Petitioner's conviction of criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. §
401 for refusing to testify and to produce business records
subpoenaed by the Internal Revenue Service in connection with an
inquiry into possible violations of the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970 (Act) was a final decision of the District Court appealable
to the Court of Appeals, and petitioner's appeal was not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
(TECA). Rather than "arising under" the Act within the meaning of §
211(b)(2) thereof, vesting the TECA with exclusive jurisdiction of
all appeals from district courts "in cases and controversies
arising under" the Act, the criminal contempt charge initiated a
separate and independent proceeding under the Criminal Code, which,
although related to an order entered in connection with an
investigation of Act violations, did not depend on the existence of
such violations or even the continuance of the investigation.
Certiorari granted; ___ F.2d ___, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
On .June 25, 1973, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served a
subpoena on the petitioner, Karl J. Bray, directing him to produce
business records for examination and to appear for questioning in
connection with an inquiry into possible violations of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 85 Stat. 743,
note following 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. III). When he
failed to comply, the IRS filed a petition for enforcement of the
subpoena in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah. Following a hearing, the District Court ordered him to comply
with the subpoena. Upon his refusal to testify or produce
Page 423 U. S. 74
the records, the court directed him to show cause why he should
not be held in criminal contempt. He was subsequently convicted of
criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 and sentenced to
imprisonment for 60 days. [
Footnote
1] He appealed the judgment of conviction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but that court dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the appeal came
within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) by § 211(b)(2) of the Economic
Stabilization Act. This petition for certiorari asks us to review
the propriety of the dismissal of Bray's appeal.
As part of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971,
Congress created the TECA and vested it with "exclusive
jurisdiction of all appeals from the district courts of the United
States in cases and controversies arising under this title or under
regulations or orders issued thereunder." § 211(b)(2), 85 Stat.
749. This judicial review provision was designed to provide speedy
resolution of cases brought under the Act and "to funnel into one
court all the appeals arising out of the District Courts, and thus
gain in consistency of decision." S.Rep. No. 92-507, p. 10 (1971).
The provision thus carved out a limited exception to the broad
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over "appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
The Tenth Circuit held that, "notwithstanding Bray's prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. [§] 401," the contempt charge did not "change the
substantive nature of the original enforcement proceedings," and
therefore remained "a
case or controversy' arising under the
[Economic
Page 423 U. S.
75
Stabilization] Act." This was, we think, a misreading of
both the language and the purpose of the stabilization statute. The
Act does not contain any provision prohibiting the violation of a
district court's' enforcement order or establishing penalties for
such a violation. Thus, rather than "arising under" any provision
of the Act, the contempt prosecution was commenced under 18 U.S.C.
§ 401, the provision of the Criminal Code that empowers federal
courts to punish certain contempts of their authority. Nothing in
the Act or in its legislative history indicates that Congress
intended "to include existing offenses, already covered under Title
18, under the umbrella of the Stabilization Act." United States
v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1398 (TECA 1973). [Footnote 2] Review in the TECA of criminal
contempt convictions relating to compliance investigations or
enforcement efforts is not necessary to assure uniform
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the stabilization
scheme. Indeed, a requirement of such review would only serve to
undermine the prompt resolution of Stabilization Act questions by
burdening the TECA with additional appeals.
The charge brought against the petitioner based on his refusal
to obey a lawful order of the District Court initiated "a separate
and independent proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to
vindicate the authority of the court" and was "not a part of the
original cause."
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 445,
451. Although the contempt charge related to an order
Page 423 U. S. 76
entered in connection with an investigation of Stabilization Act
violations, it was not dependent on the existence of such
violations or even the continuation of the investigation. As the
Court noted in
United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U. S. 258,
330 U. S.
294:
"Violations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even
though the order is set aside on appeal,
Worden v. Searls,
121 U. S.
14 (1887), or though the basic action has become moot,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S.
418 (1911)."
Here, the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner for
criminal contempt constituted a final decision of the District
Court that was then appealable to the appropriate court of appeals.
We therefore grant the motion to proceed
in forma pauperis
and the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
The District Court stayed execution of the judgment pending
appeal.
[
Footnote 2]
In
Cooper, the TECA held that a prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for willfully and knowingly making false
representations to an IRS agent in connection with a Stabilization
Act investigation was not "a controversy
arising under' any
title of the Stabilization Act or under regulations or orders
issued thereunder." 482 F.2d at 1397.