s t a t u t e . In M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , 450 S o . 2 d 181 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) , the c o u r t , i n r e j e c t i n g t h e argument t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d be a b l e t o c o n s i d e r any m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o b s e r v e d t h a t the language o f § 13A-5-6(a)(4) i s c l e a r and i t s m e a n i n g i s p l a i n . See a l s o R o c k e r v. S t a t e , 443 So. 2 d 1316 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1983). I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we l i k e w i s e reject the contention that the t r i a l court s h o u l d be a b l e t o c o n s i d e r as a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance Hammond's degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the offense; the statute simply does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between p r i n c i p a l s and a c c e s s o r i e s . F o r an e x a m p l e of a s t a t u t e which l i m i t s i m p o s i t i o n o f a m a n d a t o r y minimum s e n t e n c e f o r p o s s e s s i o n of a f i r e a r m d u r i n g commission o f robbery to the defendant having actual, not v i c a r i o u s , p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e f i r e a r m , see Fla. S t a t . § 775.087 (1976).' "497 So. 2 d a t 566 ( e m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l . ) See a l s o M i l l e r v . S t a t e , 650 S o . 2 d 940 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1993) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 650 S o . 2 d 947 ( A l a . 1994) (wherein t h i s Court found that the defendant's s e n t e n c e was p r o p e r l y e n h a n c e d p u r s u a n t t o § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 even though the defendant's accomplice actually p o s s e s s e d t h e d e a d l y weapon d u r i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f the robbery.) " I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was evidence at t r i a l that the appellant's accomplice, r a t h e r t h a n t h e a p p e l l a n t , was i n a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n of t h e s h o t g u n d u r i n g t h e b u r g l a r y does n o t remove the appellant from the application of § 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ( a ) ( 4 ) , C o d e o f A l a b a m a 1 9 7 5 . The j u r y f o u n d the appellant guilty of burglary i n the f i r s t degree; therefore, by 'virtue of the jury's v e r d i c t , ' Hammond, 4 97 S o . 2 d a t 5 6 6 , t h e t r i a l court was required t o enhance the appellant's 50 CR-08-0575 sentence pursuant to § 13A-5-6(a)(4), m i n i m u m s e n t e n c e 20 y e a r s . ... making the " R u l e 45B, A l a . R. A p p . P., reads: In those c r i m i n a l c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y has not been imposed, the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals shall n o t be o b l i g a t e d t o c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s o r i s s u e s n o t p r e s e n t e d i n b r i e f s on a p p e a l . " 1 Moore, 677 So. 2d Therefore, the at 820-22 (emphasis in last paragraph supplied). albeit for an trial incorrect court reached reason, and the correct i t s judgment result, should be affirmed. "'Nonetheless, t h i s Court w i l l a f f i r m the t r i a l c o u r t on a n y v a l i d l e g a l g r o u n d p r e s e n t e d b y the record, regardless of whether that ground was c o n s i d e r e d , o r e v e n i f i t was r e j e c t e d , b y t h e t r i a l court. E x p a r t e R y a l s , 773 So. 2 d 1011 (Ala. 2000), c i t i n g Ex p a r t e W i g i n t o n , 743 So. 2d 1071 (Ala. 1 9 9 9 ) , a n d S m i t h v . E q u i f a x S e r v s . , I n c . , 537 So. 2 d 463 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . A.G. v. State, 2 007)(quoting Alabama (Ala. 98 9 Liberty Health Servs. So. 2d Nat'l 11 67 , Life Found., 1180 Ins. P.C., Co. 881 (Ala. v. So. Crim. University 2d 1013, 2003)). Based on the foregoing, I respectfully 51 dissent. App. of 1020

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