A New York trial judge, sitting without a jury, convicted
respondent and his wife but acquitted their codefendant on charges
arising out of a robbery, notwithstanding if the judge had credited
the testimony of the prosecution's main witness (the victim), he
presumably would have convicted all three defendants or,
conversely, if he had credited the testimony of the only defense
witness (the codefendant), he presumably would have acquitted all
three. Respondent's conviction was affirmed on appeal. His
subsequent application in Federal District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
the New York trial judge had committed constitutional error because
he had not explained the apparent inconsistency in his verdicts
acquitting the codefendant and convicting respondent. Accordingly,
the court ordered the state trial judge either to grant respondent
a new trial or to make findings demonstrating a rational basis for
the facially inconsistent verdicts.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals erred when, without first determining
whether an inconsistent verdict would be unconstitutional, it
directed the state trial judge to provide an explanation of the
apparent inconsistency in his verdicts. Federal judges have no
general supervisory power over state trial judges, and may not
require the observance of any special procedures except when
necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal
Constitution.
2. An apparent inconsistency in a trial judge's verdict does not
give rise to an inference of irregularity in his finding of guilt
that is sufficiently strong to overcome the well established
presumption that the judge adhered to basic rules of procedure.
Here, even assuming that the codefendant's acquittal was logically
inconsistent with respondent's conviction, respondent, who was
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial, has no
constitutional ground to complain that his codefendant was
acquitted.
Certiorari granted; 643 F.2d 86, reversed.
Page 454 U. S. 340
PER CURIAM.
The questions presented by the certiorari petition concern the
constitutionality of inconsistent verdicts in a nonjury criminal
trial. Certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed.
During the morning of March 26, 1973, respondent, Jose Rivera,
his wife Cynthia Humdy, and their friend, Earl Robinson, entered
the apartment of Milagros Torres. After a neighbor heard a woman
scream, he called the police. The police arrested Humdy on the fire
escape with $540 in cash in her coat pocket, and when the apartment
door was opened, they found the place in shambles and arrested
respondent and Robinson.
Each of the three intruders was indicted on five separate
charges arising out of this one episode. [
Footnote 1] They were tried jointly by a justice of the
Supreme Court of New York sitting without a jury. The principal
government witness was the victim Torres; Robinson was the only
defense witness. If the judge had credited all of the testimony of
Torres, presumably he would have found all three defendants guilty
on all counts; acquittals presumably would have been rendered if
the judge had credited all of Robinson's testimony. However, he
found all defendants not guilty on three counts, acquitted Robinson
on all counts, and convicted respondent and his wife of robbery in
the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and burglary
in the third degree. [
Footnote
2] Respondent's convictions were affirmed on appeal.
People
v. Rivera, 57 App.Div.2d 738, 393 N.Y.S.2d 630,
leave to
appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 894, 366 N.E.2d 887 (1977).
Page 454 U. S. 341
In 1978, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied respondent's application for a federal
writ of habeas corpus. After reviewing the trial record, the
District Court rejected several challenges to the conviction which
he described as "variations on the claim of insufficiency of the
evidence." [
Footnote 3]
On appeal from that judgment, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit concluded that there was an apparent
inconsistency in the state trial judge's general verdicts
acquitting Robinson and convicting respondent. 643 F.2d 86. The
Court of Appeals held that the New York trial judge had committed
constitutional error because he had not explained that apparent
inconsistency on the record. [
Footnote 4] The court therefore entered an order requiring
the state trial court either to grant respondent a new trial or to
demonstrate by appropriate findings that there is a rational
basis
Page 454 U. S. 342
for the facially inconsistent verdicts. [
Footnote 5] Under the Court of Appeals' holding, the
adequacy of that explanation would thereafter be subject to review
by the federal courts, which, if they were persuaded that the
verdicts were irrationally inconsistent, would then decide whether
respondent's conviction is constitutionally permissible. [
Footnote 6] The Court of Appeals
recognized that its constitutional holding was unprecedented.
[
Footnote 7]
Page 454 U. S. 343
This case does not raise any question concerning the
significance that an appellate court may attach to an apparent
inconsistency in a verdict that is subject to review on direct
appeal. This federal proceeding constituted a collateral attack on
the final judgment of a state court that already had been affirmed
on direct appeal. In such a proceeding, a federal court is
authorized to issue
"a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. ยง 2254(a). [
Footnote
8]
Page 454 U. S. 344
In view of the limited scope of review of a state judgment
authorized in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, it is plain that
the Court of Appeals erred in this case. On the assumption that the
Court of Appeals correctly determined that the verdicts are
facially inconsistent, we hold that there is no federal requirement
that a state trial judge explain his reasons for acquitting a
defendant in a state criminal trial; even if the acquittal rests on
an improper ground, that error would not create a constitutional
defect in a guilty verdict that is supported by sufficient evidence
and is the product of a fair trial.
I
The work of appellate judges is facilitated when trial judges
make findings of fact that explain the basis for controversial
rulings. [
Footnote 9] Although
there are occasions when an explanation of the reasons for a
decision may be required by the demands of due process, [
Footnote 10] such occasions are the
exception, rather than the rule. [
Footnote 11] Federal judges have no general supervisory
power over state trial judges; they may not require the observance
of any special procedures except when necessary
Page 454 U. S. 345
to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal
Constitution. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred when it
directed the state trial judge to provide an explanation of the
apparent inconsistency in his acquittal of Robinson and his
conviction of respondent without first determining whether an
inexplicably inconsistent verdict would be unconstitutional.
[
Footnote 12]
II
Inconsistency in a verdict is not a sufficient reason for
setting it aside. We have so held with respect to inconsistency
between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant,
Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390
(1932), [
Footnote 13] and
also with respect to verdicts that treat codefendants in a joint
trial inconsistently,
United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U. S. 277,
320 U. S. 279
(1943). [
Footnote 14] Those
cases, however, involved jury trials; as the Court of Appeals
correctly recognized, both of those opinions
Page 454 U. S. 346
stressed the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of
not guilty for impermissible reasons. [
Footnote 15] It is argued that a different rule should
be applied to cases in which a judge is the factfinder.
Although
Dunn and
Dotterweich preclude a
holding that inconsistency in a verdict is intolerable in itself,
inconsistency nevertheless might constitute evidence of
arbitrariness that would undermine confidence in the quality of the
judge's conclusion. In this case, the Court of Appeals suggested
the possibility that the trial judge might have relied on
impermissible considerations such as the fact that neither
respondent nor his wife testified, or knowledge of adverse
information not contained in the record. [
Footnote 16] Undeniably, these possibilities exist,
but they also would have existed if Robinson had been convicted or
if he had been tried separately. In bench trials, judges routinely
hear inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore when
making decisions. It is equally routine for them to instruct juries
that no adverse inference may be drawn from a defendant's failure
to testify; surely we must presume that they follow their own
instructions when they are acting as factfinders. We are not
persuaded that an
Page 454 U. S. 347
apparent inconsistency in a trial judge's verdict gives rise to
an inference of irregularity in his finding of guilt that is
sufficiently strong to overcome the well established presumption
that the judge adhered to basic rules of procedure. [
Footnote 17]
Other explanations for an apparent inconsistency are far more
likely. Most apparent is the likelihood that the judge's actual
observation of everything that transpired in the courtroom created
some doubt about the guilt of one defendant that he might or might
not be able to articulate in a convincing manner. [
Footnote 18] In this case, if the judge was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent and his wife
were both guilty, it would be most unfortunate if a concern about
the plausibility of a lingering doubt about Robinson should cause
him to decide to convict all three rather than to try to articulate
the basis for his doubt.
It is also possible that the judge may have made an error of law
and erroneously assumed, for example, that Robinson should not be
found guilty without evidence that he was to share in the proceeds
of the larceny. There is no reason -- and surely no constitutional
requirement -- that such an error pertaining to the case against
Robinson should redound to the benefit of respondent. [
Footnote 19]
Page 454 U. S. 348
Even the unlikely possibility that the acquittal is the product
of a lenity that judges are free to exercise at the time of
sentencing, but generally are forbidden to exercise when ruling on
guilt or innocence, would not create a constitutional violation. We
are aware of nothing in the Federal Constitution that would prevent
a State from empowering its judges to render verdicts of acquittal
whenever they are convinced that no sentence should be imposed for
reasons that are unrelated to guilt or innocence. The Constitution
does not prohibit state judges from being excessively lenient.
The question that respondent has standing to raise is whether
his trial was fairly conducted. The trial judge, the New York
appellate courts, the Federal District Court, and the United States
Court of Appeals all agreed that the record contains adequate
evidence of his guilt. [
Footnote
20] These courts also agreed that the proceedings leading up to
respondent's conviction were conducted fairly. Apart from the
acquittal of Robinson, this record discloses no constitutional
error. Even assuming that this acquittal was logically inconsistent
with the conviction of respondent, respondent, who was found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial, has no constitutional
ground to complain that Robinson was acquitted. [
Footnote 21]
Reversed.
Page 454 U. S. 349
[
Footnote 1]
They were indicted for robbery in the first degree, robbery in
the second degree, possession of a dangerous weapon, grand larceny
in the third degree, and burglary in the second degree.
[
Footnote 2]
The grand larceny count was dismissed at the sentencing stage as
a lesser included count within robbery in the second degree.
[
Footnote 3]
"The next argument set forth is directed at the sufficiency of
the evidence presented in petitioner's state court criminal trial.
Such an allegation is beyond the scope of federal habeas corpus
review, and does not rise to the level of a constitutional
infringement,
United States ex rel. Nersesian v.
Smith, 418 F. Supp.
26,
27 (SDNY
1976) unless 'there was no proof whatever of the crime charged.'
United States ex rel. Terry v. Henderson, 426 F.2d 1125,
1131 (2d Cir.1972). I have reviewed the trial transcript. Any
allegation that the trial record is devoid of evidence must be
rejected, as are Petitioner's Points IV, VI, VII, and VIII, which,
when liberally read, are variations on the claim of insufficiency
of the evidence."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-12. The District Court's ruling
predated this Court's decision in
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. S. 307
(1979). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the insufficiency
of the evidence claim is without merit even under the test of
Jackson. 643 F.2d 86, 90, n. 2 (CA2 1981).
[
Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals concluded that,
"when verdicts in a nonjury trial are facially inconsistent, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a
conviction to stand unless the trial court demonstrates by
appropriate findings that the conviction validly rests on a
rational basis."
Id. at 87.
[
Footnote 5]
"For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court's
judgment and remand with directions to enter an order conditionally
vacating petitioner's conviction and awarding him a new trial
unless the state trial court demonstrates by appropriate findings
rendered within ninety days that petitioner's conviction is
valid."
Id. at 97.
[
Footnote 6]
"If the state trial court makes findings purporting to
demonstrate the validity of the conviction, petitioner may return
to the District Court and renew his habeas corpus challenge to his
conviction. At that point, the issue will be whether the state
court conviction, considered in light of the acquittal of
petitioner's codefendant and in light of the state trial court's
findings, denies petitioner his liberty without due process of
law."
Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 7]
See id. at 94. The Court of Appeals relied on
United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (1960), in which a
divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed a conviction on one
count of a two-count indictment because the majority found the
acquittal on the second count to be inconsistent with the
conviction on the first. Judge Friendly expressed the view that the
defendant could be retried on both counts,
id. at 904-906;
Judge Lumbard expressed the view that the defendant could be
retried on neither count, and that the indictment must be
dismissed,
id. at 906-907 (dissenting in part). Judge
Learned Hand concluded that the verdicts were not logically
inconsistent, and would not have reversed the conviction
"[r]egardless of whether the doctrine of [
Dunn v. United
States, 284 U. S. 390
(1932)] applies to cases tried to a judge."
Id. at 908
(dissenting in part and concurring in part). As the Court of
Appeals in this case recognized,
"in prohibiting inconsistent bench trial verdicts,
Maybury does not purport to rest on any provision of the
Constitution, and may well have been decided solely in the exercise
of the Court's supervisory power over the administration of
criminal justice within this Circuit."
643 F.2d at 94.
In this case, the Court of Appeals described the
"
Maybury rule barring inconsistent verdicts in federal
criminal bench trials" as "well established in this Circuit."
Id. at 91. We note, however, that in none of the three
cases cited for that proposition was a verdict actually overturned
on the ground of inconsistency. Indeed, in one of those cases, the
court expressly noted that an inconsistency resulting from an
acquittal that may have rested on the trial judge's erroneous view
of the law could not justify reversal of the conviction.
See
United States v. Wilson, 342 F.2d 43, 45 (CA2 1965). In all
events, the Court of Appeals noted:
"To our knowledge, however, this is the first time that a habeas
applicant has asked us to overturn a state conviction on the basis
of the
Maybury rule."
643 F.2d at 91.
In
United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory,
Inc., 650 F.2d 223 (1981), a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit's
reasoning in this case.
[
Footnote 8]
In
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141,
414 U. S. 146
(1973), with particular reference to a challenged jury instruction,
the Court articulated the difference between a federal court of
appeals' supervisory power over the district courts within its
jurisdiction and the court of appeals' authority to grant relief
under 28 U.S.C. 2254:
"Within such a unitary jurisdictional framework, the appellate
court will, of course, require the trial court to conform to
constitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow
procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial
practice, although in nowise commanded by statute or by the
Constitution. Thus, even substantial unanimity among federal courts
of appeals that the instruction in question ought not to be given
in United States district courts within their respective
jurisdictions is not, without more, authority for declaring that
the giving of the instruction makes a resulting conviction invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before a federal court may overturn
a conviction resulting from a state trial in which this instruction
was used, it must be established not merely that the instruction is
undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned,' but that
it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the
Fourteenth Amendment."
It is noteworthy that the Courts of Appeals are not in agreement
that the
Maybury holding is an appropriate exercise of the
supervisory power over federal district courts.
See, e.g.,
United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545 (CA8),
cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
[
Footnote 9]
See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.
S. 497,
434 U. S. 517
(1978) ("Review of any trial court decision is, of course,
facilitated by findings and by an explanation of the reasons
supporting the decision. No matter how desirable such procedural
assistance may be, it is not constitutionally mandated in a case
such as this").
[
Footnote 10]
See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.
S. 471,
408 U. S. 489
(1972);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539,
418 U. S.
564-565 (1974).
[
Footnote 11]
Moreover, when other procedural safeguards have minimized the
risk of unfairness, there is a diminished justification for
requiring a judge to explain his rulings.
See Connecticut Board
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458,
452 U. S. 472
(1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 12]
Our holding that the risk of constitutional error inherent in
facially inconsistent bench trial verdicts is not substantial,
see discussion
infra at
454 U. S.
345-348, undercuts the initial premise of the Court of
Appeals' analysis of the question whether a state prisoner is
constitutionally entitled to an explanation of such verdicts.
[
Footnote 13]
Accord, Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S.
87,
418 U. S. 101
(1974).
Cf. Hartzell v. United States, 322 U.
S. 680,
322 U. S. 682,
n. 3 (1944) (the trial court's setting aside of the conspiracy
convictions of petitioner's only alleged coconspirators "makes it
impossible to sustain the petitioner's conviction upon . . . the
conspiracy count");
but cf. Standefer v. United States,
447 U. S. 10 (1980)
(a defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the commission of a
federal offense may be convicted after the named principal has been
acquitted of that offense in a previous trial).
[
Footnote 14]
"Equally baseless is the claim of Dotterweich that, having
failed to find the corporation guilty, the jury could not find him
guilty. Whether the jury's verdict was the result of carelessness
or compromise or a belief that the responsible individual should
suffer the penalty instead of merely increasing, as it were, the
cost of running the business of the corporation, is immaterial.
Juries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries.
Dunn
v. United States, 284 U. S. 390."
[
Footnote 15]
Justice Holmes' opinion in
Dunn, his last for the
Court, characteristically was brief and to the point. He quoted the
following passage from
Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d
59, 60 (CA2 1925):
"'The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict
shows that, either in the acquittal or the conviction, the jury did
not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they
were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the
acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they
had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through
lenity.'"
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. at
284 U. S. 393.
After citing
Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.
S. 135 (1920), he added:
"That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of
a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot
be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters."
284 U.S. at
284 U. S.
393-394.
[
Footnote 16]
See 643 F.2d at 94-95.
[
Footnote 17]
Cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 518
(WHITE, J., dissenting):
"[In
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S.
293 (1963), the] Court concluded that"
"the coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges in the
administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think
the district judge may, in the ordinary case in which there has
been no articulation, properly assume that the state trier of fact
applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, in the
absence of evidence . . . that there is reason to suspect that an
incorrect standard was in fact applied."
"
Id. at
372 U. S. 314-315. A silent
record is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the state
judge has committed constitutional error; the mere possibility of
error is not enough to warrant habeas corpus relief."
[
Footnote 18]
In fact, the New York Supreme Court Justice who tried this case
stated that he had a reasonable doubt as to Robinson's guilt. 643
F.2d at 90.
[
Footnote 19]
See n 7,
supra.
[
Footnote 20]
"The question whether the evidence is constitutionally
sufficient is, of course, wholly unrelated to the question of how
rationally the verdict was actually reached. Just as the standard
announced today does not permit a court to make its own subjective
determination of guilt or innocence, it does not require scrutiny
of the reasoning process actually used by the factfinder -- if
known."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at
443 U. S.
319-320, n. 13.
[
Footnote 21]
Cf. 643 F.2d at 94, n. 5 (rejecting respondent's equal
protection challenge to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts).
See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.
S. 711,
395 U. S.
722-723 (1969). Our conclusion that federal habeas
corpus relief is not authorized in this case is buttressed by the
practical problems with the Court of Appeals' holding even if some
constitutional right of the convicted defendant were more clearly
implicated. In
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.
S. 145,
431 U. S. 154,
n. 13 (1977), we noted that such practical problems are relevant in
determining whether federal habeas relief is available:
"The strong interest in preserving the finality of judgments
[citations omitted], as well as the interest in orderly trial
procedure, must be overcome before collateral relief can be
justified. For a collateral attack may be made many years after the
conviction, when it may be impossible, as a practical matter, to
conduct a retrial."
On remand from the federal habeas court, the state trial judge,
if he is still on the bench, may not remember the criminal case,
much less the reasons for convicting one codefendant but acquitting
another. Confronted by defense counsel's assertion that the
evidence of guilt was the same for both codefendants, he may well
decide that he erroneously acquitted one codefendant; such a
finding would have to satisfy the federal habeas court, but would
hardly placate the habeas petitioner.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
I write separately to underscore my disapproval of what I
perceive to be a growing and inexplicable readiness on the part of
this Court to "dispose of" cases summarily. Perhaps this trend is
due to what is often lamented as our "increasing caseload."
Whatever the reason for this trend, I believe that it can only
detract from this Court's decisions in deserving cases by consuming
time and energy better spent elsewhere.
Moreover, by deciding cases summarily, without benefit of oral
argument and full briefing, and often with only limited access to,
and review of, the record, this Court runs a great risk of
rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that may confuse the
lower courts: there is no reason to believe that this Court is
immune from making mistakes, particularly under these kinds of
circumstances. As Justice Jackson so aptly put it, although in a
somewhat different context: "We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
344 U. S. 540
(1953) (concurring in result). I believe that this Court should
reserve its final imprimatur for those cases to which we give
plenary review, after full briefing and argument.
Page 454 U. S. 350
This is not to say that I believe that summary disposition is
never appropriate. In my view, however, this Court should utilize
this practice with more caution than has been true in the recent
past.