Elfreda Miller v. Wesley Cleckler

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REL: 6/11/10 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 2090195 Elfreda Miller v. Wesley C l e c k l e r Appeal from Shelby C i r c u i t Court (CV-07-900213) BRYAN, J u d g e . Elfreda Miller, the p l a i n t i f f below, appeals from summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f W e s l e y C l e c k l e r , the defendants negligence below, i n Mrs. M i l l e r ' s and wantonness. We a f f i r m action i n part, a one o f alleging reverse i n 2090195 part, a n d remand. This case occurred involves a four-automobile accident on I n t e r s t a t e 65 ( " I - 6 5 " ) i n S h e l b y that County. On F r i d a y a f t e r n o o n , A u g u s t 4, 2006, M r s . M i l l e r was d r i v i n g an automobile south on I - 6 5 . M r s . M i l l e r was t r a v e l i n g i n the l e f t l a n e b e h i n d h e r h u s b a n d , R i c h a r d M i l l e r , who was d r i v i n g a separate I-65, automobile. C l e c k l e r was a l s o t r a v e l i n g s o u t h d r i v i n g h i s pickup was d r i v i n g traffic Mrs. Cleckler testified a t a s p e e d o f 60 o r 65 m i l e s was " p r e t t y h e a v y " a t t h e t i m e . Miller hour. truck. testified B o t h C l e c k l e r and t h a t t h e s p e e d l i m i t was 70 m i l e s p e r t r a f f i c " w i t h v e h i c l e s "moving f r e e l y . " through traffic t h a t he p e r hour and t h a t M r s . M i l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e was a " s t e a d y contains testimony on from o b s e r v e r s " a t a high rate flow of The r e c o r d on a p p e a l t h a t C l e c k l e r was " d a r t i n g " of speed" " t r y i n g t o pass everyone." A t some p o i n t , C l e c k l e r merged h i s p i c k u p right lane vehicle. into the l e f t lane i n front t r u c k from the o f Mr. Miller's C l e c k l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t , when he moved i n t o t h e l e f t l a n e a h e a d o f Mr. M i l l e r , or four automobile he moved i n t o a gap o f a b o u t lengths. three Cleckler further t e s t i f i e d that, 2 2090195 s h o r t l y a f t e r moving i n t o the l e f t l a n e , the v e h i c l e s i n f r o n t o f him b e g a n t o b r a k e , c a u s i n g him good." Mr. front of" to apply h i s brakes " p r e t t y M i l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t C l e c k l e r moved " d i r e c t l y i n his vehicle b r a k e s " b e c a u s e he him. As other drivers was a r e s u l t of and too that Cleckler close to the "slammed vehicle Cleckler's braking, Mr. t r a v e l i n g behind Cleckler began on his in front Miller of the brake to and as well. At behind that Mrs. time, Charles Miller, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was who Williams was was behind driving Mr. a vehicle Miller. Williams t r a v e l i n g at a speed of a p p r o x i m a t e l y m i l e s p e r h o u r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one automobile length behind Miller. that, brakes Mrs. Miller testified i n r e s p o n s e t o Mr. Williams's when M i l l e r ' s braking she applied in front v e h i c l e s t r u c k her v e h i c l e from behind, c a u s i n g v e h i c l e t o c o l l i d e w i t h t h e b a c k o f Mr. Miller's vehicle. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e i n t u r n c o l l i d e d w i t h the back of pickup truck. Mrs. in colliding danger Williams t h a t he of of s t r u c k her Mr. from behind. t h o u g h t t h a t Mrs. Miller's M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e had 3 vehicle However, W i l l i a m s Mrs. her her, her Mr. Cleckler's M i l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r v e h i c l e was with 70 not before testified c o l l i d e d with 2090195 Mr. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e b e f o r e h i s own M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e , b u t he was The vehicle collided with not c o m p l e t e l y accident occurred at approximately Mrs. Cleckler, Mrs. sure about t h a t . 3:15 p.m. on a sunny day. Miller sued Williams, and fictitiously named p a r t i e s , a l l e g i n g n e g l i g e n c e and w a n t o n n e s s and to recover automobile Cleckler's damages f o r i n j u r i e s accident. answer allegedly sustained i n C l e c k l e r a n s w e r e d and d e n i e d asserted, among other seeking things, the liability. that Mrs. M i l l e r ' s i n j u r i e s were p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d by t h e n e g l i g e n c e o r wantonness of another. Cleckler then moved for a summary judgment, a s s e r t i n g t h a t h i s a c t i o n s d i d not p r o x i m a t e l y cause t h e a c c i d e n t . C l e c k l e r ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h Alabama law p r o h i b i t s a d r i v e r from another driver driver to Cleckler's proximately too look closely, behind motion caused him implicitly the Alabama before law does n o t stopping following require for traffic. argued t h a t W i l l i a m s ' s a c c i d e n t . The trial court a conduct entered a j u d g m e n t g r a n t i n g C l e c k l e r ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n , and t r i a l c o u r t c e r t i f i e d t h a t j u d g m e n t as f i n a l , p u r s u a n t to Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. supreme C i v . P. Mrs. Miller 4 appealed to the the 2090195 c o u r t , a n d t h e supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal t o t h i s c o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. "In reviewing the d i s p o s i t i o n o f a motion f o r summary j u d g m e n t , 'we u t i l i z e t h e same s t a n d a r d as the t r i a l c o u r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e [ i t ] made o u t a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , ' B u s s e y v . John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , a n d w h e t h e r t h e movant was ' e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' W r i g h t v. W r i g h t , 654 So. 2d 542 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) ; R u l e 5 6 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. When t h e movant makes a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden shifts to t h e nonmovant to present s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e c r e a t i n g s u c h an i s s u e . B a s s v . S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y , 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . E v i d e n c e i s ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' i f i t i s o f 'such w e i g h t a n d q u a l i t y t h a t f a i r - m i n d e d p e r s o n s i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f i m p a r t i a l judgment can reasonably i n f e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t sought t o be p r o v e d . ' W r i g h t , 654 So. 2d a t 543 ( q u o t i n g West v. F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r a n c e Co. o f F l o r i d a , 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ) . Our r e v i e w i s f u r t h e r s u b j e c t t o t h e c a v e a t t h a t t h i s C o u r t must r e v i e w the record i n a light most f a v o r a b l e to the nonmovant a n d must r e s o l v e a l l r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t s a g a i n s t t h e movant. Wilma C o r p . v . F l e m i n g Foods o f A l a b a m a , I n c . , 613 So. 2d 359 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; H a n n e r s v. B a l f o u r G u t h r i e , I n c . , 564 So. 2d 412, 413 ( A l a . 1990)." Hobson v . A m e r i c a n (Ala. Cast Iron P i p e Co., 690 So. 2d 3 4 1 , 344 1997). On a p p e a l , M r s . M i l l e r f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l erred i n entering the a summary j u d g m e n t i n C l e c k l e r ' s n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m because, she s a y s , t h e r e c o r d 5 court f a v o r on contains 2090195 substantial evidence indicating that Cleckler's conduct p r o x i m a t e l y caused the a c c i d e n t . Conversely, C l e c k l e r argues t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t W i l l i a m s ' s c o n d u c t was sole proximate maintains cause that of the accident. W i l l i a m s ' s conduct That s e r v e d as the i s , Cleckler an intervening c a u s e b e t w e e n C l e c k l e r ' s a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e and t h e a c c i d e n t . "In order to e s t a b l i s h must p r o v e : '(1) a duty breach of t h a t duty; or injury.'" (Ala. 2006) (Ala. S.B. 1994)). negligence (Ala. that a (3) p r o x i m a t e v. Saint plaintiff c a u s a t i o n ; and James S c h . , 959 a (4) damage So. So. (2) 2d 2d 72, 564, 97 567 "A summary j u d g m e n t i s r a r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e i n a action." N e l s o n v. Meadows, 684 1996). Typically, question from must be decided the evidence So. 2d 145, the q u e s t i o n of i s a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t t o be inferences a foreseeable p l a i n t i f f ; ( q u o t i n g M a r t i n v. A r n o l d , 643 C i v . App. causation to a negligence claim, by proximate r e s o l v e d by t h e the jury i f 148 jury; reasonable support the p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. D i x o n v. B o a r d o f W a t e r & Sewer Comm'rs o f M o b i l e , 865 So. 2d 1161, 2d 1166 393, 395 562 So. ( A l a . 2003); ( A l a . 1977). 2d 166, 169 C i t y o f M o b i l e v. L a r g a y , 346 So. See a l s o T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y v. B a r n e t t , ( A l a . 1990) 6 (stating that q u e s t i o n s of 2090195 proximate the c a u s a t i o n and i n t e r v e n i n g cause are questions jury). " L o o s e l y d e f i n e d , an ' i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e ' i s one w h i c h o c c u r s a f t e r an a c t c o m m i t t e d by a t o r t f e a s o r and w h i c h r e l i e v e s him o f h i s l i a b i l i t y by b r e a k i n g t h e c h a i n o f c a u s a t i o n b e t w e e n h i s a c t and the resulting injury. V i n e s v. P l a n t a t i o n M o t o r L o d g e , 336 So. 2d 1338 ( A l a . 1976) . T h i s C o u r t has s t a t e d : "'However n e g l i g e n t a p e r s o n may have b e e n i n some p a r t i c u l a r , he i s l i a b l e o n l y t o t h o s e who may have b e e n i n j u r e d by r e a s o n o f s u c h n e g l i g e n c e , as t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e . Where some independent agency has i n t e r v e n e d and b e e n t h e i m m e d i a t e c a u s e o f the i n j u r y , the p a r t y g u i l t y of n e g l i g e n c e i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e i s not r e s p o n s i b l e . ' M o b i l e C i t y L i n e s , I n c . v. P r o c t o r , 272 Mo Ala. 217, 130 So. 2d 388 (1961) "An i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e may be an ' a c t o f God,' s u c h as an e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t o f n a t u r e , B r a d f o r d v. S t a n l e y , 355 So. 2d 328 ( A l a . 1978), or the a c t i o n s of another, u s u a l l y , though not n e c e s s a r i l y , another t o r t f e a s o r ; however, a cause i s not an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e , so as t o r e l i e v e a t o r t f e a s o r o f h i s l i a b i l i t y , u n l e s s i t comes i n t o a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n a f t e r t h e t o r t f e a s o r has acted. [W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. K e e t o n , D. Owen,] P r o s s e r & K e e t o n on T o r t s , [§ 44, p.] 301 [ ( 5 t h ed. 1 9 8 4 ) ] . In other words, i t must o c c u r between the act of the t o r t f e a s o r and t h e i n j u r y s u s t a i n e d f o r t h e c h a i n o f c a u s a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e a c t and t h e i n j u r y t o be broken. V i n e s , s u p r a ; A p l i n v. Dean, 231 A l a . 320, 164 So. 737 (1935) . "Not e v e r y c a u s e w h i c h comes a f t e r a t o r t f e a s o r has a c t e d w i l l liability f o r h i s wrongful act. proper temporal relationship 7 into operation r e l i e v e him o f More t h a n the between the for 2090195 tortfeasor's a c t and the subsequent cause is required. I n o r d e r t o be an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e , a s u b s e q u e n t c a u s e a l s o must have b e e n u n f o r e s e e a b l e and must have b e e n s u f f i c i e n t i n and o f i t s e l f t o have b e e n t h e s o l e 'cause i n f a c t ' o f t h e i n j u r y . V i n e s , s u p r a , a t 1339. I f an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e c o u l d have r e a s o n a b l y b e e n f o r e s e e n a t t h e t i m e t h e t o r t f e a s o r a c t e d , i t does n o t b r e a k t h e c h a i n o f c a u s a t i o n b e t w e e n h i s a c t and t h e i n j u r y . Vines, s u p r a ; M o r g a n [ v. C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a , 268 A l a . 493, 108 So. 2d 342 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ] ; L o u i s v i l l e & N.R. Co. v. Courson, 234 A l a . 273, 174 So. 474 (1937). Conversely, i f the intervening cause was unforeseeable, the causal chain i s broken. Vines, s u p r a . I n t h e same r e s p e c t , i f t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o be c o n s i d e r e d t h e s o l e 'cause i n f a c t ' o f t h e i n j u r y , i f i t i s n o t i n and o f i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a n d as t h e ' e f f i c i e n t c a u s e ' of t h e i n j u r y , t h e c a u s a l c h a i n i s n o t b r o k e n ; b u t , i f t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e was a l o n e s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o d u c e t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f , i t i s deemed t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y and t h e t o r t f e a s o r o r t o r t f e a s o r s b e t w e e n whose a c t s and t h e i n j u r y t h e c a u s e i n t e r v e n e d a r e r e l i e v e d o f l i a b i l i t y . W a t t v. Combs, 244 A l a . 31, 12 So. 2d 189 ( 1 9 4 3 ) ; Goodwyn v. G i b s o n , 235 A l a . 19, 177 So. 140 ( 1 9 3 7 ) . " General (Ala. Motors 1985), Corp. v. overruled Edwards, on i n order f o r conduct after the negligence claim, defendant's 2d 1176, Schwartz 1194-95 v. Volvo ( A l a . 1989). T h e r e f o r e , i n t o be i n s u l a t i n g the defendant from l i a b i l i t y , occur So. o t h e r grounds, N o r t h A m e r i c a C o r p . , 554 So. 2d 927 summary, 482 actions an intervening cause t h e c o n d u c t must (1) giving rise to the (2) be u n f o r e s e e a b l e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t s , and (3) be s u f f i c i e n t t o be t h e s o l e 8 2090195 p r o x i m a t e cause o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s Cleckler contends that injury. Id. Williams, by automobile l e n g t h b e h i n d Mrs. M i l l e r w h i l e per h o u r , s e r v e d as t h e i n t e r v e n i n g the a l l e g e d r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s . testimony stating Cleckler's vehicle that, when she M i l l e r ' s vehicle u n t i l Williams's testified t r a v e l i n g 70 m i l e s braked i n response i n front with the c o l l i s i o n t h e b a c k o f Mr. vehicle struck her vehicle. that between he thought Mrs. M i l l e r ' s Williams's vehicle first, and Mrs. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e , b u t he was n o t c o m p l e t e l y s u r e a b o u t T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be a f a c t u a l i s s u e initial 1 collision Section i n t h i s case. that. regarding the I f Mrs. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e i n 3 2 - 5 A - 8 9 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, provides: "(a) The d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t f o l l o w a n o t h e r more c l o s e l y t h a n i s r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r u d e n t , h a v i n g due r e g a r d f o r t h e s p e e d o f s u c h v e h i c l e s a n d t h e t r a f f i c upon a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e h i g h w a y . E x c e p t when o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g another v e h i c l e , the d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e s h a l l leave a d i s t a n c e o f a t l e a s t 20 f e e t f o r e a c h 10 m i l e s p e r h o u r o f s p e e d b e t w e e n t h e v e h i c l e t h a t he i s d r i v i n g and t h e v e h i c l e t h a t he i s f o l l o w i n g . " 9 to of her, her v e h i c l e c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e b a c k o f Mr. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e before and C l e c k l e r c i t e s Mrs. M i l l e r ' s 1 a n d Mr. M i l l e r ' s b r a k i n g Williams one cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t was i n no d a n g e r o f c o l l i d i n g However, following 2090195 fact collided Williams's vehicle, cause with vehicle collided Williams's sufficient Cleckler's whether t h e b a c k o f Mr. M i l l e r ' s tailgating to break conduct the back could and t h e a c c i d e n t . caused o f Mrs. n o t be the chain C l e c k l e r ' s conduct factual question with vehicle of before Miller's an i n t e r v e n i n g causation In such a the accident between situation, would be a t o be r e s o l v e d b y t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . Even a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l fact regarding the initial collision and v e h i c l e s t r u c k Mrs. M i l l e r ' s v e h i c l e f i r s t , that Williams's C l e c k l e r has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t W i l l i a m s ' s c o n d u c t was an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e . I n o r d e r f o r W i l l i a m s ' s c o n d u c t t o be an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e , i t must have occurred after C l e c k l e r ' s alleged negligence, i t must have b e e n u n f o r e s e e a b l e t o C l e c k l e r , a n d i t must been sole sufficient accident. to General tailgating, supra. concurrently proximate cause conduct should of the First, Williams's conduct, with Cleckler's conduct. i s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t whether W i l l i a m s ' s Cleckler. the Motors, occurred Second, t h e r e be have have b e e n regarding foreseeable to C l e c k l e r t e s t i f i e d that t r a f f i c at the time of the a c c i d e n t was h e a v y . G i v e n t h a t t e s t i m o n y , 10 there i s a factual 2090195 i s s u e r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r C l e c k l e r s h o u l d have f o r e s e e n t h a t a d r i v e r w o u l d be t a i l g a t i n g among t h e c a r s b e h i n d him, a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous s i t u a t i o n brake suddenly, when C l e c k l e r creating i f C l e c k l e r s h o u l d have t o merged i n t o a space three or f o u r a u t o m o b i l e - l e n g t h s l o n g d i r e c t l y a h e a d o f Mr. M i l l e r . In a d d i t i o n t o a s s e r t i n g that he d i d n o t c a u s e i n t h e summary-judgment the accident, C l e c k l e r also motion asserted t h a t t h e r e i s no c a s e l a w o r s t a t u t e s t a t i n g t h a t a d r i v e r "has a duty to look behind him before he stops for traffic." I n s o f a r as C l e c k l e r may have moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t on the additional Miller, driver the we ground make t h a t he d i d n o t owe the following comments. a duty Cleckler, t o Mrs. as t h e ahead, had a duty t o t h e d r i v e r s b e h i n d him " ' t o use r o a d i n t h e u s u a l way, i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e l a w s road.'" Cox v . M i l l e r , 361 So. 2d 1044, 1045 of the ( A l a . 1978) ( q u o t i n g G r i b b l e v. Cox, 349 So. 2d 1 1 4 1 , 1144 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) ) . I n g e n e r a l , a d r i v e r h a s t h e d u t y t o e x e r c i s e due c a r e a n d t o keep a l o o k o u t f o r o t h e r s u s i n g t h e r o a d . 263 H o l l e y v. J o s e y , A l a . 349, 354, 82 So. 2d 328, 332 ( 1 9 5 5 ) . motorist complies w i t h a l l the requirements "'[E]ven i fa of a statute or o r d i n a n c e r e g u l a t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o f m o t o r v e h i c l e s , he may 11 2090195 yet be l i a b l e f o r the f a i l u r e to exercise ordinary care to a v o i d i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r t r a v e l e r i n f r o n t o f o r b e h i n d h i m on the highway.'" So. Cox, 361 So. 2d a t 1046 ( q u o t i n g G r i b b l e , 349 2d a t 1144) . The trial court could n o t have properly entered a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f C l e c k l e r b a s e d on t h e general g r o u n d t h a t he d i d n o t owe a d u t y t o M r s . M i l l e r . Mrs. entering Miller a also summary wantonness c l a i m . argues that the t r i a l judgment i n favor I n Ex p a r t e Essary, 2 0 0 7 ) , o u r supreme c o u r t court erred i n of C l e c k l e r on h e r 992 So. 2d 5, 9 stated: "'Wantonness' h a s b e e n d e f i n e d b y t h i s C o u r t as t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r t h e o m i s s i o n o f some d u t y w h i l e k n o w i n g o f t h e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s and b e i n g c o n s c i o u s t h a t , f r o m d o i n g o r o m i t t i n g t o do an a c t , i n j u r y w i l l l i k e l y o r p r o b a b l y result. Bozeman v . C e n t r a l Bank o f t h e S o u t h , 646 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1994). To c o n s t i t u t e w a n t o n n e s s , i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e a c t o r know t h a t a p e r s o n i s w i t h i n t h e zone made d a n g e r o u s b y h i s c o n d u c t ; i t i s enough t h a t he knows t h a t a s t r o n g possibility e x i s t s t h a t o t h e r s may r i g h t f u l l y come w i t h i n t h a t z o n e . J o s e p h v. S t a g g s , 519 So. 2d 952, 954 ( A l a . 1988). A l s o , i t i s not e s s e n t i a l t h a t the a c t o r s h o u l d have e n t e r t a i n e d a s p e c i f i c d e s i g n o r i n t e n t to i n j u r e the p l a i n t i f f , only that the actor i s 'conscious' that i n j u r y w i l l l i k e l y or probably r e s u l t from h i s a c t i o n s . I d . 'Conscious' has been d e f i n e d as ' " p e r c e i v i n g , a p p r e h e n d i n g , o r n o t i c i n g w i t h a degree of c o n t r o l l e d thought o r o b s e r v a t i o n : c a p a b l e o f o r marked by t h o u g h t , w i l l , d e s i g n , o r perception"'; '"having an a w a r e n e s s o f one's own e x i s t e n c e , s e n s a t i o n s , a n d t h o u g h t s , a n d o f one's 12 (Ala. 2090195 environment; capable of complex response to e n v i r o n m e n t ; d e l i b e r a t e . " ' B e r r y v. F i f e , 590 So. 2d 884, 885 ( A l a . 1991) ( q u o t i n g W e b s t e r ' s New C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 239 (1981) a n d The A m e r i c a n H e r i t a g e D i c t i o n a r y o f t h e E n g l i s h Language 283 (1969), r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . " The record contains testimony occurred, lane C l e c k l e r was m o v i n g h i s p i c k u p i n heavy drivers. a high that, before traffic, Mr. M i l l e r apparently testified r a t e o f speed." moved immediately indicates Cleckler Miller, long that testified speed that, Although truck when directly was he 70 merged s u b s t a n t i a l evidence him per hour. o f Mr. automobile-lengths conceivably him. of i n the record i n front ahead could there i s not s u b s t a n t i a l evidence claim against testified ahead miles f o r the t r a f f i c conduct also The e v i d e n c e limit t o brake Cleckler's negligence, wantonness having other 65 m i l e s p e r h o u r when he moved i n t o a s p a c e t h r e e o r f o u r before pass t h a t C l e c k l e r was d r i v i n g " a t the accident. the to However, Mr. M i l l e r h i s pickup before t r u c k from lane t o trying t h a t he was d r i v i n g o n l y a p p r o x i m a t e l y Cleckler the accident o f him. amount to supporting the The r e c o r d does n o t c o n t a i n i n d i c a t i n g that C l e c k l e r acted with the requisite consciousness probably result from that injury his was conduct. 13 likely Ex t o or would parte Essary. 2090195 A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t on M r s . M i l l e r ' s w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m a g a i n s t In conclusion, we affirm respect t o Mrs. M i l l e r ' s summary judgment with the wantonness respect summary claim. judgment We with reverse t o Mrs. M i l l e r ' s c l a i m , and we remand t h e c a s e t o t h e t r i a l Cleckler. negligence court. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. Thompson, P . J . , a n d P i t t m a n Moore, J . , c o n c u r s a n d Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . i n the r e s u l t , 14 without the writing.

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