Two suits, permitted to proceed as class actions, were brought
in District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by respondents,
individuals and organizations, against petitioners, the Mayor of
Philadelphia, the Police Commissioner, and others, alleging a
pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police
mistreatment of minority citizens in particular, and Philadelphia
residents in general. The petitioners were charged with misconduct
ranging from express authorization or encouragement of the
mistreatment to failure to act in such a way as to avoid
recurrence. The principal antagonists involved in one case were two
police officers, not named as parties, who were found to have
violated complainants' constitutional rights in three of eight
incidents as to which the District Court made detailed factual
findings and as to which a five-day suspension had resulted in one
incident and no disciplinary action in another. In the other case,
in only two of 28 incidents did the District Court conclude that
the police conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured
right; it found no police misconduct in four incidents; in another,
departmental policy was subsequently changed; and, though the court
made no comment on the degree of misconduct occurring in the
remainder, there were arguably 16 police violations of citizens'
constitutional rights in the year involved. The District Court
found,
inter alia, that the evidence did not establish the
existence of any policy on the part of petitioners to violate the
constitutional rights of respondent classes, but found evidence of
departmental discouragement of complaints and a tendency to
minimize the consequences of police misconduct. The court found
that only a small percentage of policemen commit violations of the
rights of Philadelphia residents generally, but that such
violations could not be dismissed as rare or isolated. Petitioners
were directed to draft for the court's approval "a comprehensive
program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints" to be
formulated in accordance with the court's "guidelines" containing
detailed suggestions for
Page 423 U. S. 363
revising the police manuals and procedural rules for dealing
with citizens and for changing procedures for handling complaints.
On petitioners' appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The requisite Art. III case or controversy between the
individually named respondents and petitioners was lacking, since
those respondents' claim to "real and immediate" injury rests not
upon what the named petitioners might do to them in the future, but
upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to
them, and thus those respondents lacked the requisite personal
stake in the outcome,
i.e., the order overhauling police
disciplinary procedures.
Cf. O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U. S. 488. Pp.
423 U. S.
371-373.
2. The judgment of the District Court constitutes an unwarranted
federal judicial intrusion into the discretionary authority of
petitioners to perform their official functions as prescribed by
state and local law, and, by validating the type of litigation and
granting the type of relief involved here, the lower courts have
exceeded their authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pp.
423 U. S.
373-381.
(a) The District Court's theory of liability under § 1983 was
erroneous, being based on a showing of an "unacceptably high"
number of incidents of constitutional dimension when, in fact,
there were only 20 in a city of three million inhabitants with
7,500 policemen, and on the untenable conclusion that, even without
a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small
percentage of the police force, petitioners' failure to act in the
face of a statistical pattern was just as enjoinable under § 1983
as was the active conduct enjoined in
Hague v. CIO,
307 U. S. 496, and
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802. Pp.
423 U. S.
373-376.
(b) Nor can the remedy granted here be upheld on the basis that
such equitable relief was sanctioned in
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S.
1, for here, unlike the situation in that case, where
the state authorities had implemented the unconstitutional
deprivation, the responsible authorities were not found to have
played an affirmative part in any unconstitutional deprivations.
Pp.
423 U. S.
376-377.
(c) Important principles of federalism militate against the
proposition, advanced by respondents, that federal equity power
should fashion prophylactic procedures designed to minimize
misconduct by a handful of state employees, and the District
Court's injunctive order, which sharply limited the police
department's
Page 423 U. S. 364
"latitude in the dispatch of its internal affairs," contravened
those principles. Pp.
423 U. S.
377-380.
506 F.2d 542, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
423 U. S. 381.
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
after parallel trials of separate actions, [
Footnote 1] filed
Page 423 U. S. 365
in 1970, entered an order in 1973 requiring petitioners
"to submit to [the District] Court for its approval a
comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen
complaints alleging police misconduct"
in accordance with a comprehensive opinion filed together with
the order. The proposed program, negotiated between petitioners and
respondents for the purpose of complying with the order, was
incorporated six months later into a final judgment. Petitioner
City Police Commissioner was thereby required,
inter alia,
to put into force a directive governing the manner by which
citizens' complaints against police officers should henceforth be
handled by the department. [
Footnote 2] The Court of Appeals for
Page 423 U. S. 366
the Third Circuit, upholding the District Court's finding that
the existing procedures for handling citizen complaints were
"inadequate," affirmed the District Court's choice of equitable
relief: "The revisions were . . . ordered because they appeared to
have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct." 506
F.2d 542, 548 (1974). We granted certiorari to consider
petitioners' claims that the judgment of the District Court
represents an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into
the discretionary authority committed to them by state and local
law to perform their official functions. We find ourselves
substantially in agreement with these claims, and we therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The central thrust of respondents' efforts in the two trials was
to lay a foundation for equitable intervention, in one degree or
another, because of an assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers. This mistreatment
was said to have been directed against minority citizens in
particular
Page 423 U. S. 367
and against all Philadelphia residents in general. The named
individual and group respondents were certified to represent these
two classes. The principal petitioners here -- the Mayor, the City
Managing Director, and the Police Commissioner -- were charged with
conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of this
mistreatment to failure to act in a manner so as to assure that it
would not recur in the future.
Hearing some 250 witnesses during 21 days of hearings, the
District Court was faced with a staggering amount of evidence; each
of the 40-odd incidents might alone have been the
piece de
resistance of a short, separate trial. The District Court
carefully and conscientiously resolved often sharply conflicting
testimony, and made detailed findings of fact, [
Footnote 3] which both sides now accept, with
respect to eight of the incidents presented by the Goode
respondents and with respect to 28 of those presented by COPPAR.
[
Footnote 4]
The principal antagonists in the eight incidents recounted in
Goode were Officers DeFazio and D'Amico, members of the city's
"Highway Patrol" force. They were not named as parties to the
action. The District Court found the conduct of these officers to
be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen
complainants in three [
Footnote
5] of the incidents, and further found that complaints to the
police Board of Inquiry had resulted in one case in a relatively
mild five-day suspension, and, in another case, a conclusion that
there was no basis for disciplinary action.
In only two of the 28 incidents recounted in COPPAR
Page 423 U. S. 368
(which ranged in time from October, 1969 to October, 1970) did
the District Court draw an explicit conclusion that the police
conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured right; it
expressly found no police misconduct whatsoever in four of the
incidents; and in one other, the departmental policy complained of
was subsequently changed. As to the remaining 21, the District
Court did not proffer a comment on the degree of misconduct that
had occurred: whether simply improvident, illegal under police
regulations or state law, or actually violative of the individual's
constitutional rights. Respondents' brief asserts that of this
latter group, the facts as found in 14 of them "reveal [federal]
violations." [
Footnote 6] While
we think that somewhat of an overstatement, we accept it,
arguendo, and thus take it as established that, insofar as
the COPPAR record reveals, there were 16 incidents occurring in the
city of Philadelphia over a year's time in which numbers of police
officers violated citizens' constitutional rights. Additionally,
the District Court made reference to citizens complaints to the
police in seven of those 16; in four of which, involving conduct of
constitutional dimension, the police department received complaints
but ultimately took no action against the offending officers.
The District Court made a number of conclusions of law, not all
of which are relevant to our analysis. It found that the evidence
did not establish the existence of any policy on the part of the
named petitioners to violate the legal and constitutional rights of
the plaintiff classes, but it did find that evidence of
departmental procedure indicated a tendency to discourage the
filing of civilian complaints and to minimize the consequences of
police
Page 423 U. S. 369
misconduct. It found that, as to the larger plaintiff class, the
residents of Philadelphia, only a small percentage of policemen
commit violations of their legal and constitutional rights, but
that the frequency with which such violations occur is such that
"they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances."
COPPAR
v. Rizzo, 357
F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (1973). In the course of its opinion, the
District Court commented:
"In the course of these proceedings, much of the argument has
been directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt
to supervise the functioning of the police department. Although,
contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Court's legal power to
do just that is firmly established, . . . I am not persuaded that
any such drastic remedy is called for, at least initially, in the
present cases."
Id. at 1320.
The District Court concluded by directing petitioners to draft,
for the court's approval, "a comprehensive program for dealing
adequately with civilian complaints," to be formulated along the
following "guidelines" suggested by the court:
"(1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of
procedure spelling out in some detail, in simple language, the
'do's and don'ts' of permissible conduct in dealing with civilians
(for example, manifestations of racial bias, derogatory remarks,
offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property and other
unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on
pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording
and processing civilian complaints, etc.). (2) Revision of
procedures for processing complaints against police, including (a)
ready availability of forms for use by civilians in lodging
complaints against police
Page 423 U. S. 370
officers; (b) a screening procedure for eliminating frivolous
complaints; (c) prompt and adequate investigation of complaints;
(d) adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an impartial
individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of
command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant
to present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his
defense; and (3) prompt notification to the concerned parties,
informing them of the outcome."
Id. at 1321. While noting that the "guidelines" were
consistent with "generally recognized minimum standards" and
imposed "no substantial burdens" on the police department, the
District Court emphasized that respondents had no constitutional
right to improved police procedures for handling civilian
complaints. But given that violations of constitutional rights of
citizens occur in "unacceptably" high numbers, and are likely to
continue to occur, the court-mandated revision was a "necessary
first step" in attempting to prevent future abuses.
Ibid.
On petitioners' appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
II
These actions were brought, and the affirmative equitable relief
fashioned, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It
provides that
"[e]very person who, under color of [law] subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the
United States] to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law [or] suit in equity. . . ."
The plain words of the statute impose liability -- whether in
the form of payment of redressive damages or being placed under an
injunction -- only for conduct which "subjects, or causes to be
subjected" the
Page 423 U. S. 371
complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws.
The findings of fact made by the District Court at the
conclusion of these two parallel trials -- in sharp contrast to
that which respondents sought to prove with respect to petitioners
-- disclose a central paradox which permeates that court's legal
conclusions. Individual police officers
not named as
parties to the action were found to have violated the
constitutional rights of particular individuals, only a few of whom
were parties plaintiff. As the facts developed, there was no
affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of
police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by
petitioners express or otherwise -- showing their authorization or
approval of such misconduct. Instead, the
sole causal
connection found by the District Court between petitioners and the
individual respondents was that, in the absence of a change in
police disciplinary procedures, the incidents were likely to
continue to occur not with respect to them, but as to the members
of the classes they represented. In sum, the genesis of this
lawsuit -- a heated dispute between individual citizens and certain
policemen -- has evolved into an attempt by the federal judiciary
to resolve a "controversy" between the entire citizenry of
Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and appointed officials
over what steps might, in the Court of Appeals' words, "[appear] to
have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct." 506
F.2d at 548. The lower courts have, we think, overlooked several
significant decisions of this Court in validating this type of
litigation and the relief ultimately granted.
A
We first of all entertain serious doubts whether on the facts as
found there was made out the requisite Art. III
Page 423 U. S. 372
case or controversy between the individually named respondents
and petitioners. In
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 (1974), the individual respondents, plaintiffs in
the District Court, alleged that petitioners, a county magistrate
and judge, had embarked on a continuing, intentional practice of
racially discriminatory bond setting, sentencing, and assessing of
jury fees. No specific instances involving the individual
respondents were set forth in the prayer for injunctive relief
against the judicial officers. And even though respondents' counsel
at oral argument had stated that some of the named respondents had,
in fact, "suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices,"
the Court concluded that
"[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however,
if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."
Id. at
414 U. S.
495-496. The Court further recognized that, while "past
wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury," the attempt to anticipate
under what circumstances the respondents there would be made to
appear in the future before petitioners "takes us into the area of
speculation and conjecture."
Id. at
414 U. S.
496-497. These observations apply here with even more
force, for the individual respondents' claim to "real and
immediate" injury rests not upon what the named petitioners might
do to them in the future -- such as set a bond on the basis of race
-- but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen
might do to them in the future because of that unknown policeman's
perception of departmental disciplinary procedures. This hypothesis
is even more attenuated than those allegations of future injury
found insufficient in
O'Shea to warrant invocation of
federal jurisdiction. Thus, insofar as the individual respondents
were concerned, we think they lacked the requisite "personal
Page 423 U. S. 373
stake in the outcome,"
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186,
369 U. S. 204
(1962),
i.e., the order overhauling police disciplinary
procedures.
B
That conclusion alone might appear to end the matter, for
O'Shea also noted that,
"if none of the named plaintiffs . . . establishes the requisite
of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief
on behalf of himself or any other member of the class"
which they purport to represent. 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 494.
But, unlike
O'Shea, this case did not arise on the
pleadings. The District Court, having certified the plaintiff
classes, [
Footnote 7] bridged
the gap between the facts shown at trial and the classwide relief
sought with an unprecedented theory of § 1983 liability. It held
that the classes' § 1983 actions for equitable relief against
petitioners were made out on a showing of an "unacceptably high"
number of those incidents of constitutional dimension -- some 20 in
all -- occurring at large in a city of three million inhabitants,
with 7,500 policemen.
Nothing in
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.
S. 496 (1939), the only decision of this Court cited by
the District Court, [
Footnote
8]
Page 423 U. S. 374
or any other case from this Court, supports such an open-ended
construction of § 1983. In
Hague, the pattern of police
misconduct upon which liability and injunctive relief were grounded
was the adoption and enforcement of deliberate policies by the
defendants there (including the Mayor and the Chief of Police) of
excluding and removing the plaintiff's labor organizers and
forbidding peaceful communication of their views to the citizens of
Jersey City. These policies were implemented "by force and
violence" on the part of individual policemen. There was no
mistaking that the defendants proposed to continue their
unconstitutional policies against the members of this discrete
group.
Likewise, in
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.
S. 802 (1974), relied upon by the Court of Appeals and
respondents here, we noted:
"The complaint charged that the enjoined conduct was but one
part of a
single plan by the defendants, and the District
Court found a
pervasive pattern of intimidation in which
the law enforcement authorities sought to suppress appellees'
constitutional rights. In this blunderbuss effort, the police not
only relied on statutes . . . found constitutionally deficient, but
concurrently exercised their authority
Page 423 U. S. 375
under valid laws in an unconstitutional manner."
Id. at
416 U. S. 812
(emphasis added). The numerous incidents of misconduct on the part
of the named Texas Rangers, as found by the District Court and
summarized in this Court's opinion, established beyond peradventure
not only a "persistent pattern," but one which flowed from an
intentional, concerted, and indeed conspiratorial effort to deprive
the organizers of their First Amendment rights and place them in
fear of coming back.
Id. at
416 U. S.
814-815.
Respondents stress that the District Court not only found an
"unacceptably high" number of incidents, but held, as did the Court
of Appeals, that "when a
pattern of frequent police
violations of rights is shown, the law is clear that injunctive
relief may be granted." 357 F. Supp. at 1318 (emphasis added).
However, there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia
police was different in kind or degree from that which exists
elsewhere; indeed, the District Court found "that the problems
disclosed by the record . . . are fairly typical of [those]
afflicting police departments in major urban areas."
Ibid.
Thus, invocation of the word "pattern" in a case where, unlike
Hague and
Medrano, the defendants are not
causally linked to it, is but a distant echo of the findings in
those cases. The focus in
Hague and
Medrano was
not simply on the number of violations which occurred, but on the
common thread running through them: a "pervasive pattern of
intimidation" flowing from a deliberate plan by the named
defendants to crush the nascent labor organizations.
Medrano,
supra at
416 U. S. 812.
The District Court's unadorned finding of a statistical pattern is
quite dissimilar to the factual settings of these two cases.
The theory of liability underlying the District Court's opinion,
and urged upon us by respondents, is that, even
Page 423 U. S. 376
without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a
small percentage of the police force, petitioners' failure to act
in the face of a statistical pattern is indistinguishable from the
active conduct enjoined in
Hague and
Medrano.
Respondents posit a constitutional "duty" on the part of
petitioners (and a corresponding "right" of the citizens of
Philadelphia) to "eliminate" future police misconduct; a "default"
of that affirmative duty being shown by the statistical pattern,
the District Court is empowered to act in petitioners' stead and
take whatever preventive measures are necessary, within its
discretion, to secure the "right" at issue. Such reasoning,
however, blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language
in a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress
chose in § 1983. We have never subscribed to these amorphous
propositions, and we decline to do so now.
Respondents claim that the theory of liability embodied in the
District Court's opinion is supported by desegregation cases such
as
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U. S. 1 (1971).
But this case, and the long line of precedents cited therein,
simply reaffirmed the body of law originally enunciated in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 (1954):
"Nearly 17 years ago, this Court held, in explicit terms, that
state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies equal
protection of the laws. At no time has the Court deviated in the
slightest degree from that holding or its constitutional
underpinnings."
"
* * * *"
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad,
for breadth and flexibility
Page 423 U. S. 377
are inherent in equitable remedies."
Swann, supra at
402 U. S. 11,
402 U. S. 15.
Respondents, in their effort to bring themselves within the
language of
Swann, ignore a critical factual distinction
between their case and the desegregation cases decided by this
Court. In the latter, segregation imposed by law had been
implemented by state authorities for varying periods of time,
whereas, in the instant case, the District Court found that the
responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving
any members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional
rights. Those against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases
such as
Swann and
Brown were not administrators
and school board members who had in their employ a small number of
individuals, which latter, on their own, deprived black students of
their constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were
administrators and school board members who were found by their own
conduct in the administration of the school system to have denied
those rights. Here, the District Court found that none of the
petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any rights
secured under the Constitution. Under the well established rule
that federal "judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of
a constitutional violation,"
Swann, supra at
402 U. S. 16,
this case presented no occasion for the District Court to grant
equitable relief against petitioners.
C
Going beyond considerations concerning the existence of a live
controversy and threshold statutory liability, we must address an
additional and novel claim advanced by respondent classes. They
assert that, given the citizenry's "right" to be protected from
unconstitutional exercises of police power, and the "need for
protection from
Page 423 U. S. 378
such abuses," respondents have a right to mandatory equitable
relief in some form when those in supervisory positions do not
institute steps to reduce the incidence of unconstitutional police
misconduct. [
Footnote 9] The
scope of federal equity power, it is proposed, should be extended
to the fashioning of prophylactic procedures for a state agency
designed to minimize this kind of misconduct on the part of a
handful of its employees. However, on the facts of this case, not
only is this novel claim quite at odds with the settled rule that,
in federal equity cases "the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy,"
ibid., but important considerations
of federalism are additional factors weighing against it. Where, as
here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked,
federal courts must be constantly mindful of the "special delicacy
of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power
and State administration of its own law."
Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U. S. 117,
342 U. S. 120
(1951), quoted in
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
500.
Section 1983, by its terms, confers authority to grant equitable
relief as well as damages, but its words "allow a suit in equity
only when that is the proper proceeding for redress, and they refer
to existing standards to determine what is a proper proceeding."
Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475,
189 U. S. 486
(1903) (Holmes, J.). Even in an action between private individuals,
it has long been held that an injunction is "to be used sparingly,
and only in a clear and plain case."
Irwin v.
Dixion, 9 How. 10,
50 U. S. 33
(1850). When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a
government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case
must contend with
"the well established rule that the Government has traditionally
been granted the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of its own
internal
Page 423 U. S. 379
affairs,'
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S.
886,
367 U. S. 896 (1961),"
quoted in
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S.
61,
415 U. S. 83
(1974). The District Court's injunctive order here, significantly
revising the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police
department, was indisputably a sharp limitation on the department's
"latitude in the
dispatch of its own internal
affairs.'"
When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system,
governed by the principles just stated, to a system of federal
courts representing the Nation, subsisting side by side with 50
state judicial, legislative, and executive branches, appropriate
consideration must be given to principles of federalism in
determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.
S. 922,
422 U. S. 928
(1975).
So strongly has Congress weighted this factor of federalism in
the case of a state criminal proceeding that it has enacted 28
U.S.C. § 2283 to actually deny to the district courts the authority
to issue injunctions against such proceedings unless the
proceedings come within narrowly specified exceptions. Even though
an action brought under § 1983, as this was, is within those
exceptions,
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.
S. 225 (1972), the underlying notions of federalism
which Congress has recognized in dealing with the relationships
between federal and state courts still have weight. Where an
injunction against a criminal proceeding is sought under § 1983,
"the principles of equity, comity, and federalism" must nonetheless
restrain a federal court. 407 U.S. at
407 U. S.
243.
But even where the prayer for injunctive relief does not seek to
enjoin the state criminal proceedings themselves, we have held that
the principles of equity nonetheless militate heavily against the
grant of an injunction except in the most extraordinary
circumstances. In
O'Shea v. Littleton, supra at
414 U. S. 502,
we held that
"a major
Page 423 U. S. 380
continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal
courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in
sharp conflict with the principles of equitable restraint which
this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted."
And the same principles of federalism may prevent the injunction
by a federal court of a state civil proceeding once begun.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592
(1975).
Thus, the principles of federalism which play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state
governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to
their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a
criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to
that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think
these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive
relief is sought not against the judicial branch of the state
government, but against those in charge of an executive branch of
an agency of state or local governments such as petitioners here.
Indeed, in the recent case of
Mayor v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U. S. 605
(1974), in which private individuals sought injunctive relief
against the Mayor of Philadelphia, we expressly noted the existence
of such considerations, saying: "There are also delicate issues of
federal-state relationships underlying this case."
Id. at
415 U. S.
615.
Contrary to the District Court's flat pronouncement that a
federal court's legal power to "supervise the functioning of the
police department . . . is firmly established," it is the foregoing
cases and principles that must govern consideration of the type of
injunctive relief granted here. When it injected itself by
injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this
state agency, the District Court departed from these precepts.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court
Page 423 U. S. 381
of Appeals which affirmed the decree of the District Court
is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The complaint in the first action, filed in February, 1970, and
styled
Goode v. Rizzo, was brought by respondent Goode and
two other individuals. The second, filed in September, 1970, and
styled
COPPAR v. Tate, was brought by 21 individuals and
four organizations: the Council of Organizations on Philadelphia
Police Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR), an
unincorporated association composed of some 32 constituent
community organizations; the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, whose principal office is in Atlanta, Ga.; and the
Black Panther Party and the Young Lords Party, unincorporated
associations of black citizens and citizens of Spanish origin,
respectively. The latter two groups, of which some of the
individual complainants in COPPAR were members, were ultimately
dismissed as parties by the District Court for failure to submit to
discovery. Both complaints named as defendants those officials then
occupying the offices of Mayor, City Managing Director (who
supervises and, with the Mayor's approval, appoints the Police
Commissioner), and the Police Commissioner, who has direct
supervisory power over the department. Two other police supervisors
subordinate to the Commissioner were also named defendants. Both
actions were permitted to proceed as class actions, with the
individual respondents representing all residents of Philadelphia
and an "included" class of all black residents of that city. For a
thorough account of the procedural background of this case,
see the District Court's opinion.
COPPAR v.
Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289 (1973).
[
Footnote 2]
A judgment of considerable detail was entered against
petitioners, appropriate substitution having been made in 1973 of
the current officeholders, including petitioner Rizzo, by then
Mayor.
See n 1,
supra. The existing procedure for handling complaints,
embodied in the 2 1/2-page "Directive 127" (March 1967), was
expanded to an all-encompassing 14-page document reflecting the
revisions suggested by the District Court's "guidelines."
See
infra at
423 U. S.
369-370. Directive 127 as revised was ordered by the
District Court to be promulgated as such by the Police Commissioner
and posted in various public areas, with copies provided anyone who
either requested one or inquired generally into the procedure for
lodging complaints. A "Citizen's Complaint Report" was ordered
drawn up in a format designated by the court, with copies to be
printed and available in sufficient quantities to the public in
several locations. The department was further ordered to propose a
police recruit training manual reflective of the court's
"guidelines," with respondents then having the chance to proffer
alternative suggestions. Finally, the department was directed to
maintain adequate statistical records and annual summaries to
provide a basis for the court's "evaluation" of the program as
ordered; the court reserved jurisdiction to review petitioners'
progress in these areas and to grant further relief as might be
appropriate. Pet. for Cert. 20a-37a.
[
Footnote 3]
Each of the incidents in Goode and COPPAR is set out in full
detail in the District Court's opinion. 357 F. Supp. at 1294-1316.
For present purposes, we need only highlight those findings.
[
Footnote 4]
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 5]
Incidents "1" through "3." 357 F. Supp. at 1294-1297.
[
Footnote 6]
This textual summary of the District Court's findings with
respect to the COPPAR incidents is taken from the Brief for
Respondents 115, and n. 18.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners had in their appeal
raised no question of the propriety of the class designation under
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23. That issue is therefore not before us, and
we express no opinion upon it.
[
Footnote 8]
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (CA4 1966), was also
cited by the District Court for the proposition that federal courts
have the legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police
department." 357 F. Supp. at 1320. But the court in
Lankford intimated no such power, and the facts which
confronted it are obviously distinguishable. There, in executing an
"evil practice that has long and notoriously persisted in the
Police Department," the police, searching over a 19-day period for
two black men who murdered one of their ranks, conducted some 300
warrantless searches of private residences in a predominately Negro
area "at all hours of the day and night" on nothing more than
"unverified anonymous [telephone] tips." 364 F.2d at 198, and 205
n. 9. This "series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever
to come under the scrutiny of a federal court" arose out of what
several experienced police officers testified was a "routine
practice" in "serious cases."
Id. at 200-201. Injunctive
relief under § 1983 was granted against the defendant Police
Commissioner because the wholesale raids were the "effectuation of
a plan conceived by high ranking [police] officials," a practice
which, in the interim, the defendant had "renounced only obliquely,
if at all," and as to which "the danger of repetition has not been
removed."
Id. at 202, 204.
[
Footnote 9]
Brief for Respondents 34-35.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
To be sure, federal court intervention in the daily operation of
a large city's police department, as the Court intimates, is
undesirable and to be avoided if at all possible. The Court
appropriately observes, however,
ante at
423 U. S. 367,
that what the Federal District Court did here was to engage in a
careful and conscientious resolution of often sharply conflicting
testimony and to make detailed findings of fact, now accepted by
both sides, that attack the problem that is the subject of the
respondents' complaint. The remedy was one evolved with the
defendant officials' assent, reluctant though that assent may have
been, and it was one that the police department concededly could
live with. Indeed, the District Court, in its memorandum of
December 18, 1973, stated that "the resolution of all the disputed
items was more nearly in accord with the defendants' position than
with the plaintiffs' position," and that the relief contemplated by
the earlier orders of March 14, 1973,
see COPPAR v.
Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289 (ED Pa.), "did not go beyond what the defendants had
always been willing to accept." App. 190a. No one, not even this
Court's majority, disputes the apparent efficacy of the relief or
the fact that it effectuated a betterment in the system and should
serve to lessen the number of instances of deprival of
constitutional rights of members of the respondent classes. What is
worrisome to the Court is abstract principle, and, of course, the
Court has a right
Page 423 U. S. 382
to be concerned with abstract principle that, when extended to
the limits of logic, may produce untoward results in other
circumstances on a future day.
See Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U. S. 349,
209 U. S. 355
(1908) (Holmes, J.).
But the District Court here, with detailed, careful, and
sympathetic findings, ascertained the existence of violations of
citizens' constitutional rights, of a pattern of that type of
activity, of its likely continuance and recurrence, and of an
official indifference as to doing anything about it. The case,
accordingly, plainly fits the mold of
Allee v. Medrano,
416 U. S. 802
(1974), and
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.
S. 496 (1939), despite the observation, 357 F. Supp. at
1319, that the evidence
"does not establish the existence of any overall Police
Department
policy to violate the legal and constitutional
rights of citizens, nor to discriminate on the basis of race."
(Emphasis supplied.) I am not persuaded that the Court's attempt
to distinguish those cases from this one is at all successful.
There must be federal relief available against persistent deprival
of federal constitutional rights even by (or, perhaps I should say,
particularly by) constituted authority on the state side.
The Court entertains "serious doubts,"
ante at
423 U. S.
371-372, as to whether there is a case or controversy
here, citing
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 (1974).
O'Shea, however, presented quite
different facts. There, the plaintiff respondents had alleged a
fear of injury from actions that would be subsequent to some
future, valid arrest. The Court said:
"We assume that respondents will conduct their activities within
the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure
to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by
petitioners. . . . Under these circumstances, where
Page 423 U. S. 383
respondents do not claim any constitutional right to engage in
conduct proscribed by therefore presumably permissible state laws,
or indicate that it is otherwise their intention to so conduct
themselves, the threat of injury from the alleged course of conduct
they attack is simply too remote to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement and permit adjudication by a federal court."
Id. at
414 U. S.
497-498. Here, by contrast, plaintiff respondents are
persons injured by past unconstitutional conduct (an allegation not
made in the
O'Shea complaint) and fear injury at the hands
of the police regardless of whether they have violated a valid
law.
To the extent that
423 U. S. I
must agree. I do not agree, however, with the Court's substitution
of its judgment for that of the District Court on what the evidence
here shows. The Court states that what was shown was minimal,
involving only a few incidents out of thousands of arrests in a
city of several million population. Small as the ratio of incidents
to arrests may be, the District Court nevertheless found a pattern
of operation, even if no policy, and one sufficiently significant
that the violations "cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated
instances." 357 F. Supp. at 1319. Nothing the Court has said
demonstrates for me that there is no justification for that finding
on this record. The Court's criticism about numbers would be just
as forceful, or would miss the mark just as much, with 100
incidents or 500 or even 3,000, when compared with the overall
number of arrests made in the city of Philadelphia. The pattern
line will appear somewhere. The District Court drew it this side of
the number of
Page 423 U. S. 384
proved instances. One properly may wonder how many more
instances actually existed but were unproved because of the
pressure of time upon the trial court, or because of reluctant
witnesses, or because of inherent fear to question constituted
authority in any degree, or because of a despairing belief,
unfounded though it may be, that nothing can be done about it
anyway, and that it is not worth the effort. That it was worth the
effort is convincingly demonstrated by the result in the District
Court, by the affirmance, on the issues before us, by a unanimous
panel of the Third Circuit, and by the support given the result
below by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Bar
Association, the Greater Philadelphia Movement, and the other
entities that have filed briefs as
amici curiae here in
support of the respondents.
The Court today appears to assert that a state official is not
subject to the strictures of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he directs the
deprivation of constitutional rights.
Ante at
423 U. S.
375-377. In so holding, it seems to me, the Court
ignores both the language of § 1983 and the case law interpreting
that language. Section 1983 provides a cause of action where a
person acting under color of state law "subjects, or causes to be
subjected," any other person to a deprivation of rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States. By its very words,
§ 1983 reaches not only the acts of an official, but also the acts
of subordinates for whom he is responsible. In
Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U. S. 167
(1961), the Court said that § 1983 "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions,"
id. at
365 U. S. 187,
and:
"It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was
passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion,
Page 423 U. S. 385
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not
be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges,and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by state agencies."
Id. at
365 U. S. 180.
(Emphasis added.)
I do not find it necessary to reach the question under what
circumstances failure to supervise will justify an award of money
damages, or whether an injunction is authorized where the superior
has no consciousness of the wrongs being perpetrated by his
subordinates. [
Footnote 2/1] It is
clear that an official may be enjoined from consciously permitting
his subordinates, in the course of their duties, to violate the
constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal. In rejecting
the concept that the official may be responsible under § 1983, the
Court today casts aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary
reached by the Courts of Appeals of 10 Circuits. [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 423 U. S. 386
In the instant case, the District Court found that, although
there was no departmental policy of racial discrimination,
"such violations do occur, with such frequency that they cannot
be dismissed as rare, isolated instances; and that little or
nothing is done by the city authorities to punish such infractions,
or to prevent their recurrence,"
357 F. Supp. at 1319, and that it
"is the policy of the department to discourage the filing of
such complaints, to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven
police misconduct, and to resist disclosure of the final
disposition of such complaints."
Id. at 1318. Needless to say, petitioners were under a
statutory duty to supervise their subordinates.
See
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, c. 2, § 200. I agree with the
District Court that its findings are sufficient to bring
petitioners within the ambit of § 1983.
Further, the applicability of § 1983 to controlling officers
allows the district courts to avoid the necessity of injunctions
issued against individual officers and the consequent continuing
supervision by the federal courts of the day-to-day activities of
the men on the street. The District Court aptly stated:
"Respect and admiration for the performance of the vast majority
of police officers cannot justify refusal to confront the reality
of the abuses which
Page 423 U. S. 387
do exist. But deference to the essential role of the police in
our society does mandate that intrusion by the courts into this
sensitive area should be limited, and should be directed toward
insuring that the police themselves are encouraged to remedy the
situation."
357 F. Supp. at 1320.
I would regard what was accomplished in this case as one of
those rightly rare but nevertheless justified instances just as
Allee and
Hague -- of federal court
"intervention" in a state or municipal executive area. The facts,
the deprival of constitutional rights, and the pattern are all
proved in sufficient degree. And the remedy is carefully
delineated, worked out within the administrative structure, rather
than superimposed by edict upon it, and essentially, and
concededly, "livable." In the City of Brotherly Love -- or in any
other American city -- no less should be expected. It is a matter
of regret that the Court sees fit to nullify what so meticulously
and thoughtfully has been evolved to satisfy an existing need
relating to constitutional rights that we cherish and hold
dear.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In this regard, however, this Court recently has approved the
imposition of criminal liability without "consciousness of
wrongdoing" for failure to supervise subordinates.
United
States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658
(1975). The concept, thus, is far from novel doctrine.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"Under section 1983, equitable relief is appropriate in a
situation where governmental officials have notice of the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and fail to prevent
a recurrence of such misconduct.
Hague v. CIO,
307 U. S.
496 . . . (1939). From a legal standpoint, it makes no
difference whether the plaintiffs' constitutional rights are
violated as a result of police behavior which is the product of the
active encouragement and direction of their superiors or as a
result of the superiors' mere acquiescence in such behavior. In
either situation, if the police officials had a duty, as they
admittedly had here, to prevent the officers under their direction
from committing the acts which are alleged to have occurred during
the Convention, they are proper defendants in this action."
Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (CA7
1969).
See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 11961 1199 (CA1),
cert. denied,
419 U.S. 977 (1974), and
Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8
(CA1 1972);
Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 134-135 (CA2)
,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972);
Lewis v.
Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (CA3 1971);
Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (CA4 1966);
Jennings v.
Patterson, 460 F.2d 1021, 1022 (CA5 1972);
Smith v.
Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36 (CA6 1973);
Byrd v. Bristake,
466 F.2d 6, 10-11 (CA7 1972);
Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d
1271, 1275 (CA8 1973);
Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 881
(CA10 1974);
Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 395,
447 F.2d 358, 365 (1971),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.
S. 418 (1973).