Case Resources
Search this Case
in Google Scholar
on the Web
Google Web Search
MSN Web Search
Yahoo! Web Search
in the News
Google News Search
Google News Archive Search
Yahoo! News Search
in the Blogs
BlawgSearch.com Search
Google Blog Search
Technorati Blog Search
in other Databases
Google Book Search
Online Research Resources
Cornell LII
Cornell Wex Dictionary & Encyclopedia
LLRX.com - Legal Research
Expert Witness Directory
Nolo Consumer & Business
US Court Forms
USA Constitution Annotated
WashLaw Directory
World LII
Online Case Law
Cornell LII
FastCase $
Lexis $
LexisOne
Loislaw $
USSCPlus.com $
VersusLaw $
Link to the Case Preview: http://supreme.justia.com/us/380/592/
Link to the Full Text of Case: http://supreme.justia.com/us/380/592/case.html
U.S. Supreme Court
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965)
Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp.
No. 422
Argued March 10-11, 1965
Decided April 28, 1965
380 U.S. 592
Syllabus
Respondent, a large, diversified company, which owns food processing plants and a network of wholesale and retail food stores, in 1951 acquired Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic. Gentry, before the merger, had about 32% of the sales of those products, and, with its chief competitor, accounted for about 90% of the total industry sales. By 1958, in an expanding market, Gentry had 35% of the sales, and the combined share with its principal competitor remained about 90%. After the merger, respondent attempted to induce reciprocal buying of Gentry's products by respondent's suppliers. The Federal Trade Commission held that the acquisition violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, as the opportunity for reciprocal buying in this oligopolistic industry created a probability of a substantial lessening of competition and ordered divestiture. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding no substantial impact on the market in the light of ten years of post-acquisition experience.
Held:
1. Post-acquisition evidence of the effect of the merger upon competition is entitled to consideration in determining whether a merger violates § 7, but it must not be given conclusive weight or allowed to override all probabilities. P. 380 U. S. 598.
2. The finding by the Commission of the probability of reciprocal buying's leading to a lessening of competition in the instant case was supported by substantial evidence. P. 380 U. S. 600.
3. Reciprocal buying is an anticompetitive device condemned by § 7 of the Clayton Act. Pp. 380 U. S. 594-595.
329 F.2d 623 reversed.
