An application to stay the California Supreme Court's mandate
prohibiting the placement on the State's November 1984 ballot of an
initiative that would require the California Legislature (or the
California Secretary of State) to request Congress to call a
Constitutional Convention for the purpose of amending the Federal
Constitution to require a balanced federal budget is denied. The
California Supreme Court ruled that the proposed initiative would
violate both the Federal and State Constitutions, and a majority of
this Court would probably conclude that there was an adequate and
independent state ground for the state court's decision. Moreover,
applicants' "political question" claim probably would not be viewed
as raising a substantial federal question.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice
Applicants ask that I stay a mandate of the Supreme Court of
California prohibiting the placement on California's November,
1984, ballot of a proposed "balanced federal budget statutory
initiative." The initiative would have required the California
Legislature to request Congress to call a Constitutional Convention
for the purpose of amending the United States Constitution to
require a balanced federal budget. If the legislature failed to
act, the initiative would have directed the California Secretary of
State, the nominal respondent in this case, to apply directly to
Congress in behalf of the State's voters. At present, 32 of the
necessary 34 States have formally applied to Congress to convene
such a Constitutional Convention.
The Supreme Court of California ruled at the behest of
respondents, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations
et al., who filed an original
action in that court challenging the legality of the initiative
under
Page 468 U. S. 1311
both state law and the United States Constitution. The
constitutional provision at issue is that part of Article V which
states that
"[t]he Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments. . . ."
The California court undertook to decide two clearly federal
questions relating to the meaning of the word "Legislatures" in the
above clause: (1) whether that word encompasses the voters of a
State who have power to enact laws by initiative, and (2) whether
it includes a legislature not acting as an independent body, but
forced to act by exercise of the initiative power. The court
answered each of these questions in the negative, concluding that
the word "Legislatures" means the State's lawmaking body of elected
representatives, acting independently of restrictions imposed by
state law. These federal questions are important, and by no means
settled; however, because the California court went on to hold the
proposed initiative invalid on independent state law grounds, I am
satisfied that a majority of this Court would conclude that there
is an adequate and independent state ground for the California
court's decision.
After a detailed analysis of California law and a discussion of
the treatment of similar questions by other state courts, the
Supreme Court of California decided that important portions of the
proposed initiative were not "statutes," as that term is used in
the California Constitution, but were "resolutions," and were
therefore not a proper subject of the initiative process under the
California Constitution.
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d
687,
686 P.2d 609
(1984). We have long held that we will not review state court
decisions such as this, largely for the reason that decisions on
the federal questions in such cases would amount to no more than
advisory opinions.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032,
463 U. S.
1037-1039 (1983);
Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U. S. 117,
324 U. S.
125-126 (1945).
Applicants urge that the foregoing construction of the
California initiative provision, although denominated a state
law
Page 468 U. S. 1312
question by the California Court, is actually a "political
question" as a matter of federal law, and therefore not subject to
decision on the merits by a state court. Applicants base their
"political question" claim on the decision of this Court in
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433
(1939). In that case, four Justices of this Court adopted the
position that the Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on questions
arising in connection with the ratification of a constitutional
amendment because all such questions were "political" in nature.
But that position did not command a majority in
Coleman,
supra, and however this Court would presently resolve the
issues raised in the
Coleman case, I do not think a
majority would subscribe to applicants' expansive reading of the
"political question" doctrine in connection with the amending
process. Acceptance of applicants' arguments would, in effect, mean
that courts in the State of California or elsewhere would be
powerless to prevent the placing on the ballot of initiative
measures designed to play a part in the process of amending the
United States Constitution, even though such initiative proposals
clearly did not comply with state requirements as to the necessary
number of signatures, time of filing, and the like. In the light of
later discussions of the "political question" doctrine in cases
such as
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.
S. 486 (1969), and
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186 (1962), I simply do not think this Court would
believe that applicants' claim in this regard raises a substantial
federal question.
See also Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.
Supp. 1291 (ED Ill.1975) (three-judge court).
The application for a stay is accordingly denied.