1. A statute which authorizes towns to contract debts or other
obligations payable in money implies the duty to levy taxes to pay
them unless some other fund or source of payment is provided.
2. If there is no power in the legislature which passed such a
statute to authorize the levy of taxes in aid of the purpose for
which the obligation is to be contracted, the statute is void, and
so are the bonds or other forms of contract based on the
statute.
3. There is no such thing in the theory of our governments,
state and national, as unlimited power in any of their branches.
The executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments are
all of limited and defined powers.
4. There are limitations of such powers which arise out of the
essential nature of all free governments; implied reservations of
individual rights, without which the social compact could not
exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the
name.
5. Among these is the limitation of the right of taxation, that
it can only be used in aid of a public object, an object which is
within the purpose for which governments are established.
Page 87 U. S. 656
6. It cannot, therefore, be exercised in aid of enterprises
strictly private, for the benefit of individuals, though in a
remote or collateral way the local public may be benefited
thereby.
7. Though the line which distinguishes the public use for which
taxes may be assessed from the private use for which they may not,
is not always easy to discern, yet it is the duty of the courts,
where the case falls clearly within the latter class, to interpose
when properly called on for the protection of the rights of the
citizen, and aid to prevent his private property from being
unlawfully appropriated to the use of others.
8. A statute which authorizes a town to issue its bonds in aid
of the manufacturing enterprise of individuals is void, because the
taxes necessary to pay the bonds would, if collected, be a transfer
of the property of individuals to aid in the projects of gain and
profit of others, and not for a public use, in the proper sense of
that term.
9. And in a suit brought on such bonds or the interest coupons
attached thereon, they are properly declared void.
10. The fact that the town authorities paid one installment of
interest on the bonds, by means of a levy of taxes, does not alter
the case. It works no estoppel.
The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland brought
their action in the court below, against the City of Topeka, on
coupons for interest attached to bonds of the City of Topeka.
The bonds on their face purported to be payable to the King
Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing and Iron-Works Company, of
Topeka, to aid and encourage that company in establishing and
operating bridge shops in said City of Topeka, under and in
pursuance of section twenty-six of an act of the Legislature of the
State of Kansas, entitled "An act to incorporate cities of the
second class," approved February 29, 1872; and also of another
"Act to authorize cities and counties to issue bonds for the
purpose of building bridges, aiding railroads, water power, or
other works of internal improvement,"
approved March 2, 1872.
The city issued one hundred of these bonds for $1,000 each, as a
donation (and so it was stated in the declaration), to
encourage that company in its design of establishing a manufactory
of iron bridges in that city.
The declaration also alleged that the interest coupons first due
were paid out of a fund raised by taxation for that purpose,
Page 87 U. S. 657
and that after this payment the plaintiff became the purchaser
of the bonds and the coupons on which suit was brought, for
value.
A demurrer was interposed by the City of Topeka to this
declaration.
The section of the Act of February 29, on which the main
reliance was placed for the authority to issue these bonds, reads
as follows:
"SECTION 76. The council shall have power to encourage the
establishment of manufactories and such other enterprises as may
tend to develop and improve such city, either by direct
appropriation from the general fund or by the issuance of bonds of
such city in such amounts as the council may determine,
provided that no greater amount than one thousand dollars
shall be granted for any one purpose, unless a majority of the
votes cast at an election called for that purpose shall authorize
the same. The bonds thus issued shall be made payable at any time
within twenty years, and bear interest not exceeding ten percent
per annum."
It was conceded that the steps required by this act prerequisite
as to issuing the bonds were regular, as were also the other
details, and that the language of the statute was sufficient to
justify the action of the city authorities, if the statute was
within the constitutional competency of the legislature.
The single question, therefore, for consideration raised by the
demurrer was the authority of the legislature of the State of
Kansas to enact this part of the statute.
The court below denied the authority, placing the denial on two
grounds:
1st. That this part of the statute violated the fifth section of
Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Kansas, a section
in these words:
"SECTION 5. Provision shall be made by general law for the
organization of cities, towns, and villages; and their power of
taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and
Page 87 U. S. 658
loaning their credit, shall be so restricted as to prevent the
abuse of such power."
[The argument here was that the section of the Act of February
29, 1872, conferring the power to issue bonds contained no
restriction as to the amount which the city might issue to aid
manufacturing enterprises, and that the failure of the legislature
to limit and restrict the power so as to prevent abuse, violated
the fifth section of Article XII of the constitution above referred
to.]
2d. That the act authorized the towns and other municipalities
to which it applied, by issuing bonds or lending its credit, to
take the property of the citizen under the guise of taxation to pay
these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others which
were not of a public character; that this was a perversion of the
right of taxation, which could only be exercised for a public use,
to the aid of individual interests and personal purposes of profit
and gain.
The court below accordingly, sustaining the demurrer, gave
judgment in favor of the defendant, the City of Topeka, and to its
judgment this writ of error was taken.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two grounds are taken in the opinion of the circuit judge and in
the argument of counsel for defendant, on which it is insisted that
the section of the statute of February 29, 1872, on which the main
reliance is placed to issue the bonds, is unconstitutional.
The first of these is that by section five of article twelve of
the Constitution of that state it is declared that provision shall
be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns, and
villages; and their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money,
contracting debts, and loaning their credit, shall be so restricted
as to prevent the abuse of such power.
The argument is that the statute in question is void because
Page 87 U. S. 659
it authorizes cities and towns to contract debts, and does not
contain any restriction on the power so conferred. But whether the
statute which confers power to contract debts should always contain
some limitation or restriction, or whether a general restriction
applicable to all cases should be passed, and whether in the
absence of both the grant of power to contract is wholly void, are
questions whose solution we prefer to remit to the state courts, as
in this case we find ample reason to sustain the demurrer on the
second ground on which it is argued by counsel and sustained by the
circuit court.
That proposition is that the act authorizes the towns and other
municipalities to which it applies, by issuing bonds or loaning
their credit, to take the property of the citizen under the guise
of taxation to pay these bonds, and use it in aid of the
enterprises of others which are not of a public character, thus
perverting the right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a
public use, to the aid of individual interests and personal
purposes of profit and gain.
The proposition as thus broadly stated is not new, nor is the
question which it raises difficult of solution.
If these municipal corporations, which are in fact subdivisions
of the state, and which for many reasons are vested with
quasi-legislative powers, have a fund or other property
out of which they can pay the debts which they contract, without
resort to taxation, it may be within the power of the legislature
of the state to authorize them to use it in aid of projects
strictly private or personal, but which would in a secondary manner
contribute to the public good; or where there is property or money
vested in a corporation of the kind for a particular use, as public
worship or charity, the legislature may pass laws authorizing them
to make contracts in reference to this property, and incur debts
payable from that source.
But such instances are few and exceptional, and the proposition
is a very broad one, that debts contracted by municipal
corporations must be paid, if paid at all, out of taxes which they
may lawfully levy, and that all contracts creating
Page 87 U. S. 660
debts to be paid in future, not limited to payment from some
other source, imply an obligation to pay by taxation.
It follows that in this class of cases the right to contract
must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case no
tax can lawfully be levied to pay the debt, the contract itself is
void for want of authority to make it.
If this were not so, these corporations could make valid
promises, which they have no means of fulfilling, and on which even
the legislature that created them can confer no such power. The
validity of a contract which can only be fulfilled by a resort to
taxation, depends on the power to levy the tax for that purpose.
[
Footnote 1]
It is therefore to be inferred that when the legislature of the
state authorizes a county or city to contract a debt by bond, it
intends to authorize it to levy such taxes as are necessary to pay
the debt, unless there is in the act itself, or in some general
statute, a limitation upon the power of taxation which repels such
an inference.
With these remarks and with the reference to the authorities
which support them, we assume that unless the Legislature of Kansas
had the right to authorize the counties and towns in that state to
levy taxes to be used in aid of manufacturing enterprises,
conducted by individuals, or private corporations, for purposes of
gain, the law is void, and the bonds issued under it are also void.
We proceed to the inquiry whether such a power exists in the
Legislature of the State of Kansas.
We have already said the question is not new. The subject of the
aid voted to railroads by counties and towns has been brought to
the attention of the courts of almost every state in the Union. It
has been thoroughly discussed and is still the subject of
discussion in those courts. It is quite true that a decided
preponderance of authority is to be found in favor of the
proposition that the legislatures of the states,
Page 87 U. S. 661
unless restricted by some special provisions of their
constitutions, may confer upon these municipal bodies the right to
take stock in corporations created to build railroads, and to lend
their credit to such corporations. Also to levy the necessary taxes
on the inhabitants, and on property within their limits subject to
general taxation, to enable them to pay the debts thus incurred.
But very few of these courts have decided this without a division
among the judges of which they were composed, while others have
decided against the existence of the power altogether. [
Footnote 2]
In all these cases, however, the decision has turned upon the
question whether the taxation by which this aid was afforded to the
building of railroads was for a public purpose. Those who came to
the conclusion that it was, held the laws for that purpose valid.
Those who could not reach that conclusion held them void. In all
the controversy this has been the turning-point of the judgments of
the courts. And it is safe to say that no court has held debts
created in aid of railroad companies, by counties or towns, valid
on any other ground than that the purpose for which the taxes were
levied was a public use, a purpose or object which it was the right
and the duty of state governments to assist by money raised from
the people by taxation. The argument in opposition to this power
has been, that railroads built by corporations organized mainly for
purposes of gain -- the roads which they built being under their
control, and not that of the state -- were private and not public
roads, and the tax assessed on the people went to swell the profits
of individuals and not to the good of the state, or the benefit of
the public, except in a remote and collateral way. On the other
hand it was said that roads, canals, bridges, navigable streams,
and all other highways had in all times been matter of public
concern. That such channels of travel and of the carrying business
had always been established, improved, regulated by the state, and
that the railroad had
Page 87 U. S. 662
not lost this character because constructed by individual
enterprise, aggregated into a corporation.
We are not prepared to say that the latter view of it is not the
true one, especially as there are other characteristics of a public
nature conferred on these corporations, such as the power to obtain
right of way, their subjection to the laws which govern common
carriers, and the like which seem to justify the proposition. Of
the disastrous consequences which have followed its recognition by
the courts and which were predicted when it was first established
there can be no doubt.
We have referred to this history of the contest over aid to
railroads by taxation, to show that the strongest advocates for the
validity of these laws never placed it on the ground of the
unlimited power in the state legislature to tax the people, but
conceded that where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued
could no longer be justly claimed to have this public character,
but was purely in aid of private or personal objects, the law
authorizing it was beyond the legislative power, and was an
unauthorized invasion of private right. [
Footnote 3]
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free
government beyond the control of the state. A government which
recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and
the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute
disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic
depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is
a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you choose to call it
so, but it is nonetheless a despotism. It may well be doubted if a
man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his own, all in
which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which is
essential to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of
others, whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised
by one man than by many.
Page 87 U. S. 663
The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to
the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the
legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all
of limited and defined powers.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of
individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist
and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No
court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which
enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife to each other
should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter be the
husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should enact that the
homestead now owned by A. should no longer be his, but should
henceforth be the property of B. [
Footnote 4]
Of all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is
most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation
may be lawfully used and the extent of its exercise is in its very
nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount
of tax to levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by
constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are
levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the
National defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of
the people should in some instances be at the disposal of the
government.
The power to tax is therefore the strongest, the most pervading
of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to
all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall,
in the case of
McCulloch v. state of Maryland, [
Footnote 5] that the power to tax is
the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the
proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten
percent imposed by the United States on the circulation of all
other banks than the national banks drove out of existence
every
Page 87 U. S. 664
state bank of circulation within a year or two after its
passage. This power can as readily be employed against one class of
individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class
and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is
no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be
exercised.
To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property
of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored
individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is
a decree under legislative forms.
Nor is it taxation. A "tax," says Webster's Dictionary, "is a
rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a
citizen by government for the use of the nation or state." "Taxes
are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or
property to raise money for public purposes." [
Footnote 6]
Coulter, J., in
Northern Liberties v. St. John's
Church, [
Footnote 7] says,
very forcibly,
"I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the
understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by
authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the
government in all its machinery and operations -- that they are
imposed for a public purpose."
We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no
lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be
easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public
purpose in this sense and what is not.
It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or
authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to
be used for purposes of private interest instead of a public use,
and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a
violation of this principle is clear and the
Page 87 U. S. 665
reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in the
given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon
the one side or the other of this line, they must be governed
mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for
which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation
levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to
the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state
or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned
by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be held to
belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good
government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful
taxation.
But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to
contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers,
there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public
purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit
results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures,
the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs
capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the
banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of
the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by
forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the
manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the public
treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the businessmen of
the city or town.
A reference to one or two cases adjudicated by courts of the
highest character will be sufficient, if any authority were needed,
to sustain us in this proposition.
In the case of
Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, [
Footnote 8] the town meeting had voted
to loan their credit to the amount of $10,000, to Hutchins and
Lane, if they would invest $12,000 in a steam saw mill, grist mill,
and box factory machinery, to be built in that town by them. There
was a provision to secure the town by mortgage on the mill, and the
selectmen
Page 87 U. S. 666
were authorized to issue town bonds for the amount of the aid so
voted. Ten of the taxable inhabitants of the town filed a bill to
enjoin the selectmen from issuing the bonds.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in an able opinion by Chief
Justice Appleton, held that this was not a public purpose, and that
the town could levy no taxes on the inhabitants in aid of the
enterprise, and could, therefore, issue no bonds, though a special
act of the legislature had ratified the vote of the town, and they
granted the injunction as prayed for.
Shortly after the disastrous fire in Boston, in 1872, which laid
an important part of that city in ashes, the governor of the state
convened the legislative body of Massachusetts, called the General
Court, for the express purpose of affording some relief to the city
and its people from the sufferings consequent on this great
calamity. A statute was passed, among others, which authorized the
city to issue its bonds to an amount not exceeding twenty millions
of dollars, which bonds were to be loaned, under proper guards for
securing the city from loss, to the owners of the ground whose
buildings had been destroyed by fire, to aid them in
rebuilding.
In the case of
Lowell v. City of Boston, in the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the validity of this act was
considered. We have been furnished a copy of the opinion, though it
is not yet reported in the regular series of that court. The
American Law Review for July, 1873, says that the question was
elaborately and ably argued. The court, in an able and exhaustive
opinion, decided that the law was unconstitutional, as giving a
right to tax for other than a public purpose.
The same court had previously decided, in the case of
Jenkins v. Anderson, [
Footnote 9] that a statute authorizing the town
authorities to aid by taxation a school established by the will of
a citizen, and governed by trustees selected by the will,
Page 87 U. S. 667
was void because the school was not under the control of the
town officers, and was not, therefore, a public purpose for which
taxes could be levied on the inhabitants.
The same principle precisely was decided by the state court of
Wisconsin in the case of
Curtis v. Whipple. [
Footnote 10] In that case, a special
statute which authorized the town to aid the Jefferson Liberal
Institute was declared void because, though a school of learning,
it was a private enterprise not under the control of the town
authorities. In the subsequent case of
Whiting v. Fond du
Lac, already cited, the principle is fully considered and
reaffirmed.
These cases are clearly in point, and they assert a principle
which meets our cordial approval.
We do not attach any importance to the fact that the town
authorities paid one installment of interest on these bonds. Such a
payment works no estoppel. If the legislature was without power to
authorize the issue of these bonds and its statute attempting to
confer such authority is void, the mere payment of interest, which
was equally unauthorized, cannot create of itself a power to levy
taxes resting on no other foundation than the fact that they have
once been illegally levied for that purpose.
The Act of March 2, 1872, concerning internal improvements, can
give no assistance to these bonds. If we could hold that the
corporation for manufacturing wrought iron bridges was within the
meaning of the statute, which seems very difficult to do, it would
still be liable to the objection that money raised to assist the
company was not for a public purpose, as we have already
demonstrated.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa.St. 147, 167;
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia. 28;
Allen v. Inhabitants of
Jay, 60 Me. 127;
Lowell v. Boston, Massachusetts
(MS.);
Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188.
[
Footnote 2]
State v. Wapello Co., 9 Ia. 308;
Hanson v.
Vernon, 27
id. 28;
Sharpless v. Mayor, 21
Pa.St. 147;
Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188.
[
Footnote 3]
Olcott v.
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 689;
People v.
Salem, 20 Mich. 452;
Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass.
94; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 587; 2 Redfield's Laws of
Railways 398, rule 2.
[
Footnote 4]
Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188; Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations 129, 175, 487; Dillon on Municipal
Corporations, § 587.
[
Footnote 5]
17 U. S. 4
Wheat. 431.
[
Footnote 6]
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations 479.
[
Footnote 7]
13 Pa.St. 104;
see also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31
id. 69;
Matter of Mayor of New York, 11 Johnson
77;
Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutcher 398;
Sharpless v. Mayor
of Philadelphia, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia. 47;
Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188.
[
Footnote 8]
60 Me. 124.
[
Footnote 9]
103 Mass. 74.
[
Footnote 10]
24 Wis. 350.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting:
Unable to concur either in the opinion or judgment in this case,
I will proceed to state, in very brief terms, the reasons which
compel me to withhold my concurrence.
Page 87 U. S. 668
Corporations of a municipal character are created by the
legislature, and the legislature, as the trustee or guardian of the
public interest, has the exclusive and unrestrained control over
such a franchise, and may enlarge, diminish, alter, change, or
abolish the same at pleasure. Where the grantees of a franchise, as
well as the grantors, are public bodies and the franchise is
created solely for municipal objects, the grant is at all times
within the control of the legislature, and consequently the charter
is subject to amendment or repeal at the will of the granting
power. [
Footnote 2/1]
Errors of indiscretion which the legislature may commit in the
exercise of the power it possesses cannot be corrected by the
courts, for the reason that the courts cannot adjudge an act of the
legislature void unless it is in violation of the federal or state
constitution. [
Footnote 2/2]
State constitutions may undoubtedly restrict the power of the
legislature to pass laws, and it is plain that any law passed in
violation of such a prohibition is void, but the better opinion is
that where the Constitution of the state contains no prohibition
upon the subject, express or implied, neither the state nor federal
courts can declare a statute of the state void as unwise, unjust,
or inexpedient, nor for any other cause, unless it be repugnant to
the federal Constitution. Except where the Constitution has imposed
limits upon the legislative power the rule of law appears to be
that the power of legislation must be considered as practically
absolute, whether the law operates according to natural justice or
not in any particular case, for the reason that courts are not the
guardians of the rights of the people of the state, save where
those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which
comes within judicial cognizance; or, in the language of Marshall,
C.J.,
"The interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body
furnish the only security
Page 87 U. S. 669
in a large class of cases not regulated by any constitutional
provision. [
Footnote 2/3]"
Courts cannot nullify an act of the state legislature on the
vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit
supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution where neither the
terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such
restriction. [
Footnote 2/4] Such a
power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would be to
make the courts sovereign over both the constitution and the people
and convert the government into a judicial despotism. [
Footnote 2/5]
Subject to the federal Constitution, the legislature of the
state possesses the whole legislative power of the people except so
far as the power is limited by the state constitution. [
Footnote 2/6]
Our own decisions are to the same effect, as appears by one of
very recent date, in which the Court said that
"the legislative power of a state extends to everything within
the sphere of such power, except as it is restricted by the federal
Constitution or that of the state. [
Footnote 2/7]"
Apply those principles to the cases before the Court and it
follows, as it seems to me, that the judgment in each case should
be reversed for the following reasons:
(1) Because the demurrer to the declaration in each case should
have been overruled.
(2) Because the bonds to which the coupons sued on were attached
were issued in pursuance of the express authority of the
legislature vesting that power in the corporation defendants.
(3) Because the constitution of the state does not in any manner
prohibit the passage of such a law as that under which the bonds
were issued.
(4) Because it is not competent for a federal court to adjudge a
state statute void which does not conflict in any respect with the
Constitution of the United States or that of the state whose
legislature enacted the statute.
Page 87 U. S. 670
Unwise laws and such as are highly inexpedient and unjust are
frequently passed by legislative bodies, but there is no power
vested in a circuit court nor in this Court, to determine that any
law passed by a state legislature is void if it is not repugnant to
their own constitution nor the Constitution of the United
States.
Vague apprehensions seem to be entertained that unless such a
power is claimed and exercised inequitable consequences may result
from unnecessary taxation, but in my judgment there is much more to
be dreaded from judicial decisions which may have the effect to
sanction the fraudulent repudiation of honest debts, than from any
statutes passed by the state to enable municipal corporations to
meet and discharge their just pecuniary obligations.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Hartford v. Bridge
Co., 10 How. 534;
Bissell v.
Jeffersonville, 24 How. 294;
Darlington v.
Mayor, 31 N.Y. 187;
Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416;
2 Kent (12th ed.) 275.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Benson v. Mayor, 24 Barb. 248;
Clarke v. Rochester,
ib., 446;
Bank v. Rome, 18 N.Y. 38.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Bank v.
Billings, 4 Pet. 563; Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations (2d ed.) 168;
Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall., 398.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio State 41.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash.C.C. 313.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Bank v. Brown, 26 N.Y. 467;
People v. Draper,
15
id. 532.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Pine Grove v.
Talcott, 19 Wall. 676.