Jacqueline Lee Mosley v. Builders South, Inc.

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Rel: 01/15/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 2080284 J a c q u e l i n e Lee Mosley v. B u i l d e r s South, Inc. Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t (DR-96-500152.02) Court PER CURIAM. Jacqueline order Lee Mosley appeals requiring her to deliver property from the t r i a l t h e deed t o B u i l d e r s South, I n c . ("Builders court's to certain South"). real 2080284 The disposition of this appeal i s dependent upon p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h i s c a s e , w h i c h i s as f o l l o w s . and h e r h u s b a n d , G e r a l d M. M o s l e y 1997. The t h i n g s , 168 husband trial divorce judgment the Mosley ("the h u s b a n d " ) , d i v o r c e d i n awarded a c r e s , known as t h e " A r d e n Mosley, among other Road p r o p e r t y . " appealed from the d i v o r c e judgment, The c l a i m i n g t h a t the c o u r t had abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d i v i d i n g the m a r i t a l property, i n c l u d i n g the assets business, B u i l d e r s South. (Ala. C i v . App. 1 of the p a r t i e s ' M o s l e y v. M o s l e y , construction 747 So. 2d 894 1999). In Mosley, t h i s c o u r t a f f i r m e d the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment awarding Mosley the Arden Road property, arguments analyzing the o f t h e p a r t i e s as f o l l o w s : "The dispute at t r i a l centered on how the b u s i n e s s a s s e t s s h o u l d be d i v i d e d . The e v i d e n c e as to t h e n e t v a l u e o f B u i l d e r s S o u t h was highly disputed. W h i l e t h e p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d as t o the worth of the corporation's assets, they d i s a g r e e d as t o t h e amount o f i t s l i a b i l i t i e s . The corporate assets, including office equipment, construction machinery, vehicles, tools, r e c e i v a b l e s , and c a s h d e p o s i t s (but e x c l u d i n g r e a l The h u s b a n d was t h e p r e s i d e n t o f B u i l d e r s S o u t h ; M o s l e y was t h e s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r . M o s l e y owned a l l t h e s h a r e s o f s t o c k , so t h a t B u i l d e r s S o u t h was considered a minority b u s i n e s s e n t e r p r i s e . M o s l e y v. M o s l e y , 747 So. 2d 894, 895 (Ala. C i v . App. 1 9 9 9 ) . 1 2 2080284 estate and approximately improvements) $990,000. were valued at "The p a r t i e s owned 168 a c r e s on A r d e n Road i n Chunchula, Alabama. The h e a d q u a r t e r s o f B u i l d e r s S o u t h i s s i t u a t e d on f i v e o f t h o s e a c r e s . The f i v e - a c r e t r a c t i s v a l u e d a t $10,000. Improvements on t h e f i v e - a c r e t r a c t i n c l u d e an o f f i c e b u i l d i n g w i t h an a t t a c h e d l i v i n g s p a c e t h a t was t h e p a r t i e s ' homeplace, v a l u e d a t $65,000; a commercial warehouse v a l u e d a t $100,000; and a garage w i t h a s m a l l apartment, valued a t $36,000. An a r e a of 3 a d d i t i o n a l a c r e s p r o v i d e s highway f r o n t a g e f o r the business s i t e . The r e m a i n i n g a r e a o f 160 a c r e s i n the 168-acre p a r c e l i s t i m b e r l a n d , and i t i s v a l u e d at $170,000. The p a r t i e s owned t h e f o l l o w i n g additional real property: a two-acre lot in Chunchula t h a t had belonged t o [ M o s l e y ' s ] f a m i l y , v a l u e d a t $ 7 , 0 0 0 ; a l o t on H i g h w a y 45 i n E i g h t M i l e , A l a b a m a , v a l u e d a t $ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 ; a n d a l o t on Z i e g l e r Road v a l u e d a t $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 . " [ M o s l e y ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t she was n o t r e q u e s t i n g , and d i d n o t w a n t , p e r i o d i c a l i m o n y . She s t a t e d t h a t , i n l i e u o f a l i m o n y , she p r e f e r r e d t o have i n c o m e - p r o d u c i n g p r o p e r t y , s u c h as t h e 160 a c r e s o f t i m b e r l a n d , or a p i e c e of c o n s t r u c t i o n equipment, s u c h as a c r a n e , t h a t she c o u l d l e a s e t o a n o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r . The t r i a l c o u r t a w a r d e d t h e h u s b a n d a l l the assets of B u i l d e r s South except f o r the f i v e - a c r e t r a c t and t h e improvements c o n s t i t u t i n g the b u s i n e s s p r e m i s e s , which i t awarded t o [ M o s l e y ] . The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o awarded t h e husband t h e c o m m e r c i a l l o t on Z i e g l e r Road. The t r i a l c o u r t a w a r d e d [ M o s l e y ] t h e r e m a i n i n g r e a l e s t a t e : t h e 160 a c r e s o f t i m b e r l a n d on A r d e n Road, t h e t w o - a c r e l o t i n Chunchula t h a t had belonged t o [ M o s l e y ' s ] f a m i l y ; and t h e l o t on H i g h w a y 45 i n E i g h t M i l e . The h u s b a n d ' s award, e x c l u d i n g d e b t s a n d l i a b i l i t i e s , t o t a l s a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,215,000. [ M o s l e y ' s ] award totals approximately $428,000. There a r e no 3 2080284 o u t s t a n d i n g debts or awarded t o [ M o s l e y ] . liabilities on the property "The husband m a i n t a i n s t h a t the debts and l i a b i l i t i e s on t h e p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d t o h i m amount t o $784,644.69. E v e n i f we a c c e p t e d t h e h u s b a n d ' s d e b t - a n d - l i a b i l i t y f i g u r e as a c c u r a t e , t h e h u s b a n d ' s n e t a w a r d w o u l d amount t o $ 4 3 0 , 3 5 5 . 3 1 , a f i g u r e v e r y c l o s e t o [ M o s l e y ' s ] n e t a w a r d . The h u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n was i n e q u i t a b l e b e c a u s e , a l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t gave him t h e a s s e t s o f B u i l d e r s S o u t h , i t f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e t h e p r e m i s e s on which B u i l d e r s South i s located, i t s office, w a r e h o u s e , and g a r a g e - - a l l o f w h i c h a r e , a c c o r d i n g to the husband, n e c e s s a r y t o the c o n t i n u e d o p e r a t i o n o f t h e b u s i n e s s . He c l a i m s t h a t i f t h e b u s i n e s s has t o pay t h e e x p e n s e o f r e l o c a t i o n , as w e l l as h a v i n g to shoulder i t s other liabilities, i t may not survive. The award of the b u s i n e s s p r e m i s e s t o [ M o s l e y ] , o f c o u r s e , does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e the b u s i n e s s to r e l o c a t e . The h u s b a n d may buy [ M o s l e y ' s ] i n t e r e s t o r pay h e r r e n t . C f . James v. James, [764] So. 2d So. 2d [561, 554] (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) [ r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e James, 764 So. 2d 557 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ] ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order 'does n o t p r o h i b i t the husband from ... buying out [Mosley's] ... interest'). The l a t t e r o p t i o n c o u l d , i n f a c t , be what t h e t r i a l c o u r t had i n m i n d by a w a r d i n g t h e [Mosley] the p r o p e r t y . She u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t she w a n t e d i n c o m e - p r o d u c i n g p r o p e r t y i n s t e a d o f alimony." Id. at In the 899-900. the y e a r s a f t e r the e n t r y of the d i v o r c e judgment issuance of our d e c i s i o n i n Mosley, the parties m u l t i p l e c o n t e m p t p e t i t i o n s and m o t i o n s t o m o d i f y t h e judgment. See Moss v. M o s l e y , 948 4 So. 2d 560, 563 and filed divorce (Ala. Civ. 2080284 App. 2006). 2 In Moss, this court discussed the p o s t d i v o r c e f i l i n g s t h a t are p e r t i n e n t to the i n s t a n t parties' appeal. "Many o f t h e c o n t e m p t p e t i t i o n s stemmed f r o m t h e p a r t i e s ' disagreement over the t r u e ownership of the 168 a c r e s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y on A r d e n Road. On May 20, 2002, t h e p a r t i e s had p e n d i n g b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t , among o t h e r t h i n g s , c r o s s - p e t i t i o n s s e e k i n g t o h o l d t h e o t h e r i n c o n t e m p t when, on t h a t d a t e , B u i l d e r s S o u t h , I n c . , moved t o i n t e r v e n e , a l l e g i n g t h a t i t was t h e owner o f t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d on A r d e n Road and a v e r r i n g t h a t , on i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f , [ M o s l e y ] had t r e s p a s s e d on t h e p r o p e r t y and had harvested an unknown quantity of timber b e l o n g i n g to B u i l d e r s South. N e i t h e r p a r t y o b j e c t e d t o t h e p r o p o s e d i n t e r v e n t i o n , and, on J u l y 8, 2002, the t r i a l c o u r t granted B u i l d e r s South's motion to intervene. "On November 18, 2002, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d order 'restraining a l l parties from cutting an ber from the r e a l p r o p e r t y , the t i t l e to timber from the r e a l p r o p e r t y , the t i t l e to which i s q u e s t i o n , pending f u r t h e r orders of th[e] c o u r t . ' i n q u e s t i o n , pending f u r t h e r orders of th[e The o r d e r f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d [ M o s l e y ] t o p r o v i d e an a c c o u n t i n g o f a l l t i m b e r c u t on t h e p r o p e r t y and s e t t h e m a t t e r f o r a h e a r i n g on a l l p e n d i n g motions. The m a t t e r was c o n t i n u e d and r e s e t s e v e r a l t i m e s . The p a r t i e s s u b m i t t e d b r i e f s t o t h e t r i a l court outlining their respective positions. Builders S o u t h a r g u e d t h a t t h e j u d g e who had tried the divorce case had no jurisdiction to distribute p r o p e r t y t i t l e d i n B u i l d e r s S o u t h when B u i l d e r s S o u t h was n o t a p a r t y t o t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n and t h e judge had made no express finding that the c o r p o r a t i o n and i t s a s s e t s were m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y . " M o s l e y h a d r e m a r r i e d and had t a k e n t h e name "Moss" a t t h e t i m e o f t h e 2006 a p p e a l . I n t h i s a c t i o n , she once a g a i n g o e s by t h e name o f " M o s l e y . " 2 5 2080284 Id. On November 29, determining 2004, t h e t r i a l t h a t i t h a d no court entered jurisdiction orders with respect to property t i t l e d denying a l l other pending motions. an order t o make any f u r t h e r t o B u i l d e r s South On March 30, 2005, four months a f t e r t h a t o r d e r h a d b e e n e n t e r e d , B u i l d e r s S o u t h a "Motion order for Clarification" applied property regarding granted to owned by a l l orders the motion d i v o r c e judgment for On filed as t o whether t h e November of the trial court or only B u i l d e r s South such p r o p e r t y . and June 29, to regarding future orders 2005, t h e t r i a l clarification, finding court that was "'flawed in its inconsistent and improper d i s t r i b u t i o n s of the p r o p e r t y of the i n t e r v e n o r , B u i l d e r s S o u t h , I n c . , when B u i l d e r s S o u t h was n o t a party to the action, and when neither the c o r p o r a t i o n n o r i t s a s s e t s were f o u n d t o be m a r i t a l a s s e t s of the p a r t i e s . The Judgment p u r p o r t e d t o award t h e a s s e t s o f B u i l d e r s S o u t h t o t h e [husband] but, i n other paragraphs, awarded p r o p e r t y to [Mosley], without acknowledging t h a t the p r o p e r t y was owned by B u i l d e r s S o u t h , I n c . The Court, t h e r e f o r e r e a f f i r m s p a r a g r a p h 14 o f t h e o r i g i n a l Judgment o f D i v o r c e w h i c h a w a r d e d " t o t h e [husband] t h e b u s i n e s s known as B u i l d e r s S o u t h , I n c . [ , ] and t h e a s s e t s o f s a i d company ... " S i n c e p a r a g r a p h 9 and 11 o f t h e o r i g i n a l Judgment a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c l e a r i n t e n t o f p a r a g r a p h 14, p a r a g r a p h s 9 and 11 o f t h e Judgment o f D i v o r c e a r e h e r e b y v o i d , as a r e any o t h e r p a r a g r a p h s i n t h e o r i g i n a l Judgment 6 29 the 2080284 w h i c h , w i t h o u t acknowledgment o f ownership, awarded a s s e t s o f B u i l d e r s South, I n c . t o [Mosley]." Moss, 948 So. 2 d a t 5 6 5 . Mosley (under t h e name "Moss," s e e s u p r a n o t e 2) a p p e a l e d from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s June 2 9 , 2005, j u d g m e n t . dismissed the appeal f o r lack of appellate This court j u r i s d i c t i o n and e x p l a i n e d i t s r a t i o n a l e as f o l l o w s : "Despite being labeled a 'motion for I 4-1-,^ ix/r-,,,^!-, on o n n c clarification,' t h e March 3 0 , 2005, m o t i o n b y B u i l d e r s S o u t h s o u g h t more t h a n a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the trial c o u r t ' s November 2 9 , 2004, o r d e r . A ' m o t i o n f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' i s j u s t what t h e name i m p l i e s : a r e q u e s t f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n f r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h e meaning o f a p r i o r , allegedly u n c l e a r , o r d e r . A ' m o t i o n f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' does not seek t o persuade t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t a p r i o r judgment should be changed, modified, or i n v a l i d a t e d . I f i t does s e e k t o do a n y o f t h o s e t h i n g s , t h e n i t i s n o t a 'motion t o c l a r i f y ' a j u d g m e n t , b u t a m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e a j u d g m e n t , one t h a t , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., must be f i l e d n o t l a t e r t h a n 30 days a f t e r e n t r y o f t h e judgment. I f a t r i a l c o u r t ' s response to a 'motion f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' i s to explain, r a t h e r than t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e a p r i o r order, then t h a t response i s a strong i n d i c a t o r that t h e m o t i o n was, i n f a c t , one s e e k i n g c l a r i f i c a t i o n . See G o l d K i s t , I n c . v . C r o u c h , 671 So. 2 d 695, 696 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1995) ( n o t i n g t h a t ' t h e o r i g i n a l order was n o t m o d i f i e d b y [the request f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n ] ; t h e c o u r t s i m p l y c l a r i f i e d what we c o n c l u d e was an a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r o r d e r ' ) . The converse i s also true. I f the t r i a l court's r e s p o n s e t o a m o t i o n f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n d o e s 'more than merely c l a r i f y the t r i a l court's previous o r d e r , ' by making, f o r example, ' m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h a t ^ -PA ^^-I-A ^-.-i-A 7 , 2080284 [are] more s u b s t a n t i a l i n n a t u r e t h a n t h e c o r r e c t i o n of a mere m e c h a n i c a l m i s t a k e , ' t h e n s u c h c o r r e c t i o n s must be made p u r s u a n t t o e i t h e r R u l e 59(e) o r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. App. P. P a t e v. P a t e , 849 So. 2d 972, 976 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . "The motion by B u i l d e r s South sought oral a r g u m e n t and a t t a c h e d a ' p r o p o s e d o r d e r ' a i m e d n o t o n l y a t a l t e r i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s November 29, 2004, o r d e r , b u t a l s o a t a m e n d i n g t h e e i g h t - y e a r - o l d d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t . The m o t i o n a c c o m p l i s h e d t h a t aim when t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n p u r p o r t i n g t o amend t h e divorce judgment on June 29, 2005, adopted, v e r b a t i m , B u i l d e r s South's proposed o r d e r . We can h a r d l y imagine a motion l e s s d e s e r v i n g of the d e s i g n a t i o n 'motion f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' ; we c o n c l u d e t h a t i t was a p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, or v a c a t e a j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. App. P. The m o t i o n c a n n o t be c o n s t r u e d as one p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. App. P., b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t a l l e g e any o f t h e g r o u n d s f o r r e l i e f u n d e r that rule. See L u k e r v. C a r r e l l , [Ms. 2040318, M a r c h 31, 2006] So. 3d ( A l a . C i v . App. 2006) [ r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e L u k e r , [Ms. 1051805, Aug. 31, 2007] So. 3d (Ala.2007)]. "The m o t i o n was f i l e d on M a r c h 30, 2005, 121 d a y s a f t e r t h e c o u r t ' s November 29, 2004, o r d e r , long p a s t the time f o r f i l i n g e i t h e r a postjudgment m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., o r a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 4 ( a ) , A l a . R. App. P., and l o n g a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h e November 29, 2004, o r d e r . See G e o r g e v. Sims, 888 So. 2d 1224 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) : "'"A f i n a l j u d g m e n t i s an o r d e r ' t h a t c o n c l u s i v e l y determines the i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t and a s c e r t a i n s and d e c l a r e s t h e rights of the parties involved.'" L u n c e f o r d v. M o n u m e n t a l L i f e I n s . Co., 641 So. 2d 244, 246 ( A l a . 1994) ( q u o t i n g Bean 8 2080284 v. C r a i g , 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253 ( A l a . 1990)). G e n e r a l l y , a t r i a l c o u r t h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y o r amend a f i n a l o r d e r more t h a n 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e j u d g m e n t has been entered, except to correct clerical errors. See R u l e 5 9 ( e ) a n d R u l e 60, A l a . R. C i v . P.; C o r n e l i u s v. G r e e n , 477 So. 2d 1363, 1365 ( A l a . 1985) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y i t s f i n a l o r d e r more t h a n 30 d a y s a f t e r i t s f i n a l judgment); D i c k e r s o n v. D i c k e r s o n , 885 So. 2d 160, 166 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2003) ( h o l d i n g t h a t , a b s e n t a t i m e l y p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e a f i n a l judgment); and S u p e r i o r Sec. Serv., I n c . v . A z a l e a C i t y F e d . C r e d i t U n i o n , 651 So. 2d 28, 29 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1994) ( " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a f t e r 30 d a y s elapse f o l l o w i n g t h e e n t r y o f a judgment, t h e t r i a l c o u r t no l o n g e r h a s a u t h o r i t y t o c o r r e c t o r amend i t s j u d g m e n t , e x c e p t f o r clerical errors.").' "888 So. 2d a t 1226-27. " B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s November 29, 2004, o r d e r became f i n a l b e f o r e B u i l d e r s S o u t h e v e r f i l e d its ' M o t i o n f o r C l a r i f i c a t i o n , ' t h e c o u r t h a d no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o amend i t s November 29, 2004, o r d e r and i t s June 29, 2005, o r d e r p u r p o r t i n g t o do so and t o amend t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t i s v o i d . An a p p e a l f r o m a v o i d j u d g m e n t must be d i s m i s s e d . See, e . g . , Ex p a r t e C i t i z e n s Bank, 879 So. 2d 535, 540 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ; a n d C a r t e r v. H i l l i a r d , 838 So. 2d 1062 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . " Moss, 948 So. 2d a t 565-66. On court's May 30, opinion 2007, subsequent i n Moss, Builders 9 to the issuance South filed of this a motion t o 2080284 require Mosley property that t o d e l i v e r t o i t the deed t o the Arden she h a d b e e n a w a r d e d i n t h e d i v o r c e Road judgment. On November 14, 2008, a f t e r a h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n , t h e trial court South entered on o r d e r had h e l d t i t l e f i n d i n g t h a t , because t o t h e A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y divorce and because divorce a c t i o n , the i t had trial not court been had award M o s l e y t h e A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y Accordingly, divorce the trial court Builders at the time of the made a lacked party that of the j u d g m e n t a w a r d i n g M o s l e y t h e A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y was Builders court's portion South. Mosley timely appealed from requiring the contends that the November her to d e l i v e r to B u i l d e r s Road property that she was South awarded 14, trial 2008, counters o r i g i n a l divorce that, because i t was not order t h e deed in the j u d g m e n t i s b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a . South property order. Mosley Arden to judgment. v o i d , and she was o r d e r e d t o d e l i v e r t h e d e e d t o t h a t to the jurisdiction i n the d i v o r c e stated, to a party to the divorce Builders to action, res j u d i c a t a i s i n a p p l i c a b l e . 10 the 2080284 In Roubicek v. Roubicek , 246 A l a . 442, 449, 21 So. 2d 244, 251 ( 1 9 4 5 ) , o u r supreme c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h e g e n e r a l that a divorce court lacks jurisdiction to divide rule property l e g a l l y t i t l e d i n t h e name o f a t h i r d p a r t y n o t j o i n e d i n t h e divorce action. supreme court 246 A l a . later a t 449, 21 So. 2d a t 2 5 1 . explained the holding The i n Roubicek as follows: " I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h e c o u r t w o u l d be g u i l t y o f d e n y i n g due p r o c e s s t o t h e [ t h i r d p a r t y ] i f t h e c o u r t s h o u l d take p r o p e r t y o f t h e [ t h i r d p a r t y ] and g i v e i t t o a n o t h e r i n a p r o c e e d i n g where t h e [ t h i r d p a r t y ] was n o t a p a r t y a n d was n o t g i v e n t h e e l e m e n t a l r i g h t t o be h e a r d . " Boswell (1966). v. B o s w e l l , 280 A l a . 53, 60, 189 So. 2d 854, 860 Consistent with that reasoning, have c a r v e d allows a d i v o r c e c o u r t t o e n t e r a judgment a f f e c t i n g p r o p e r t y titled the to the general cases rule that in o u t an e x c e p t i o n l a t e r Alabama t h e name o f a t h i r d p a r t y when t h e t h i r d p a r t y a p p e a r s i n divorce proceeding "given the elemental a n d , as t h e B o s w e l l r i g h t t o be h e a r d . " court put i t , See, e . g . , Moody v . Moody, 339 So. 2d 1030 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1976) ( h o l d i n g because the attorney conveyed a cabin divorce proceeding t o whom t h e husband l o trepresented i s had that, purportedly t h e husband throughout t h e i n w h i c h o w n e r s h i p o f t h e l o t was l i t i g a t e d 11 2080284 and p a s s e d t o w i f e , t h e d i v o r c e c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n e n t e r i n g a judgment d i s p o s i n g o f t h e c a b i n l o t w i t h o u t formally joining the a t t o r n e y as p a r t y ) . In Owen divorcing several v. Miller, 414 So. husband and h i s s i s t e r bank accounts. f o r the purposes those accounts. Also, 889 held The s i s t e r trial 2d legal a t i t l e to appeared a t the d i v o r c e of attempting the s i s t e r joint ( A l a . 1981), to gain filed ownership of a s u c c e s s f u l motion w i t h t h e d i v o r c e c o u r t t o r e l e a s e f u n d s i n a bank a c c o u n t she s i n g l y owned t h a t t h e d i v o r c e c o u r t h a d m i s t a k e n f o r m a r i t a l property. After the t r i a l , the divorce court o w n e r s h i p o f t h e d i s p u t e d bank a c c o u n t s t o t h e w i f e c h i l d r e n o f t h e husband. filed 414 So. 2d a t 890. accounts. res Our supreme court was b o u n d b y t h e d i v o r c e judicata sufficiently as close then and t h e bank c l a i m i n g ownership of t h e funds i n t h e concluded that, s i s t e r h a d n e v e r b e e n made a p a r t y t o t h e d i v o r c e she and t h e The s i s t e r an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e w i f e , t h e c h i l d r e n , h o l d i n g the accounts, awarded "[a] although the proceedings, judgment under t h e d o c t r i n e o f non-party t o the matter 12 who has litigated an interest a n d who h a d an 2080284 adequate opportunity proceeding." 414 to So. litigate 2d a t I n L y o n s v. L y o n s , 340 a h u s b a n d a r g u e d on 2d 450 that the a d j u d i c a t e d h i s d i v o r c e c a s e "was conveyance of c o r p o r a t e corporation recognized that not the g e n e r a l exception circuit court Id. at r u l e a s s e r t e d by that had direct to which 451. This the court the husband but Id. divorce and c o u r t has to recognized a when that, in a u t h o r i t y to p i e r c e the corporate as c o r p o r a t i o n was has the divide corporation court applied party property so long properly before as without the a s s e t s under the the c o u r t . There i s no d i v i d i n g the evidence assets judgment, the as ego alter of in this cases, a corporate veil adding the of I d . a t 452. the Lyons courts to d i v i d e theory. case, however, that, in of B u i l d e r s South between the p a r t i e s i n the d i v o r c e an alter-ego such principal o f t e n b e e n c i t e d as a u t h o r i z i n g d i v o r c e corporate one held s p o u s e s t r e a t a c l o s e l y h e l d c o r p o r a t i o n as an a l t e r ego. This rule 1976), a u t h o r i t y to i n a proceeding party." that prior both 451-52. to the ( A l a . C i v . App. without property a in or at an was issue 891. So. appeal the trial court treated Builders either party; 13 indeed i t does not South appear 2080284 that the issue whether Builders South e i t h e r p a r t y was e v e n r a i s e d a t t r i a l . trial wholly court the holding from a p p l y i n g before treated this i n Lyons case, the t r i a l the treatment husband b o t h t h e p a r t i e s and Builders South, which does n o t p r e c l u d e was asset. this court the sole court of owners on of Builders South were the issue of the d i v i s i o n Like the attorney of I f B u i l d e r s S o u t h h a d any o b j e c t i o n i t s assets as m a r i t a l property, o r M o s l e y c o u l d have r a i s e d t h a t o b j e c t i o n on of the c o r p o r a t i o n and c o u l d have b e e n h e a r d on t h a t the behalf issue. i n Moody, t h e p r i n c i p a l s i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n s a t by s i l e n t l y w h i l e titled as i n d i c a t e d t h e r u l e i n Moody a n d Owen. B u i l d e r s South's a s s e t s . to ego o f owned b y t h e p a r t i e s , as t h e l a r g e s t m a r i t a l However, In simply an a l t e r Instead, i n t h i s court's opinion i n Mosley, supra, the was a court i n the corporation's took a c t i o n a f f e c t i n g name. Like the s i s t e r property i n Owen, B u i l d e r s S o u t h i s b o u n d b y t h e j u d g m e n t as a n o n p a r t y who h a d an i n t e r e s t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e t o t h e m a t t e r l i t i g a t e d a n d who h a d an a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y to l i t i g a t e the issue i n the p r i o r proceeding. 14 2080284 The p a r t i e s t o t h e d i v o r c e South d u r i n g action incorporated the course of t h e i r marriage. M o s l e y were t h e o n l y two c o r p o r a t e The h u s b a n d officers, a l l the shares of stock i n B u i l d e r s South. Builders and and M o s l e y owned B u i l d e r s S o u t h was a s i g n i f i c a n t m a r i t a l a s s e t o f t h e p a r t i e s ; t h e r e f o r e , i t was subject to parties. (Ala. See, e.g., C i v . App. liability asset; in equitable distribution 2003) the t r i a l i t s computation divorcing (The was parties' the "only c o u r t was business, 154 a limited significant marital free to include of the p a r t i e s ' m a r i t a l i t s worth assets and i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h o s e a s s e t s . " ) ; see a l s o equitable Shewbart v. S h e w b a r t , 19 So. 3d 223 value the T e n E y c k v. T e n E y c k , 885 So. 2d 146, corporation, [thus,] between of husband's ( A l a . C i v . App. 2009) sole proprietorship, ( f a i r market taking into c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l o f i t s a s s e t s , must be u s e d i n f a s h i o n i n g an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y ) ; P e t r e y v. P e t r e y , So. 2d 1128 ( A l a . C i v . App. judgment holding transfer t o the husband a b u s i n e s s the divorce the wife 2008) judgment (affirming t r i a l i n contempt equitably f o r her court's failure to she owned, as o r d e r e d i n distributing p r o p e r t y ) ; Combs v. Combs, 4 So. 3d 1141, 1149 15 989 the marital ( A l a . C i v . App. 2080284 2008) a "major" m a r i t a l asset subject to consideration i n equitable division o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y ) ; and 17 Civ. (the App. husband's 1995) benefit of equitable the trial assets. Mosley, divorce W o l f v. marriage distribution See business Wolf, 666 was So. (parties' dry-cleaning business a f f i r m e d the Now, landscaping a between court's more t h a n judgment, was marital the division 2d used f o r the subject to asset parties). of the (Ala. This parties' court marital supra. 11 the years after husband, this through court affirmed Builders South, the has a t t e m p t e d t o have t h e d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y r e a l l o c a t e d to his benefit. again that, Although m e n t i o n e d above, i t i s w o r t h n o t i n g i n a f f i r m i n g the marital property t h e A r d e n Road trial court's division of the i n the d i v o r c e judgment, t h i s c o u r t s a i d of property: "The a w a r d o f t h e b u s i n e s s p r e m i s e s t o [ M o s l e y ] , o f c o u r s e , does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e the b u s i n e s s t o r e l o c a t e . The h u s b a n d may buy [ M o s l e y ' s ] i n t e r e s t o r pay h e r r e n t . C f . James v. James, [764] So. 2d [561, 554] ( A l a . C i v . App. 1999) [ r e v e r s e d on other g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e James, 764 So. 2d 557 ( A l a . 1999)] ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r 'does n o t p r o h i b i t t h e h u s b a n d f r o m ... b u y i n g o u t [Mosley's] ... i n t e r e s t ' ) . The l a t t e r o p t i o n c o u l d , i n f a c t , be what t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d i n m i n d by a w a r d i n g [ M o s l e y ] the p r o p e r t y . She u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t she wanted income-producing p r o p e r t y i n s t e a d of alimony." 16 2080284 M o s l e y , 747 So. 2d a t 900. There i s m e r i t business, Builders A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y t o Mosley's a s s e r t i o n that South, c a n n o t now c l a i m practical that provision that i t owns t h e t h a t was a w a r d e d t o M o s l e y i n t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t when t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s The t h e husband's were d i v i d e d b e t w e e n them. e f f e c t of the t r i a l of the divorce court's judgment decision awarding to void Mosley the Arden Road p r o p e r t y i s to allow t h e husband t o a t t a i n parcel of property i n t h e name of the business, Builders South. "'The elements of r e s j u d i c a t a , or c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n , a r e (1) a p r i o r j u d g m e n t on t h e m e r i t s , (2) r e n d e r e d b y a c o u r t o f competent jurisdiction, (3) with s u b s t a n t i a l i d e n t i t y o f t h e p a r t i e s , and (4) w i t h t h e same c a u s e o f a c t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n b o t h s u i t s . Hughes v . A l l e n s t e i n , 514 So. 2d 858, 860 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . I f t h o s e f o u r e l e m e n t s a r e p r e s e n t , any c l a i m t h a t was o r c o u l d have b e e n a d j u d i c a t e d i n t h e p r i o r a c t i o n i s b a r r e d from f u r t h e r l i t i g a t i o n . ' " D a i r y l a n d I n s . Co. v . J a c k s o n , 566 So. 2d 723, 725 ( A l a . 1990) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . '"Res j u d i c a t a a p p l i e s not o n l y t o t h e e x a c t l e g a l t h e o r i e s advanced i n t h e p r i o r case, b u t t o a l l l e g a l t h e o r i e s and c l a i m s a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e same n u c l e u s o f o p e r a t i v e f a c t s . " ' O l d R e p u b l i c I n s . Co. v. L a n i e r , 790 So. 2d 922, 928 ( A l a . 2000) ( q u o t i n g Wesch v . F o l s o m , 6 F.3d 1465, 1471 (11th C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ) . " 17 that 2080284 G a t l i n v. J o i n e r , (Ala. [Ms. 2080611, S e p t . 4, 2009] So. 3d , C i v . App. 2 0 0 9 ) . " T h i s c o u r t , i n Whisman v . A l a b a m a Power Co., 512 So. 2d 78, 81 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , r e s t a t e d t h e e l e m e n t s of r e s j u d i c a t a : "'[R]es judicata ... involves prior litigation between a plaintiff and a d e f e n d a n t , w h i c h i s d e c i d e d on t h e m e r i t s by a c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n , a n d then a subsequent attempt by t h e p r i o r p l a i n t i f f t o r e l i t i g a t e t h e same c a u s e o f action against t h e same d e f e n d a n t , o r perhaps t o r e l i t i g a t e a d i f f e r e n t c l a i m not p r e v i o u s l y l i t i g a t e d but which a r i s e s out o f t h e same e v i d e n c e . Alabama law i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h i s w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d . A v a l i d , f i n a l j u d g m e n t on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e claim extinguishes the claim. I f the p l a i n t i f f won, t h e c l a i m i s merged i n t o t h e judgment; i f the defendant won, the p l a i n t i f f i s b a r r e d f r o m r e l i t i g a t i n g any m a t t e r w h i c h c o u l d have b e e n l i t i g a t e d i n the p r i o r a c t i o n . ' " ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) This s t a t e m e n t f r o m Whisman i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l o n g l i n e of cases h o l d i n g t h a t whether the second a c t i o n p r e s e n t s t h e same c a u s e o f a c t i o n d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r t h e i s s u e s i n t h e two a c t i o n s a r e t h e same a n d on w h e t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same e v i d e n c e w o u l d s u p p o r t a recovery i n both a c t i o n s . " Equity (Ala. R e s . Mgmt., I n c . v. V i n s o n , 723 So. 2d 634, 636-37 1998). "The p u r p o s e s and p o l i c i e s promoted by t h e doctrine of res j u d i c a t a include the i n t e r e s t s of b o t h t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e and t h e p a r t i e s t o a 18 2080284 p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n i n (a) f i n a l i t y o f j u d g m e n t s , (b) r e d u c i n g waste o f p r i v a t e and j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and (c) a v o i d i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t r u l i n g s . Hughes v . M a r t i n , 533 So. 2 d 188, 190 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . " Herring-Malbis 2009] I , L L C v . TEMCO, I n c . , So. 3 d , [Ms. 2080296, O c t . ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 9 ) . "'The p r i n c i p l e s o f r e s ju d i c a t a , ^^4-^,^,^^! c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l , a n d 4-1-,^ e f i n a l i t y o f t h 4^.;^judgments p r o h i b i t a t r i a l court from d i s t u r b i n g a f i n a l judgment. Louisville & N.R.R. v . A t k i n s , 435 So. 2 d 1275 ( A l a . 1983); State v. Morrison Cafeterias C o n s o l i d a t e d , I n c . , 487 So. 2 d 898 ( A l a . 1985). I n L o u i s v i l l e & N.R.R. v . A t k i n s t h i s Court held that t h ed o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a w o u l d be v i o l a t e d i f t h e l a w a s i t e v o l v e s were made r e t r o a c t i v e t o r e o p e n , f o r a n o t h e r t r i a l , m a t t e r s t h a t h a d been l a i d t o r e s t under t h e o r i e s o f l i a b i l i t y e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e t h e y were t r i e d must n o t be r e o p e n e d . 435 So. 2 d a t 1279. This Court, i n S t a t e v. M o r r i s o n Cafeterias, citing F a r r i o r v . New E n g l a n d M o r t g a g e S e c u r i t y Co., 92 A l a . 1 7 6 , 9 So. 532 ( 1 8 9 1 ) , s t a t e d t h a t where a p a r t y h a s a c t e d upon t h e l a w a s c l e a r l y d e c l a r e d b y a judicial decision, that party w i l l be protected even i f the decision i s thereafter overruled. Matters l a i d t o rest under t h e o r i e s o f l i a b i l i t y e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e t h e m a t t e r s were t r i e d must n o t be reopened. State v. Morrison C a f e t e r i a s , s u p r a , 487 So. 2 d a t 903. To r e o p e n s u c h matters would not only conflict with s e t t l e d Alabama law, b u t a l s o would d e f e a t public policy considerations: "'[t]he q u i e t i n g o f l i t i g a t i o n ; t h e p u b l i c peace and repose; respect for judicial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the law, and confidence -,4-^,,-,l 19 30, 2080284 i n i t s r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y , s t a b i l i t y and consistency.' B i b b v. B i b b , 79 A l a . 437, 444 ( 1 8 8 5 ) . " S t a l l w o r t h v. H i c k s , 434 So. 2d 229, 230 (Ala.1983).' " [Ex p a r t e ] A m e r i c o l d [ C o m p r e s s o r s C o . ] , [140] a t 144 [ ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ] . " O s b o r n v. R o c h e , 813 The division of So. 2d 811, 819 684 So. 2d ( A l a . 2001). marital assets between Mosley and the h u s b a n d , i n c l u d i n g B u i l d e r s S o u t h and t h e A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y , has been competent decided a jurisdiction. marital property decided i n the that by judgment by a court of Whether B u i l d e r s South c o n s t i t u t e d subject to equitable a f f i r m a t i v e by d e c i s i o n was rendered a f f i r m e d by the this division was trial court court i n Mosley, clearly i n 1997, and supra. Under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a precludes t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t a w a r d i n g M o s l e y t h e A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y from b e i n g reopened t o modify the d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l property. The trial court's order of November 14, 2008, r e q u i r i n g Mosley t o d e l i v e r t o B u i l d e r s South the deed t o A r d e n Road p r o p e r t y i s i m p r o p e r and i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e i s remanded f o r t h e t r i a l with this the cause c o u r t t o e n t e r a judgment c o n s i s t e n t opinion. 20 2080284 M o s l e y h a s r e q u e s t e d an a t t o r n e y ' s f e e on a p p e a l . case, Mosley division initial ago. was required of m a r i t a l property, divorce proceedings Therefore, to Mosley's litigate which was the issue of the determined i n the and subsequent request In t h i s appeal 11 f o r an a t t o r n e y ' s years fee i s g r a n t e d i n t h e amount o f $2,500. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Thompson, JJ., P . J . , and P i t t m a n , concur. 21 Bryan, Thomas, a n d Moore,

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