The academic performance of students at the University of
Missouri-Kansas City Medical School is periodically assessed by the
Council of Evaluation, a faculty-student body that can recommend
various actions, including probation and dismissal; its
recommendations are reviewed by the faculty Coordinating Committee,
with ultimate approval by the Dean. After several faculty members
had expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of
respondent medical student during a pediatrics rotation, the
Council recommended that she be advanced to her final year on a
probationary basis. Following further faculty dissatisfaction with
respondent's clinical performance that year, the Council, in the
middle of the year, again evaluated her academic progress, and
concluded that she should not be considered for graduation in June
of that year, and that, absent "radical improvement," she be
dropped as a student. As an "appeal" of that decision, respondent
was allowed to take examinations under the supervision of seven
practicing physicians, only two of whom thereafter recommended that
respondent be allowed to graduate on schedule. Two others
recommended that she be dropped from the school immediately; and
three recommended that she not be allowed to graduate as scheduled,
but that she be continued on probation. The Council then reaffirmed
its prior position. At a subsequent meeting, having noted that
respondent's recent surgery rotation had been rated
"low-satisfactory," the Council concluded that, barring reports of
radical improvement, respondent should not be allowed to reenroll;
and when a report on another rotation turned out to be negative,
the Council recommended that respondent be dropped. When notified
of that decision, which the Coordinating Committee and Dean had
approved, respondent appealed to the Provost, who, after review,
sustained the decision. Respondent thereafter brought this action
against petitioner officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending,
inter alia, that she had not been accorded due process
prior to her dismissal. The District Court, after a full trial,
concluded that respondent had been afforded all rights guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held:
Page 435 U. S. 79
1. The procedures leading to respondent's dismissal for academic
deficiencies, under which respondent was fully informed of faculty
dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the consequent
threat to respondent's graduation and continued enrollment, did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dismissals for academic (as opposed to disciplinary) cause do not
necessitate a hearing before the school's decisionmaking body.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565,
distinguished. Pp.
435 U. S.
84-91.
2. Though respondent contends that the case should be remanded
to the Court of Appeals for consideration of her claim of
deprivation of substantive due process, this case, as the District
Court correctly concluded, reveals no showing of arbitrariness or
capriciousness that would warrant such a disposition, even if it
were deemed appropriate for courts to review under an arbitrariness
standard an academic decision of a public educational institution.
Pp.
435 U. S.
91-92.
538 F.2d 1317, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in
Parts I, II-A, and III of which WHITE, J., joined. POWELL, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
435 U. S. 92.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment,
post, p.
435 U. S. 96.
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part,
post, p.
435 U. S. 97.
BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
435 U. S.
108.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City
Medical School, was dismissed by petitioner officials of the school
during her final year of study for failure to meet academic
standards. Respondent sued petitioners under 42
Page 435 U. S. 80
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri alleging, among other constitutional
violations, that petitioners had not accorded her procedural due
process prior to her dismissal. The District Court, after
conducting a full trial, concluded that respondent had been
afforded all of the rights guaranteed her by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and dismissed her
complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
538 F.2d 1317 (1976), and a petition for rehearing en banc was
denied by a divided court. 542 F.2d 1335 (1976). We granted
certiorari, 430 U.S. 964, to consider what procedures must be
accorded to a student at a state educational institution whose
dismissal may constitute a deprivation of "liberty" or "property"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Respondent was admitted with advanced standing to the Medical
School in the fall of 1971. During the final years of a student's
education at the school, the student is required to pursue in
"rotational units" academic and clinical studies pertaining to
various medical disciplines such as obstetrics-gynecology,
pediatrics, and surgery. Each student's academic performance at the
School is evaluated on a periodic basis by the Council on
Evaluation, a body composed of both faculty and students, which can
recommend various actions, including probation and dismissal. The
recommendations of the Council are reviewed by the Coordinating
Committee, a body composed solely of faculty members, and must
ultimately be approved by the Dean. Students are not typically
allowed to appear before either the Council or the Coordinating
Committee on the occasion of their review of the student's academic
performance.
In the spring of respondent's first year of study, several
faculty members expressed dissatisfaction with her clinical
Page 435 U. S. 81
performance during a pediatrics rotation. The faculty members
noted that respondent's "performance was below that of her peers in
all clinical patient-oriented settings," that she was erratic in
her attendance at clinical sessions, and that she lacked a critical
concern for personal hygiene. Upon the recommendation of the
Council on Evaluation, respondent was advanced to her second and
final year on a probationary basis.
Faculty dissatisfaction with respondent's clinical performance
continued during the following year. For example, respondent's
docent, or faculty adviser, rated her clinical skills as
"unsatisfactory." In the middle of the year, the Council again
reviewed respondent's academic progress and concluded that
respondent should not be considered for graduation in June of that
year; furthermore, the Council recommended that, absent "radical
improvement," respondent be dropped from the school.
Respondent was permitted to take a set of oral and practical
examinations as an "appeal" of the decision not to permit her to
graduate. Pursuant to this "appeal," respondent spent a substantial
portion of time with seven practicing physicians in the area who
enjoyed a good reputation among their peers. The physicians were
asked to recommend whether respondent should be allowed to graduate
on schedule and, if not, whether she should be dropped immediately
or allowed to remain on probation. Only two of the doctors
recommended that respondent be graduated on schedule. Of the other
five, two recommended that she be immediately dropped from the
school. The remaining three recommended that she not be allowed to
graduate in June, and be continued on probation pending further
reports on her clinical progress. Upon receipt of these
recommendations, the Council on Evaluation reaffirmed its prior
position.
The Council met again in mid-May to consider whether respondent
should be allowed to remain in school beyond June
Page 435 U. S. 82
of that year. Noting that the report on respondent's recent
surgery rotation rated her performance as "low-satisfactory," the
Council unanimously recommended that, "barring receipt of any
reports that Miss Horowitz has improved radically, [she] not be
allowed to reenroll in the . . . School of Medicine." The Council
delayed making its recommendation official until receiving reports
on other rotations; when a report on respondent's emergency
rotation also turned out to be negative, the Council unanimously
reaffirmed its recommendation that respondent be dropped from the
school. The Coordinating Committee and the Dean approved the
recommendation and notified respondent, who appealed the decision
in writing to the University's Provost for Health Sciences. The
Provost sustained the school's actions after reviewing the record
compiled during the earlier proceedings.
II
A
To be entitled to the procedural protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment, respondent must, in a case such as this, demonstrate
that her dismissal from the school deprived her of either a
"liberty" or a "property" interest. Respondent has never alleged
that she was deprived of a property interest. Because property
interests are creatures of state law,
Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U. S. 593,
408 U. S.
599-603 (1972), respondent would have been required to
show at trial that her seat at the Medical School was a "property"
interest recognized by Missouri state law. Instead, respondent
argued that her dismissal deprived her of "liberty" by
substantially impairing her opportunities to continue her medical
education or to return to employment in a medically related
field.
The Court of Appeals agreed, citing this Court's opinion in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.
S. 564 (1972). [
Footnote
1] In that case,
Page 435 U. S. 83
we held that the State had not deprived a teacher of any liberty
or property interest in dismissing the teacher from a nontenured
position, but noted:
"[T]here is no suggestion that the State, in declining to
reemploy the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities. The State, for example, did not invoke
any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public
employment in state universities."
Id. at
408 U. S.
573.
We have recently had an opportunity to elaborate upon the
circumstances under which an employment termination might infringe
a protected liberty interest. In
Bishop v. Wood,
426 U. S. 341
(1976), we upheld the dismissal of a policeman without a hearing;
we rejected the theory that the mere fact of dismissal, absent some
publicizing of the reasons for the action, could amount to a stigma
infringing one's liberty:
"In
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.
S. 564, we recognized that the nonretention of an
untenured college teacher might make him somewhat less attractive
to other employers, but nevertheless concluded that it would
Page 435 U. S. 84
stretch the concept too far "to suggest that a person is
deprived of
liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job,
but remains as free as before to seek another." Id. at
408 U. S. 575.
This same conclusion applies to the discharge of a public employee
whose position is terminable at the will of the employer when there
is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge."
"In this case, the asserted reasons for the City Manager's
decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private, and
also were stated in writing in answer to interrogatories after this
litigation commenced. Since the former communication was not made
public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that
petitioner's interest in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity' was thereby impaired."
Id. at
426 U. S. 348
(footnote omitted).
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, decided only five weeks
after we issued our opinion in
Bishop, does not discuss
whether a state university infringes a liberty interest when it
dismisses a student without publicizing allegations harmful to the
student's reputation. Three judges of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc on
the ground that "the reasons for Horowitz's dismissal were not
released to the public, but were communicated to her directly by
school officials." Citing
Bishop, the judges concluded
that, "[a]bsent such public disclosure, there is no deprivation of
a liberty interest." 542 F.2d at 1335. Petitioners urge us to adopt
the view of these judges and hold that respondent has not been
deprived of a liberty interest.
B
We need not decide, however, whether respondent's dismissal
deprived her of a liberty interest in pursuing a medical career.
Nor need we decide whether respondent's dismissal infringed any
other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation
without procedural due process. Assuming the
Page 435 U. S. 85
existence of a liberty or property interest, respondent has been
awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment
requires. The school fully informed respondent of the faculty's
dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the danger that this
posed to timely graduation and continued enrollment. The ultimate
decision to dismiss respondent was careful and deliberate. These
procedures were sufficient under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We agree with the District Court that
respondent
"was afforded full procedural due process by the [school]. In
fact, the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that the school
went beyond [constitutionally required] procedural due process by
affording [respondent] the opportunity to be examined by seven
independent physicians in order to be absolutely certain that their
grading of the [respondent] in her medical skills was correct."
App. 47.
In
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565
(1975), we held that due process requires, in connection with the
suspension of a student from public school for disciplinary
reasons,
"that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the
story."
Id. at
419 U. S. 581.
The Court of Appeals apparently read
Goss as requiring
some type of formal hearing at which respondent could defend her
academic ability and performance. [
Footnote 2] All
Page 435 U. S. 86
that
Goss required was an "informal give-and-take"
between the student and the administrative body dismissing him that
would, at least, give the student "the opportunity to characterize
his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context."
Id. at
419 U. S. 584.
But we have frequently emphasized that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation."
Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886,
367 U. S. 895
(1961). The need for flexibility is well illustrated by the
significant difference between the failure of a student to meet
academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of
conduct. This difference calls for far less stringent procedural
requirements in the case of an academic dismissal. [
Footnote 3]
Page 435 U. S. 87
Since the issue first arose 50 years ago, state and lower
federal courts have recognized that there are distinct differences
between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for disciplinary
purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons which may
call for hearings in connection with the former, but not the
latter. Thus, in
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216
Mass.19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected an argument, based on several earlier
decisions requiring a hearing in disciplinary contexts, that school
officials must also grant a hearing before excluding a student on
academic grounds. According to the court, disciplinary cases
have
"no application. . . . Misconduct is a very different matter
from failure to attain a standard of excellence in studies. A
determination as to the fact involves investigation of a quite
different kind. A public hearing may be regarded as helpful to the
ascertainment of misconduct, and useless or harmful in finding out
the truth as to scholarship."
Id. at 22-23, 102 N.E. at 1097. A similar conclusion
has been reached by the other state courts to consider the issue.
See, e.g., Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 367,
211 So. 2d
489,
498,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968);
cf. Foley v.
Benedict, 122 Tex.193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932). Indeed, until the
instant decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
the Courts of Appeals were also unanimous in concluding that
dismissals for academic (as opposed to disciplinary) cause do not
necessitate a hearing before the school's decisionmaking body.
See Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (CA5 1976);
[
Footnote 4]
Gaspar v.
Bruton, 513
Page 435 U. S. 88
F.2d 843 (CA10 1975). [
Footnote
5] These prior decisions of state and federal courts, over a
period of 60 years, unanimously holding that formal hearings before
decisionmaking bodies need not be held in the case of academic
dismissals, cannot be rejected lightly.
Cf. Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97,
291 U. S.
118-119,
291 U. S.
131-132 (1934);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45,
287 U. S. 69-71
(1932);
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22,
260 U. S. 31
(1922). Reason, furthermore, clearly supports the perception of
these decisions. A school is an academic institution, not a
courtroom or administrative hearing room. In
Goss, this
Court felt that suspensions of students for disciplinary reasons
have a sufficient resemblance to traditional judicial and
administrative
Page 435 U. S. 89
factfinding to call for a "hearing" before the relevant school
authority. While recognizing that school authorities must be
afforded the necessary tools to maintain discipline, the Court
concluded:
"[I]t would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational
institution if no communication was sought by the disciplinarian
with the student in an effort to inform him of his dereliction and
to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an
injustice is not done."
"
* * * *"
"[R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting
the student to give his version of the events will provide a
meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the
disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes about
facts and arguments about cause and effect."
419 U.S. at
419 U. S. 580,
419 U. S.
583-584. Even in the context of a school disciplinary
proceeding, however, the Court stopped short of requiring a formal
hearing, since
"further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its
formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a
regular disciplinary tool, but also destroy its effectiveness as a
part of the teaching process."
Id. at
419 U. S.
583.
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary
determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and
administrative factfinding proceedings to which we have
traditionally attached a full hearing requirement. In
Goss, the school's decision to suspend the students rested
on factual conclusions that the individual students had
participated in demonstrations that had disrupted classes, attacked
a police officer, or caused physical damage to school property. The
requirement of a hearing, where the student could present his side
of the factual issue, could, under such circumstances "provide a
meaningful hedge against erroneous action."
Ibid. The
decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the
academic judgment of school officials that she did not have
Page 435 U. S. 90
the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a
medical doctor, and was making insufficient progress toward that
goal. Such a judgment is, by its nature, more subjective and
evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the
average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual
professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the
determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons
requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information, and is not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking.
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic
judgment of educators, and thereby formalize the academic dismissal
process by requiring a hearing. The educational process is not. by
nature. adversary; instead, it centers around a continuing
relationship between faculty and students, "one in which the
teacher must occupy many roles -- educator, adviser, friend, and,
at times, parent substitute."
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S. 594
(POWELL, J., dissenting). This is especially true as one advances
through the varying regimes of the educational system and the
instruction becomes both more individualized and more specialized.
In
Goss, this Court concluded that the value of some form
of hearing in a disciplinary context outweighs any resulting harm
to the academic environment. Influencing this conclusion was
clearly the belief that disciplinary proceedings, in which the
teacher must decide whether to punish a student for disruptive or
insubordinate behavior, may automatically bring an adversary flavor
to the normal student-teacher relationship. The same conclusion
does not follow in the academic context. We decline to further
enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community, and
thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the
faculty-student relationship. We recognize, as did the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court over 60 years ago, that a
hearing may be "useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to
scholarship."
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216
Mass. at 23, 102 N.E. at 1097.
Page 435 U. S. 91
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.
. . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to
the control of state and local authorities."
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97,
393 U. S. 104
(1968). We see no reason to intrude on that historic control in
this case. [
Footnote 6]
III
In reversing the District Court on procedural due process
grounds, the Court of Appeals expressly failed to "reach the
substantive due process ground advanced by Horowitz." 538 F.2d at
1321 n. 5. Respondent urges that we remand the cause to the Court
of Appeals for consideration of this additional claim. In this
regard, a number of lower courts have implied in dictum that
academic dismissals from state institutions can be enjoined if
"shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious."
Mahavongsanan v.
Hall, 529 F.2d at 449.
See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d
at 850, and citations therein. Even assuming that the courts can
review under such a standard an academic decision of a public
educational
Page 435 U. S. 92
institution, we agree with the District Court that no showing of
arbitrariness or capriciousness has been made in this case.
[
Footnote 7] Courts are
particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance. The
factors discussed in
435 U. S. and
warn against any such judicial intrusion into academic
decisionmaking. [
Footnote
8]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Respondent concedes that petitioners have not "invoke[d] any
regulations to bar" her from seeking out employment in the medical
field or from finishing her medical education at a different
institution. Brief for Respondent 21.
Cf. Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. at
408 U. S. 573.
Indeed, the Coordinating Committee, in accepting the recommendation
of the Council that respondent be dismissed, noted that, "as with
all students, should sufficient improvement take place, she could
be considered for readmission to the School of Medicine." The Court
of Appeals, however, relied on the testimony of a doctor employed
by the Kansas City Veterans' Administration to the effect that
respondent's dismissal would be "a significant black mark." On the
Medical School side, it was the doctor's view that respondent
"would have great difficulty to get into another medical school, if
at all." As for employment, if two people were applying for a
position with the Veterans' Administration with "otherwise . . .
equal qualifications, roughly, I would lean heavily to the other
person who was not dismissed from a graduate school." 538 F.2d
1317, 1320-1321, n. 3 (1976).
[
Footnote 2]
The Court of Appeals held without elaboration that the dismissal
had been "effected without the hearing required by the fourteenth
amendment." 538 F.2d at 1321. No express indication was given as to
what the minimum requirements of such a hearing would be. One can
assume, however, that the contours of the hearing would be much the
same as those set forth in
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5
(CA8 1975), which also involved an academic dismissal and upon
which the Court of Appeals principally relied.
Greenhill
held that the student must be
"accorded an opportunity to appear personally to contest [the
allegations of academic deficiency]. We stop short, however, of
requiring full trial-type procedures in such situations. A graduate
or professional school is, after all, the best judge of its
students' academic performance and their ability to master the
required curriculum. The presence of attorneys or the imposition of
rigid rules of cross-examination at a hearing for a student . . .
would serve no useful purpose, notwithstanding that the dismissal
in question may be of permanent duration. But an 'informal
give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body
dismissing him. . . would not unduly burden the educational process
and would, at least, give the student 'the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper
context.'"
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted), quoting
Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S. 584.
Respondent urges us to go even further than the Court of Appeals
and require "the fundamental safeguards of representation by
counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses." Brief
for Respondent 36.
[
Footnote 3]
We fully recognize that the deprivation to which respondent was
subjected -- dismissal from a graduate medical school -- was more
severe than the 10-day suspension to which the high school students
were subjected in
Goss. And a relevant factor in
determining the nature of the requisite due process is "the private
interest that [was] affected by the official action."
Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976). But the severity of the deprivation is only one of several
factors that must be weighed in deciding the exact due process
owed.
Ibid. We conclude that, considering all relevant
factors, including the evaluative nature of the inquiry and the
significant and historically supported interest of the school in
preserving its present framework for academic evaluations, a
hearing is not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
[
Footnote 4]
"The district court's grant of relief is based on a confusion of
the court's power to review disciplinary actions by educational
institutions, on the one hand, and academic decisions, on the other
hand. This Court has been in the vanguard of the legal development
of due process protections for students ever since
Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education, 5 Cir.1961, 294 F.2d 150,
cert. denied 1961, 368 U.S. 930. . . . However, the due
process requirements of notice and hearing developed in the
Dixon line of cases have been carefully limited to
disciplinary decisions. When we explained that 'the student at the
tax supported institution cannot be arbitrarily disciplined without
the benefit of the ordinary, well recognized principles of fair
play,' we went on to declare that"
"[w]e know of no case which holds that colleges and universities
are subject to the supervision or review of the courts in the
uniform application of their academic standards. Indeed,
Dixon infers to the contrary."
"
Wright v. Texas Southern University, 5 Cir.1968, 392
F.2d 728, 729. Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of
scholarship cannot be equated. A hearing may be required to
determine charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or
harmful in finding out the truth concerning scholarship. There is a
clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights in
disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals."
529 F.2d at 449-450.
[
Footnote 5]
In
Greenhill v. Bailey, supra, the Court of Appeals
held that a hearing had been necessary where a medical school not
only dismissed a student for academic reasons but also sent a
letter to the Liaison Committee of the Association of the American
Medical Colleges suggesting that the student either lacked
"intellectual ability" or had insufficiently prepared his course
work. The court specifically noted that
"there has long been a distinction between cases concerning
disciplinary dismissals, on the one hand, and academic dismissals,
on the other,"
and emphasized that it did not wish to "blur that distinction."
519 F.2d at 8. In the court's opinion, the publicizing of an
alleged deficiency in the student's intellectual ability removed
the case from the typical instance of academic dismissal and called
for greater procedural protections.
Cf. Bishop v. Wood,
426 U. S. 341
(1976).
[
Footnote 6]
Respondent contends in passing that she was not dismissed
because of "clinical incompetence," an academic inquiry, but for
disciplinary reasons similar to those involved in
Goss.
Thus, as in
Goss, a hearing must be conducted. In this
regard, respondent notes that the school warned her that
significant improvement was needed not only in the area of clinical
performance but also in her personal hygiene and in keeping to her
clinical schedules. The record, however, leaves no doubt that
respondent was dismissed for purely academic reasons, a fact
assumed without discussion by the lower courts. Personal hygiene
and timeliness may be as important factors in a school's
determination of whether a student will make a good medical doctor
as the student's ability to take a case history or diagnose an
illness. Questions of personal hygiene and timeliness, of course,
may seem more analogous to traditional factfinding than other
inquiries that a school may make in academically evaluating a
student. But in so evaluating the student, the school considers and
weighs a variety of factors, not all of which, as noted earlier,
are adaptable to the factfinding hearing. And the critical
faculty-student relationship may still be injured if a hearing is
required.
[
Footnote 7]
Respondent alleges that the school applied more stringent
standards in evaluating her performance than that of other students
because of her sex, religion, and physical appearance. The District
Court, however, found:
"There was no evidence that [respondent] was in any manner
evaluated differently from other students because of her sex or
because of her religion. With regard to [respondent's] physical
appearance, this, in and of itself, did not cause [her] to be
evaluated any differently than any of the other students."
App 45.
[
Footnote 8]
Respondent also contends that petitioners failed to follow their
own rules respecting evaluation of medical students, and that this
failure amounted to a constitutional violation under
Service v.
Dulles, 354 U. S. 363
(1957). We disagree with both respondent's factual and legal
contentions. As for the facts, the record clearly shows that the
school followed its established rules, except where new rules had
to be designed in an effort to further protect respondent, as with
the practical "appeal" that petitioners allowed respondent to take.
The District Court specifically found that
"the progress status of [respondent] in the medical school was
evaluated in a manner similar to and consistent with the evaluation
of other similarly situated students, with the exception that
[respondent's] docent . . . went to even greater lengths to assist
[respondent] in an effort for her to obtain her M.D. degree than he
did for any of his other students."
App. 45. As for the legal conclusion that respondent draws, both
Service and
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.
S. 260 (1954), upon which
Service relied,
enunciate principles of federal administrative law, rather than of
constitutional law binding upon the States.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because I read it as upholding the
District Court's view that respondent was dismissed for academic
deficiencies, rather than for unsatisfactory personal
Page 435 U. S. 93
conduct, and that, in these circumstances, she was accorded due
process.
In the numerous meetings and discussions respondent had with her
teachers and advisers,
see opinion of MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL,
post at
435 U. S. 98-99, culminating in the special clinical
examination administered by seven physicians, [
Footnote 2/1]
ante at
435 U. S. 81,
respondent was warned of her clinical deficiencies and given every
opportunity to demonstrate improvement or question the evaluations.
The primary focus of these discussions and examinations was on
respondent's competence as a physician.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL nevertheless states that respondent's
dismissal was based "largely" on "her conduct":
"It may nevertheless be true, as the Court implies,
ante at
435 U. S. 91 n. 6, that the
school decided that respondent's inadequacies in such areas as
personal hygiene, peer and patient relations, and timeliness would
impair her ability to be 'a good medical doctor.' Whether these
inadequacies can be termed 'purely academic reasons,' as the Court
calls them,
ibid., is ultimately an irrelevant question,
and one placing an undue emphasis on words, rather than functional
considerations.
The relevant point is that
Page 435 U. S. 94
respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct,
just as the students in Goss
were suspended because of
their conduct."
Post at
435 U. S. 104
(emphasis added; footnotes omitted). This conclusion is explicitly
contrary to the District Court's undisturbed findings of fact. In
one sense, the term "conduct" could be used to embrace a poor
academic performance, as well as unsatisfactory personal conduct.
But I do not understand MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL to use the term in
that undifferentiated sense. [
Footnote
2/2] His opinion likens the dismissal of respondent to the
suspension of the students in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 (1975), for personal misbehavior. There is
evidence that respondent's personal conduct may have been viewed as
eccentric, but -- quite unlike the suspensions in
Goss --
respondent's dismissal was not based on her personal behavior.
The findings of the District Court conclusively show that
respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the academic standards
of the Medical School. The court, after reviewing the evidence in
some detail, concluded:
"The evidence presented in this case totally failed to
Page 435 U. S. 95
establish that plaintiff [respondent] was expelled for any
reason other than the quality of her work."
App. 44. [
Footnote 2/3]
It is well to bear in mind that respondent was attending a
medical school, where competence in clinical courses is as much of
a prerequisite to graduation as satisfactory grades in other
courses. Respondent was dismissed because she was as deficient in
her clinical work as she was proficient in the "book-learning"
portion of the curriculum. [
Footnote
2/4] Evaluation of her performance in the former area is no
less an "academic" judgment because it involves observation of her
skills and techniques in actual conditions of practice, rather than
assigning a grade to her written answers on an essay question.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Page 435 U. S. 96
Because it is clear from the findings of fact by the District
Court that respondent was dismissed solely on academic grounds, and
because the standards of procedural due process were abundantly met
before dismissal occurred, [
Footnote
2/6] I join the Court's opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
As a safeguard against erroneous judgment, and at respondent's
request, App. 185, the Medical School submitted the question of
respondent's clinical competency to a panel of "seven experienced
physicians." Panel members were requested "to provide a careful,
detailed, and thorough assessment of [respondent's] abilities at
this time."
Ibid. The Dean's letter to respondent of March
15, 1973, advised her quite specifically of the "general topic[s]
in the curriculum about which we are asking [the panel] to evaluate
your performance. . . ."
Ibid. Each member of the
examining panel was requested to "evaluate the extent of
[respondent's] mastery of relevant concepts, knowledge, skills, and
competence to function as a physician."
Id. at 209. The
examinations by members of the panel were conducted separately. Two
of the doctors recommended that respondent be graduated, although
one added that "she would not qualify to intern at the hospital
where he worked."
Id. at 40. Each of the other five
doctors submitted negative recommendations, although they varied as
to whether respondent should be dropped from school immediately.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Indeed, in view of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's apparent conclusion
that respondent was dismissed because of some objectively
determinable conduct, it is difficult to understand his conclusion
that the special examination administered by the seven practicing
physicians "may have been, better than . . . a formal hearing."
Post at
435 U. S. 102.
That examination did not purport to determine whether, in the past,
respondent had engaged in conduct that would warrant dismissal.
Respondent apparently was not called upon to argue that she had not
done certain things in the past. There were no facts found on that
point. Nor did the doctors who administered the examination address
themselves to respondent's conduct at the time,
apart from her
ability to perform the clinical tasks physicians must master.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL says that this evaluation tested the truth of
the assertions that respondent could not function as a doctor.
Post at
435 U. S.
102-103, n. 14. This is a tacit recognition that the
issue was an academic one, rather than one limited to whether
respondent simply engaged in improper conduct.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The District Court also found:
"Considering all of the evidence presented, the Court finds that
the grading and evaluating system of the medical school was applied
fairly and reasonably to plaintiff, but plaintiff did not satisfy
the requirements of the medical school to graduate from the medical
school in June, 1973."
App. 45.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Dr. William Sirridge was the faculty member assigned to
respondent as her "chief docent" (faculty adviser). A portion of
his testimony was summarized by the District Court as follows:
"He [Dr. Sirridge] emphasized that plaintiff's [respondent's]
problem was that she thought she could learn to be a medical doctor
by reading books, and he advised her [that] the clinical skills
were equally as important for obtaining the M.D. degree. He further
testified that plaintiff cannot perform many of the necessary basic
skills required of a practicing physician. . . ."
Id. at 35.
[
Footnote 2/5]
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL insists that calling this an academic
judgment is an exercise in futility.
Post at
435 U. S.
104-105, n. 18. As the Court points out, however, the
distinction between dismissal for academic deficiency and dismissal
for misconduct may be decisive as to the process that is due.
Ante at
435 U. S. 89-90.
A decision relating to the misconduct of a student requires a
factual determination as to whether the conduct took place or not.
The accuracy of that determination can be safeguarded by the sorts
of procedural protections traditionally imposed under the Due
Process Clause. An academic judgment also involves this type of
objectively determinable fact --
e.g., whether the student
gave certain answers on an examination. But the critical decision
requires a subjective, expert evaluation as to whether that
performance satisfies some predetermined standard of academic
competence. That standard, in turn, is set by a similarly expert
judgment. These evaluations, which go far beyond questions of mere
"conduct," are not susceptible of the same sorts of procedural
safeguards that are appropriate to determining facts relating to
misconduct. Thus, the conclusion that a particular dismissal is
academic -- that it entails these expert evaluations -- is likely
to have controlling significance in determining how much and what
sort of process is due.
[
Footnote 2/6]
University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in
making judgments as to the academic performance of students and
their entitlement to promotion or graduation. Contrary to the
suggestion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL,
post at
435 U. S.
104-105, n. 18, the fact that a particular procedure is
possible or available does not mean that it is required under the
Due Process Clause.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 (1975), simply does not speak to that point.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I join Parts I, II-A, and III of the Court's opinion and concur
in the judgment.
I agree with my Brother BLACKMUN that it is unnecessary to
decide whether respondent had a constitutionally protected property
or liberty interest or precisely what minimum procedures were
required to divest her of that interest if it is assumed she had
one. Whatever that minimum is, the procedures accorded her
satisfied or exceeded that minimum.
The Court nevertheless assumes the existence of a protected
interest, proceeds to classify respondent's expulsion as an
"academic dismissal," and concludes that no hearing of any kind or
any opportunity to respond is required in connection with such an
action. Because I disagree with this conclusion,
Page 435 U. S. 97
I feel constrained to say so, and to concur only in the
judgment. As I see it, assuming a protected interest, respondent
was, at the minimum, entitled to be informed of the reasons for her
dismissal and to an opportunity personally to state her side of the
story. Of course, she had all this, and more. I also suspect that
expelled graduate or college students normally have the opportunity
to talk with their expellers, and that this sort of minimum
requirement will impose no burden that is not already being
shouldered and discharged by responsible institutions.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I agree with the Court that,
"[a]ssuming the existence of a liberty or property interest,
respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the
Fourteenth Amendment requires."
Ante at
435 U. S. 84-85.
I cannot join the Court's opinion, however, because it contains
dictum suggesting that respondent was entitled to even less
procedural protection than she received. I also differ from the
Court in its assumption that characterization of the reasons for a
dismissal as "academic" or "disciplinary" is relevant to resolution
of the question of what procedures are required by the Due Process
Clause. Finally, I disagree with the Court's decision not to remand
to the Court of Appeals for consideration of respondent's
substantive due process claim.
I
We held in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 (1975), that
"due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10
days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him, and, if he denies them, an explanation of
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story."
Id. at
419 U. S.
581.
Page 435 U. S. 98
There is no question that respondent received these protections,
and more. [
Footnote 3/1]
According to the stipulation of facts filed in the District
Court, respondent had a "discussion" with the Dean of the Medical
School in mid-1972, at the close of her first year in school,
during which she was notified of her unsatisfactory performance.
[
Footnote 3/2] The Dean testified
that he explained the nature of her problems to respondent twice at
this meeting, so that she would fully understand them. [
Footnote 3/3] A letter from the Dean
followed shortly thereafter, in which respondent was advised that
she was being placed on probation because of,
inter alia,
"a major deficiency" in her "relationships with others," and her
failure to "kee[p] to established schedules" and "atten[d]
carefully to personal appearance." [
Footnote 3/4] The Dean again met with respondent in
October, 1972 "to call attention in a direct and supportive way to
the fact that her performance was not then strong." [
Footnote 3/5]
In January, 1973, there was still another meeting between
respondent and the Dean, who was accompanied by respondent's docent
and the chairman of the Council on Evaluation. Respondent was there
notified of the Council's recommendation that she not graduate and
that she be dropped from school unless there was "radical
improvement" in her "clinical competence, peer and patient
relations, personal hygiene, and ability to accept criticism."
[
Footnote 3/6] A letter from the
Dean again
Page 435 U. S. 99
followed the meeting; the letter summarized respondent's problem
areas and noted that they had been discussed with her "several
times." [
Footnote 3/7]
These meetings and letters plainly gave respondent all that
Goss requires: several notices and explanations, and at
least three opportunities "to present [her] side of the story." 419
U.S. at
419 U. S. 581.
I do not read the Court's opinion to disagree with this conclusion.
Hence, I do not understand why the Court indicates that even the
"informal give-and-take" mandated by
Goss, id. at
419 U. S. 584,
need not have been provided here.
See ante at
435 U. S. 85-86,
435 U. S. 89-91.
This case simply provides no legitimate opportunity to consider
whether "far less stringent procedural requirements,"
ante
at
435 U. S. 86,
than those required in
Goss are appropriate in other
school contexts. While I disagree with the Court's conclusion that
"far less" is adequate, as discussed
infra, it is equally
disturbing that the Court decides an issue not presented by the
case before us. As Mr. Justice Brandeis warned over 40 years ago,
the "
great gravity and delicacy'" of our task in constitutional
cases should cause us to "`shrink'" from "`anticipat[ing] a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it,'" and from "`formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.'" Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.
S. 288, 297 U. S.
345-347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
II
In view of the Court's dictum to the effect that even the
minimum procedures required in
Goss need not have been
provided to respondent, I feel compelled to comment on the extent
of procedural protection mandated here. I do so within a framework
largely ignored by the Court, a framework derived from our
traditional approach to these problems. According to our prior
decisions, as summarized in
Mathews
v.
Page 435 U. S. 100
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319
(1976), three factors are of principal relevance in determining
what process is due:
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Id. at
424 U. S.
335.
As the Court recognizes, the "private interest" involved here is
a weighty one:
"the deprivation to which respondent was subjected -- dismissal
from a graduate medical school -- was more severe than the 10-day
suspension to which the high school students were subjected in
Goss."
Ante at
435 U. S. 86 n.
3. One example of the loss suffered by respondent is contained in
the stipulation of facts: Respondent had a job offer from the
psychiatry department of another university to begin work in
September, 1973; the offer was contingent on her receiving the M.D.
degree. [
Footnote 3/8] In summary,
as the Court of Appeals noted:
"The unrefuted evidence here establishes that Horowitz has been
stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way that she will be unable
to continue her medical education, and her chances of returning to
employment in a medically related field are severely damaged."
538 F.2d 1317, 1321 (CA8 1976). As Judge Friendly has written in
a related context, when the State seeks "to deprive a person of a
way of life to which [s]he has devoted years of preparation and on
which [s]he . . . ha[s] come to rely," it should be required first
to provide a "high level of procedural protection." [
Footnote 3/9]
Page 435 U. S. 101
Neither of the other two factors mentioned in
Mathews
justifies moving from a high level to the lower level of protection
involved in
Goss. There was at least some risk of error
inherent in the evidence on which the Dean relied in his meetings
with and letters to respondent; faculty evaluations of such matters
as personal hygiene and patient and peer rapport are neither as
"sharply focused" nor as "easily documented" as was,
e.g.,
the disability determination involved in
Mathews, supra at
424 U. S. 343.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S. 580
(when decisionmaker "act[s] on the reports and advice of others . .
. [t]he risk of error is not at all trivial"). [
Footnote 3/10]
Nor can it be said that the university had any greater interest
in summary proceedings here than did the school in
Goss.
Certainly the allegedly disruptive and disobedient students
involved there,
see id. at
419 U. S.
569-571, posed more of an immediate threat to orderly
school administration than did respondent. As we noted in
Goss, moreover, "it disserves . . . the interest of the
State if [the student's] suspension is in fact unwarranted."
Id. at
419 U. S. 579.
[
Footnote 3/11] Under these
circumstances -- with respondent having much more at stake than did
the students in
Goss, the administration, at best, having
no more at stake, and the meetings between respondent and the Dean
leaving some possibility of erroneous dismissal -- I believe that
respondent was entitled to more procedural protection than is
provided by "informal give-and-take" before the school could
dismiss her.
The contours of the additional procedural protection to which
respondent was entitled need not be defined in terms of the
traditional adversary system so familiar to lawyers and
Page 435 U. S. 102
judges.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 348.
We have emphasized many times that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation."
Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886,
367 U. S. 895
(1961);
see, e.g., ante at
435 U. S. 86;
Goss v. Lopez, supra at
419 U. S. 578.
In other words, what process is due will vary "according to
specific factual contexts."
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.
S. 420,
363 U. S. 442
(1960);
see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, supra at
424 U. S. 334;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 481
(1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535,
402 U. S. 540
(1971).
See also Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U. S. 123,
341 U. S.
162-163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In the instant factual context, the "appeal" provided to
respondent,
see ante at
435 U. S. 81,
served the same purposes as, and in some respects may have been
better than, a formal hearing. In establishing the procedure under
which respondent was evaluated separately by seven physicians who
had had little or no previous contact with her, it appears that the
Medical School placed emphasis on obtaining "a fair and neutral and
impartial assessment." [
Footnote
3/12] In order to evaluate respondent, each of the seven
physicians spent approximately half a day observing her as she
performed various clinical duties, and then submitted a report on
her performance to the Dean. [
Footnote 3/13] It is difficult to imagine a better
procedure for determining whether the school's allegations against
respondent had any substance to them. [
Footnote 3/14]
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra
at
Page 435 U. S. 103
424 U. S.
337-338,
424 U. S. 344
(use of independent physician to examine disability applicant and
report to decisionmaker). I therefore believe that the appeal
procedure utilized by respondent, together with her earlier notices
from and meetings with the Dean, provided respondent with as much
procedural protection as the Due Process Clause requires. [
Footnote 3/15]
III
The analysis in Parts I and II of this opinion illustrates that
resolution of this case under our traditional approach does not
turn on whether the dismissal of respondent is characterized as one
for "academic" or "disciplinary" reasons. In my view, the effort to
apply such labels does little to advance the due process inquiry,
as is indicated by examination of the facts of this case.
The minutes of the meeting at which it was first decided that
respondent should not graduate contain the following:
"This issue is
not one of academic achievement, but of
performance, relationship to people and ability to
communicate."
App. 218 (emphasis added). By the customary measures of academic
progress, moreover, no deficiency was apparent at the time that the
authorities decided respondent could not graduate; prior to this
time, according to the stipulation of facts, respondent had
received
Page 435 U. S. 104
"credit" and "satisfactory grades" in all of her courses,
including clinical courses. [
Footnote
3/16]
It may nevertheless be true, as the Court implies,
ante
at
435 U. S. 91 n.
6, that the school decided that respondent's inadequacies in such
areas as personal hygiene, peer and patient relations, and
timeliness would impair her ability to be "a good medical doctor."
Whether these inadequacies can be termed "purely academic reasons,"
as the Court calls them,
ibid., is ultimately an
irrelevant question, and one placing an undue emphasis on words,
rather than functional considerations. The relevant point is that
respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct, [
Footnote 3/17] just as the students in
Goss were suspended because of their conduct. [
Footnote 3/18]
Page 435 U. S. 105
The Court makes much of decision from state and lower federal
courts to support its point that "dismissals for academic . . .
cause do not necessitate a hearing."
Ante at
435 U. S. 87.
The decisions on which the Court relies, however, plainly use the
term "academic" in a much narrower sense than does the Court,
distinguishing "academic" dismissals from ones based on
"misconduct" and holding that, when a student is dismissed for
failing grades, a hearing would serve no purpose. [
Footnote 3/19] These cases may be viewed as
consistent with
Page 435 U. S. 106
our statement in
Mathews v. Eldridge that "the probable
value . . . of additional . . . procedural safeguards" is a factor
relevant to the due process inquiry. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 335,
quoted
supra at
435 U. S. 100;
see 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
343-347. But they provide little assistance in resolving
cases like the present one, where the dismissal is based not on
failing grades, but on conduct-related considerations. [
Footnote 3/20]
In such cases, a talismanic reliance on labels should not be a
substitute for sensitive consideration of the procedures required
by due process. [
Footnote 3/21]
When the facts disputed are of a type susceptible of determination
by third parties, as the allegations about respondent plainly were,
see ante at
435 U. S. 91 n.
6, there is no more reason to deny all procedural protection to one
who will suffer a serious loss than there was in
Goss v.
Lopez, and indeed there may be good reason to provide even
more protection, as discussed in
435 U. S.
supra. A court's
Page 435 U. S. 107
characterization of the reasons for a student's dismissal adds
nothing to the effort to find procedures that are fair to the
student and the school, and that promote the elusive goal of
determining the truth in a manner consistent with both individual
dignity and society's limited resources.
IV
While I agree with the Court that respondent received adequate
procedural due process, I cannot join the Court's judgment, because
it is based on resolution of an issue never reached by the Court of
Appeals. That court, taking a properly limited view of its role in
constitutional cases, refused to offer dictum on respondent's
substantive due process claim when it decided the case on
procedural due process grounds.
See 538 F.2d at 1321 n. 5,
quoted
ante at
435 U. S. 91.
Petitioners therefore presented to us only questions relating to
the procedural issue. Pet. for Cert. 2. Our normal course in such a
case is to reverse on the questions decided below and presented in
the petition, and then to remand to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of any remaining issues.
Rather than taking this course, the Court here decides on its
own that the record will not support a substantive due process
claim, thereby "agree[ing]" with the District Court.
Ante
at
435 U. S. 92. I
would allow the Court of Appeals to provide the first level of
appellate review on this question. Not only would a remand give us
the benefit of the lower court's thoughts, [
Footnote 3/22] it
Page 435 U. S. 108
would also allow us to maintain consistency with our own Rule
23(1)(c), which states that "[o]nly the questions set forth in the
petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the
court." By bypassing the courts of appeals on questions of this
nature, we do no service to those courts that refuse to speculate
in dictum on a wide range of issues, and instead follow the more
prudential, preferred course of avoiding decision -- particularly
constitutional decision -- until "
absolutely necessary'" to
resolution of a case. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. at
297 U. S. 347
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
for further proceedings.
[
Footnote 3/1]
It is necessary to recount the facts underlying this conclusion
in some detail, because the Court's opinion does not provide the
relevant facts with regard to the notice and opportunity to reply
given to respondent.
[
Footnote 3/2]
App. 15. It is likely that respondent was less formally notified
of these deficiencies several months earlier, in March, 1972.
See id. at 100-101 (testimony of respondent's docent).
[
Footnote 3/3]
Id. at 146.
[
Footnote 3/4]
Id. at 15-16.
[
Footnote 3/5]
Id. at 147.
[
Footnote 3/6]
Id. at 18.
[
Footnote 3/7]
Id. at 182-183.
[
Footnote 3/8]
Id. at 16
[
Footnote 3/9]
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1296-1297 (1975)
(revocation of professional licenses).
[
Footnote 3/10]
The inquiry about risk of error cannot be separated from the
first inquiry about the private interest at stake. The more serious
the consequences for the individual, the smaller the risk of error
that will be acceptable.
[
Footnote 3/11]
The statements and letters of the Medical School Dean reflect a
genuine concern that respondent not be wrongfully dismissed.
See App. 147-150, 180-183, 185-187.
[
Footnote 3/12]
Id. at 150 (testimony of Dean);
see id. at
185, 187, 208, 210 (letters to respondent and seven
physicians).
[
Footnote 3/13]
See id. at 190-207.
[
Footnote 3/14]
Respondent appears to argue that her sex and her religion were
underlying reasons for her dismissal, and that a hearing would have
helped to resolve the "factual dispute" between her and the school
on these issues. Brief for Respondent 30;
see id. at
51-52.
See also ante at 92 n. 7. But the only express
grounds for respondent's dismissal related to deficiencies in
personal hygiene, patient rapport, and the like, and, as a matter
of procedural due process, respondent was entitled to no more than
a forum to contest the factual underpinnings of these grounds. The
appeal procedure here gave respondent such a forum -- an
opportunity to demonstrate that the school's charges were "unfair
or mistaken,"
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565,
419 U. S. 581
(1975).
[
Footnote 3/15]
Like a hearing, the appeal procedure and the meetings
"represent[ed] . . . a valued human interaction in which the
affected person experience[d] at least the satisfaction of
participating in the decision that vitally concern[ed] her. . . .
[T]hese rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to
be a
person, rather than a
thing, is at least to
be consulted about what is done with one."
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-7, p. 503 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 3/16]
App. 12. Respondent later received "no credit" for her emergency
room rotation, the only course in which her grade was less than
satisfactory.
Ibid. This grade was not recorded, according
to the District Court, until after the decision had been made that
respondent could not graduate.
Id. at 31. When the
Coordinating Committee made this decision, moreover, it apparently
had not seen any evaluation of respondent's emergency room
performance.
See id. at 229 (minutes of Coordinating
Committee meeting).
[
Footnote 3/17]
Only one of the reasons voiced by the school for deciding not to
graduate respondent had any arguable nonconduct aspects, and that
reason, "clinical competence," was plainly related to perceived
deficiencies in respondent's personal hygiene and relationships
with colleagues and patients.
See id. at 219.
See also
id. at 181, 182-183, 210.
[
Footnote 3/18]
The futility of trying to draw a workable distinction between
"academic" and "disciplinary" dismissals is further illustrated by
my Brother POWELL's concurring opinion. The opinion states that the
conclusion in the text
supra "is explicitly contrary to
the District Court's undisturbed findings of fact,"
ante
at
435 U. S. 94,
but it cites no District Court finding indicating that respondent's
dismissal was based on other than conduct-related considerations.
No such finding exists.
The District Court's statement that respondent was dismissed
because of "
the quality of her work,'" quoted ante at
435 U. S. 95,
like statements to the effect that the dismissal was "solely on
academic grounds," ante at 435 U. S. 96, is
ultimately irrelevant to the due process inquiry. It provides no
information on the critical question whether "the facts disputed
are of a type susceptible of determination by third parties."
Infra at 435 U. S. 106.
Nor does the District Court's finding that " 'the grading and
evaluating system of the medical school was applied fairly,'"
quoted ante at 435 U. S. 95 n.
3, advance resolution of this case, especially in view of the fact,
noted supra, that respondent's grades in clinical courses,
as in all other courses, were satisfactory when the decision was
made that she could not graduate. This fact further indicates,
contrary to MR. JUSTICE POWELL's intimation, ante at
435 U. S. 95,
that the school found the deficiencies in respondent's clinical
performance to be different from the deficiencies that lead to
unsatisfactory grades in more traditional scholastic
subjects.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL is correct, of course, in suggesting that the
kind of conduct here involved is different from that involved in
Goss v. Lopez, supra. Ante at
435 U. S. 94,
and n. 2. The question facing the Medical School authorities was
not solely whether respondent had misbehaved in the past, but
rather whether her past, present, and likely future conduct
indicated that she would not be "a good medical doctor,"
ante at
435 U. S. 91 n.
6. The appeal procedure of the school was well suited to aid in
resolution of this question, since it involved "observation of her
skills and techniques in actual conditions of practice,"
ante at
435 U. S. 95. It
matters not at all whether the result of such observation is
labeled "an
academic' judgment," ibid., so long as it
is recognized that the school authorities, having an efficient
procedure available to determine whether their decision to dismiss
respondent was "unfair or mistaken," Goss v. Lopez, supra
at 419 U. S. 581,
were constitutionally required to give respondent a chance to
invoke the procedure, as they did, before depriving her of a
substantial liberty or property interest. See supra at
435 U. S.
100-102.
[
Footnote 3/19]
See Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 450 (CA5
1976);
Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 849-851 (CA10
1975);
Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 367,
211 So. 2d
489, 497-498,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968);
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass.19, 19-20,
22-23, 102 N.E. 1095, 1096-1097 (1913).
[
Footnote 3/20]
See Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F.
Supp. 379, 383 (ED Pa.1973):
"This case is not the traditional disciplinary situation where a
student violates the law or a school regulation by actively
engaging in prohibited activities. Plaintiff has allegedly failed
to act and comply with school regulations for admission and class
attendance by passively ignoring these regulations. These alleged
failures do not constitute misconduct in the sense that plaintiff
is subject to disciplinary procedures. They do constitute
misconduct in the sense that plaintiff was required to do
something. Plaintiff contends that he did comply with the
requirements. Like the traditional disciplinary case, the
determination of whether plaintiff did or did not comply with the
school regulations is a question of fact. Most importantly, in
determining this factual question, reference is not made to a
standard of achievement in an esoteric academic field. Scholastic
standards are not involved, but rather disputed facts concerning
whether plaintiff did or did not comply with certain school
regulations. These issues adapt themselves readily to determination
by a fair and impartial 'due process' hearing."
[
Footnote 3/21]
The Court's reliance on labels, moreover, may give those school
administrators who are reluctant to accord due process to their
students an excuse for not doing so.
See generally Kirp,
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting,
28 Stan.L.Rev. 841 (1976).
[
Footnote 3/22]
It would be useful, for example, to have more careful
assessments of whether the school followed its own rules in
dismissing respondent and of what the legal consequences should be
if it did not. The Court states that it "disagree[s] with both
respondent's factual and legal contentions."
Ante at
435 U. S. 92 n.
8. It then asserts that "the record clearly shows" compliance with
the rules,
ibid., but it provides neither elaboration of
this conclusion nor discussion of the specific ways in which
respondent contends that the rules were not followed, Brief for
Respondent 42-46, contentions accompanied by citations to the same
record that the Court finds so "clear." The statement of the
District Court quoted by the Court,
ante at
435 U. S. 92 n.
8, is not inconsistent on its face with respondent's claim that the
rules were not followed, nor is there anything about the context of
the statement to indicate that it was addressed to this claim,
see App. 45.
Review by the Court of Appeals would clarify these factual
issues, which rarely warrant the expenditure of this Court's time.
If the Court's view of the record is correct, however, then I do
not understand why the Court goes on to comment on the legal
consequences of a state of facts that the Court has just said does
not exist. Like other aspects of the Court's opinion, discussed
supra, the legal comments on this issue are nothing more
than confusing dictum. It is true, as the Court notes,
ante at
435 U. S. 92 n.
8, that the decision from this Court cited by respondent was not
expressly grounded in the Due Process Clause.
Service v.
Dulles, 354 U. S. 363
(1957). But that fact, which amounts to the only legal analysis
offered by the Court on this question, hardly answers respondent's
point that some compliance with previously established rules --
particularly rules providing procedural safeguards -- is
constitutionally required before the State or one of its agencies
may deprive a citizen of a valuable liberty or property
interest.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's opinion, and that of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, together
demonstrate conclusively that, assuming the existence of a liberty
or property interest, respondent received all the procedural
process that was due her under the Fourteenth
Page 435 U. S. 109
Amendment: that, for me, disposes of this case, and compels the
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I find it unnecessary, therefore, to indulge in the arguments
and counterarguments contained in the two opinions as to the extent
or type of procedural protection that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires in the graduate school dismissal situation. Similarly, I
also find it unnecessary to choose between the arguments as to
whether respondent's dismissal was for academic or disciplinary
reasons (or, indeed, whether such a distinction is relevant). I do
agree with MR JUSTICE MARSHALL, however, that we should leave to
the District Court and to the Court of Appeals in the first
instance the resolution of respondent's substantive due process
claim and of any other claim presented to, but not decided by,
those courts.
Accordingly, I, too, would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.