1. The powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia in patent cases are the same, as well in
equity as at law, as those of the circuit courts of the United
States, and whether a case, involving the validity or the
infringement of letters patent, shall be first tried at law is a
matter of discretion, and not of jurisdiction.
2. The improvement in processes for manufacturing flour for
which reissued letters patent No. 6,841 were granted to William F.
Cochrane and his assignees April 21, 1874, being a reissue of
letters patent No. 37,317, granted to him Jan. 6, 1863, does not
consist in using drafts or currents of air, but in the process as a
whole, comprising the application of the blast, and the carrying
off the fine impurities whereby the middlings, after being
separated from the other parts, are purified preparatory to
regrinding.
3. A process may be patentable irrespective of the particular
form of the instrumentalities used. If one of the steps of a
process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder,
it may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is used
to effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a
mill. Either may be pointed out, but if the patent is not confined
to that particular tool or machine, the use of the other would be
an infringement, the general process being the same.
4. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to
produce a given result. It is not an act or series of acts,
performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to
a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as
patentable as a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent
law, it is an art.
Page 94 U. S. 781
5. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process
may or may not be new or patentable, whilst the process itself may
be altogether new and produce an entirely new result. The process
requires that certain things should be done with certain substances
and in a certain order, but the tools to be used in doing this may
be of secondary consequence.
6. The Court holds that reissued letters patent No. 5,841,
bearing date April 21, 1874, for improvements in processes for
manufacturing flour, No. 6,030, bearing date Aug. 24, 1870, No.
6,594 and No. 6,595, bearing date Aug. 17, 1875, for improvements
in machines for bolting flour, and issued to William F. Cochrane
and his assignees, are valid and were infringed by the defendants
in using machines constructed according to reissued letters patent
No. 5,346, bearing date April 1,1873, being a reissue of letters
patent No. 135,953, bearing date Feb. 18, 1873, and granted to
Edward P. Welch and his assignees, for improvements in middlings
purifiers, and being for improvements upon machines patented to
Jesse B. Wheeler and Ransom S. Reynolds, but that letters patent
No. 37,319 and No. 37,320, bearing date Jan. 6, 1863, issued to
said Cochrane for improvements in bolting flour, were not
infringed.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity, instituted in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia for injunction and relief against an alleged
infringement of various patents belonging to the complainants. The
bill was dismissed, and the complainants have appealed.
The patents sued on are six in number, originally five, granted
to the appellant Cochrane on the 13th of January, 1863, and
numbered respectively 37,317, 37,318, 37,319, 37,320, and 37,321.
They all related to an improved method of bolting flour, the first
being for the general process, and the others for improvements in
the different parts of the machinery rendered necessary in carrying
on the process. Three of the original patents, Nos. 37,317, 37,318,
and 37,321, were surrendered, and reissues taken in 1874, which
reissues were numbered 5,841, 6,029, and 6,030, the first being for
the process, and the other two for portions of the machinery.
Reissue 6,029, being in place of the original patent numbered
37,321, was also subsequently
Page 94 U. S. 782
surrendered, and two new reissued patents substituted therefor,
numbered 6,594 and 6,595.
The case has been mainly argued on the question of infringement,
the defendants using a bolting apparatus constructed according to
letters patent issued to Edward P. Welch in April, 1873, for
improvements upon machines patented to Jesse B. Wheeler and Ransom
S. Reynolds, which, as well as the process employed, they contend,
are radically different from the apparatus and process of
Cochrane.
A preliminary question is raised with regard to the jurisdiction
of the court below to hear the case on a bill in equity, before a
determination of the rights of the parties in an action at law.
The powers of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in
patent cases are the same as those of the circuit courts of the
United States.
See Revised Statutes relating to the
District of Columbia, secs. 760, 764.
The circuit courts were first invested with equity jurisdiction
in patent cases by the act of Feb. 15, 1819, which declared that
these courts should have
"original cognizance, as well in equity as at law, of all
actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising under any law of
the United States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings, inventions, and
discoveries; and upon any bill in equity, filed by any party
aggrieved in any such cases, should have authority to grant
injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of
equity,"
&c.
This law was substantially reenacted in the seventeenth section
oft he patent law of July 4, 1836, and the fifty-fifth section of
that of July 8, 1870, special powers to assess damages in equity
cases being also conferred by the latter act.
Before the act of 1819 was passed, the circuit courts had
cognizance of actions at law brought to recover damages for the
infringement of patents, but not of suits in equity in relation
thereto, unless the parties happened to be citizens of different
states. Phillips on Pat. 379;
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 1
Paine 54;
Sullivan v. Redfield, id., 447. Under that act
and the subsequent acts in which it became incorporated, bills in
equity for injunction, discovery, and account have constantly
Page 94 U. S. 783
been sustained, frequently without any previous action at law.
As said by Mr. Justice Grier, in a case decided at the circuit,
"It is true that, in England, the chancellor will generally not
grant a final and perpetual injunction in patent cases, when the
answer denies the validity of the patent, without sending the
parties to law to have that question decided. But even there the
rule is not universal; it is a practice founded more on convenience
than necessity. It always rests in the sound discretion of the
court. A trial at law is ordered by a chancellor to inform his
conscience, not because either party may demand it as a right, or
that a court of equity is incompetent to judge of questions of fact
or of legal titles. In the United States, the practice is by no
means so general as in England."
Goodyear v. Day, 2 Wall.Jr. 296. Subsequently, in the
case of
Sickles v. Gloucester Manufacturing Co., 3
id. 196, the same judge said:
"The courts of the United States have their jurisdiction over
controversies of this nature by statute, and do not exercise it
merely as ancillary to a court of law."
And, after quoting the statute, he proceeds:
"Having such original cognizance, . . . the courts of the United
States do not, in all cases, require a verdict at law on the title,
before granting a final injunction, or concede a right to every
party to have every issue as to originality or infringement tried
by a jury."
The position of Mr. Justice Grier is undoubtedly true that
whether a case shall be first tried at law is a matter of
discretion, and not of jurisdiction, and in this matter the courts
of the United States, sitting as courts of equity in patent cases,
are much less disposed than the English courts are to send parties
to a jury before assuming to decide upon the merits.
But the counsel for the defendants suggest that the Revised
Statutes have not preserved in entirety the previous enactments on
this subject, but have omitted the vesting of original cognizance
in the circuit courts sitting as courts of equity in patent cases.
From a careful consideration, however, of all the sections of the
Revised Statutes on the subject, we think that no intention is
evinced to make any change in the law. The original enactments are
separated into distinct parts, and somewhat condensed, but the
substance of them is retained. By sec. 629, the circuit courts are
invested with jurisdiction, among
Page 94 U. S. 784
other things, "Ninth, of all suits at law or in equity arising
under the patent or copyright laws of the United States." And, by
sec. 4921, it is declared, that
"the several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising
under the patent laws shall have power to grant injunctions
according to the course and principles of courts of equity,"
&c., following precisely the language used in the act of
1870, the last previous revision of this branch of the law. The
grant of jurisdiction is as broad and general as it could well be,
and the mode of exercising it is prescribed in precisely the same
terms as in previous statutes.
In the present case, we see no special reason for sending the
case to a court of law or to a jury for trial. There are no such
issues depending upon the credibility of witnesses, or on the
intricacy of machinery, as to make the case susceptible of easier
solution or greater certainty as to the truth before such a
tribunal than it admits of when presented to the consideration of a
chancellor. It would perhaps be desirable if all cases of this sort
could be referred to a commission of intelligent experts and
practical men to report their opinion thereon, with their reasons,
for the final action of the court. A proceeding of this kind was
probably in the mind of Congress in passing the act of Feb. 16,
1875, authorizing a reference to a jury of five persons. Neither
courts nor ordinary juries are perfectly adapted to the
investigation of mechanical and scientific questions. The court
below, however, exercised its discretion to decide the case upon
its merits, without the aid of a jury of any sort, and their action
is not a ground of appeal. If we were convinced, however, that the
case was not properly decided, and could not be properly decided
without such a reference, we might undoubtedly, in the exercise of
our own discretion, remand it to the court below for that purpose.
But we see nothing in the questions raised which require that such
a course should be adopted.
The principal patent sued on in this case was granted on the
21st of April, 1874, being a reissue of a patent granted to William
F. Cochrane on the 6th of January, 1863. The original patent was
numbered 37,317, and the reissue 5,841. The alleged invention is
for a process in manufacturing flour. The patentee, in his
specification, says:
"The object of my invention
Page 94 U. S. 785
was to increase the production of the best quality of flour, and
my improvement consisted in separating from the meal first the
superfine flour, and then the pulverulent impurities mingled with
the flour-producing portions of the middlings meal, so as to make
'white' or 'purified' middlings, which, when reground and rebolted,
would yield pure white flour, which, when added to the superfine,
would improve the quality of the flour resulting from their union,
instead of deteriorating its quality, as had heretofore been the
case when the middlings flour was mingled with the superfine."
The process employed for producing the result here indicated is
then described. It consists in passing the ground meal through a
series of bolting reels clothed with cloth of progressively finer
meshes which pass the superfine flour and retard the escape of the
finer and lighter impurities, and, at the same time, subjecting the
meal to blasts or currents of air introduced by hollow perforated
shafts furnished with pipes so disposed that the force of the blast
may act close to the surface of the bolting cloth; the bolting
chest having an opening at the top for the escape of the air, and
of the finer and lighter particles therewith, through a chamber
where the particles are arrested, whilst the floor and sides of
each compartment of the chest are made close, so as to prevent the
escape of the air in any other direction than through the said
opening. By this means, the superfine flour is separated, and the
fine and light specks and impurities, which ordinarily adhere to
the middlings and degrade the flour produced therefrom, are got rid
of, and when the middlings are now separated from the other
portions of the meal, they are white and clean and capable of being
reground and rebolted so as to produce superfine flour equal in
quality and even superior to the first installment.
This is the process described, but the patentee claims that it
is not limited to any special arrangement of machinery. He admits
the prior use of currents of air in the interior of the reels,
introduced by means of hollow, perforated shafts, for the purpose
of keeping back the speck, and increasing the quantity of superfine
flour; but not for purifying the middlings preparatory to
regrinding. His improvement, therefore, does not consist in using
drafts and currents of air, but in the process as a
Page 94 U. S. 786
whole, comprising the application of the blast, and the carrying
off of the fine impurities, whereby the middlings are purified
preparatory to regrinding after being separated from the other
parts.
The defendants deny that they use this process. They purity the
middlings of the flour, as before stated, by means of machines
constructed according to letters patent issued to Edward P. Welch,
in April, 1873, for improvements upon machines patented to Jesse B.
Wheeler and Ransom S. Reynolds.
In this process, reels are not used for purifying the middlings,
but a flat and slightly inclined vibrating screen or sieve is sued
for the purpose, over which the ground meal is passed, and whilst
passing is subjected to currents of air blown through a series of
pipes situated close underneath the screen, which currents pass up
through the screen and through an opening at the top of the chest
into a chamber, carrying with them the finer and lighter
impurities, whereby the middlings are rendered clean and white, and
capable of being reground into superfine flour. The bolting chest
is made tight and close on all sides except the opening at the top,
so that the currents of air may be forced to escape by that
exit.
Now except in the use of a flat sieve or screen in place of
reels, it is difficult to see any substantial difference between
these two methods. The defendants use, in addition, brushes, which
revolve on the under side of the screen so as to keep the meshes
thereof constantly clean and free, but this is merely an addition,
which does not affect the identity of the two processes in other
particulars. We have substantially the same method of cleaning the
middlings preparatory to regrinding by means of currents of air
passed through them whilst being bolted, and whilst being confined
in a close chest or chamber, said chamber having an opening above
for the escape of said currents of air and the impurities with
which they become loaded. The middlings being thus purified are
reground and rebolted, producing a superfine flour of superior
grade -- a new, useful, and highly valuable result.
The use of a flat screen instead of a revolving reel for bolting
and cleaning the middlings is a mere matter of form. It
Page 94 U. S. 787
may be an improved form, and, perhaps, patentable as an
improvement, but it is at most an improvement.
The forcing of the air currents upward through the screen and
film of meal carried on it and against the downward fall of the
meal, instead of forcing them through the bolting cloth in the same
direction with the meal, is also a mere matter of form, and does
not belong to the substance of the process. The substantial
operation of the currents of air in both cases is to take up the
light impurities and bear them away on the aggregate current
through the open flue, and thus to separate them from the
middlings. This too may be an improvement on Cochrane's method; but
it is only an improvement.
The defendants admit that the process has produced a revolution
in the manufacture of flour, but they attribute that revolution to
their improvements. It may be as they say, that it is greatly due
to these. But it cannot be seriously denied that Cochrane's
invention lies at the bottom of these improvements, is involved in
them, and was itself capable of beneficial use, and was put to such
use. It had all the elements and circumstances necessary for
sustaining the patent, and cannot be appropriated by the
defendants, even though supplemented by and enveloped in very
important and material improvements of their own.
We do not perceive that the patent of Cogswell and McKiernan, if
valid at all as against Cochrane (a point which will be more fully
considered hereafter), affects the question in the least. That
patent is not at all for the process which Cochrane claims. If
valid, and if, in using his process, Cochrane is obliged to use any
device secured to Cogswell and McKiernan, it does not detract in
the slightest degree from his own patent. One invention may include
within it many others, and each and all may be valid at the same
time. This only consequence follows, that each inventor is
precluded from using inventions made and patented prior to his own,
except by license from the owners thereof. His invention and his
patent are equally entitled to protection from infringement, as if
they were independent of any connection with them.
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular
form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If
Page 94 U. S. 788
one of the steps of a process be that a certain substance is to
be reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material what
instrument or machinery is used to effect that object, whether a
hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be pointed out;
but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or
machine, the use of the others would be an infringement, the
general process being the same. A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of
the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable
to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst
the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely
new result. The process requires that certain things should be done
with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to
be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.
The machine patents come next to be considered.
As to number 6,030, which is a reissue of the original patent
number 37,318, the defendants clearly infringe, at least, the last
claim, which is in these words:
"In combination with the screen incased in a chest, the
perforated blast pipe and the suction pipe, arranged to operate on
opposite sides of the screen, substantially as set forth."
As to the patent next in order, namely, the original patent
number 37,319, which relates specially to the use of what the
patentee calls the pump for introducing the meal into the chest and
reels, whilst the valve arrangement used by the defendants may be
an equivalent in the general combination with the said pump
described by Cochrane, yet, taken by themselves, as separate pieces
of machinery, they are not the same, and the use of the one is not
an infringement of a patent for the other. Curtis, sec. 332;
Foster v. Moore, 1 Curtis C.C. 279. Nor can we perceive
that the defendants infringe the next patent, number 37,320, which
is for certain combinations of machinery, including the bolting
reels, dead air chambers therein, slotted shaft, and reciprocating
board for discharging the meal, &c., which it is unnecessary to
describe more particularly.
Page 94 U. S. 789
The two remaining patents, numbered 6,594 and 6,595, being
reissues of original patent number 37,321, are for combinations of
essential parts of the machinery required for bolting flour and
purifying the middlings according to the general process described
in the first patent. The principal claim of the original patent was
for the condensing or collecting chamber, through which the
currents of air, on leaving the bolting chest, make their escape,
and where they leave the fine particles with which they become
loaded. This claim, it is said, was found to be too broad, inasmuch
as a collecting chamber, somewhat similar, had been used in another
connection, though not in the combinations presented in Cochrane's
bolting process. The original patent, therefore, was surrendered,
and the two patents now under consideration were issued in place
thereof, claiming the use of the collecting chamber in combination
with the various material parts of the bolting apparatus. The
reissue, number 6,594, contains three claims, and number 6,595, one
claim.
The first claim of reissue number 6,594 is for the collecting
chamber (used for the purpose aforesaid) in combination with the
bolter, air pipes, and valves for feeding and delivering the meal
without allowing the air to pass therewith. Now although the
defendants use a flat bolter instead of a reel, and use different
kinds of valves for feeding and delivering the meal without
allowing the air to pass, yet they employ the combination of
devices described in this claim. They use the collecting chamber
for the same purpose as that pointed out in the patent, and use it
in connection with a bolter, air pipes, and valves for feeding and
delivering the meal without allowing the air to pass therewith,
each effecting the same separate purpose, and all combined
effecting the same general purpose, which the like parts are
intended to accomplish in Cochrane's bolting apparatus. Though some
of the corresponding parts of the machinery, designated in this
combination, are not the same in point of form in the two bolting
apparatuses, and, separately considered, could not be regarded as
identical or conflicting, yet having the same purpose in the
combination, and effecting that purpose in substantially the same
manner, they are the equivalents of each other in that regard. The
claim
Page 94 U. S. 790
of the patent is not confined to any particular form of
apparatus, but (in regard to the valves, for example) embraces
generally any valves for feeding and delivering the meal without
allowing the air to pass through. We are of opinion, therefore,
that the combination here claimed is infringed by the apparatus
used by the defendants.
It is unnecessary to make a separate examination of the other
claims embraced in the two patents under consideration. They are
all susceptible of the same observations which we have made with
regard to the first claim. In our opinion, the defendants do
infringe them.
But a question is raised with regard to Cochrane's priority of
invention. A patent was granted on the 12th of June, 1860, to
Mortimer C. Cogswell and John McKiernan for improvements in
ventilated bolting chests, which, it is contended, antedates and
nullifies Cochrane's apparatus as patented to him in the original
patent 37,321, and in the two reissues thereof before mentioned.
This patent (of Cogswell and McKiernan) we have examined, and find
that it does contain five of the elements embraced in those
reissues -- namely, besides the bolting chest and bolter, which are
always used, it contains the perforated air pipe extending inside
of the bolting reel, the fan for producing a blast of air therein,
and a collecting chamber for arresting the flour carried off by the
blast. The purpose was simply to cool the meal and keep the bolting
cloths dry. The flour which collected in the chamber was returned
to the chest. The parts contained in this apparatus are those which
are patented in combination in Cochrane's reissue 6,595, which was
separated, it is said, from reissue 6,594 on account of this patent
of Cogswell and McKiernan. The combinations patented in reissue
6,594 embrace other parts not contained in Cogswell and McKiernan's
patent; and the defendants contend that this reissue is void, as
not being sustained by the original patent 37,321.
The latter position, we think, is untenable. Cochrane's
apparatus, as exhibited in his model, and described in his original
patent, and in the series of patents taken out at the same time,
all having relation to the same general process, and referred to in
patent 37,321, contained all the parts which go to make the
Page 94 U. S. 791
combination claimed in reissue number 6,594. We see no reason,
therefore, why such reissue was not properly granted to him by the
Patent Office, the claim being in fact a much narrower one than
that of the original patent.
The same observations apply to reissue number 6,595. But, as to
that, as before stated, the particular elements of the combination
claimed in it are found in Cogswell and McKiernan's machine; and if
this is entitled to the precedency over Cochrane's, reissue number
6,595 is void. He contends that it is not entitled to such
precedency; but that, in fact, Cogswell and McKiernan
surreptitiously obtained a patent for his invention. We have
examined the evidence relating to this matter, and are satisfied
that the improvement claimed by Cochrane was his invention; that
Cogswell and McKiernan obtained their knowledge of it from him, and
that there is nothing connected with their patent which ought to
invalidate the reissued patent in question.
A French patent dated 27th of September, 1860, granted to one
Perigault, is also referred to as anticipating the combinations in
these patents. But it being shown that Cochrane's invention was
actually made before that date, the point was not pressed in the
argument. By the act of 1870, a foreign patent, in order to
invalidate an American patent, must antedate the invention
patented.
Our conclusion is, that the patent for the process, being
reissue number 5,841, and the several reissued patents for
combinations of mechanical devices, numbered respectively 6,030,
6,594, and 6,595, are valid patents, and are infringed by the
defendants; and that the other two patents named in the bill of
complaint, numbered respectively 37,319 and 37,320, are not
infringed by the defendants.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded with directions to enter
a decree for the complainants, and to proceed therein in conformity
with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE STRONG,
dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court in this
case for the following reasons:
Page 94 U. S. 792
1. Because the mechanical means employed by the respondents to
effect the result are substantially different from those described
in the complainants' patent.
2. Because the process employed by the respondents to
manufacture the described product is materially and substantially
different from the patented process employed by the
complainants.
3. Because the respondents do not infringe the combination of
mechanism patented and employed by the complainants.
Prouty v.
Ruggles, 16 Pet. 341;
Vance
v. Campbell, 1 Black 428;
Gill v.
Wells, 22 Wall. 26.
4. Because the respondents do not infringe the process patented
by the complainants, the rule being that a process, like a
combination, is an entirety, and that the charge of infringement in
such a case is not made out unless it is alleged and proved that
the entire process is employed by the respondents.
Howe v.
Abbott, 2 Story C.C. 194;
Gould v.
Rees, 15 Wall. 193.