Under direction of the bankruptcy court, but without objection,
an involuntary bankrupt filed schedules of assets and liabilities
which, standing alone, did not amount to an admission of guilt or
furnish clear proof of crime, and, later in the proceeding, he
declined to answer certain question concerning them on the ground
that to do so might incriminate him.
Held that, by filing
the schedules, he did not waive his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment. P.
254 U. S.
72.
The privilege of the Amendment applies if it cannot be said that
the questions propounded, considered in the light of the
circumstances disclosed, may be answered with entire impunity.
Id.
The provision of § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act that no testimony
given by a bankrupt shall be offered in evidence against him in any
criminal proceeding is not a substitute for the protection of the
Fifth Amendment, since it does not prevent the use of his testimony
to search out other evidence to be used in evidence against him or
his property. P.
254 U. S. 73.
Reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
See also post,
254 U. S. 379.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Holding that the petition failed to disclose adequate grounds
therefor, the court below denied appellant's
Page 254 U. S. 72
application for a writ of habeas corpus, through which he sought
release from confinement for contempt. The cause is here by reason
of the constitutional question involved.
The petition alleges:
That, having been adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, Arndstein
was called before special commissioners for examination under §
21a, Bankruptcy Act. He refused to answer a long list of questions,
claiming that to do so might tend to degrade and incriminate him.
The district judge upheld this contention, and denied a motion to
punish for contempt.
That, subsequent to such examination and under the direction of
the court, the bankrupt filed schedules under oath which purported
to show his assets and liabilities. When interrogated concerning
these, he set up his constitutional privilege, and refused to
answer many questions, which are set out. Thereupon he was
committed to jail.
The writ was refused upon the theory that, by filing schedules
without objection, the bankrupt waived his constitutional
privilege, and could not thereafter refuse to reply when questioned
in respect of them. This view of the law we think is erroneous. The
schedules, standing alone, did not amount to an admission of guilt
or furnish clear proof of crime, and the mere filing of them did
not constitute a waiver of the right to stop short whenever the
bankrupt could fairly claim that to answer might tend to
incriminate him.
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.
S. 591,
161 U. S. 597;
Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266, 274;
People v.
Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 230;
Regina v. Garbett, 2 C.
& K. 474, 495. It is impossible to say from mere consideration
of the questions propounded, in the light of the circumstances
disclosed, that they could have been answered with entire impunity.
The writ should have issued.
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.' Fifth Amendment. 'This provision must
have a broad construction
Page 254 U. S. 73
in favor of the right which it was intended to secure."
"The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime."
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.
S. 547,
142 U. S.
562.
The protection of the Constitution was not removed by the
provision in § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act: "No testimony given by him
shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal
proceeding." "It could not and would not prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence
against him or his property."
Counselman v. Hitchcock, p.
142 U. S.
564.
The judgment below must be reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this cause.
