A general court-martial was convened under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (Code) in New York, where petitioner was serving
in the Coast Guard, to try him for the sexual abuse of fellow
coastguardsmen's minor daughters in his privately owned home in
Alaska during a prior tour of duty. The Code empowers
courts-martial to try servicemen for such crimes. However, the
court granted petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that it
lacked jurisdiction under
O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U. S. 258,
which held that a military tribunal may not try a serviceman
charged with a crime that has no "service connection," and
Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,
401 U. S. 355,
which enumerated numerous factors to be weighed in determining
whether an offense is service-connected. The Coast Guard Court of
Military Review reversed the dismissal and reinstated the charges,
and the Court of Military Appeals affirmed, concluding that the
Alaska offenses were service-connected within the meaning of
O'Callahan and
Relford.
Held: The jurisdiction of a court-martial depends
solely on the accused's status as a member of the Armed Forces, and
not on the "service-connection" of the offense charged. Thus,
O'Callahan is overruled. The plain meaning of Art. I, § 8,
cl. 14, of the Constitution -- which grants Congress plenary power
"[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces" -- supports the military status test, as was held in
numerous decisions of this Court prior to
O'Callahan.
O'Callahan's service-connection test is predicated on the
Court's less-than-accurate reading of the history of court-martial
jurisdiction in England and in this country during the 17th and
18th centuries, which history is far too ambiguous to justify the
restriction on Clause 14's plain language which the Court imported
to it. Clause 14 answers concerns about the general use of military
courts for the trial of ordinary crimes by vesting in Congress,
rather than the Executive, authority to make rules for military
governance. The Clause grants Congress primary responsibility for
balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
military, and Congress' implementation of that responsibility is
entitled to judicial deference. That civil courts are
"ill-equipped" to establish policies regarding matters of military
concern is substantiated
Page 483 U. S. 436
by the confusion evidenced in military court decisions
attempting to apply the service-connection approach, even after
Relford. Pp.
483 U. S.
438-451. 21 M.J. 251, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post p.
483 U. S. 451.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, and in all but the last paragraph of which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined,
post p.
483 U. S.
452.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a
court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a member of the Armed Forces depends on
the "service-connection" of the offense charged. We hold that it
does not, and overrule our earlier decision in
O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U. S. 258
(1969).
While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the
Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sexually
abused two young daughters of fellow coastguardsmen.
Page 483 U. S. 437
Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a 2-year period until he
was transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors Island, New York.
Coast Guard authorities learned of the Alaska crimes only after
petitioner's transfer, and investigation revealed that he had later
committed similar sexual abuse offenses while stationed in New
York. The Governors Island commander convened a general
court-martial to try petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred
in Alaska and New York.
There is no "base" or "post" where Coast Guard personnel live
and work in Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast Guard military
personnel reside in the civilian community. Petitioner's Alaska
offenses were committed in his privately owned home, and the
fathers of the 10- to 12-year-old victims in Alaska were active
duty members of the Coast Guard assigned to the same command as
petitioner. Petitioner's New York offenses also involved daughters
of fellow coastguardsmen, but were committed in Government quarters
on the Governors Island base.
After the general court-martial was convened in New York,
petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for crimes committed in
Alaska on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction under this
Court's decisions in
O'Callahan v. Parker, supra, and
Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,
401 U. S. 355
(1971). [
Footnote 1] Ruling
that the Alaska offenses were not sufficiently "service-connected"
to be tried in the military criminal justice system, the
court-martial judge granted the motion to dismiss. The Government
appealed the dismissal of the charges to the United
Page 483 U. S. 438
States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which reversed the
trial judge's order and reinstated the charges. 21 M.J. 512
(1985).
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Court
of Military Review, concluding that the Alaska offenses were
service-connected within the meaning of
O'Callahan and
Relford. 21 M.J. 251 (1986). Stating that "not every
off-base offense against a servicemember's dependent is
service-connected," the court reasoned that
"sex offenses against young children . . . have a continuing
effect on the victims and their families, and ultimately on the
morale of any military unit or organization to which the family
member is assigned."
Id. at 256. In reaching its holding, the court also
weighed a number of other factors, including: the interest of
Alaska civilian officials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship
on the victims, who had moved from Alaska, that would result if
they were called to testify both at a civilian trial in Alaska and
at the military proceeding in New York; and the benefits to
petitioner and the Coast Guard from trying the Alaska and New York
offenses together. [
Footnote 2]
This Court subsequently granted certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1259(3) (1982 ed., Supp. III) to review the decision of the Court
of Military Appeals. 476 U.S. 1181 (1986). We now affirm.
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising this authority,
Congress has empowered courts-martial to try servicemen for the
crimes proscribed by the U.C.M.J.,
Page 483 U. S. 439
Arts. 2, 17, 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 817. The Alaska offenses with
which petitioner was charged are each described in the U.C.M.J.
See n 1,
supra. Thus, it is not disputed that the court-martial
convened in New York possessed the statutory authority to try
petitioner on the Alaska child abuse specifications.
In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this Court
interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise of
court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the
military status of the accused.
Gosa v. Mayden,
413 U. S. 665,
413 U. S. 673
(1973) (plurality opinion);
see Kinsella v. United States ex
rel. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234,
361 U. S.
240-241,
361 U. S. 243
(1960);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
354 U. S. 22-23
(1957) (plurality opinion);
Grafton v. United States,
206 U. S. 333,
206 U. S. 348
(1907);
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.
S. 109,
158 U. S. 114
(1895);
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.
S. 167,
116 U. S.
183-185 (1886);
Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U. S. 509,
97 U. S.
513-514 (1879);
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2,
71 U. S. 123
(1866);
cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11,
350 U. S. 15
(1955);
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S.
1,
255 U. S. 6-9
(1921);
Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S.
11,
255 U. S. 20-21
(1921). This view was premised on what the Court described as the
"natural meaning" of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the Fifth
Amendment's exception for "cases arising in the land or naval
forces."
Reid v. Covert, supra, at
354 U. S. 19;
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra, at
350 U. S. 15. As
explained in
Kinsella v. Singleton, supra:
"The test for jurisdiction . . . is one of status, namely,
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who
can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.'
. . ."
Id. at
361 U. S.
240-241 (emphasis in original).
"Without contradiction, the materials . . . show that military
jurisdiction has always been based on the "status" of the accused,
rather than on the nature of the offense. To say that military
jurisdiction "defies definition in terms of military
status'"
is to defy the unambiguous
Page 483 U. S.
440
language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the historical
background thereof and the precedents with reference
thereto."
Id. at
361 U. S. 243.
Implicit in the military status test was the principle that
determinations concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction
over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter reserved for
Congress:
"[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must
determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The
Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress."
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137,
346 U. S. 140
(1953) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
See also Coleman
v. Tennessee, supra, at
97 U. S. 514;
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181,
187 (1962). [
Footnote 3]
In 1969, the Court in
O'Callahan v. Parker departed
from the military status test and announced the "new constitutional
principle" that a military tribunal may not try a serviceman
charged with a crime that has no service connection.
See Gosa
v. Mayden, supra, at 673. Applying this principle, the
O'Callahan Court held that a serviceman's off-base sexual
assault on a civilian with no connection with the military could
not be tried by court-martial. On reexamination of
Page 483 U. S. 441
O'Callahan, we have decided that the service-connection
test announced in that decision should be abandoned.
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the
Armed Forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as
do the provisions granting Congress authority,
inter alia,
to regulate commerce among the several States, to coin money, and
to declare war. On its face there is no indication that the grant
of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other
authority to Congress in the same section. Whatever doubts there
might be about the extent of Congress' power under Clause 14 to
make rules for the "Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," that power surely embraces the authority to regulate the
conduct of persons who are actually members of the Armed Services.
As noted by Justice Harlan in his
O'Callahan dissent,
there is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the
Constitution that the Framers intended the language of Clause 14 to
be accorded anything other than its plain meaning. [
Footnote 4] Alexander Hamilton described
these powers of Congress "essential to the common defense" as
follows:
"These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means
which may be necessary to satisfy them. . . ."
"
* * * *"
". . . Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this
purpose [common safety]? The government of the Union must be
empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have
relation to them."
The Federalist No. 23, pp. 152-154 (E. Bourne ed.1947).
Page 483 U. S. 442
The
O'Callahan Court's historical foundation for its
holding rests on the view that,
"[b]oth in England prior to the American Revolution and in our
own national history, military trial of soldiers committing
civilian offenses has been viewed with suspicion."
395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 268.
According to the Court, the historical evidence demonstrates that,
during the late 17th and 18th centuries in England, as well as the
early years of this country, courts-martial did not have authority
to try soldiers for civilian offenses. The Court began with a
review of the 17th-century struggle in England between Parliament
and the Crown over control of the scope of court-martial
jurisdiction. As stated by the Court, this conflict was resolved
when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689, which
granted Parliament exclusive authority to define the jurisdiction
of military tribunals.
See ibid. The Court correctly
observed that Parliament, wary of abuses of military power,
exercised its new authority sparingly. [
Footnote 5] Indeed, a statute enacted by Parliament in
1689 provided for court-martial only for the crimes of sedition,
mutiny, and desertion, and exempted members of militia from its
scope. Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5.
The
O'Callahan Court's representation of English
history following the Mutiny Act of 1689, however, is less than
accurate. In particular, the Court posited that
"[i]t was . . . the rule in Britain at the time of the American
Revolution that a soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense
committed in Britain; instead, military officers were required to
use their energies and office to insure that the accused soldier
would be tried before a civil court."
395 U.S. at
359 U. S. 269.
In making this statement, the Court was apparently referring to
Section
Page 483 U. S. 443
XI, Article I, of the British Articles of War in effect at the
time of the Revolution. [
Footnote
6] This Article provided:
"Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a Capital
Crime, or of having used Violence, or committed any Offence against
the Persons or Property of Our Subjects, . . . the Commanding
Officer, and Officers of every Regiment, Troop, or Party to which
the . . . accused shall belong, are hereby required, upon
Application duly made by, or in behalf of the Party or Parties
injured, to use . . . utmost Endeavors to deliver over such accused
. . . to the Civil Magistrate."
British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in G. Davis, Military
Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d rev. ed.1915). This
provision, however, is not the sole statement in the Articles
bearing on court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses.
Specifically, Section XIV, Article XVI, provided that all officers
and soldiers who
"shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to
any of Our Subjects, unless by Order of the then Commander in Chief
of Our Forces, to annoy Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us,
he or they that shall be found guilty of offending herein shall
(besides such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished
according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence, by the Judgment
of a Regimental or General Court Martial."
Id. at 593. Under this provision, military tribunals
had jurisdiction over offenses punishable under civil law. Nelson
& Westbrook
Page 483 U. S. 444
11. Accordingly, the
O'Callahan Court erred in
suggesting that, at the time of the American Revolution, military
tribunals in England were available "only where ordinary civil
courts were unavailable." 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 269,
and n. 11.
The history of early American practice furnishes even less
support to
O'Callahan's historical thesis. The American
Articles of War of 1776, which were based on the British Articles,
contained a provision similar to Section XI, Article I, of the
British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver over to
civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of
"a capital crime, . . . having used violence, or . . . any
offence against the persons or property of the good people of any
of the United American States"
upon application by or on behalf of an injured party. American
Articles of War of 1776, Section X, Article I, reprinted in 2
Winthrop 1494. It has been postulated that American courts-martial
had jurisdiction over the crimes described in this provision where
no application for a civilian trial was made by or on behalf of the
injured civilian. [
Footnote 7]
Indeed, American military records reflect trials by court-martial
during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians and
punishable under civil law, such as theft and assault. [
Footnote 8]
The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be found
in the much-disputed "general article" of the 1776 Articles of War,
which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over
"[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which
officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline."
American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article 5,
reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1503.
Page 483 U. S. 445
Some authorities, such as those cited by the
O'Callahan
Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial
jurisdiction to crimes that had a direct impact on military
discipline. [
Footnote 9]
Several others, however, have interpreted the language as
encompassing all noncapital crimes proscribed by the civil law.
[
Footnote 10] Even W.
Winthrop, the authority relied on most extensively by the majority
in
O'Callahan, recognized that military authorities read
the general article to include crimes "committed upon or against
civilians . . . at or near a military camp or post." 2
Winthrop 1124, 1126, n. 1.
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England
and in this country during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too
ambiguous to justify the restriction on the plain language of
Clause 14 which
O'Callahan imported into it. [
Footnote 11]
Page 483 U. S. 446
There is no doubt that the English practice during this period
shows a strong desire in that country to transfer from the Crown to
Parliament the control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction.
And it is equally true that Parliament was chary in granting
jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not as chary as the
O'Callahan opinion suggests. But reading Clause 14
consistently with its plain language does not disserve that
concern; Congress, and not the Executive, was given the authority
to make rules for the regulation of the Armed Forces.
The
O'Callahan Court cryptically stated:
"The 17th century conflict over the proper role of
courts-martial in the enforcement of the domestic criminal law was
not, however, merely a dispute over what organ of government had
jurisdiction. It also involved substantive disapproval of the
general use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes."
395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 268.
But such disapproval in England at the time of William and Mary
hardly proves that the Framers of the Constitution, contrary to the
plenary language in which they conferred the power on Congress,
meant to freeze court-martial usage at a particular time in such a
way that Congress might not change it. The unqualified language of
Clause 14 suggests that, whatever these concerns, they were met by
vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to make
rules for the government of the military. [
Footnote 12]
Page 483 U. S. 447
Given the dearth of historical support for the
O'Callahan holding, there is overwhelming force to Justice
Harlan's reasoning that the plain language of the Constitution, as
interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court preceding
O'Callahan, should be controlling on the subject of
court-martial jurisdiction. 395 U.S. at
395 U. S.
275-278 (dissenting);
cf. Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658,
436 U. S. 696
(1978) ("[W]e ought not
disregard the implications of an
exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100]
years'"), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U. S. 294,
370 U. S. 307
(1962).
Decisions of this Court after
O'Callahan have also
emphasized that Congress has primary responsibility for the
delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the
needs of the military. As we recently reiterated,
"'[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support
armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged.'"
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.
S. 503,
475 U. S. 508
(1986), quoting
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S.
57,
453 U. S. 70
(1981).
Page 483 U. S. 448
Since
O'Callahan, we have adhered to this principle of
deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the
constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated.
See, e.g.,
Goldman v. Weinberger, supra, at
475 U. S.
509-510 (free exercise of religion);
Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U. S. 296,
462 U. S.
300-305 (1983) (racial discrimination);
Rostker v.
Goldberg, supra, at
453 U. S. 64-66,
70-71 (sex discrimination);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.
S. 348,
444 U. S. 357,
360 (1980) (free expression);
Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U. S. 25,
425 U. S. 43
(1976) (right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings);
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.
S. 738,
420 U. S. 753
(1975) (availability of injunctive relief from an impending
court-martial);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.
S. 733,
417 U. S. 756
(1974) (due process rights and freedom of expression).
The notion that civil courts are "ill-equipped" to establish
policies regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by
experience under the service-connection approach.
Chappell v.
Wallace, supra, at
462 U. S. 305.
In his
O'Callahan dissent, Justice Harlan forecasted
that
"the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are
bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation over the
[court-martial] jurisdiction issue."
395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 284.
In fact, within two years after
O'Callahan, this Court
found it necessary to expound on the meaning of the decision,
enumerating a myriad of factors for courts to weigh in determining
whether an offense is service-connected.
Relford v. Commandant,
U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U. S. 355
(1971). Yet the service-connection approach, even as elucidated in
Relford, has proved confusing and difficult for military
courts to apply. [
Footnote
13]
Page 483 U. S. 449
Since
O'Callahan and
Relford, military courts
have identified numerous categories of offenses requiring
specialized analysis of the service-connection requirement. For
example, the courts have highlighted subtle distinctions among
offenses committed on a military base, offenses committed off-base,
offenses arising from events occurring both on and off a base, and
offenses committed on or near the boundaries of a base. [
Footnote 14] Much time and energy
has also been expended in litigation over other jurisdictional
factors, such as the status of the victim of the crime, and the
results are difficult to reconcile. [
Footnote 15] The confusion created by the complexity of
the service-connection requirement, however, is perhaps best
illustrated in the area of off-base drug offenses. [
Footnote 16] Soon after
O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held that drug
offenses were of such "special military significance" that their
trial by court-martial was unaffected by the decision.
United
States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 565, 40 C.M.R. 275, 277
(1969). Nevertheless, the court has changed its position on
Page 483 U. S. 450
the issue no less than two times since
Beeker, each
time basing its decision on
O'Callahan and
Relford. [
Footnote
17]
When considered together with the doubtful foundations of
O'Callahan, the confusion wrought by the decision leads us
to conclude that we should read Clause 14 in accord with the plain
meaning of its language, as we did in the many years before
O'Callahan was decided. That case's novel approach to
court-martial jurisdiction must bow "to the lessons of experience
and the force of better reasoning."
Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393,
285 U. S.
406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We therefore
hold that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated
where, as here, a court-martial
Page 483 U. S. 451
is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the Armed
Services at the time of the offense charged. [
Footnote 18] The judgment of the Court of
Military Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner was charged with 14 specifications alleging indecent
liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of
U.C.M.J., Art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934, 6 specifications alleging
assault in violation of Art. 128, 10 U.S.C. § 928, and 1
specification alleging attempted rape in violation of Art. 80, 10
U.S.C. § 880. The specifications alleged to have occurred in Alaska
included all of the Article 128 and Article 80 specifications and 7
of the Article 134 specifications.
[
Footnote 2]
Following the decision of the Court of Military Appeals,
petitioner unsuccessfully sought a stay from that court and from
Chief Justice Burger. The court-martial reconvened, and petitioner
was convicted of 8 of the 14 specifications alleging offenses
committed in Alaska and 4 of the 7 specifications alleging offenses
committed in New York. These convictions are currently under review
by the convening authority pursuant to U.C.M.J., Art. 60, 10 U.S.C.
§ 860.
[
Footnote 3]
One pre-1969 decision of this Court suggests that the
constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by
court-martial must be limited to "the least possible power adequate
to the end proposed."
United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U. S. 11,
350 U. S. 23
(1955) (emphasis deleted). Broadly read, this dictum applies to
determinations concerning Congress' authority over the
courts-martial of servicemen for crimes committed while they were
servicemen. Yet the Court in
Toth v. Quarles was
addressing only the question whether an ex-serviceman may be tried
by court-martial for crimes committed while serving in the Air
Force. Thus, the dictum may be also interpreted as limited to that
context.
[
Footnote 4]
See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 277
(Harlan, J., dissenting); 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, pp. 329-330 (1911); 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the
Federal Constitution 443, 545 (1876).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., 1 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents
8-9 (2d ed. 1896) (hereinafter Winthrop); G. Nelson & J.
Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for
"Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of
O'Callahan v. Parker,
54 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 7-11 (1969) (hereinafter Nelson &
Westbrook).
[
Footnote 6]
There is some confusion among historians and legal scholars
about which version of the British Articles of War was "in effect"
at the time of the American Revolution. Some cite to the Articles
of War of 1765, and others to the Articles of War of 1774.
Compare, e.g., 2 Winthrop 1448,
with J. Horbaly,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction 34 (1986) (unpublished dissertation,
Yale Law School) (hereinafter Horbaly). For present purposes,
however, the two versions of the Articles contain only stylistic
differences. In the interest of simplicity, we will refer to the
1774 Articles.
[
Footnote 7]
See Nelson & Westbrook 14;
cf. Duke &
Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 Vand.L.Rev. 435, 445-446 (1960)
(hereinafter Duke & Vogel).
[
Footnote 8]
See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 278,
n. 3 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also J. Bishop, Justice
under Fire 81-82 (1974); Nelson & Westbrook 15; Comment,
O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on
the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 Vill.L.Rev. 712, 719, n. 38
(1970) (hereinafter Comment).
[
Footnote 9]
See 2 Winthrop 1123; Duke & Vogel 446-447.
[
Footnote 10]
See, e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.
S. 333,
206 U. S. 348
(1907); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
Appendix to S.Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 (statement of
Brig. Gen. Enoch Crowder).
George Washington also seems to have held this view. When
informed of the decision of a military court that a complaint by a
civilian against a member of the military should be redressed only
in a civilian court, he stated in a General Order dated February
24, 1779:
"All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or
soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well as
subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of military
as civil law, and as punishable by the one as the other."
14 Writings of George Washington 140-141 (J. Fitzpatrick
ed.1936).
[
Footnote 11]
The history of court-martial jurisdiction after the adoption of
the Constitution also provides little support for
O'Callahan. For example, in 1800, Congress enacted
Articles for the Better Government of the Navy, which provided
that
"[a]ll offences committed by persons belonging to the navy while
on the shore shall be punished in the same manner as if they had
been committed at sea."
Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, Art. XVII, 2 Stat. 47. Among the
offenses punishable if committed at sea were murder, embezzlement,
and theft. In addition, the Act also provided that,
"[i]f any person in the navy shall, when on shore, plunder,
abuse, or maltreat any inhabitant, or injure his property in any
way, he shall suffer such punishment as a court martial shall
adjudge."
Art. XXVII, 2 Stat. 48. This broad grant of jurisdiction to
naval courts-martial would suggest that limitations on the power of
other military tribunals during this period were the result of
legislative choice, rather than want of constitutional power.
[
Footnote 12]
See, e.g., O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 277
(Harlan, J., dissenting); 1 W. Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution 413-414, 424-426 (1953) (hereinafter Crosskey);
Comment 718;
but cf. Horbaly 45-56.
The only other basis for saying that the Framers intended the
words of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, to be narrowly construed is the
suggestion that the Framers "could hardly have been unaware of
Blackstone's strong condemnation of criminal justice administered
under military procedures." Duke & Vogel 449. In his
Commentaries, Blackstone wrote:
"When the nation was engaged in war . . . more rigorous methods
were put in use for the raising of armies and the due regulation
and discipline of the soldiery: which are to be looked upon only as
temporary excrescences bred out of the distemper of the state, and
not as any part of the permanent and perpetual laws of the kingdom.
For martial law, which is built on no settled principles, but is
entirely arbitrary in it's [
sic] decisions, is . . .
something indulged in, rather than allowed as a law. The necessity
of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give
it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time
of peace, when the king's courts are open to all persons to receive
justice according to the laws of the land."
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *413. Although we do not doubt
that Blackstone's views on military law were known to the Framers,
see Crosskey 411-412, 424-425, we are not persuaded that
their relevance is sufficiently compelling to overcome the
unqualified language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
[
Footnote 13]
See Cooper,
O'Callahan Revisited: Severing the
Service Connection, 76 Mil.L.Rev. 165, 186-187 (1977) (hereinafter
Cooper); Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only
Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After
O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 Air Force L.Rev. 1, 9-35 (1985)
(hereinafter Tomes);
cf. United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414
416, n. 4. (Ct.Mil.App.1977);
United States v. McCarthy, 2
M.J. 26, 29, n. 1 (Ct.Mil.App.1976).
[
Footnote 14]
See, e.g., United States v. Garries, 19 M.J. 845
(A.F.C.M.R.1985) (serviceman's on-post murder of wife held
service-connected),
aff'd, 22 M.J. 288 (Ct.Mil.App.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986);
United States v.
Williamson, 19 M.J. 617 (A.C.M.R.1984) (serviceman's off-post
sexual offense involving young girl held service-connected);
United States v. Mauck, 17 M.J. 1033 (A.C.M.R.) (variety
of offenses committed 15 feet from arsenal boundary held
service-connected),
review denied, 19 M.J. 106
(Ct.Mil.App.1984);
United States v. Scott, 15 M.J. 589
(A.C.M.R.1983) (serviceman's off-post murder of another serviceman
held service-connected where crime had its basis in on-post conduct
of participants).
[
Footnote 15]
Compare United States v. Wilson, 2 M.J. 24
(Ct.Mil.App.1976) (off-post robbery and assault of a fellow
serviceman held not service-connected),
and United States v.
Tucker, 1 M.J. 463 (Ct.Mil.App.1976) (off-post concealment of
property stolen from fellow serviceman on-post held not
service-connected),
with United States v. Lockwood, 15
M.J. 1 (Ct.Mil.App.1983) (on-post larceny of fellow serviceman's
wallet and use of identification cards in it to obtain loan from an
off-post business establishment held service-connected),
and
United States v. Shorte, 18 M.J. 518 (A.F.C.M.R.1984)
(off-post felonious assault committed against fellow serviceman
held not service-connected).
[
Footnote 16]
See Cooper 172-182; Tomes 13-31.
[
Footnote 17]
Seven years after
United States v. Beeker, the Court of
Military Appeals expressly renounced that decision, holding that
O'Callahan and
Relford mandated the conclusion
that off-base drug offenses by a serviceman could not be tried by
court-martial.
See United States v. McCarthy, supra; United
States v. Williams, 2 M.J. 81, 82 (Ct.Mil.App.1976);
see
also United States v. Conn, 6 M.J. 351, 353 (Ct.Mil.App.1979);
United States v. Alef, supra, at 415-418. Reversing its
position again in 1980, the Court of Military Appeals decided that
such a restrictive approach was not required under this Court's
decisions.
United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 340-351
(1980). The court therefore held that
"the gravity and immediacy of the threat to military personnel
and installations posed by the drug traffic and . . . abuse
convince us that very few drug involvements of a service person
will not be 'service-connected.'"
Id. at 351.
United States v. Trottier, however, has not settled the
confusion in this area. In
Trottier, the court identified
the following exception to its general rule:
"[I]t would not appear that use of marijuana by a serviceperson
on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would
have such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of
a claim of special military interest and significance adequate to
support court-martial jurisdiction under
O'Callahan."
Id. at 350, n. 28. Since
Trottier, at least
two lower military court decisions have found court-martial
jurisdiction over offenses arguably falling within this exception.
See United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884 (A.F.C.M.R.1981),
review denied, 12 M.J. 318 (Ct.Mil.App.1981) (off-post use
of marijuana during 6-day leave held sufficient to establish
service-connection);
United States v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794
(A.F.C.M.R.),
review denied, 12 M.J. 109 (Ct.Mil.App.1981)
(off-post use of marijuana during 6-day leave 275 miles from post
held sufficient to establish service-connection);
see also
Horbaly 534-535.
[
Footnote 18]
Petitioner argues that the Court of Military Appeals' decision
should be reversed because it applies a more expansive subject
matter jurisdiction test to him than had previously been announced.
According to petitioner, the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction
over him violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Our review of the record in this case, however,
reveals that petitioner did not raise his due process claim in the
Court of Military Appeals. The Court of Military Review, which
reinstated the Alaska charges against petitioner, held that
military courts had jurisdiction over petitioner's Alaska offenses.
Petitioner therefore had an opportunity to raise his due process
challenge in the proceedings before the Court of Military Appeals.
He has not offered any explanation for his failure to do so. In
fact, petitioner, in his reply brief and at oral argument, did not
contest the Government's suggestion that he inexcusably failed to
raise his due process claim earlier in the proceedings.
See Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-19; Tr. of Oral Arg.
36-39. We therefore decline to consider the claim.
See, e.g.,
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420,
468 U. S. 443
(1984);
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.
S. 346,
450 U. S. 362
(1981);
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.
S. 783,
431 U. S. 788,
n. 7 (1977).
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
Today's unnecessary overruling of precedent is most unwise. The
opinion of the United States Court of Military Appeals demonstrates
that petitioner's offenses were sufficiently "service-connected" to
confer jurisdiction on the military tribunal. Unless this Court
disagrees with that determination -- and I would be most surprised
to be told that it does -- it has no business reaching out to
reexamine the decisions in
O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U. S. 258
(1969), and
Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary
Barracks, 401 U. S. 355
(1971). While there might be some dispute about the exact standard
to be applied in deciding whether to overrule prior decisions, I
had thought that we all could agree that such drastic action is
only appropriate when essential to
Page 483 U. S. 452
the disposition of a case or controversy before the Court.
* The fact that
any five Members of the Court have the power to reconsider settled
precedents at random does not make that practice legitimate.
For the reasons stated by the Court of Military Appeals, I agree
that its judgment should be affirmed.
* Even in its brief proposing the reconsideration of
O'Callahan, the United States asked the Court to
reconsider that decision only in the event that the Court disagrees
with the United States' submission that petitioner's acts of sexual
assaults on military dependents are service related. Brief for
United States 28.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, and with whom
JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins in all but the last paragraph,
dissenting.
Less than 20 years ago, this Court held in
O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U. S. 258
(1969), that, to be subject to trial by court-martial, a criminal
offense charged against a member of the Armed Forces had to be
"service-connected," lest the phrase "cases arising in the land or
naval forces" in the Fifth Amendment
"be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of
the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury
of his peers."
Id. at
395 U. S. 273.
Today the Court overrules
O'Callahan. In doing so, it
disregards constitutional language and principles of
stare
decisis in its single-minded determination to subject members
of our Armed Forces to the unrestrained control of the military in
the area of criminal justice. I dissent.
I
The majority begins by assuming that the limitation on
court-martial jurisdiction enunciated in
O'Callahan was
based on the power of Congress, contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 14,
"[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces." It then rejects this asserted limitation of
congressional power on the ground that the Framers intended to give
Congress plenary authority over the
Page 483 U. S. 453
government of the military. But the Court in
O'Callahan
did not simply address whether Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, granted
Congress the authority to create court-martial jurisdiction over
all crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces. Congress'
Article I power to regulate the Armed Forces is limited by the
Fifth Amendment right to indictment or presentment by a grand jury
and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. [
Footnote 2/1] "[T]he constitutional grant of power
to Congress to regulate the armed forces," this Court has
previously stated,
"itself does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials
under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold
that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred
through the Necessary and Proper Clause."
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S.
11,
350 U. S. 21-22
(1955). The majority simply disregards the limitations the Bill of
Rights imposes on the reach of Art. I, § 8,cl. 14.
The rights to grand jury process and to trial by jury are, of
course, of restricted application in military cases. The Fifth
Amendment excepts from the grand jury requirement "cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger," [
Footnote 2/2] and the
Page 483 U. S. 454
Court has held this exception applicable to the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury as well.
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2,
71 U. S. 123
(1867). But the text of the exception is inconsistent with the
majority's conclusion that the only relevant factor in determining
whether a court-martial has jurisdiction over a case is the status
of the defendant as a member of the Armed Services. [
Footnote 2/3]
The Fifth Amendment's exception covers only "
cases arising
in the land and naval forces" (emphasis added). It makes no
reference to the
status of the individual committing the
crime. Had that been the Framers' intent, it would have been easy
to have said so, given that the grand jury provision of the
Amendment, which states that "[n]o Person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury," speaks not in terms of "crimes" or
"cases," but of individual defendants. Nonetheless, the exception
contained in the Fifth Amendment is expressed -- and applies by its
terms -- only to
cases arising in the Armed Forces.
O'Callahan addressed not whether Art. I, § 8, cl. 14,
empowered Congress to create court-martial jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by service members, but rather whether Congress,
in exercising that power, had encroached upon the rights of members
of Armed Forces whose cases did not "arise in" the Armed Forces.
This is clear from the Court's statement of its holding in
O'Callahan:
"We have concluded that the crime, to be under military
jurisdiction, must be service-connected, lest 'cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth Amendment, be
expanded to deprive every
Page 483 U. S. 455
member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by
a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers."
395 U. S. at
395 U. S.
272-273 (footnote omitted). [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 483 U. S. 456
The protections afforded individuals by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are central to our constitutional scheme of justice. The
right to trial by jury, in particular, "ranks very high in our
catalogue of constitutional safeguards."
United States eX rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at
350 U. S. 16.
These protections should not be lightly abrogated. Consequently,
the exception in the Fifth Amendment for cases arising in the Armed
Forces must be strictly construed. This was the basis for the
Court's conclusion, in
Toth, that the power to authorize
trial by court-martial should be limited to "
the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed.'" Id. at 350 U. S. 23
(emphasis omitted), quoting Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 19 U. S. 231
(1821).
The historical evidence considered by the Court in
O'Callahan is therefore relevant, not to what the Framers
intended to include in the scope of the congressional power to
regulate the Armed Forces in Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, but to what the
Framers, wary of military jurisdiction and familiar with strong
restrictions on the scope of that jurisdiction, considered "cases
arising in the armed forces." Even assuming that they intended to
assign control over the scope of the Article I power to the
Legislature, this does not imply that the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's "arising in" exception can be interpreted without
reference to the practices of that time.
In that respect, it is significant that the British political
and legal writing of the 17th and 18th centuries demonstrates a
longstanding suspicion of broad court-martial jurisdiction. This
suspicion was well known in colonial America, and was based on
familiar history. [
Footnote 2/5]
British writers and legislators
Page 483 U. S. 457
took a narrow view of the appropriate scope of court-martial
jurisdiction, which manifested itself in a very limited grant of
authority to try offenses by court-martial during the period of
which the Framers would have been most acutely aware.
See,
e.g., M. Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 42-43
(6th ed. 1820). Not only was that jurisdiction narrow, it was
expressly limited to cases having some connection with the
military. The test was not one of status, but one of military
relationship.
See S. Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial 60
(1786) ("The crimes that are cognizable by a court martial, as
repugnant to military discipline, are pointed out by the mutiny act
and articles of war . . . and as to other crimes which officers and
soldiers being guilty of, are to be tried for by the ordinary
course of law, in like manner with other subjects");
see
also 1 C. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown; Their
Administration and Government 158
Page 483 U. S. 458
(1869) ("It has been a subject of controversy to distinguish the
offences that are purely Military (and therefore properly within
the cognizance of a Court-martial), from others that are Civil or
Political (and therefore properly within the cognizance of the
civil tribunals of the community)");
Grant v. Gould, 2
H.Bl. 69, 99-100, 126 Eng.Rep. 434, 450 (C. P. 1792) ("In this
country, all the delinquencies of soldiers are not triable, as in
most countries in Europe, by martial law; but where they are
ordinary offences against the civil peace, they are tried by the
common law courts. . . . The object of the mutiny act . . . is to
create a court invested with authority to try those who are a part
of the army . . . and the object of the trial is limited to
breaches of military duty") (emphasis omitted). The reach of
military law in Britain at the time of the Revolution thus
permitted courts-martial only for offenses committed by members of
the Armed Forces that had some connection with their military
service.
The majority disputes the
O'Callahan Court's suggestion
that the British Articles of War forbade the trial of civil
offenses by court-martial. The Court points to Section XIV, Article
XVI, of the British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in G. Davis,
Military Law of the United States 581, 593 (3d rev. ed.1915), which
provided:
"All Officers and Soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in
Quarters, and on their March; and whosoever shall commit any Waste
or Spoil either in Walks of Trees, Parks, Warrens, Fish Ponds,
Houses or Gardens, Corn Fields, Inclosures or Meadows, or shall
maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to any of Our
Subjects, unless by order of the then Commander in Chief of Our
Forces, to annoy Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, he or
they that shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (besides
such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according
to the Nature and Degree of the Offence, by the Judgment of a
Regimental or General Court Martial.
Page 483 U. S. 459
The majority contends that this provision counters any argument
that court-martial jurisdiction in Britain at the time of the
American Revolution was in any respect limited to offenses not
punishable by civil law.
Ante at
483 U. S.
443. The latter provision, however, appears in a section
of the Articles of War captioned 'Of Duties in Quarters, in
Garrison, or in the Field,' and its text suggests that the
activities it forbade were considered derelictions of
military duty, and were punishable by court-martial on
that basis. [
Footnote 2/6]"
American colonists shared the British suspicion of broad
military authority in courts-martial. One of the grievances stated
in the Declaration of Independence was King George III's assent
to
"pretended Legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed
troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from
punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the
Inhabitants of these States."
The Framers thus were concerned both with protecting the rights
of those subjected to courts-martial and with preventing
courts-martial from permitting soldiers to get away with murder --
literally -- in the civilian community. This
"known hostility of the American people to any interference by
the military with the regular administration of justice in the
civil courts,"
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509,
97 U. S. 514
(1879), makes it unlikely that the Framers considered any crime
committed by a member of the Armed Forces, regardless of
Page 483 U. S. 460
its lack of connection to military service, to give rise to a
"case arising in" the Armed Forces of the new Nation. [
Footnote 2/7]
This is borne out by provisions in the American Articles of 1776
that are comparable to those in the British Articles of War of
1774.
See Section X, Article I, reprinted in 2 W.
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 1494 (1896); Section XIII,
Article 16, reprinted in 2 Winthrop,
supra at 1497;
Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop,
supra,
at 1503. The provisions created military offenses where the crimes
involved were service-connected. This tradition continued after the
adoption of the Constitution. With respect to the 1874 Articles of
War, for example, Davis wrote:
"As to whether an act which is a civil crime is also a military
offense, no rule can be laid down which will cover all cases, for
the reason that what may be a military offense under certain
circumstances may lose that character under others. . . . But if
the act be committed on a military reservation, or other ground
occupied by the army, or in its neighborhood, so as to be in the
constructive presence of the army; or if committed while on duty,
particularly if the injury be to a member of the community whom it
is the offender's duty to protect; or if committed
Page 483 U. S. 461
in the presence of other soldiers, or while in uniform; or if
the offender use his military position, or that of another, for the
purpose of intimidation or other unlawful influence or object --
such facts would be sufficient to make it prejudicial to military
discipline. . . ."
Davis,
supra, at 476.
Viewed historically, then,
O'Callahan's recognition of
the service-connection requirement did not signify a meaningful
change in what could be tried in courts-martial. Quite the reverse:
not until the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
1950 did Congress attempt to give courts-martial the
authority to try the crimes of murder and rape committed in
peacetime within the United States.
See Duke & Vogel,
The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 12 Vand.L.Rev. 435, 452-453 (1960).
Common law felonies in peacetime were only brought within the
court-martial jurisdiction in 1916. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the
Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 10-12
(1958). The Framers' conception of what could properly be tried in
a court-martial must have informed their understanding of what
cases arise in the Armed Forces, thus permitting what would
otherwise be unconstitutional infringements of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. The relatively recent expansion of the authority
of military tribunals appears to disregard the Framers'
understanding.
Instead of acknowledging the Fifth Amendment limits on the
crimes triable in a court-martial, the Court simply ignores them.
But
"[t]he concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they
become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very
dangerous doctrine, and, if allowed to flourish, would destroy the
benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our
Government."
Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
354 U. S. 14
(1957) (plurality opinion).
Page 483 U. S. 462
The limitations may not, in the view of the majority, be
desirable, but that does not mean they do not exist.
The requirement of service-connection recognized in
O'Callahan has a legitimate basis in constitutional
language, and a solid historical foundation. It should be applied
in this case.
II
Application of the service-connection requirement of
O'Callahan, as further elaborated in
Relford v.
Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.
S. 355 (1971), demonstrates that petitioner's Alaska
crimes do not have an adequate service-connection to support the
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. Petitioner's offenses did
not detract from the performance of his military duties. He
committed these crimes while properly absent from his unit, and
there was no connection between his assigned duties and his crimes.
Nor did petitioner's crimes threaten people or areas under military
control. The crimes were committed in petitioner's private home in
the civilian community in Juneau, where there is not even a base
for Coast Guard personnel. Petitioner's acts were not likely to go
unpunished; the court-martial judge determined that the offenses
were of a type traditionally prosecuted by civilian courts, that
such courts were available, and that, while the Alaska courts had
deferred prosecution in light of the court-martial proceeding, the
State had not declined to prosecute the offenses. Nor did the
crimes implicate any authority stemming from the war power; they
were committed within the territorial United States while the
Nation was at peace.
Moreover, the crimes caused no measurable interference with
military relationships. Though the victims were dependents of Coast
Guard members, the court-martial judge found that there was only
de minimis military interaction between petitioner and the
fathers of the victims, and that the relationships between
petitioner and the families of the victims
Page 483 U. S. 463
"were founded primarily upon the ages and activities of the
children, and additionally upon common sporting interests, common
spousal interest, and employment and neighborly relationships,"
App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a, rather than the connection of
petitioner and the families through the Coast Guard. [
Footnote 2/8] Because the crimes did not
take place in an area within military control or have any effect on
petitioner's military duties, their commission posed no challenge
to the maintenance of order in the local command. The military
judge found that the Government had not demonstrated any impact of
the offenses on "morale, discipline, [or] the reputation or the
integrity of the Coast Guard in Juneau." The only connection
between the military and the offenses at issue was the fact that
the victims were military dependents. But the military judge found
explicitly that the military association of petitioner and the
victims' fathers did not facilitate petitioner's crimes, [
Footnote 2/9] and that
"[t]he impact apparent in this case, that is, on the parents and
the victims themselves, is no different than that which would be
produced by [a] civilian perpetrator."
Id. at 57a.
The military judge, after properly reviewing the
Relford factors, concluded correctly that they did not
render petitioner's
Page 483 U. S. 464
offenses service-connected and dismissed the charges. Engaging
in what can only be described as impermissible appellate
factfinding, [
Footnote 2/10] the
Coast Guard Court of Military
Page 483 U. S. 465
Review reversed the dismissal. 21 M.J. 512 (1985). It concluded
that the military judge's finding that the offenses had had no
impact on morale or discipline was erroneous, because the judge
should have considered the effect the offenses would have had on
the community in Juneau had they come to light while the victims
and their families were still in Alaska, and the impact of the
offenses on morale and discipline at Governors Island. Without
remanding for further factfinding, the court held that the Alaska
offenses had a direct impact upon the good order, discipline,
morale, and welfare of Coast Guard personnel at Governors Island.
Id. at 519. It further asserted, again without basis in
the facts found by the military judge, that the Coast Guard's
interest in deterring the offenses was greater than that of the
civilian authorities, and that the concerns of the victims' parents
would have been different had the offender been a civilian.
Id. at 519-520. On the basis of these newly found facts,
the Court of Military Review held petitioner's crime sufficiently
service-connected to justify the exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction.
Id. at 522.
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed. 21 M.J. 251 (1986).
While conceding that its "precedents involving off-base sex
offenses against civilian dependents of military personnel would
point to a different conclusion,"
id. at 254, it concluded
that a "recent development in our society" -- specifically, an
increase in concern for the victims of crimes -- meant that sex
offenses committed against young children of members of the
military, which would have "a continuing effect on the victims and
their families,"
id. at 256, sufficed to establish
service-connection.
The military judge's straightforward application of
O'Callahan and
Relford was plainly correct, given
the facts as he found them, facts that the reviewing courts have
not demonstrated to have been clearly erroneous. The Court of
Military
Page 483 U. S. 466
Appeals' apparent conclusion that serious or disturbing crimes
committed upon military dependents sufficed to create court-martial
jurisdiction ignored this Court's prior decisions.
The majority asserts that "the service-connection approach, even
as elucidated in
Relford, has proved confusing and
difficult for military courts to apply."
Ante at
483 U. S. 448.
It is true that the test requires a careful, case-specific factual
inquiry. But this is not beyond the capacity of the military
courts. Indeed, the military judge in this case engaged in a
thorough and thoughtful application of the
Relford
factors. It should not be surprising that such determinations may,
at times, be difficult or time-consuming, or require the drawing of
narrow distinctions. The trial of any person before a court-martial
encompasses a deliberate decision to withhold procedural
protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Denial of these
protections is a very serious matter. The Framers declined to draw
an easy line, like that established by the Court today, which would
sweep an entire class of Americans beyond the reach of the Bill of
Rights. Instead, they required that the protections of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments be applied in any case not "arising in" the
Armed Forces. This requirement must not be discarded simply because
it may be less expeditious than the majority deems appropriate.
III
O'Callahan v. Parker remains correct and workable
today. The Court nonetheless insists on reopening a question which
was finally and properly resolved in 1969. In doing so, it shows a
blatant disregard for principles of
stare decisis, and
makes more dubious the presumption "that bedrock principles are
founded in the law, rather than in the proclivities of
individuals."
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.
S. 254,
474 U. S. 265
(1986). This, in turn, undermines "the integrity of our
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in
fact."
Page 483 U. S. 467
Ibid.; see also Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 158 U. S. 601,
158 U. S. 663
(1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court's willingness to overturn precedent may reflect, in
part, its conviction, frequently expressed this Term, that members
of the Armed Forces may be subjected virtually without limit to the
vagaries of military control.
See United States v. Stanley,
post, p.
483 U. S. 669;
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.
S. 681 (1987). But the Court's decision today has,
potentially, the broadest reach of any of these cases. Unless
Congress acts to avoid the consequences of this case, every member
of our Armed Forces, whose active duty members number in the
millions, can now be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction --
without grand jury indictment or trial by jury -- for
any
offense, from tax fraud to passing a bad check, regardless of its
lack of relation to "military discipline, morale and fitness."
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.
S. 738,
420 U. S. 761,
n. 34 (1975). Today's decision deprives our military personnel of
procedural protections that are constitutionally mandated in trials
for purely civilian offenses. The Court's action today reflects
contempt both for the members of our Armed Forces and for the
constitutional safeguards intended to protect us all. I
dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In any criminal proceeding brought against petitioner by the
State of Alaska, the federal grand jury right would not attach; the
Sixth Amendment right would apply by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether petitioner would have these rights in any
prosecution by a dual sovereign is not at issue here, however. The
sole question is whether the Federal Government, when it proceeded
against petitioner, was obliged to provide those safeguards
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
See Grafton v.
United States, 206 U. S. 333,
206 U. S.
352-354 (1907).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The language of this exception could be understood to mean that
"cases arising in the land or naval forces," as well as in the
militia, are only excepted from the requirement of grand jury
indictment or presentment "in actual service in time of War or
public danger." This Court, however, has interpreted the "time of
war" provision as referring only to cases arising in the militia,
not the land or naval forces.
Johnson v. Sayre,
158 U. S. 109,
158 U. S. 114
(1895). I am not convinced this reading of the Fifth Amendment is
correct, but need not rely on a different interpretation here.
[
Footnote 2/3]
"This Court has constantly reiterated that the language of the
Constitution, where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain
evident meaning."
Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
354 U. S. 8, n. 7
(1957) (plurality opinion).
[
Footnote 2/4]
See also Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary
Barracks, 401 U. S. 355,
401 U. S.
362-363 (1971);
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.
S. 665,
413 U. S.
672-673 (1973).
The majority contends that, before
O'Callahan, this
Court had held consistently that status as a member of the Armed
Forces was an adequate basis for the assertion of court-martial
jurisdiction.
Ante at
483 U. S. 439.
But a number of the precedents cited dealt with the assertion of
court-martial jurisdiction over individuals who were not members of
the Armed Forces, and therefore, this Court ruled, did not come
within the reach of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
See Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234,
361 U. S.
246-248 (1960) (military dependent in noncapital case);
Reid v. Covert, supra, at
354 U. S. 19-23
(plurality opinion) (military dependent in capital case);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S.
11,
350 U. S. 14-15
(1955) (discharged veteran);
see also Grisham. v. Hagan,
361 U. S. 278
(1960) (civilian military employee in capital case);
McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.
S. 281,
361 U. S. 286
(1960) (civilian military employee in noncapital case). Having
disposed of these cases on the threshold issue of the reach of the
congressional power created by Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, the Court did
not consider the limits imposed on the Article I power by the Fifth
Amendment.
Several of the remaining cases cited involved crimes committed
in the course of the performance of military duties that therefore
clearly arose in the Armed Forces.
See Grafton v. United
States, supra, (murder by Army private serving sentry duty on
post);
Johnson v. Saure, supra, (embezzlement of United
States funds intended for the Naval service);
Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U. S. 167
(1886) (fraud on Navy contracts). In
Smith, the Court
concluded that
"such conduct of a naval officer is a case arising in the naval
forces, and therefore punishable by court martial under the
articles and regulations made or approved by Congress in the
exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, to
provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces, without indictment or
trial by jury."
Id. at
116 U. S.
186.
The remaining cases cited by the majority are similarly
inapposite.
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S.
509 (1879), dealt with a murder committed by a soldier
in time of war. In
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1867), any reference to the
reach of court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the Armed
Services was dictum, since the holding of that case was that a
civilian was improperly subjected to military jurisdiction during
the Civil War in a State which had "upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed."
Id. at
71 U. S. 121.
[
Footnote 2/5]
This attitude is evident in the Petition of Right in 1627, in
which the two Houses of Parliament joined in a petition to the
Crown to redress four major grievances, the last of which was the
trial of soldiers by military commissions.
See J. Tanner,
English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century 61-62
(1983 reprint). The pertinent portion of the Petition stated:
"VII. [W]hereas no offender of what kind soever is exempted from
the proceedings to be used, and punishments to be inflicted by the
laws and statutes of this your realm: nevertheless of late time
divers commissions . . . have issued forth . . . according to the
justice of martial law, against such soldiers or mariners, or other
dissolute persons joining with them, as should commit any murder,
robbery, felony, mutiny or other outrage or misdemeanor whatsoever;
and by such summary course and order as is agreeable to martial
law, and as is used in armies in time of war, to proceed to the
trial and condemnation of such offenders, and them to cause to be
executed and put to death according to the law martial:"
"VIII. By pretext whereof some of your Majesty's subjects have
been by some of the said Commissioners put to death, when and
where, if by the laws and statutes of the land they had deserved
death, by the same laws and statutes also they might, and by no
other ought to have been judged and executed."
3 Car. I, ch. 1.
The petition, which prayed revocation of the military
commissions, ultimately received royal assent. Tanner,
supra at 64.
The Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5, went further,
providing that
"no man may be forejudged of Life or Limb, or subjected to any
kind of Punishment by Martial Law, or in any other manner then by
the Judgment of his Peers, and according to the known and
established Laws of this Realm,"
limiting this provision only with respect to "Soldiers who shall
Mutiny or Stir up Sedition, or shall Defect Their Majesties
Service," who might "be brought to a more exemplary and speedy
punishment than the usual forms of Law will allow."
[
Footnote 2/6]
See also G. Davis, Military Law of the United States
437 (3d rev. ed.1915) ("The acts of trespass, etc., indicated in
this Article are made punishable as special breaches of discipline,
and less for the protection of citizens than for the maintenance of
the orderly behavior and morale of the military force") (emphasis
omitted); 2 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 1022 (1896)
("This Article, which, dating from an early period of the British
law, first appeared in our code in the Articles of 1776, is
designed, by making severely punishable trespasses committed by
soldiers on the march or otherwise, to prevent straggling and
maintain order and discipline in military commands, while at the
same time availing to secure from intrusion and injury the premises
and property of the inhabitants") (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 2/7]
But cf. Cong.Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 953
(1863).
The Court contends that
"American military records reflect trials by court-martial
during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians and
punishable under the civil law, such as theft and assault."
Ante at
483 U. S. 444.
It apparently bases this conclusion on materials provided to the
O'Callahan Court by the United States.
See Brief
for United States in
O'Callahan v. Parker, O.T. 1968, No.
646, pp. 35-52, summarizing courts-martial during the period from
1775 to 1815 involving "apparently non-military criminal offenses
committed by military personnel."
Id. at 35. I agree with
the
O'Callahan Court that, to the extent the
courts-martial described there did not appear to deal with crimes
that were committed during wartime, were committed by officers, or
involved special military interests, the descriptions of the crimes
"simply recite the offender and the offense, and give no basis for
judging the relationship of the offense to military discipline."
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258,
395 U. S. 270,
n. 14 (1969).
[
Footnote 2/8]
See also 21 M.J. 512, 514 (C. G. C.M.R.1985) ("A
friendship had grown between the accused and both of the other
families, grounded, in one case, on the common sporting interests
of bowling and basketball, and, in the other, on the proximity of
living next door. The alleged victims came to the accused's home on
a regular basis to visit with his two sons. Both girls at one time
played on a soccer team coached by the accused, and they also
bowled in a league in which the accused was active").
[
Footnote 2/9]
See the military judge's Supplemental Essential
Findings of Fact, App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a ("To the extent that
trust had a bearing on the opportunity for the alleged offenses,
that trust arose out of friendships between the Solorio and Johnson
and Solorio and Grantz families, and not out of the respective
fathers [
sic] common association as members of the U.S.
Coast Guard. The trust placed in a servicemember in general, and in
the accused in particular, by virtue of status as a member of the
Coast Guard was minimal, and had no direct relationship to the
offenses alleged").
[
Footnote 2/10]
The appeal to the Court of Military Review was brought under
Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 862 (1982
ed., Supp. III). Section 862(b) provides that,
"[i]n ruling on an appeal under this section, the Court of
Military Review may act only with respect to matters of law,
notwithstanding section 866(c) of this title (article 66(c))."
Title 10 U.S.C. 866(c), Article 66(c) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, authorizes the Court of Military Review, in
acting on findings of guilty and sentences, to "weigh the evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted
questions of fact."
See also United States v. Burris, 21
M.J. 140, 143-144 (Ct.Mil.App.1985).
While the Court of Military Review acknowledged that it was
bound by facts found at the trial level unless those findings were
incorrect as a matter of law, 21 M.J. at 515, 517, it nonetheless
proceeded to assume the facts necessary to its conclusion that the
impact on the Coast Guard community at Governors Island created the
requisite service-connection to justify the exercise of
court-martial jurisdiction. One judge on the Court of Military
Review, dissenting in part from the court's ruling, rejected the
majority's approach:
"Where I depart from the majority is the holding that there was
'service connection,' and therefore jurisdiction, in this case, as
a matter of law. . . . [T]he [military] judge made no specific
findings with respect to the possible effect of the offenses at
Governors Island or on personnel under the authority and
responsibility of the convening authority. Even if this case were
before us for review under Article 66(c), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §
666(c), I would hesitate to determine that jurisdiction exists in
light of this omission. . . . Since this case is before us for
review under Article 62(b) U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 862(b), I do not
believe we are empowered to cure an omission from the essential
findings of the trial judge."
Id. at 523 (Bridgman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Judge Bridgman would have remanded without prejudice to the
accused's right to renew his attack on the jurisdiction of the
court-martial.
Ibid.
The Court of Military Appeals suggested broadly that the Court
of Military Review had violated its obligations under Article 62 in
this case, but concluded that the violation was immaterial.
See 21 M.J. 251, 254 (1986) ("A military judge's
factfinding power under Article 62 cannot be superseded by a Court
of Military Review in an appeal under Article 62. . . . To some
extent the Court of Military Review may have erred in this
direction; but any such error is immaterial because, on the basis
of undisputed facts, we conclude that the offenses in Alaska were
service-connected").