Larry Dunaway v. State of Alabama

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REL: 12/18/2009 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-06-0996 Larry Dunaway v. State o f Alabama A p p e a l from B a r b o u r C i r c u i t C o u r t (CC-97-75.60 and CC-97-76.60) KELLUM, Judge. The Alabama's 1 appellant, death Larry Dunaway, row i n Holman currently an inmate Correctional Facility, on appeals T h i s c a s e was o r i g i n a l l y a s s i g n e d t o a n o t h e r j u d g e on t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ; i t was r e a s s i g n e d t o J u d g e K e l l u m on May 5, 2009. 1 CR-06-0996 the c i r c u i t relief court's denial filed pursuant In October for murdering and for child, Ala. d u r i n g the Code parole Dunaway's appeal. App. 529 U.S. judgment In Barbour He life filed aff'd, 1089 746 April 2001, recommended and v. and to death the State, 2d This 10, See without 746 1042 Court o f an arson 22-month-old that Dunaway be possibility of f o r James's murder. recommendations. affirmed 2d 1021 ( A l a . 1999), issued the a Rule 32 on direct (Ala. Crim. cert. denied, certificate of 1999. Dunaway filed petition C i r c u i t C o u r t a t t a c k i n g h i s c o n v i c t i o n s and amended p e t i t i o n s murder 13A-5-40(a)(9), the were So. a § jury's sentences So. (2000). on N o v e m b e r Patterson, arson. followed Dunaway course o f an murder P. convicted of capital imprisonment convictions 1998), Crim. jury The court See A l a . R. Anthony course f o r Tressa's circuit 32, D u n a w a y was James 1975. to to Rule Tressa P a t t e r s o n d u r i n g the murdering sentenced The 1997, of his petition f o r postconviction i n October 2001 and in sentences. January 2004. E v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g s were h e l d i n J a n u a r y 2004, June 2004, 2 the and CR-06-0996 A u g u s t 2004. the State's appeal 110-page o r d e r 14, 2 0 0 6 , t h e R u l e 32 c o u r t adopted d e n y i n g t h e R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . This followed. This direct On D e c e m b e r Court s e t out the f o l l o w i n g facts i n our opinion appeal: "The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t [ D u n a w a y ] l i v e d w i t h h i s g i r l f r i e n d , T r e s s a P a t t e r s o n , a n d h e r s o n , James P a t t e r s o n , i n a m o b i l e home i n B a r b o u r C o u n t y . On t h e e v e n i n g o f J a n u a r y 8, 1 9 9 7 , t h e m o b i l e home burned. I n v e s t i g a t o r s subsequently discovered the burned bodies of Tressa Patterson and James P a t t e r s o n , who was 22 m o n t h s o l d , i n t h e r e m a i n s o f t h e m o b i l e home. "In the course of h i s investigation, [Fire Marshall Edward] Paulk interviewed [Dunaway]. [ D u n a w a y ] made a n o r a l s t a t e m e n t a n d g a v e a w r i t t e n statement about t h e f i r e . In h i s oral statement, [ D u n a w a y ] c l a i m e d t h a t he was n o t p r e s e n t w h e n t h e f i r e b e g a n . He s t a t e d t h a t h e h a d r i d d e n w i t h a 'crack-head' i n a r e d pickup truck into Clayton, w h e r e he h o p e d t o s e l l some c r a c k cocaine. He c l a i m e d t h a t he d e c i d e d n o t t o s e l l t h e c r a c k , t h a t t h e man d r o p p e d h i m o f f on H i g h w a y 2 3 9 n e a r h i s m o b i l e home, a n d t h a t h e w a l k e d home f r o m there. [ D u n a w a y ] c l a i m e d t h a t he f i r s t saw t h e f i r e while he was w a l k i n g home. He s t a t e d t h a t t h e l a s t t i m e h e saw T r e s s a , s h e was l y i n g o n t h e c o u c h a n d J a m e s was with her. 3 on CR-06-0996 " S u b s e q u e n t l y , [Dunaway] a d m i t t e d to P a u l k t h a t t h e s t o r y a b o u t t h e man i n t h e r e d t r u c k was not t r u e . P a u l k t h e n a s k e d [ D u n a w a y ] i f he c o u l d t a k e a written statement from him, and the appellant agreed. In that statement, [Dunaway] a d m i t t e d t h a t he a n d T r e s s a h a d b e e n h a v i n g p r o b l e m s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n c e T h a n k s g i v i n g o f 1 9 9 6 . He stated t h a t T r e s s a h a d t o l d h i m t o move o u t b y D e c e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 9 6 , t h a t he h a d n o t m o v e d o u t , a n d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n a r g u i n g s i n c e D e c e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 9 6 . On o r a b o u t J a n u a r y 5, 1 9 9 7 , when [ D u n a w a y ] s t i l l h a d n o t m o v e d out, T r e s s a removed h i s c l o t h i n g from the mobile home. "On January 8, 1997, [Dunaway] w a t c h e d over J a m e s w h i l e T r e s s a was a t w o r k . He s t a t e d t h a t he a n d T r e s s a g o t i n t o a n o t h e r a r g u m e n t when s h e came home f r o m w o r k , a n d t h a t he p u t a r i f l e t o h i s h e a d t o show h i s ' l o v e ' f o r h e r . He claimed that he p u l l e d t h e t r i g g e r , b u t i t d i d n o t f i r e . He then l a i d t h e r i f l e on h i s l a p a n d a c c i d e n t a l l y f i r e d i t a t T r e s s a . [ D u n a w a y ] s t a t e d t h a t T r e s s a g a s p e d when s h e was s t r u c k b y t h e f i r s t b u l l e t . The n o i s e c a u s e d h i m t o p a n i c a n d he a c c i d e n t a l l y f i r e d t h e r i f l e a second time. [Dunaway] t o l d P a u l k t h a t after he d e t e r m i n e d t h a t T r e s s a was d e a d , he s a i d t o J a m e s , 'Man, yo momma's d e a d . ' He then poured rubbing a l c o h o l o v e r T r e s s a ' s body and b e s i d e t h e f i r e p l a c e in t h e l i v i n g r o o m . He l a i d J a m e s down n e a r h i s m o t h e r ' s b o d y a n d s e t t h e a l c o h o l on f i r e . He t h e n f l e d t o a n e a r b y wooded a r e a and h i d t h e r i f l e . "[Dunaway] testified at trial in his own d e f e n s e . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s m o t h e r s u f f e r e d f r o m p a r a n o i d s c h i z o p h r e n i a , a n d t h a t he h a d h e a r d v o i c e s t e l l i n g h i m w h a t t o do s i n c e he was a child. His t r i a l t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e m u r d e r s was s i m i l a r t o h i s s t a t e m e n t t o P a u l k , e x c e p t t h a t he t e s t i f i e d that 4 CR-06-0996 v o i c e s s t a r t e d t a l k i n g t o h i m w h i l e he was i n t h e m o b i l e home. He s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t r e m e m b e r e v e r y t h i n g he d i d b e t w e e n t h e t i m e he s h o t T r e s s a a n d t h e t i m e he r e a l i z e d he was i n t h e w o o d s , a n d he a d d e d t h a t he was n o t i n c o n t r o l o f h i m s e l f a t t h e t i m e . He c o n t e n d e d t h a t he d i d w h a t t h e v o i c e s t o l d h i m t o d o . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he made u p t h e s t o r y a b o u t g o i n g t o C l a y t o n b e c a u s e he was s c a r e d a n d n e r v o u s . He a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t , i n spite of h i s s t a t e m e n t s i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e f i r e , he k n e w T r e s s a a n d J a m e s w e r e i n t h e m o b i l e home when i t was burning." Davis, 746 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 2 3 - 2 5 . Standard of Review T h i s p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g was According to Rule "burden the facts When d i s c u s s i n g State, Dunaway. 3 2 . 2 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., Dunaway h a s t h e s o l e of p l e a d i n g evidence i n i t i a t e d by and p r o v i n g necessary to by a preponderance entitle [him] t o the burden of p l e a d i n g , t h i s 913 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 3 (Ala. Crim. Court App. 2 0 0 3 ) , of the relief." i n Boyd v. stated: "'Rule 32.6(b) r e q u i r e s t h a t the p e t i t i o n i t s e l f d i s c l o s e t h e f a c t s r e l i e d upon i n s e e k i n g r e l i e f . ' B o y d v . S t a t e , 746 S o . 2 d 3 6 4 , 406 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1999). In other words, i t i s not the p l e a d i n g of a conclusion 'which, i f true, entitle[s] the p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . ' L a n c a s t e r v . S t a t e , 638 S o . 2 d 1370 , 1 3 7 3 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) . I t i s the allegation of facts i n p l e a d i n g which, i f true, entitle a petitioner to r e l i e f . After facts are 5 CR-06-0996 pleaded, which, i f t r u e , e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to relief, the petitioner i s then entitled to an o p p o r t u n i t y , as p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 3 2 . 9 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts." 913 So. 2d "The at standard proceeding when he 1125. (Ala. Crim. App. White, Elliott 1992). review v. Ex appeal judge the So. 2d 1097, petition, we reason.'" 3d [Ms. Crim. may Lee , 32 discretion p a r t e Heaton, 542 So. 601 So. facts v. State, a ruling [Ms. (Ala. Crim. C R - 0 3 - 1 902 , May App. 2d are 1118, 29, 2009). 6 1119 i s de i f i t is CR-07-0054, 2009), 200 9] 931 (Ala. and q u e s t i o n s of law, n o v o . " Ex "Moreover, made i n a App. 2d undisputed ( A l a . 2001). court's rulings affirm conviction his proceeding 1098 i n a post abused State, i n a Rule a circuit (Ala. trial "[W]hen reviewing State, on c o u r t i s p r e s e n t e d w i t h pure 792 So. the the p e t i t i o n . 1989)." court's review i s whether denied appellate of an that parte 'when postconviction correct October for 9, 2009] q u o t i n g Bush So. 3d any , v. CR-06-0996 Last, for on plain direct error. appeal we reviewed Dunaway's However, the p l a i n - e r r o r standard of does not apply to p o s t c o n v i c t i o n petitions Rule A l a . R. when 32, Crim. P., capital-murder convictions been imposed. See even Crim. App. Hunt v. State, filed those i n which review pursuant petitions the death So. 940 conviction 2d attack sentence 1041, to 1049 has (Ala. 2005). I Dunaway adopting first in argues toto that the State's p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f because, are not the circuit court proposed order those of the circuit have repeatedly fact court's. Courts in denying he a r g u e s , t h e f i n d i n g s o f "Alabama court's adoption postconviction March "[E]ven 23, of proposed cases." 2007] when entirety, and erred ___ Hodges So. a circuit law 3d drafted v. ___ State, (Ala. court adopts the p e t i t i o n e r c o n c l u s i o n s of orders must order 7 by are the circuit the State i n [Ms. Crim. a proposed show t h a t i n that upheld the CR-04-1226, App. 2007). order in i t s findings 'clearly of fact erroneous' CR-06-0996 before basis an a p p e l l a t e that State, 950 the order So. s e t out court's findings for relief will was 2d 344, reasons basis court submitted 371 i n this the order by ( A l a . Crim. opinion, are not exists reverse clearly regarding we on t h e the State." Hyde App. For the find 2006). that erroneous. this solely the v. circuit Therefore, no claim. II. Dunaway next argues that denying his claim that several answers questions during voir argues, denying him the a b i l i t y effectively the circuit jurors dire court failed to examination, erred truthfully thereby, t o use h i s peremptory a n d t o make a n y c h a l l e n g e s he strikes f o r cause. " I t i s true that the p a r t i e s i n a case are entitled to true and honest answers to their questions on v o i r d i r e , s o t h a t t h e y may exercise t h e i r peremptory s t r i k e s wisely. See F a b i a n k e v . W e a v e r , 527 S o . 2 d 1 2 5 3 ( A l a . 1 988 ) . H o w e v e r , n o t every failure to respond properly to questions propounded during v o i r d i r e ' a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e s [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] t o a new t r i a l o r r e v e r s a l o f t h e c a u s e on a p p e a l . ' F r e e m a n v . H a l l , 28 6 A l a . 1 6 1 , 166, 238 S o . 2 d 3 3 0 , 335 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; s e e a l s o Dawson v . State, [710 S o . 2 d 4 7 2 ] a t 474 [ ( A l a . 1997 ) ] ; a n d Reed v. S t a t e , [547 S o . 2 d 596 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ] . As stated p r e v i o u s l y , the proper standard to apply i n determining w h e t h e r a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a new 8 in CR-06-0996 t r i a l i n t h i s circumstance i s 'whether the defendant might have been p r e j u d i c e d by a veniremember's failure to make a proper response.' Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d [122] a t 124 [(Ala. 1993)]. F u r t h e r , the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a p a r t y might have been prejudiced, i . e . , whether there was p r o b a b l e p r e j u d i c e , i s a matter w i t h i n the trial court's d i s c r e t i o n . " Ex parte D o b y n e , 805 So. 2d 763, 771-72 ( A l a . 2001) (footnote omitted). "The S u p r e m e C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e D o b y n e [ , 805 So. 2d 763 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , ] i d e n t i f i e d f a c t o r s t o be u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r p r o b a b l e p r e j u d i c e e x i s t e d . The factors include the temporal remoteness of the e v e n t , t h e a m b i g u i t y o f t h e q u e s t i o n a s k e d , and the juror's willfulness in providing inaccurate information. 805 So. 2d at 772. "'The form of p r e j u d i c e that would e n t i t l e a p a r t y to r e l i e f f o r a j u r o r ' s n o n d i s c l o s u r e or f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n v o i r d i r e w o u l d be i t s e f f e c t , i f a n y , t o c a u s e t h e p a r t y to forgo c h a l l e n g i n g the j u r o r f o r cause or e x e r c i s i n g a peremptory c h a l l e n g e t o s t r i k e t h e j u r o r . Ex p a r t e Ledbetter, 404 So. 2d 731 (Ala. 1981); Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 984); and L e a c h v . S t a t e , 31 A l a . App. 390 , 18 So. 2d 285 (1944 ) . I f t h e party e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t the j u r o r ' s d i s c l o s u r e of the t r u t h would have caused the party either to (successfully) challenge the j u r o r f o r cause or to e x e r c i s e a peremptory challenge to s t r i k e the j u r o r , then the 9 CR-06-0996 p a r t y h a s made a prejudice. Id.'" McGahee v. State, 2003), quoting 885 i n part So. prima 2d facie showing 1 91 , 2 0 3 - 0 4 Ex p a r t e of ( A l a . Crim. App. D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d a t 7 7 2 - 7 3 . W i t h t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n m i n d we r e v i e w Dunaway's claims. A. First, Dunaway contends that juror L.L. 2 failed to d i s c l o s e d u r i n g v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t a f a m i l y member h a d been the v i c t i m hearing, of a crime. At the Rule 32 evidentiary L . L . t e s t i f i e d t h a t she h a d a f a m i l y member who h a d b e e n t h e v i c t i m o f a s h o o t i n g i n t h e f a m i l y member's home; she did not i d e n t i f y Dunaway pleaded the f a m i l y member's i n h i s consolidated r e l a t i o n s h i p to her. petition " c o u s i n " had been t h e v i c t i m o f a v i o l e n t c r i m e . The that L.L.'s (C.R. 4 9 1 . ) c i r c u i t court stated the f o l l o w i n g i n regard to this claim: "Dunaway c o n t e n d s j u r o r [ L . L . ] d i d n o t d i s c l o s e d u r i n g v o i r d i r e t h a t a member o f h e r f a m i l y was a v i c t i m of a shooting. According t o Dunaway, i f [ L . L . ] had d i v u l g e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , h i s t r i a l counsel w o u l d have removed h e r b y a for-cause c h a l l e n g e o r by e x e r c i s i n g a peremptory s t r i k e . 2 I n i t i a l s are used t o p r o t e c t the anonymity o f the j u r o r s . 10 CR-06-0996 "Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k [ t r i a l c o u n s e l ] i f t h e y w o u l d have removed [ L . L . ] i f she h a d i n d i c a t e d she was r e l a t e d t o a s h o o t i n g v i c t i m . F u r t h e r , [ L . L . ] i n d i c a t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g t h a t i f she d i d n o t i n f o r m d e f e n s e c o u n s e l and t h e p r o s e c u t o r one o f h e r r e l a t i v e s was t h e v i c t i m o f a s h o o t i n g i t was b e c a u s e s h e was n o t a s k e d o r d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d the q u e s t i o n . I n any e v e n t , [L.L.] a f f i r m a t i v e l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f a c t h e r r e l a t i v e had been t h e victim of a shooting d i d not affect her d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n Dunaway's c a s e and t h a t she b a s e d h e r v e r d i c t s and s e n t e n c i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s on t h e evidence at t r i a l and t h e t r i a l court's jury instructions. "The Court finds this allegation of j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s Dunaway failed t o meet h i s burden o f p r o v i n g by a preponderance o f evidence t h a t t h i s a l l e g a t i o n o f juror misconduct might have c a u s e d h i m t o be p r e j u d i c e d as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 3 2 . 3 , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 663-64.) We have examined t h e r e c o r d o f Dunaway's trial. 3 The record indicates that during v o i r d i r e examination the e n t i r e v e n i r e was a s k e d i f t h e y h a d a f a m i l y member o r a f r i e n d who had been t h e v i c t i m o f a c r i m e . question. Dunaway a s s e r t s L.L. d i d not respond t o t h i s t h a t t h e j u r o r s were a s k e d three t i m e s i f t h e y h a d a f a m i l y member who h a d b e e n t h e v i c t i m o f T h i s C o u r t may t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f i t s r e c o r d s i n Dunaway's d i r e c t a p p e a l . See N e t t l e s v . S t a t e , 731 So. 2d 626 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) . 3 11 CR-06-0996 a crime. and However, t h e v e n i r e was each p a n e l counsel asked was asked L.L. the very questioned i n three same q u e s t i o n . few panels Postconviction questions -- her direct e x a m i n a t i o n c o n s i s t s o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y two p a g e s o f t r a n s c r i p t . L.L. was not member. did Also, not hear fact that had no on r e l a t i o n s h i p was cross-examination a question impact on counsel L.L. for her been the verdict were cause L.L. r e l a t e d to her a f a m i l y member had Dunaway's struck a s k e d what h e r not in she family t o j u r o r L.L. whether answered b e c a u s e he and v i c t i m of family the she that a the shooting case. they a g r e e w i t h t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t t h a t Dunaway was regard the responded t h a t Dunaway's asked had to Also, would have questions. We due no r e l i e f i n f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n of proof. B. Second, disclose Whigham. Dunaway their argues connection Specifically, he that several the district to asserts jurors failed attorney t h a t j u r o r E.B. d i s c l o s e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y had p r e v i o u s l y -- M.B. failed to disclose 12 that she had Boyd failed to represented h e r i n a c u s t o d y d i s p u t e r e l a t e d t o h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r and juror to worked for that the CR-06-0996 district attorney as previously represented The circuit denying r e l i e f a maid i n h i s home her i n a divorce court regarding stated and t h a t he h a d action. the f o l l o w i n g i n i t s order j u r o r E.B.: "Dunaway c o n t e n d s j u r o r [ E . B . ] d i d n o t d i s c l o s e in her j u r o r questionnaire t h a t she knew B o y d Whigham, t h e B a r b o u r C o u n t y D i s t r i c t Attorney, before trial. According t o Dunaway, Mr. Whigham 'provided l e g a l assistance i n a c h i l d custody s u i t r e g a r d i n g h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r d u r i n g t h e 1980s.' " A c c o r d i n g t o Dunaway, i f [ E . B . ] h a d d i v u l g e d this information, his t r i a l counsel w o u l d have removed her by a for-cause challenge or by e x e r c i s i n g a peremptory s t r i k e . "Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k [ t r i a l c o u n s e l ] i f t h e y w o u l d have removed [ E . B . ] i f she had d i s c l o s e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . F u r t h e r , a t t h e evidentiary h e a r i n g , [ E . B . ] i n d i c a t e d Whigham's p r i o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h a d no b e a r i n g a t a l l on h e r a b i l i t y t o s i t on Dunaway's c a s e . A c c o r d i n g to [ E . B . ] , she b a s e d h e r v e r d i c t s a n d sentencing recommendations on the evidence presented at Dunaway's t r i a l . "The Court f i n d s t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s Dunaway failed t o meet h i s burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of juror m i s c o n d u c t m i g h t have c a u s e d h i m t o be p r e j u d i c e d as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 3 2 . 3 , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 662-63.) 13 CR-06-0996 The record district indicates a t t o r n e y had p r e v i o u s l y w h i l e he was i n p r i v a t e practice. During the postconviction 1980s that dispute Whigham's verdict In involving representation to juror asked J u r o r E.B. d i d n o t r e s p o n d . Whigham i n the e a r l y to represent him i n a She s a i d o f h e r s o n h a d no b e a r i n g M.B., i f the r e p r e s e n t e d a n y one o f them her granddaughter. i n Dunaway's c a s e . regard was h e a r i n g E.B. s a i d t h a t h e r "son" had r e t a i n e d custody the j u r y that on h e r (R. 260.) the c i r c u i t court stated: "Dunaway a l l e g e d t h a t a l t e r n a t e j u r o r [M.B.] d i d not d i s c l o s e d u r i n g v o i r d i r e t h a t [the d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ] h a d d o n e l e g a l w o r k f o r h e r when he was i n p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e , t h a t she had worked a t h i s house as a m a i d , a n d t h a t s h e h a d h e a r d a b o u t t h e f a c t s o f the case. According t o D u n a w a y , i f [M.B.] h a d d i v u l g e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , h i s t r i a l counsel would have removed h e r by a f o r - c a u s e c h a l l e n g e o r by e x e r c i s i n g a peremptory s t r i k e . "Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k [ t r i a l counsel] i f t h e y w o u l d h a v e r e m o v e d [M.B.] i f s h e had d i s c l o s e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e t r i a l r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t [M.B.] s e r v e d a s a n a l t e r n a t e j u r o r a n d was e x c u s e d b e f o r e t h e j u r y ' s g u i l t p h a s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s b e g a n . Dunaway p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e [M.B.] d i s c u s s e d her past a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h Mr. W h i g h a m w i t h members of h i s jury. I f , f o r some reason, [M.B.] f a i l e d t o a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s during v o i r d i r e i t w o u l d n o t h a v e c a u s e d Dunaway t o b e p r e j u d i c e d . S e e R e e v e s v . S t a t e , 807 S o . 2 d 1 8 , 32 14 CR-06-0996 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) ( h o l d i n g '[t]here [was] s i m p l y no p o s s i b i l i t y ' R e e v e s was h a r m e d b y j u r o r s ' failure to r e c a l l their remote c o n n e c t i o n s with R e e v e s and the v i c t i m b e c a u s e b o t h were excused before j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s b e g a n and t h e r e was no evidence they informed other j u r o r s about their c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h the case). "The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h i s a l l e g a t i o n o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s D u n a w a y failed to meet his burden of proving by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of juror misconduct might have caused him to be p r e j u d i c e d as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 3 2 . 3 , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 664-65.) Dunaway a s s e r t s t h a t M.B. that she office. of the did not anyone in the questionnaire district attorney's However, t h e t r i a l r e c o r d shows t h a t a t t h e voir w h e t h e r she dire had her t o s e r v e on she c o u l d not At know r e s p o n d e d on h e r the examination any M.B. responded to beginning a question p r o b l e m t h a t w o u l d make i t d i f f i c u l t the j u r y . M.B. told the circuit for court that testified that read very w e l l . Rule 32 evidentiary hearing M.B. she had w o r k e d f o r Whigham as a m a i d i n h i s home, t h a t she had little contact and t h a t i n 1984 he w i t h him had b e c a u s e she represented 15 her dealt with his i n a divorce had wife, action. CR-06-0996 Dunaway was t r i e d i n 1997. worked f o r Whigham. excused before M.B. d i d n o t t e s t i f y when s h e h a d Also, the j u r y M.B. started was an a l t e r n a t e a n d was i t s deliberations. N o r was M.B. q u e s t i o n e d a b o u t w h e t h e r s h e d i s c u s s e d h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with any o f t h e o t h e r jurors. T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t a b u s e d i t s considerable discretion i n denying Dunaway relief on h i s c l a i m s r e l a t e d t o j u r o r s E.B. a n d M.B. C. Dunaway next argues that juror W.H. committed juror misconduct by v i s i t i n g t h e scene o f t h e crime. Specifically, he because argues that he i s e n t i t l e d v i s i t e d the burned t r a i l e r t o a new t r i a l W.H. i n w h i c h t h e v i c t i m s ' b o d i e s were found. The relief circuit on t h i s court stated the following when denying claim: "The l a s t j u r o r w i t n e s s c a l l e d b y Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l was [W.H.]. [W.H.'s] t e s t i m o n y was c o n t i n u e d u n t i l A u g u s t 17, 2004, due t o h i s h e a l t h . Dunaway a l l e g e d t h a t [W.H.] d r o v e t o t h e crime scene d u r i n g t h e t r i a l 'so t h a t he c o u l d better understand the evidence presented a t t r i a l . ' Dunaway c o n t e n d s [W.H.'s] v i s i t t o t h e c r i m e s c e n e p r e j u d i c e d h i m 'because [W.H.] was a b l e t o c o n s i d e r and t o communicate t o h i s f e l l o w j u r o r s extra 16 CR-06-0996 judicial information that [Dunaway] opportunity to challenge or rebut.' had no " A t t h e t i m e o f t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , [W.H.] was 88 y e a r s o l d a n d i n f a i l i n g h e a l t h . When a s k e d on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n i f he went t o t h e c r i m e s c e n e w h i l e he was a j u r o r , [W.H.] a n s w e r e d y e s . [W.H.] s a i d he saw where t h e b a b y was b u r n e d a n d t h a t t h e trailer was 'burned pretty bad.' In c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , however, [W.H.] i n d i c a t e d t h a t he t h o u g h t he v i s i t e d t h e t r a i l e r b e f o r e Dunaway's t r i a l w i t h a g r o u p o f p e o p l e . When a s k e d b y t h i s C o u r t w h e t h e r he c o u l d have c o n f u s e d g o i n g t o t h e crime scene w i t h l o o k i n g a t p i c t u r e s o f i t a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , [W.H.] a g a i n s a i d he went t o t h e scene. "[W.H.] a p p e a r e d s u r e he went t o t h e c r i m e s c e n e . What h i s t e s t i m o n y l e f t u n c l e a r i s when. There i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g t h e j u r y went t o t h e c r i m e s c e n e d u r i n g t h e t r i a l . A t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , [ a n o t h e r j u r o r ] s a i d she d i d not r e c a l l t h e j u r y going t o t h e crime scene. [ E . B . ] and [ a n o t h e r j u r o r ] e m p h a t i c a l l y s a i d t h e j u r y d i d n o t go t o t h e c r i m e s c e n e . The b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h a t [W.H.] v i s i t e d t h e c r i m e s c e n e d u r i n g t h e t r i a l rested entirely on Dunaway a n d h i s c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l . See Ex p a r t e Dawson, 710 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. 1997) ( h o l d i n g 'a d e f e n d a n t s e e k i n g a new trial on t h e b a s i s o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t h a s t h e i n i t i a l burden t o prove t h a t a j u r o r o r j u r o r s d i d i n f a c t commit t h e a l l e g e d m i s c o n d u c t ' ) . B e c a u s e [W.H.'s] t e s t i m o n y was c o n f l i c t i n g , t o say the l e a s t , t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t f i n d t h a t Dunaway h a s met his burden of proving this a l l e g a t i o n of j u r o r misconduct by a preponderance o f t h e e v i d e n c e as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P. "Moreover, even assuming [W.H.] i m p r o p e r l y v i s i t e d t h e c r i m e s c e n e d u r i n g Dunaway's trial, t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y p r o v i n g i t a f f e c t e d [W.H.'s] 17 CR-06-0996 v e r d i c t s o r s e n t e n c i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k [W.H.] w h e t h e r he c o n s i d e r e d h i s v i s i t as e v i d e n c e n o r d i d t h e y a s k [W.H.] w h e t h e r i t h a d a n y a f f e c t on h i s v e r d i c t s o r sentencing recommendations. Further, Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l a l s o d i d n o t e l i c i t any t e s t i m o n y from any o f t h e o t h e r j u r o r s o r t h e a l t e r n a t e j u r o r c a l l e d a t t h e J u n e 2004 h e a r i n g s h o w i n g t h a t [W.H.] had d i s c l o s e d t o them a n y i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e c r i m e s c e n e . None o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y a t t h e J u n e 2004 p r o c e e d i n g i n d i c a t e d [W.H.] ever d i s c l o s e d any i n f o r m a t i o n from v i s i t i n g t h e c r i m e s c e n e . See Reed v . S t a t e , 547 So. 2 d 596, 598 (Ala. 1989) ( h o l d i n g t h a t ' [ b ] e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e h a s f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e e x p e r i m e n t [conducted by a j u r o r ] r e s u l t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f a c t s t h a t m i g h t have u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d t h e v e r d i c t r e n d e r e d , we f i n d t h a t t h e j u r o r ' s a c t i o n does n o t w a r r a n t a new t r i a l ' ) ; s e e a l s o R e y n o l d s v . C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 723 So. 2d 822, 826 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1998) ( f i n d i n g t h a t j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t d i d n o t w a r r a n t a new t r i a l b e c a u s e ' [ t ] h e j u r o r s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a l l s t a t e d t h a t t h e y were b a s i n g t h e i r d e c i s i o n on t h e o f f i c e r s ' t e s t i m o n y r a t h e r t h a n a n y statements of allegations coming from the i n v e s t i g a t i n g j u r o r ' ) ; Ex p a r t e Dawson, 710 So. 2 d a t 476 ( h o l d i n g ' [ b ] e c a u s e Dawson f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e j u r o r ' s v i e w i n g o f t h e crime scene r e s u l t e d in the introduction of facts t h a t might have u n l a w f u l l y i n f l u e n c e d t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , a new t r i a l i s not warranted'). "Even i f t h i s C o u r t were t o f i n d Dunaway h a d met h i s i n i t i a l b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g [W.H.] h a d c o m m i t t e d m i s c o n d u c t , t h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g he m i g h t have b e e n p r e j u d i c e d by t h i s misconduct by a preponderance o f e v i d e n c e a s r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 669-71.) 18 CR-06-0996 The c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s law. f i n d i n g s a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Alabama As we s t a t e d i n Minshew v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 594 So. 2d 703 ( A l a . 1991): " ' J u r o r m i s c o n d u c t w i l l j u s t i f y a new t r i a l when it indicates bias or corruption, o r when t h e m i s c o n d u c t a f f e c t e d t h e v e r d i c t , o r when f r o m t h e e x t r a n e o u s f a c t s p r e j u d i c e may be p r e s u m e d as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' W h i t t e n v. A l l s t a t e I n s . Co., 447 So. 2d 655, 658 ( A l a . 1984) . As a g e n e r a l r u l e , '[w]here e x t r a n e o u s m a t e r i a l [ i s ] i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the jury's deliberations, ... a c t u a l prejudice [must] be shown t o w o r k a r e v e r s a l o f t h e v e r d i c t . ' N i c h o l s v. S e a b o a r d C o a s t l i n e Ry., 341 So. 2d 671, 672 ( A l a . 1976) . However, i t i s a l i g h t burden p l a c e d upon t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show p r e j u d i c e b a s e d on m i s c o n d u c t w h i c h m i g h t have i n f l u e n c e d t h e v e r d i c t . Ex p a r t e T r o h a , 462 So. 2d 953, 954 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) . " 594 So. 2d a t 716. W.H.'s testimony at the evidentiary hearing clearly i n d i c a t e s t h a t he was v e r y c o n f u s e d -- a c o n d i t i o n n o t u n u s u a l for an i n d i v i d u a l who definitively was 88 years s a y when he v i s i t e d old. W.H. the scene. a s k e d what he saw as a r e s u l t o f t h a t v i s i t . whether there was any m i s c o n d u c t i n this could Nor was not W.H. I t i s unclear case. Neither i s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t W.H. d i s c u s s e d h i s v i s i t w i t h any o f his [Dunaway] fellow [W.H.'s] jurors. viewing introduction "Because of the crime of f a c t s t h a t might 19 scene failed t o show resulted have u n l a w f u l l y in that the influenced CR-06-0996 the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , " Dunaway f a i l e d entitled to r e l i e f . (Ala. t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he i s See Dawson v . S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 472, 476 1997). M o r e o v e r , Dunaway t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he a c c i d e n t a l l y s h o t T r e s s a a n d t h a t he s e t h e r on f i r e b e c a u s e v o i c e s him t o "send her t o h e l l . " He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t know t h a t t h e b a b y was i n t h e t r a i l e r . the jury murders, was Dunaway's not whether confident trailer he mental burned Thus, t h e q u e s t i o n f o r state a t the time s e t the t r a i l e r t h a t e v e n i f W.H. was told had v i s i t e d i t would have of the on f i r e . We a r e t h e s c e n e where t h e had no effect on t h e proceedings. Accordingly, in regard Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f to h i s claim related to juror W.H. III. Dunaway n e x t a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o u n s e l the penalty phase of h i s capital-murder were i n e f f e c t i v e a t trial. s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t grounds i n support of t h i s To counsel prevail a on a petitioner claim must of 20 cites contention. i n e f f e c t i v e assistance show: p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t ; a n d He (2) t h a t (1) that of counsel's t h e p e t i t i o n e r was CR-06-0996 p r e j u d i c e d by c o u n s e l ' s d e f i c i e n t p e r f o r m a n c e . v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 See Strickland (1984). " J u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y o f c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e must be h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l . I t i s a l l t o o t e m p t i n g f o r a defendant to second-guess counsel's a s s i s t a n c e a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n o r a d v e r s e s e n t e n c e , and i t i s a l l t o o easy f o r a c o u r t , examining counsel's defense a f t e r i t has p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l , t o c o n c l u d e t h a t a particular act or omission of counsel was u n r e a s o n a b l e . C f . E n g l e v. I s a a c , 456 U.S. 107, 1 3 3 - 3 4 [ , 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783] ( 1 9 8 2 ) . A f a i r assessment of a t t o r n e y performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the d i s t o r t i n g e f f e c t s of h i n d s i g h t , to r e c o n s t r u c t the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f c o u n s e l ' s c h a l l e n g e d c o n d u c t , and to e v a l u a t e the conduct from c o u n s e l ' s p e r s p e c t i v e at the time. Because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n m a k i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n , a c o u r t must i n d u l g e a s t r o n g presumption t h a t counsel's conduct f a l l s w i t h i n the wide range of r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e ; t h a t i s , t h e d e f e n d a n t must overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t , under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n 'might be c o n s i d e r e d s o u n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ' See M i c h e l v. L o u i s i a n a , [350 U.S. 91], at 101[, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ] . T h e r e a r e c o u n t l e s s ways t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i n any g i v e n c a s e . Even t h e b e s t c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e a t t o r n e y s w o u l d n o t d e f e n d a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t i n t h e same way." S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. at 689. "[T]he purpose of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s review i s not to grade counsel's performance. See Strickland [v. Washington], [466 U.S. 668,] 104 S.Ct. [2052] a t 2065 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; see a l s o W h i t e v. S i n g l e t a r y , 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1992) ('We are not i n t e r e s t e d i n g r a d i n g l a w y e r s ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ; we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n whether the a d v e r s a r i a l process a t t r i a l , i n f a c t , w o r k e d a d e q u a t e l y . ' ) . We r e c o g n i z e t h a t ' [ r ] e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an a r t , and an a c t o r 21 CR-06-0996 o m i s s i o n t h a t i s u n p r o f e s s i o n a l i n one c a s e may be s o u n d o r e v e n b r i l l i a n t i n a n o t h e r . ' S t r i c k l a n d , 104 S.Ct. a t 2067. D i f f e r e n t l a w y e r s have d i f f e r e n t g i f t s ; t h i s f a c t , as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m c a s e t o c a s e , means t h e r a n g e o f what m i g h t be a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r o a c h a t t r i a l must be b r o a d . To s t a t e the obvious: the t r i a l lawyers, i n every case, could have done something more or something d i f f e r e n t . So, o m i s s i o n s a r e i n e v i t a b l e . B u t , t h e i s s u e i s n o t what i s p o s s i b l e o r 'what i s p r u d e n t o r appropriate, b u t o n l y what i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l e d . ' B u r g e r v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S . C t . 3114, 3126, 97 L . E d . 2 d 638 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . " "Because t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f c o u n s e l ' s a c t s (including what investigations are reasonable) depends ' c r i t i c a l l y ' upon ' i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d b y the [petitioner]' or 'the [petitioner]'s own statements or a c t i o n s , ' evidence of a p e t i t i o n e r ' s statements and a c t s i n d e a l i n g w i t h c o u n s e l i s highly relevant to ineffective assistance claims. S t r i c k l a n d , 104 S . C t . a t 2066. '[An] i n q u i r y i n t o c o u n s e l ' s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e [ p e t i t i o n e r ] may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n d e c i s i o n s , j u s t as i t may be c r i t i c a l to a p r o p e r assessment of c o u n s e l ' s o t h e r l i t i g a t i o n d e c i s i o n s . ' I d . ('[W]hen a d e f e n d a n t has g i v e n counsel reason to b e l i e v e t h a t pursuing c e r t a i n i n v e s t i g a t i o n s w o u l d be f r u i t l e s s o r e v e n h a r m f u l , c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o p u r s u e t h o s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s may n o t l a t e r be c h a l l e n g e d as u n r e a s o n a b l e . ' ) . " Chandler 2000) v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 218 F.3d 1305, 1313-19 (11th C i r . (footnotes omitted). With counsel regard related to claims of ineffective t o the p e n a l t y phase 22 of a assistance capital of murder CR-06-0996 trial, 539 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t U.S. 510 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , i n W i g g i n s v. Smith, stated: " I n S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] , we made c l e a r t h a t , t o e s t a b l i s h p r e j u d i c e , a ' d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y that, but f o r counsel's unprofessional e r r o r s , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g w o u l d have b e e n d i f f e r e n t . A reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y i s a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t t o u n d e r m i n e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome.' I d . , a t 694, 104 S . C t . 2052. I n a s s e s s i n g p r e j u d i c e , we r e w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e i n a g g r a v a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l i t y of a v a i l a b l e m i t i g a t i n g evidence." 539 U.S. a t 534. Dunaway was represented at t r i a l Brunson and Donald J . McKinnon. 4 by a t t o r n e y s Paul W. Both a t t o r n e y s t e s t i f i e d a t the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s . First, Dunaway a r g u e s that h i s t r i a l counsel f a i l e d to i n v e s t i g a t e Dunaway's l i f e i n L o u i s i a n a a n d T e x a s f o r p u r p o s e s of the p e n a l t y phase. resided i n Alabama A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r s Dunaway h a d f o r approximately three months and h a d moved f r o m Texas t o A l a b a m a w i t h t h e v i c t i m s . In t h e s e c t i o n o f Dunaway's b r i e f addressing this he makes a g e n e r a l i z e d c l a i m t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y cap on issue fees B r u n s o n a n d M c K i n n o n a l s o r e p r e s e n t e d Dunaway on d i r e c t appeal. 4 23 CR-06-0996 for o u t - o f - c o u r t work i n a c a p i t a l case denied a b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e Dunaway's l i f e At the time of c o u r t work was amended in $1,000. 1999 capital-murder When Dunaway's t r i a l to the counsel i n L o u i s i a n a and cap on fees the Texas. for out-of- S e c t i o n 1 5 - 1 2 - 2 1 , A l a . Code 1975, lift the cap for out-of-court was work in cases. denying relief on this claim, the circuit court stated: " A t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , Mr. [ P a u l ] B r u n s o n and Mr. [Donald] M c K i n n o n e x p r e s s e d t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t the compensation f o r a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y s i n c a p i t a l cases i n e f f e c t a t the time they r e p r e s e n t e d Dunaway was inadequate. Both indicated they c o n t i n u e d t o do l e g a l work f o r w h i c h t h e y were b e i n g p a i d w h i l e r e p r e s e n t i n g Dunaway. B r u n s o n t e s t i f i e d he s p e n t 'a l o t more h o u r s t h a n [he] was p a i d f o r ' in preparing for Dunaway's trial. McKinnon i n d i c a t e d he a l s o went o v e r t h e cap f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n and s a i d he and B r u n s o n d i d t h e b e s t w i t h what t h e y had. M c K i n n o n a l s o i n d i c a t e d b e c a u s e o f i l l n e s s he d i d not submit a fee d e c l a r a t i o n . "The Alabama observed t h a t : Court of Criminal Appeals "'These l i m i t a t i o n s on compensation have w i t h s t o o d r e p e a t e d challenges that they violate the s e p a r a t i o n of powers doctrine, c o n s t i t u t e a taking without just compensation, deprive indigent capital defendants of the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, and deny e q u a l protection in v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F i f t h , S i x t h , E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n Amendments o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 24 has CR-06-0996 C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n , and A l a b a m a s t a t e l a w . See Ex p a r t e S m i t h , 698 So. 2d 219 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 522 U.S. 957, 188 S.Ct. 385, 139 L.Ed.2d 300 (1997).' "Samra v. S t a t e , App. 1 9 9 9 ) . 771 So. 2d 1108, 1112 ( A l a . Crim. "No d o u b t t h a t w i t h a d d i t i o n a l t i m e and money B r u n s o n and M c K i n n o n c o u l d have done s o m e t h i n g more o r d i f f e r e n t . The same c o u l d be s a i d a f t e r any t r i a l where a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t was found g u i l t y and sentenced to death, but ' p e r f e c t i o n i s not the standard of e f f e c t i v e assistance.' Waters v. Thomas, 46 F. 3d 1506, 1514 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) . Mr. Brunson and Mr. M c K i n n o n f a c e d a d a u n t i n g t a s k d e f e n d i n g Dunaway and b o t h t e s t i f i e d t h e y s p e n t f a r more h o u r s p r e p a r i n g f o r Dunaway's c a s e t h a n t h e y were given compensation. The cap on personal c o m p e n s a t i o n d i d n o t l e s s e n B r u n s o n ' s and M c K i n n o n ' s v i g o r o r z e a l i n t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n and p r e s e n t a t i o n a t Dunaway's t r i a l . See B u i v. S t a t e , 717 So. 2d 6, 15 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997) ( h o l d i n g 'we r e j e c t t h e notion that Alabama's statutory scheme for c o m p e n s a t i n g a t t o r n e y s i n c a p i t a l c a s e s , i n and o f itself, denies a defendant effective representation'). " B a s e d on t h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d o f Brunson's and McKinnon's efforts to represent Dunaway and t h e l a w i n A l a b a m a , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway's a l l e g a t i o n t h e y were i n e f f e c t i v e due t o l i m i t s on t h e i r p e r s o n a l c o m p e n s a t i o n i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. (C.R. Crim. P." 684-85.) The c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e s u p p o r t e d by and by Alabama law. Brunson testified 25 at the the r e c o r d evidentiary CR-06-0996 hearing that he was appointed between t h e 72-hour h e a r i n g preliminary hearing. t o Dunaway's case sometime f o l l o w i n g Dunaway's a r r e s t a n d t h e He s a i d t h a t he w o u l d have l i k e d t o have h i r e d a p r i v a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r b u t he knew f r o m p a s t e x p e r i e n c e that the c i r c u i t also said: for." court would not approve that expense. He " I s p e n t a l o t more h o u r s t h a n I a c t u a l l y g o t p a i d (R. 24.) Brunson t e s t i f i e d that he w o r k e d c l o s e l y w i t h Dunaway and t h a t he c o m m u n i c a t e d with Dunaway's Lopez, who family He a l s o retained contacted organizations Dr. members. had been condition, that On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n Lopez to evaluate "certain i n Louisiana obtained said that Dr. F e r n a n d e z Dunaway's hospitals and and g o t a d d i t i o n a l information from a children's educational testified at Louisiana. M c K i n n o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r he h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e penalty-phase two obtained Dunaway's Dunaway's The other information;" M e t h o d i s t home i n R u s t o n , L o u i s i a n a ; a n d t h a t he a l s o records. mental witnesses hearing work on t h e c a s e he d i d n o t s u b m i t an a t t o r n e y - f e e b e c a u s e , he s a i d , " I was j u s t l e t i t go." (R. 37.) facing a b a t t l e with He d i d t e s t i f y were who from declaration c a n c e r and I t h a t he knew that t h e t i m e he w o r k e d on t h e c a s e e x c e e d e d t h e s t a t u t o r y cap a n d 26 CR-06-0996 t h a t he and Brunson d i d the b e s t t h a t they could with their resources. In Ex Alabama parte Supreme Grayson, Court 479 So. noted that 2d a 76 ( A l a . 1985), claim of the ineffective a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l b a s e d on t h e s t a t u t o r y cap i s "made on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t l a w y e r s w i l l n o t p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e u n l e s s p a i d a c e r t a i n amount o f money. But the legal profession requires i t s members t o g i v e t h e i r b e s t e f f o r t s i n ' a d v a n c i n g t h e " u n d i v i d e d i n t e r e s t s of [ t h e i r ] c l i e n t [ s ] . " ' Polk C o u n t y v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19, 102 S.Ct. 445, 449-50, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)." 479 So. denied 2d a t 79-80. T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Dunaway t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l b a s e d on t h e existing s t a t u t o r y cap court c o r r e c t l y denied Dunaway next f o r o u t - o f - c o u r t work. relief argues on t h i s that his then circuit claim. trial d i s c o v e r and p r e s e n t m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e . Dunaway's b r i e f a d d r e s s i n g t h i s The was counsel failed to In the s e c t i o n of i s s u e , Dunaway s e p a r a t e s argument a c c o r d i n g t o the m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e the t h a t he a s s e r t s c o u n s e l d i d n o t d i s c o v e r and p r e s e n t a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . "As an i n i t i a l m a t t e r , we 'must r e c o g n i z e t h a t trial counsel i s a f f o r d e d broad authority in determining what evidence will be offered in m i t i g a t i o n . ' S t a t e v. F r a z i e r ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 61 O h i o S t . 3 d 27 CR-06-0996 247, 255, 574 N.E.2d 483. We a l s o r e i t e r a t e t h a t p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s were d e s i g n e d t o r e d r e s s d e n i a l s or i n f r i n g e m e n t s of b a s i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and were n o t i n t e n d e d as an avenue f o r s i m p l y r e t r y i n g t h e c a s e . L a u g e n s e n [ L a u g e s e n ] v. S t a t e , [ ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 11 O h i o M i s c . 10, 227 N.E.2d 663] supra; S t a t e v. L o t t , [(Nov. 3, 1 9 9 4 ) , Cuyahoga App. Nos. 66338, 66389, 66390] s u p r a . F u r t h e r , t h e f a i l u r e t o present evidence which i s merely cumulative to that w h i c h was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l i s , g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , not i n d i c a t i v e of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of t r i a l c o u n s e l . S t a t e v. Combs ( 1 9 9 4 ) , 100 O h i o App.3d 90, 105, 652 N.E.2d 205. J e l l s v. M i t c h e l l , 538 F.3d 478, 489 (6th C i r . 2008). "'[C]ounsel i s not r e q u i r e d to present a l l mitigation evidence, even i f the additional m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e w o u l d n o t have b e e n i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h c o u n s e l ' s s t r a t e g y . C o u n s e l must be p e r m i t t e d t o weed o u t some a r g u m e n t s t o s t r e s s o t h e r s and a d v o c a t e e f f e c t i v e l y . ' H a l i b u r t o n v. S e c ' y f o r t h e Dep't o f C o r r . , 342 F.3d 1233, 1243-44 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2003) ( q u o t a t i o n marks and c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; see H e r r i n g v. S e c ' y , Dep't o f C o r r . , 397 F.3d 1338, 1348-50 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2005) (rejecting ineffective a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m where d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r was o n l y m i t i g a t i o n w i t n e s s and c o u n s e l d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e evidence from hospital records in counsel's possession s h o w i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s b r a i n damage and mental retardation or call psychologist who e v a l u a t e d d e f e n d a n t p r e - t r i a l as h a v i n g d u l l n o r m a l i n t e l l i g e n c e ) ; H u b b a r d v. H a l e y , 317 F.3d 1245, 1254 n. 16, 1260 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2003) ( s t a t i n g t h i s C o u r t has ' c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e r e i s "no a b s o l u t e d u t y ... t o i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g o r c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e " ' and r e j e c t i n g c l a i m t h a t c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e i n failing to present hospital records showing d e f e n d a n t was in 'borderline mentally retarded range') (brackets omitted) (quoting Chandler [v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ] , 218 F.3d [1305] a t 1319 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2000)])." 28 CR-06-0996 Wood v. A l l e n , decision 542 F.3d 1281, 1306 o f what m i t i g a t i n g (11th C i r . 2008). evidence "The to present d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l case i s g e n e r a l l y a matter of t r i a l strategy." Hill v. M i t c h e l l , 400 F.3d 308, 331 (6th C i r . 2005). Initially, we note that t h e r e c o r d shows that both of Dunaway's t r i a l a t t o r n e y s were a s k e d v e r y few q u e s t i o n s a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . Brunson's d i r e c t examination c o n s i s t s of n i n e pages and McKinnon's d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n c o n s i s t s o f f o u r pages. N e i t h e r a t t o r n e y was a s k e d why c o u n s e l p r e s e n t e d t h e mitigating conducted silent evidence they d i d or what investigation they to d i s c o v e r m i t i g a t i n g evidence. " I f the r e c o r d i s as to the reasoning behind counsel's actions, presumption o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o deny r e l i e f ineffective assistance 239 S.W.3d 359, 367 Also, of counsel claim." (Tex. C r i m . App. "Although P e t i t i o n e r ' s s h o u l d have done s o m e t h i n g lawyer d i d i n f a c t . " Howard v. on State, 2007). claim i s that h i s t r i a l more, we the first counsel l o o k a t what t h e C h a n d l e r v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 218 F. 3d a t 1320. 29 CR-06-0996 The r e c o r d phase c o u n s e l o f Dunaway's t r i a l shows t h a t a t t h e p e n a l t y o f f e r e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Dunaway's f a t h e r , L a r r y Dunaway, S r . , a n d Mary M a r s h , t h e p a s t o r o f t h e c h u r c h Dunaway had a t t e n d e d i n L o u i s i a n a . Dunaway S r . t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway l i v e d w i t h h i m s i n c e he was a b o u t f i v e y e a r s o l d , t h a t he was a quiet easily child, that influenced he was a p r e t t y by others, that good b o y , t h a t he pretended he was t o be a p r e a c h e r a n d w o u l d s i n g , a n d t h a t he was a t h l e t i c a n d p l a y e d basketball. Dunaway S r . a l s o heard voices a l lof h i s l i f e . instances t h a t had occurred also t h a t he h a d o f t e n said what t h e c h i l d was testified t h a t he h i m s e l f h a d He r e l a t e d several specific as a r e s u l t o f t h o s e v o i c e s . ignored Dunaway a n d s e l d o m knew doing. M a r s h t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway's m o t h e r h e a r d v o i c e s , she He h a d b e e n w i t h h i s m o t h e r when s h e h e a r d v o i c e s , mother had t h r e a t e n e d her because o f the v o i c e s , that that h i s t h a t a t one p o i n t h i s mother had d e s t r o y e d t h e Dunaway home b e c a u s e o f t h e voices, mother and t h a t psychiatric Dunaway's home i n Monroe, h a d been Louisiana. placed She a l s o in a testified t h a t Dunaway's m o t h e r c o u l d n o t h e l p h e r s e l f a n d t h a t Dunaway h a d h a d no c o n t a c t w i t h h i s m o t h e r s i n c e he was f i v e y e a r s o l d 30 CR-06-0996 when h i s p a r e n t s d i v o r c e d a n d Dunaway l i v e d w i t h h i s f a t h e r . M a r s h f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway was a v e r y u n u s u a l child and s p e n t most o f h i s t i m e p r e t e n d i n g t o be a p r e a c h e r , his f a t h e r h e a r d v o i c e s and had f r e q u e n t l y asked f o r h e r h e l p w i t h t h o s e v o i c e s , a n d t h a t Dunaway was o f t e n n e g l e c t e d father. the that by h i s She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway was v e r y a c t i v e i n church, t h a t he h a d f o u n d e d a g o s p e l t h a t he was t h e c h u r c h s i n g i n g g r o u p , and organist. At the g u i l t phase, t r i a l counsel presented the testimony o f Dr. F e r n a n d o L o p e z , a p s y c h i a t r i s t . t a l k e d t o Dunaway f o u r t i m e s b e f o r e IQ t e s t a n d a p e r s o n a l i t y t e s t . He s a i d t h a t he h a d t r i a l a n d h a d g i v e n h i m an Dr. L o p e z t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was h i s o p i n i o n t h a t Dunaway s u f f e r e d f r o m a m e n t a l i l l n e s s -¬ schizophrenia, about t h i s the r e s i d u a l type. condition and s a i d t h a t He t e s t i f i e d extensively i t was h i s o p i n i o n Dunaway was s u f f e r i n g f r o m s c h i z o p h r e n i a that a t the time of the murders. 1. First, failing Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t h i s mother, V i c k i e Modest, s u f f e r e d from p a r a n o i d schizophrenia. 31 CR-06-0996 In regard to this claim, the c i r c u i t court stated: "At t r i a l , Dunaway t e s t i f i e d h i s m o t h e r s u f f e r e d from p a r a n o i d s c h i z o p h r e n i a and Dr. Lopez t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway s u f f e r e d f r o m r e s i d u a l s c h i z o p h r e n i a . The C o u r t a l s o n o t e s Mr. B r u n s o n a r g u e d i n h i s g u i l t p h a s e c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t Dunaway c o u l d have inherited h i s mental illness from h i s mother. Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k a n y j u r o r i f they d i d not consider the e f f e c t of t h i s evidence s i m p l y because Brunson and McKinnon d i d n o t o f f e r documentation t o prove i t . "The Court finds that this a l l e g a t i o n of ineffective assistance i s without merit. Rule 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n of p r o v i n g t h i s a l l e g a t i o n o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e v i d e n c e as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 732.) As stated above, Marsh t e s t i f i e d that Dunaway's m o t h e r h e a r d v o i c e s , t h a t s h e h a d b e e n w i t h h i s m o t h e r when she h e a r d voices, that h i s mother had threatened v o i c e s , t h a t a t one p o i n t s h e d e s t r o y e d the voices, psychiatric testified in and t h a t home her because of the t h e i r home b e c a u s e o f Dunaway's m o t h e r h a d b e e n p l a c e d i n Monroe, that h i s wife Louisiana. had heard v o i c e s . in a Dunaway Sr. also Dunaway testified h i s own d e f e n s e a t t h e g u i l t p h a s e t h a t h i s m o t h e r was a paranoid schizophrenic. 32 CR-06-0996 T h e r e was e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t h a t Dunaway's m o t h e r h a d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m and had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . the circuit counsel's court failure that Dunaway to present mother's mental h e a l t h . failed more The regarding his See S t r i c k l a n d . evidence about the v i o l e n c e h i s parents' t o show p r e j u d i c e i n evidence S e c o n d , Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l and We a g r e e w i t h s h o u l d have presented i n h i s home when he was a child volatile relationship. c i r c u i t court stated: "At the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, V i c k i e Modest [Dunaway's m o t h e r ] t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e d o m e s t i c abuse she s u f f e r e d a t t h e hands o f Dunaway S r . S i s t e r M a r s h a l s o t e s t i f i e d a b o u t what Dunaway S r . had confided i n h e r . Dunaway's b r o t h e r , Hiram Dunaway, a l s o s a i d t h a t h i s m o t h e r a n d f a t h e r h a d an a b u s i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d f o u g h t c o n s t a n t l y . As an e x a m p l e , H i r a m t e s t i f i e d a b o u t an i n c i d e n t where h i s mother t h r e a t e n e d t o stab h i s f a t h e r w i t h a k n i f e . "The t r i a l t e s t i m o n y o f M a r s h a n d Dunaway S r . gave t h e j u r y a n d t r i a l c o u r t more t h a n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e f r o m w h i c h t h e y c o u l d c o n c l u d e Dunaway's p a r e n t s had a bad m a r r i a g e t h a t ended i n d i v o r c e . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g he was p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t p r e s e n t more t e s t i m o n y a b o u t h i s p a r e n t s ' t u r b u l e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 751-52.) 33 CR-06-0996 Dunaway S r . t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l when Dunaway was a b o u t five t h a t he a n d h i s w i f e years split o l d a n d t h a t Dunaway a n d another son, Hiram, l i v e d w i t h him and t h a t t h e o t h e r c h i l d r e n lived with their mother. mother i n h i s l i f e testimony failure M a r s h t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway h a d no s i n c e he was f i v e t h a t was p r e s e n t e d , to present evidence we years o l d . cannot about B a s e d on t h e s a y t h a t Dunaway's h i s parent's "volatile r e l a t i o n s h i p , " g i v e n t h a t t h e y s e p a r a t e d when Dunaway was f i v e y e a r s o l d , r e s u l t e d i n any p r e j u d i c e t o h i m . T h i r d , Dunaway a r g u e s See S t r i c k l a n d . t h a t c o u n s e l s h o u l d have p r e s e n t e d t e s t i m o n y about h i s f a t h e r ' s mental illness and t h e p o v e r t y and n e g l e c t Dunaway s u f f e r e d as a c h i l d . The c i r c u i t court stated: "As previously stated, the testimony at Dunaway's e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g shows t h a t he was r e a r e d i n an e n v i r o n m e n t l a c k i n g i n m a t e r i a l l u x u r y . Dunaway's f a t h e r a p p e a r s t o have h a d a good j o b b u t s p e n t a l o t o f h i s money on g a m b l i n g a n d women. Many p e o p l e , however, have come f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e Dunaway e n d u r e d a n d d i d n o t go on t o c o m m i t t i n g c a p i t a l murder. T h i s C o u r t i s c o n v i n c e d t h e r e a s o n f o r a m a j o r i t y o f t h e j u r o r s recommending Dunaway r e c e i v e [ d e a t h ] f o r t h e c a p i t a l m u r d e r o f James P a t t e r s o n were t h e h o r r i f i c f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i n c i d e n t . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t , e v e n i f B r u n s o n and M c K i n n o n h a d p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e o f Dunaway's socio-economic background a t t h e p e n a l t y phase 34 CR-06-0996 similar to that presented a t the evidentiary h e a r i n g , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y i t w o u l d have c a u s e d a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . " (C.R. 759-60.) As phase stated that testified what above, he h a d h e a r d was d o i n g . divorced when Dunaway was a v e r y pretending had frequently Marsh He also Dunaway a n d s e l d o m knew testified about five that years Dunaway's old, that u n u s u a l c h i l d who s p e n t most o f h i s t i m e asked that s i n c e he was f i v e by h i s f o r her help had been Monroe, L o u i s i a n a , neglected a l l of h i s l i f e . ignored he was at the penalty t o be a p r e a c h e r , t h a t h i s f a t h e r h e a r d v o i c e s a n d Dunaway's m o t h e r life Sr. t e s t i f i e d voices t h a t he h a d o f t e n the c h i l d parents Dunaway placed with those voices, that i n a p s y c h i a t r i c home i n Dunaway h a d no m o t h e r f i g u r e i n h i s y e a r s o l d , a n d t h a t Dunaway was o f t e n father. "'Prejudicial i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel under S t r i c k l a n d c a n n o t be e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e g e n e r a l c l a i m t h a t a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d have b e e n c a l l e d i n m i t i g a t i o n . See B r i l e y v . B a s s , 750 F.2d 1238, 1248 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) ; s e e a l s o B a s s e t t e v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 941 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) . Rather, the d e c i d i n g f a c t o r i s whether a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s w o u l d have made a n y d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e m i t i g a t i o n p h a s e o f t h e t r i a l . ' S m i t h v. A n d e r s o n , 104 F.Supp.2d 773, 809 (S.D. O h i o 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 348 F.3d 177 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) . 'There h a s n e v e r b e e n a c a s e where a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s c o u l d n o t have b e e n 35 CR-06-0996 c a l l e d . ' S t a t e v. T a r v e r , C r i m . App. 19 9 3 ) . " McWilliams v. S t a t e , 2 0 0 4 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r 159 629 So. 2d 14, 21 ( A l a . 897 So. 2d 437, 453 g r o u n d s i n Ex p a r t e (Ala. Crim. Jenkins, App. 972 So. 2d (Ala. 2005). C o u n s e l d i d p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e o f Dunaway's f a t h e r ' s m e n t a l illness and h i s father's counsel's f a i l u r e Dunaway was neglect. We cannot to present evidence of the poverty raised resulted i n any p r e j u d i c e say that i n which t o him. See S t r i c k l a n d v. W a s h i n g t o n . 4. Fourth, failing to Specifically, Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l present evidence he a s s e r t s that counsel documentary evidence of h i s mental The circuit court of was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r his mental should have illness. presented illness. stated: " D u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , Dr. L o p e z t e s t i f i e d e x t e n s i v e l y a b o u t Dunaway's m e n t a l i l l n e s s and i t s e f f e c t on h i s a c t i o n s l e a d i n g up t o t h e murders. Lopez['s] testimony i n c l u d e d a vigorous cross-examination by the p r o s e c u t o r . Lopez s t a t e d t h a t , a t t h e t i m e Dunaway c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r s , he suffered from residual schizophrenia. Lopez c o n c l u d e d h i s d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y by s t a t i n g t h a t : the " ' I n my m e d i c a l o p i n i o n , b a s e d on a l l studies, reports, evaluations from 36 CR-06-0996 previous places, certain history, and psychiatric examination, psychological t e s t i n g , and t h e d i a g n o s i s i s I b e l i e v e t h a t he i s s u f f e r i n g f r o m a m e n t a l i l l n e s s , and as s u c h h i s b e h a v i o r , a l t h o u g h he knows t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t and w r o n g , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n c i d e n t he c o u l d not p e r c e i v e t h e w r o n g f u l n e s s o f h i s a c t s . He was u n d e r p s y c h i a t r i c d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t h e moment.' " I n a d d r e s s i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same u n d e r l y i n g issue on d i r e c t a p p e a l , the Alabama Court r C r i m i n a l Appeals c o n c l u d e d t h a t Dunaway's t t r iia l c o u n s e l had, i n f a c t , p r e s e n t e d 'some e v i d e n c e t h a t c r e a t e d doubt about h i s mental s t a t e a t the time of state the murders', but t h a t : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ u^^^^,^ ^ o f " ' B a s e d on t h e c o n f l i c t i n g e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g [Dunaway's] s a n i t y , t e s t i m o n y o f l a y w i t n e s s e s t h a t [Dunaway] a p p e a r e d t o be sane, and [Dunaway's] testimony and demeanor a t t r i a l , t h e j u r y c o u l d have reasonably concluded that [Dunaway] was sane a t t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r s . ' "Dunaway v. [(1998)]. State, 746 So. 2d [1021] at 1034 " B a s e d on e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y Dunaway's t r i a l c o u n s e l and t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t o f Criminal Appeals, the Court finds that this a l l e g a t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i s without m e r i t . G i b b y v. S t a t e , 753 So. 2d 1206, 1207-1208 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n c l a i m t h a t i s r e f u t e d by the r e c o r d i s w i t h o u t m e r i t ) In the a l t e r n a t i v e , the Court f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e by a preponderance o f e v i d e n c e as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P." 37 CR-06-0996 (C.R. 726-29.) Dunaway testified murder t r i a l . he defense at h i s He s a i d t h a t he h a d b e e n h e a r i n g was a c h i l d depressed. i n h i s own and t h a t a t the time He s a i d t h a t he, T r e s s a , capital- voices since o f t h e m u r d e r s he was a n d t h e b a b y were s i t t i n g i n t h e m o b i l e home and he was p l a y i n g w i t h a gun a n d p r e s s i n g it t o h i s head. Dunaway s a i d t h a t went o f f , a n d " V o i c e s t o l d record a t page 525.) the t r i g g e r a c c i d e n t a l l y him t o send h e r t o h e l l . " (Trial He h a d no c o n t r o l o v e r h i s a c t i o n s , he s a i d , a n d he f o r g o t t h a t t h e b a b y was i n t h e m o b i l e home. In Dunaway's he statement to police he said a c c i d e n t a l l y s h o t T r e s s a he p o u r e d r u b b i n g s e t h e r on Dr. after a l c o h o l on h e r and fire. Lopez evaluated that testified Dunaway personality test. and at had Dunaway's given him trial an IQ that test he had and a Dr. L o p e z t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was h i s o p i n i o n t h a t Dunaway s u f f e r e d f r o m a m e n t a l i l l n e s s -- t h e r e s i d u a l t y p e -- t h a t he was s u f f e r i n g f r o m schizophrenia, schizophrenia at the time o f the murders. E v i d e n c e o f Dunaway's m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n was p r e s e n t e d a t trial. We c a n n o t s a y t h a t Dunaway was p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e f a c t 38 CR-06-0996 t h a t c o u n s e l d i d n o t s u b m i t documents t o e s t a b l i s h h i s m e n t a l problems. Dunaway failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland. 5. Fifth, failing Dunaway a r g u e s to present evidence s t r u c t u r e d environment. 476 U.S. 1 The that He c o u n s e l was that cites ineffective Dunaway thrived S k i p p e r v. S o u t h for in a Carolina, (1986), t o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . c i r c u i t c o u r t s t a t e d the f o l l o w i n g i n r e g a r d to t h i s claim: " T h i s C o u r t i s c o n v i n c e d b e y o n d any d o u b t t h a t i f Dunaway's t r i a l c o u n s e l s had p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e o f Dunaway's g o o d b e h a v i o r w h i l e a t t h e C h i l d r e n ' s Home or w h i l e he was i n c a r c e r a t e d i n L o u i s i a n a and A l a b a m a t h e outcome o f t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and the t r i a l c o u r t ' s s e n t e n c e f o r the c a p i t a l murder of James P a t t e r s o n w o u l d have b e e n t h e same. The C o u r t f i n d s that t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 760-62.) In S k i p p e r , defense c o u n s e l sought t o i n t r o d u c e evidence t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had made a good a d j u s t m e n t The trial court excluded that evidence. The to p r i s o n life. United States Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g the evidence because, i t said, 39 any a s p e c t o f t h e defendant's CR-06-0996 good c h a r a c t e r was c a p i t a l case. as was the a d m i s s i b l e i n the s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g of a However, t h e i s s u e h e r e i s n o t t h e same i s s u e i s s u e i n S k i p p e r . Here, the ineffective for failing i s s u e i s whether to present evidence counsel t h a t Dunaway responded w e l l i n a s t r u c t u r e d environment. " [ C ] o u n s e l c o u l d have i n t r o d u c e d t e s t i m o n y f r o m j a i l and p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s , f o r e v i d e n c e l i k e t h a t may n o t be b a r r e d a t a c a p i t a l s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . S k i p p e r v. S o u t h C a r o l i n a , 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). Skipper d i d not also hold, h o w e v e r , t h a t c o u n s e l must be deemed i n e f f e c t i v e f o r failing to present a v a i l a b l e testimony of that nature." People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 29, 708 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1998). "Under S k i p p e r , t h i s e v i d e n c e w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y have b e e n a d m i s s i b l e , b u t t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e me is w h e t h e r c o u n s e l can be f o u n d i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o i n t r o d u c e i t . The E i g h t h C i r c u i t has c a u t i o n e d t h a t S k i p p e r c a n n o t be r e a d t o r e q u i r e c o u n s e l t o present a l l possible mitigating evidence. See S k i l l i c o r n v. L u e b b e r s , 475 F.3d 965, 976 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 007)." C o l e v. R o p e r , 579 We, like to present F. Supp. 2d 1246, the c i r c u i t this evidence 1283 (E.D. Mo. 2008). c o u r t , cannot say t h a t the failure p r e j u d i c e d Dunaway. Dunaway Thus, f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the S t r i c k l a n d t e s t i n r e g a r d to t h i s c l a i m . 40 CR-06-0996 Sixth, failing Dunaway a r g u e s to present conviction This amended t h a t c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r evidence i n mitigation of his prior f o r carjacking. issue Rule was not r a i s e d 32 p e t i t i o n . before this Court. appeal from the d e n i a l i n Dunaway's c o n s o l i d a t e d Therefore, i t i s not properly "An a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t of a Rule r a i s e d i n t h e R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . " 2d 237, 239 ( A l a . C r i m . App. raise 32 p e t i t i o n an i s s u e on which was n o t A r r i n g t o n v. S t a t e , 716 So. 2007). 7. Seventh, failing to present consisted that Dunaway a r g u e s evidence of testimony he was a t h a t c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r loving from o f h i s good character, h i s f a m i l y members brother and f r i e n d , and f r i e n d s respectful, loyal. First, "'As a m a t t e r o f t r i a l s t r a t e g y , c o u n s e l c o u l d w e l l d e c i d e n o t t o c a l l f a m i l y members as w i t n e s s e s b e c a u s e f a m i l y members c a n be e a s i l y i m p e a c h e d f o r b i a s . ' Bergman v . M c C a u g h t r y , 65 F.3d 1372, 1380 (7th C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) . "'Once counsel conducts a reasonable investigation o f law and f a c t s in a p a r t i c u l a r case, h i s s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s are "virtually unchallengeable." 41 which and CR-06-0996 [ S t r i c k l a n d v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668] a t 690, 104 S . C t . 2052 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] . T a c t i c a l o r r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments a r e n o t deficient but a f a i l u r e to investigate a m a t e r i a l m a t t e r due t o i n a t t e n t i o n may be d e f i c i e n t . When t h e c l a i m i s t h a t c o u n s e l f a i l e d to present a s u f f i c i e n t mitigating case d u r i n g s e n t e n c i n g , t h e i n q u i r y " i s n o t w h e t h e r c o u n s e l s h o u l d have p r e s e n t e d a mitigation case" but "whether the i n v e s t i g a t i o n supporting counsel's d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e ... was i t s e l f r e a s o n a b l e . " See W i g g i n s [ v . S m i t h ] , 539 U.S. [510] a t 5 2 3 , 123 S . C t . 2527 [ (2003)] (internal citations omitted)." Davis , F.3d v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-05-2050, A u g u s t 7, 2009] So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) , q u o t i n g P o w e l l v. K e l l y , 562 656, 670 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 9 ) . I t i s n o t p e r se i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel not t o present good-character witnesses. See Commonwealth v. B u e h l , 510 P a . 363, 508 A . 2 d 1167 (1986) . In f a c t , c o u n s e l may make a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n n o t t o p r e s e n t good-character 491, evidence. 511 ( A l a . C r i m . See B r o o k s v. S t a t e , 929 So. 2d App. 2 0 0 5 ) . " ' S t r i c k l a n d cautions that "there are countless ways t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i n a g i v e n c a s e " a n d t h a t "even t h e b e s t c r i m i n a l defense attorneys would not defend the p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t the same way." 466 U.S. a t 689, 104 S . C t . 2052. Among the " v i r t u a l l y u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e " t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n s left t o t h e judgment of trial counsel are determinations regarding the defense strategy adopted a t t r i a l . ' " 42 CR-06-0996 B r o o k s v. S t a t e , States, 929 So. 2d a t 509, q u o t i n g Gluzman v. U n i t e d 124 F.Supp.2d 171, 174 At the evidentiary (S.D.N.Y. 2 0 0 0 ) . hearing, Dunaway presented the t e s t i m o n y o f v a r i o u s f a m i l y members a n d f r i e n d s . Family testified members. Vickie Modest, Dunaway's mother, t h a t she was 17 y e a r s o l d when she m a r r i e d Dunaway S r . a n d t h a t h e r h u s b a n d d r a n k and w o u l d b e a t h e r . She s a i d t h a t Dunaway h a d p r o b l e m s g r o w i n g up, t h a t he was i n a "Head S t a r t " p r o g r a m , b u t , she s a i d , she d i d n o t know what Dunaway's problems were. Joseph Dunaway, Dunaway's u n c l e , t h a t a f t e r Dunaway's p a r e n t s d i v o r c e d testified he w o u l d v i s i t Dunaway b e c a u s e he knew t h a t t h e k i d s were l o o k i n g a f t e r t h e m s e l v e s . He s a i d t h a t t h e i r had no adult psychiatric testified home was " p r e t t y s h a b b y , " supervision, problems. that he was and Bryan that that the kids Dunaway's Dunaway, mother Dunaway's r a i s e d by h i s mother, that had brother, he would v i s i t h i s f a t h e r , t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n h a d no s u p e r v i s i o n i n h i s f a t h e r ' s h o u s e h o l d , a n d t h a t h i s m o t h e r h a d been h o s p i t a l i z e d . He said that Dunaway was athletic and t h a t he c o u l d sing. D e r r i c k M o d e s t , Dunaway's y o u n g e r b r o t h e r , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s mother would beat them. Hiram 43 Dunaway, Dunaway's older CR-06-0996 brother, father testified was that h i s mother r a r e l y a t home, a n d t h a t themselves. was abusive, that h i s he a n d Dunaway A n g e l a Dunaway, Dunaway's s t e p m o t h e r , raised testified t h a t Dunaway was s e v e n y e a r s o l d when he was l i v i n g w i t h h e r , t h a t t h e y l i v e d i n a m o b i l e home t h a t was n o t " v e r y pleasant," t h a t Dunaway S r . was i r r e s p o n s i b l e , t h a t he n e v e r s p e n t with time Dunaway, a n d t h a t she l e f t Dunaway S r . a f t e r he c h e a t e d on h e r . C o r n e l i u s Dunaway, Dunaway's b r o t h e r , testified that he was r a i s e d b y t h e i r m o t h e r a n d t h a t he w o u l d v i s i t Dunaway. Friends. similar Marsh's t e s t i m o n y a t t h e Rule to her t r i a l testimony. She o f f e r e d 32 h e a r i n g a little was more d e t a i l a b o u t t h e i n s t a n c e where Dunaway's m o t h e r d e s t r o y e d t h e home t h e i r were l i v i n g friend, testified in. Bobby H i l l , Dunaway's t h a t as a c h i l d he l i v e d a c r o s s childhood the s t r e e t f r o m Dunaway, t h a t Dunaway's f a t h e r was r a r e l y a t home, a n d t h a t Dunaway was a t h l e t i c , Modest t e s t i f i e d that t a l e n t e d , and c o u l d sing. she d a t e d Dunaway S r . , t h a t Romesa she moved i n t o h i s h o u s e when Dunaway was a b o u t 13 o r 14 y e a r s o l d , t h a t Dunaway was o f t e n d i r t y , o f h i s money g a m b l i n g . could a n d t h a t Dunaway's f a t h e r s p e n t most She s a i d t h a t Dunaway was t a l e n t e d and sing. 44 CR-06-0996 Dr. that Karen having Salekin, a a m o t h e r who psychologist, i s a paranoid factor." people at r i s k f o r problems i n t h e i r development." Salekin Dunaway b u t also that testified testified she was that that a "risk factor" 124.) spoken with in generalities. (R. had not 138.) M a r i l y n Romanouski, a c l i n i c a l s o c i a l worker, about the impact of the events in "puts (R. she testifying testified schizophrenic i s a "risk Dr. She clinical Dunaway's testified life on his development. In the light of the testimony compelling. evidence offered at presented the a t Dunaway's evidentiary hearing A g r e a t d e a l o f t h e t e s t i m o n y was trial, was cumulative not of t h e t r i a l t e s t i m o n y o f Dr. L o p e z , Dunaway S r . , and M a r y M a r s h . "The t e s t i m o n y o f t h e s e w i t n e s s e s was g e n e r a l l y c u m u l a t i v e to t h a t p r e s e n t e d a t the p e n a l t y phase. See T e f f e t e l l e r v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1021 ( F l a . 1999) ('Much o f t h e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t [defendant] f a u l t s counsel f o r not p r e s e n t i n g i s c u m u l a t i v e t o t h a t p r e s e n t e d by t h e m e n t a l h e a l t h expert and [defendant] d u r i n g the resentencing p r o c e e d i n g . ' ) ; R o u t l y v. S t a t e , 590 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1991) (finding that defendant did not demonstrate reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t sentence would have been different where much o f the p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was a l r e a d y b e f o r e t h e j u d g e and j u r y i n a d i f f e r e n t f o r m ) . T r i a l c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was n o t d e f i c i e n t s i m p l y b e c a u s e he d i d n o t p r e s e n t c u m u l a t i v e e v i d e n c e . See C o l e v. S t a t e , 841 So. 2d 409 ( F l a . 2003) ( r e j e c t i n g i n e f f e c t i v e 45 CR-06-0996 a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l c l a i m where c o u n s e l d i d n o t present cumulative evidence of defendant's drug p r o b l e m ) ; V a l l e v . S t a t e , 705 So. 2d 1 3 3 1 , 1334-35 ( F l a . 1997) ( r e j e c t i n g i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m based on trial counsel's failure to present cumulative evidence)." Duckett as we 2009] v . S t a t e , 918 So. 2d 224, 236-37 s t a t e d i n Davis So. 3d , v. S t a t e , ( F l a . 2005). Also, [Ms. CR-05-2050, A u g u s t ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009): "'As a m a t t e r o f t r i a l s t r a t e g y , c o u n s e l c o u l d w e l l d e c i d e n o t t o c a l l f a m i l y members as w i t n e s s e s b e c a u s e f a m i l y members c a n be e a s i l y i m p e a c h e d f o r b i a s . ' Bergman v. M c C a u g h t r y , 65 F.3d 1372, 1380 (7th C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) . "'Once counsel conducts a reasonable investigation o f law and f a c t s in a p a r t i c u l a r case, h i s s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s are "virtually unchallengeable." [ S t r i c k l a n d v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668] a t 690, 104 S . C t . 2052 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] . T a c t i c a l o r r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments a r e n o t d e f i c i e n t but a f a i l u r e to investigate a m a t e r i a l m a t t e r due t o i n a t t e n t i o n may be d e f i c i e n t . When t h e c l a i m i s t h a t c o u n s e l f a i l e d to present a s u f f i c i e n t mitigating case d u r i n g s e n t e n c i n g , t h e i n q u i r y " i s n o t w h e t h e r c o u n s e l s h o u l d have p r e s e n t e d a mitigation case" but "whether the i n v e s t i g a t i o n supporting counsel's decision n o t t o i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e ... was i t s e l f r e a s o n a b l e . " See W i g g i n s [ v . S m i t h ] , 539 U.S. [510] a t 523, 123 S . C t . 2527 [(2003)] (internal citations omitted)." 46 7, CR-06-0996 Quoting Powell v. "Which w i t n e s s e s , the epitome [courts] will Thomas, 46 the be i f any, a 656, to c a l l , 1506, if ever, 1512 of p a r o l e i t is guess." one that Waters v. life f o r the The the court agreed, that imprisonment without the m u r d e r o f T r e s s a and to death c i r c u i t court noted i n i t s order m u r d e r s was that James's f i r e was he started. have r e w e i g h e d t h e a l l e g e d o m i t t e d m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e against the confident case. and them i s e s p e c i a l l y heinous, a t r o c i o u s , or c r u e l because a l i v e when t h e We when t o c a l l second t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two was (4th C i r . 2009). (11th C i r . 1995). to f o r t h e m u r d e r o f James. m u r d e r was 670 and j u r y recommended, and sentenced possibility F.3d strategic decision, seldom, F.3d Here, Dunaway of K e l l y , 562 aggravating circumstances t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be See Dunaway was W i g g i n s v. due no Smith, relief on presented and are no change i n t h e r e s u l t i n t h i s 539 this U.S. a t 534. claim. Accordingly, 5 I n t h i s s e c t i o n o f Dunaway's b r i e f he a l s o a r g u e s t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s order i s erroneous f o r s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t reasons. I n most o f t h e i n s t a n c e s Dunaway does n o t i d e n t i f y what p o r t i o n o f t h e o r d e r he i s c h a l l e n g i n g . In other i n s t a n c e s , t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t gave a l t e r n a t i v e g r o u n d s f o r d e n y i n g r e l i e f , and he c h a l l e n g e s o n l y one o f t h o s e g r o u n d s . A l s o , these i s s u e s are addressed i n other s e c t i o n s of t h i s 5 47 CR-06-0996 IV. Dunaway next argues that the c i r c u i t court erred i n f i n d i n g t h a t he f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t one of his Specifically, simultaneously Patterson, attorneys he argues represented a that conflict of attorney Paul interest. Brunson b o t h Dunaway a n d a c o u s i n o f T r e s s a one o f t h e v i c t i m s , i n an u n r e l a t e d Brunson a l s o represented divorce had a State's witness, case and t h a t Don D y k e s , i n a case. When a d d r e s s i n g this claim, the c i r c u i t court stated: "Dunaway c o n t e n d s t h a t B r u n s o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s Don Dykes a n d M a r c u s Russaw a t t h e same t i m e B r u n s o n r e p r e s e n t e d h i m c a u s e d B r u n s o n t o be i n e f f e c t i v e . Dunaway a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have i n q u i r e d i n t o B r u n s o n ' s p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t because Brunson had represented Dykes i n h i s d i v o r c e . I n p a r a g r a p h s 50 a n d 5 1 , Dunaway c o n t e n d s t h a t , a l t h o u g h D y k e s ' s testimony was ' v e r y d a m a g i n g ' , B r u n s o n d i d n o t i m p e a c h Dykes w i t h evidence t h a t h i s estranged w i f e had r e p o r t e d t o p o l i c e t h a t he h a d t h r e a t e n e d h e r l i f e . Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l counsel o f f e r e d c e r t a i n e x h i b i t s a t the e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i n an e f f o r t t o p r o v e B r u n s o n had an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t . P e t i t i o n e r ' s E x h i b i t s 14, 16, 24, 25, a n d 26 were a d m i t t e d a n d c o n s i d e r e d b y t h e C o u r t . P e t i t i o n e r ' s E x h i b i t s 13, 15, 17-19, 21-22 were n o t a d m i t t e d b y t h e C o u r t b u t made p a r t o f t h e r e c o r d f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p e a l . P e t i t i o n e r ' s E x h i b i t 23 was n o t a d m i t t e d b y t h e opinion. 48 CR-06-0996 C o u r t and collateral was u l t i m a t e l y counsel. withdrawn by Dunaway's " I n W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 574 So. 2d 876, 878 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) , t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals held: [U]nder S t r i c k l a n d , t o p r e v a i l on a conflict of i n t e r e s t claim the petitioner must show: (1) an actual c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t (2) t h a t "adversely a f f e c t e d " h i s counsel's representation. "'Moreover, in a case alleging ineffectiveness f o r counsel through a conflict of interest from successive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , mere p r o o f t h a t a c r i m i n a l defendant's counsel p r e v i o u s l y represented a prosecution witness i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h i n c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r e s t s , and a defendant must show either that h i s counsel's e a r l i e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the w i t n e s s was s u b s t a n t i a l a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l a t e d to counsel's l a t e r representation of the defendant, or t h a t counsel a c t u a l l y learned particular c o n f i d e n t i a l information during p r i o r representation of the witness t h a t was r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . "At Dunaway's t r i a l , Don Dykes t e s t i f i e d t h a t he owned t h e t r a i l e r where Dunaway l i v e d , t h a t i t was d e s t r o y e d b y t h e f i r e , a n d t h a t he d i d n o t see Dunaway act unusual. Dykes testimony was c o r r o b o r a t e d b y o t h e r w i t n e s s e s . A n n i e McCoy, T r e s s a P a t t e r s o n ' s m o t h e r , t e s t i f i e d she r e n t e d t h e t r a i l e r f r o m Dykes a n d t h a t she n e v e r saw Dunaway a c t i n g o u t of t h e o r d i n a r y . Ed Paulk, a Deputy S t a t e Fire Marshall, t e s t i f i e d concerning the extent of the damage t o t h e t r a i l e r . J o h n P h i l l i p s , a n e i g h b o r o f Dunaway a n d P a t t e r s o n ' s , testified that Dunaway looked normal the n i g h t of the f i r e . 49 CR-06-0996 "Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t a s k Mr. Brunson a s i n g l e q u e s t i o n about h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f D y k e s . I n a d d i t i o n , Dunaway p r o v i d e d t h e C o u r t w i t h no s t a t u t o r y o r l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t w o u l d have p e r m i t t e d Dykes t o be i m p e a c h e d w i t h e v i d e n c e o f a l l e g e d t h r e a t s he made t o h i s e s t r a n g e d w i f e . R u l e 6 0 8 ( b ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , s p e c i f i c a l l y w o u l d have forbidden t h e use of s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of bad conduct to impeach a w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y u n l e s s s u c h c o n d u c t r e s u l t e d i n a c o n v i c t i o n . See a l s o R u l e 6 0 9 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d to prove t h a t Brunson's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Dykes i n a d i v o r c e c r e a t e d an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t o f interest or adversely affected Brunson's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P. See M.S. v. S t a t e , 822 So. 2d 449, 452 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) ( h o l d i n g ' [ t ] h e burden of p r o v i n g t h a t a c o n f l i c t of interest rises to the level of ineffective assistance rests on the one asserting the conflict'). "The Court finds that this a l l e g a t i o n of ineffective assistance i s without merit. Rule 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e v i d e n c e that B r u n s o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f Dykes i n an u n r e l a t e d c a s e c a u s e d B r u n s o n t o be i n e f f e c t i v e as r e q u i r e d by R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P. "...[Dunaway] a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t Mr. B r u n s o n had a conflict of i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e he represented S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s M a r c u s Russaw on a p e n d i n g a t t e m p t e d murder charge. A c c o r d i n g t o Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l , M a r c u s Russaw was T r e s s a P a t t e r s o n ' s first cousin. In his consolidated Rule 32 petition, Dunaway contends that Mr. Brunson did not c r o s s - e x a m i n e M a r y Russaw a t a l l and c o n d u c t e d o n l y cursory cross-examinations o f L o i s Russaw, F e l i c i a Russaw, and T e r e s a Russaw b e c a u s e t h e y were g o i n g t o be w i t n e s s e s a t M a r c u s Russaw's t r i a l . 50 CR-06-0996 "At the evidentiary hearing, Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l counsel o f f e r e d court records i n d i c a t i n g Mr. B r u n s o n was a p p o i n t e d i n November 1996 t o represent Michael Russaw i n a case that was u l t i m a t e l y n o l prossed by t h e S t a t e . Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t , h o w e v e r , a s k Mr. B r u n s o n a s i n g l e q u e s t i o n about h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f Marcus Russaw or Michael Russaw. Dunaway's collateral counsel also failed to offer this Court any i n f o r m a t i o n B r u n s o n c o u l d have u s e d t o i m p e a c h t h e t r i a l t e s t i m o n y o f M a r c u s Russaw, M a r y Russaw, L o i s Russaw, F e l i c i a Russaw, o r T e r e s a Russaw. F u r t h e r , Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t c a l l any o f t h e Russaws t o t e s t i f y a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . "The Court finds that this a l l e g a t i o n of ineffective assistance i s without merit. Rule 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n of p r o v i n g t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e v i d e n c e as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P. See M.S. v. S t a t e , 822 So. 2d 449, 452 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) ( h o l d i n g '[t]he burden of p r o v i n g t h a t a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t r i s e s t o t h e l e v e l o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e r e s t s on t h e one a s s e r t i n g t h e c o n f l i c t ' ) . " (C.R. 743-46.) We agree w i t h the c i r c u i t meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f a s k e d no q u e s t i o n s questioned that counsel i n regard to t h i s claim. regarding about t h i s court this failed B r u n s o n was c l a i m , n o r was any witness c l a i m . Dunaway a p p e a r e d t o a s s e r t p r e j u d i c e was p r e s u m e d b a s e d on B r u n s o n ' s j o i n t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t and a s t a t e w i t n e s s . the law. 51 to that representation However, t h a t i s not CR-06-0996 In Wimberly v. S t a t e , App. 2 0 0 5 ) , we s t a t e d : 934 So. 2d 4 1 1 , 418 "By f a r , t h e m a j o r i t y (Ala. Crim. of states that have a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e have l i k e w i s e h e l d t h a t t h e r e i s no p e r s e b a n on t h e j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f b o t h a s t a t e and a defendant." The U n i t e d v. Sullivan, U.S. 446 States 335, 350 witness Supreme C o u r t i n C u y l e r (1980), held that "the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o impugn a c r i m i n a l conviction. In order Amendment r i g h t s , conflict of t o demonstrate a v i o l a t i o n of h i s S i x t h a d e f e n d a n t must e s t a b l i s h t h a t an a c t u a l interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." "To p r o v e t h a t an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d h i s c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e , a d e f e n d a n t must make a factual showing 'that h i s counsel actively represented conflicting interests,' Cuyler v. S u l l i v a n , 446 U.S. [335] a t 350, 100 S . C t . [1708] a t 1719 ([1980)], '"and must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y 'made a c h o i c e b e t w e e n p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , s u c h as e l i c i t i n g ( o r f a i l i n g t o e l i c i t ) e v i d e n c e h e l p f u l t o one c l i e n t b u t h a r m f u l t o t h e o t h e r . ' " ' Barham v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 724 F.2d 1529, 1532 ( 1 1 t h C i r . [1984]) ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. M e r s , 701 F.2d 1 3 2 1 , 1328 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) ] , c e r t . denied, 467 U.S. 1230, 104 S . C t . 2687, 81 L.Ed.2d 882 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . " M o l t o n v. S t a t e , "Furthermore, 651 So. 2d 663, 669 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) . a d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t h i s l a w y e r made a c h o i c e b e t w e e n p l a u s i b l e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , s u c h as p r e s e n t i n g 52 CR-06-0996 arguments o r e v i d e n c e h e l p f u l the other." United t o one c l i e n t b u t h a r m l e s s t o S t a t e s v. K h o u r y , 901 F. 2d 948, 968 (11th C i r . 1990). Dunaway made no a t t e m p t t o s a t i s f y h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f i n regard to this claim. A c c o r d i n g l y , we a g r e e w i t h t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t t h a t Dunaway was due no r e l i e f on t h i s claim. V. Dunaway n e x t a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o move t o s u p p r e s s h i s s t a t e m e n t b e c a u s e , i t was t h e p r o d u c t o f an i l l e g a l The circuit arrest. he a r g u e s , 6 court stated: "Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l counsel d i d not ask Brunson o r McKinnon a s i n g l e q u e s t i o n about t h e i r attempt t o s u p p r e s s Dunaway's s t a t e m e n t or h i s arrest. The o n l y t e s t i m o n y a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g c o n c e r n i n g Dunaway's a r r e s t came f r o m J o d i Hatcher. Hatcher t e s t i f i e d t h a t the n i g h t of the m u r d e r s Dunaway came t o h e r house a n d t h e p o l i c e came a n d t o o k Dunaway away i n h a n d c u f f s . H a t c h e r s a i d she d i d n o t know why Dunaway was t a k e n b y police." (C.R. 688.) Dunaway concerning t h i s claim. failed t o meet h i s burden of proof T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t c o u n s e l d i d f i l e a motion t o s u p p r e s s Dunaway's s t a t e m e n t t o p o l i c e on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e c o n f e s s i o n was c o e r c e d . 6 53 CR-06-0996 hearing c o n c e r n i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g Dunaway's arrest. "The b u r d e n o f p r o o f o f a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n is on t h e p e t i t i o n e r , M o n t a l v o v. S t a t e , Cr. App. 1 9 8 6 ) , a n d t h i s C o u r t w i l l allegation 488 So. 2d 25 (Ala. n o t presume e r r o r f r o m a s i l e n t r e c o r d . R o b i n s o n v. S t a t e , 444 So. 2d 884 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . " M c C o l l o u g h v. S t a t e , 678 So. 2d 199, 200-01 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1995). VI. Dunaway n e x t a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r "numerous o t h e r g r o u n d s . " A. First, Dunaway argues that counsel's argument i n the p e n a l t y p h a s e was i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e , he s a y s , c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o make a " c o g e n t a r g u m e n t " as t o why t h e j u r y s h o u l d s e n t e n c e Dunaway to parole. The c i r c u i t c o u r t f o u n d t h a t Dunaway h a d a b a n d o n e d this claim closing At life imprisonment because without the p o s s i b i l i t y he d i d n o t q u e s t i o n M c K i n n o n of about h i s argument. the penalty phase, McKinnon argued that the State f a i l e d t o prove t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t t h e murders were e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s , o r c r u e l when compared t o 54 CR-06-0996 other c a p i t a l offenses. significant mentally h i s t o r y of p r i o r disturbed, commit t h e c r i m e , crime occurred. anything He f u r t h e r a r g u e d t h a t Dunaway h a d no that circumstances. he d i d n o t have t h a t he was the capacity to a n d t h a t he was o n l y 20 y e a r s o l d when t h e He a l s o a r g u e d t h a t t h e j u r y c o u l d i n mitigation. mitigating criminal activity, Counsel v i g o r o u s l y asserted that the circumstances outweighed the C o u n s e l was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e argument i n t h e p e n a l t y consider aggravating i n his closing phase. B. S e c o n d , Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r failing t o make an a d e q u a t e B a t s o n v . K e n t u c k y , (1986), o b j e c t i o n to the prosecutor's 476 U.S. 79 use o f i t s p e r e m p t o r y strikes. The c i r c u i t court stated the f o l l o w i n g i n regard to t h i s claim: "Dunaway's t r i a l c o u n s e l d i d n o t make a f o r m a l m o t i o n a t t r i a l p u r s u a n t t o B a t s o n v. K e n t u c k y , [476 U.S. 79 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ] . The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s , h o w e v e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t was p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e s t r i k i n g o f t h e j u r y and r e q u i r e d t h e p r o s e c u t o r to state h i s reasons f o r h i s peremptory s t r i k e s after each s t r i k e . The t r i a l c o u r t was f u l l y aware o f t h e r a c e of each p e r s o n s t r u c k by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e i r age. The t r i a l c o u r t w o u l d have a l s o b e e n aware o f t h e e x t e n t o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s v o i r d i r e . The C o u r t 55 CR-06-0996 a l s o n o t e s t h a t a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e was u s e d by t h e p a r t i e s , w h i c h w o u l d have n e g a t e d t h e n e e d f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o a s k q u e s t i o n s t h a t were a l r e a d y answered. "Dunaway c i t e s t h i s C o u r t t o one c a s e , M o r r i s o n v. J o n e s , 952 F.Supp. 729 (M.D. A l a . 1996), i n support of his contention the Barbour County D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e has a h i s t o r y o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n j u r y s e l e c t i o n . This Court w i l l n o t f i n d a ' p a t t e r n o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' b a s e d on one c a s e o u t o f t h e t h o u s a n d s c r i m i n a l c a s e s t h a t have been p r o s e c u t e d i n B a r b o u r County. " M o r e o v e r , on Dunaway's d i r e c t a p p e a l t o t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t , he r a i s e d t h e e x a c t g r o u n d s i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t a n t i v e c l a i m t h a t he now a d v a n c e s i n h i s s e c o n d amended p e t i t i o n . Ex p a r t e Dunaway, 746 So. 2d [1042] a t 1044 [(Ala. 1999)]. The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d : " ' A f t e r t h o r o u g h l y e x a m i n i n g t h e r e c o r d , we f i n d no e r r o r on t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s p a r t i n accepting the State's reasons for i t s strikes. We find those reasons to be race-neutral; therefore, we hold that Dunaway i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l on the b a s i s of the r u l e s t a t e d i n Batson.' "Ex p a r t e Dunaway, 746 So. 2d a t 1046. Dunaway d i d n o t p r e s e n t any e v i d e n c e a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g t h a t would c o n f l i c t w i t h the f i n d i n g s of the t r i a l c o u r t o r t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t . "The C o u r t f i n d s t h i s a l l e g a t i o n o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 686-87.) 56 CR-06-0996 In i t s opinion on Dunaway's d i r e c t Supreme C o u r t n o t e d t h a t a l t h o u g h appeal, the the p r o s e c u t o r used a l a r g e number o f i t s p e r e m p t o r y s t r i k e s t o remove b l a c k jurors, Dunaway's j u r y c o n s i s t e d o f s i x w h i t e black jurors. jurors were specifically were r a c e in the neutral. j u r o r s and six the record. The reasons given found t h a t the by " C o u n s e l c a n n o t be Supreme the [Ms. CR-05-0561, S e p t e m b e r 26, 2008] 2008). Dunaway was due prosecutor S m i t h v. So. 3d no Court held ineffective f a i l i n g t o r a i s e an i s s u e t h a t has no m e r i t . " C r i m . App. prospective reasons f o r s t r i k i n g A l s o , the p r o s e c u t o r ' s contained Alabama relief State, , on for (Ala. this claim. C. Third, failing to misconduct. objected to Dunaway a r g u e s object The what he counsel was alleges ineffective was the prosecutor's that the gun closing used to argument kill for prosecutorial S p e c i f i c a l l y , he a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l s h o u l d Dunaways t h e o r y accidentally to that Tressa have concerning Patterson fired. circuit court c l a i m because counsel f o u n d t h a t Dunaway had was not a s k e d any argument. 57 abandoned questions about this the CR-06-0996 "The f a c t t h a t t h e c o u n s e l d i d n o t o b j e c t a t e v e r y p o s s i b l e i n s t a n c e does n o t mean t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t d i d not r e c e i v e adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . O ' N e i l v. S t a t e , 605 So. 2d 1247, 1250 ( A l a . C r . App. 1992). O b j e c t i o n s a r e a m a t t e r o f t r i a l s t r a t e g y , and an appellant must overcome the presumption that 'counsel's conduct f a l l s w i t h i n the wide range of r e a s o n a b l e p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e , ' t h a t i s , the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n 'might be c o n s i d e r e d sound t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ' S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 687-88, 104 S.Ct. a t 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d a t 693 (1984)." Moore v. State, 659 So. 2d 205, 209 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1994). "A c o m p e t e n t t r i a l a t t o r n e y m i g h t w e l l eschew o b j e c t i n g ... order to minimize United States "[Counsel] the his best before Puckett, 969 have prosecutor's j u r y by the F.2d been F.2d 86, a 887, damaging m a t e r i a l . " 891 (7th C i r . decided have not o b j e c t i n g , o r he was to States') 102 l e t his speak to closing itself." (5th C i r . 1992). to 1984). risk c o u l d have d e c i d e d own for strategic decision argument Wiley v. Accordingly, i t not object to the argument. Moreover, counsel to the p r o s e c u t o r ' s questions 741 reasonably strategy (recited could Payne , could antagonizing that v. j u r y a t t e n t i o n to the in was not argument. a s k e d why In f a c t , c o n c e r n i n g c l o s i n g arguments. 58 they d i d not counsel was object asked no CR-06-0996 "'An ambiguous o r s i l e n t r e c o r d i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s p r o v e t h e s t r o n g and c o n t i n u i n g p r e s u m p t i o n [ o f effective representation]. Therefore "where the r e c o r d i s incomplete or u n c l e a r about [counsel]'s a c t i o n s , we w i l l presume t h a t he d i d what he s h o u l d have done, and that he exercised reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l j u d g m e n t . " ' C h a n d l e r v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n. 15 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2000) (en banc) ( q u o t i n g W i l l i a m s v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1228 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1999)). " G r a y s o n v. Thompson, 257 F.3d Dunaway was due no r e l i e f on t h i s Fourth, failing to 1194, 1218 claim. Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t c o u n s e l object to (11th C i r . 2001). h i s appearance was ineffective for before the jury in shackles. The circuit court s t a t e d the f o l l o w i n g concerning claim: "The o n l y t e s t i m o n y a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g a b o u t Dunaway b e i n g s e e n i n r e s t r a i n t s was e l i c i t e d f r o m a l t e r n a t e j u r o r [M.B.]. When a s k e d by Dunaway's c o l l a t e r a l c o u n s e l , [M.B.] i n d i c a t e d she saw Dunaway i n handcuffs. " I n B a k e r v. S t a t e , 906 So. 2d 210, 260 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e B a k e r , 906 So. 2d 277 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , t h e a p p e l l a n t raised a similar issue a l l e g i n g that: " ' [ h ] e was u n a b l e t o r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l a f t e r he h a d a l l e g e d l y been p a r a d e d i n front of the jury i n handcuffs and s h a c k l e s , e s c o r t e d b y a l a r g e number o f 59 this CR-06-0996 d e p u t i e s . No o b j e c t i o n as t o t h i s m a t t e r a p p e a r s i n t h e r e c o r d a n d no r e f e r e n c e t o i t s having occurred appears i n the r e c o r d . ' "The A l a b a m a C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s went on t o f i n d t h a t ' " [ i ] t i s not ground f o r m i s t r i a l t h a t the a c c u s e d a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e j u r y i n h a n d c u f f s when h i s a p p e a r a n c e was o n l y p a r t o f g o i n g t o a n d f r o m t h e c o u r t r o o m . ' " J u s t o v . S t a t e , 568 So. 2d 312, 318 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) , q u o t i n g C u s h i n g v. S t a t e , 455 So. 2d 119, 121 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) . "Dunaway f a i l e d t o c i t e t o anywhere i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g he a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e j u r y d u r i n g his trial i n handcuffs and s h a c k l e s . Further, [M.B.] was e x c u s e d b e f o r e g u i l t p h a s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s b e g a n a n d g a v e no i n d i c a t i o n she d i s c u s s e d s e e i n g Dunaway i n h a n d c u f f s with other j u r o r s o r , that o t h e r j u r o r s t o l d h e r t h e y saw Dunaway i n h a n d c u f f s . "The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet h i s burden of p r o v i n g t h i s a l l e g a t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance by a preponderance of evidence as r e q u i r e d b y R u l e 32.3, A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 724-25.) The "Where c i r c u i t court's f i n d i n g s are supported there confrontation members of has been between the j u r y , a only a shackled this brief person is likely by the r e c o r d . and inadvertent and t o be one or viewed more as an i n s u f f i c i e n t showing of p r e j u d i c e t o r e q u i r e the r e v e r s a l o f a conviction." 23.2(d) (1984). Effect of 3 LaFave and I s r a e l , See a l s o A n n o t . , Gagging, Shackling, 60 Criminal Procedure § P r o p r i e t y and P r e j u d i c i a l or Otherwise Physically CR-06-0996 R e s t r a i n i n g Accused During Course of S t a t e C r i m i n a l T r i a l , A.L.R. 3d 17 The M.B.'s Dunaway (1979). only evidence testimony when t h i s w i t h any o t h e r presented to support this a t the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing i n handcuffs. concerning 90 M.B. was occurred jurors. no that other she A l s o , M.B., saw questions o r w h e t h e r she d i s c u s s e d excused before d e l i b e r a t i o n s . h i s burden of proof asked c l a i m was this an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r , was C l e a r l y , Dunaway f a i l e d t o meet i n regard to t h i s claim. VII. Dunaway n e x t prohibits argues t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n the i m p o s i t i o n b e c a u s e , he a r g u e s , First, Dunaway collateral estoppel asserts of death under the i s barred from r e t a r d e d because order as t o him retarded. that the State i n i t s sentencing retarded. sentence he i s m e n t a l l y Dunaway i s n o t m e n t a l l y found of that doctrine arguing the c i r c u i t Dunaway is of that court mentally 7 " ' C o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l ' i s an awkward p h r a s e , b u t i t s t a n d s f o r an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t p r i n c i p l e i n o u r a d v e r s a r y s y s t e m o f j u s t i c e . I t means s i m p l y t h a t when an i s s u e o f u l t i m a t e f a c t has once b e e n d e t e r m i n e d b y a v a l i d a n d f i n a l j u d g m e n t , t h a t i s s u e c a n n o t a g a i n be l i t i g a t e d b e t w e e n t h e 7 61 CR-06-0996 A l a b a m a has n o t a d d r e s s e d t h i s s p e c i f i c i s s u e , so we looked to other s t a t e s . v. Hill, (2008), 177 O h i o App. The 3d Ohio Court of A p p e a l s i n 171, 184, 894 N.E.2d have State 108, 118 stated: "Because mental r e t a r d a t i o n d i d not p r e c l u d e the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y at the time of [ t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s ] s e n t e n c i n g , t h e s t a t e d i d n o t have ' a f u l l and f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y to l i t i g a t e ' the issue d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase of H i l l ' s t r i a l , as i s n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l may be a p p l i e d . B i e s [v. B a g l e y ] , 519 F.3d [324] a t 338 [(6th C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) ] , c i t i n g N.A.A.C.P. D e t r o i t B r a n c h v. D e t r o i t P o l i c e O f f i c e r s A s s n . (C.A.6, 1 9 8 7 ) , 821 F.2d 328, 330; Goodson [v. McDonough Power E q u i p e m e n t , I n c . ] , 2 O h i o S t . 3 d [193] a t 201, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 9 7 8 [ ( 1 9 8 3 ) ] ('an a b s o l u t e due p r o c e s s p r e r e q u i s i t e t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l i s t h a t t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g t h e p r e c l u s i o n must p r o v e t h a t t h e i d e n t i c a l i s s u e was a c t u a l l y l i t i g a t e d , d i r e c t l y d e t e r m i n e d , and e s s e n t i a l t o t h e j u d g m e n t i n t h e prior action'). "'Collaterally estopping a party from r e l i t i g a t i n g an i s s u e p r e v i o u s l y d e c i d e d a g a i n s t i t v i o l a t e s due p r o c e s s where i t c o u l d n o t be f o r e s e e n that the issue w o u l d s u b s e q u e n t l y be utilized collaterally, and where the party had little knowledge or incentive to litigate fully and v i g o r o u s l y i n t h e f i r s t a c t i o n due t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l and/or f a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d therein.' Goodson, 2 O h i o S t . 3 d a t 201, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d same p a r t i e s i n any f u t u r e l a w s u i t . U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 62 ..." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 CR-06-0996 97 8; S t a t e ex r e l . W e s t c h e s t e r E s t a t e s , I n c . v. B a c o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 61 O h i o S t . 2 d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, at paragraph two of the syllabus ('[w]here t h e r e has b e e n a change i n t h e f a c t s s i n c e a d e c i s i o n was r e n d e r e d i n an a c t i o n , w h i c h e i t h e r r a i s e s a new m a t e r i a l i s s u e o r w h i c h w o u l d have b e e n r e l e v a n t t o the r e s o l u t i o n of a m a t e r i a l issue i n v o l v e d i n the e a r l i e r a c t i o n , n e i t h e r the d o c t r i n e of r e s j u d i c a t a nor the d o c t r i n e of collateral e s t o p p e l w i l l bar l i t i g a t i o n of t h a t i s s u e i n a later action'). " I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e s t a t e d i d n o t have t h e knowledge o r i n c e n t i v e t o v i g o r o u s l y l i t i g a t e t h e i s s u e of H i l l ' s mental r e t a r d a t i o n , because that i s s u e was o n l y t a n g e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t t o w h e t h e r t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e r e was no r e a s o n f o r the s t a t e to contest the evidence of r e t a r d a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d a t the m i t i g a t i o n h e a r i n g because t h a t evidence d i d not l i n k H i l l ' s a l l e g e d r e t a r d a t i o n w i t h h i s c u l p a b i l i t y f o r t h e m u r d e r o f Raymond F i f e . W i t h o u t t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t H i l l m i g h t be m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t t o w h e t h e r H i l l c o u l d be e x e c u t e d . " 177 O h i o App. holding S m i t h v. (Ala. 3d a t 184, i s consistent State, [Ms. 894 with N.E.2d a t 118. our The Ohio Court Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n 1060427, May 25, 2007] So. 3d 2007): " I n t h e c o n t e x t o f an A t k i n s [v. V i r g i n i a , 536 U.S. 304 (2002)] c l a i m , t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he o r she i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d and t h u s i n e l i g i b l e f o r t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . See Morrow v. S t a t e , 928 So. 2d 315, 323 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004); see also H o l l a d a y v. C a m p b e l l , 463 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1341 n. 21 (N.D. A l a . 2006) (interpreting Alabama law to r e q u i r e t h a t the defendant prove mental r e t a r d a t i o n 63 in CR-06-0996 by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e ) . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e f o r a court t o conclude t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s met h i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g m i l d m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n as a m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e b u t , a t t h e same t i m e , t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s not c a r r i e d the burden o f p r o v i n g mental r e t a r d a t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f an A t k i n s c l a i m . " ___ So. 3d a t ___ . The d o c t r i n e o f c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l not bar our review of t h i s i s s u e . The c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s does finding i n i t s s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r t h a t Dunaway was m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d is not is dispositive o f whether Dunaway's sentence of death c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b a r r e d because of h i s mental d e f i c i e n c y . Dunaway asserts that he i s mentally u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s Virginia, retarded and d e c i s i o n i n A t k i n s v. 536 U.S. 304 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , h i s s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h violates the U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . In regard to t h i s claim, the c i r c u i t court s t a t e d : "Dunaway r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y on t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Dr. F e r n a n d o L o p e z , h i s p s y c h i a t r i c e x p e r t a t t r i a l t o s u p p o r t t h i s a r g u m e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d the testimony o f Dr. L o p e z , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e testimony from o t h e r w i t n e s s e s , t o determine whether any n o n - s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , under S e c t i o n 13A-5-52 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a (1975), e x i s t e d . The j u r y , b y i t s g u i l t - p h a s e v e r d i c t , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t , by i t s s e n t e n c e , r e j e c t e d L o p e z ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t Dunaway s u f f e r e d f r o m a s e v e r e m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a t t h e t i m e he m u r d e r e d James P a t t e r s o n . T h e r e f o r e , Dunaway's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t 'made a d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' he i s m e n t a l l y 64 that CR-06-0996 retarded C r i m . P. i s without merit. Rule 32.7(d), A l a . R. " B a s e d on e v i d e n c e f r o m Dunaway's t r i a l a n d evidence presented a t h i s e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway i s n o t m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d . A r e v i e w o f Dunaway's t r i a l t e s t i m o n y shows he was c l e a r a n d a r t i c u l a t e on t h e s t a n d , e v e n d u r i n g a v i g o r o u s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r . See C l i s b y v. S t a t e o f A l a b a m a , 26 F. 3d 1054, 1056 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1994) (holding that Clisby's trial t e s t i m o n y '[gave] t h e j u d g e an o p p o r t u n i t y t o gauge r o u g h l y [ C l i s b y ' s ] i n t e l l i g e n c e ' ) . Dunaway a d m i t t e d he made up an a l i b i b e c a u s e he was s c a r e d . Dunaway a l s o s a i d he was a b l e t o f o l l o w d i r e c t i o n s f r o m Don Dykes when Dunaway w o r k e d f o r Dykes. Dunaway a d m i t t e d he t o o k money h i s m o t h e r s e n t h i m t o buy c r a c k c o c a i n e t o r e s e l l t o g e t t h e money n e c e s s a r y f o r h i m t o go b a c k t o T e x a s . Dr. L o p e z t e s t i f i e d t h a t , b e f o r e t h e i n c i d e n t , Dunaway h a d s c o r e d 75 o r 76 on IQ t e s t s . At the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, Dunaway's s t e p m o t h e r , A n g e l a Dunaway, t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dunaway came t o l i v e w i t h h e r i n T e x a s i n 1996, t h a t he a t t e n d e d a t r a d e s c h o o l , r e c e i v e d a c e r t i f i c a t e i n a u t o m e c h a n i c s , a n d w o r k e d a t an A u t o W o r l d store. " C o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e a t Dunaway's t r i a l a n d e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway did n o t have s i g n i f i c a n t s u b a v e r a g e intellectual functioning or s i g n i f i c a n t or s u b s t a n t i a l d e f i c i t s i n a d a p t i v e b e h a v i o r b e f o r e t u r n i n g 18 y e a r s o l d . Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 851 So. 2d 453, 456 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Dunaway's a l l e g a t i o n he i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P." (C.R. 680-81.) In A t k i n s , the United States Supreme C o u r t held that i t was a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e E i g h t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d 65 States CR-06-0996 C o n s t i t u t i o n to execute Court left a mentally retarded individual. i t to the i n d i v i d u a l of mental r e t a r d a t i o n . legislation Though A l a b a m a has addressing this i n Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 851 most liberal states view that retarded. of So. bar intellectual below; significant behavior; and (3) themselves d u r i n g the defendant reached by these problems developmental t h e age Dr. of Michael functions the "borderline result of t h i s that retarded of in 70 or adaptive manifested i . e . , before the report to Dunaway be evaluated before D'Errico, a forensic stated that Dunaway low ( T r i a l c l e r k ' s r e c o r d , p. recommended mentally IQ have years, those significant deficits must Thomas D'Errico's intelligence." the the 18. Dr. in of considered mentally substantial psychologist. also execution f u n c t i o n i n g , i . e . , an or Court r e t a r d a t i o n f o l l o w e d by the any ( A l a . 2002), adopted r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t Dunaway was trial yet to enact t h e d e f e n d a n t must h a v e : (1) subaverage his 2d 453 Under P e r k i n s , t o be (2) definition i s s u e , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme mental currently for A t k i n s purposes, The s t a t e s t o adopt a The average 23.) Dr. range D'Errico further evaluated. r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , c o u n s e l moved f o r f u n d s 66 of As a for a CR-06-0996 mental-health evaluate scored expert. Dunaway. Dr. Fernado Dr. Lopez Lopez testified that was retained i n 1993 Dunaway a 76 on an IQ t e s t b u t t h a t t h r e e weeks b e f o r e was t e s t e d a g a i n a n d he s c o r e d t r i a l he 67. The r e c o r d a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t a f t e r Dunaway was from t h e Texas Department of Corrections automobile-mechanics program, was e m p l o y e d to obtained a t a company as a l u b e he released completed an h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n , and technician. Dunaway a l s o f a t h e r e d a c h i l d w i t h a f e m a l e i n Texas a n d h a d a r e l a t i o n s h i p with one testified of the victims i n h i s own -- behalf Tressa and Patterson. Dunaway h i s testimony appeared articulate. "In the context burden of proving o f an A t k i n s c l a i m , t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e by a preponderance o r she i s m e n t a l l y retarded." o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he S m i t h v. S t a t e , ___ . Dunaway d i d n o t meet t h i s b u r d e n . that Dunaway does not meet the So. 3d a t The r e c o r d definition indicates of mental r e t a r d a t i o n a d o p t e d b y t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n Ex Perkins. Thus, constitutionally Dunaway's sentence barred. VIII. 67 of death is parte not CR-06-0996 Dunaway n e x t a r g u e s t h a t h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e v i o l a t e s the U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n R i n g v. A r i z o n a , 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n v. New J e r s e y , 530 U.S. which increases presented to a jury T h i s h o l d i n g was First, to the 466 review. R i n g was Supreme C o u r t (2004), beyond sentence a must reasonable t h e h o l d i n g i n R i n g does n o t a p p l y i n 1999; States proven maximum specifically in Schriro held that retroactively Dunaway's d i r e c t not r e l e a s e d u n t i l d e c i s i o n was a n n o u n c e d . " 513 ( A l a . C r i m . App. Second, the be doubt. v. 2002. Summerlin, i t s decision appeal "The 542 jury was United U.S. 348 i n Ring d i d not a p p l y t o d e a t h c a s e s t h a t were a l r e a d y f i n a l a t t h e t i m e the fact extended to d e a t h - p e n a l t y cases i n Ring. c a s e s on c o l l a t e r a l final ( 2 0 0 0 ) , f i r s t h e l d t h a t any statutory and Apprendi that B r o o k s v. S t a t e , 929 So. 2d 491, 2005). was instructed that before i t could p r o c e e d t o v o t e on w h e t h e r t o i m p o s e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i t must u n a n i m o u s l y f i n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e . In r e g a r d t o James's d e a t h t h e j u r y recommended by a v o t e o f 10 t o 2 t h a t Dunaway be that i t unanimously sentenced to death. found the 68 e x i s t e n c e of " [ I ] ti s clear at least one CR-06-0996 aggravating 568 circumstance." P i l l e y v. S t a t e , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . violation i n this Accordingly, 930 So. 2d 550, there was no Ring case. IX. Dunaway a r g u e s t h a t his Brady v. Specifically, the c i r c u i t Maryland, he argues 373 that U.S. about t h e d i s t r i c t prospective jurors, i t failed have record indicates summarily 2004, that dismissed the c i r c u i t i n October the Brady court Dunaway r a i s e d t h i s had p r e v i o u s l y issue dismissed with information of i n t e r e s t . court should not i n i t sfinal the Brady 2003, claim. allowed c o n s o l i d a t e d R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . court t o produce had a c o n f l i c t of this i t had p r e v i o u s l y to disclose relationship asserts that the c i r c u i t r u l e d on t h e m e r i t s because failed claims. and t h a t i t f a i l e d t o produce that defense counsel Dunaway f i r s t i n denying (1963), attorney's regarding prosecution witnesses; information erred 83 the State information that court claim. the c i r c u i t However, Dunaway to f i l e order The court i n January a new a n d In the consolidated petition, c l a i m and a n o t h e r c l a i m t h a t t h e c i r c u i t summarily dismissed. 69 However, Dunaway CR-06-0996 presented no e v i d e n c e t o support this c l a i m a t the Rule 32 hearing. The circuit court stated the f o l l o w i n g concerning this claim: "Dunaway f i r s t c o n t e n d s Mr. Whigham d i d n o t d i s c l o s e h i s p a s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h j u r o r s [R.B.], [ B . L . ] , [ E . B . ] , [ V . S . ] , a n d [ M . B . ] . [ ] Dunaway a l s o c o n t e n d s Whigham v i o l a t e d B r a d y b y l y i n g a b o u t h i s r e a s o n s f o r s t r i k i n g b l a c k veniremembers d u r i n g a Batson h e a r i n g . Dunaway a l s o a s s e r t s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' f a i l e d to d i s c l o s e evidence favorable t o the defense regarding prosecution witnesses', and ' f a i l e d t o disclose evidence that defense counsel had a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . ' 8 "The e v i d e n t i a r y hearing testimony of j u r o r s [E.B.], [R.B.], [ B . L . ] , a n d [V.S.] e s t a b l i s h e d b e y o n d any d o u b t t h a t t h e i r p a s t a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h Mr. Whigham h a d no e f f e c t on t h e i r g u i l t a n d p e n a l t y phase deliberations. The Court finds these a l l e g a t i o n s a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. "The C o u r t f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t Dunaway f a i l e d t o p r o v e h i s a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t Mr. Whigham gave any false information during the Batson hearing concerning his reasons for striking black veniremembers and d i d not d i s c l o s e favorable e v i d e n c e t o t h e d e f e n s e . Mr. Whigham was n o t c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g and t h e r e i s nothing i n the t r i a l record r a i s i n g the s l i g h t e s t i n f e r e n c e t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s h a s any m e r i t . F u r t h e r , n o t h i n g was a d m i t t e d at the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing e s t a b l i s h i n g Mr. Whigham d i d n o t f u l l y c o m p l y w i t h On a p p e a l , Dunaway does n o t r a i s e i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g a l l o f t h e j u r o r s t h a t he c h a l l e n g e d i n h i s R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . 8 70 CR-06-0996 the d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s e s t a b l i s h e d i n Brady v. M a r y l a n d . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P. " F i n a l l y , Dunaway's c o n t e n t i o n Whigham d i d n o t d i s c l o s e one o f Dunaway's d e f e n s e c o u n s e l h a d a conflict of i n t e r e s t i s meritless. There was a b s o l u t e l y no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g t h a t Whigham knew Mr. B r u n s o n r e p r e s e n t e d Don Dykes o r M a r c u s Russaw. As t h e D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y f o r B a r b o u r a n d B u l l o c k C o u n t i e s , Mr. Whigham was the l e a d p r o s e c u t o r of thousands o f c r i m i n a l cases and c o u l d n o t be e x p e c t e d t o remember what a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t e d e a c h d e f e n d a n t . The C o u r t f i n d s t h i s a l l e g a t i o n i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. Crim. (C.R. P." 673-74.) failed We a g r e e w i t h t h e c i r c u i t t o meet h i s b u r d e n t h u s , he was due no Dunaway of proof i n regard to this that thus, Alabama's he Rule a Rule his death sentence punishment. c l a i m was n o t p r e s e n t e d i n Dunaway's c o n s o l i d a t e d 32 p e t i t i o n ; Court. claim; method o f e x e c u t i o n i s argues, c o n s t i t u t e s c r u e l and u n u s u a l This Dunaway relief. argues unconstitutional; court. therefore, i t i s not p r o p e r l y before this "An a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t r a i s e an i s s u e f r o m t h e d e n i a l o f 32 petition which was not r a i s e d i n the Rule 32 p e t i t i o n . " A r r i n g t o n v. S t a t e , 716 So. 2d 237, 239 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997). 71 CR-06-0996 XI. The circuit court correctly found that i s s u e s were p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d i n t h i s R u l e the 32 following proceeding. 1) T h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t a l l o w e d h e a r s a y evidence t o be p r e s e n t e d a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e h e a r i n g ; 2) T h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o c o n s i d e r b u l l e t s t h a t were c o l l e c t e d f r o m t h e t o i l e t i n a h o l d i n g c e l l where Dunaway was incarcerated; 3) That Dunaway's jury venire u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of African-Americans; was 4) That the circuit court erroneously denied Dunaway's m o t i o n s f o r i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e and f o r a change o f v e n u e ; 5) That the misconduct; 6) and prosecutor T h a t Dunaway was engaged improperly in prosecutorial tried in handcuffs; 7) That the c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g i n a d m i s s i b l e evidence concerning the aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t t h e m u r d e r was e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s , or c r u e l . We agree with the circuit court p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d under Rules that these claims 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) , A l a . R. were Crim. P. erred in XII. Dunaway denying next argues that s e v e r a l of h i s motions. 72 the circuit court S p e c i f i c a l l y , he a r g u e s t h a t CR-06-0996 his motion f o r funds f o r expert m o t i o n s h o u l d have b e e n "Because the not entitled law to postconviction a s s i s t a n c e and 2d 1113 i s c l e a r that Rule funds to litigation, parte ex experts or to assist Dunaway a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e circuit the B o y d v. 2 0 0 3 ) . " J o h n s o n v. So. allowing 28, p e t i t i o n e r s are otherwise, 2007] C r i m . App. September 32 hire ( A l a . C r i m . App. CR-05-1805, discovery granted. c o u r t d i d not e r r i n denying the motion. So. his 3d in trial State, 913 State, , [Ms. (Ala. 20 0 7 ) . attorney's private- p r a c t i c e c a s e f i l e s on t h e j u r o r s he had represented while he of the discovery of in private practice. The the discovery not district was him court erred i n record i n d i c a t e s that counsel district attorney's asserted had district attorney. i f he had present had failed access a l l of the to files requested related disclose their (C.R. 88.) He to the jurors he r e l a t i o n s h i p to asserts in his brief the that t o t h e f i l e s he w o u l d have "been a b l e facts (Dunaway's b r i e f a t page about 117.) 73 the to prior relationships." CR-06-0996 In Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847 ( A l a . 2000), the A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t o be e n t i t l e d t o d i s c o v e r y i n a postconviction cause." proceeding, The C o u r t t h e p e t i t i o n e r must show stated: "We a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s t h a t 'good c a u s e ' i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d by which t o judge p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y motions. In fact, other courts have adopted a similar 'good-cause' or 'good-reason' standard f o r the postconviction discovery process. See [ S t a t e v.] M a r s h a l l , [148 N . J . 89, 690 A . 2 d 1 (1997) ] ; S t a t e v. L e w i s , 656 So. 2d 1248 ( F l a . 1 9 9 4 ) ; P e o p l e ex rel. D a l e y v. F i t z g e r a l d , 123 I l l . 2 d 175, 121 I l l . D e c . 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . As n o t e d b y t h e Illinois Supreme C o u r t , t h e g o o d - c a u s e standard g u a r d s a g a i n s t p o t e n t i a l abuse o f t h e p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y p r o c e s s . See F i t z g e r a l d , s u p r a , 123 I l l . 2 d a t 183, 121 I l l . D e c . 937, 526 N.E.2d a t 135. We a l s o a g r e e t h a t New J e r s e y ' s M a r s h a l l c a s e p r o v i d e s a good w o r k i n g framework f o r r e v i e w i n g discovery m o t i o n s a n d o r d e r s i n c a p i t a l c a s e s . I n a d d i t i o n , we a r e b o u n d by o u r own r u l e t h a t 'an e v i d e n t i a r y hearing must be held on a [petition for p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ] w h i c h i s m e r i t o r i o u s on i t s face, i . e . , one which contains matters and allegations (such as i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel) which, i f true, e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . ' Ex p a r t e B o a t w r i g h t , 471 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Ala. 1985). "We emphasize that this holding -that p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y m o t i o n s a r e t o be j u d g e d b y a good-cause s t a n d a r d -- does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a l l o w d i s c o v e r y u n d e r R u l e 32, A l a . R. C r i m . P., a n d t h a t i t does n o t e x p a n d t h e d i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e s w i t h i n R u l e 32.4. A c c o r d L e w i s , s u p r a , 656 So. 2d a t 1250, w h e r e i n t h e F l o r i d a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t the good-cause s t a n d a r d d i d not a f f e c t F l o r i d a ' s 74 "good CR-06-0996 h r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e d u r e , wwhi c h a r e s i m i l a r t o o u r s . By a d o p t i n g t h i s s t a n d a r d , we a r e o n l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t , upon p e t i t i o n e r ' s s h o w i n g o f good c a u s e , may e x e r c i s e i t s inherent authority to order discovery in a p r o c e e d i n g f o r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f . In a d d i t i o n , we c a u t i o n t h a t p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i s c o v e r y does n o t provide a p e t i t i o n e r with a r i g h t to ' f i s h ' through o f f i c i a l f i l e s and t h a t i t ' i s n o t a d e v i c e f o r investigating possible claims, but a means of v i n d i c a t i n g a c t u a l c l a i m s . ' P e o p l e v. G o n z a l e z , 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 C a l . R p t r . 729, 776 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L . E d . 2 d 85 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . Instead, i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n d i s c o v e r y , a p e t i t i o n e r must a l l e g e f a c t s t h a t , i f p r o v e d , w o u l d e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f . C f . P o r t e r v. W a i n w r i g h t , 805 F.2d 930, 933 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1986) ('a h e a r i n g [on a h a b e a s c o r p u s p e t i t i o n ] i s not r e q u i r e d u n l e s s the p e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s f a c t s w h i c h , i f p r o v e d , w o u l d e n t i t l e him t o f e d e r a l h a b e a s r e l i e f ' ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 482 U.S. 918, 919, 107 S.Ct. 3195, 96 L.Ed.2d 682 (1987). Furthermore, a p e t i t i o n e r seeking postconviction d i s c o v e r y a l s o must meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., w h i c h s t a t e s : "'The p e t i t i o n must c o n t a i n a c l e a r and s p e c i f i c s t a t e m e n t o f t h e g r o u n d s upon which r e l i e f i s sought, i n c l u d i n g full d i s c l o s u r e of the f a c t u a l b a s i s of those grounds. A bare allegation that a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t has been v i o l a t e d and mere c o n c l u s i o n s of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.' "That h a v i n g b e e n s a i d , we must d e t e r m i n e whether Land p r e s e n t e d the t r i a l c o u r t w i t h good c a u s e f o r o r d e r i n g t h e r e q u e s t e d d i s c o v e r y . To do t h a t , we must e v a l u a t e L a n d ' s b a s i s f o r t h e r e l i e f requested in his postconviction petition and determine whether his claims are facially 75 CR-06-0996 m e r i t o r i o u s . Only a f t e r making t h a t examination determination can we d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r L a n d shown good c a u s e . " 775 So. 2d a t 852-53 T h i s C o u r t has (footnote and has omitted). h e l d t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o show g o o d c a u s e when t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h l e s s i n t r u s i v e sources. 2007). See This themselves. about S t a t e v. T u r n e r , 976 information was relationships Accordingly, the circuit d i s c o v e r y on t h i s 2d 508 (Ala. Crim. a v a i l a b l e through Dunaway c o u l d e a s i l y their So. have q u e s t i o n e d with court the the jurors the jurors district granted him discovery p a r t e T u r n e r , 2 So. of 3d 806 his the not circuit institutional err attorney. ground. Dunaway a l s o a r g u e s t h a t did App. court in denying should records. have In Ex ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d t o show good c a u s e f o r d i s c o v e r y o f institutional records when t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n been p r o v i d e d through the testimony o f one of the could jailers. "[W]e a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s and with the State that [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] has not d e m o n s t r a t e d good c a u s e f o r t h e L i m e s t o n e C o u n t y j a i l r e c o r d s , b e c a u s e he has n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t [ t h e j a i l e r ' s ] t e s t i m o n y w o u l d be an i n s u f f i c i e n t a l t e r n a t i v e source f o r the i n f o r m a t i o n necessary to v i n d i c a t e the c l a i m r e l a t e d to those r e c o r d s . " 76 have CR-06-0996 2 So. 3d a t 817. information. Dunaway f a i l e d t o show good c a u s e Thus, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n d e n y i n g t h i s discovery request. For for this the reasons See T u r n e r , stated above, supra. we affirm c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f Dunaway's R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . AFFIRMED. Wise, P . J . , and Welch and Main, J J . , c o n c u r . Windom, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t . 77 the c i r c u i t

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