The court notices judicially that the government of the United
States recognized the government of Carranza as the
de
facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19,
1915, and as the
de jure government on August 31,
1917.
Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their
terms and international character, do not apply to a civil war, and
that the regulations
Page 246 U. S. 298
annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military
seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this
case.
The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative -- the political --
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.
Who is the sovereign
de jure or
de facto of a
foreign territory is a political question the determination of
which by the political departments of the government conclusively
binds the judges.
When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is
recognized by the political department of our government as the
de jure government of the country in which it is
established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and
validates all the actions and conduct of the government so
recognized from the commencement of its existence.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as
applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within
the custody of a court as to claims for damages based upon acts
done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest
considerations of international comity and expediency.
In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting
independent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of
the Carranza government, which had then made much progress in its
revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in
enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed
by a citizen of Mexico.
Held that the act could not be
reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.
87 N.J.L. 552, 704, affirmed.
This cases are stated in the opinion.
Page 246 U. S. 299
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases, involving the same question, were argued and
will be decided together. They are suits in replevin, and involve
the title to two large consignments of hides which the plaintiff in
error claims to own as assignee of Martinez & Co., a
partnership engaged in business in the City of Torreon, Mexico, but
which the defendant in error claims to own by purchase from the
Finnegan-Brown Company, a Texas corporation which it is alleged
purchased the hides in Mexico from General Francisco Villa on
January 3, 1914.
The cases were commenced in a circuit court of New Jersey in
which judgments were rendered for the defendants, which were
affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, and they are brought
to this Court on the theory that the claim of title to the hides by
the defendant in error is invalid because based upon a purchase
from General Villa, who, it is urged, confiscated them contrary to
the provisions of the Hague convention of 1907 respecting the laws
and customs of war on land, that the judgment of the state court
denied to the plaintiff in error this right which he "set up and
claimed" under the Hague Convention or treaty, and that this denial
gives him the right of review in this Court.
A somewhat detailed description will be necessary of the
political conditions in Mexico prior to and at the time of the
seizure of the property in controversy by the military authorities.
It appears in the record, and is a matter of general history, that,
on February 23, 1913, Madero, President of the Republic of Mexico,
was assassinated; that immediately thereafter, General Huerta
declared himself Provisional President of the Republic
Page 246 U. S. 300
and took the oath of office as such; that, on the 26th day of
March following, General Carranza, who was then Governor of the
State of Coahuila, inaugurated a revolution against the claimed
authority of Huerta, and, in a "Manifesto Addressed to the Mexican
Nation," proclaimed the organization of a constitutional government
under "the plan of Guadalupe," and that civil war was at once
entered upon between the followers and forces of the two leaders.
When General Carranza assumed the leadership of what were called
the Constitutionalist forces, he commissioned General Villa his
representative, as "Commander of the North," and assigned him to an
independent command in that part of the country. Such progress was
made by the Carranza forces that, in the autumn of 1913, they were
in military possession, as the record shows, of approximately
two-thirds of the area of the entire country, with the exception of
a few scattered towns and cities, and after a battle lasting
several days, the City of Torreon in the State of Coahuila was
captured by General Villa on October 1 of that year. Immediately
after the capture of Torreon, Villa proposed levying a military
contribution on the inhabitants for the support of his army, and
thereupon influential citizens, preferring to provide the required
money by an assessment upon the community to having their property
forcibly seized, called together a largely attended meeting and,
after negotiations with General Villa as to the amount to be paid,
an assessment was made on the men of property of the city, which
was in large part promptly paid. Martinez, the owner from whom the
plaintiff in error claims title to the property involved in this
case, was a wealthy resident of Torreon, and was a dealer in hides
in a large way. Being an adherent of Huerta, when Torreon was
captured, Martinez fled the city and failed to pay the assessment
imposed upon him, and it was to satisfy this assessment that, by
order of General Villa, the hides in controversy
Page 246 U. S. 301
were seized, and on January 3, 1914, were sold in Mexico to the
Finnegan-Brown Company. They were paid for in Mexico, and were
thereafter shipped into the United States and were replevied, as
stated.
This Court will take judicial notice of the fact that, since the
transactions thus detailed and since the trial of this case in the
lower courts, the government of the United States recognized the
government of Carranza as the
de facto government of the
Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the
de jure
government on August 31, 1917.
Jones v. United States,
137 U. S. 202;
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250.
On this state of fact, the plaintiff in error argues that the
"Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting
Laws and Customs of War on Land" constitute a treaty between the
United States and Mexico; that these "Regulations" forbid such
seizure and sale of property as we are considering in this case,
and that therefore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale
made by General Villa, and the property may be recovered by the
Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this country.
It would perhaps be sufficient answer to this contention to say
that the Hague Conventions are international in character, designed
and adapted to regulate international warfare, and that they do
not, in terms or in purpose, apply to a civil war. Were it
otherwise, however, it might be effectively argued that the
declaration relied upon that "private property cannot be
confiscated" contained in Article 46 of the Regulations does not
have the scope claimed for it, since Article 49 provides that
"money contributions . . . for the needs of the army" may be levied
upon on occupied territory, and Article 52 provides that
"requisitions in kind and services may be demanded for the needs of
the army of occupation," and that contributions in kind shall, as
far as possible, be
Page 246 U. S. 302
paid for in cash, and, when not so paid for, a receipt shall be
given and payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as
possible. And also for the reason that the "Convention" to which
the "Regulations" are annexed, recognizing the incomplete character
of the results arrived at, expressly provides that, until a more
complete code is agreed upon, cases not provided for in the
"Regulations" shall be governed by the principles of the law of
nations.
But, since claims similar to the one before us are being made in
many cases in this and in other courts, we prefer to place our
decision upon the application of three clearly settled principles
of law to the facts of this case as we have stated them.
The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative --
"the political" -- departments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
United
States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610;
Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253,
27 U. S. 307,
27 U. S. 309;
Garcia v. Lee,
12 Pet. 511,
37 U. S. 517,
37 U. S. 520;
Williams v. Suffolk Ins.
Co., 13 Pet. 415,
38 U. S. 420;
In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472,
143 U. S. 499.
It has been specifically decided that:
"Who is the sovereign,
de jure or
de facto, of
a territory is not a judicial, but is a political, question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all
other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This
principle has always been upheld by this Court, and has been
affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."
Jones v. United States, 137 U.
S. 202,
137 U. S.
212.
It is also the result of the interpretation by this Court of the
principles of international law that, when a government which
originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political
department of our government as the
de
Page 246 U. S. 303
jure government of the country in which it is
established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and
validates all the actions and conduct of the government so
recognized from the commencement of its existence.
Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176,
96 U. S. 186;
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250,
168 U. S. 253.
See s.c., 65 F. 577.
To these principles we must add that:
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be available of by
sovereign powers as between themselves."
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.
S. 250,
168 U. S. 252;
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.
S. 347.
Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a
duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted as
the legitimate government of Mexico, in the progress of a
revolution, and when conducting active independent operations,
seizing and selling in Mexico, as a military contribution, the
property in controversy at the time owned and in the possession of
a citizen of Mexico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error.
Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican
government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we have
seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this
Court such action, is not subject to reexamination and modification
by the courts of this country.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as
applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within
the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be
to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon
acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the
highest
Page 246 U. S. 304
considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit
the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly
"imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the
peace of nations."
It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court did,
the validity of the levy of the contribution made by the Mexican
commanding general under rules of international law applicable to
the situation, since the subject is not open to reexamination by
this or any other American court.
The remedy of the former owner, or of the purchaser from him, of
the property in controversy, if either has any remedy, must be
found in the courts of Mexico or through the diplomatic agencies of
the political department of our government. The judgments of the
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey must be
Affirmed.