Pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA), respondent Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license authorizing
the operation in California of a hydroelectric project, which
draws, and releases a mile later, water from Rock Creek to drive
its generators. After considering the project's economic
feasibility and environmental consequences, FERC set an interim
"minimum flow rate" of water that must remain in the bypassed
section of the stream and thus remains unavailable to drive the
generators. The State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB) issued a
state water permit that conformed to FERC's interim minimum
requirements, but reserved the right to set different permanent
ones. When WRCB later considered a draft order requiring permanent
minimum flow rates well in excess of the FERC rates, the licensee
petitioned FERC for a declaration that FERC possessed exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the project's minimum flow rates. FERC
ordered the licensee to comply with the federal permit's rates,
concluding that the task of setting such rates rested within its
exclusive jurisdiction. It reasoned that setting the rates was
integral to its planning and licensing process under the FPA, and
that giving effect to competing state requirements would interfere
with its balancing of competing considerations in licensing and
would vest in States a veto power over federal projects
inconsistent with the FPA, as interpreted in
First Iowa
Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.
S. 152. WRCB adopted the higher flow requirements and
intervened seeking a rehearing of FERC's order. FERC denied the
request, concluded that the State sought to impose conflicting
license requirements, and reaffirmed its conclusion that it had
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the rates. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that FPA § 27 -- which saves from supersedure
state
"laws . . . relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal
or
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein"
-- as construed in
First Iowa, did not preserve the
State's right to regulate minimum flow rates, and that the FPA
preempted WRCB's minimum flow rate requirements.
Page 495 U. S. 491
Held: The California requirements for minimum stream
flows cannot be given effect and allowed to supplement the federal
flow requirements. Pp.
495 U. S.
496-507.
(a) Were the meaning of § 27 and the preemptive effect of the
FPA matters of first impression, the State's argument that the
stream flow requirement might relate to a use encompassed by § 27
-- the generation of power or protection of fish -- could be said
to present a close question. However, First Iowa has previously
construed § 27, holding that it is limited to laws relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water in irrigation
or for municipal
or other uses of the same nature, and has
primary, if not exclusive, reference to such
proprietary
rights. Such rights are not implicated in the instant case.
California's request that First Iowa's interpretation be repudiated
misconceives the deference the Court must accord to longstanding
and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting
statutes that underlie complex regulatory regimes. There has been
no sufficient intervening change in the law, or indication that
First Iowa has proved unworkable or has fostered confusion
and inconsistency in the law, that warrants a departure from
established precedent.
First Iowa's limited reading of §
27 has been endorsed,
see FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.
S. 435, and the decision has been employed with approval
in a range of cases. In addition, Congress has amended the FPA to
elaborate and reaffirm
First Iowa's understanding that the
FPA establishes a broad and paramount federal regulatory role. Pp.
495 U. S.
496-500.
(b)
First Iowa's narrow reading of § 27 was not dictum,
but was necessary for and integral to the Court's conclusion that
FPA § 9(b) -- which governs submission to the federal licensing
agency of evidence of compliance with state law -- did not require
licensees to obtain a state permit or to demonstrate compliance
with the state law prerequisites to obtaining such a permit, but
rather merely authorized the federal agency to require evidence of
actions consistent with the federal permit. A broad interpretation
of § 27 would have "saved" the state licensing requirements and
would have created concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal
authorities over the same subject matter. Pp.
495 U. S.
500-503.
(c) Although
California v. United States, 438 U.
S. 645, construed § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 --
which is similar to, and served as a model for, FPA § 27 -- in a
manner more generous to the States' regulatory powers than was
First Iowa's reading of § 27, it bears quite indirectly,
at best, upon the FPA's interpretation. In interpreting the
Reclamation Act, the Court did not advert to or purport to
interpret the FPA, and held simply that § 8 requires the Secretary
of the Interior to comply with state laws governing the use of
water employed in federal reclamation projects. The purpose,
structure, and legislative history of
Page 495 U. S. 492
the two statutes show that the FPA envisioned a considerably
broader and more active federal oversight role in hydropower
development than did the Reclamation Act. Even if the two savings
clauses were properly viewed in isolation from the remainder of
their respective Acts, § 8 explicitly directs that the Secretary
"shall proceed in conformity with such [state] laws," language
which has no counterpart in § 27 and which was crucial to the
Court's interpretation of § 8. Pp.
495 U. S.
503-505.
(d) Section 27's legislative history does not require
abandonment of
First Iowa's interpretation, because a
quite natural reading of the statutory language has failed to
displace an intervening decision providing a contrary
interpretation; because
First Iowa expressly considered
the history and found it to support the Court's interpretation of
the FPA and § 27; because it is only tangentially related to the
issue at hand; and because strong interests support adherence to
First Iowa. Pp.
495 U. S.
505-506.
(e) The FPA and the federal license conditions established
pursuant to the Act preempt the California stream flow
requirements. The State's requirements conflict with FERC's
licensing authority and with the balance struck by the federal
license condition. Pp.
495 U. S.
506-507.
877 F.2d 743, affirmed.
Page 495 U. S. 493
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns overlapping federal and state regulation of a
hydroelectric project located near a California stream. California
seeks to ensure that the project's operators maintain water flowing
in the stream sufficient, in the State's judgment, to protect the
stream's fish. The Federal Government claims the exclusive
authority to set the minimum stream flows that the federally
licensed power plant must maintain. Each side argues that its
position is consistent with the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41
Stat. 1063, as
Page 495 U. S. 494
amended, 16 U.S.C. § 791a
et seq. (1982 ed.), and, in
particular, with § 27 of that Act. We granted certiorari to resolve
these competing claims.
I
The Rock Creek hydroelectric project lies near the confluence of
the South Fork American River and one of the river's tributaries,
Rock Creek. Rock Creek runs through federally managed land located
within California. The project draws water from Rock Creek to drive
its generators and then releases the water near the confluence of
the stream and river, slightly less than one mile from where it is
drawn. The state and federal requirements at issue govern the
"minimum flow rate" of water that must remain in the bypassed
section of the stream and that thus remains unavailable to drive
the generators.
In 1983, pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA or Act), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license
authorizing the operation of the Rock Creek project.
Keating, 23 FERC � 62,137. Section 4(e) of the FPA
empowers FERC to issue licenses for projects
"necessary or convenient . . . for the development,
transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in
any of the streams . . . over which Congress has jurisdiction."
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982 ed.). Section 10(a) of the Act also
authorizes FERC to issue licenses subject to the conditions that
FERC deems best suited for power development and other public uses
of the waters. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982 ed.). Congress' subsequent
amendments to those provisions expressly direct that FERC consider
a project's effect on fish and wildlife as well as "power and
development purposes." Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986,
Pub.L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243, 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1). FERC
issued the 1983 license and set minimum flow rates after
considering the project's economic feasibility and environmental
consequences. In part to protect trout in the stream, the
license
Page 495 U. S. 495
required that the project maintain interim minimum flow rates of
11 cubic feet per second (cfs) during May through September and 15
cfs during the remainder of the year. 23 FERC � 62,137, at 63,204.
The license also required the licensee to submit studies
recommending a permanent minimum flow rate, after consulting with
federal and state fish and wildlife protection agencies.
Ibid. In 1985, the licensee submitted a report
recommending that FERC adopt the interim flow rates as permanent
rates. The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG)
recommended that FERC require significantly higher minimum flow
rates.
The licensee had also applied for state water permits, and, in
1984, the State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB) issued a
permit that conformed to FERC's interim minimum flow requirements
but reserved the right to set different permanent minimum flow
rates. App. 65-67. When the WRCB in 1987 considered a draft order
requiring permanent minimum flow rates of 60 cfs from March through
June and 30 cfs during the remainder of the year, the licensee
petitioned FERC for a declaration that FERC possessed exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the project's minimum flow requirements.
Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 38 FERC � 61,240, p.
61,772 (1987). The licensee, by then respondent Rock Creek Limited
Partnership, also claimed that the higher minimum flow rates sought
by the WRCB would render the project economically infeasible.
Ibid.
In March, 1987, FERC issued an order directing the licensee to
comply with the minimum flow requirements of the federal permit. In
that order, FERC concluded that the task of setting minimum flows
rested within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Id. at 61,774.
The Commission reasoned that setting minimum flow requirements was
integral to its planning and licensing process under FPA § 10(a);
giving effect to competing state requirements "would interfere with
the Commission's balancing of competing considerations in
licensing" and would vest in States a veto power over federal
Page 495 U. S. 496
projects inconsistent with the FPA, as interpreted in
First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.
S. 152 (1946). 38 FERC, at 61,773. FERC also directed an
Administrative Law Judge to hold a hearing to determine the
appropriate permanent minimum flow rates for the project.
Id. at 61,774. After considering proposals and arguments
of the licensee, the CDFG, and FERC staff, the Administrative Law
Judge set the minimum flow rate for the project at 20 cfs during
the entire year.
Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC �
63,019 (1987). Four days after FERC's declaratory order, the WRCB
issued an order directing the licensee to comply with the higher
minimum flow requirements contained in its draft order. App. 73.
The WRCB also intervened to seek a rehearing of FERC's order. FERG
denied the rehearing request, concluded that the State sought to
impose conflicting license requirements, and reaffirmed its
conclusion that the FPA, as interpreted in
First Iowa,
provided FERC with exclusive jurisdiction to determine minimum flow
rates.
Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC 61, 198
(1987).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed FERC's order
denying rehearing.
California ex rel. State Water Resources
Board v. FERC, 877 F.2d 743 (1989). That court, too, concluded
that
First Iowa governed the case; that FPA § 27, as
construed in
First Iowa, did not preserve California's
right to regulate minimum flow rates; and that the FPA preempted
WRCB's minimum flow rate requirements.
Ibid. We granted
certiorari, 493 U.S. 991 (1989), and we now affirm.
II
In the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 863, Congress clearly
intended a broad federal role in the development and licensing of
hydroelectric power. That broad delegation of power to the
predecessor of FERC, however, hardly determines the extent to which
Congress intended to have the Federal Government exercise exclusive
powers, or intended
Page 495 U. S. 497
to preempt concurrent state regulation of matters affecting
federally licensed hydroelectric projects. The parties' dispute
regarding the latter issue turns principally on the meaning of § 27
of the FPA, which provides the clearest indication of how Congress
intended to allocate the regulatory authority of the States and the
Federal Government. That section provides:
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as
affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with
the laws of the respective States relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or
for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein."
16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982 ed.). Were this a case of first
impression, petitioner's argument based on the statute's language
could be said to present a close question. As petitioner argues,
California's minimum stream flow requirement might plausibly be
thought to "relat[e] to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used . . . for . . . other uses," namely the
generation of power or the protection of fish. This interpretation
would accord with the "presumption against finding preemption of
state law in areas traditionally regulated by the States" and
"'with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S.
93,
490 U. S. 101
(1989), quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947);
see California v. United States, 438 U.
S. 645,
438 U. S.
653-663 (1978) (tracing States' traditional powers over
exploitation of water). Just as courts may not find state measures
preempted in the absence of clear evidence that Congress so
intended, so must they give full effect to evidence that Congress
considered, and sought to preserve, the States' coordinate
regulatory role in our federal scheme.
But the meaning of § 27 and the preemptive effect of the FPA are
not matters of first impression. Forty-four
Page 495 U. S. 498
years ago, this Court in
First Iowa construed the
section and provided the understanding of the FPA that has since
guided the allocation of state and federal regulatory authority
over hydroelectric projects. The Court interpreted § 27 as
follows:
"The effect of § 27, in protecting state laws from supersedure,
is limited to laws as to the control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses
of the same nature. It therefore has primary, if not
exclusive, reference to such
proprietary rights. The
phrase 'any vested right acquired therein' further emphasizes the
application of the section to property rights. There is nothing in
the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words
'other uses.' Those words, however, are confined to rights of the
same nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or
for municipal purposes."
First Iowa, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S.
175-176 (emphasis added). The Court interpreted § 27's
reservation of limited powers to the States as part of the
congressional scheme to divide state from federal jurisdiction over
hydroelectric projects and, "in those fields where rights are not
thus
saved' to the States . . . to let the supersedure of the
state laws by federal legislation take its natural course."
Id. at 328 U. S.
176.
We decline at this late date to revisit and disturb the
understanding of § 27 set for in
First Iowa. As petitioner
prudently concedes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7,
First Iowa's
interpretation of § 27 does not encompass the California regulation
at issue: California's minimum stream flow requirements neither
reflect nor establish "proprietary rights" or "rights of the same
nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for
municipal purposes."
First Iowa, supra, at
328 U. S. 176;
see Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d
590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979);
accord, California Trout,
Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d
816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979). Instead, petitioner
Page 495 U. S. 499
requests that we repudiate First Iowa's interpretation of § 27
and the FPA. This argument misconceives the deference this Court
must accord to longstanding and well-entrenched decisions,
especially those interpreting statutes that underlie complex
regulatory regimes. Adherence to precedent is, in the usual case, a
cardinal and guiding principle of adjudication, and
"[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis have special force
in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is
implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done."
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.
S. 164,
491 U. S.
172-173 (1989). There has been no sufficient intervening
change in the law, or indication that
First Iowa has
proved unworkable or has fostered confusion and inconsistency in
the law, that warrants our departure from established precedent.
Cf. id. at
491 U. S. 173.
This Court has endorsed and applied
First Iowa's limited
reading of § 27,
see FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.
S. 435 (1955);
cf. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 347 U. S. 239
(1954), and has employed the decision with approval in a range of
decisions, both addressing the FPA and in other contexts.
See,
e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.
S. 331,
455 U. S. 338,
n. 6 (1982);
Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians, 466 U. S. 765,
466 U. S. 773
(1984);
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,
357 U. S. 320,
357 U. S. 334
(1958);
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.
S. 190,
461 U. S. 223,
n. 34 (1983). By directing FERC to consider the recommendations of
state wildlife and other regulatory agencies while providing FERC
with final authority to establish license conditions (including
those with terms inconsistent with the States' recommendations),
Congress has amended the FPA to elaborate and reaffirm
First
Iowa's understanding that the FPA establishes a broad and
paramount federal regulatory role.
See 16 U.S.C. §§
803(a)(1)-(3) (FERC to issue license on conditions that protect
fish and wildlife, after considering
Page 495 U. S. 500
recommendations of state agencies), as amended by the Electric
Consumers Protection Act of 1986; 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(j) (1)-(2) (FERC
license conditions protecting fish and wildlife to be based on
recommendations of federal and state wildlife agencies, with FERC
to issue findings if it adopts conditions contrary to
recommendations);
cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409,
476 U. S. 424
(1986) ("We are especially reluctant to reject this presumption [of
adherence to precedent] in an area that has seen careful, intense,
and sustained congressional attention").
Petitioner asks this Court fundamentally to restructure a highly
complex and long-enduring regulatory regime, implicating
considerable reliance interests of licensees and other participants
in the regulatory process. That departure would be inconsistent
with the measured and considered change that marks appropriate
adjudication of such statutory issues.
See Square D Co.,
supra, at
472 U. S. 424 (for
statutory determinations, "
it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. .
. . This is commonly true, even where the error is a matter of
serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation,'"
quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.
S. 393, 285 U. S. 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Petitioner also argues that we should disregard
First
Iowa's discussion of § 27 because it was merely dictum. It is
true that our immediate concern in
First Iowa was the
interpretation of § 9(b) of the FPA, which governs submission to
the federal licensing agency of evidence of compliance with state
law. [
Footnote 1] The Court
determined that § 9(b) did not require
Page 495 U. S. 501
licensees to obtain a state permit or to demonstrate compliance
with the state law prerequisites to obtaining such a permit.
First Iowa, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S.
163-164,
328 U. S. 167,
328 U. S. 177.
Instead, the Court construed the section merely as authorizing the
federal agency to require evidence of actions consistent with the
federal permit.
Id. at
328 U. S.
167-169,
328 U. S.
177-179.
First Iowa's limited reading of § 27
was, however, necessary for, and integral to, that conclusion. Like
this case,
First Iowa involved a state permit requirement
that related to the control of water for particular uses but that
did not relate to or establish proprietary rights. Iowa had
required as one condition of securing a state permit that diverted
water be
"returned . . . at the nearest practicable place without being
materially diminished in quantity or polluted or rendered
deleterious to fish life,"
Iowa Code § 7771 (1939), a provision the Court found to conflict
with the federal requirements and to "strik[e] at the heart of the
present project."
First Iowa, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S.
166-167,
328 U. S.
170-171. The Court reasoned that, absent an express
congressional command, § 9(b) could not be read to require
compliance with, and thus to preserve, state laws that conflicted
with and were otherwise preempted by the federal requirements.
See id. at
328 U. S.
166-167 ("If a state permit is not required, there is no
justification for requiring the petitioner, as a condition of
securing its federal permit, to present evidence of the
petitioner's compliance with the requirements of the State Code for
a state permit");
id. at
328 U. S. 177.
Only the Court's narrow reading of § 27 allowed it to sustain this
interpretation of § 9(b). Had § 27 been given the broader meaning
that Iowa sought, it would have "saved" the state requirements at
issue, made the state permit one that could be issued, and
supported the interpretation of § 9(b) as
Page 495 U. S. 502
requiring evidence of compliance with those state requirements,
rather than compliance only with those requirements consistent with
the federal license.
The Court's related, but more general, rationale for its reading
of § 9(b) in
First Iowa also necessarily rested on its
narrow construction of § 27. The Court framed the issue as whether
the Act allowed the States to regulate through permit requirements
such as Iowa's "the very requirements of the project that Congress
has placed in the discretion of the Federal Power Commission."
Id. at
328 U. S. 165
(footnote citing FPA § 10(a) omitted). The Court rejected the
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction and interpreted the FPA as
mandating divided powers and
"a dual system involving the close integration of these powers,
rather than a dual system of futile duplication of two authorities
over the same subject matter."
Id. at
328 U. S. 171;
see id. at
328 U. S. 174
(no "divided authority over any one subject");
id. at
328 U. S. 181
(comprehensive federal role "leave[s] no room or need for
conflicting state controls"). Section 9 reflected the operation of
this exclusive federal authority.
See id. at
328 U. S.
167-169;
id. at
328 U. S. 168
("Where the Federal Government supersedes the state government
there is no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final
authority"). In accord with this view, the Court interpreted § 9(b)
as requiring compliance only with state measures relevant to
federal requirements, rather than, as would exist under a system of
concurrent jurisdiction, compliance with the state requirements
necessary to secure the state permit.
Id. at
328 U. S.
167-169. Instead, only § 27 preserved and defined the
States' exclusive regulatory sphere.
Id. at
328 U. S.
175-178. That is, the Court rejected an interpretation
of § 9(b) that would have "saved" or accommodated the state permit
system and its underlying requirements. To reach its interpretation
of § 9(b), however, the Court had to interpret § 27 consistently
with the limited state regulatory sphere and in a manner that did
not, by "saving" the Iowa requirements, establish "divided
authority over any one subject."
Id. at
328 U. S. 174.
Constricting
Page 495 U. S. 503
§ 27 to encompass only laws relating to proprietary rights, and
thus leaving the permit requirements at issue to the federal
sphere, accomplished that goal. The Court's discussion immediately
after its extended discussion of § 27 illustrates the relation
between the sections. Before distinguishing § 27's role in saving
state law from § 9(b)'s role in the sphere of exclusive federal
regulation, the Court concluded:
"[Section 27] is therefore thoroughly consistent with the
integration, rather than the duplication, of federal and state
jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens the
argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus 'saved' to
the States, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state
laws by federal legislation take its natural course."
Id. at
328 U. S. 176.
The Court's interpretation of § 9(b), of course, rested on that
supersedure, and required that the remaining field "saved" to the
States by § 27 be limited correspondingly.
Petitioner also argues that our decision in
California v.
United States, 438 U. S. 645
(1978), construing § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, [
Footnote 2] requires that we abandon
First Iowa's interpretation of § 27 and the FPA.
Petitioner reasons that § 8 is similar to, and served as a model
for, FPA § 27, that this Court in
California v. United
States interpreted § 8 in a manner inconsistent with
First
Iowa's reading of § 27, and that that reading of § 8,
subsequent to
First Iowa, in some manner overrules or
repudiates
First Iowa's understanding of § 27.
Page 495 U. S. 504
California v. United States is cast in broad terms, and
embodies a conception of the States' regulatory powers in some
tension with that set forth in
First Iowa, but that
decision bears quite indirectly, at best, upon interpretation of
the FPA. The Court in
California v. United States
interpreted the Reclamation Act of 1902; it did not advert to, or
purport to interpret, the FPA, and held simply that § 8 requires
the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state laws, not
inconsistent with congressional directives, governing use of water
employed in federal reclamation projects.
California v. United
States, supra. Also, as in
First Iowa, the Court in
California v. United States examined the purpose,
structure, and legislative history of the entire statute before it,
and employed those sources to construe the statute's saving clause.
See 438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
649-651,
438 U. S.
653-670,
438 U. S.
674-675. Those sources indicate, of course, that the FPA
envisioned a considerably broader and more active federal oversight
role in hydropower development than did the Reclamation Act.
Compare FPA §§ 4, 9, 10, as codified, 16 U.S.C. §§ 797,
802, 803,
and First Iowa, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 164,
328 U. S.
167-169,
328 U. S.
171-174,
328 U. S.
179-181,
with Reclamation Act of 1902 §§ 1, 2,
32 Stat. 388, as codified, 43 U.S.C. §§ 391, 411 (1982 ed.),
and California v. United States, supra, at
438 U. S.
649-651,
438 U. S.
663-670.
Even if the two saving clauses were properly viewed in isolation
from the remainder of their respective Acts and resulting
regulatory schemes, significant differences exist between them.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, after referring to state water
laws relating to water used in irrigation and preserved by the Act,
contains an explicit direction that "the Secretary of the Interior,
in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in
conformity with such [state] laws." 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1982 ed.).
This language has no counterpart in § 27 of the FPA, and was
crucial to the Court's interpretation of § 8.
See California v.
United States, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S. 650,
438 U. S.
664-665,
438 U. S.
674-675. Although
California v. United States
and
First Iowa accord different effect to laws
relating
Page 495 U. S. 505
to water uses, this difference stems in part from the different
roles assumed by the federal actor in each case, as reflected in §
8's explicit directive to the Secretary. The Secretary, in
executing a particular reclamation project, is in a position
analogous to a licensee under the FPA, and need not comply with
state laws conflicting with congressional directives respecting
particular reclamation projects,
see id. at
438 U. S.
672-674; similarly, a federal licensee under the FPA
need not comply with state requirements that conflict with the
federal license provisions established pursuant to the FPA's
directives. An additional textual difference is that § 8 refers
only to "water used in irrigation," and contains no counterpart to
§ 27's reference to "other uses," the provision essential to
petitioner's argument. Laws controlling water used in irrigation
relate to proprietary rights, as the
First Iowa Court
indicated, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 176,
and n. 20, and § 8 does not indicate the appropriate treatment of
laws relating to other water uses that do not implicate proprietary
rights.
Given these differences between the statutes and saving
provisions, it should come as no surprise that
California v.
United States did not refer either to § 27 or to
First
Iowa. Since the Court decided
California v. United
States, we have continued to cite
First Iowa with
approval.
See, e.g., Escondido Mut. Water Co., 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 773;
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. at
461 U. S. 223,
n. 34;
New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 338,
n. 6. We do not believe that
California v. United States
requires that we disavow
First Iowa in this case.
Finally, petitioner argues that § 27's legislative history
requires us to abandon
First Iowa's interpretation of that
section. Whatever the usefulness of legislative history for
statutory interpretation in the usual case, that source provides
petitioner with no aid. If a quite natural reading of the statutory
language fails to displace an intervening decision providing a
contrary interpretation, legislative history supporting that
reading and, by definition, before the Court that
Page 495 U. S. 506
has already construed the statute provides little additional
reason to overturn the decision.
Cf. Patterson, 491 U.S.
at
491 U. S.
172-174 (reviewing sources most likely to prompt
overruling of decision). Indeed,
First Iowa expressly
considered the legislative history of the FPA, and of § 27 in
particular, and found that source to support its interpretation of
both.
First Iowa, supra, at
328 U. S.
171-174,
328 U. S. 176,
n. 20,
328 U. S. 179.
Given the tangential relation of the legislative history to the
issue at hand and the interests supporting adherence to
First
Iowa, we decline to parse again the legislative history to
determine whether the Court in
First Iowa erred in its
understanding of the development, as well as the meaning, of the
statute.
Adhering to
First Iowa's interpretation of § 27, we
conclude that the California requirements for minimum instream
flows cannot be given effect and allowed to supplement the federal
flow requirements. A state measure is
"preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.
S. 238,
464 U. S. 248
(1984) (citations omitted). As Congress directed in FPA § 10(a),
FERC set the conditions of the license, including the minimum
stream flow, after considering which requirements would best
protect wildlife and ensure that the project would be economically
feasible, and thus further power development.
See Rock Creek
Limited Partnership, 41 FERC 63,019 (1987);
Keating,
23 FERC 62, 137 (1983);
see also Rock Creek Limited
Partnership, 41 FERC 61,198 (1987). Allowing California to
impose significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements would
disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in that considered
federal agency determination. FERC has indicated that the
California requirements interfere with its comprehensive planning
authority, and we agree that allowing California to impose the
challenged requirements would be contrary to congressional
intent
Page 495 U. S. 507
regarding the Commission's licensing authority, and would
"constitute a veto of the project that was approved and licensed by
FERC." 877 F.2d at 749;
cf. First Iowa, supra, at
328 U. S.
164-165.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 9(b), 16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (formerly 16 U.S.C. § 802(b)
(1982 ed.)), provides:
"(a) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall
submit to the commission --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with
the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which
the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks
and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power
purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of
developing, transmitting and distributing power, and in any other
business necessary to effect the purposes of a license under this
chapter."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, now 43
U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1982 ed.), provided in part:
"[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any
State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right
acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying
out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of
any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner,
appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate
stream or the waters thereof. . . ."