A pleasure yacht, which appellee had leased to Puerto Rican
residents, was seized, pursuant to Puerto Rican statutes providing
for forfeiture of vessels used for unlawful purposes, without prior
notice to appellee or the lessees and without a prior adversary
hearing, after authorities had discovered marihuana aboard her.
Appellee was neither involved in nor aware of a lessee's wrongful
use of the yacht. Appellee then brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme. A three-judge District
Court, relying principally on
Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U. S. 67, held
that the statutes' failure to provide for pre-seizure notice and
hearing rendered them unconstitutional, and that, as applied to
forfeit appellee's interest in the yacht, they unconstitutionally
deprived an innocent party of property without just
compensation.
Held:
1. The statutes of Puerto Rico are "State statute[s]" for
purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, and hence a three-judge
court was properly convened under that Act, and direct appeal to
this Court was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Pp.
416 U. S.
669-676.
2. This case presents an "extraordinary" situation in which
postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny
due process, since (1) seizure under the statutes serves
significant governmental purposes by permitting Puerto Rico to
assert
in rem jurisdiction over the property in forfeiture
proceedings, thereby fostering the public interest in preventing
continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing criminal
sanctions; (2) pre-seizure notice and hearing might frustrate the
interests served by the statutes, the property seized often being
of the sort, as here, that could be removed from the jurisdiction,
destroyed, or concealed, if advance notice were given; and (3),
unlike the situation in
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, seizure
is not initiated by self-interested private parties, but by
government officials. Pp.
416 U. S.
676-680.
Page 416 U. S. 664
3. Statutory forfeiture schemes are not rendered
unconstitutional because of their applicability to the property
interests of innocents, and here the Puerto Rican statutes, which
further punitive and deterrent purposes, were validly applied to
appellee's yacht. Pp.
416 U. S.
680-690.
363 F. Supp. 1337, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST,
JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which STEWART, J., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which POWELL, J., joined,
post, p.
416 U. S. 691.
STEWART, J., filed a separate statement;
post, p.
416 U. S. 690.
DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which STEWART,
J., joined in part,
post, p.
416 U. S.
691.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Constitution is violated
by application to appellee, the lessor of a yacht, of Puerto Rican
statutes providing for seizure and forfeiture of vessels used for
unlawful purposes when (1) the yacht was seized without prior
notice or hearing after allegedly being used by a lessee for an
unlawful purpose, and (2) the appellee was neither involved in nor
aware of the act of the lessee which resulted in the
forfeiture.
Page 416 U. S. 665
In March, 1971, appellee, Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., leased a
pleasure yacht to two Puerto Rican residents. Puerto Rican
authorities discovered marihuana on board the yacht in early May,
1972, and charged one of the lessees with violation of the
Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 24 §
2101
et seq. (Supp. 1973). On July 11, 1972, the
Superintendent of Police seized the yacht pursuant to P.R.Laws
Ann., Tit. 24 §§ 2512(a)(4), (b) (Supp. 1973), [
Footnote 1] and Tit. 34 § 1722 (1971), [
Footnote 2] which provide that vessels
used to
Page 416 U. S. 666
transport, or to facilitate the transportation of, controlled
substances, including marihuana, are subject to seizure and
forfeiture to the Commonwealth
Page 416 U. S. 667
of Puerto Rico. The vessel was seized without prior notice to
appellee or either lessee, and without a prior adversary hearing.
The lessees, who had registered the yacht with the Ports Authority
of the Commonwealth, were thereafter given notice within 10 days of
the
Page 416 U. S. 668
seizure as required by § 1722(a). [
Footnote 3] But when a challenge to the seizure was not
made within 15 days after service of the notice, the yacht was
forfeited for official use of the Government of Puerto Rico
pursuant to § 1722(C). [
Footnote
4] Appellee shortly thereafter first learned of the seizure and
forfeiture when attempting to repossess the yacht from the lessees
because of their apparent failure to pay rent. It is conceded that
appellee was "in no way . . . involved in the criminal enterprise
carried on by [the] lessee," and "had no knowledge that its
property was being used in connection with or in violation of
[Puerto Rican Law]."
On November 6, 1972, appellee filed this suit, seeking a
declaration that application of P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 24, §§
2512(a)(4), (b), and Tit. 34, § 1722, had (1) unconstitutionally
denied it due process of law insofar as the statutes authorized
appellants, the Superintendent of Police and the Chief of the
Office of Transportation of the Commonwealth, to seize the yacht
without notice or a prior adversary hearing, and (2)
unconstitutionally deprived appellee of its property without just
compensation. [
Footnote 5]
Injunctive relief was also sought.
Page 416 U. S. 669
A three-judge District Court, [
Footnote 6] relying principally upon
Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67
(1972), held that the failure of the statutes to provide for
pre-seizure notice and hearing rendered them constitutionally
defective. 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-1343 (PR 1973). Viewing
United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
401 U. S. 715
(1971), as having effectively overruled our prior decisions that
the property owner's innocence has no constitutional significance
for purposes of forfeiture, the District Court further declared
that the Puerto Rican statutes, insofar as applied to forfeit
appellee's interest in the yacht, unconstitutionally deprived it of
property without just compensation. 363 F. Supp. at 1341-1342.
Appellants were accordingly enjoined from enforcing the
statutes
"insofar as they deny the owner or person in charge of property
an opportunity for a hearing due to the lack of notice, before the
seizure and forfeiture of its property and insofar as a penalty is
imposed upon innocent parties."
Id. at 1343-1344. We noted probable jurisdiction.
414 U. S. 16
(1973). We reverse.
I
Although the parties consented to the convening of the
three-judge court, and hence do not challenge our jurisdiction
Page 416 U. S. 670
to decide this direct appeal, we nevertheless may not entertain
the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 [
Footnote 7] unless statutes of Puerto Rico are "State
statute[s]" for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.'s.C. §
2281. [
Footnote 8] We therefore
turn first to that question.
In
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.
S. 368 (1949), this Court held that enactments of the
Territory of Hawaii were not "State statute[s]" for purposes of
Judicial Code § 266, the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 2281,
reasoning:
"While, of course, great respect is to be paid to the enactments
of a territorial legislature by all courts as it is to the
adjudications of territorial courts, the predominant reason for the
enactment of Judicial Code § 266 does not exist as respects
territories.
This reason was a congressional purpose to avoid
unnecessary interference with the laws of a sovereign state.
In our dual system of government, the position of the state as
sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution requires a
deference to state
Page 416 U. S. 671
legislative action beyond that required for the laws of a
territory. A territory is subject to congressional regulation."
336 U.S. at
336 U. S.
377-378 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Similar
reasoning -- that the purpose of insulating a sovereign State's
laws from interference by a single judge would not be furthered by
broadly interpreting the word "State" -- led the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, some 55 years ago, to hold § 266
inapplicable to the laws of the Territory of Puerto Rico.
Benedicto v. West India & Panama Tel. Co., 256 F. 417
(1919).
Congress, however, created the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico after
Benedicto was decided. Following the Spanish-American War,
Puerto Rico was ceded to this country in the Treaty of Paris, 30
Stat. 1754 (1898). A brief interlude of military control was
followed by congressional enactment of a series of Organic Acts for
the government of the island. Initially, these enactments
established a local governmental structure with high officials
appointed by the President. These Acts also retained veto power in
the President and Congress over local legislation. By 1950,
however, pressures for greater autonomy led to congressional
enactment of Pub.L. 600, 64 Stat. 319, which offered the people of
Puerto Rico a compact whereby they might establish a government
under their own constitution. Puerto Rico accepted the compact, and
on July 3, 1952, Congress approved, with minor amendments, a
constitution adopted by the Puerto Rican populace, 66 Stat. 327;
see note accompanying 48 U.S.C. § 731d. Pursuant to that
constitution, the Commonwealth now
"elects its Governor and legislature; appoints its judges, all
cabinet officials, and lesser officials in the executive branch;
sets its own educational policies; determines its own budget; and
amends its own civil and criminal code."
Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal
Page 416 U. S. 672
Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo.L.J. 219, 221
(1967);
see 28 Dept. of State Bull. 584589 (1953);
Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431
(CA3 1966); Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15
U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1 (1953).
These significant changes in Puerto Rico's governmental
structure formed the backdrop to Judge Magruder's observations in
Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377 (CA1 1953):
"[I]t may be that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico -- 'El Estado
Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico' in the Spanish version -- organized
as a body politic by the people of Puerto Rico under their own
constitution, pursuant to the terms of the compact offered to them
in Pub.L. 600, and by them accepted, is a State within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The preamble to this constitution refers to
the Commonwealth . . . which, 'in the exercise of our natural
rights, we [the people of Puerto Rico] now create within our union
with the United States of America.' Puerto Rico has thus not become
a State in the federal Union like the 48 States, but it would seem
to have become a State within a common and accepted meaning of the
word.
Cf. 74 U. S. White, 1868, 7
Wall. 700,
74 U. S. 721. . . . It is a
political entity created by the act and with the consent of the
people of Puerto Rico and joined in union with the United States of
America under the terms of the compact."
"A serious argument could therefore be made that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a State within the intendment and
policy of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. . . . If the constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is really a 'constitution' -- as the
Congress says it is, 66 Stat. 327 -- and not just another
Organic
Page 416 U. S. 673
Act approved and enacted by the Congress, then the question is
whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is to be deemed 'sovereign
over matters not ruled by the Constitution' of the United States,
and thus a 'state' within the policy of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, which
enactment, in prescribing a three-judge federal district court,
expresses 'a deference to state legislative action beyond that
required for the laws of a territory' [
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke
Lok Po, 336 U.S. at
336 U. S. 378] whose local
affairs are subject to congressional regulation."
206 F.2d at 387-388 (footnote omitted).
Lower federal courts since 1953 have adopted this analysis and
concluded that Puerto Rico is to be deemed "sovereign over matters
not ruled by the Constitution," and thus a State within the policy
of the Three-Judge Court Act.
See Mora v.
Mejias, 115 F.
Supp. 610 (PR 1953); [
Footnote
9]
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 346 F.Supp.
Page 416 U. S. 674
470, 481 (PR 1972);
Suarez v. Administrador del Deporte
Hipico de Puerto Rico, 354 F.
Supp. 320 (PR 1972). And in
Wackenhut Corp. v. Aponte,
386 U. S. 268
(1967), we summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge court
for the District of Puerto Rico that had ordered abstention and
said:
"[A]pplication of the doctrine of abstention is particularly
appropriate in a case . . . involv[ing] the construction and
validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. For a due
regard for the status of that Commonwealth under its compact with
the Congress of the United States dictates, we believe, that it
should have the primary opportunity through its courts to determine
the intended scope of its own legislation and to pass upon the
validity of that legislation under its own constitution, as well as
under the Constitution of the United States."
266 F.
Supp. 401, 405 (1966). Although the question of Puerto Rico's
status under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 was raised in neither the
Jurisdictional Statement nor the Motion to Affirm in
Wackenhut, and we do not normally feel ourselves bound by
a
sub silentio exercise of jurisdiction,
see Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528,
415 U. S.
533-535, n. 5 (1974);
United
States v. More, 3 Cranch 159,
7 U. S. 172
(1805), this Court has noted that, in three-judge court cases,
"where . . . the responsibility [is] on the courts to see that the
three-judge rule [is] followed," unexplained action may take on
added significance.
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336
U.S. at
336 U. S.
379-380. This is particularly so, when as in
Wackenhut, the opinion supporting the judgment over which
we exercised appellate jurisdiction had expressed the view that
abstention was appropriate for reasons of comity, an oft-repeated
justification for the abstention doctrine,
see, e.g.,
312 U. S. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S.
Page 416 U. S. 675
496,
312 U. S. 500
(1941), [
Footnote 10] as
well as the principal underpinning of the Three-Judge Court Act.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452,
415 U. S.
465-466 (1974).
While still of the view that § 2281 is not "a measure of broad
social policy to be construed with great liberality,"
Phillips
v. United States, 312 U. S. 246,
312 U. S. 251
(1941), we believe that the established federal judicial practice
of treating enactments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as "State
statute[s]" for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, serves and
does not expand, the purposes of § 2281. We therefore hold that a
three-judge court was properly convened under that statute,
[
Footnote 11] and that
direct
Page 416 U. S. 676
appeal to this Court was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Accordingly, we now turn to the merits.
II
Appellants challenge the District Court's holding that the
appellee was denied due process of law by the omission
Page 416 U. S. 677
from § 2512(b), as it incorporates § 1722, of provisions for
pre-seizure notice and hearing. They argue that seizure for
purposes of forfeiture is one of those "
extraordinary
situations' that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a
hearing." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 90;
see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.
S. 337, 395 U. S. 339;
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
401 U. S.
378-379 (1971). We agree. [Footnote 12]
Page 416 U. S. 678
In holding that lack of pre-seizure notice and hearing denied
due process, the District Court relied primarily upon our decision
in
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra. Fuentes involved the
validity of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes permitting
creditors to seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained. A writ of
replevin could be obtained under the Florida statute upon the
creditor's bare assertion to a court clerk that he was entitled to
the property, and under the Pennsylvania statute, upon filing an
affidavit fixing the value of the property, without alleging legal
entitlement to the property.
Fuentes held that the
statutory procedures deprived debtors of their property without due
process by failing to provide for hearings "
at a meaningful
time.'" 407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
80.
Fuentes reaffirmed, however, that, in limited
circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an
opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible.
Such circumstances are those in which
"the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible
for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular
instance."
Id. at
407 U. S.
91.
Page 416 U. S. 679
Thus, for example, due process is not denied when postponement
of notice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from
contaminated food,
North American Storage Co. v. Chicago,
211 U. S. 306
(1908); from a bank failure,
Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U. S. 29
(1928); or from misbranded drugs,
Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594
(1950); or to aid the collection of taxes,
Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589
(1931); or the war effort,
United States v. Pfitsch,
256 U. S. 547
(1921).
The considerations that justified postponement of notice and
hearing in those cases are present here. First, seizure under the
Puerto Rican statutes serves significant governmental purposes:
seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert
in rem jurisdiction
over the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings,
[
Footnote 13] thereby
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use
of the property and in enforcing criminal sanctions. Second,
pre-seizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served
by the statutes, since the property seized -- as here, a yacht --
will often be of a sort that could be removed to another
jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed if advance warning of
confiscation were given. And finally, unlike the situation in
Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested
private parties; rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether
seizure is appropriate under the provisions of the Puerto Rican
statutes. [
Footnote 14] In
these circumstances, we hold that this case
Page 416 U. S. 680
presents an "extraordinary" situation in which postponement of
notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.
[
Footnote 15]
III
Appellants next argue that the District Court erred in holding
that the forfeiture statutes unconstitutionally authorized the
taking for government use of innocent parties' property without
just compensation. They urge that a long line of prior decisions of
this Court establish the principle that statutory forfeiture
schemes are not rendered unconstitutional because of their
applicability to the property interests of innocents, and further
that
United States v. United States Coin 7 Currency,
401 U. S. 715
(1971), did not -- contrary to the opinion of the District Court --
overrule those prior precedents
sub silentio. We agree.
The historical background of forfeiture statutes in this country
and this Court's prior decisions sustaining their constitutionality
lead to that conclusion.
At common law, the value of an inanimate object directly or
indirectly causing the accidental death of a
Page 416 U. S. 681
King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand.
[
Footnote 16] The origins of
the deodand are traceable to Biblical [
Footnote 17] and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which
reflected the view that the instrument of death was accused and
that religious expiation was required.
See O. Holmes, The
Common Law, c. 1 (1881). The value of the instrument was forfeited
to the King in the belief that the King would provide the money for
Masses to be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure
that the deodand was put to charitable uses. 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *300. [
Footnote
18] When application of the deodand to religious or
eleemosynary purposes ceased, and the deodand became a source of
Crown revenue, the institution was justified as a penalty for
carelessness. [
Footnote
19]
Page 416 U. S. 682
Forfeiture also resulted at common law from conviction for
felonies and treason. The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to
the Crown, and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted
traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the
Crown.
See 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 68-71
(3d ed.1927); 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English
Law 351 (2d ed.1909). The basis for these forfeitures was that a
breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace,
which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.
See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *299. [
Footnote 20]
In addition, English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of
offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws
-- likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand
tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be
denied the wrongdoer. Statutory forfeitures were most often
enforced under the
in rem procedure utilized in the Court
of Exchequer to forfeit the property of felons.
See 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *261-262;
C.J. Hendry Co. v.
Moore, 318 U. S. 133,
318 U. S.
137-138 (1943).
Deodands did not become part of the common law tradition of this
country.
See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188
S.W. 54 (1916). Nor has forfeiture
Page 416 U. S. 683
of estates as a consequence of federal criminal conviction been
permitted,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3563; Rev.Stat. § 5326 (1874);
1 Stat. 117 (1790). Forfeiture of estates resulting from a
conviction for treason has been constitutionally proscribed by Art.
III, § 3, though forfeitures of estates for the lifetime of a
traitor have been sanctioned,
see Wallach v. Van Riswick,
92 U. S. 202
(1876). But
"[l]ong before the adoption of the Constitution, the common law
courts in the Colonies -- and later in the states during the period
of Confederation -- were exercising jurisdiction
in rem in
the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes,"
C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, supra, at
318 U. S. 139,
which provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels used
in violations of customs and revenue laws.
See id. at
318 U. S.
145-148;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616,
116 U. S. 623
(1886). And almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution,
ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses were made subject to
forfeiture under federal law, [
Footnote 21] as were vessels used to deliver slaves to
foreign countries, [
Footnote
22] and, somewhat later, those used to deliver slaves to this
country. [
Footnote 23] The
enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary
federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of
property that might be used in the conduct of a criminal
enterprise.
Despite this proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the
innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost
uniformly been rejected as a defense. Thus, Mr. Justice Story
observed in
The Palmyra, 12
Wheat. 1 (1827), that a conviction for piracy was not a
prerequisite
Page 416 U. S. 684
to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical
aggression in violation of a federal statute:
"It is well known, that, at the common law, in many cases of
felonies, the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown.
The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach
in rem,
but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment of
conviction. . . . [T]he [Crown's right to the goods and chattels]
attached only by the conviction of the offender. . . . But this
doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by
statute,
in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the
Exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender,
or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing, and this,
whether the offence be
malum prohibitum or
malum in
se. . . . [T]he practice has been, and so this Court
understand the law to be, that the proceeding
in rem
stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal
proceeding
in personam."
Id. at
25 U. S. 14-15.
This rationale was relied upon to sustain the statutory forfeiture
of a vessel found to have been engaged in piratical conduct where
the innocence of the owner was "fully established."
United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 2 How. 210,
43 U. S. 238
(1844). The vessel was "treated as the offender," without regard to
the owner's conduct, "as the only adequate means of suppressing the
offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party."
Id. at
43 U. S. 233.
[
Footnote 24]
Page 416 U. S. 685
Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S.
395 (1878), is an illustration of how severely this
principle has been applied. That case involved a lessee's
violations of the revenue laws which led to the seizure of real and
personal property used in connection with a distillery. The
lessor's assertions of innocence were rejected as a defense to a
federal statutory forfeiture of his entire property, for the
offense
"attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal
property used in connection with the same, without any regard
whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the
owner beyond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased
the property to the distiller and suffered it to be occupied and
used by the lessee as a distillery."
Id. at
96 U. S. 401;
see United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S.
1,
133 U. S. 13-14
(1890).
Decisions reaching the same conclusion have continued into this
century. In
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U. S. 505
(1921), it was held that the federal tax fraud forfeiture statute
did not deprive an innocent owner of his property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. There, the claimant was a conditional vendor
of a taxicab that had been used in the removal and concealment of
distilled spirits upon which the federal tax was unpaid. Although
recognizing that arguments against the application of the statute
to cover an innocent owner were not without force, the Court
rejected them, saying:
"In breaches of revenue provisions, some forms of property are
facilities, and therefore it may be said that Congress interposes
the care and responsibility
Page 416 U. S. 686
of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its
punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong. In such
case, there is some analogy to the law of deodand, by which a
personal chattel that was the immediate cause of the death of any
reasonable creature was forfeited. To the superstitious reason to
which the rule was ascribed, Blackstone adds 'that such misfortunes
are, in part ,owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore
he is properly punished by such forfeiture.' . . ."
"But whether the reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial or
real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."
Id. at
254 U. S.
510-511.
See also United States v. One Ford Coupe
Automobile, 272 U. S. 321
(1926) (Brandeis, J.);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
United States, 286 U. S. 49 (1932)
(Cardozo, J.). In
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.
S. 465 (1926), the Court upheld, against a Fourteenth
Amendment attack, a forfeiture under state law of an innocent
owner's interest in an automobile that he had entrusted to an
alleged wrongdoer. Judicial inquiry into the guilt or innocence of
the owner could be dispensed with, the Court held, because state
lawmakers, in the exercise of the police power, were free to
determine that certain uses of property were undesirable and then
establish "a secondary defense against a forbidden use. . . ."
Id. at
275 U. S.
467.
Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the
punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to
uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other
forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents. [
Footnote 25] Forfeiture of conveyances that
have been
Page 416 U. S. 687
used -- and may be used again -- in violation of the narcotics
laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal
statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance
and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal
behavior unprofitable.
See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1054, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S.Rep. No. 926, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939); H.R.Rep. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S.Rep. No.
1755, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). [
Footnote 26] To the extent that
Page 416 U. S. 688
such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or
secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation
may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater
care in transferring possession of their property.
Cf. United
States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U. S. 219,
307 U. S.
238-241 (1939) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). Against the
legitimate governmental interests served by the Puerto Rican
statute and the long line of this Court's decisions which squarely
collide with appellee's assertion of a constitutional violation,
the District Court opposed our decision in
United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.
S. 715 (1971). This reliance was misplaced. In
Coin
& Currency, the Government claimed that the privilege
against self-incrimination could not be asserted in a forfeiture
proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 7302 by one in possession of money
seized from him when used in an illegal bookmaking operation. In
the Government's view, the proceeding was not "criminal" because
the forfeiture was authorized without regard to the guilt or
innocence of the owner of the money. The Court's answer was that §
7302, read in conjunction with 19 U.S.C. § 1618, manifested a clear
intention "to impose a penalty only upon those who [were]
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise," 401 U.S. at
401 U. S.
721-722, and, in that circumstance, the privilege could
be asserted in the forfeiture proceeding by the person from whom
the money was taken. Thus,
Coin & Currency did not
overrule prior decisions that sustained application to innocents of
forfeiture statutes, like the Puerto Rican statutes, not limited in
application to persons "significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise." This is not to say, however, that the "broad
sweep"
Page 416 U. S. 689
of forfeiture statutes remarked in
Coin & Currency
could not, in other circumstances, give rise to serious
constitutional questions. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall intimated as
much over a century and a half ago in observing that
"a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the
means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be
employed."
Peisch v. Ware,
4 Cranch 347,
8 U. S. 363
(1808). It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to
reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property
subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity
or consent.
See, id. at
8 U. S. 364;
Goldsmth-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. at
254 U. S. 512;
United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. at
272 U. S. 333;
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. at
272 U. S. 467.
Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property; [
Footnote 27] for, in that circumstance, it
Page 416 U. S. 690
would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate
purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Cf. Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U. S. 40,
364 U. S. 49
(1960).
But in this case, appellee voluntarily entrusted the lessees
with possession of the yacht, and no allegation has been made or
proof offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to
avoid having its property put to an unlawful use.
Cf. Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590,
369 U. S. 596
(1962). The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins Parts I and II of the Court's opinion,
but, for the reasons stated in the dissenting
Page 416 U. S. 691
opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, he would hold that the
forfeiture of property belonging to an innocent and nonnegligent
owner violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 24, §§ 2512(a)(4) and (b) provide:
"(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:"
"
* * * *"
"(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or
in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property described in clauses (1) and
(2) of this subsection;"
"
* * * *"
"(b) Any property subject to forfeiture under clause (4) of
subsection (a) of this section shall be seized by process issued
pursuant to Act No. 39, of June 4, 1960, as amended, known as the
Uniform Vehicle, Mount, Vessel and Plane Seizure Act, sections 1721
and 1722 of Title 34."
[
Footnote 2]
Title 34, § 1722, provides:
"Whenever any vehicle, mount, or other vessel or plane is seized
. . . such seizure shall be conducted as follows:"
"(a) The proceedings shall be begun by the seizure of the
property by the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Treasury
or the Police Superintendent, through their delegates, policemen or
other peace officers. The officer under whose authority the action
is taken shall serve notice on the owner of the property seized or
the person in charge thereof or any person having any known right
or interest therein, of the seizure and of the appraisal of the
properties so seized, said notice to be served in an authentic
manner, within ten (10) days following such seizure and such notice
shall be understood to have been served upon the mailing thereof
with return receipt requested. The owners, persons in charge, and
other persons having a known interest in the property so seized may
challenge the confiscation within the fifteen (15) days following
the service of the notice on them, through a complaint against the
officer under whose authority the confiscation has been made, on
whom notice shall be served, and which complaint shall be filed in
the Part of the Superior Court corresponding to the place where the
seizure was made, and shall be heard without subjection to docket.
All questions that may arise shall be decided, and all other
proceedings shall be conducted as in an ordinary civil action.
Against the judgment entered, no remedy shall lie other than a
certiorari before the Supreme Court, limited to issues of law. The
filing of such complaint within the period herein established shall
be considered a jurisdictional prerequisite for the availing of the
action herein authorized."
"(b) Every vehicle, mount, or any vessel or plane so seized
shall be appraised as soon as taken possession of by the officer
under whose authority the seizure took place, or by his delegate,
with the exception of motor vehicles, which shall be placed under
the custody of the Office of Transportation of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, which shall appraise same immediately upon receipt
thereof."
"In the event of a judicial challenge of the seizure, the court
shall, upon request of the plaintiff and after hearing the parties,
determine the reasonableness of the appraisal as an incident of the
challenge."
"Within ten (10) days after the filing of the challenge, the
plaintiff shall have the right to give bond in favor of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico before the pertinent court's clerk to
the satisfaction of the court, for the amount of the assessed value
of the seized property, which bond may be in legal tender, by
certified check, hypothecary debentures, or by insurance companies.
Upon the acceptance of the bond, the court shall direct that the
property be returned to the owner thereof. In such case, the
provisions of the following paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) shall not
apply."
"When bond is accepted, the subsequent substitution of the
seized property in lieu of the bond shall not be permitted, said
bond to answer for the seizure if the lawfulness of the latter is
upheld, and the court shall provide in the resolution issued to
that effect, for the summary forfeiture execution of said bond by
the clerk of the court and for the covering of such bond into the
general funds of the Government of Puerto Rico in case it may be in
legal tender or by certified check; the hypothecary debentures or
debentures of insurance companies shall be transmitted by the
pertinent clerk of the court to the Secretary of Justice for
execution."
"(c) After fifteen(15) days have elapsed since service of notice
of the seizure without the person or persons with interest in the
property seized have [
sic] filed the corresponding
challenge, or after twenty-five (25) days have elapsed since
service of notice of the seizure without the court's having
directed that the seized property be returned on account of the
bond to that effect having been given, the officer under whose
authority the seizure took place, the delegate thereof, or the
Office of Transportation, as the case may be, may provide for the
sale at auction of the seized property, or may set the same aside
for official use of the Government of Puerto Rico. In case the
seized property cannot be sold at auction or set aside for official
use of the Government, the property may be destroyed by the officer
in charge, setting forth, in a minute which he shall draw up for
the purpose, the description of the property, the reasons for its
destruction and the date and place where it is destroyed, and he
shall serve notice with a copy thereof on the Secretary of
Justice."
"(d) In case the vehicle, mount, or vessel or plane is sold at
auction, the proceeds from the sale shall be covered into the
general fund of the Government of Puerto Rico, after deducting and
reimbursing expenses incurred."
"(e) If the seizure is judicially challenged and the court
declares same illegal, the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico
shall, upon presentation of a certified copy of the final decision
or judgment of the court, pay to the challenger the amount of the
appraisal or the proceeds from the public auction sale of such
property, whichever sum is the highest, plus interest thereon at
the rate of 6% per annum, counting from the date of the
seizure."
[
Footnote 3]
P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 23, §§ 451(e), 451b, and 451c, provide that
no person shall "operate or give permission for the operation of" a
vessel in Commonwealth waters without registering his interest in
the vessel. Only the lessees had registered the yacht, and this led
the District Court to conclude that,
"[f]rom the record in this case, we are not disposed to rule
that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico did not have reason to believe
that [post-seizure] notice to the owner was, in fact, given."
363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (PR 1973). Appellee does not contest
this ruling.
[
Footnote 4]
It is agreed that the yacht was appraised at a value of $19,800,
and that the Chief of the Office of Transportation of the
Commonwealth purports to maintain possession of the yacht as legal
owner.
[
Footnote 5]
Unconstitutionality of the statutes was alleged under both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court deemed it
unnecessary to determine which Amendment applied to Puerto Rico,
see Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S.
41,
400 U. S. 43-44
(1970), and we agree. The Joint Resolution of Congress approving
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, subjects its
government to "the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the
United States," 66 Stat. 327, and "there cannot exist under the
American flag any governmental authority untrammeled by the
requirements of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States."
Mora v. Mejias, 206
F.2d 377, 382 (CA1 1953) (Magruder, C.J.).
See 48 U.S.C. §
737.
[
Footnote 6]
Appellants initially opposed the convening of a three-judge
court, arguing that the District Court should abstain. After a
hearing, appellants withdrew their opposition and consented to the
convening of a three-judge court.
[
Footnote 7]
That section provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding
required by any Act of Congress to
be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 8]
That section provides:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of any
State statute
by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the
enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under State statutes,
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon
the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the
application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 9]
The court in
Mora quoted from the statement of the
United States to the Secretary General of the United Nations
explaining its decision to cease transmission of information
concerning Puerto Rico under Art. 73(e) of the United Nations
Charter, which requires the communication of certain technical
information by countries responsible for administering territories
whose people have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government, 115 F.Supp. at 612:
"'By the various actions taken by the Congress and the people of
Puerto Rico, Congress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under
that Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the
Congress in respect of internal government and administration,
subject only to compliance with applicable provisions of the
Federal Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and
the acts of Congress authorizing and approving the Constitution, as
may be interpreted by Judicial decision. Those laws which directed
or authorized interference with matters of local government by the
Federal Government have been repealed.'"
28 Dept. of State Bull. 584, 587 (1953).
But cf. Note,
Puerto Rico; Colony or Commonwealth? 6 N.Y.U.J.Intl L. & P. 115
(1973).
[
Footnote 10]
See also H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General
View 93 (1973).
[
Footnote 11]
Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S.
41 (1970), does not militate against this holding.
There, we held that a Puerto Rican statute was not a "State
statute" within 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which permits appeals from
judgments of federal courts of appeals holding state statutes
unconstitutional. We noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1258, requiring that we
permit final judgments of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico to be reviewed by appeal or by certiorari, directly
corresponded to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 providing for
review of final judgments of "state" courts. Since no parallel
provision was added to § 1254(2) to permit appeals from the courts
of appeals holding Puerto Rican statutes unconstitutional, we
said:
"Whether the omission was by accident or by design, our practice
of strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals dictates
that we not give an expansive interpretation to the word
'state.'"
400 U.S. at
400 U. S. 42 n.
1.
This conclusion seems compelled by the history of the close
relationship between 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1257. In
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86, final decisions of
state courts sustaining state statutes against challenges under the
Federal Constitution were subjected to review by this Court on writ
of error.
See King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta,
277 U. S. 100
(1928). But, prior to 1925, there was no appeal from "final"
judgments of the federal circuit courts.
See 36 Stat. 1157
(1911). When consideration was being given to amendment of the
Judiciary Act in 1924 and 1925
"[a]ttention was drawn to the disparity between the want of
obligatory review over [decisions of the circuit courts involving
the constitutionality of state statutes] and the existence of
obligatory jurisdiction over a similar class of cases in the state
courts. Senator Copeland rehearsed before the Senate correspondence
he had had on this point with the Chief Justice, who had urged
that, if it was desirable to put the circuit courts of appeals on
the same level with the state courts, it would be better to
withdraw review as of right from the state courts and subject the
decisions of both the state courts and the circuit courts solely to
a discretionary review by the Supreme Court, rather than to allow
obligatory review over all constitutional cases from both courts.
The Chief Justice, however, justified the proposed discrimination
on the ground that a circuit court of appeals, in deciding a
federal constitutional question,"
"would be more likely to preserve the Federal view of the issue
than the State court, at least to an extent to justify making a
review of its decision by our court conditional upon our
approval."
"However, an amendment prevailed which met this discrimination
by allowing writ of error to the circuit courts of appeals in cases
sustaining a constitutional claim against a state statute. The
argument advanced by the Chief Justice thus became the basis for a
new development of the principle which, since 1789, had been the
basis of Supreme Court review of the highest courts of the states.
Due to the belief that the state courts would be more jealous of
local rights than of federal claims review had lain as of right
where the constitutional claim was advanced and denied. Now, due to
the belief . . . that the federal court would sustain
constitutional claims as opposed to the local right, review was
provided from the circuit courts of appeals where the
constitutional claim was advanced and allowed. Thereby, the
Senate"
"intended to put the two on a perfect parity, allowing a writ of
error from the circuit court of appeals under conditions exactly
the same, except reversed, and allowing a writ of certiorari in the
one case as in the other case, so that the two would be entirely
harmonious."
F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court 277-278 (1928) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, against that background, when Congress made § 1258 only a
counterpart of § 1257, there could be no basis for an expansive
reading of the word "State" in § 1254(2), in the absence of its
congressional amendment.
We have no occasion to address the question whether Puerto Rico
is a "State" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, a jurisdictional
basis of appellee's complaint. Since the complaint and lease
agreement, as incorporated, fairly read, leave little doubt that
the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and arises under the
Constitution of the United States, there is jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
[
Footnote 12]
Appellants also argue that the seizure did not result in any
injury to appellee that constituted failure of pre-seizure notice
and hearing a denial of due process. This is so, they contend,
because the lease gave the lessees exclusive right to possession at
the time of the seizure, and therefore appellee's nonpossessory
interest was adequately protected by the statutory provisions for a
post-seizure hearing. But the lease provides that lessees' failure,
inter alia, within 15 days after notice from appellee to
pay arrears of rent or use the yacht solely for legal purposes
would establish a default entitling appellee to possession. Whether
a default had in fact occurred between May 6, 1972, when a lessee
was first accused of a narcotics violation, and the date of
seizure, July 11, 1972, is not clear from the record, although it
is clear that appellee did not attempt to repossess the yacht until
October 19, 1972.
Since, however, our holding is that pre-seizure notice and
hearing are not required by due process in the context of this
forfeiture, we have no occasion to remand for a determination (1)
whether the company had an immediate, but as yet unexercised, right
to possession on the date of seizure or merely a right to collect
rents, together with a reversionary interest and (2) whether either
or both of these property interests would be of sufficient
significance to require that the company be given an advance
opportunity to contest the seizure.
Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U. S. 67,
407 U. S. 86-87
(1972).
[
Footnote 13]
Cf. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94
(1921), cited with approval in
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra,
at
407 U. S. 91 n.
23.
[
Footnote 14]
Fuentes expressly distinguished seizure under a search
warrant from seizure under a writ of replevin:
"First, a search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly
important governmental need --
e.g., the apprehension and
conviction of criminals -- rather than the mere private advantage
of a private party in an economic transaction. Second, a search
warrant is generally issued in situations demanding prompt action.
The danger is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide
evidence or fruits of his crime if given any prior notice. Third,
the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not issue
search warrants merely upon the conclusory application of a private
party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over
the issuance of warrants, and that no warrant will be issued
without a prior showing of probable cause."
407 U.S. at
407 U. S. 93-94,
n. 30.
We have no occasion to address the question whether the Fourth
Amendment warrant or probable cause requirements are applicable to
seizures under the Puerto Rican statutes.
[
Footnote 15]
No challenge is made to the District Court's determination that
the form of post-seizure notice satisfied due process requirements.
See n 3,
supra. Notice, of course, was required to be
"
reasonably calculated' to apprise [the company] of the
pendency of the forfeiture proceedings." Robinson v.
Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38,
409 U. S. 40
(1972).
[
Footnote 16]
Deodand derives from the Latin
Deo dandum, "to be given
to God."
[
Footnote 17]
See Exodus 21:28 ("[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman,
and they die, he shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be
eaten").
[
Footnote 18]
See 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 419, 423-424 (1st Am.
ed. 1847); 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law
473 (2d ed.1909); Law of Deodands, 34 Law Mag. 188, 189 (1845);
Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 Temp.L.Q. 169, 182 (1973).
[
Footnote 19]
See Hale,
n 18,
supra, at 424. Indeed, the abolition of the deodand
institution in England in 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 62, went hand
in hand with the passage of Lord Campbell's Act creating a cause of
action for wrongful death, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). Passage
of the two bills was linked, because Lord Campbell was unwilling to
eliminate the deodand institution, with its tendency to deter
carelessness, particularly by railroads, unless a right of action
was granted to the dead man's survivors.
See 77 Hansard's
Parliamentary Debates, Third Series 1031 (1845).
See
generally Finkelstein,
n 18,
supra, at 170-171.
The adaptation of the deodand institution to serve the more
contemporary function of deterrence is an example of a phenomenon
discussed by Mr. Justice Holmes:
"The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a
rule or a formula. In the course of centuries, the custom, belief,
or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which
gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of
policy is thought of which seems to explain it and to reconcile it
with the present state of things, and then the rule adapts itself
to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a
new career. The old form receives a new content, and, in time, even
the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has
received."
The Common Law 5 (1881).
[
Footnote 20]
In 1870, England eliminated most forfeitures of those convicted
of felonies or treason. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23.
[
Footnote 21]
Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47;
see
also Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 157,
161, 163, 176.
[
Footnote 22]
Act of Mar. 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 347.
[
Footnote 23]
Act of Mar. 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426.
[
Footnote 24]
Thirty years earlier, the Court upheld a forfeiture of a
quantity of coffee which had been transferred to
bona fide
purchasers after violation of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, upon
reasoning that
"[i]n the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice,
enterprise and combinations of individuals, on the one hand, and
the power charged with the administration of the laws, on the
other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive
to carry into effect the measure of policy adopted by the
legislature."
United States v.1960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch 398,
12 U. S. 405
(1814).
[
Footnote 25]
But for unimportant differences, P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 24, §
2512(a) (Supp. 1973), is modeled after 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). The
latter section provides:
"(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States and no property right shall exist in them:"
"
* * * *"
"(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels,
which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession,
or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2),
except that -- "
"(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited
under the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that
the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was a
consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter; and"
"(b) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of
this section by reason of any act or omission established by the
owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person other
than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the
possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States, or of any State. . . ."
See n 1,
supra. The exceptions contained in subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of the federal statute, although having no specific counterpart
in § 2512(a)(4), have been judicially recognized by the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico.
See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Branuela, 61 P.R.R. 701 (1943);
Metro Taxicabs, Inc. v.
Treasurer of Puerto Rico, 73 P.R.R. 164 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 94 P.R.R. 687 (1967).
[
Footnote 26]
Seizure and forfeiture statutes also help compensate the
Government for its enforcement efforts and provide methods for
obtaining security for subsequently imposed penalties and fines.
See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,
409 U. S. 232,
409 U. S. 237
(1972).
[
Footnote 27]
The common law sought to mitigate the harshness of felony and
deodand forfeitures. The writ of restitution was available to an
individual whose goods were stolen by a thief and forfeited to the
crown as a consequence of the thief's conviction.
See 2 F.
Pollock & F. Maitland,
supra, n 18, at 165-166; 3 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 280 and n. 3 (3d ed.1927). Mitigation with respect to
deodands was less formalized:
"It seems also clear from the ancient authorities that jurors
always determined the amount of deodand to be imposed with great
moderation, and with a due regard to the rights of property and the
moral innocence of the party incurring the penalty. Our ancestors
seem fully to have perceived the hardship of inflicting such
penalty on one who had been guilty of no moral, or indeed legal,
offense; and in all cases, therefore, where death was purely the
result of accident, and not of negligence or carelessness, imposed
a nominal fine, or found that only to be the deodand, which, by its
immediate contact, occasioned death."
Law of Deodands,
supra, n 18, at 190.
Since 1790, the Federal Government has applied the ameliorative
policy -- first adopted in England,
See
United States v.
Morris, 10 Wheat. 246,
23 U. S.
293-295 (1825) -- of providing administrative remissions
and mitigations of statutory forfeitures in most cases where the
violations are incurred "without willful negligence" or an intent
to commit the offense.
See 1 Stat. 122, c. 12 (1790); 1
Stat. 506 (1797); Rev.Stat. §§ 5292-5293 (1874); 19 U.S.C. § 1618;
The Laura, 114 U. S. 411,
114 U. S.
414-415 (1885);
United States v. United States Coin
& Currency, 401 U. S. 715,
401 U. S. 721
(1971). Indeed, forfeitures incurred under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a),
which served as the model for enactment of the disputed Puerto
Rican statute,
see n 25,
supra, are subject to the remission and
mitigation procedures of 19 U.S.C. § 1618.
See 21 U.S.C. §
881(d). Regulations implementing § 1618 provide that, if the seized
property was in the possession of another who was responsible for
the act which resulted in the seizure, the petitioner must produce
evidence explaining the manner in which the other person acquired
possession and showing that, prior to parting with the property, he
did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that the property
would be used in violation of the law or that the violator had a
criminal record or a reputation for commercial crime. 19 CFR §
171.13(a). These provisions are also extended to those individuals
holding chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts. 19 CFR §
171.13(b).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b), establishing
standards for judicial remission and mitigation of forfeitures
resulting from violations of the internal revenue laws relating to
liquor.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL Joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, and agree that there was no
constitutional necessity under
Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U. S. 67
(1972), or any other case in this Court to accord the owner-lessor
of the yacht a hearing in the circumstances of this case. I add,
however, that the presence of important public interests which
permits dispensing with a pre-seizure hearing in the instant case
is only one of the situations in which no prior hearing is
required.
See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., ante, p.
416 U. S. 600;
Arnett v. Kennedy, ante, p.
416 U. S. 134
(WHITE, J., concurring).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.
While I agree that Puerto Rico is a State for purposes of the
three-judge court jurisdiction, I dissent on the merits.
The discovery of marihuana on the yacht took place May 6, 1972.
The seizure of the yacht took place on July 11, 1972 -- over two
months later. In view of the long delay in making the seizure where
is that "special need for very prompt action" which we emphasized
in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
407 U. S. 91?
The Court cites instances of exigent circumstances -- seized
poisoned food, dangerous drugs, failure of a bank, and the like.
But they are inapt.
Fuentes v. Shevin, involved a contest between debtor
and creditor and a resolution of private property rights not
implicated in an important governmental purpose. Here, important
governmental purposes are involved. As
Page 416 U. S. 692
to that type of case, we said in
Fuentes:
"First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in the particular instance. Thus, the Court has allowed
summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the
United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to
protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to
protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated
food."
Id. at
407 U. S.
91-92.
Postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure of the
vessel apparently was not needed here, as the District Court held.
Yet, after that two-month delay, forfeiture of the vessel is
ordered without notice to the owner and without just compensation
for the taking. On those premises, this is the classic case of lack
of procedural due process.
The owner on the record before us was wholly innocent of knowing
that the lessee was using the vessel illegally. To analogize this
case to the old cases of forfeiture of property of felons is
peculiarly inappropriate. Nor is this a case where owner and lessee
are "in cahoots" in a smuggling venture or negligent in any way.
The law does provide for forfeitures of property even of the
innocent. But as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in
Peisch v. Ware,
4 Cranch 347,
8 U. S. 365:
"[T]he law is not understood to forfeit the property of owners
or consignees, on account of the misconduct of mere strangers, over
whom such owners or consignees could have no control."
The lessee of the vessel was, of course, no stranger.
Page 416 U. S. 693
Here unlike
United States v. One Ford Coach,
307 U. S. 219,
307 U. S.
238-239 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting), there is no
suggestion that the lessee was a mere strawman for runners of
drugs. Even where such ambiguous circumstances were present, the
Court refused to impose forfeiture of an auto running illegal
whiskey and belonging to those who acted "in good faith and without
negligence."
Id. at
307 U. S.
236.
The present case is one of extreme hardship. The District Court
found that the owner
"did not know that its property was being used for an illegal
purpose, and was completely innocent of the lessee's criminal act.
After the seizure and within the time allowed by law, the
Superintendent [of the Police] notified lessee. Plaintiff was never
notified, and, since lessee did not post bond, the yacht was
forfeited to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It was not until
plaintiff attempted to recover possession of the yacht after lessee
had defaulted in the rental payments that plaintiff learned of its
forfeiture."
363 F. Supp. 1337, 1340. Moreover, the owner had included in the
lease a prohibition against use of the yacht for an unlawful
project.
If the yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs, those
who claim forfeiture might have equity on their side. But no such
showing was made, and, so far as we know, only one marihuana
cigarette was found on the yacht. We deal here with trivia where
harsh judge-made law should be tempered with justice. I realize
that the ancient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate
object itself is guilty of wrongdoing.
United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715,
401 U. S.
719-720. But that traditional forfeiture doctrine cannot
at times be reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at
401 U. S. 721. Such a case is the present one.
Page 416 U. S. 694
Some forfeiture statutes are mandatory, title vesting in the
State when the forfeiting act occurs.
United States v.
Stowell, 133 U. S. 1,
133 U. S. 19.
Others are conditional, forfeiture occurring only if and when the
State follows prescribed procedures.
One 1968 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693,
380 U. S. 699.
Some forfeiture statutes exclude from their scope property used in
violation of the law as to which the owner is not "a consenting
party or privy."
See 19 U.S.C. § 1594. Some provide for
discretionary administrative or judicial relief from forfeiture if
the forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without
any intention on the part of the owner to violate the law, 19
U.S.C. § 1618, or if the owner had at no time any knowledge or
reason to believe that the property was used in violation of
specified laws, 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b);
United States v. One Ford
Coach, 307 U. S. 219.
Puerto Rico, however, has no provision for mitigation in case
the owner of the seized property is wholly innocent of any
wrongdoing. And, as the Court says, these absolute, mandatory
forfeiture procedures have been supported at least by much dicta in
the cases.
But, in my view, there was a taking of private property "for
public use" under the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States by the
Fourteenth, and compensation must be paid an innocent owner. Where
the owner is in no way implicated in the illegal project, I see no
way to avoid paying just compensation for property taken. I,
therefore, would remand the case to the three-judge court for
findings as to the innocence of the lessor of the yacht -- whether
the illegal use was of such magnitude or notoriety that the owner
cannot be found faultless in remaining ignorant of its
occurrence.
Page 416 U. S. 695
The law of deodands
* was, at one
time, as severe as the rule applied this day by the Court.
See Law of Deodands, 34 Law Mag. 188-191 (1845). Its
severity was tempered by juries who were sustained by the King's
Bench,
id. at 191. The "great moderation" of the jurors in
light of "the moral innocence of the party incurring the penalty,"
id. at 190, is an example we should follow here. While the
law of deodands does not obtain here (cf.
Goldsmith-Grant Co.
v. United States, 254 U. S. 505,
254 U. S.
510-511;
United States v. One Ford Coupe,
272 U. S. 321,
272 U. S.
333), the quality of mercy is no stranger to our equity
jurisdiction,
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.
S. 321,
321 U. S.
329-330;
United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 95.
* The law of deodands, starting with Exodus 21:28, is related by
O. Holmes, The Common Law 7
et seq. (1881). Deodand
derives from
Deo dandum (to be given to God). "It was to
be given to God, that is to say to the church, for the king, to be
expended for the good of his soul."
Id. at 24.