Samuel Mills, Jr. v. Baldwin Transfer Company, Inc., and Alabama Department of Labor

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REL: 10/04/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2013 2120395 Samuel M i l l s , J r . v. Baldwin T r a n s f e r Company, Inc., and Alabama Department o f Labor Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t (CV-11-804) THOMPSON, P r e s i d i n g Judge. Samuel M i l l s , Circuit Court Court J r . , appeals ("the t r i a l compensation b e n e f i t s . from a judgment o f t h e M o b i l e court") d e n y i n g h i m unemployment- 2120395 Most of the facts i n this case are undisputed. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t M i l l s , who was 72 y e a r s o l d a t t h e t i m e of the t r i a l , Baldwin worked for five years as a t r u c k T r a n s f e r Company, I n c . ( " B a l d w i n " ) . d e v e l o p e d an e a r i n f e c t i o n . infection was caused or Mills driver for I n 2010, M i l l s does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e aggravated by h i s j o b , but the i n f e c t i o n d i d cause him t o s u f f e r d i z z i n e s s and v e r t i g o . a result, As f o r two p e r i o d s i n 2010, M i l l s was a b s e n t f r o m w o r k at Baldwin pursuant t o the f e d e r a l F a m i l y M e d i c a l Leave A c t ("FMLA"). Before medical undergo a driver leave a f o r Baldwin o f absence, physical can r e t u r n Baldwin examination t o work a f t e r requires that a him o r h e r t o complies with the requirements o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ("DOT"). The physicians at Northside Industrial clinic") a r e c e r t i f i e d t o p e r f o r m DOT p h y s i c a l s , retains the c l i n i c t o determine whether ("the and B a l d w i n i t s drivers are c l e a r e d t o r e t u r n t o work. On J a n u a r y 19, 2 0 1 1 , D r . J a s o n V a l e n t i n e , a p h y s i c i a n a t t h e c l i n i c , e x a m i n e d M i l l s on b e h a l f o f B a l d w i n a n d d e t e r m i n e d that Mills was not p h y s i c a l l y 2 f i t to return t o work as a 2120395 driver. Specifically, driving any at which restrictions other Mills could i m p o s e d by be Dr. reevaluated. w o r k i n g as a t r u c k d r i v e r . F e b r u a r y 10, determined work. restricted Valentine, type of work f o r M i l l s On who Valentine commercial v e h i c l e or from c l i m b i n g time, continue Dr. that Because Dr. 2011, to was Polansky Mills was not DOT Daniel able On February 20, to return to Baldwin be restriction on his a physician at the b u t he w o u l d have t o do so a t h i s own reexamination d e c i d e d t o comply w i t h Dr. any r e e x a m i n e d by c o u l d be $45 to the y e a r l o n g clinic, the the Polansky, Baldwin t o l d M i l l s that, to e n d e d , he pay unable certified, driving not year, do. was a b l e t o r e t u r n t o work b e f o r e would f o r one B a l d w i n d i d n o t have physically would not a c c e p t the r e l e a s e . from Because of M i l l s v i s i t e d Dr. Mills Mills Valentine's 2011, Mills fee, expense. and driving filed Mills instead he restriction. a claim for unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s w i t h the Alabama Department of I n d u s t r i a l of Labor ("the Relations, now department"). known as t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t In 1 completing the paperwork On O c t o b e r 1, 2012, t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f I n d u s t r i a l Relations, which administered the state's unemploymentc o m p e n s a t i o n s y s t e m , merged w i t h t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f 1 3 2120395 required f o r the claim, M i l l s t o w o r k and t h a t he was because of other i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was not able not a v a i l a b l e t o a c c e p t f u l l - t i m e work obligations. Additionally, he did not c o n t a c t the department w i t h i n f o u r days of f i l i n g h i s c l a i m t o provide additional instructed. The information, department b e n e f i t s , determining work for which experience, he he the denied qualified not based eligible department Mills's t h a t , b e c a u s e he was was was as to request had for not able to p e r f o r m on past receive t r a i n i n g or unemployment- c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s p u r s u a n t t o § 2 5 - 4 - 7 7 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975. Mills appealed Board of Appeals hearing the ("the board"). The to connected to his the department's department scheduled on t h e i s s u e s w h e t h e r M i l l s was w o r k and w h e t h e r he had cause determination a b l e and a a v a i l a b l e to l e f t B a l d w i n v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h o u t good job. After a hearing conducted by telephone, the h e a r i n g o f f i c e r f o r the board i s s u e d a d e c i s i o n i n w h i c h she job "when he determined that M i l l s failed to return to had work voluntarily quit and get a his physical L a b o r ; t h e c o n s o l i d a t e d d e p a r t m e n t i s now known as t h e A l a b a m a Department of Labor. See § 2 5 - 2 - 1 . 1 , A l a . Code 1975. 4 2120395 required by the employer from the hearing o f f i c e r stated that M i l l s ' s company reason doctor." The for leaving work was " o f a p e r s o n a l n a t u r e and no w o r k r e a s o n was e s t a b l i s h e d . " Therefore, the disqualified hearing from officer receiving concluded, he or she A l a . Code 1975. the h e a r i n g o f f i c e r p o i n t e d out t h a t a claimant i s not e l i g i b l e things, was unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s , pursuant t o § 25-4-78(2), In her d e c i s i o n , Mills to receive benefits i s "physically and if, among o t h e r mentally unable to p e r f o r m w o r k o f a c h a r a c t e r w h i c h she i s q u a l i f i e d t o p e r f o r m by p a s t e x p e r i e n c e o r t r a i n i n g . " that Mills had called The h e a r i n g o f f i c e r the department's "inquiry found line" on F e b r u a r y 28, 2011, and p r o v i d e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he h a d become a b l e t o w o r k as o f F e b r u a r y 14, 2011. the hearing officer eligibility the would decision remain concluded, requirements continued, i n effect Mills met as o f F e b r u a r y the he obtained s u b s e q u e n t l y met t h e s t a t u t o r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o r e c e i v e unemployment compensation. 5 department's 14, 2011. his disqualification until Therefore, a However, for benefits j o b and t o be then eligible 2120395 Mills trial 17, appealed court 2012. evidence the hearing fora trial de novo. In addition indicated restriction period officer's A trial to the facts that, at the was h e l d set forth end of imposed by Dr. V a l e n t i n e , r e t u r n t o B a l d w i n t o make h i m s e l f He a l s o s a i d t h a t , since on A p r i l above, t h e the one-year Mills d i d not Mills he was l o o k i n g f o r the yearlong r e s t r i c t i o n had e n d e d , he h a d b e e n s e e k i n g a j o b i n w h i c h he c o u l d truck to the a v a i l a b l e f o r work. t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a t the time of the t r i a l , work. decision drive a locally. After the t r i a l , denying M i l l s ' s the t r i a l court entered a judgment c l a i m f o r unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s . In explaining i t s decision, the t r i a l court wrote: "Here, [ M i l l s ] f a i l e d t o r e t u r n t o B a l d w i n and o f f e r h i m s e l f b a c k f o r w o r k a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e one (1) y e a r r e s t r i c t i o n a n d as s u c h , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t [ M i l l s ] v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t h i s j o b w i t h o u t good cause connected with work and is therefore d i s q u a l i f i e d f r o m r e c e i v i n g unemployment b e n e f i t s p u r s u a n t t o Code o f A l a b a m a § 2 5 - 4 - 7 8 ( 2 ) . " M i l l s appealed t o t h i s On a p p e a l , M i l l s court asserts from t h e t r i a l that court's the t r i a l denying him unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s beginning on F e b r u a r y 20, 2 0 1 1 , when he 6 court judgment. erred i n f o r the period first applied for 2120395 benefits, and e n d i n g on J a n u a r y 19, 2012, when h i s one-year d r i v i n g r e s t r i c t i o n e n d e d and he a d m i t t e d l y f a i l e d t o r e t u r n to Baldwin. "The trial c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t i n an unemployment c o m p e n s a t i o n c a s e a r e p r e s u m e d c o r r e c t , and i t s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on s u c h f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be reversed u n l e s s the f i n d i n g s are c l e a r l y c o n t r a r y to the g r e a t w e i g h t of the e v i d e n c e . Department of I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s v. P i c k e t t , 448 So. 2d 364 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). The Unemployment Compensation A c t i s ' i n s u r a n c e f o r the unemployed w o r k e r and i s i n t e n d e d t o be a r e m e d i a l measure f o r h i s b e n e f i t . ' D e p a r t m e n t o f I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s v. J a c o , 337 So. 2d 374, 376 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 7 6 ) . ' I t s h o u l d be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n [ t h e ] c l a i m a n t ' s f a v o r and t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f r o m b e n e f i t s s h o u l d be n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e d . ' Department o f I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s v. S m i t h , 360 So. 2d 726, 727 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . ) , c e r t . den., 360 So. 2d 728 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) . " S t a t e Dep't o f I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v. B r y a n t , 697 So. 2d 469, (Ala. C i v . App. 1997) . employment v o l u n t a r i l y fact. "Whether 1347 Relations ( A l a . C i v . App. v. Ford, 700 employee w i t h o u t good c a u s e L a g r o n e v. D e p a r t m e n t 1345, an So. 2d leaves h i s i s a q u e s t i o n of of Indus. R e l a t i o n s , 1987)." 470 519 So. 2d D i r e c t o r , Dep't o f I n d u s . 1388, 1390 (Ala. Civ. App. court i n t h i s case 1997). The is statute r e l i e d upon by t h e t r i a l § 25-4-78(2), which p r o v i d e s , 7 i n pertinent part: 2120395 "An i n d i v i d u a l s h a l l be d i s q u a l i f i e d or p a r t i a l unemployment: for total " "(2) V o l u n t a r i l y q u i t t i n g work. I f he has l e f t h i s most r e c e n t bona f i d e work v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h o u t good c a u s e c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h work. "a.1. However, he shall not be d i s q u a l i f i e d i f he was f o r c e d t o l e a v e work b e c a u s e he was s i c k o r d i s a b l e d , n o t i f i e d h i s e m p l o y e r o f t h e f a c t as s o o n as i t was reasonably p r a c t i c a b l e so t o do, and returned t o t h a t e m p l o y e r and o f f e r e d h i m s e l f f o r work as s o o n as he was a g a i n able t o work; provided, however, this exception s h a l l not apply i f the employer h a d an e s t a b l i s h e d l e a v e - o f - a b s e n c e policy c o v e r i n g s i c k n e s s o r d i s a b i l i t y and: " ( I ) The i n d i v i d u a l f a i l s t o c o m p l y w i t h same as soon as i t i s r e a s o n a b l y p r a c t i c a b l e so t o do; or " ( i i ) Upon t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f a leave of absence s h a l l f a i l t o r e t u r n t o s a i d e m p l o y e r and o f f e r h i m s e l f f o r work, i f he shall t h e n be a b l e t o work, o r i f he i s n o t t h e n a b l e t o work, he f a i l s t o so n o t i f y h i s e m p l o y e r o f t h a t f a c t and r e q u e s t an e x t e n s i o n o f h i s s a i d l e a v e o f a b s e n c e as s o o n as i t i s r e a s o n a b l y p r a c t i c a b l e so t o do." F o r t h e r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w , we a g r e e w i t h M i l l s the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t he f a i l e d t o r e t u r n t o 8 that Baldwin 2120395 and o f f e r h i m s e l f d e n y i n g him 2011, benefits when Dr. commercial f o r employment c a n n o t s e r v e as t h e b a s i s for Valentine truck the year beginning restricted Mills driver. We note that, on January his restriction period, he is not on appeal, entitled to u n e m p l o y m e n t - c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s f r o m J a n u a r y 2012 To review determination, the we must propriety construe of the the meaning forward. court's § "'"The i n t e n t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s the p o l e s t a r of s t a t u t o r y construction." S i e g e l m a n v. A l a b a m a A s s ' n o f Sch. Bds., 819 So. 2d 568, 579 ( A l a . 2001) (citing R i c h a r d s o n v. PSB A r m o r , I n c . , 682 So. 2d 438, 440 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; J o n e s v. C o n r a d i , 673 So. 2d 389, 394 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) ; and Ex p a r t e J o r d a n , 592 So. 2d 579, 581 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ) . We a r e m i n d f u l t h a t " t h e L e g i s l a t u r e w i l l n o t be p r e s u m e d t o have done a f u t i l e t h i n g in enacting a statute; there is a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d a j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n and d i d n o t e n a c t a s t a t u t e t h a t has no p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g . " W e a t h e r s v. C i t y o f O x f o r d , 8 95 So. 2d 305, 309 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2004) ( c i t i n g Ex p a r t e W a t l e y , 708 So. 2d 890 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) , and Ex p a r t e Meeks, 682 So. 2d 423 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ) . ' 9 end receive trial of a Mills 78(2)a.1.(ii). " G l a s s v. A n n i s t o n C i t y Bd. 1143, 1147 ( A l a . C i v . App. 19, f r o m w o r k i n g as c o n c e d e s t h a t , b e c a u s e he d i d n o t r e t u r n t o B a l d w i n a t t h e of for o f E d u c . , 957 So. 2d 2006). Additionally, 25-4- 2120395 ' " [ a ] l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l n o t be a d o p t e d , when i t w o u l d d e f e a t t h e p u r p o s e s o f a s t a t u t e , i f any o t h e r r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n c a n be g i v e n t o the words."' L i m e s t o n e C o u n t y Water & Sewer A u t h . v. C i t y o f A t h e n s , 896 So. 2d 5 3 1 , 537 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2004) ( q u o t i n g H a r r i n g t o n v. S t a t e , 200 A l a . 480, 482, 76 So. 422, 424 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ) . '[T]he l a w i s a r e a s o n a b l e m a s t e r , a n d i t s h o u l d be so c o n s t r u e d i n the l i g h t o f common s e n s e i n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . ' S t i t h C o a l Co. v. S a n f o r d , 192 A l a . 601, 606-07, 68 So. 990, 992 ( 1 9 1 5 ) . " T.G. v. H o u s t o n C n t y . 1149-50 Dep't o f Human R e s . , 39 So. 3d 1146, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 9 ) . The trial court determined that M i l l s from r e c e i v i n g b e n e f i t s b e g i n n i n g was i n January disqualified 2011 b e c a u s e , a y e a r a f t e r he a p p l i e d a n d was d e n i e d t h o s e b e n e f i t s , he f a i l e d to r e t u r n t o work at Baldwin. In other words, the t r i a l court's interpretation of § 25-4-78(2)a.1.(ii) deprives of obtaining benefits during Baldwin's policy, However, M i l l s ' s Mills the period was n o t a b l e Mills t h a t , pursuant to drive to commercially. f a i l u r e t o r e t u r n t o work a t t h e e n d o f t h a t p e r i o d c a n n o t p o s s i b l y be t h e b a s i s f o r t h e d e n i a l o f b e n e f i t s as e a r l y a s F e b r u a r y As mentioned, 20, 2011. the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s intent Unemployment C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t ("the A c t " ) , Ala. Code 1975, i n enacting the § 25-4-1 e t s e q . , was t o p r o v i d e " ' i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e u n e m p l o y e d 10 2120395 worker and benefit.'" i s intended Bryant, t o be a remedial 697 So. 2d a t 470 measure ( q u o t i n g Dep't o f R e l a t i o n s v. J a c o , 337 So. 2d 374, 376 ( A l a . C i v . App. F u r t h e r m o r e , d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f r o m b e n e f i t s must be construed. Id. for his Indus. 1976)). narrowly A claimant c e r t a i n l y i s not r e q u i r e d t o wait u n t i l he o r she once a g a i n has t h e a b i l i t y t o work b e f o r e he o r she c a n a p p l y f o r b e n e f i t s f o r payments a i m e d a t a s s i s t i n g the claimant conclude during t h e p e r i o d he o r she c a n n o t work. t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n a t i s s u e does n o t become o p e r a t i v e u n t i l a l e a v e p e r i o d has e n d e d and t h e c l a i m a n t t h e n return We t o work. During the time work, § 2 5 - 4 - 7 8 ( 2 ) a . 1 . ( i i ) a claimant has no a p p l i c a t i o n . t h e s t a t u t e i n t h e manner t h e t r i a l f a i l s to i s not able To to interpret c o u r t has i n t e r p r e t e d i t would d e p r i v e a c l a i m a n t o f unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s at the time those b e n e f i t s a r e most needed. Such a result d e f e a t s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e A c t . A c c o r d i n g l y , we c o n c l u d e the trial court erred in denying compensation b e n e f i t s from February Mills that unemployment- 2011 u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e y e a r d u r i n g w h i c h Dr. V a l e n t i n e r e s t r i c t e d h i m f r o m d r i v i n g on the ground t h a t M i l l s h i m s e l f f o r employment failed to r e t u r n to Baldwin i n January 11 2012. to offer 2120395 Our inquiry does not end there, however. This court "'must a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i f t h a t j u d g m e n t is supported was not by any argued valid before legal the ground, even i f t h a t trial court or P a t t e r s o n v. L i b e r t y N a t ' l L i f e I n s . Co., (Ala. 2004)(quoting (Ala. Ex p a r t e CTB, Inc., this 903 782 So. So. ground Court.'" 2d 769, 780 2d 191 2000)). S e c t i o n 25-4-77 o f t h e A c t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e a claimant must meet to be eligible to might be disqualified c e r t a i n reasons from receiving requirements receive A s s u m i n g a c l a i m a n t meets t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s , benefits. he o r she benefits e n u m e r a t e d i n § 25-4-78. 188, still because In determining of that M i l l s had v o l u n t a r i l y l e f t h i s employment w i t h o u t good c a u s e connected t o h i s work, t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d t h e s e c o n d s t e p in the process from o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r M i l l s was receiving unemployment-compensation disqualified benefits. t h r e s h o l d q u e s t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s w h e t h e r M i l l s was r e c e i v e b e n e f i t s i n the first The eligible place. On a p p e a l , t h e d e p a r t m e n t a r g u e s t h a t M i l l s d i d n o t employment d u r i n g therefore, i t the says, to year he he was 12 was restricted not eligible seek from driving; to receive 2120395 unemployment c o m p e n s a t i o n . In support of i t s a s s e r t i o n , the d e p a r t m e n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t , t o be e l i g i b l e compensation benefits, a claimant must f o r unemploymentbe physically and m e n t a l l y a b l e a n d a v a i l a b l e t o p e r f o r m work o f a c h a r a c t e r he or she i s q u a l i f i e d t o p e r f o r m b y p a s t e x p e r i e n c e o r t r a i n i n g , and he o r she i s r e q u i r e d t o make obtain such work d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f o r w h i c h compensation b e n e f i t s Ala. a reasonable a r e sought. effort to unemployment- § 25-4-77(a)(3) and ( 5 ) , Code 1975. M i l l s p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t , on F e b r u a r y 10, 2011, h i s physician, physically conceded able that, commercial Dr. P o l a n s k y , to return other than determined t o work. being t h a t he was In h i s b r i e f , restricted from Mills being t r u c k d r i v e r , he was n o t m e d i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d performing any other requirement t h a t he be job. Therefore, Mills met a from the p h y s i c a l l y a n d m e n t a l l y a b l e t o work. § 25-4-77(a)(3). However, a further eligibility requirement i s that the c l a i m a n t make a " r e a s o n a b l e a n d a c t i v e e f f o r t t o s e c u r e work which he training." i s qualified t o perform § 25-4-77(a)(5). by p a s t experience " I t i s not necessary 13 and that a 2120395 claimant former s e e k employment s o l e l y employment. Heatherly (Ala. C i v . App. 1 9 8 6 ) . " (Ala. C i v . App. 1 9 9 4 ) . i n t h e same i n d u s t r y as h e r v. Campbell, Canady v. A l l e n , employment. Singleton, this Mills he State and r e a s o n a b l e Dep't 364 So. 2d 3 2 5 , 326-27 case, there 646 So. 2d 147, 149 A c l a i m a n t must p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t shows he o r she made g o o d - f a i t h secure 485 So. 2d 735 efforts to Relations v. ( A l a . C i v . App. 1978) . In of Indus. i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g that s o u g h t employment o f a n y k i n d d u r i n g t h e t i m e f o r w h i c h seeks failed unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s . t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g good-faith and reasonable Accordingly, Mills compensation benefits, that M i l l s albeit court's effort was n o t e l i g i b l e secure court's he made a employment. unemploymentdetermination i n t h e judgment. Mills's compensation b e n e f i t s i s t h e r e f o r e claim The affirmed. Thomas, a n d D o n a l d s o n , J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t , 14 trial f o r unemployment- AFFIRMED. Pittman, thus t o r e c e i v e b e n e f i t s was c o r r e c t , f o r a reason not s t a t e d denying that to receive and t h e t r i a l was n o t e n t i t l e d judgment to Mills without writing.

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