By the Act of March 3, 1891, the Annette Islands in Alaska were
"set apart as a reservation" for the Metlakatlans and other
Indians, "to be held and used by them . . . under such rules and
regulations . . . as may be prescribed from time to time by the
Secretary of the Interior." Relying not upon that Act, but upon the
White Act of June 6, 1924, and § 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act, the
Secretary of the Interior promulgated the present regulations
whereby appellant, the incorporated Metlakatla Indian Community,
was accorded the right to erect and operate salmon traps in waters
surrounding the Annette Islands. Appellant sued to enjoin
threatened enforcement against it of a statute of the State of
Alaska forbidding the use of salmon traps. Its suit was dismissed,
and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.
Held:
1. Neither the White Act nor § 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act
conferred authority on the Secretary of the Interior to permit
Metlakatlans to use salmon traps.
Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, post, p.
369 U. S. 60. P.
369 U. S.
54.
2. The authority to issue regulations governing the Metlakatla
Indian Reservation, which was granted to the Secretary of the
Interior by the 1891 Act, has not been repealed or impaired, and he
has power to issue regulations concerning the fishing rights of
these Indians on this reservation which would supersede state law;
but the present regulations did not purport to be issued under that
authority. They purported to be issued under a misconceived duty
wrongly read into the Alaska Statehood Act. Pp.
369 U. S.
54-59.
3. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alaska is vacated, and
the case is remanded to that Court, there to be held to give ample
opportunity for the Secretary of the Interior, with all reasonable
expedition, to determine prior to the 1963 salmon fishing season
what, if any, authority he chooses to exercise in the light of this
opinion, and the stay heretofore granted is continued in force
until the end of the 1962 salmon fishing season. P.
369 U. S.
59.
___ Alaska ___,
362
P.2d 901, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
Page 369 U. S. 46
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of Alaska,
362
P.2d 901, affirming the denial of an injunction against
interference by the State with appellant's use of fish traps in the
Annette Islands of southeastern Alaska. Appellant rests its claim
in part on regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior
whereby the Metlakatla Indian Community was accorded the right to
erect and to operate salmon traps at four locations in waters
surrounding the Annette Islands, which Congress set aside for its
use in 1891. Alaska challenged this authorization by a state
conservation law forbidding the use of salmon traps.
Long before the white man came to Alaska, the annual migrations
of salmon from the sea into Alaska's rivers to spawn served as a
food supply for the natives. Commercial salmon fishing has become
vital for Alaska's economy, but its exploitation seriously
threatened the resource even before the turn of the century.
See Gruening, The State of Alaska (1954), pp. 75, 97.
Congress, in 1889, in 1896, in 1906, and again in 1924, enacted
conservation measures, prohibiting any obstruction of waters to
impede salmon migration, limiting the times and means of taking
salmon,
Page 369 U. S. 47
and authorizing the appropriate department to impose further
restrictions. [
Footnote 1] When
Alaska was established as a State, Congress withheld jurisdiction
over her fisheries until she had made adequate provision for their
administration. [
Footnote
2]
Equally with Congress, Alaska has been concerned with the evils
of over-exploitation. In particular, she saw a menace in the fish
trap, a labor-saving but costly device which became, in her eyes,
the symbol of exploitation of her resources by "Stateside"
colonialism.
See Rogers, Alaska in Transition (1960), pp.
4-15; Gruening,
supra, at pp. 392-407; Gruening, Let Us
End American Colonialism (1955), reprinted at 103 Cong.Rec.
470-474. The fish trap, "a formidable structure,"
Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S.
78,
248 U. S. 87,
consists principally of a fence or netting stretched across or
partly across a stream to obstruct the upstream progress of the
salmon and turn the fish into the "heart" or "pot" of the trap,
where they are imprisoned until removed.
See Rogers,
supra, at p. 7; Gruening, The State of Alaska,
supra, at pp. 169-170. At one time, there were about 700
salmon traps in operation in Alaska. The Secretary of the Interior
felt that the fish trap's threat to conservation could be
adequately dealt with by regulating the number of fish permitted to
escape. [
Footnote 3] Alaska
vigorously opposed this. The Territorial Legislature several times
sent memorials to Congress urging abolition
Page 369 U. S. 48
of trap fishing. [
Footnote
4] An ordinance to abolish all commercial traps was approved by
Alaska voters along with the proposed State Constitution in 1956,
and, in early 1959, the first State Legislature turned this
ordinance into the statute here under review. [
Footnote 5]
The Metlakatla Indians, some 800, led by a British missionary,
moved from British Columbia to Alaska in 1887. In 1891, the Annette
Islands, south of Ketchikan at the extreme lower end of the Alaskan
archipelago, were "set apart as a reservation" by Congress for the
Metlakatlans and other Indians,
"to be held and used by them in common, under such rules and
regulations, and subject to such restrictions, as may be prescribed
from time to time by the Secretary of the Interior."
26 Stat. 1095, 1101, 48 U.S.C. § 358. In 1915, the Secretary
issued regulations, 25 CFR (1939 ed.), pt. 1, establishing an
elective council to make local ordinances for Metlakatla, and also
permitting members of the Community to obtain permits for the use
of salmon traps in waters adjacent to the Annette Islands. The next
year, in furtherance of the Secretary's plan to establish a
salmon
Page 369 U. S. 49
cannery at Metlakatla, President Wilson, by proclamation,
declared the waters within 3,000 feet of certain of these islands
to be a part of the Metlakatla Reserve, to be used by the Indians
as a source of supply for the intended cannery, "under the general
fisheries laws and regulations of the United States as administered
by the Secretary of Commerce." 39 Stat. 1777. [
Footnote 6] In 1918, without reference to the
proclamation, this Court upheld the right of the Metlakatlans to
exclude others from the waters surrounding their islands on the
ground that these waters were included within the original
reservation by Congress.
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U. S. 78.
Ever since 1915, Metlakatla has operated fish traps with the
consent of the Secretary of the Interior. Following the enactment
of the State's fish trap law in 1959, the Secretary, in the
exercise of his transitional power over Alaska fisheries, banned
all fish traps except those operated by Metlakatla and by other
Indians involved in the companion case,
Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, post, p.
369 U. S. 60, 24
Fed.Reg. 2053, 2056, 2069 (1959). The following year, having
relinquished general control of the fisheries, the Secretary again
authorized Metlakatla to operate fish traps at four of eight
specified locations, citing as authority the White Act, 43 Stat.
464, as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 221-228, and § 4 of the Alaska
Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339, as amended by 73 Stat. 141. 25 CFR
(1961 Supp.), pt. 88. [
Footnote
7]
With this background, we reach the present controversy. In May,
1959, just before the salmon season began, the
Page 369 U. S. 50
State warned Metlakatla and other Indians that she would enforce
the fish trap law against them. The threat was intensified when the
State arrested members of other Indian communities and seized one
fish trap. Suits were thereupon filed by Metlakatla and by the
appellants in the companion case in the interim United States
District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking an injunction
against interference with their asserted federal rights to fish
with traps. All complaints were dismissed,
174 F.
Supp. 500. Appeal was brought to this Court, as the Supreme
Court of Alaska had not yet been fully organized. Pending decision,
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN granted a stay of enforcement by the State, 4
L. Ed. 2d 34, 80 S. Ct. 33. The Court assumed jurisdiction and
continued the stay, but remanded the case to the newly constituted
State Supreme Court primarily for its disposition of matters of
local law,
363 U. S. 555.
That Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal, holding the
fish trap law applicable to Metlakatla and to the other appellants,
and upholding its validity as so applied,
362
P.2d 901. From its judgment, the appeal is properly here under
28 U.S.C. § 125. We noted probable jurisdiction,
368 U.
S. 886.
Several grounds of the decision below are now out of the case on
concession of error by Alaska, but she firmly stands on the
judgment in her favor. Metlakatla argues that it is immune from the
fish trap law because (1) state law cannot regulate Indian
activities on Indian reservations; (2) the State cannot regulate a
federal instrumentality; and (3) appellant has been authorized to
operate traps by the Secretary of the Interior. The United States
has supported Metlakatla as
amicus curiae, see 362 U.S.
967.
The Indians of southeastern Alaska, who have very substantially
adopted and been adopted by the white man's civilization, were
never in the hostile and isolated
Page 369 U. S. 51
position of many tribes in other States. As early as 1886, a
federal judge, holding Alaskan Indians subject to the Thirteenth
Amendment, denied that the principle of Indian national sovereignty
enunciated in
Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, applied to them.
In re Sah
Quah, 31 F. 327 (D.Alaska). There were no Indian wars in
Alaska, although, on at least one occasion,
see Gruening,
The State of Alaska (1954), pp. 36-37, there were fears of an
uprising. There was never an attempt in Alaska to isolate Indians
on reservations. Very few were ever created, and the purpose of
these, in contrast to many in other States, was not to confine the
Indians for the protection of the white settlers, but to safeguard
the Indians against exploitation. Alaskan Indians are now voting
citizens, some of whom occupy prominent public office in the state
government.
See United States v. Booth, 161 F.
Supp. 269, 17 Alaska 561 (D.Alaska 1958);
United States v.
Libby, McNeil & Libby, 107 F.
Supp. 697, 699, 14 Alaska 37, 41-42 (D.Alaska 1952).
Metlakatlans, the State tells us, have always paid state taxes, in
contrast to the practice described and prescribed for other
reservations in
The Kansas
Indians, 5 Wall. 737, and it has always been
assumed that the reservation is subject to state laws.
United
States v. Booth, supra, 161 F. Supp. at 270, 17 Alaska at 563.
Congress, in 1936, 49 Stat. 1250, 48 U.S.C. § 358a, by authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior to create Indian reservations of land
reserved for Indian uses under 48 U.S.C. § 358, seems to have
believed that Metlakatla was no ordinary reservation, since
Metlakatla alone is covered in § 358. Finally, in
United States
v. Booth, supra, the District Court for Alaska held that a
crime committed on the Metlakatla Reserve, before the extension of
jurisdiction over Indian country to Alaska,
see p.
369 U. S. 56,
infra, was punishable under territorial laws, since, for
the reasons here outlined, the
Page 369 U. S. 52
Reserve was not "Indian country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-1153.
The words "set apart as a reservation," appearing in the statute
creating the Annette Islands Reserve, are substantially the same as
used in numerous other statutory reservations.
E.g., 13
Stat. 63 (Unita Valley, Utah); 13 Stat. 541, 559 (Colorado River);
18 Stat. 28 (Gros Ventre and others); 19 Stat. 28, 29 (Pawnee).
None of these statutes made express provision for self-government
or for state government. Some treaties, such as that with the
Cherokees in 1828, 7 Stat. 311, expressly excluded state laws.
Other treaties, however, while sometimes phrased in terms of a gift
or assignment, rather than a reservation of land, made no mention
of state power.
E.g., Treaty with the Shawnee Tribe, 1825,
7 Stat. 284; Treaty with the Potawatomies, 1837, 7 Stat. 532;
Treaty with the New York Indians, 1838, 7 Stat. 550, 551; Treaty
with the Sacs and Foxes, 1842, 7 Stat. 596. Later treaties "set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the
Indians certain lands.
E.g., Treaty with the Arapahoes and
Cheyennes, 1867, 15 Stat. 593, 594; Treaty with the Crow Indians,
1868, 15 Stat. 649. 650. The 1868 Treaty with the Navajos was
similar. 15 Stat. 667, 668. And the 1855 treaty with the Quiault
Indian Tribe, 12 Stat. 971, which the Supreme Court of Washington
held barred state regulation of reservation fishing, promised only
that lands would be "reserved, for the use and occupation of the
tribes." It was implemented by an executive order of November 7,
1873, by which certain lands were "withdrawn from sale and set
apart for the use" of the tribe.
See Pioneer Packing Co. v.
Winslow, 159 Wash. 655, 657-658, 294 P. 557, 558.
The provision creating the Metlakatla Reserve in 1891 was added
to a House bill dealing with timber lands on the floor of the
Senate by Nebraska's Senator Manderson.
Page 369 U. S. 53
Reciting the unfortunate experience of the Metlakatlans in
British Columbia and their emigration to Alaska, Senator Manderson
explained that his amendment was designed to dispel fears of
expulsion from their new lands as from their old, or of intrusion
by outsiders seeking to exploit the resources of the islands. The
purpose, he stated, was
"simply to allow this band of Indians to remain there under such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may impose,
and give them some recognized footing at that place."
Remarks by Senators Dawes and Dolph were to the same effect. 21
Cong.Rec. 10092-10093 (1890). The amendment was agreed to and
adopted by both Houses after a conference, with no further
discussion.
This provision subjecting Metlakatla to rules and regulations of
the Secretary of the Interior is unusual. Since 1849, the Secretary
had been the officer of the United States charged with
administration of the Indian laws, but none of the treaties or
statutes which have come to our attention contained such a
provision. The Cheyenne and Crow treaties,
supra, provided
that Congress might regulate matters on the reservations, but this
was no delegation of Congress' powers to the Secretary. It was but
a recognition by the Indians of powers the Constitution gave to the
national legislature.
The regulations issued by the Secretary for the government of
the Annette Islands January 28, 1915, appear to be without
parallel. No such rules applying to other reservations are to be
found in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Secretary vested
powers of local government in an elective council, 25 CFR (1939
ed.), § 1.2, which was given authority to pass ordinances required
not to conflict with "the laws of the United States, the laws of
the Territory of Alaska, or the rules and regulations in this
part," § 1.10, and subject to review by the Secretary, § 1.62. As a
condition to the right to vote in local elections,
Page 369 U. S. 54
members of the Reserve -- limited to Metlakatlans and other
natives, § 1.51 -- were required to swear obedience to local laws,
laws of the United States, and laws of the Territory of Alaska, §
1.52. Thus, the Secretary, in the exercise of the authority
delegated him by Congress, subjected self-government of Metlakatla
not only to federal oversight, but to territorial laws as well.
However, as discussed above, an additional regulation issued by the
Secretary in 1915 authorized the use of fish traps at Metlakatla,
and this permission has been continued in regulations issued since
statehood.
Alaska urges that the regulations are invalid because neither
the White Act nor the Statehood Act conferred authority on the
Secretary to permit Metlakatlans to use fish traps. The State's
premise is correct,
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
post, p.
369 U. S. 60.
However, Congress, in 1891, gave the Secretary authority to make
rules governing the Metlakatla Reservation, and his authority, like
the reservation itself,
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U. S. 78,
extended to the waters surrounding the islands. Does this Act
validate the regulations in light of subsequent legislative and
executive actions?
The Presidential Proclamation of 1916, 39 Stat. 1777, declared
waters within 3,000 feet of Annette and adjacent islands to be a
part of the Metlakatla Reservation, and provided that the Indians
should have the use of these waters "under the general fisheries
laws and regulations of the United States as administered by the
Secretary of Commerce." Alaska argues that the purpose of this
provision was to place Metlakatla fishermen in the same position as
all others in Alaska by subjecting them to the same laws. In 1916,
the general laws were federal; now they are those of the State.
Therefore, the State contends, the policy of the Proclamation
requires that the provision be construed as subjecting the
Metlakatlans to the laws governing all other fishermen, which now
include the state
Page 369 U. S. 55
fish trap law. The Metlakatlans have the right to exclude others
from their waters, Alaska agrees, but not the right to be free from
regulation.
Alaska does not argue that the Proclamation deprived the
Secretary of the Interior of the authority Congress gave him to
prescribe rules governing fishing and other activities on the
Annette Islands. Assuming the President had power to do so, he did
not purport to exercise it. Quite the contrary. The Proclamation
recites that the Secretary has determined to establish a cannery
for the Metlakatlans, that the Secretary has been given authority
to make regulations for Metlakatla by the statute of 1891, and that
protection of the Indians' fishing rights is required to assure a
supply of fish for the cannery. Apparently the Proclamation was
prompted by the threatened encroachment of non-Indian fishermen
into Metlakatla waters and the fear that the reservation of the
islands might not protect the Indians against such intrusions. No
statutory authority for the Proclamation was cited. It was declared
to be issued under authority of "the laws of the United States." It
is clear that President Wilson was attempting to assist and promote
the plans of the Secretary of the Interior to develop the reserve
under his statutory authority, not to limit or destroy that
authority. The subjection of Metlakatla to general fisheries laws
and to regulations of the Secretary of Commerce thus did not make
those laws and regulations superior to regulations of the Secretary
of the Interior. Rather, the general laws and Commerce regulations
were adopted as a part of the Interior regulations, so far as not
in conflict with other rules adopted by the Secretary of the
Interior and subject to his further modification under the power
given him in 1891.
Nor did the White Act impair the Secretary's power. That statute
permitted the Secretary, for conservation purposes, to limit the
taking of salmon in areas of his designation,
Page 369 U. S. 56
but prohibited his granting exclusive rights in so doing. This
Court, in
Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U. S.
86, held that the prohibition bars the Secretary from
creating exclusive White Act rights in Indians as well as in
non-Indians, but it expressly disclaimed holding that no exclusive
Indian rights may exist. 337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
118-119,
337 U. S.
122-123. The Secretary's regulations did not create
exclusivity; that was a part of the reservation as created in 1891
and clarified by the proclamation of 1916, which excluded others
from fishing in Metlakatla waters.
In 1958, 72 Stat. 545, Alaska was added to the list of States
and Territories permitted to exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations. The State has not argued
that this took away the power of the Secretary of the Interior to
make regulations contrary to state law. Appellant has argued, to
the contrary, that the statute expressly preserved Indian fishing
rights from state laws. The statute granting States civil and
criminal jurisdiction was passed in 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. §
1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360. Subsection (b) of that statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1162, provides that nothing therein shall authorize alienation
encumbrance, or taxation of Indian property,
"or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a
manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the
control, licensing, or regulation thereof."
This statute expressly protects against state invasion all uses
of Indian property authorized by federal treaty, agreement,
statute, or regulation, but only those fishing rights and
privileges given by federal treaty, agreement, or statute. It might
plausibly be argued, therefore, that
Page 369 U. S. 57
fishing rights given by regulation are not protected, and state
jurisdiction is established. Legislative history is silent as to
the interpretation of the provision.
See H.R.Rep. No. 848,
83d Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; 99
Cong.Rec. 9962, 10782, 10928 (1953). The apparent purpose of the
proviso was to preserve federally granted fishing rights. It would
be sheer speculation to attribute significance to the imperfect
parallelism of the provisions protecting property and fishing
rights in the absence of any suggested reason for excluding fishing
rights based on regulations. The process of statutory drafting and
evolution, here veiled from scrutiny, is too imprecise to permit
such an inference.
Cf. United States v. Mersky,
361 U. S. 431,
361 U. S. 437.
In any event, the proviso also protects rights given the Indians by
statute respecting the control and regulation of fishing, and the
1891 statute gave the Metlakatlans the right to fish under
regulations of the Secretary of the Interior.
Section 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339, 340-341,
providing for the conveyance of United States properties "used for
the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries
and wildlife of Alaska," contemplated transfer to the State of the
same measure of administration and jurisdiction over fisheries and
wildlife as possessed by other States, S.Rep. No. 1929, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-14 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 1731, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1948); S. Rep. No. 1028, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1954); S. Rep.
No. 1163, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957),
see Geer v. State of
Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519,
after the transition period during which the State was to establish
machinery for this purpose. Section 4, however, as amended by 73
Stat. 141, required Alaska to disclaim all right and title to any
United States property not granted her by the statute, and also
"to any lands or other property (including fishing rights), the
right or title
Page 369 U. S. 58
to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts
(hereinafter called natives) or is held by the United States in
trust for said natives."
Such property was to
"be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
the United States until disposed of under its authority, except to
such extent as the Congress has prescribed or may hereafter
prescribe,"
with immaterial exceptions, and provided that claims against the
United States are neither enlarged, diminished, nor recognized by
these provisions. This disclaimer is substantially the same as
found in the Acts admitting 13 other States.
See S.Rep.
No. 315, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951).
Alaska does not expressly argue that the Secretary's power was
destroyed by the Statehood Act. She does, however, contend that
control of all fishing was transferred to the State, with no
exception for Indian fishing, and that only the exclusiveness of
Metlakatla's fishing rights was preserved. But legislative history
makes clear that the transfer of jurisdiction over fishing was
subject to rights reserved in § 4. S.Rep.No.1929, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1950).
Clearly, this section does not protect only "recognized" Indian
rights -- those the taking of which would be compensable by the
United States. Committee reports demonstrate the aim of Congress to
preserve the
status quo as to a broader class of "right,"
including, in the case of land, mere possession or occupancy.
Compensation was an issue Congress took pains to avoid.
See H.R. Rep.No. 1731, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948);
H.R. Rep. No. 255, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949); S. Rep. No.
1028, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 29-30 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1163, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1957). We need not here explore the remoter
reaches of this protection. The Metlakatla Reservation was Indian
property within § 4. Whether or not the "absolute jurisdiction"
retained
Page 369 U. S. 59
by the United States in § 4 is exclusive of state authority,
see Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, post, p.
369 U. S. 60, the
statute clearly preserves federal authority over the reservation.
Federal authority was lodged in the Secretary in 1891, and it was
not dislodged by the Statehood Act.
However, in issuing the present regulations, the Secretary
relied not on the 1891 statute, but on the White Act and the
Statehood Act, neither of which authorized his action. In a letter
to the Solicitor General, filed by the United States as an Appendix
to its brief as
amicus curiae, the Secretary left no doubt
that, in issuing the regulations, he acted under compulsion of what
he conceived to be his duty under the Statehood Act to preserve the
status quo. He deemed himself, as it were, to be a mere
automaton. The exercise of any authority that the Secretary has
under the reservation statute to allow fish traps necessarily
involves his judgment on a complex of facts, his evaluation of the
relative weights of the Indians' need for traps, and of the impact
of traps at Metlakatla on the State's interest in conservation. We
cannot make this determination for him.
The appropriate course is to vacate the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Alaska and remand the case there to be held to give ample
opportunity for the Secretary of the Interior, with all reasonable
expedition, to determine prior to the 1963 salmon fishing season
what, if any, authority he chooses to exercise in light of this
opinion. Should the Secretary fail so to act, the parties may apply
to the Alaska court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
Inc., 322 U. S. 607,
322 U. S.
618-619. The stay granted by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and
continued by the Court will remain in force until the end of the
1962 salmon fishing season, as defined in the regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Interior.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
25 Stat. 1009; 29 Stat. 316 (Treasury Department); 34 Stat. 478,
now 48 U.S.C. §§ 230-239, 241-242 (Commerce Department); 43 Stat.
464, now 48 U.S.C. §§ 221-228 (Commerce Department). The Secretary
of the Interior succeeded to these responsibilities in 1939. 1939
Reorganization Plan No. II, § 4(e), 53 Stat. 1431, 1433.
[
Footnote 2]
72 Stat. 339, 340-341. Alaska adopted a comprehensive fish and
game code April 17, 1959, Alaska Laws 1959, c. 94, and received
full control over her resources soon afterward.
[
Footnote 3]
Letter of Douglas McKay, Secretary of the Interior, to Herbert
C. Bonner, Chairman, House Comm. on Merchant Marine &
Fisheries, Oct. 7, 1955.
[
Footnote 4]
Alaska Laws 1931, pp. 275-276; 1947, pp. 325-326; 1953, pp.
401-402; 1955, pp. 447-448.
[
Footnote 5]
Alaska Laws 1959, c. 17. As amended by
id., c. 95, the
statute reads as follows:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful to operate fish traps,
including but not limited to floating, pile-driven, or hand-driven
fish traps, in the State of Alaska on or over any of its lands,
tidelands, submerged lands, or waters; provided nothing in this
section shall prevent the operation of small hand-driven fish traps
of the type ordinarily used on rivers of Alaska which are otherwise
legally operated in or above the mouth of any stream or river in
Alaska; nor shall this Act be construed so as to violate Sec. 4 of
Public Law 85-508, 72 Stat. 339, which constitutes a compact
between the United States and Alaska, pursuant to which the State
disclaims all right and title to any lands or other property
(including fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held
by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called Natives) or
is held by the United States in trust for said Natives."
[
Footnote 6]
In 1934, when the Metlakatlans were made citizens, Congress
declared that reservations made for them by statute, order, or
proclamation should "continue in full force and effect," 48 Stat.
667.
[
Footnote 7]
Since 1944, Metlakatla has been a chartered federal corporation
under a constitution adopted pursuant to the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48
Stat. 984, 988, as amended, 49 Stat. 1250, 25 U.S.C. §§ 473a, 476,
477.