1. Where a patentee has assigned his right to manufacture, sell,
and use within a limited district an instrument, machine, or other
manufactured product, a purchaser of such instrument or machine,
when rightfully bought within the prescribed limits, acquires by
such purchase the right to use it anywhere, without reference to
other assignments of territorial rights by the same patentee.
2. The right to the use of such machines or instruments stands
on a different ground from the right to make and sell them, and
inheres in the nature of a contract of purchase, which carries no
implied limitation of the right of use within a given locality.
On the 26th day of May, 1863, letters patent were granted
Page 84 U. S. 454
to Merrill & Horner for a certain improvement in coffin
lids, giving to them the exclusive right of making, using, and
vending to others to be used, the said improvement.
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the
patentees, by an assignment duly executed and recorded, assigned to
Lockhart & Seelye, of Cambridge, in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said
patentees had in the invention described in the said letters
patent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles, having
the city of Boston as a center. They subsequently assigned the
patent, or what right they retained in it, to one Adams.
Adams now filed a bill in the court below, against a certain
Burke, an undertaker, who used in the town of Natick (a town about
seventeen miles from Boston, and therefore outside of the circle
above mentioned) coffins with lids of the kind patented, alleging
him to be an infringer of their patent, and praying for an
injunction, discovery, profits, and other relief suitable against
an infringer.
The defendant pleaded in bar:
"That he carries on the business of an undertaker, having his
place of business in Natick, in said district; that in the exercise
of his said business, he is employed to bury the dead; that when so
employed, it is his custom to procure hearses, coffins, and
whatever else may be necessary or proper for burials and to
superintend the preparation of graves, and that his bills for his
services in each case, and the coffin, hearse, and other articles
procured by him, are paid by the personal representatives of the
deceased; that since the date of the alleged assignment to the
plaintiff of an interest in the invention secured by the said
letters patent, he has sold no coffins unless the use of coffins by
him in his said business, as above described, shall be deemed a
sale, has used no coffins, except in his said business as
aforesaid, and has manufactured no coffins containing the said
invention, and that since the said date he has used in his business
as aforesaid, in Natick, no coffin containing the invention secured
by said letters patent, except such coffins containing said
invention as have been manufactured by said Lockhart & Seelye,
within a circle, whose radius is ten miles, having the
Page 84 U. S. 455
City of Boston as its center, and sold within said circle by
said Lockhart & Seelye without condition or restriction."
The validity of this plea was the question in the case. The
court below, referring to the case of
Bloomer v. McQuewan,
[
Footnote 1] in which Taney,
C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"When a machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no
longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it,
and is no longer under the protection of the Act of Congress."
And referring also to some other cases, held that the plea was
good. And from a decree which followed, dismissing, of course, the
bill, this appeal was taken.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by the plea in this case is a very
interesting one in patent law, and the precise point in it has
never been decided by this Court, though cases involving some of
the considerations which apply to it have been decided and others
of analogous character are frequently recurring. The vast pecuniary
results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest,
admonish us to proceed with care and to decide in each case no more
than what is directly in issue.
We have repeatedly held that where a person had purchased a
patented machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase
carried with it the right to the use of that machine so long as it
was capable of use, and that the expiration and renewal of the
patent, whether in favor of the original patentee or of his
assignee, did not affect this right. The true ground on which these
decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right
to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to
the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used
in point of time.
Page 84 U. S. 456
The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to
use are each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred
separately by the patentee.
But in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole
value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and
he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the
language of the Court, passes without the limit of the monopoly.
[
Footnote 2] That is to say the
patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the
royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to
the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of
the monopoly of the patentees.
If this principle be sound as to a machine or instrument whose
use may be continued for a number of years, and may extend beyond
the existence of the patent, as limited at the time of the sale,
and into the period of a renewal or extension, it must be much more
applicable to an instrument or product of patented manufacture
which perishes in the first use of it, or which, by that first use,
becomes incapable of further use, and of no further value. Such is
the case with the coffin lids of appellant's patent.
It seems to us that although the right of Lockhart & Seelye
to manufacture, to sell, and to use these coffin lids was limited
to the circle of ten miles around Boston, that a purchaser from
them of a single coffin acquired the right to use that coffin for
the purpose for which all coffins are used. That so far as the use
of it was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration,
and it was no longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be
to engraft a limitation upon the right of use not contemplated by
the statute nor within the reason of the contract to say that it
could only be used within the ten-miles circle. Whatever,
therefore, may be the rule when patentees subdivide territorially
their patents as to the exclusive right
to make or
to
sell within a
Page 84 U. S. 457
limited territory, we hold that in the class of machines or
implements we have described, when they are once lawfully made and
sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the
benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.
A careful examination of the plea satisfies us that the
defendant, who, as an undertaker, purchased each of these coffins
and used it in burying the body which he was employed to bury,
acquired the right to this use of it freed from any claim of the
patentee, though purchased within the ten-mile circle and used
without it.
The decree of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff's bill
is therefore
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
55 U. S. 14
How. 549.
[
Footnote 2]
Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 14 How. 549;
Mitchell
v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY (with whom concurred JUSTICES SWAYNE and
STRONG), dissenting:
The question raised in this case is whether an assignment of a
patented invention for a limited district, such as a city, a
county, or a state, confers upon the assignee the right to sell the
patented article to be used outside of such limited district. The
defendant justifies under such a claim. He uses a patented article
outside of the territory within which the patent was assigned to
the persons from whom he purchased it. The plaintiff, who claims
under the original patentee, complains that this is a transgression
of the limits of the assignment.
If it were a question of legislative policy whether a patentee
should be allowed to divide up his monopoly into territorial
parcels, it might admit of grave doubt whether a vendee of the
patented article, purchasing it rightfully, ought to be restrained
or limited as to the place of its use. But the patent act gives to
the patentee a monopoly of use, as well as of manufacture,
throughout the whole United States, and the eleventh section of the
act (of 1836) expressly authorizes not only an assignment of the
whole patent or any undivided part thereof, but a
"grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent,
to make and use, and to
Page 84 U. S. 458
grant to others to make and use the thing patented within and
throughout any specified part or portion of the United States.
*"
If an assignment under this clause does not confer the same
rights within the limited district which the patentee himself
previously had in the whole United States, and no more, it is
difficult to know what meaning to attach to language however
plain.
On the 26th day of May, 1863, letters patent were granted to
Merrill & Horner for a certain improvement in coffin lids,
giving to them the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to
others to be used, the said improvement.
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the
patentees, by an assignment duly executed and recorded, did assign
to Lockhart & Seelye, of Cambridge, in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said
patentees had in the invention described in the said letters patent
for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles, having the city
of Boston as a center. By necessary consequence (as it seems to
me), the right thus assigned consisted of the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the improved coffin lid within the limited
territory described, but did not include any right to make, use, or
vend the same outside of those limits. As the assigned right to
make the lids was a restricted right, limited to the territory, so
the assigned right to use them was a restricted right limited in
the same manner. Each right is conveyed by precisely the same
language. A different construction would defeat the intent of the
parties. For if the assignees, after making any number of lids
within the limited district, could use them or authorize others to
use them outside of the district, the balance of the monopoly
remaining in the hands of the patentees might be rendered of little
value.
If it be contended that the right of vending the lids to others
enables them to confer upon their vendees the right
Page 84 U. S. 459
to use the lids thus sold outside of the limited district, the
question at once arises, how can they confer upon their vendees a
right which they cannot exercise themselves? The only consistent
construction to be given to such an assignment is to limit all the
privileges conferred by it to the district marked out. It is an
assignment of the manufacture and use of the patented article
within that district, and within that district only.
Difficulties may undoubtedly be suggested in special cases. If
the patented thing be an article of wearing apparel, sold by the
assignee within his district, it is confidently asked, cannot the
purchaser wear the article outside of the district? The answer to
acute suggestions of this sort would probably be found (in the
absence of all bad faith in the parties) in the maxim
de
minimis non curat lex.
On the other hand, the difficulties and the injustice which
would follow from a contrary construction to that which I contend
for are very obvious. Take the electric telegraph, for example.
Suppose Professor Morse had assigned his patent within and for the
New England states. Would such an assignment authorize the vendees
of his assignees to use the apparatus in the whole United States?
Take the planing machine: would an assignment from Woodworth of his
patent within and for the State of Vermont authorize the assignees
to manufacture machines
ad libitum and sell them to
parties to be used in other states? So of Hoe's printing press, and
a thousand other machines and inventions of like sort.
Such a doctrine would most seriously affect not only the
assignor (as to his residuary right in his patent), but the
assignee also. For if it be correct, there would be nothing to
prevent the patentee himself, after assigning his patent within a
valuable city or other locality, from selling the patent machine or
article to be used within the assigned district. By this means, the
assignment could be, and in numberless instances would be, rendered
worthless. Millions of dollars have been invested by manufacturers
and mechanics in these limited assignments of patents in our
manufacturing
Page 84 U. S. 460
districts and towns, giving them, as they have supposed, the
monopoly of the patented machine or article within the district
purchased. The decision of the Court in this case will, in my view,
utterly destroy the value of a great portion of this property.
I do not regard the authorities cited as establishing a
different doctrine from that now contended for. The remark of Chief
Justice Taney in
Bloomer v. McQuewan that
"when a machine passes to the hands of a purchaser, it is no
longer within the limits of the monopoly; it passes outside of it,
and is no longer under the protection of the Act of Congress,"
is perfectly true in the sense and application in which the
Chief Justice made it. He was speaking of time, not territory; of
the right to use a machine after the original patent had expired
and a renewal had been granted, not of using it in a place outside
of the grant. All the effects mentioned by the Chief Justice would
undoubtedly follow so far forth as it was in the power of the
vendor to produce them, but no further. And he would never have
contended that those effects would follow any further than the
vendor's power to produce them extended. That is the very question
in this case. How far did the assignee's interest and therefore his
power extend? In my judgment, it was limited in locality, both as
to manufacture and use, and that he could not convey to another
what he did not have himself. I hold therefore that the decree
should be reversed.
*
Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story 131;
Blanchard v.
Eldridge, 1 Wall. Jr. 339.