Police suspected respondent Olson of being the driver of the
getaway car used in a robbery-murder. After recovering the murder
weapon and arresting the suspected murderer, they surrounded the
home of two women with whom they believed Olson had been staying.
When police telephoned the home and told one of the women that
Olson should come out, a male voice was heard saying "tell them I
left." Without seeking permission, and with weapons drawn, they
entered the home, found Olson hiding in a closet, and arrested him.
Shortly thereafter, he made an inculpatory statement, which the
trial court refused to suppress. He was convicted of murder, armed
robbery, and assault. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that Olson had a sufficient interest in the women's home to
challenge the legality of his warrantless arrest, that the arrest
was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify
warrantless entry, and that his statement was tainted, and should
have been suppressed.
Held: The arrest violated Olson's Fourth Amendment
rights.
(a) Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone sufficient to
show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
See Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U. S. 128,
439 U. S.
143-144;
cf. Jones v. United States,
362 U. S. 257. The
distinctions relied on by the State between this case and
Jones -- that there, the overnight guest was left alone
and had a key to the premises with which he could come and go and
admit and exclude others -- are not legally determinative. All
citizens share the expectation that hosts will more likely than not
respect their guests' privacy interests even if the guests have no
legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority
to determine who may enter the household. Pp.
495 U. S.
95-100.
(b) The State Supreme Court applied essentially the correct
standard in holding that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless entry: an entry may be justified by hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon, the imminent destruction of evidence,
the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to
the police or others; but, in the absence of hot pursuit, there
must be at least probable cause to believe that one or more of the
other factors were present and, in assessing the risk of danger,
the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is
Page 495 U. S. 92
armed should be considered. This Court is not inclined to
disagree with the fact-specific application of this standard by the
lower court, which pointed out that, although a grave crime was
involved, Olson was known not to be the murderer and the murder
weapon had been recovered; that there was no suggestion of danger
to the women; that several police squads surrounded the house; that
it was Sunday afternoon; that it was evident that the suspect was
going nowhere; and that, if he came out of the house, he would have
been promptly apprehended. Pp.
495 U. S.
100-101.
436
N.W.2d 92, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J.,
post, p.
495 U. S. 101,
and KENNEDY, J.,
post, p.
495 U. S. 102,
filed concurring opinions. REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J.,
dissented.
Page 495 U. S. 93
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The police in this case made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry
into a house where Olson was an overnight guest and arrested him.
The issue is whether the arrest violated Olson's Fourth Amendment
rights. We hold that it did.
I
Shortly before 6 a.m. on Saturday, July 18, 1987, a lone gunman
robbed an Amoco gasoline station in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
fatally shot the station manager. A police officer heard the police
dispatcher report and suspected Joseph Ecker. The officer and his
partner drove immediately to Ecker's home, arriving at about the
same time that an Oldsmobile arrived. The Oldsmobile took evasive
action, spun out of control, and came to a stop. Two men fled the
car on foot. Ecker, who was later identified as the gunman, was
captured shortly thereafter inside his home. The second man
escaped.
Inside the abandoned Oldsmobile, police found a sack of money
and the murder weapon. They also found a title certificate with the
name Rob Olson crossed out as a secured party, a letter addressed
to a Roger R. Olson of 3151 Johnson Street, and a videotape rental
receipt made out to Rob Olson and dated two days earlier. The
police verified that a Robert Olson lived at 3151 Johnson
Street.
The next morning, Sunday, July 19, a woman identifying herself
as Dianna Murphy called the police and said that a man by the name
of Rob drove the car in which the gas station killer left the
scene, and that Rob was planning to leave town by bus. About noon,
the same woman called again, gave her address and phone number, and
said that a man named Rob had told a Maria and two other women,
Louanne and Julie, that he was the driver in the Amoco robbery. The
caller stated that Louanne was Julie's mother, and that the two
women lived at 2406 Fillmore Northeast. The detective-in-charge who
took the second phone call sent police
Page 495 U. S. 94
officers to 2406 Fillmore to check out Louanne and Julie. When
police arrived, they determined that the dwelling was a duplex and
that Louanne Bergstrom and her daughter Julie lived in the upper
unit, but were not home. Police spoke to Louanne's mother, Helen
Niederhoffer, who lived in the lower unit. She confirmed that a Rob
Olson had been staying upstairs, but was not then in the unit. She
promised to call the police when Olson returned. At 2 p.m., a
pickup order, or "probable cause arrest bulletin," was issued for
Olson's arrest. The police were instructed to stay away from the
duplex.
At approximately 2:45 p.m., Niederhoffer called police and said
Olson had returned. The detective-in-charge instructed police
officers to go to the house and surround it. He then telephoned
Julie from headquarters and told her Rob should come out of the
house. The detective heard a male voice say "tell them I left."
Julie stated that Rob had left, whereupon, at 3 p.m., the detective
ordered the police to enter the house. Without seeking permission
and with weapons drawn, the police entered the upper unit and found
respondent hiding in a closet. Less than an hour after his arrest,
respondent made an inculpatory statement at police
headquarters.
The Hennepin County trial court held a hearing and denied
respondent's motion to suppress his statement. App. 3-13. The
statement was admitted into evidence at Olson's trial, and he was
convicted on one count of first degree murder, three counts of
armed robbery, and three counts of second degree assault. On
appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
436 N.W.2d
92 (1989). The court ruled that respondent had a sufficient
interest in the Bergstrom home to challenge the legality of his
warrantless arrest there, that the arrest was illegal because there
were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry,
[
Footnote 1] and that
respondent's
Page 495 U. S. 95
statement was tainted by that illegality and should have been
suppressed. [
Footnote 2]
Because the admission of the statement was not harmless beyond
reasonable doubt, the court reversed Olson's conviction and
remanded for a new trial. [
Footnote
3]
We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 493 U.S. 806
(1989), and now affirm.
II
It was held in
Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980), that a suspect should not be arrested in
his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is probable
cause to arrest him. The purpose of the decision was not to protect
the person of the suspect but to protect his home from entry in the
absence of a magistrate's finding of probable cause. In this case,
the court below held that Olson's warrantless arrest was illegal
because he had a sufficient connection with the premises to be
treated like a householder. The State challenges that
conclusion.
Since the decision in
Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347
(1967), it has been the law that
"capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of
the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place."
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128,
439 U. S. 143
(1978). A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is
"
one that society
Page 495 U. S.
96
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"'" id. at
439 U. S.
143-144, n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at
389 U. S. 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
The State argues that Olson's relationship to the premises does
not satisfy the 12 factors which in its view determine whether a
dwelling is a "home." [
Footnote
4] Aside from the fact that it is based on the mistaken premise
that a place must be one's "home" in order for one to have a
legitimate expectation of privacy there, [
Footnote 5] the State's proposed test is needlessly
complex. We need go no further than to conclude, as we do, that
Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show
Page 495 U. S. 97
that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
As recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the facts of this
case are similar to those in
Jones v. United States,
362 U. S. 257
(1960). In
Jones, the defendant was arrested in a friend's
apartment during the execution of a search warrant and sought to
challenge the warrant as not supported by probable cause.
"[Jones] testified that the apartment belonged to a friend,
Evans, who had given him the use of it, and a key, with which
[Jones] had admitted himself on the day of the arrest. On
cross-examination [Jones] testified that he had a suit and shirt at
the apartment, that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing
for the use of the apartment, that Evans had let him use it 'as a
friend,' that he had slept there 'maybe a night,' and that, at the
time of the search, Evans had been away in Philadelphia for about
five days."
Id. at
362 U. S. 259.
[
Footnote 6] The Court ruled
that Jones could challenge the search of the apartment because he
was "legitimately on [the] premises,"
id. at
362 U. S. 267.
Although the "legitimately on [the] premises" standard was rejected
in
Rakas as too broad, 439 U.S. at
439 U. S.
142-148, the
Rakas Court explicitly reaffirmed
the factual holding in
Jones:
"We do not question the conclusion in
Jones that the
defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth
Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. . . .
"
"We think that
Jones, on its facts, merely stands for
the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally
sufficient interest in a place other than his own
Page 495 U. S. 98
home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable
governmental intrusion into that place."
439 U.S. at
439 U. S.
141-142. Rakas thus recognized that, as an overnight
guest,
Jones was much more than just legitimately on the
premises.
The distinctions relied on by the State between this case and
Jones are not legally determinative. The State emphasizes
that, in this case, Olson was never left alone in the duplex or
given a key, whereas, in
Jones, the owner of the apartment
was away and Jones had a key with which he could come and go and
admit and exclude others. These differences are crucial, it is
argued, because, in not disturbing the holding in
Jones,
the Court pointed out that, while his host was away, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude
others from it.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at
439 U. S. 149.
We do not understand
Rakas, however, to hold that an
overnight guest can never have a legitimate expectation of privacy
except when his host is away and he has a key, or that only when
those facts are present may an overnight guest assert the
"unremarkable proposition,"
Rakas, supra, at
439 U. S. 142,
that a person may have a sufficient interest in a place other than
his home to enable him to be free in that place from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the everyday
expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in
another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves
functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others'
homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure,
when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out
of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit
for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many
times in our lives. From either perspective, we think that society
recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home.
Page 495 U. S. 99
From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in
another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a
place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone
but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most
vulnerable when we are asleep, because we cannot monitor our own
safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason
that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we
cannot sleep in our own home, we seek out another private place to
sleep, whether it be a hotel room or the home of a friend. Society
expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone
booth -- "a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants'
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as
reasonable,"
Katz, 389 U.S. at
389 U. S. 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house
is not inconsistent with the guest's having a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the permission
of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with
his guest. It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a
restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep,
the guest will have a measure of control over the premises. The
host may admit or exclude from the house as he prefers, but it is
unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to see or meet with
the guest over the objection of the guest. On the other hand, few
houseguests will invite others to visit them while they are guests
without consulting their hosts; but the latter, who have the
authority to exclude despite the wishes of the guest, will often be
accommodating. The point is that hosts will more likely than not
respect the privacy interests of their guests, who are entitled to
a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have
no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal
authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. If
the untrammeled power to admit and exclude were essential to Fourth
Amendment protection,
Page 495 U. S. 100
an adult daughter temporarily living in the home of her parents
would have no legitimate expectation of privacy, because her right
to admit or exclude would be subject to her parents' veto.
Because respondent's expectation of privacy in the Bergstrom
home was rooted in "understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society,"
Rakas, supra, at
439 U. S. 144,
n. 12, it was legitimate, and respondent can claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment.
III
In
Payton v. New York, the Court had no occasion to
"consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation,
described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would
justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either
arrest or search,"
445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 583.
This case requires us to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court was correct in holding that there were no exigent
circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into the house
to make the arrest.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially the correct
standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. The
court observed that
"a warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence,
Welsh [v.
Wisconsin], 466 U. S. 740 [(1984)], or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the
police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling."
436 N.W.2d at 97. The court also apparently thought that, in the
absence of hot pursuit, there must be at least probable cause to
believe that one or more of the other factors justifying the entry
were present and that in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity
of the crime, and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be
considered. Applying this standard, the state court determined that
exigent circumstances did not exist.
We are not inclined to disagree with this fact-specific
application of the proper legal standard. The court pointed out
Page 495 U. S. 101
that, although a grave crime was involved, respondent "was known
not to be the murderer, but thought to be the driver of the getaway
car,"
ibid., and that the police had already recovered the
murder weapon,
ibid.
"The police knew that Louanne and Julie were with the suspect in
the upstairs duplex, with no suggestion of danger to them. Three or
four Minneapolis police squads surrounded the house. The time was 3
p.m., Sunday. . . . It was evident the suspect was going nowhere.
If he came out of the house, he would have been promptly
apprehended."
Ibid. We do not disturb the state court's judgment that
these facts do not add up to exigent circumstances.
IV
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme
Court.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST and Justice BLACKMUN dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
Because the absence of a warrant made respondent's arrest
illegal, the court did not review the trial court's determination
that the police had probable cause for the arrest. 436 N.W.2d at
95. Hence, we judge the case on the assumption that there was
probable cause.
[
Footnote 2]
The State had not argued that, if the arrest was illegal,
respondent's statement was nevertheless not tainted by the
illegality.
Id. at 98. Likewise, at oral argument before
this Court, counsel for the State expressly disavowed any claim
that the statement was not a fruit of the arrest. Tr. Oral Arg.
4-5. We will therefore not raise
sua sponte the
applicability of
New York v. Harris, ante, p.
495 U. S. 14, to
the facts of this case.
[
Footnote 3]
The court left for the trial court on remand respondent's claims
that other evidence -- statements by persons present at 2406
Fillmore at the time of the arrest and a statement by Ecker
obtained after the police showed him respondent's statement --
should also have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal
arrest.
[
Footnote 4]
The 12 factors are:
(1) the visitor has some property rights in the dwelling;
(2) the visitor is related by blood or marriage to the owner or
lessor of the dwelling;
(3) the visitor receives mail at the dwelling or has his name on
the door;
(4) the visitor has a key to the dwelling;
(5) the visitor maintains regular or continuous presence in the
dwelling, especially sleeping there regularly;
(6) the visitor contributes to the upkeep of the dwelling,
either monetarily or otherwise;
(7) the visitor has been present at the dwelling for a
substantial length of time prior to the arrest;
(8) the visitor stores his clothes or other possessions in the
dwelling;
(9) the visitor has been granted by the owner exclusive use of a
particular area of the dwelling;
(10) the visitor has the right to exclude other persons from the
dwelling;
(11) the visitor is allowed to remain in the dwelling when the
owner is absent;
(12) the visitor has taken precautions to develop and maintain
his privacy in the dwelling.
Brief for Petitioner 21.
[
Footnote 5]
Of course, 2406 Fillmore need not be respondent's "home,"
temporary or otherwise, in order for him to enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy there. "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,"
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 351
(1967), and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.
Id. at
389 U. S. 359.
Mr. Katz could complain because he had such an expectation in the
bugged telephone booth, not because it was his "home" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Similarly, if Olson had a reasonable
expectation of privacy as a one-night guest, his warrantless
seizure was unreasonable whether or not the upper unit at 2406
Fillmore was his home.
[
Footnote 6]
Olson, who had been staying at Ecker's home for several days
before the robbery, spent the night of the robbery on the floor of
the Bergstroms' home, with their permission. He had a change of
clothes with him at the duplex.
Justice STEVENS, concurring.
While I join the Court's entire opinion, I add this caveat
concerning the discussion in Part II of respondent's standing to
challenge his arrest on federal constitutional grounds. If we had
concluded that he did not have standing as a matter of federal law,
the question that would then have been presented would be whether
this Court simply should have dismissed the appeal. For we have no
power to prevent state courts from allowing litigants to raise
federal questions even though they would not have standing to do so
in a federal court.
See Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947,
467 U. S.
970-971 (1984) (concurring opinion).
Questions of that kind buttress my opinion that the Court grants
review in far too many cases in which state courts have protected
the constitutional rights of their own citizens. Notwithstanding
the Court's decision to enlarge its
Page 495 U. S. 102
own power to review state court judgments,
see Michigan v.
Long, 463 U. S. 1032
(1983), I remain convinced that this power should be used
sparingly.
See generally Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U. S. 673,
475 U. S.
689-708 (1986) (dissenting opinion). Only in the most
unusual case should the Court volunteer its opinion that a state
court has imposed standards upon its own law enforcement officials
that are too high.
Justice KENNEDY, concurring.
I interpret the last two paragraphs of Part III as deference to
a State court's application of the exigent circumstances test to
the facts of this case, and not as an endorsement of that
particular application of the standard. With that understanding, I
join in the opinion of the Court.