Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (as did its predecessors dating back to
1790) requires federal courts to afford the same full faith and
credit to state court judgments that would apply in the State's own
courts. Petitioner filed an employment discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the EEOC, as required by the
Act, referred the charge to the New York State Division of Human
Rights (NYHRD), the agency charged with enforcing the New York law
prohibiting employment discrimination. The NYHRD rejected the claim
as meritless, and was upheld on administrative appeal. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed.
Subsequently, a District Director of the EEOC ruled that there was
no reasonable cause to believe that the discrimination charge was
true, and issued a right-to-sue letter. Petitioner then brought a
Title VII action in Federal District Court. Ultimately, the
District Court dismissed the complaint on
res judicata
grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The District Court was required under 28 U.S.C. §
1738 to give preclusive effect to the state court decision
upholding the state administrative agency's rejection of the
employment discrimination claim. Pp.
456 U. S.
466-485.
(a) Where, under New York law, the New York court's
determination precludes petitioner from bringing any other action
based on the same grievance in the New York courts, § 1738, by its
terms, precludes him from relitigating the same question in federal
courts. Pp.
456 U. S.
466-467.
(b) There is no "affirmative showing" of a "clear and manifest"
legislative purpose in Title VII to deny
res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming that
an employment discrimination claim is unproved. An exception to §
1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an
express or implied partial repeal.
Allen v. McCurry,
449 U. S. 90. Here,
there is no claim that Title VII expressly repealed § 1738, and no
implied repeal is evident from the language, operation, or
legislative history of Title VII, there being no manifest
incompatibility between Title VII and § 1738. Pp.
456 U. S.
468-476.
(c) While initial resort to state administrative remedies does
not deprive an individual of a right to a federal trial
de
novo on a Title VII claim, this does not mean that a prior
state court judgment can be disregarded.
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,
distinguished.
Page 456 U. S. 462
The comity and federalism interests embodied in § 1738 are not
compromised by the application of
res judicata and
collateral estoppel in Title VII cases. Rather, to deprive state
judgments of finality not only would violate basic tenets of comity
and federalism, but also would reduce the incentive for States to
work toward effective and meaningful systems prohibiting employment
discrimination. Pp.
456 U. S.
476-478.
(d) The procedures provided in New York for the determination of
employment discrimination claims, complemented by administrative as
well as judicial review, offer a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the merits, and thus are sufficient under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State proceedings need do no
more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit
guaranteed by federal law. Section 1738 does not allow federal
courts to employ their own rules of
res judicata in
determining the effect of state judgments, but rather goes beyond
the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules
chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken. Here,
petitioner received all the process that was constitutionally
required in rejecting his employment discrimination claim. Pp.
456 U. S.
479-485.
623 F.2d 786, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.,
joined,
post, p.
456 U. S. 486.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
456 U. S.
508.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
As one of its first acts, Congress directed that all United
Page 456 U. S. 463
States courts afford the same full faith and credit to state
court judgments that would apply in the State's own courts. Act of
May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. More recently,
Congress implemented the national policy against employment
discrimination by creating an array of substantive protections and
remedies which generally allows federal courts to determine the
merits of a discrimination claim. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et
seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The principal question presented
by this case is whether Congress intended Title VII to supersede
the principles of comity and repose embodied in § 1738.
Specifically, we decide whether a federal court in a Title VII case
should give preclusive effect to a decision of a state court
upholding a state administrative agency's rejection of an
employment discrimination claim as meritless when the state court's
decision would be
res judicata in the State's own
courts.
I
Petitioner Rubin Kremer emigrated from Poland in 1970 and was
hired in 1973 by respondent Chemical Construction Corp. (Chemico)
as an engineer. Two years later, he was laid off, along with a
number of other employees. Some of these employees were later
rehired, but Kremer was not, although he made several applications.
In May, 1976, Kremer filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting that his
discharge and failure to be rehired were due to his national origin
and Jewish faith. Because the EEOC may not consider a claim until a
state agency having jurisdiction over employment discrimination
complaints has had at least 60 days to resolve the matter, §
706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), [
Footnote 1] the Commission referred
Page 456 U. S. 464
Kremer's charge to the New York State Division of Human Rights
(NYHRD), the agency charged with enforcing the New York law
prohibiting employment discrimination. N.Y.Exec.Law §§ 295(6),
296(1)(a) (McKinney 1972 and Supp.1981-1982).
After investigating Kremer's complaint, [
Footnote 2] the NYHRD concluded that there was no
probable cause to believe that Chemico had engaged in the
discriminatory practices complained of. The NYHRD explicitly based
its determination on the findings that Kremer was not rehired
because one employee who was rehired had greater seniority, that
another employee who was rehired filled a lesser position than that
previously held by Kremer, and that neither Kremer's creed nor age
was a factor considered in Chemico's failure to rehire him. The
NYHRD's determination was upheld by its Appeal Board as "not
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." Kremer again
brought his complaint to the attention of the EEOC, and also filed,
on December 6, 1977, a petition with the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court to set aside the adverse administrative
determination. On February 27, 1978, five justices of the Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed the Appeal Board's order. Kremer
could have sought, but did not seek, review by the New York Court
of Appeals.
Page 456 U. S. 465
Subsequently, a District Director of the EEOC ruled that there
was no reasonable cause to believe that the charge of
discrimination was true, and issued a right-to-sue notice.
[
Footnote 3] The District
Director refused a request for reconsideration, noting that he had
reviewed the case files and considered the EEOC's disposition as
"appropriate and correct in all respects."
Kremer then brought this Title VII action in District Court,
claiming discrimination on the basis of national origin and
religion. [
Footnote 4] Chemico
argued from the outset that Kremer's Title VII action was barred by
the doctrine of
res judicata. The District Court initially
denied Chemico's motion to dismiss.
464 F.
Supp. 468 (SDNY 1978). The court noted that the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit had recently found such state
determinations
res judicata in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1981,
Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265
(1977), but distinguished Title VII cases because of the statutory
grant of
de novo federal review. Several months later, the
Second Circuit extended the
Mitchell rule to Title VII
cases.
Sinicropi v. Nassau
Page 456 U. S. 466
County, 601 F.2d 60 (per curiam),
cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979). The District Court then dismissed
the complaint on grounds of
res judicata. 477 F. Supp. 687
(SDNY 1979). The Court of Appeals refused to depart from the
Sinicropi precedent and rejected petitioner's claim that
Sinicropi should not be applied retroactively. 623 F.2d
786 (1980).
A motion for rehearing en banc was denied, and petitioner filed
for a writ of certiorari. We issued the writ, 452 U.S. 960 (1981),
to resolve this important issue of federal employment
discrimination law over which the Courts of Appeals are divided.
[
Footnote 5] We now affirm.
II
Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive
effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given
in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.
[
Footnote 6] Here, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has issued a
judgment affirming the decision of the NYHRD Appeals Board that the
discharge and failure to rehire Kremer were not the product of the
discrimination that he had alleged. There is no question
Page 456 U. S. 467
that this judicial determination precludes Kremer from bringing
"any other action, civil or criminal, based upon the same
grievance" in the New York courts. N.Y.Exec.Law § 300 (McKinney
1972). By its terms, therefore, § 1738 would appear to preclude
Kremer from relitigating the same question in federal court.
Kremer offers two principal reasons why § 1738 does not bar this
action. First, he suggests that, in Title VII cases, Congress
intended that federal courts be relieved of their usual obligation
to grant finality to state court decisions. Second, he urges that
the New York administrative and judicial proceedings in this case
were so deficient that they are not entitled to preclusive effect
in federal courts and, in any
Page 456 U. S. 468
event, the rejection of a state employment discrimination claim
cannot, by definition, bar a Title VII action. We consider this
latter contention in
456 U. S.
A
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90,
449 U. S. 99
(1980), made clear that an exception to § 1738 will not be
recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied
partial repeal. There is no claim here that Title VII expressly
repealed § 1738; if there has been a partial repeal, it must be
implied. "It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored,"
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.
S. 148,
426 U. S. 154
(1976);
United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp.,
425 U. S. 164,
425 U. S. 168
(1976), and, whenever possible, statutes should be read
consistently. There are, however,
"'two well-settled categories of repeals by implication -- (1)
where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict,
the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to
repeal must be clear and manifest. . . .'"
Radzanower v. Touche Ross Co., supra, at
426 U. S. 154,
quoting
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.
S. 497,
296 U. S. 503
(1936).
The relationship of Title VII to § 1738 does not fall within
either of these categories. Congress enacted Title VII to assure
equality of employment opportunities without distinction with
respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 44
(1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.
S. 792,
411 U. S. 800
(1973). To this end, the EEOC was created and the federal courts
were entrusted with ultimate enforcement responsibility. State
antidiscrimination laws, however, play
Page 456 U. S. 469
an integral role in the congressional scheme. Whenever an
incident of alleged employment discrimination occurs in a State or
locality which by law prohibits such discrimination and which has
established an "authority to grant or seek relief from such
[discrimination] or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto," no charge of discrimination may be actively processed by
the EEOC until the state remedy has been invoked and at least 60
days have passed, or the state proceedings have terminated. §
706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Only after providing the
appropriate state agency an opportunity to resolve the complaint
may an aggrieved individual press his complaint before the EEOC. In
its investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge of employment discrimination is true, the
Commission is required to "accord substantial weight to final
findings and orders made by State and local authorities in
proceedings commenced under State or local law" pursuant to the
limited deferral provisions of § 706, but is not bound by such
findings.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at
415 U. S. 48, n.
8. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination has occurred, it undertakes conciliation efforts to
eliminate the unlawful practice; if these efforts fail, the
Commission may elect to bring a civil action to enforce the Act. If
the Commission declines to do so, or if the Commission finds no
reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, "a civil
action" may be brought by an aggrieved individual. § 706(f)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
No provision of Title VII requires claimants to pursue in state
court an unfavorable state administrative action, nor does the Act
specify the weight a federal court should afford a final judgment
by a state court if such a remedy is sought. While we have
interpreted the "civil action" authorized to follow consideration
by federal and state administrative agencies to be a "trial
de
novo,"
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.
S. 840,
425 U. S.
844-845 (1976);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
supra, at
415 U. S. 38;
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at
Page 456 U. S. 470
411 U. S.
798-799, neither the statute nor our decisions indicate
that the final judgment of a state court is subject to
redetermination at such a trial. Similarly, the congressional
directive that the EEOC should give "substantial weight" to
findings made in state proceedings, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. §
2000-5(b), indicates only the minimum level of deference the EEOC
must afford all state determinations; it does not bar affording the
greater preclusive effect which may be required by § 1738 if
judicial action is involved. [
Footnote 7] To suggest otherwise, to say that either the
opportunity to bring a "civil action" or the "substantial weight"
requirement implicitly repeals § 1738, is to prove far too much.
For if that is so, even a full trial on the merits in state court
would not bar a trial
de novo in federal court, and would
not be entitled to more than "substantial weight" before the EEOC.
The state courts would be placed on a one-way street; the finality
of their decisions would depend on which side prevailed in a given
case. [
Footnote 8]
Since an implied repeal must ordinarily be evident from the
language or operation of a statute, the lack of such manifest
incompatibility between Title VII and § 1738 is enough to answer
our inquiry. No different conclusion is suggested by the
legislative history of Title VII. Although no inescapable
Page 456 U. S. 471
conclusions can be drawn from the process of enactment,
[
Footnote 9] the legislative
debates surrounding the initial passage of Title VII in 1964 and
the substantial amendment adopted in 1972 plainly do not
demonstrate that Congress intended to override
Page 456 U. S. 472
the historic respect that federal courts accord state court
judgments. [
Footnote 10]
At the time Title VII was written, over half of the States had
enacted some form of equal employment legislation. [
Footnote 11] Members of Congress agreed
that the States should play an important role in enforcing Title
VII, but also felt the federal system should defer only to adequate
state laws. [
Footnote 12]
Congress considered a number of possible ways of achieving these
goals, ranging from limiting Title VII's jurisdiction to States
without fair employment laws to having Congress
Page 456 U. S. 473
or the President assess the adequacy of state laws. As Title VII
emerged from the House, it empowered the EEOC to assess the
adequacy of state laws and procedures. § 708(b), H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Senate bill that was finally signed
into law widened the state role by guaranteeing all States with
fair employment practices laws an initial opportunity to resolve
charges of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Senator
Humphrey, an advocate of strong enforcement, emphasized the state
role under the legislation:
"We recognized that many States already have functioning
antidiscrimination programs to insure equal access to places of
public accommodation and equal employment opportunity. We sought
merely to guarantee that these States -- and other States which may
establish such programs -- will be given every opportunity to
employ their expertise and experience without premature
interference by the Federal Government."
110 Cong.Rec. 12725 (1964).
Indeed, New York's fair employment laws were referred to in the
congressional debates by proponents of the legislation as an
example of existing state legislation effectively combating
employment discrimination. [
Footnote 13]
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1964 Act suggests that
Congress considered it necessary or desirable to provide an
absolute right to relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by
a state court. While striving to craft an optimal
Page 456 U. S. 474
niche for the States in the overall enforcement scheme, the
legislators did not envision full litigation of a single claim in
both state and federal forums. [
Footnote 14] Indeed, the requirement of a trial
de
novo in federal district court following EEOC proceedings was
added primarily to protect employers from overzealous enforcement
by the EEOC. A memorandum signed by seven Representatives
accompanying the compromise measure ultimately adopted concluded
that
"we believe the employer or labor union will have a fairer forum
to establish innocence, since a trial
de novo is required
in district court proceedings."
H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963).
Similar views were expressed in 1972, when Congress reconsidered
whether to give the EEOC adjudicatory and enforcement powers.
[
Footnote 15] There is also
reason to believe that Congress required that the EEOC give state
findings "substantial weight" because the Commission had
Page 456 U. S. 475
too freely ignored the determinations handed down by state
agencies. [
Footnote 16]
An important indication that Congress did not intend Title VII
to repeal § 1738's requirement that federal courts give full faith
and credit to state court judgments is found in an exchange between
Senator Javits, a manager of the 1972 bill, and Senator Hruska.
Senator Hruska, concerned with the potential for multiple
independent proceedings on a single discrimination charge, had
introduced an amendment which would have eliminated many of the
duplicative remedies for employment discrimination. Senator Javits
argued that the amendment was unnecessary because the doctrine of
res judicata would prevent repetitive litigation against a
single defendant:
"[T]here is the real capability in this situation of dealing
with the question on the basis of
res judicata. In other
words once there is a litigation -- a litigation started by the
Commission, a litigation started by the Attorney General, or a
litigation started by the individual -- the remedy has been chosen,
and can be followed through and no relitigation of the same issues
in a different forum would be permitted."
118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972). [
Footnote 17]
Page 456 U. S. 476
Senator Williams, another proponent of the 1972 bill, echoed
Senator Javits' remarks:
"I do not believe that the individual claimant should be allowed
to litigate his claim to completion in one forum, and then if
dissatisfied, go to another forum to try again."
Id. at 3372. After Senator Javits and Senator Williams
spoke, an evenly divided Senate refused to approve the Hruska
amendment.
It is sufficiently clear that Congress, both in 1964 and 1972,
though wary of assuming the adequacy of state employment
discrimination remedies, did not intend to supplant such laws. We
conclude that neither the statutory language nor the congressional
debates suffice to repeal § 1738's longstanding directive to
federal courts.
B
Our finding that Title VII did not create an exception to § 1738
is strongly suggested, if not compelled, by our recent decision in
Allen v. McCurry that preclusion rules apply in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 actions, and may bar federal courts from freshly deciding
constitutional claims previously litigated in state courts. Indeed,
there is more in § 1983 to suggest an implied repeal of § 1738 than
we have found in Title VII. In
Allen, we noted that "one
strong motive" behind the enactment of § 1983 was the "grave
congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in
protecting federal rights." 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 98-99.
Nevertheless, we concluded that
"much clearer support than this would be required to hold that §
1738 and the traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable to
§ 1983 suits."
Id. at
449 U. S.
99.
Page 456 U. S. 477
Because Congress must "clearly manifest" its intent to depart
from § 1738, our prior decisions construing Title VII in situations
where § 1738 is inapplicable are not dispositive. They establish
only that
initial resort to state administrative remedies
does not deprive an individual of a right to a federal trial
de
novo on a Title VII claim. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792
(1973), and
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.
S. 840 (1976), we held that the "civil action" in
federal court following an EEOC decision was intended to be a trial
de novo. This holding, clearly supported by the
legislative history, is not a holding that a prior state court
judgment can be disregarded.
The petitioner and the Courts of Appeals which have denied
res judicata effect to such judgments rely heavily on our
statement in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver that "final
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal
courts." 415 U S at
415 U. S. 44.
[
Footnote 18] We did not
say, and our language should not be read to imply, that, by vesting
"final responsibility" in one forum, Congress intended to deny
finality to decisions in another. The context of the statement
makes this clear. In describing the operation of Title VII, we
noted that the EEOC cannot adjudicate claims or impose sanctions;
that responsibility, the "final responsibility for enforcement,"
must rest in federal court.
The holding in
Gardner-Denver was that a private
arbitration decision concerning an employment discrimination claim
did not bind the federal courts. Arbitration decisions, of course,
are not subject to the mandate of § 1738. Furthermore, unlike
arbitration hearings under collective bargaining agreements, state
fair employment practice laws are explicitly made part of the Title
VII enforcement scheme. Our decision in
Gardner-Denver
explicitly recognized the "distinctly separate nature of these
contractual and statutory rights."
Page 456 U. S. 478
Id. at
415 U. S. 50.
Here we are dealing with a state statutory right, subject to state
enforcement in a manner expressly provided for by the federal
Act.
Gardner-Denver also rested on the inappropriateness of
arbitration as a forum for the resolution of Title VII issues. The
arbitrator's task, we recognized, is to "effectuate the intent of
the parties, rather than the requirements of enacted legislation."
Id. at
415 U. S. 56-57.
The arbitrator's specialized competence is "the law of the shop,
not the law of the land," and "the factfinding process in
arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding."
Ibid. These characteristics cannot be attributed to state
administrative boards and state courts. State authorities are
charged with enforcing laws, and state courts are presumed
competent to interpret those laws.
Finally, the comity and federalism interests embodied in § 1738
are not compromised by the application of
res judicata and
collateral estoppel in Title VII cases. Petitioner maintains that
the decision of the Court of Appeals will deter claimants from
seeking state court review of their claims, ultimately leading to a
deterioration in the quality of the state administrative process.
On the contrary, stripping state court judgments of finality would
be far more destructive to the quality of adjudication by lessening
the incentive for full participation by the parties and for
searching review by state officials. Depriving state judgments of
finality not only would violate basic tenets of comity and
federalism,
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.
S. 478,
446 U. S. 488,
491-492 (1980), but also would reduce the incentive for States to
work towards effective and meaningful antidiscrimination systems.
[
Footnote 19]
Page 456 U. S. 479
III
The petitioner nevertheless contends that the judgment should
not bar his Title VII action because the New York courts did not
resolve the issue that the District Court must hear under Title VII
-- whether Kremer had suffered discriminatory treatment -- and
because the procedures provided were inadequate. Neither contention
is persuasive. Although the claims presented to the NYHRD and
subsequently reviewed by the Appellate Division were necessarily
based on New York law, the alleged discriminatory acts are
prohibited by both federal and state laws. [
Footnote 20] The elements of a successful
employment discrimination claim are virtually identical; petitioner
could not succeed on a Title VII claim
Page 456 U. S. 480
consistently with the judgment of the NYHRD that there is no
reason to believe he was terminated or not rehired because of age
or religion. The Appellate Division's affirmance of the NYHRD's
dismissal necessarily decided that petitioner's claim under New
York law was meritless, and thus it also decided that a Title VII
claim arising from the same events would be equally meritless.
[
Footnote 21]
The more serious contention is that, even though administrative
proceedings and judicial review are legally sufficient to be given
preclusive effect in New York, they should be deemed so
fundamentally flawed as to be denied recognition under § 1738. We
have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of
collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the
earlier decision is asserted did not have a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate the claim
Page 456 U. S. 481
or issue,
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 95;
Montana v. United States, 440 U.
S. 147,
440 U. S. 153
(1979);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313,
402 U. S. 328
329 (1971). [
Footnote 22]
"Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt
the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in
prior litigation."
Montana v. United States, supra, at
440 U. S. 164,
n. 11.
Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.
S. 564 (1973).
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined
the content of the requirement that the first adjudication offer a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. But, for present purposes,
where we are bound by the statutory directive of § 1738, state
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in
order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by
federal law. It has long been established that § 1738 does not
allow federal courts to employ their own rules of
res
judicata in determining the effect
Page 456 U. S. 482
of state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and
commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State
from which the judgment is taken.
McElmoyle
v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312,
38 U. S. 326
(1839);
Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481,
11 U. S. 485
(1813). As we recently noted in
Allen v. McCurry,
supra,
"though the federal courts may look to the common law or to the
policies supporting
res judicata and collateral estoppel
in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal
courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts to
give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever the courts
of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so."
449 U.S. at
449 U. S.
96.
The State must, however, satisfy the applicable requirements of
the Due Process Clause. A State may not grant preclusive effect in
its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, [
Footnote 23] and other state and
federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to
such a judgment. Section 1738 does not suggest otherwise; other
state and federal courts would still be providing a state court
judgment with the "same" preclusive effect as the courts of the
State from which the judgment emerged. In such a case, there
Page 456 U. S. 483
could be no constitutionally recognizable preclusion at all.
[
Footnote 24] We have little
doubt that Kremer received all the process that was
constitutionally required in rejecting his claim that he had been
discriminatorily discharged contrary to the statute. We must bear
in mind that no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a
particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process
Clause.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.
S. 600,
416 U. S. 610
(1974);
Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.
S. 697,
325 U. S. 710
(1945). "
The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation.'" Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at
416 U. S. 610
(quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.
S. 886, 367 U. S. 895
(1961)). Under New York law, a claim of employment discrimination
requires the NYHRD to investigate whether there is "probable cause"
to believe that the complaint is true. Before this determination of
probable cause is made, the claimant is entitled to a
"full opportunity to present on the record, though informally,
his charges against his employer or other respondent, including the
right to submit all exhibits which he wishes to present and
testimony of witnesses in addition to his own testimony."
State Div. of Human Rights v. New York State Drug Abuse
Comm'n, 59 App.Div.2d 332, 336, 399 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (1977).
The complainant also is entitled to an opportunity "to rebut
evidence submitted by or obtained from the respondent." 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 465.6 (1977). He may have an attorney assist him, and
may ask the division to issue subpoenas. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 465.12(c)
(1977).
If the investigation discloses probable cause and efforts at
conciliation fail, the NYHRD must conduct a public hearing
Page 456 U. S. 484
to determine the merits of the complaint. N.Y.Exec.Law §
297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp.1981-1982). A public hearing must also be
held if the Human Rights Appeal Board finds "there has not been a
full investigation and opportunity for the complainant to present
his contentions and evidence, with a full record."
State Div.
of Human Rights v. New York State Drug Abuse Comm'n, supra, at
337, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 544-545. [
Footnote 25] Finally, judicial review in the Appellate
Division is available to assure that a claimant is not denied any
of the procedural rights to which he was entitled and that the
NYHRD's determination was not arbitrary and capricious.
N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
See Gregory v. New
York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 64 App.Div.2d 775, 776,
407 N.Y.S.2d 266, 257 (1978);
Tenenbaum v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 50 App.Div.2d 257, 259, 376 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544
(1975).
We have no hesitation in concluding that this panoply of
procedures, complemented by administrative as well as judicial
review, is sufficient under the Due Process Clause. [
Footnote 26]
Page 456 U. S. 485
Only where the evidence submitted by the claimant fails, as a
matter of law, to reveal any merit to the complaint may the NYHRD
make a determination of no probable cause without holding a
hearing.
Flah's, Inc. v. Schneider, 71 App.Div.2d 993, 420
N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (1979).
See n 21,
supra. And before that determination
may be reached, New York requires the NYHRD to make a full
investigation, wherein the complainant has full opportunity to
present his evidence, under oath if he so requests.
State Div.
of Human Rights v. New York State Drug Abuse Control Comm'n,
supra, at 336, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 544. The fact that Mr. Kremer
failed to avail himself of the full procedures provided by state
law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy.
Cf. Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327,
430 U. S. 337
(1977).
IV
In our system of jurisprudence, the usual rule is that merits of
a legal claim, once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction,
are not subject to redetermination in another forum. Such a
fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion, enacted
into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated by
Congress. [
Footnote 27]
Because there is no "affirmative showing" of a "clear and manifest"
legislative purpose in Title VII to deny
res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming that
a claim of employment discrimination is unproved, and because the
procedures provided in New York for the determination of such
claims offer a full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Page 456 U. S. 486
[
Footnote 1]
The statute provides that
"[i]n the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice
occurring in a State . . . which has a State or local law
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and
establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or
seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings
with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may
be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person
aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings
have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier terminated."
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c).
See also Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U. S. 522
(1972); 29 CFR 1601.13 (1981).
[
Footnote 2]
Kremer's complaint filed with the NYHRD alleged discrimination
on the basis of age and religion, and did not contain a separate
claim concerning national origin.
[
Footnote 3]
Sections 706(f)(1) and (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5f(1) and (3),
provide that where the EEOC determines that there is no reasonable
cause to believe that a charge is true, it must dismiss the charge
and issue the complainant a statutory right-to-sue letter. Where
the Commission has not filed a civil action against the employer,
it must, if requested, issue a right-to-sue letter 180 days after
the charge was filed. Within 90 days after receipt of the
right-to-sue letter, the complainant may institute a civil action
in federal district court against the party named in the
charge.
[
Footnote 4]
No further mention was made of age discrimination, which is not
covered by Title VII. Nor has petitioner argued at any point that
his national origin claim was in any sense distinct from his claim
of religious discrimination. Of course, if Kremer desired to make
such a claim, he was obligated to first bring it before the NYHRD.
See n 1,
supra. Moreover,
"[a] party cannot escape the requirements of full faith and
credit and
res judicata by asserting its own failure to
raise matters clearly within the scope of a prior proceeding."
Underwriter National Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life &
Accident & Health Insurance Guaranty Assn., 455 U.
S. 691,
455 U. S. 710
(1982);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.
S. 343,
334 U. S. 352
(1948).
[
Footnote 5]
Three Courts of Appeals have held that a federal court may not
attribute preclusive deference to prior state court decisions
reviewing state agency determinations.
Smouse v. General
Electric Co., 626 F.2d 333 (CA3 1980) (per curiam);
Unger
v. Consolidated Food Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (CA7 1981);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079
(CA8),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980). The Fourth
Circuit has held that issues decided in a
de novo state
judicial proceeding are not subject to redetermination in a
subsequent Title VII action.
Moosavi v. Fairfax County Board of
Education, 666 F.2d 58 (1981).
[
Footnote 6]
In the Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, Congress
required all federal courts to give such preclusive effect to state
court judgments "as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from [which they are] taken." In essentially unchanged form,
the Act, now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provides that
"[t]he . . . judicial proceedings of any court of any such State
. . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State. . . ."
Accordingly, the federal courts consistently have applied
res judicata and collateral estoppel to causes of action
and issues decided by state courts.
Allen v. McCurry,
449 U. S. 90,
449 U. S. 96
(1980);
Montana v. United States, 440 U.
S. 147 (1979);
Angel v. Bullington,
330 U. S. 183
(1947). Indeed, from
Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U. S. 351
(1877), to
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U. S. 394
(1981), this Court has consistently emphasized the importance of
the related doctrines of
res judicata and collateral
estoppel in fulfilling the purpose for which civil courts had been
established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their
jurisdiction. Under
res judicata, a final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action.
Allen v. McCurry, supra, at
449 U. S. 94;
Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra, at
94 U. S. 352.
Under collateral estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or
law necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation
of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same
parties.
Montana v. United States, supra, at
440 U. S. 153.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.
S. 322,
439 U. S. 326,
n. 5 (1979). Thus, invocation of
res judicata and
collateral estoppel
"relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing
inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication."
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 94.
When a state court has adjudicated a claim or issue, these
doctrines also serve to "promote the comity between state and
federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal
system."
Id. at
449 U. S.
96.
[
Footnote 7]
EEOC review of discrimination charges previously rejected by
state agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were bound
by such agency decisions.
Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp.,
503 F.2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S.
928 (1975). Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intended
federal courts to be bound further by state administrative
decisions than by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that
decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial
de novo in
federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative
determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such
review, even if such a decision were to be afforded preclusive
effect in a State's own courts.
Garner v. Giarrusso, 571
F.2d 1330 (CA5 1978);
Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., supra;
Cooper v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (CA6 1972);
Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (CA2 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
[
Footnote 8]
Section 706(b) guarantees that the outcome of both agency and
judicial proceedings will be given substantial weight. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN interprets that provision as a ceiling on the deference
federal courts are obligated to give state court judgments.
Post at
456 U. S. 489.
The "substantial weight" requirement, however, was added to Title
VII in 1972 not because the EEOC was giving state administrative
decisions too much weight, but because it was affording them too
little significance.
See infra at
456 U. S.
474-476, and
n
16. Finding an implied repeal of § 1738 in an amendment directed
exclusively at increasing the deference to be given state decisions
would be contrary to normal principles of statutory interpretation,
let alone the more difficult test of demonstrating an implied
repeal.
It is even more implausible to find an implied repeal in the
limited deferral to pending state and local proceedings, § 706(c),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). First, that provision does not even address
the issue of the proper weight to be afforded state decisions.
Moreover, because the section requires complainants to wait no
longer than 60 days before initiating federal proceedings, it is
doubtful that Congress even contemplated that the provision applied
after a complaint had run the full course of state administrative
and judicial consideration.
See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U. S. 750,
441 U. S. 755
(1979) (Section 706(c) "is intended to give state
agencies
a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment
discrimination") (emphasis added);
Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U.S. at
404 U. S. 526
(The purpose of § 706(c) is "to give state
agencies a
prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints") (emphasis
added).
For the same reasons, the EEOC's authority to enter work-sharing
agreements with state agencies is irrelevant. This provision, like
the limited deferral and "substantial weight" requirements, is
directed at increasing, not reducing, the authority of state
agencies to resolve employment discrimination disputes. All of
these provisions are directed toward administrative cooperation,
and lend no evidence of congressional intent to compromise or
circumscribe the validity of state
judicial proceedings.
Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN implies that work-sharing agreements
constitute the one "narrow exception for possible exclusive state
agency jurisdiction,"
post at
456 U. S. 496,
left by Congress, neither the statute nor its background so
indicates. Indeed, it is no "exception" at all; even though the
EEOC declines to process a charge under a work-sharing agreement,
the statute does not prevent the complainant from subsequently
filing suit in federal court.
[
Footnote 9]
Interpretation of Title VII is hampered by the fact that there
are no authoritative legislative reports. The House Civil Rights
bill went directly to the Senate floor without committee
consideration in hopes that it would be approved without change.
This did not happen. The bill including Title VII, was amended 87
times during the 83-day debate in the Senate. Upon being returned
to the House, the bill was not subjected to the usual conference
procedure. Instead, the House voted acceptance of the Senate
measure.
See EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and
XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, pp. 9-11 (1968) (hereafter 1964
Leg.Hist.).
[
Footnote 10]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN reads the legislative history differently,
post at
456 U. S.
494-499, seizing upon doubts expressed concerning the
adequacy of state remedies. It does not follow, however, that an
implied repeal of § 1738 has been demonstrated. For that, the
intent of Congress "must be clear and manifest."
Radzanower v.
Touche Ross Co., 426 U. S. 148,
426 U. S. 154
(1976). JUSTICE BLACKMUN never claims that this rigorous standard
is satisfied. Nor would such a claim be persuasive. Similar
expressions of congressional concern with state remedies were
unsuccessfully mustered in
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S.
90 (1980), where we refused to find an implied repeal of
§ 1738 in the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See infra at
456 U. S. 476.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN also claims too much from the refusal of Congress
to place employment discrimination within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the States, 22 of whom lacked any fair employment
laws at the time Title VII was enacted. Reluctance to rely entirely
on the States does not require a departure from traditional rules
of
res judicata when a state fair employment law exists, a
state agency has investigated and processed a grievance, and a
state court has upheld the agency's decision as procedurally fair
and substantively justified.
[
Footnote 11]
See Bureau of National Affairs, State Fair Employment
Laws and Their Administration (1964).
See also 110
Cong.Rec. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
[
Footnote 12]
In their interpretive memorandum, Senators Clark and Case, floor
managers of the bill, stated that
"Title VII specifically provides for the continued effectiveness
of state and local laws and procedures for dealing with
discrimination in employment,"
and that "it will not override any state law or municipal
ordinance which is not inconsistent."
Id. at 7214, 7216.
See also id. at 7205 (remarks of Sen. Clark);
id.
at 12725 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
See generally
Jackson, Matheson, & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata
and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 Mich.L.Rev. 1485,
1493-1497 (1981) (hereinafter Jackson, Matheson, &
Piskorski).
[
Footnote 13]
110 Cong.Rec. 1635-1636 (1964), reprinted in 1964 Leg.Hist.
3345-3346 (remarks of Cong. Reid) ("The New York State Commission
for Human Rights has pioneered effectively, and it has now been
copied in 22 States . . ."); 110 Cong.Rec. 1643 (1964), 1964
Leg.Hist. 3258-3259 (remarks of Cong. Ryan); 110 Cong.Rec. 12595
(1964), 1964 Leg.Hist. 3066 (remarks of Sen. Clark).
[
Footnote 14]
Senator Dirksen, the principal drafter of the Senate bill,
stated in no uncertain terms his desire to avoid multiple suits
arising out of the same discrimination:
"What a layering upon layer of enforcement. What if the court
orders differed in their terms or requirements? There would be no
assurance that they would be identical. Should we have the Federal
forces of justice pull on the one arm, and the State forces of
justice tug on the other? Should we draw and quarter the
victim?"
110 Cong.Rec. 6449 (1964).
[
Footnote 15]
See, e.g., 117 Cong.Rec. 42026 (1971), reprinted in
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, p. 571 (1972) (hereafter 1972 Leg.Hist.) (remarks of
Sen. Allen); 118 Cong.Rec. 932 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist. 807 (same);
118 Cong.Rec. 311, 933 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist. 632, 809 (remarks of
Sen. Ervin); 118 Cong.Rec. 595 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist. 682 (remarks
of Sen. Tower); 118 Cong.Rec. 699-703 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist.
698-709 (remarks of Sen. Fannin).
Opponents successfully objected to combining investigatory,
adjudicatory, and enforcement power in a single agency. A
compromise, sponsored by Senator Dominick, was adopted which gave
the EEOC the power to bring suit, but retained a trial
de
novo in federal district court so that employers and other
defendants would receive "an impartial judicial decision free from
accusation of institutional bias." S.Rep. No. 92-415, P. 86 (1971),
1972 Leg.Hist. 464 (views of Sen. Dominick).
[
Footnote 16]
Prior to the 1972 amendments, the EEOC was free to ignore state
administrative decisions. In the Senate debates, Senator Montoya
asked Senator Williams, the floor manager of the amendments, and
Senator Ervin, an opponent, to explain the purpose of the
"substantial weight" directive. Senator Ervin responded that the
provision's purpose was to prevent the EEOC from reversing state
decisions "peremptorily." The Commission would be required to "give
due respect to the findings of the State or local authorities." 118
Cong.Rec. 310 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist. 627. Senator Williams did not
dispute this answer.
See also Jackson, Matheson, &
Piskorski,
supra, n
12, at 1504-1505.
[
Footnote 17]
We reject petitioner's suggestion, repeated by JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
post at
456 U.S.
499-501, that, since the Hruska amendment excluded state
proceedings, Senator Javits' comments "should, in context also, be
read as excluding state proceedings from any application of
res
judicata in Title VII suits." Reply Brief for Petitioner 9, n.
**. Not only is the idea that even a full state judicial proceeding
be excluded from
res judicata effect implausible on its
face, but Senator Javits prefaced his
res judicata
statement by discussing the very New York employment discrimination
laws under which Kremer proceeded. 118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972).
[
Footnote 18]
See, e.g., Smouse v. General Electric Co., 626 F.2d at
33335;
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d
at 1082-1083.
[
Footnote 19]
Here JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent rests on two dubious premises:
that plaintiffs will be deterred from seeking state judicial review
of administrative decisions and that the more such cases are
subject to judicial review, the better the system becomes. Obvious
incentives remain for an individual with a truly meritorious claim
to proceed. In New York, judicial review of "no probable cause"
determinations is rigorous in both a procedural and substantive
sense,
see infra at
456 U. S.
479-485, and n. 21. Forgoing such review ensures
considerable delay and lengthening of the adjudicatory process. And
the reward for such forbearance is a federal proceeding in which
the existing adverse state decision must be given "substantial
weight." JUSTICE BLACKMUN assumes, without supporting evidence,
that this "strategy" is wise, and very likely to be pursued in many
cases. Even were this assumption plausible, it hardly follows that
state proceedings are improved by the sheer quantity of
administrative adjudications brought before them.
[
Footnote 20]
The New York law is at least as broad as Title VII. Title 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer --
"
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. . . ."
New York Exec. Law § 296(1) (McKinney Supp.1981-1982)
provides:
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:"
"(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital
status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
to discharge from employment such individual."
We, of course, do not decide in this case whether jurisdiction
to entertain Title VII claims is limited to the federal courts.
[
Footnote 21]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS wrongly assert that the New
York court's holding does not constitute a finding "one way or the
other" on the merits of petitioner's claim.
Post at
456 U. S. 492
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
post at
456 U. S. 509
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). When the NYHRD summarily dismisses a
complaint, the Appellate Division must find that the petitioner's
"complaint lacks merit as a matter of law."
Flah's, Inc. v.
Schneider, 71 App.Div.2d 993, 420 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (1979).
See also New York State Div. for Youth v. State Human Rights
Appeal Board, 83 App.Div.2d 972, 973, 442 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814
(1981) ("Since the investigation as conducted by the division
involved separate meetings without hearings, it must appear in such
instance that, as a matter of law, the complaint lacks merit in
order for the division to dismiss the complaint");
State Div.
of Human Rights v. Blanchette, 73 App.Div.2d 820, 821, 423
N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (1979) ("[T]he division may not determine that
there is no probable cause for the complaint and dismiss it when
the facts revealed in the investigation do not
generate
conviction in and persuade a fair and detached factfinder' that
that there is no substance in the complaint"); Stansiak v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 App.Div.2d 962, 411 N.Y.S.2d
700, 701 (1978) ("In order to sustain a dismissal of a complaint
before the complainant has had his opportunity to present his case
in a formal manner, it must appear virtually as a matter of law
that the complaint lacks merit"); Altier v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 61 App.Div.2d 780, 781, 402 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (1978)
("It cannot be said as a matter of law, that the complaint . . .
lacked merit"). Decisions applying the standard employed in the
foregoing cases are decisions on the merits, just as was the
decision in State Div. of Human Rights v. New York State Drug
Abuse Comm'n, 59 App.Div.2d 332, 336, 399 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544
(1977) (when a complainant has a "full opportunity to present his
evidence and exhibits, under oath if he so requests," the presence
of a "rational basis in the record" for that decision will
suffice). It is well established that judicial affirmance of an
administrative determination is entitled to preclusive effect.
CIBA Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.
S. 640, 412 U. S. 644
(1973); Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.
S. 470, 281 U. S.
475-477 (1930). There is no requirement that judicial
review must proceed de novo if it is to be preclusive.
Furthermore, as we have explained, Congress did not draft the
de novo requirement in order to deny preclusive effect to
state decisions. See supra at 456 U. S.
474.
[
Footnote 22]
While our previous expressions of the requirement of a full and
fair opportunity to litigate have been in the context of collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion, it is clear from what follows that
invocation of
res judicata or claim preclusion is subject
to the same limitation.
The lower courts did not discuss whether it is the doctrine of
res judicata or collateral estoppel that applies here.
Section 1738 requires dismissal of petitioner's Title VII suit
whether his Title VII claim is precluded by the New York judgment
or whether he is collaterally estopped by that judgment from
complaining that Chemico had discriminated against him.
Res
judicata has recently been taken to bar claims arising from
the same transaction even if brought under different statutes,
Nash County Bd. of Ed. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488
(CA4),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
See
also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61(1) (Tent. Draft
No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978); Currie,
Res Judicata: The Neglected
Defense, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 317, 340-341 (1978). It may be that
petitioner would be precluded under
res judicata from
pursuing a Title VII claim. However that may be, it is undebatable
that petitioner is at least estopped from relitigating the issue of
employment discrimination arising from the same events.
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.
90,
243 U. S. 92
(1917) ("[A]n ordinary personal judgment for money, invalid for
want of service amounting to due process of law, is as ineffective
in the State as it is outside of it");
Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562,
201 U. S. 567,
201 U. S. 568
(1906).
[
Footnote 24]
The Court's decisions enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, also suggest that what a full
and fair opportunity to litigate entails is the procedural
requirements of due process.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
at
334 U. S. 348
("there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that
a defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate the
existence of jurisdictional facts");
Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling
Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522,
283 U. S. 524
(1931);
Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S.
25,
244 U. S. 30
(1917). Section 1738 was enacted to implement the Full Faith and
Credit Clause,
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U. S. 430,
320 U. S. 437
(1943), and specifically to insure that federal courts, not
included within the constitutional provision, would be bound by
state judgments.
Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S.
32,
305 U. S. 40
(1938) ("The Act extended the rule of the Constitution to all
courts, federal as well as state").
See also Underwriters
National Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident &
Health Insurance Guaranty Assn., 455 U.
S. 691 (1982). It is therefore reasonable that § 1738 be
subject to no more restriction than the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
[
Footnote 25]
The Human Rights Appeal Board is authorized to reverse or remand
any order that is not "supported by substantial evidence on the
whole record" or that is "arbitrary, capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
N.Y.Exec.Law §§ 297-a(7)(d) and (e) (McKinney 1972).
[
Footnote 26]
Certainly, the administrative nature of the factfinding process
is not dispositive. In
United States v. Utah Construction &
Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394
(1966), we held that, so long as opposing parties had an adequate
opportunity to litigate disputed issues of fact,
res
judicata is properly applied to decisions of an administrative
agency acting in a "judicial capacity."
Id. at
384 U. S.
422.
[
Footnote 27]
One example is the authorization for federal courts to reexamine
state findings upon a request for a writ of habeas corpus. 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
Today the Court follows an isolated Second Circuit approach, and
holds that a discrimination complainant cannot bring a Title VII
suit in federal court after unsuccessfully seeking state court
"review" of a state antidiscrimination agency's unfavorable
decision. The Court embraces a rule that has been subject to
challenge within the Second Circuit [
Footnote 2/1] and that has been "vigorously attacked and
soundly rejected by other courts." [
Footnote 2/2] The Court reaches this result because it
purports to find nothing in Title VII inconsistent with the
application of the general preclusion rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
the state court's affirmance of the state agency's decision. For a
compelling array of reasons, the Court is wrong.
Page 456 U. S. 487
I
The Court, as it must, concedes that a state agency
determination does not preclude a trial
de novo in federal
district court.
Ante at
456 U. S.
468-470, and n. 7. Congress made it clear beyond doubt
that state agency findings would not prevent the Title VII
complainant from filing suit in federal court.
Title VII provides that no charge may be filed until 60 days
"after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." §
706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). After a charge is filed, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may take action, and,
eventually, the complainant may file suit, §§ 706(b) and (f)(1). By
permitting a charge to be filed after termination of state
proceedings, the statute expressly contemplates that a plaintiff
may bring suit despite a state finding of no discrimination.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Page 456 U. S. 488
This fact is also made clear by § 706(b). In 1972, by Pub.L.
92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 104, Congress amended that section by
directing that the EEOC "accord substantial weight to final
findings and orders made by State or local authorities in
proceedings commenced under State or local law." [
Footnote 2/4] If the original version of Title VII
had given the outcomes of state "proceedings" preclusive effect,
Congress would not have found it necessary to amend the statute in
1972 to direct that they be given "substantial weight." And if, in
1972, Congress had intended final decisions in state "proceedings"
to have preclusive effect, it certainly would not have instructed
that they be given "substantial weight." [
Footnote 2/5]
Thus, Congress expressly recognized in both § 706(b) and §
706(c) that a complainant could bring a Title VII suit in federal
court despite the conclusion of state "proceedings." And, as the
Court must acknowledge,
see ante at
456 U. S.
470-471, n. 8, when Congress referred to state
"proceedings," it referred to both state agency proceedings and
state judicial
Page 456 U. S. 489
review of those agency proceedings.
"[T]hroughout Title VII, the word 'proceeding,' or its plural
form, is used to refer to all the different types of proceedings in
which the statute is enforced, state and federal, administrative
and judicial."
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S.
54,
447 U. S. 62-63
(1980).
Yet the Court nevertheless finds that petitioner's Title VII
suit is precluded by the termination of state "proceedings." In
this case, the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD)
found no probable cause to believe that petitioner had been a
victim of discrimination. Under the Court's own rule, that
determination in itself does not bar petitioner from filing a Title
VII suit in federal district court. According to the Court,
however, petitioner lost his opportunity to bring a federal suit
when he unsuccessfully sought review of the state agency's decision
in the New York courts. As the Court applies preclusion principles
to Title VII, the state court affirmance of the state agency
decision -- not the state agency decision itself -- blocks any
subsequent Title VII suit.
The Court reaches this result through a schizophrenic reading of
§ 706(b).
See ante at
456 U. S.
469-470, and n. 8. According to the Court, when Congress
amended § 706(b) so that state "proceedings" would be accorded
"substantial weight," it meant two different things at the same
time: it intended state agency "proceedings" to be accorded only
"substantial weight," while, simultaneously, state judicial
"proceedings" in review of those agency "proceedings" would be
accorded "substantial weight and more" -- that is, "preclusive
effect." But the statutory language gives no hint of this hidden
double meaning. Instead of reading an unexpressed intent into §
706(b), the Court should accept the plain language of the statute.
All state "proceedings," whether agency proceedings or state
judicial review proceedings, are entitled to "substantial weight,"
not "preclusive effect." As the Court implicitly concedes when it
permits suit despite the conclusion
Page 456 U. S. 490
of agency proceedings, "substantial weight" is a very different
concept from "preclusive effect," and Congress thus did not intend
for the termination of any state "proceeding" to foreclose a
subsequent Title VII suit.
In addition, the Court must disregard the clear import of §
706(c). That section explicitly contemplates that a complainant can
bring a Title VII suit despite the termination of state
"proceedings." Once again, the statute contains no suggestion that
any state "proceeding" has preclusive effect on a subsequent Title
VII suit. Nonetheless, contrary to § 706(c), the Court bars
petitioner's Title VII suit because of the termination of state
"proceedings." [
Footnote 2/6]
The Court's attempt to give § 706(b) a double meaning and to
avoid the language of § 706(c) is made all the more awkward because
the Court's decision artificially separates the proceedings before
the reviewing state court from the state administrative process.
Indeed, if Congress meant to permit a Title VII suit despite the
termination of state agency proceedings, it is only natural to
conclude that Congress also intended to permit a Title VII suit
after the agency decision has been simply affirmed by a state
court.
State court review is merely the last step in the administrative
process, the final means of review of the state agency's decision.
For instance, in New York, the NYHRD "is primarily responsible for
administering the law and to that end has been granted broad powers
to eliminate discriminatory practices."
Imperial Diner, Inc. v.
State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52
N.Y.2d 72, 77, 417 N.E.2d 525, 528 (1980). When, as in this
case, the NYHRD finds no probable cause, a reviewing court must
affirm the Division's decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious
or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion,"
see
Page 456 U. S. 491
N.Y.Exec.Law § 297-a(7)(e) (McKinney 1972), [
Footnote 2/7] that is, unless the decision is
"devoid of a rational basis."
State Office of Drug Abuse Servs.
v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 48
N.Y.2d 276, 284, 397 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (1979). If the agency
decides to hold a hearing, its decision must be affirmed if it is
"supported by substantial evidence on the whole record."
N.Y.Exec.Law § 297-a(7)(d) (McKinney 1972).
See State Division
o,f Human Rights v. Syracuse University, 46 App.Div.2d 1002,
362 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1974).
See generally N.Y.Exec.Law § 298
(McKinney Supp.1981-1982).
This review, therefore, is not
de novo in the state
courts. When it affirms the agency's decision, the reviewing court
does not determine that the Division was correct. In fact, the
court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the [NYHRD],"
State Division of Human Rights v. Mecca Kendall Corp., 53
App.Div.2d 201, 203-204, 385 N.Y.S.2d 665, 6666-67 (1976); the
court is
"not empowered to find new facts or take a different view of the
weight of the evidence if the [NYHRD's] determination is supported
by substantial evidence,"
State Division of Human Rights v. Columbia
University, 39
N.Y.2d 612, 616, 350 N.E.2d 396, 398 (1976),
cert. denied
sub nom. Gilinsky v. Columbia University, 429 U.S. 1096
(1977). In affirming, the reviewing court finds only that the
agency's conclusion
"was a reasonable
Page 456 U. S. 492
one, and thus may not be set aside by the courts although a
contrary decision may 'have been reasonable and also
sustainable.'"
Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,
52 N.Y.2d at 79, 417 N.E.2d at 529, quoting
Mize v. State
Division of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 56, 304 N.E.2d 231,
233 (1973). [
Footnote 2/8]
The Court purports to give preclusive effect to the New York
court's decision. But the Appellate Division made no finding one
way or the other concerning the
merits of petitioner's
discrimination claim. The NYHRD, not the New York court, dismissed
petitioner's complaint for lack of probable cause. In affirming,
the court merely found that the
agency's decision was not
arbitrary or capricious. Thus, although it claims to grant a state
court decision preclusive effect,
Page 456 U. S. 493
in fact the Court bars petitioner's suit based on the state
agency's decision of no probable cause. The Court thereby
disregards the express provisions of Title VII, for, as the Court
acknowledges, Congress has decided that an adverse state agency
decision will not prevent a complainant's subsequent Title VII
suit. [
Footnote 2/9]
Finally, if the Court is, in fact, giving preclusive effect only
to the state court decision, the Court misapplies 28 U.S.C. § 1738
by barring petitioner's suit. The state reviewing court never
considered the merits of petitioner's discrimination claim, the
subject matter of a Title VII suit in federal court. It is a basic
principle of preclusion doctrine,
see ante at
456 U. S.
481-482, n. 22, that a decision in one judicial
proceeding cannot bar a subsequent suit raising issues that were
not relevant to the first decision. "If the legal matters
determined in the earlier case differ from those raised in the
second case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the situation."
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591,
333 U. S. 600
(1948).
See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S.
90,
449 U. S. 94
(1980). Here, the state court decided only whether the state agency
decision was arbitrary or capricious. Since the discrimination
claim, not the validity of the state agency's decision, is the
issue before the federal court, under § 1738, the state court's
decision, by itself, cannot preclude a federal Title VII suit.
Page 456 U. S. 494
Thus, the Court is doing one of two things: either it is
granting preclusive effect to the state agency's decision, a course
that it concedes would violate Title VII, or it is misapplying §
1738 by giving preclusive effect to a state court decision that did
not address the issue before the federal court. Instead of making
one of these two mistakes, the Court should accept the fact that
the New York state court judicial review is simply the end of the
state administrative process, the state "proceedings." The Court
searches in vain for a partial repeal of § 1738 in Title VII
because it is blind to the fact that judicial review is a part --
indeed, a distinctly secondary part -- of the administration of
discrimination claims filed before the NYHRD. [
Footnote 2/10]
II
A
The Court's decision also flies in the face of Title VII's
legislative history. Under the Court's ruling, a complainant is
foreclosed from pursuing his federal Title VII remedy if he
unsuccessfully seeks judicial correction of the state agency's
adverse disposition of his discrimination charge. Thus, state
proceedings are the complainant's sole remedy when he
unsuccessfully pursues judicial review on the state side. But Title
VII's legislative history makes clear that Congress never intended
the outcome of state agency proceedings to be the discrimination
complainant's exclusive remedy.
One of the principal issues during congressional consideration
of Title VII in 1964 was the proper role of state fair employment
practices commissions.
See, e.g., 110 Cong.Rec. 7216
(1964). At various times, Congress considered proposals to give the
state commissions exclusive jurisdiction over
Page 456 U. S. 495
discrimination charges. But, repeatedly, Congress rejected those
proposals.
When Title VII was before the House for the first time, the
House twice rejected attempts to prevent the application of Title
VII in States that were enforcing adequate fair employment laws.
See 110 Cong.Rec. 2727 (1964);
id. at 2828. In
the end, the House provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the
States, but only under certain conditions. Under the House version,
the EEOC would have been given authority to determine the adequacy
of state agency procedures. If it found the procedures to be
adequate, the EEOC was directed to enter into a written agreement
with the state agency. In States covered by those agreements, the
EEOC would not bring civil actions in cases referred to in the
agreements, and the complainants would likewise be barred from
bringing a civil suit in federal court. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 708(b) (1964).
See 110 Cong.Rec. 7214 (1964).
But when the bill went to the Senate, the House approach was
discarded for the present provisions of the statute.
Page 456 U. S. 496
Senator Dirksen presented the explanation of the changes.
Id. at 12817. Among these was the statement that the
exclusive jurisdiction provision of the House bill "which provides
for the ceding of Federal jurisdiction is deleted."
Id. at
12819. Instead,
"it has been replaced by the new provisions of section 706 which
provide that, where there is a State or local law prohibiting the
alleged unlawful employment practice, the State or local
authorities are given exclusive jurisdiction
for a limited
period of time."
(Emphasis added.)
Ibid. Thus, after state proceedings
had terminated, the complainant was free to seek federal remedies.
See id. at 12721 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
id.
at 12595 (remarks of Sen. Clark) (accepting final version because
complainant can "eventually" pursue federal remedies after applying
for state relief).
Congress left open only a narrow exception for possible
exclusive state agency jurisdiction. The EEOC was empowered to
enter into worksharing agreements with state agencies. A
worksharing agreement did not automatically foreclose a complainant
from filing a federal civil suit, but the EEOC was free to include
such a provision in a worksharing agreement if it considered that
course wise.
Id. at 12820.
See § 709(b).
Thus, in the end, Congress expressly decided that no
discrimination complainant should be left solely to his remedies
before state fair employment commissions unless the EEOC agreed
otherwise. Yet, contrary to this congressional choice, the Court
would deny some discrimination victims any federal remedy, and
would make the decisions of state commissions their exclusive
redress, even in the absence of an EEOC agreement. When a state
court refuses to overturn a state commission's rejection of a
complainant's discrimination
Page 456 U. S. 497
claim, the Court declares the state remedy to be exclusive.
B
But the Court qualifies its holding. The Court permits the state
agency's decision to be the complainant's exclusive remedy only if
the agency's procedures satisfy the minimal requirements of due
process.
Ante at
456 U. S.
481-485. The Court surveys the procedures of the NYHRD
and concludes that they are in accord with due process.
Ante at
456 U. S.
483-485. [
Footnote
2/11] This discussion, by itself, demonstrates the fallacy of
the Court's attempt to differentiate between the state agency's
decision and the state court's affirmance of that decision. By
relying more heavily on the adequacy of the state
agency's
procedures than on the adequacy of the state
court's
procedures, the Court underscores that it is, in fact, granting
preclusive effect to a state administrative decision.
It is important also to note that, in two different ways, the
Court's inquiry violates the congressional intent. First, the Court
undertakes to determine whether the state procedures are adequate
when Congress has expressly left that decision to the EEOC.
Congress explicitly permitted a state complainant to file suit in
federal court, despite a final state agency decision, unless the
EEOC has signed a worksharing agreement with the state agency
foreclosing subsequent federal suits. If the EEOC agreed with the
Court that minimal due process in agency procedures justified
barring subsequent Title VII suits when the state agency's decision
had been affirmed by a state court, the EEOC could sign worksharing
agreements with state agencies on those terms. By assuming the
authority to make that decision, the Court usurps a role that
Congress reserved to the EEOC.
Page 456 U. S. 498
Second, throughout its consideration of Title VII, Congress was
concerned that state agency procedures were not the equivalent of
those that it intended federal authorities to employ. Senator Clark
told the Senate that "State and local FEPC laws vary widely in
effectiveness." 110 Cong.Rec. 7205 (1964). He continued: "In many
areas, effective enforcement is hampered by inadequate legislation,
inadequate procedures, or an inadequate budget."
Ibid.
Unlike the Court, Congress realized that no legal doctrine could
accurately gauge the effectiveness of state agencies and laws in
eliminating discrimination. In their interpretative memorandum,
Senators Clark and Case [
Footnote
2/12] explained:
"It has been suggested . . . that there should be some provision
automatically providing for exclusive State jurisdiction where
adequate State remedies for discrimination in employment exist.
Such a proposal is unworkable. Congress cannot determine, nor can
we devise a formula for determining, which State laws and
procedures are adequate. . . . An antidiscrimination law cannot be
evaluated simply by an examination of its provisions, 'for the
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'"
Id. at 7214. Yet the Court concludes that minimal due
process standards provide safeguards sufficient to warrant denying
a discrimination victim federal remedies if a state court rejects
his request to overturn an adverse state agency decision. In Title
VII, Congress wanted to assure discrimination victims more than
bare due process; it wanted them to have the benefit of a vigorous
effort to eliminate discrimination.
See
Alexander
Page 456 U. S. 499
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 44-45
(1974). By affording some discrimination complainants less, the
Court contravenes the congressional intent behind Title VII.
C
The Court's search of the legislative history uncovers only a
single bit of concrete support for its interpretation of Title VII.
[
Footnote 2/13] But, ironically,
the legislative history cited by the Court actually undercuts its
position. During the 1972 debates over changes in Title VII,
Senator Hruska proposed an amendment that would have made Title VII
the exclusive remedy for a discrimination victim, with certain
exceptions. One of the exceptions permitted concurrent state
proceedings. The Senator explained:
"[T]here would be a further exception and that would be
proceedings in a State agency. Those proceedings could continue
notwithstanding the pendency of an employee's action under section
706 of title VII.
Page 456 U. S. 500
It seems to me and others that this is only fair."
118 Cong.Rec. 3369 (1972). Thus, even Senator Hruska would not
have prevented duplicative state and federal proceedings. Here is
strong evidence of a congressional consensus that state and federal
remedies should exist independently of each other.
The Court quotes part of Senator Javits' response to Senator
Hruska's proposal.
See ante at
456 U. S. 475.
What the Court fails to point out is that the bulk of Senator
Javits' response rejected the suggestion that the number of
discrimination remedies should be reduced. Senator Javits quoted
with approval from the testimony of an official of the Department
of Justice:
"In the field of civil rights, the Congress has regularly
insured that there be a variety of enforcement devices to insure
that all available resources are brought to bear on problem of
discrimination. . . ."
"At this juncture, when we are all agreed that some improvement
in the enforcement of Title VII is needed, it would be . . . unwise
to diminish in any way the variety of enforcement means available
to deal with discrimination in employment."
118 Cong.Rec. 3369 3370 (1972).
Thus, since Senator Javits was responding to a proposed
amendment that expressly provided for separate federal and state
proceedings, he certainly did not suggest that state proceedings
should bar Title VII suits when he spoke of
res judicata.
See ante at
456 U. S. 475.
[
Footnote 2/14] At the most, he
may have been
Page 456 U. S. 501
referring to suits brought under overlapping federal statutes.
And, given his reluctance to reduce the number of available
antidiscrimination remedies, it is not clear that his remarks were
intended to reach even that far. [
Footnote 2/15] In no sense can the defeat of Senator
Hruska's amendment be interpreted as a congressional endorsement of
the Court's decision to bar a complainant's Title VII suit based on
a state court affirmance of an adverse state agency decision.
[
Footnote 2/16] In Senator
Javits' own words, "[w]e should not cut off the range of remedies
which is available." 118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972). [
Footnote 2/17]
III
The Court's opinion today is also contrary to the rationales
underlying its past Title VII decisions. Time and again, the Court
has held that Congress did not intend to foreclose a
Page 456 U. S. 502
Title VII suit because of the conclusion of proceedings in
another forum.
The case list begins with
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792
(1973), when the Court refused to prevent a plaintiff from bringing
suit in federal court because of an EEOC determination of no
reasonable cause. The Court cited "the large volume of complaints
before the Commission and the nonadversary character of many of its
proceedings,"
id. at
411 U. S. 799;
noted that Title VII "does not restrict a complainant's right to
sue to those charges as to which the Commission has made findings
of reasonable cause,"
id. at
411 U. S. 798;
and refused to "engraft on the statute a requirement which may
inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination in the
federal courts,"
id. at
411 U. S.
798-799. The Court today could just as easily have
written about "the nonadversary character" of state agency
proceedings and the fact that Title VII does not "restrict a
complainant's right to sue" to those charges as to which a state
court has not affirmed the state agency's findings.
In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36 (1974), the Court repeated the same theme by
permitting a Title VII suit despite a prior adverse arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement. The Court emphasized that
Congress intended a scheme of overlapping, independent,
supplementary discrimination remedies:
"[L]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against
discrimination. . . . Title VII provides for consideration of
employment discrimination claims in several forums. . . .
And,
in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a
later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative
history
Page 456 U. S. 503
of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII
and other applicable state and federal statutes."
Id. at
415 U. S. 47-48
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Court today disregards
the congressional intent described in
Alexander when it
makes state agency proceedings the exclusive remedy for those
complainants who unsuccessfully pursue state judicial review.
Finally, in two subsequent decisions, the Court adhered to
Alexander. In
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S. 461
(1975), it held that Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, although
"related" and "directed to most of the same ends," provide
"separate, distinct, and independent" discrimination remedies. And
in
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.
S. 840 (1976), the Court permitted a federal employee to
bring a Title VII suit even though the Civil Service Commission had
affirmed a federal agency's rejection of the employee's
discrimination claim.
In each of these four cases, the Court refused to close the
doors of the federal courthouse to the Title VII plaintiff. The
Court has allowed Title VII plaintiffs to sue in federal court,
though they had failed before the EEOC, an arbitrator, and a
federal agency. And even today's majority must add another forum to
this list, namely, a state antidiscrimination agency. Until now, it
has been
"clear from [the] scheme of interrelated and complementary state
and federal enforcement that Congress viewed proceedings before the
EEOC and in federal court as supplements to available state
remedies for employment discrimination."
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 65.
The Court departs from the reasoning of an unbroken line of its
prior decisions when it bars a discrimination complainant from
suing under Title VII simply because he unsuccessfully sought state
judicial "review" of an adverse state agency decision.
Page 456 U. S. 504
IV
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's decision is
its tendency to cut back upon two critical policies underlying
Title VII.
First, Congress intended that state antidiscrimination
procedures be an integral part of the Nation's battle against
discrimination. For that reason, Congress did not preempt state
antidiscrimination agencies,
see 110 Cong.Rec. 7216
(1964), and instead gave state and local authorities an initial
opportunity to resolve discrimination complaints.
See, e.g.,
id. at 12725 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
The Court's decision is directly contrary to this congressional
intent. The lesson of the Court's ruling is:
an unsuccessful
state discrimination complainant should not seek state judicial
review. [
Footnote 2/18] If a
discrimination complainant pursues state judicial review and loses
-- a likely result, given the deferential standard of review in
state court -- he forfeits his right to seek redress in a federal
court. If, however, he simply bypasses the state courts, he can
proceed to the EEOC and ultimately to federal court. Instead of a
deferential review of an agency record, he will receive in federal
court a
de novo hearing accompanied by procedural aids
such as broad discovery rules and the ability to subpoena
witnesses. Thus, paradoxically, the Court effectively has
eliminated state reviewing courts from the fight against
discrimination in an entire class of cases. Consequently, the state
courts will not have a chance to correct state agency errors when
the agencies rule against discrimination victims, and the quality
of
Page 456 U. S. 505
state agency decisionmaking can only deteriorate. [
Footnote 2/19] It is a perverse sort of
comity that eliminates the reviewing function of state courts in
the name of giving their decisions due respect.
This argument against preclusion is not novel. In prior
decisions, the Court has refused to set up incentives for
discrimination complainants to abandon alternative remedies. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 59, it
concluded:
"Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their
rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass
arbitration and institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary
compliance or settlement of Title VII
Page 456 U. S. 506
claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more
litigation, not less."
In
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 65,
the Court addressed state proceedings directly, explaining:
"Complainants unable to recover fees in state proceedings may be
expected to wait out the 60-day deferral period, while focusing
efforts on obtaining federal relief . . . Only authorization of fee
awards ensures incorporation of state procedures as a meaningful
part of the Title VII enforcement scheme."
In this case, the Court has chosen preclusion over common sense,
with the result that the state courts will decline, not grow, in
importance. [
Footnote 2/20]
Second, the Court, for a small class of discrimination
complainants, has undermined the remedial purpose of Title VII.
Invariably, there will be some complainants who will not be aware
of today's decision. The Court has thus constructed a rule that
will serve as a trap for the unwary
pro se or poorly
represented complainant. For these complainants, their sole remedy
lies in the state administrative processes. Yet, inevitably those
agencies do not give all discrimination complaints careful
attention. Often hampered by "inadequate
Page 456 U. S. 507
procedures" or "an inadequate budget,"
see 110
Cong.Rec. 7205 (1964), the state antidiscrimination agency may give
a discrimination charge less than the close examination it would
receive in federal court. [
Footnote
2/21] When, as in this case, the state agency dismisses for
lack of probable cause, the discrimination complainant is
particularly at risk, because inadequate staffing of state agencies
can lead to "a tendency to dismiss too many complaints for alleged
lack of probable cause." [
Footnote
2/22] Though state courts may be diligent in reviewing agency
dismissals for no probable cause, the nature of the agency's
deliberations, combined with deferential judicial review, can lead
only to discrimination charges' receiving less careful
consideration than Congress intended when it passed Title VII. The
Court's decision thus cannot be squared with the congressional
intent that the fight against discrimination be a policy "of the
highest priority."
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
390 U. S. 400,
390 U. S. 402
(1968). [
Footnote 2/23]
Page 456 U. S. 508
V
For all these reasons, the Court's decision is neither "strongly
suggested" nor "compelled" by
Allen v. McCurry,
449 U. S. 90
(1980).
See ante at
456 U. S. 476.
In
McCurry, the Court found only "the most equivocal
support," 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 99,
for an argument that Congress intended to override the general
preclusion rule of § 1738 when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But
here, the language, the legislative history, and the fundamental
policies of Title VII all demonstrate that Congress contemplated
relitigation of a discrimination claim in federal court, even
though a state court had refused to disturb a state agency decision
adverse to the complainant.
And no drastic consequences would flow from a decision finding §
1738 inapplicable in this case. The Court would not be forced to
permit a subsequent Title VII suit in federal court if the
complainant already had lost a trial on the merits in state court.
See 456
U.S. 461fn2/10|>n. 10,
supra. Furthermore, the
state court affirmance of the state agency's decision would not be
discarded. The state decision could be "admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate,"
Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 60,
that is, "substantial weight,"
see § 706(b).
But despite the reasonableness of the rule followed by other
Courts of Appeals,
see 456
U.S. 461fn2/2|>n. 2,
supra, the Court improperly
applies § 1738 to bar petitioner from bringing a Title VII suit in
federal court. I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Before the Court of Appeals addressed the issue, one District
Court in the Second Circuit held that a state court affirmance of a
decision by the New York State Division of Human Rights did not
preclude a subsequent Title VII suit.
Benneci v. Department of
Labor, New York State Division of Employment, 388 F.
Supp. 1080 (SDNY 1975). Then, in
Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (1977), the Second Circuit
ruled, over a strong dissent, that a state court affirmance of a
state agency decision barred a subsequent civil rights suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Later, in a brief per curiam decision,
Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60,
cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979), the Circuit concluded that
Mitchell dictated the same
res judicata result
for Title VII, despite the significant differences between § 1981
and the complex structure of Title VII, which expressly addresses
the role of state proceedings in the resolution of discrimination
claims. The District Judge in this case appropriately felt himself
bound by
Sinicropi, but he wrote a persuasive opinion
questioning its wisdom.
477 F.
Supp. 587, 591-594 (SDNY 1979). On appeal, a panel of the
Second Circuit also found the outcome in this case dictated by
Sinicropi. 623 F.2d 786 (1980). Two judges of that court
voted for rehearing en banc. App. 80.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 914,
n. 5 (CA7 1981). All other Courts of Appeals that have considered
the issue have disagreed with the Second Circuit. In addition to
Unger, see Smouse v. General Electric Co., 626 F.2d 333,
336 (CA3 1980) (expressly rejecting
Sinicropi);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079,
1084 (CA8) ("questioning"
Sinicropi),
cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
See also Aleem v. General
Felt Industries, Inc., 661 F.2d 135, 137 (CA9 1981)
("
Sinicropi is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in
Alexander [v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36 (1974)]").
Commentators, too, agree that the Second Circuit's rule is
ill-conceived.
See Note,
Res Judicata in
Successive Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U.Ill.Law Forum
1049, 1099; Comment, 15 Harv.Civ.Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 29, 266-276
(1980) (criticizing application of Second Circuit's rule to 42
U.S.C. § 1981); Comment, 31 Rutgers L.Rev. 973 (1979) (same);
Comment, 6 Ford. Urban L.J. 481, 492-494 (1978) (same); Comment, 62
Minn.L.Rev. 987 (1978); Note, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 187 (1978).
See
also Jackson, Matheson, & Piskorski, The Proper Role of
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits,
79 Mich.L.Rev. 1485, 1519-1520 (1981) (rejecting application of
res judicata when, as in this case, the state court
affirms a state agency finding of no probable cause); Comment, 30
Vand.L.Rev. 1260 (1977); Richards,
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 Ark.L.Rev.
129, 158 (1975) (interpreting Title VII contrary to Second
Circuit's decisions, but before the relevant Second Circuit cases
were decided).
[
Footnote 2/3]
See also § 706(f)(1) (permitting the district court to
stay a Title VII suit for not more than 60 days pending termination
of "State or local proceedings," without suggesting that the
termination would bar further district court proceedings).
[
Footnote 2/4]
By indicating that final decisions in state proceedings have no
preclusive effect on the EEOC, Congress also indicated that final
decisions in state proceedings do not preclude a subsequent Title
VII suit in federal court.
"It would be meaningless for Congress to set up standards for
EEOC examination of cases after determinations were made in state
proceedings if Congress intended that those cases be barred from
consideration in federal court,"
because the EEOC,
"which lacks enforcement power, would be attempting to mediate
with defendants who were already protected from any further legal
action."
Batute v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450, n. 1
(CA7 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975)
[
Footnote 2/5]
Congress simply would have inserted the words "preclusive
effect" instead of "substantial weight." The legislative history of
the "substantial weight" amendment indicates that Congress intended
for the EEOC to refrain only from overturning state decisions
"peremptorily," and for the EEOC simply to give them "due respect."
118 Cong.Rec. 310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court observes that this section does not address the issue
of the proper weight to be afforded state decisions.
See
ante at
456 U. S. 471,
n. 8. It is true that § 706(c) does not specify the precise amount
of deference due a state decision. But by permitting a complainant
to file charges with the EEOC and ultimately to bring suit despite
the termination of state proceedings, § 706(c) does provide that
the termination of state proceedings will not have preclusive
effect.
Section 706(f)(1) follows the same path. It permits the federal
court to stay a Title VII suit pending termination of state
"proceedings," without suggesting that the termination of state
proceedings will preclude further action in the Title VII suit.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Sections 297-a(7)(d) and (e) describe the scope of review by the
New York Human Rights Appeal Board. Those standards also apply to
review by the New York courts of NYHRD decisions.
See Mize v.
State Division of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 57, 304 N.E.2d
231, 233 (1973); N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 7803 (McKinney 1981); Gabrielli
& Nonna, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in New York:
An Overview and Survey, 52 St.John's L.Rev. 361, 369-373
(1978).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Despite these express statutory provisions and explanations from
New York's highest courts, this Court seems to insist that New York
courts pass upon the merits of a complainant's discrimination
claim.
See ante at
456 U. S.
480-481, n. 21. If this is the basis for the Court's
decision giving the New York court's ruling preclusive effect, then
today's decision is much less important than some might think at
first glance. If a state court in fact adheres to a pure arbitrary
and capricious standard, the Court might not grant such a state
court decision preclusive effect.
On the other hand, the Court may be stating only that use of an
arbitrary and capricious standard involves some examination of the
merits, because the reviewing court must look at the evidence to
determine if the agency acted in an arbitrary fashion. If this is
the gist of the Court's argument, the Court advances its case very
little. When a court reviews an agency record under a deferential
standard of review, the agency, not the court, decides the merits
of the claim.
The Court states that "[t]here is no requirement that judicial
review must proceed
de novo if it is to be preclusive."
Ante at
456 U. S. 481,
n. 21. Whether that conclusion is correct in the usual case or not,
it certainly cannot stand in the context of Title VII. As the Court
itself holds, Congress expressly intended that a state agency's
determination would not bar a Title VII suit. When the state court
does not conduct a
de novo review, it accepts the
determination of the state agency. When the Court gives such a
state court affirmance preclusive effect, it thereby forecloses a
Title VII suit based on a state agency's resolution of the
complainant's discrimination charge -- a result that Title VII
condemns.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The primacy of the state agency's decision is underscored by the
source of the preclusion rule upon which the Court relies. To
determine the preclusive effect the state court affirmance would
have in the New York courts, the Court quotes N.Y Exec.Law § 300
(McKinney 1972).
Ante at
456 U. S. 467.
But § 300 makes no reference to state court decisions; it prevents
state suit after a final decision in any proceeding brought before
the NYHRD. Thus, for the purposes of state preclusion, a state
court affirmance of the state agency's final decision is mere
happenstance.
[
Footnote 2/10]
One reason for the Court's decision is its fear that a state
court affirmance of a state agency decision cannot be distinguished
from a full state court trial of a discrimination claim.
See
ante at
456 U. S.
469-470. This fear is unfounded.
When Congress permitted a complainant to bring a Title VII suit
despite the termination of his state proceedings, it had
proceedings connected with state antidiscrimination agencies
clearly in mind.
See §§ 706(c) and 709(b). Thus, the Court
easily could hold that Congress referred to state administrative
processing of discrimination claims, including judicial review of
agency decisions, when it referred to "proceedings" in §§ 706(b)
and (c), and, at the same time, could refuse to hold that Congress
intended to include a state court trial on the merits of the
complainant's claim within the term "proceedings."
Such a decision would be buttressed by the fact that the
procedures available in state court closely approximate those
available in federal court. Moreover, the policies favoring
preclusion under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 would be considerably stronger if
the merits of the discrimination claim had been settled by the
state court itself. The Fourth Circuit recently had no difficulty
distinguishing a state court trial on a discrimination claim from a
state court affirmance of a state agency' determination.
Moosavi v. Fairfax County Bd. of Educ., 666 F.2d 58
(1981).
[
Footnote 2/11]
The Court is quite correct in holding that a state decision must
satisfy at least due process before it can be given preclusive
effect in the federal courts. Indeed, this aspect of the Court's
decision follows directly from our decision earlier this tern in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.
S. 422 (1982).
[
Footnote 2/12]
The Clark-Case memorandum is a particularly authoritative source
for determining the congressional intent behind Title VII.
See
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324,
431 U. S.
360-352, and
431 U. S. 351,
n. 35 (1977).
[
Footnote 2/13]
The Court also cites legislative materials indicating that
congressional defenders of employers and unions preferred trial
de novo in federal court over conclusive administrative
proceedings before the EEOC.
See ante at
456 U. S.
473-475. But the Court focuses on the wrong choice. The
question is not why Congress chose federal trial
de novo
over conclusive EEOC proceedings, but why Congress chose to provide
a federal remedy rather than relying on state remedies. The reason
is that Congress wanted to provide a federal remedy, whether before
a federal court or the EEOC, separate from and independent of the
antidiscrimination procedures afforded by the States.
Furthermore, the Court's decision is contrary to its own reading
of the legislative history. Presumably, if the complainant prevails
before the state agency and also before the state courts, the Court
would give that decision in his favor preclusive effect. Thus, if
state law provides the complainant with an inadequate remedy,
evidently he will be able to bring a Title VII suit in federal
court asserting the state decision as
res judicata on the
issue of the employer's liability. Yet the Court insists that
Congress intended that employers not be bound by administrative
findings, but instead intended that employers have the protection
of a trial
de novo in federal court.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The Court finds it significant that Senator Javits referred to
New York state administrative proceedings during his remarks.
Ante at
456 U. S.
475-476, n. 17. But Senator Javits cited New York
proceedings only to show that businessmen had not been subject to
harassment through discrimination complaints; he did not mention
state proceedings during his discussion of
res judicata.
See 118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972). Furthermore, when Senator
Javits discussed
res judicata, he poke of litigation
instigated by the EEOC, the Attorney General, and an individual.
See ante at
456 U. S. 475.
Thus, Senator Javits was addressing only federal proceedings; he
was not suggesting that the outcome of state proceedings might have
res judicata effect. The EEOC and the Attorney General of
the United States obviously do not participate in proceedings
before the New York state agency.
[
Footnote 2/15]
Since Senator Javits specifically mentioned successive suits
brought by the EEOC, the Attorney General, and an individual,
see ibid., he may have been referring only to successive
suits brought under Title VII.
See also 118 Cong.Rec.
3371-3372 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (rejecting Hruska
amendment and insisting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII should
not be mutually exclusive).
[
Footnote 2/16]
The Court quotes Senator Williams' statement that
"the individual claimant should [not] be allowed to litigate his
claim to completion in one forum, and then, if dissatisfied, go to
another forum to try again."
118 Cong.Rec. 3372 (1972).
See ante at
456 U. S. 476.
But the Court fails to quote Senator Williams' immediately
succeeding statement: "I do feel that, where one form of relief
proves unresponsive or impractical, . . . [the complainant] should
have that right." 118 Cong.Rec. 3372 (1972). Indeed, the feared
unresponsiveness of some state agencies was a principal reason for
the enactment of Title VII.
See 110 Cong.Rec. 7214 (1964);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 48, n.
9 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/17]
This reading of the statute is fully supported by the original
legislative history of Title VII. In 1964, Senator Tower offered an
amendment similar to Senator Hruska's 1972 amendment, making Title
VII the exclusive federal employment discrimination remedy. 110
Cong.Rec. 13650 (1964). Like Senator Hruska's amendment, Senator
Tower's made an exception for state proceedings.
Ibid.
There was no mention of
res judicata during the debates,
see id. at 13650-13652, and the Senate rejected the
amendment by a vote of 29 to 59.
Id. at 13652.
[
Footnote 2/18]
Indeed, a prudent discrimination complainant may make every
effort to vent the state agency from reaching a final decision. If
the complainant prevails after a full hearing, he runs the risk
that his adversary may seek judicial review. He could then find
himself closed out of federal court if a state court decides that
the agency's decision is unsupported by sufficient evidence.
See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d at
1084. In some future case, the Court may find such a result
inimical to Title VII, but, given today's decision, no complainant
could safely predict that the Court would not apply § 1738. For a
complainant with some evidence to support his claim, the wiser
course might well be to thwart all state proceedings and wait for
EEOC attempts at conciliation and the full procedural advantages of
federal court adjudication.
[
Footnote 2/19]
The Court's response to this is unconvincing. The Court argues
that, if it does not give the state court affirmance preclusive
effect, it will "lesse[n] the incentive for full participation by
the parties and for searching review by state officials."
Ante at
456 U. S. 478.
It is difficult to see how this result will come about when a
complainant can win a ruling in his favor if he succeeds on
judicial review and when his adversary risks losing the state court
judgment if he does not rebut the complainant's arguments.
Moreover, the parties will have another incentive to litigate
vigorously during state judicial review, because no one disputes
that state court affirmances "may be admitted as evidence, and
accorded such weight as the [federal] court deems appropriate."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 60,
that is, "substantial weight,"
see § 706(b).
The Court also insists that a reversal in this case would
"reduce the incentive for States to work towards effective and
meaningful antidiscrimination systems."
Ante at
456 U. S. 478.
This fact will undoubtedly surprise state officials in the 47
States outside the Second Circuit -- States which have not been
governed by the preclusion rule currently followed only in that
Circuit.
See 456
U.S. 461fn2/2|>n. 2,
supra. These state officials
unquestionably recognize, as did Congress when it passed Title VII,
that state procedures can provide efficient dispute resolution,
even if the possibility of a subsequent Title VII suit exists. In
any event, the Court hardly increases the quality of state
decisionmaking when it effectively writes the state courts out of a
large number of administrative cases.
[
Footnote 2/20]
Thus, when the Court labels this line of reasoning "dubious,"
see ante at
456 U. S. 478,
n.19, it is doubting not only the logic of this dissent, but also
the logic of two prior decisions of this Court. In addition, it
seems unlikely that many discrimination complainants will find the
"delay,"
see ante at
456 U. S. 479,
n.19, of a Title VII suit a measurable burden when they take into
account the procedural advantages of federal court litigation as
compared with state judicial review of agency decisions.
The Court also questions whether the state decisionmaking
process will improve through practice.
See ante at
456 U. S.
478-479, n.19. Although some might argue the point, it
seems that state agencies will be more careful if their decisions
are subject to state court review and that state decisionmakers
will learn from experience. But even if the quality of state
decisionmaking does not decline as fewer complainants seek state
judicial review, a reduction in the number of discrimination cases
handled by state courts obviously carries with it a reduction in
the role of state authorities in resolving discrimination charges.
This result is directly contrary to the congressional intent.
[
Footnote 2/21]
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 57-58
(concluding that the informal procedures used during arbitration
"mak[e] arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution
of Title VII issues than the federal courts").
[
Footnote 2/22]
Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the Agencies
Administering Fair Employment Practices Laws (Part II), 42
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1035, 1048-1049 (1967). "[T]he vagueness of the
probable cause concept makes it a flexible tool in the hands of a
commissioner";
"[b]y tightening it, he can cut the Agency's caseload, perhaps
to allow the Agency to devote its resources to cases that may be
expected to produce a higher return in terms of job opportunities,
or perhaps only to disguise his own personal timidity."
Note, The California FEPC: Stepchild of the State Agencies, 18
Stan.L.Rev. 187, 191 (1965).
The risk is heightened by the fact that the complainant
evidently must present more proof to establish probable cause than
to survive a summary judgment motion in federal court. Probable
cause exists when there is
"reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in the belief that the law is being violated."
See Goldberg v. State Commission for Human Rights, 54
Misc.2d 676, 680, 283 N.Y.S.2d 347, 352 (1966).
[
Footnote 2/23]
There is one final irony in the Court's decision. While the
Court holds that a New York court's affirmance of an adverse state
agency decision precludes a complainant from bringing a federal
Title VII suit, a New York court has held that an unsuccessful
Title VII suit in federal court does not preclude a proceeding
before the NYHRD.
State Division of Human Rights v. County of
Monroe, 88 Misc.2d 16, 386 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1976). Citing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, the court noted
that "dual or overlapping remedies were contemplated and expressly
intended by Congress in Title VII," 88 Misc.2d at 19, 386 N.Y.S.2d
at 320, and held that "neither
res judicata nor collateral
estoppel applies,"
id. at 20, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The issue that divides the Court is fairly narrow. The majority
concedes that state agency proceedings will not bar a
Page 456 U. S. 509
federal claim under Title VII,
ante at
456 U. S. 470,
n. 7, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN assumes,
arguendo, that a state
court decision on the merits of a discrimination claim would create
such a bar,
ante at
456 U. S.
494-495, n. 10, and
456 U. S. 508
(dissenting opinion). Thus, the area of dispute is limited to cases
in which an adverse agency decision has been reviewed and upheld by
a state court.
The proper resolution of the dispute depends, I believe, on the
character of the judicial review to which the agency decision is
subjected. If it is the equivalent of a
de novo trial on
the merits, then I would agree that the analysis in the Court's
opinion leads to the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 forecloses a
second lawsuit in a federal court. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN has
demonstrated,
ante at
456 U. S.
490-493, that is not the character of the relevant
judicial review in New York. The New York court's holding that the
agency decision was not arbitrary or capricious merely establishes
as a matter of law that a rational adjudicator might have resolved
the discrimination issue either way.
* It is therefore
entirely
Page 456 U. S. 510
consistent with § 1738 for a federal district court to accept
the New York judgment as having settled that proposition, and then
to proceed to resolve the discrimination issue in a
de
novo trial.
Page 456 U. S. 511
Both the text of Title VII and its legislative history indicate
that Congress intended the claimant to have at least one
opportunity to prove his case in a
de novo trial in court.
Thus, while I agree with the Court that Title VII did not impliedly
repeal § 1738, I cannot accept the Court's construction of § 1738
in this case. In New York, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN demonstrates, the
judicial review is simply a part of the "proceedings" that are
entitled to "substantial weight" under Title VII.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
* In the two cases cited in
Flah's, Inc. v. Schneider,
71 App.Div.2d 993, 420 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1979), the Appellate Division
had developed the standard for reviewing agency dismissals for lack
of probable cause. According to
Mayo v. Hopeman Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 33 App.Div.2d 310, 307 N.Y.S.2d 691,
motion for
leave to appeal dism'd, 26 N.Y.2d 962, 259 N.E.2d 477 (1970),
the test is whether the agency determination "was arbitrary,
capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion." 33 App.Div.2d at 313, 307
N.Y.S.2d at 694 (paraphrasing N.Y.Exec.Law 297-a(7)(e) (McKinney
1972)). The Appellate Division observed that,
"[f]or the [Divison of Human Rights] to dismiss his complaint
under such circumstances, it must appear virtually that, as a
matter of law, the complaint lacks merit."
33 App.Div. at 313, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
In
State Div. of Human Right v. New York State Drug Abuse
Control Comm'n, 59 App.Div.2d 332, 399 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1977),
the Division of Human Rights had dismissed the complaint after an
investigation but without a hearing. The Appeal Board had reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. In sustaining the Human
Rights Division, the Appellate Division clarified its holding in
Mayo:
"In [
Mayo] it was not our intention to deprive the
commissioner [of the Division of Human Rights] of his statutory
duty to [determine whether there is a reasonable basis for
sustaining the complaint, based upon complainant's evidence, and
for requiring the employer to answer and submit to a hearing].
Thus, after the commissioner has made a full investigation, wherein
the complainant has had full opportunity to present his evidence
and exhibits, under oath if he so requests, if the commissioner
determines that complainant has not shown probable cause for his
complaint, the appeal board has no authority to reverse such
determination and order a [hearing], provided that the
commissioner's determination is rationally supported by the record
before him."
Id. at 336-337, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (citations
omitted). These cases demonstrate that the issue before a New York
court reviewing an agency dismissal of a discrimination complaint
is not the equivalent of the merits issue in a Title VII
action.
The Court's citations to New York cases,
ante at
456 U. S.
480-481, n. 21, simply do not support the general
proposition that a New York court's affirmance of an agency's
dismissal of a complaint necessarily determines that the complaint
lacked merit as a matter of law. It is true that some of those
cases contain language similar to the observation in
Mayo
that the agency may summarily dismiss a complaint only if it
appears "virtually that, as a matter of law, the complaint lacks
merit." As in
Mayo, however, other language in those cases
refutes the notion that only complaints meritless as a matter of
law are permitted to be dismissed without hearings by the agency.
See, e.g., New York State Division for Youth v. State Human
Rights Appeal Board, 83 App.Div.2d 972, 973, 442 N.Y.S.2d 813,
814 (1981) ("We conclude that here, absent a full investigation
including an opportunity for confrontation, the determination of
the division was based on a record which was inadequate to meet the
test of substantial evidence and was, therefore, arbitrary and
capricious");
State Division of Human Rights v.
Blanchette, 73 App.Div.2d 820, 821, 423 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1979)
("After the State Division of Human Rights has conducted an
investigation of a complaint, with full opportunity to the
complainant to support his or her claims of discrimination, the
Division's determination of no probable cause and dismissal of the
complaint may not be vacated by the Appeal Board or the court if it
is supported by substantial evidence"). The facts of the cases also
demonstrate that allegations that clearly state a cause of action
are not necessarily sufficient to avoid dismissal without a
hearing.
See, e.g., Stansiak v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
66 App.Div.2d 962, 411 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1978). Moreover, it is
perfectly clear that the New York courts do not reach an
independent conclusion on the merits of a discrimination claim that
has been adjudicated against the claimant by the agency after a
formal hearing.